Handbook

Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion. State Disciplinary Board September 20, 1968 Amended by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board March 1993 Propriety of an attorney permitting the use of his or her letterhead stationery by a retainer client who is writing as a creditor or as a collection agency seeking to collect an account or debt from the recipient.The question submitted is actually in five differing forms, but each question involves certain ingredients which result in the advisory opinion being the same as to each. DR 3-101(a) provides: \"A lawyer shall not aid a non lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\"See also Standard 24. It may well be that under this rule the varying factual situations may be productive or varying conclusions. The determination of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia is a matter of statutory interpretation, O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50 et.seq., and this opinion is not based on either the above standard or statutes.Standard 4 requires that \"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation.\"In light of these admonitions, it is professionally improper for a lawyer to furnish his or her letterhead to a client for the purpose stated. A lawyer is an officer of the court. As such, the lawyer assumes certain responsibilities, is under certain obligations and the lawyer's conduct is subject to certain restrictions and limitations. The lawyer is obligated to uphold the honor and dignity of the profession. See EC 9-6. The lawyer's participation in conduct contemplated purely and simply to deceive is incompatible with those responsibilities and obligations.In addition, a lawyer has been given certain privileges by the State. Because of these privileges, letters of the character stated in the question purporting to be written by lawyers have a greater weight than those written by laymen. It is obvious that the sole reason for the practice is to give the letter the weight that lawyers alone can contribute. That end can be gained only through the deception which is manifestly out of harmony with the Code of Professional Responsibility. See EC 3-3. The lawyer cannot, therefore, delegate to a nonlawyer.The practice described is violative of both the letter and the spirit of the ethical canons and constitutes unethical practice.","UrlName":"rule492","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2168028f-f1d0-4bc9-af01-a5b617a0655f","Title":"Internal Rules - Formal Advisory Opinion Board","Content":" FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD INTERNAL OPERATING RULES OF PROCEDURE \n(As Amended on April 25, 2023) \n \nRule 1. Meetings \n \n(a) The Chair or Vice-chair of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (\"Board \") shall determine when and where the meetings of the Board shall occur. \n(b) The Chair shall preside over all meetings of the Board and shall serve until a successor is elected (see Rule 12 below). \n(c) All Board business, including voting on opinions, may be conducted by telephone, e-mail, or other electronic communication device. \n(d) Board members may attend meetings by telephone or other electronic communication device. \n(e) In case of the absence, incapacity, or disqualification of the Chair, the Vice-chair shall assume the duties and powers of the Chair.  If both the Chair and Vice-chair are absent or incapacitated, or disqualified from consideration of a matter while a meeting is in session, the remaining members of the Board shall vote upon a member to preside over the meeting or the consideration of the matter at issue. \n \nRule 2. Quorum Requirement \n \nA majority of the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum. \n \n Rule 2A. Voting Requirements \n \n(a) Regular Business - Subject to sub-paragraph (b) below, a majority of the members of the Board present and voting shall be required to transact the business of the Board. \n(b) Publication under Bar Rule 4-403 (d) - The affirmative vote of not less than five (5) members of the Board shall be required in order to submit opinions for second publication under Bar Rule 4-403 (d). \n \nRule 3. Preliminary Determination of Whether Opinion Should Be Drafted \n \nWhen the Office of the General Counsel receives a request for a Formal Advisory Opinion, the request shall be forwarded to each member of the Board and placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Board for preliminary determination of whether a proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. \n \nRule 4. Assignment of Research and Drafting to Board Members \n \nThe Chair of the Board shall have complete discretion in assigning requests for Formal Advisory Opinions to members of the Board for researching and drafting proposed opinions. The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia will provide staff assistance in researching and drafting opinions upon request by the Board members assigned to draft a proposed opinion. \n \nRule 5. Comments \n \n(a) Any comment to a proposed Formal Advisory Opinion filed pursuant to Rule 4-403 (c) shall be filed with the Board through the Office of the General Counsel within thirty (30) days of the date that the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia. \n(b) There shall be filed a minimum number of one copy of any comment pursuant to Rule 4-403 (c) in order for the comment to be considered by the Board. \n(c) A copy of the petition for discretionary review filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-403 (d) must be simultaneously served upon the Board through the Office of the General Counsel. \n(d) Any comment submitted to the Board pursuant to Rule 4-403 (c) is for the Board's internal use in assessing proposed opinions and shall not be released unless the comment has been submitted to the Supreme Court of Georgia in compliance with Bar Rule 4-403 (d). \n \nRule 6. Operating Guidelines \n \n(a) Upon receipt of a request for a Formal Advisory Opinion, the Office of the General Counsel will assign a file number to the request. \n(b) The Office of the General Counsel will transmit the request to the Board. \n(c) The request will be placed on the agenda of the next Board meeting. The Board should make a determination at the meeting as to whether a formal opinion will be drafted. \n(d) At the same meeting, or immediately thereafter, the Board will assign the request to a Board member for the drafting of a proposed opinion. \n(e) The draft opinion should be prepared and transmitted by the drafter to the members of the Board at least one week prior to the next scheduled meeting of the Board. Address labels will be supplied by the Office of the General Counsel for this purpose. \n(f) At the option of the drafter, the draft opinion will be distributed by the Office of the General Counsel at least ten (10) days prior to the next scheduled meeting of the Board. \n(g) At the meeting, the Board will adopt, reject, or revise the opinion. \n(h) Upon adoption, the opinion will be edited for style and published for comment as provided in Bar Rule 4-403 (c). \n(i) As long as the Board complies with Bar Rules, it may take any action it deems necessary to insure that the opinions continue to provide an accurate interpretation of the Bar's ethical rules. \n \nRule 7. Confidentiality \n \n(a) The name of the lawyer making the request will be held confidential unless the lawyer otherwise elects as provided in Bar Rule 4-403 (g). \n(b) The name of the Board member who has been assigned to draft a proposed opinion will be held confidential unless the Board otherwise elects by majority vote. \n(c) All inquiries regarding Formal Advisory Opinions being considered by the Board should be forwarded to the Chair or Vice Chair. \n \nRule 8. E-Mail Voting Procedure \n \nIt is best that the Board meets and holds live discussions as often as possible. However, the Board, in its discretion, may discuss and vote on matters regarding formal advisory opinions by e-mail, rather than at a meeting of the Board. Matters shall be provided to each member of the Board by e-mail, along with a message directing the Board to participate in a discussion by e-mail. The Board Chair determines when the discussion period will end and call for a vote on the matter. At any time, however, any Board member has \"veto power,\"which allows him or her to call for a \"live discussion.\" \n \nRule 9. Presentations to the Board \n \nPresentations to the Board shall be in writing unless oral presentation is permitted in specific cases by the Board. \n \nRule 10. Attendance at Board Meetings \n \nOnly Board members and Office of the General Counsel staff shall be permitted to attend a Formal Advisory Opinion Board meeting during the deliberations of the Board. \n \nRule 11. Contact with the Press \n \nBoard members may be contacted by members of the press regarding opinions and other Board matters. If contacted, Board members must refrain from communicating with the press and immediately contact the Director of the State Bar's Communications Department at 404-527-8761. In compliance with State Bar policy, all inquiries from the press go through the Communications Department to be routed to the appropriate person.\n Rule 12.  Election of Board Officers\n (a) Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-402 (d), the Board will annually elect a Chair and Vice-chair at the first meeting of the Board after July 1 of each year.  At that meeting, the election of the Chair will take place before the election of the Vice-chair.  \n(b) Any Board member may nominate themselves to serve as Chair or Vice-chair. \n(c) The newly elected Chair and Vice-chair term of office will begin at the adjournment of the meeting at which they were elected. \n<div></div>","UrlName":"part10","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"6e17c812-cd79-45f4-a404-f95b8e7c29b9","Title":"Rule 4-401. Informal Advisory Opinions","Content":"The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to render Informal Advisory Opinions concerning the Office of the General Counsel's interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Informal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may be issued in oral or written form. An Informal Advisory Opinion is the personal opinion of the issuing attorney of the Office of the General Counsel and is neither a defense to any complaint nor binding on the State Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court of Georgia, or the State Bar of Georgia. If the person requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion desires, the Office of the General Counsel will transmit the Informal Advisory Opinion to the Formal Advisory Opinion Board for discretionary consideration of the drafting of a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.","UrlName":"rule241","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9352c34c-e065-400d-b993-906e86f9970a","Title":"Rule 4-301","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule218","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Rule 4-201. State Disciplinary Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The powers to investigate and discipline lawyers for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors; two nonlawyer members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; and two nonlawyer members appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors. The Court and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Board. No State Disciplinary Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors, whichever appointed the member whose term has expired.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant. </li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work investigating cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule63","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"07f753ca-7fed-4fb2-a326-4be45d9389ca","ParentId":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The powers to investigate and discipline members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct set forth in Bar Rule 4-102 are hereby vested in a State Disciplinary Board and a Consumer Assistance Program. The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of two panels. The first panel shall be the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Investigative Panel). The second panel shall be the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Review Panel). The Consumer Assistance Program shall operate as described in Part XII of these Rules. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Investigative Panel shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the President with the approval of the Board of Governors, and six public members appointed by the Supreme Court to serve as public members of the Panel.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> All members shall be appointed for three-year terms subject to the following exceptions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed;</li> \n <li>ex-officio members shall serve during the term of their office; and shall not increase the quorum requirement; and</li> \n <li>certain initial members as set forth in paragraph (2) below.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>It shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third (1/3) of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually.</li> \n <li>A member may be removed from the Panel pursuant to procedures set by the Panel for failure to attend regular meetings of the Panel. The vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the current President of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel shall annually elect a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, or a vice-chairperson for any subcommittee for which the chairperson is not a member to serve as chairperson for that subcommittee, and such other officers as it may deem proper. The Panel shall meet in its entirety in July of each year to elect a chairperson. At any time the Panel may decide to divide itself into subcommittees or to consolidate after having divided. A majority shall constitute a quorum and a majority of a quorum shall be authorized to act. However, in any matter in which one or more Investigative Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the matter.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel is authorized to organize itself into as many subcommittees as the Panel deems necessary to conduct the expeditious investigation of disciplinary matters referred to it by the Office of General Counsel. However, no subcommittee shall consist of fewer than seven (7) members of the Panel and each such subcommittee shall include at least one (1) of the public members.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The Review Panel shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President, nine (9) members of the State Bar, three (3) from each of the three (3) federal judicial districts of the State appointed as described below, and four (4) public members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The nine (9) members of the Bar from the federal judicial districts shall be appointed for three (3) year terms so that the term of one Panel member from each district will expire each year. The three (3) vacant positions will be filled in odd years by appointment by the President, with the approval of the Board of Governors, and in even years by appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Panel members serving at the time this Rule goes into effect shall continue to serve until their respective terms expire. New Panel members shall be appointed as set forth above.</li> \n <li>Any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed.</li> \n <li>Ex-officio members shall serve during the term or terms of their offices and shall not increase the quorum requirement.</li> \n <li>The Review Panel shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper in July of each year. The presence of six (6) members of the Panel shall constitute a quorum. Four (4) members of the Panel shall be authorized to act except that a recommendation of the Review Panel to suspend or disbar shall require the affirmative vote of at least six (6) members of the Review Panel, with not more than four (4) negative votes. However, in any case in which one or more Review Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum and the number of members necessary to vote affirmatively for disbarment or suspension, shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the case. No recommendation of disbarment or suspension may be made by fewer than four (4) affirmative votes. For the purposes of this Rule the recusal of a member shall have the same effect as disqualification.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision102"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c083cea2-60f5-4f66-8277-3ce6f50cff7e","Title":"Rule 4-101. Enforcement of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia is hereby authorized to maintain and enforce, as set forth in rules hereinafter stated, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in the state of Georgia and to institute disciplinary action in the event of the violation thereof.","UrlName":"rule87","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Title":"CHAPTER 1 GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND ENFORCEMENT THEREOF","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter13","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"c083cea2-60f5-4f66-8277-3ce6f50cff7e","Title":"Rule 4-101. Enforcement of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia is hereby authorized to maintain and enforce, as set forth in rules hereinafter stated, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in the state of Georgia and to institute disciplinary action in the event of the violation thereof.","UrlName":"rule87","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Rule 4-102. Disciplinary Action; Levels of Discipline; Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Public Reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Public Reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand but less than suspension. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Review Board at a meeting of the State Disciplinary Review Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Confidential Reprimand but less than a Public Reprimand. This level of discipline includes publication on the official State Bar of Georgia website as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Confidential Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Confidential Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Board at a meeting of the Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Formal Letter of Admonition but less than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Letter of Admonition: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Formal Letter of Admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Bar Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Board pursuant to the provisions of Bar Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Definitions and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n1.18                                  Duties to Prospective Client \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"rule89","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"fcbf296b-3b7c-44ee-beae-70f2bc53cab4","ParentId":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline removing the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline which removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a public reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A public reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a review panel reprimand but less than suspension.</li> \n <li>Review Panel Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Review Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Review Panel at a meeting of the Review Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than an investigative panel reprimand but less than a public reprimand.</li> \n <li>Investigative Panel Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. An Investigative Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Investigative Panel at a meeting of the Investigative Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a formal admonition but less than a review panel reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Admonition: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A formal admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the Court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Investigative Panel pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"revision46"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7daabdf1-451a-49d1-9f0f-ad03812aabe1","Title":"Contents","Content":" Rules: Client-Lawyer Relationship \n \n1.0 Terminology and Definitions \n1.1 Competence \n1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3 Diligence \n1.4 Communication \n1.5 Fees \n1.6 Confidentiality of Information \n1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12 Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13 Organization as Client \n1.14 Client under a Disability \n1.15(I) Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II) Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III) Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17 Sale of Law Practice \n1.18 Duties to Prospective Client \n \nCounselor \n \n2.1 Advisor \n2.2 (This rule is reserved.) \n2.3 Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n \nAdvocate \n \n3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions \n3.2 Expediting Litigation \n3.3 Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6 Trial Publicity \n3.7 Lawyer as Witness \n3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9 Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \nTransactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n \n4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \nLaw Firms and Associations \n \n5.1 Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyers \n5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5 Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6 Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7 Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \nPublic Service \n \n6.1 Voluntary Pro Bono Public Service \n6.2 Accepting Appointments \n6.3 Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4 Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n6.5 Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs\n Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services \n7.2 Advertising \n7.3 Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads \n \nMaintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2 Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4 Misconduct \n8.5 Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \nMiscellaneous \n \n9.1 Reporting Requirements \n9.2 Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3 Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4 Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5 Lawyer as a Public Official","UrlName":"rule70","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3254fea5-c24d-461b-8a15-5530a31eed26","Title":"PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES","Content":" [1] A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. \n \n[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. \n \n[3] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the these rules or other law. \n \n[4] A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the law, the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. \n \n[5] As a citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest. \n \n[6] A lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as by substantive and procedural law. A lawyer also is guided by conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service. \n \n[7] Reserved. \n \n[8] In the nature of law practice conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict among a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these rules, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules. \n \n[9] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested in the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n[10] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice. \n \n[11] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves. \n \n[12] The fulfillment of a lawyer's professional responsibility role requires an understanding by them of their relationship to our legal system. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.","UrlName":"rule74","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9afa4c06-904a-4b16-94e0-40aa21e2a658","Title":"SCOPE","Content":" [13] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the rules are imperatives, cast in the terms \"shall \"or \"shall not.\"These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the terms \"may \"or \"should,\"are permissive or aspirational and define areas under the rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. Disciplinary action shall not be taken when the lawyer's conduct falls within the bounds of such discretion. The rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly aspirational and descriptive. Together they define a lawyer's professional role. Comments do not add obligations to or expand the rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the rules. \n \n[14] The rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. Compliance with the rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. \n \n[15] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Bar Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, that may attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship will be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose depends on the circumstances and may be a question of fact. \n \n[16] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government entity may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized by law to represent several government entities in intergovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. They also may have authority to represent the \"public interest \"in circumstances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to do so. These rules do not abrogate any such authority. \n \n[17] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations. \n \n[18] The purpose of these rules is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. These rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the rule. Accordingly, nothing in the rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty. \n \n[19] Moreover, these rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege. In reliance on the attorney-client privilege, clients are entitled to expect that communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected against compelled disclosure. The attorney-client privilege is that of the client and not of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in accordance with recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and work product privileges. \n \n[20]Reserved. \n \n[21] The comment accompanying each rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the rule. The preamble and this note on scope provide general orientation. The comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative.","UrlName":"rule220","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"RULE 1.0. TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li>“Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct against a lawyer filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel and containing the name and signature of the complainant or initiated pursuant to Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law. \n(bb) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(cc) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(dd) “Willfull blindness” denotes awareness of a high probability that a fact exists and deliberate action to avoid learning of the fact. \n(ee) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"rule223","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0915bda9-a785-4194-b214-12b0666b9fa8","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n <li>“Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.</li> \n <li>“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.</li> \n <li>“Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.</li> \n </ol> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision294"},{"Id":"06d293c8-0303-4a5f-bb02-1426dc98b877","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 5","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li>“Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct against a lawyer filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel and containing the name and signature of the complainant or initiated pursuant to Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law. \n(bb) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(cc) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(dd) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision409"},{"Id":"bc1a4859-b8c4-4f17-8fff-17f572ee7964","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 4","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(bb) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(cc) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision389"},{"Id":"5286835f-4415-448b-ac8d-6169d3cf48a3","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer. </li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n <li>“Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.</li> \n <li>“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.</li> \n <li>“Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and e-mail. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.</li> \n </ol> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision282"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f20144b-7054-4d80-84ac-f1211b551489","Title":"RULE 1.1 COMPETENCE","Content":" A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer's level of competence without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in question. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLegal Knowledge and Skill \n \n[1A] The purpose of these rules is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. These rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. \n \n[1B] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances. \n \n[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. \n \n[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest. \n \n[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person subject to Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. \n \nThoroughness and Preparation \n \n[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more elaborate treatment than matters of lesser consequence. \n \nMaintaining Competence \n \n[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should engage in continuing study and education.","UrlName":"rule79","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4d1f67c8-77b9-4b06-a0b8-59b68ffa64f7","Title":"RULE 1.2 SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION AND ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.</li> \n <li>A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not either knowingly or with willful blindness counsel a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct, nor knowingly or with willful blindness assist a client in such conduct. However, a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nAllocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4 (a) (1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4 (a) (2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. \n \n[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16 (b) (4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16 (a) (3). \n \n[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time. \n \n[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering from diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14. \n \nIndependence from Client's Views or Activities \n \n[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities. \n \nAgreements Limiting Scope of Representation \n \n[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. \n \n[7] Although this rule affords the lawyer and the client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1. \n \n[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6. \n \nCriminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions \n \n[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. \n \n[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16 (a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1. \n \n[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary. \n \n[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities. \n \n[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4 (a) (5). </div>","UrlName":"rule50","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9d080d94-78a4-498b-8c17-e968e402cca0","ParentId":"4d1f67c8-77b9-4b06-a0b8-59b68ffa64f7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.</li> \n <li>A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, nor knowingly assist a client in such conduct, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.</li> \n</ol>\n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nAllocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. \n \n[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3). \n \n[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time. \n \n[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering from diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14. \n \nIndependence from Client's Views or Activities \n \n[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities. \n \nAgreements Limiting Scope of Representation \n \n[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. \n \n[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and the client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1. \n \n[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6. \n \nCriminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions \n \n[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. \n \n[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1. \n \n[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary. \n \n[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent voidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities. \n \n[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4(a)(5).","UrlName":"revision48"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0358fab6-2af3-4ea0-b55a-18edc0e83daa","Title":"RULE 1.3 DILIGENCE","Content":"A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.\n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyers duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect. \n  \n[2] A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently. \n \n[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable competence, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client. \n \n[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will serve on a continuing basis. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client but has not been specifically instructed concerning pursuit of an appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter.","UrlName":"rule52","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"39dbb7f3-4d74-4e12-aff1-04eb83ad420b","Title":"RULE 1.4. COMMUNICATION.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), is required by these rules;</li> \n <li>reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;</li> \n <li>keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;</li> \n <li>promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and</li> \n <li>consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation. \n \nCommunicating with Client \n \n[2] If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a) (1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's informed consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2 (a). \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a) (3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation. \n \n[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) (4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. A lawyer should promptly respond to or acknowledge client communications. The timeliness of a lawyer's communication must be judged by all the controlling factors. \"Prompt \"communication with the client does not equate to \"instant \"communication with the client and is sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n \nExplaining Matters \n \n[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, where there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h). \n \n[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. \n \nWithholding Information \n \n[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. </div>","UrlName":"rule54","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"4e5b8c7d-ef0e-41cb-93de-002aca41399f","ParentId":"39dbb7f3-4d74-4e12-aff1-04eb83ad420b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h), is required by these rules;</li> \n <li>reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;</li> \n <li>keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;</li> \n <li>promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and</li> \n <li>consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation. \n \nCommunicating with Client \n \n[2] If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a) (1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's informed consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2 (a). \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a) (3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation. \n \n[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) (4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. Client telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged. The timeliness of a lawyer's communication must be judged by all the controlling factors. \"Prompt \"communication with the client does not equate to \"instant \"communication with the client and is sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n \nExplaining Matters \n \n[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, where there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h). \n \n[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. \n \nWithholding Information \n \n[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. </div>","UrlName":"revision280"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d966e74f-47a5-4d8a-aeb5-236af01deab4","Title":"RULE 1.5 FEES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;</li> \n <li>the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;</li> \n <li>the amount involved and the results obtained;</li> \n <li>the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;</li> \n <li>the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;</li> \n <li>the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and</li> \n <li>whether the fee is fixed or contingent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client. \n To the extent that agreements to arbitrate disputes over fees or expenses are enforceable, a lawyer may enter into such an agreement with a client or prospective client if the client or prospective client gives informed consent in writing signed by the client or prospective client. The agreement to arbitrate and the attorney's disclosures regarding arbitration must be set out in a separate paragraph, written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract, and separately initialed by the client and the lawyer. </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.</li> \n <li> Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the outcome of the matter; and,</li> \n <li> if there is a recovery showing:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>the remittance to the client;</li> \n <li>the method of its determination;</li> \n <li>the amount of the attorney fee; and</li> \n <li>if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or</li> \n <li>a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;</li> \n <li>the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and</li> \n <li>the total fee is reasonable.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n  \n Comment \n \nReasonableness of Fee and Expenses \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer. \n \n[1A] A fee can also be unreasonable if it is illegal. Examples of illegal fees are those taken without required court approval, those that exceed the amount allowed by court order or statute, or those where acceptance of the fee would be unlawful, e.g., accepting controlled substances or sexual favors as payment. \n \nBasis or Rate of Fee \n \n[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth. \n \n[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. \n \nTerms of Payment \n \n[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16 (d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8 (j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8 (a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client. \n \n[5] An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. \n [5A] Paragraph (b) requires informed consent to an agreement to arbitrate disputes over fees and expenses. See Rule 1.0 (l). In obtaining such informed consent, the lawyer should reveal to the client or prospective client the following: (1) in an arbitration, the client or prospective client waives the right to a jury trial because the dispute will be resolved by an individual arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators; (2) generally, there is no right to an appeal from an arbitration decision; (3) arbitration may not permit the broad discovery that would be available in civil litigation; (4) how the costs of arbitration compared to the costs of litigation in a public court, including the requirement that the arbitrator or arbitrators be compensated; and (5) who will bear the cost of arbitration. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client regarding the existence and operation of the State Bar of Georgia's Fee Arbitration Program, regardless of whether the attorney seeks agreement to submit any future fee disputes to that program. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute over fees and expenses is not a waiver of the right to make a disciplinary complaint regarding the lawyer. \n \nProhibited Contingent Fees \n \n[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns. See Formal Advisory Opinions 36 and 47. \n \nDivision of Fee \n \n[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation. \n \n[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. \n \nDisputes over Fees \n \n[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the State Bar of Georgia, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure. </div>","UrlName":"rule55","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2129b43c-aa41-4262-a297-c2073d93a652","ParentId":"d966e74f-47a5-4d8a-aeb5-236af01deab4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;</li> \n <li>the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;</li> \n <li>the amount involved and the results obtained;</li> \n <li>the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;</li> \n <li>the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;</li> \n <li>the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and</li> \n <li>whether the fee is fixed or contingent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.</li> \n <li> Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the outcome of the matter; and,</li> \n <li> if there is a recovery showing:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>the remittance to the client;</li> \n <li>the method of its determination;</li> \n <li>the amount of the attorney fee; and</li> \n <li>if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or</li> \n <li>a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;</li> \n <li>the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and</li> \n <li>the total fee is reasonable.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n  \n \n Comment \n \nReasonableness of Fee and Expenses \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer. \n \n[1A] A fee can also be unreasonable if it is illegal. Examples of illegal fees are those taken without required court approval, those that exceed the amount allowed by court order or statute, or those where acceptance of the fee would be unlawful, e.g., accepting controlled substances or sexual favors as payment. \n \nBasis or Rate of Fee \n \n[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth. \n \n[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. \n \nTerms of Payment \n \n[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client. \n \n[5] An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. \n \nProhibited Contingent Fees \n \n[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns. See Formal Advisory Opinions 36 and 47. \n \nDivision of Fee \n \n[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation. \n \n[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. \n \nDisputes over Fees \n \n[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure. </div>","UrlName":"revision50"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bb7b9ba2-53ef-45ae-a307-e637e4a49b9b","Title":"RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;</li> \n <li>to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by subparagraph (i) above;</li> \n <li>to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules.</li> \n <li>to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer's change of employment or changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In a situation described in paragraph (b) (1), if the client has acted at the time the lawyer learns of the threat of harm or loss to a victim, use or disclosure is permissible only if the harm or loss has not yet occurred.</li> \n <li>Before using or disclosing information pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (i) or (ii), if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duty of confidentiality shall continue after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. See Rule 1.18. \n \n[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance. \n \n[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. \n \n[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. \n \n[4A] RESERVED \n \n[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. Rule 1.6 applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information gained in the professional relationship, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope. The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the client's policy goals. \n \nAuthorized Disclosure \n \n[6] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. \n \n[7] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. \n \n[7A] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized paragraph (b) (1) (iv) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n \nDisclosure Adverse to Client \n \n[8] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. \n \n[9] Several situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3 (a) (4) not to use false evidence. \n \n[10] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2 (d), because to \"knowingly assist \"criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. \n \n[11] Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal and likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b) (1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent death or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes will occur. It is very difficult for a lawyer to \"know \"when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. \n \n[12] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b) (1) does not violate this rule. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[13] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a) (1). \n \n[14] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8 (b) nor Rule 1.16 (d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. \n \n[15] Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b). \n \nDispute Concerning a Lawyer's Conduct \n \n[16] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b) (1) (iii) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n \n[17] If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b) (1) (iii) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure. \nDetection of Conflicts of Interest \n[18] Paragraph (b) (1) (v) recognizes that lawyers in different firms may need to disclose limited information to each other to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, such as when a lawyer is considering an association with another firm, two or more firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering the purchase of a law practice. See Rule 1.17, Comment [6]. Under these circumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to disclose limited information, but only once substantive discussions regarding the new relationship have occurred. Any such disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the persons and entities involved in a matter, a brief summary of the general issues involved, and information about whether the matter has terminated. Even this limited information, however, should be disclosed only to the extent reasonably necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interests that might arise from the possible new relationship. Moreover, the disclosure of any information is prohibited if it would compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client (e.g., the fact that a corporate client is seeking advice on a corporate takeover that has not been publicly announced; that a person has consulted a lawyer about the possibility of divorce before the person’s intentions are known to the person’s spouse; or that a person has consulted a lawyer about a criminal investigation that has not led to a public charge). Under those circumstances, paragraph (a) prohibits disclosure unless the client or former client gives informed consent. A lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the lawyer’s firm may also govern a lawyer’s conduct when exploring an association with another firm and is beyond the scope of these rules. \n[19] Any information disclosed pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (v) may be used or further disclosed only to the extent necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest. Paragraph (b) (1) (v) does not restrict the use of information acquired by means independent of any disclosure pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (v). Paragraph (b) (1) (v) also does not affect the disclosure of information within a law firm when the disclosure is otherwise authorized, see Comment [7], such as when a lawyer in a firm discloses information to another lawyer in the same firm to detect and resolve conflicts of interest that could arise in connection with undertaking a new representation. \nDisclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized \n [20] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client. \n \n[21] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession. \n[22] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n[23] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client’s representation to accomplish the purposes specified. In exercising the discretion conferred by this rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer’s own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer’s decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other rules. Some rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2 (d), 4.1 (b), and 8.1. Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this rule. See Rule 3.3 (b). \nActing Competently to Preserve Confidentiality \n[24] A lawyer should make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information covered by this Rule.  A lawyer should make reasonable efforts to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use). Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of these rules. \n[25] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer should take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to comply with other laws, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these rules.</div>","UrlName":"rule57","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"963c68dc-cfa0-459e-8cc3-b2b5f08dc416","ParentId":"bb7b9ba2-53ef-45ae-a307-e637e4a49b9b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;</li> \n <li>to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by subparagraph (i) above;</li> \n <li>to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In a situation described in paragraph (b) (1), if the client has acted at the time the lawyer learns of the threat of harm or loss to a victim, use or disclosure is permissible only if the harm or loss has not yet occurred.</li> \n <li>Before using or disclosing information pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (i) or (ii), if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The lawyer may, where the law does not otherwise require, reveal information to which the duty of confidentiality does not apply under paragraph (b) without being subjected to disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>The lawyer shall reveal information under paragraph (b) as the applicable law requires.</li> \n <li>The duty of confidentiality shall continue after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. \n \n[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance. \n \n[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. \n \n[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. \n \n[4A] Information gained in the professional relationship includes information gained from a person (prospective client) who discusses the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, the restrictions and exceptions of these rules as to use or revelation of the information apply, e.g. Rules 1.9 and 1.10. \n \n[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. Rule 1.6 applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information gained in the professional relationship, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope. The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the client's policy goals. \n \nAuthorized Disclosure \n \n[6] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. \n \n[7] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. \n \n[7A] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized paragraph (b) (1) (iv) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n \nDisclosure Adverse to Client \n \n[8] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. \n \n[9] Several situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3 (a) (4) not to use false evidence. \n \n[10] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2 (d), because to \"knowingly assist \"criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. \n \n[11] Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal and likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b) (1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent death or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes will occur. It is very difficult for a lawyer to \"know \"when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. \n \n[12] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b) (1) does not violate this rule. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[13] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a) (1). \n \n[14] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8 (b) nor Rule 1.16 (d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. \n \n[15] Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b). \n \nDispute Concerning a Lawyer's Conduct \n \n[16] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b) (1) (iii) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n \n[17] If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b) (1) (iii) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure. \n \nDisclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized \n \n[18] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client. \n \n[19] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession. </div>","UrlName":"revision321"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"179833f9-065d-4c1f-80c1-792594c90dac","Title":"RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).</li> \n <li> If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation after:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0 (c);</li> \n <li>having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation, and</li> \n <li>having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>is prohibited by law or these rules;</li> \n <li>includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or</li> \n <li>involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Though otherwise subject to the provisions of this rule, a part-time prosecutor who engages in the private practice of law may represent a private client adverse to the state or other political subdivision that the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, except with regard to matters for which the part-time prosecutor had or has prosecutorial authority or responsibility.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLoyalty to a Client \n \n[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. If an impermissible conflict of interest exists before representation is undertaken the representation should be declined. The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest. \n \n[2] Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (a) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. \n  \n[3] If an impermissible conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment 4 to Rule 1.3 and Scope. \n \n[4] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. Paragraph (d) states an exception to that general rule. A part-time prosecutor does not automatically have a conflict of interest in representing a private client who is adverse to the state or other political subdivision (such as a city or county) that the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, although it is possible that in a particular case, the part-time prosecutor could have a conflict of interest under paragraph (a). \n \nSimultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require informed consent of the respective clients. \n \nConsultation and Informed Consent \n \n[5] A client may give informed consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's informed consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain informed consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to give informed consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to give informed consent. If informed consent is withdrawn, the lawyer should consult Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.16. \n \n[5A] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0 (b). See also Rule 1.0 (s) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0 (b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. \n \nLawyer's Interests \n \n[6] The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the propriety of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client objective advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. \n \nConflicts in Litigation \n \n[7] Paragraph (c) (2) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same or a similar proceeding including simultaneous representation of parties whose interests may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal, the requirements of paragraph (b) are met, and consent is not prohibited by paragraph (c). \n  \n[8] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients give informed consent as required by paragraph (b). By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government entity is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. \n \n[9] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases while they are pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so should one or more of the cases reach the appellate court. \n \nInterest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service \n \n[10] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and gives informed consent and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8 (f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the clients give informed consent and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. \n \nNon-litigation Conflicts \n \n[11] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for material and adverse effect include the duration and extent of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. \n \n[12] In a negotiation common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest among them. \n \n[13] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved. \n \n[14] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director. \n \nConflict Charged by an Opposing Party \n \n[15] Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope. \n [16] For the purposes of 1.7 (d), part-time prosecutors include but are not limited to part-time solicitors-general, part-time assistant solicitors-general, part-time probate court prosecutors, part-time magistrate court prosecutors, part-time municipal court prosecutors, special assistant attorneys general, part-time juvenile court prosecutors and prosecutors pro tem. \n \n[17] Pragmatic considerations require that the rules treat a lawyer serving as a part-time prosecutor differently. See Thompson v. State, 254 Ga. 393, 396-397 (1985). \n \nSpecial Considerations in Common Representation \n \n[18] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients. \n \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule58","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3c263cdc-75e0-462c-ad1f-5e5a5627313a","ParentId":"179833f9-065d-4c1f-80c1-792594c90dac","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).</li> \n <li> If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation after:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0(c);</li> \n <li>having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation, and</li> \n <li>having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>is prohibited by law or these Rules;</li> \n <li>includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or</li> \n <li>involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLoyalty to a Client \n \n[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. If an impermissible conflict of interest exists before representation is undertaken the representation should be declined. The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest. \n \n[2] Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (a) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. \n  \n[3] If an impermissible conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment 4 to Rule 1.3 and Scope. \n \n[4] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Paragraphs (b) and (c) express that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require informed consent of the respective clients. \n \nConsultation and Informed Consent \n \n[5] A client may give informed consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's informed consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain informed consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to give informed consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to give informed consent. If informed consent is withdrawn, the lawyer should consult Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.16. \n \n[5A] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(s) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. \n \nLawyer's Interests \n \n[6] The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the propriety of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client objective advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. \n \nConflicts in Litigation \n \n[7] Paragraph (c)(2) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same or a similar proceeding including simultaneous representation of parties whose interests may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal, the requirements of paragraph (b) are met, and consent is not prohibited by paragraph (c). \n  \n[8] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients give informed consent as required by paragraph (b). By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government entity is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. \n \n[9] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases while they are pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so should one or more of the cases reach the appellate court. \n \nInterest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service \n \n[10] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and gives informed consent and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the clients give informed consent and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. \n \nNon-litigation Conflicts \n \n[11] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for material and adverse effect include the duration and extent of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. \n \n[12] In a negotiation common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest among them. \n \n[13] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved. \n \n[14] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director. \n \nConflict Charged by an Opposing Party \n \n[15] Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope. \n ","UrlName":"revision4"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"6c1fcca2-0b79-4c3c-94a0-b42a00e94a27","Title":"RULE 1.8 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall neither enter into a business transaction with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer's professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;</li> \n <li>the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use information gained in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these rules.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.</li> \n <li>Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n <ol> \n <li>a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or</li> \n <li>a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:\n <ol> \n <li>the client gives informed consent;</li> \n <li>there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and</li> \n <li>information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for or against the clients, nor in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyers disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law, and the client is independently represented by a lawyer in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith. To the extent that agreements to arbitrate disputes over a lawyer's liability for malpractice are enforceable, a lawyer may enter into such an agreement with a client or a prospective client if the client or prospective client gives informed consent in writing signed by the client or prospective client. The agreement to arbitrate and the attorney's disclosures regarding arbitration must be set out in a separate paragraph, written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract, and separately initialed by the client and the lawyer. </li> \n <li>A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer has actual knowledge is represented by the other lawyer unless his or her client gives informed consent regarding the relationship. The disqualification stated in this paragraph is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:\n <ol> \n <li>acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses as long as the exercise of the lien is not prejudicial to the client with respect to the subject of the representation; and</li> \n <li>contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, except as prohibited by Rule 1.5.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8 (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8 (a) and 1.8 (c)-(j) is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nTransactions Between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1A] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. The client should be fully informed of the true nature of the lawyer's interest or lack of interest in all aspects of the transaction. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's informed consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable. \n  \nUse of Information to the Disadvantage of the Client \n  \n[1B] It is a general rule that an attorney will not be permitted to make use of knowledge, or information, acquired by the attorney through the professional relationship with the client, or in the conduct of the client's business, to the disadvantage of the client. Paragraph (b) follows this general rule and provides that the client may waive this prohibition. However, if the waiver is conditional, the duty is on the attorney to comply with the condition. \n \nGifts from Clients \n \n[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the objective advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial. \n \nLiterary Rights \n \n[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the subject of the representation creates a conflict between the interest of the client and the personal interest of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j) of this rule. \n \nFinancial Assistance to Clients \n \n[4] Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above. \n \nPayment for a Lawyer's Services from One Other Than The Client \n  \n[5] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4 (c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another). \n \nSettlement of Aggregated Claims \n \n[6] Paragraph (g) requires informed consent. This requirement is not met by a blanket consent prior to settlement that the majority decision will rule. \n \nAgreements to Limit Liability \n \n[7] A lawyer may not condition an agreement to withdraw or the return of a client's documents on the client's release of claims. However, this paragraph is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in opinions and memoranda. \n \n[8] A lawyer should not seek prospectively, by contract or other means, to limit the lawyer's individual liability to a client for the lawyer's malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of a client properly has no need to attempt to limit liability for the lawyer's professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of clients properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer may, however, practice law as a partner, member, or shareholder of a limited liability partnership, professional association, limited liability company, or professional corporation. \nArbitration \n [8A] Paragraph (h) requires informed consent to an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims. See Rule 1.0 (l). In obtaining such informed consent, the laywer should reveal to the client or prospective client the following: (1) in an arbitration, the client of prospective client waives the right to a jury because the dispute will be resolved by an individual arbitrator or a panel or arbitrators; (2) generally, there is no right to an appeal from an arbitration decision; (3) arbitration may not permit the broad discovery that would be available in civil litigation; (4) how the costs of arbitration compare to the costs of litigation in a public court, including the requirement that the arbitrator or arbitrators be compensated; and (5) who will bear the costs of arbitration. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client that an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims over fees and expenses is not a waiver of the right to make a disciplinary complaint regarding the lawyer. \n \nFamily Relationships Between Lawyers \n \n[9] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. \n \nAcquisition of Interest in Litigation \n \n[10] Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in the common law prohibition of champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for lawyer's fees and for certain advances of costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e). </div>","UrlName":"rule60","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1547bf53-9f72-45e5-8253-a31aa5d7ae8d","ParentId":"6c1fcca2-0b79-4c3c-94a0-b42a00e94a27","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall neither enter into a business transaction with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer's professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;</li> \n <li>the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use information gained in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.</li> \n <li>Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n <ol> \n <li>a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or</li> \n <li>a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:\n <ol> \n <li>the client gives informed consent;</li> \n <li>there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and</li> \n <li>information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for or against the clients, nor in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyers disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.</li> \n <li>A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer has actual knowledge is represented by the other lawyer unless his or her client gives informed consent regarding the relationship. The disqualification stated in this paragraph is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:\n <ol> \n <li>acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses as long as the exercise of the lien is not prejudicial to the client with respect to the subject of the representation; and</li> \n <li>contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, except as prohibited by Rule 1.5.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(a) and 1.8(c)-(j) is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nTransactions Between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1A] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. The client should be fully informed of the true nature of the lawyer's interest or lack of interest in all aspects of the transaction. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's informed consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable. \n  \nUse of Information to the Disadvantage of the Client \n  \n[1B] It is a general rule that an attorney will not be permitted to make use of knowledge, or information, acquired by the attorney through the professional relationship with the client, or in the conduct of the client's business, to the disadvantage of the client. Paragraph (b) follows this general rule and provides that the client may waive this prohibition. However, if the waiver is conditional, the duty is on the attorney to comply with the condition. \n \nGifts from Clients \n \n[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the objective advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial. \n \nLiterary Rights \n \n[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the subject of the representation creates a conflict between the interest of the client and the personal interest of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j) of this Rule. \n \nFinancial Assistance to Clients \n \n[4] Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above. \n \nPayment for a Lawyer's Services from One Other Than The Client \n  \n[5] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another). \n \nSettlement of Aggregated Claims \n \n[6] Paragraph (g) requires informed consent. This requirement is not met by a blanket consent prior to settlement that the majority decision will rule. \n \nAgreements to Limit Liability \n \n[7] A lawyer may not condition an agreement to withdraw or the return of a client's documents on the client's release of claims. However, this paragraph is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in opinions and memoranda. \n \n[8] A lawyer should not seek prospectively, by contract or other means, to limit the lawyer's individual liability to a client for the lawyer's malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of a client properly has no need to attempt to limit liability for the lawyer's professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of clients properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer may, however, practice law as a partner, member, or shareholder of a limited liability partnership, professional association, limited liability company, or professional corporation. \n \nFamily Relationships Between Lawyers \n \n[9] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. \n \nAcquisition of Interest in Litigation \n \n[10] Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in the common law prohibition of champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for lawyer's fees and for certain advances of costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e). </div>","UrlName":"revision51"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d1647878-baba-429a-8b11-8c4f60290964","Title":"RULE 1.9 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: FORMER CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and</li> \n <li>about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c), that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or</li> \n <li>reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this rule. Under this rule for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11. \n \n[2] The scope of a \"matter \"for purposes of this rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. \n \n[3] Matters are \"substantially related \"for purposes of this rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services. \n \nLawyers Moving Between Firms \n  \n[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. \n \n[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10 (b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm. \n \n[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. \n \n[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c). \n \n[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. \n \n[9] The provisions of this rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0 (b) and (h). With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10. </div>","UrlName":"rule61","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ae93d6f-b0aa-45e5-8088-bf2d4c1fc7e7","ParentId":"d1647878-baba-429a-8b11-8c4f60290964","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and</li> \n <li>about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or</li> \n <li>reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under this Rule for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11. \n \n[2] The scope of a \"matter \"for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. \n \n[3] Matters are \"substantially related \"for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services. \n \nLawyers Moving Between Firms \n  \n[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. \n \n[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm. \n \n[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. \n \n[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). \n \n[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. \n \n[9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(b) and (h). With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10. </div>","UrlName":"revision52"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3d8ef04b-23ce-4883-b52f-67ca784694d4","Title":"RULE 1.10 IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8 (c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.</li> \n <li> When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and</li> \n <li>any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9 (c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \nDefinition of \"Firm \" \n[1] For purposes of these rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. \n[2] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation. \n[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (a) and (b): Successive Government and Private Employment; where a lawyer represents the government after having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (c) (1): Successive Government and Private Employment. The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule and 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. \n[5] Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. However, if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and, thus, has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. \nPrinciples of Imputed Disqualification \n[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9 (b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.10 (b): Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. \n[7] Rule 1.10 (b): Imputed Disqualification operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9 (c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.</div>","UrlName":"rule86","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"39b7e9f5-9ade-497b-8c70-1a8d0a95e14c","ParentId":"3d8ef04b-23ce-4883-b52f-67ca784694d4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.</li> \n <li> When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and</li> \n <li>any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \nDefinition of \"Firm \" \n[1] For purposes of these Rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. \n[2] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation. \n[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b): Successive Government and Private Employment; where a lawyer represents the government after having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(c)(1): Successive Government and Private Employment. The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule and 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. \n[5] Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. However, if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and, thus, has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. \nPrinciples of Imputed Disqualification \n[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. \n[7] Rule 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.</div>","UrlName":"revision53"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0acc2933-f3df-436b-b82d-ad55711fcb4f","Title":"RULE 1.11 SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government entity gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is duly given to the client and to the appropriate government entity to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.</li> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or</li> \n <li>negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12 (b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12 (b).</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> As used in this rule, the term \"matter \"includes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and</li> \n <li>any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government entity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>As used in this rule, the term \"confidential government information \"means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. It is a counterpart of Rule 1.10 (b), which applies to lawyers moving from one firm to another. \n[2] A lawyer representing a government entity, whether employed or specially retained by the government, is subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In addition, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government entity may give consent under this rule. \n[3] Where the successive clients are a public entity and a private client, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government entity should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. \n[4] When the client is an agency of one government, that agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. \n[5] Paragraphs (a) (1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. \n[6] Paragraph (a) (2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the government entity at a time when premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order that the government entity will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer is not complying. \n[7] Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer. \n[8] Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government entity when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law. \n[9] Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the entity with which the lawyer in question has become associated.</div>","UrlName":"rule90","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9819c8a5-48a8-4555-ada1-fd19b5986ad3","ParentId":"0acc2933-f3df-436b-b82d-ad55711fcb4f","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government entity gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is duly given to the client and to the appropriate government entity to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.</li> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or</li> \n <li>negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> As used in this Rule, the term \"matter \"includes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and</li> \n <li>any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government entity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>As used in this Rule, the term \"confidential government information \"means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This Rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. It is a counterpart of Rule 1.10(b), which applies to lawyers moving from one firm to another. \n[2] A lawyer representing a government entity, whether employed or specially retained by the government, is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In addition, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government entity may give consent under this Rule. \n[3] Where the successive clients are a public entity and a private client, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government entity should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. \n[4] When the client is an agency of one government, that agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this Rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. \n[5] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. \n[6] Paragraph (a)(2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the government entity at a time when premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order that the government entity will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer is not complying. \n[7] Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer. \n[8] Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government entity when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law. \n[9] Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the entity with which the lawyer in question has become associated.</div>","UrlName":"revision54"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e39b427e-f692-412a-b382-185913c92ba3","Title":"RULE 1.12 FORMER JUDGE OR ARBITRATOR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.</li> \n <li> If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThis rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term \"personally and substantially \"signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. The term \"adjudicative officer \"includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not \"act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.\"Although phrased differently from this rule, those rules correspond in meaning.</div>","UrlName":"rule93","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"6ebe642e-55da-4665-adee-8bb95321e16f","ParentId":"e39b427e-f692-412a-b382-185913c92ba3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.</li> \n <li> If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThis Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term \"personally and substantially \"signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. The term \"adjudicative officer \"includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not \"act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.\"Although phrased differently from this Rule, those rules correspond in meaning.</div>","UrlName":"revision55"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3f4b6e1c-3da9-448f-b9bc-4c1f8b196f87","Title":"RULE 1.13 ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.</li> \n <li>If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.</li> \n <li> Except as provided in paragraph (d), if\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and</li> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c ), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.</li> \n <li>In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.</li> \n <li>A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThe Organization as the Client \n[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. \"Other constituents \"as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations. \n[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. \n[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0 (i), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. \n[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant consideration. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. \n[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation. \nRelation to Other Rules \n[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other rules. In particular, this rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this rule supplements Rule 1.6 (b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6 (b) (1). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyers' representation of the organization. In such circumstances Rule 1.2 (d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16 (a) (1) may be required. \n[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim. \n[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. \nGovernmental Organization \n[9] The duty defined in this rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these rules. See Scope [16]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business in involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This rule does not limit that authority. See Scope [16]. \nClarifying the Lawyer's Role \n[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged. \n[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case. \nDual Representation \n[12] Paragraph (g) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder. \nDerivative Actions \n[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization. \n[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.</div>","UrlName":"rule97","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"29994363-3ff9-42e9-a318-129638717b79","ParentId":"3f4b6e1c-3da9-448f-b9bc-4c1f8b196f87","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.</li> \n <li>If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.</li> \n <li> Except as provided in paragraph (d), if\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and</li> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c ), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.</li> \n <li>In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.</li> \n <li>A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThe Organization as the Client \n[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. \"Other constituents \"as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations. \n[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. \n[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0(i), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. \n[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant consideration. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. \n[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation. \nRelation to Other Rules \n[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyers' representation of the organization. In such circumstances Rule 1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16(a)(1) may be required. \n[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim. \n[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. \nGovernmental Organization \n[9] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Scope [16]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business in involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This Rule does not limit that authority. See Scope [16]. \nClarifying the Lawyer's Role \n[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged. \n[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case. \nDual Representation \n[12] Paragraph (e) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder. \nDerivative Actions \n[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization. \n[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.</div>","UrlName":"revision56"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b4525c0d-731a-4122-a984-e0f1db856652","Title":"RULE 1.14 CLIENT WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.</li> \n <li>When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.</li> \n <li>Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6 (a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished mental capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions. \n \n[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication. \n \n[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the lawyer should consider such participation in terms of its effect on the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf. \n \n[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2 (d). \n \nTaking Protective Action \n \n[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-making tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections. \n \n[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. \n \n[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client. \n \nDisclosure of the Client's Condition \n \n[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. \n \nEmergency Legal Assistance \n \n[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client. \n \n[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken. \n \n[11] This rule is not violated if a lawyer acts in good faith to comply with the rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule107","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"de6f6d4d-713d-4367-97e2-a05c3318f02b","ParentId":"b4525c0d-731a-4122-a984-e0f1db856652","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.</li> \n <li>When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.</li> \n <li>Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severly incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished mental capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions. \n \n[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication. \n \n[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the lawyer should consider such participation in terms of its effect on the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf. \n \n[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d). \n \nTaking Protective Action \n \n[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections. \n \n[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. \n \n[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client. \n \nDisclosure of the Client's Condition \n \n[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. \n \nEmergency Legal Assistance \n \n[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client. \n \n[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken. \n \n[11] This Rule is not violated if a lawyer acts in good faith to comply with the Rule. </div>","UrlName":"revision57"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fab74617-b734-48a1-ab5a-beca89919b7d","Title":"RULE 1.15(I) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - GENERAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.</li> \n <li> For the purposes of this rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person's interest in funds or other property in the lawyer's possession if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the interest is known to the lawyer, and</li> \n <li> the interest is based upon one of the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A statutory lien;</li> \n <li>A final judgment addressing disposition of those funds or property; or</li> \n <li>A written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The lawyer may disregard the third person's claimed interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement. </li> \n <li>Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.</li> \n <li>When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. \n[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration or interpleader. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed. \n[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party. The obligations of a lawyer under this rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction. \n[3A] In those cases where it is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds or property. \n[4] A \"clients' security fund \"provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.</div>","UrlName":"rule42","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2910a926-e4e3-470b-aaee-83e6228535a2","ParentId":"fab74617-b734-48a1-ab5a-beca89919b7d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.</li> \n <li> For the purposes of this Rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person's interest in funds or other property in the lawyer's possession if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the interest is known to the lawyer, and</li> \n <li> the interest is based upon one of the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A statutory lien;</li> \n <li>A final judgment addressing disposition of those funds or property; or</li> \n <li>A written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The lawyer may disregard the third person's claimed interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement. </li> \n <li>Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.</li> \n <li>When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. \n[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration or interpleader. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed. \n[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party. The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction. \n[3A] In those cases where it is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds or property. \n[4] A \"clients' security fund \"provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.</div>","UrlName":"revision58"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"RULE 1.15(II) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - TRUST ACCOUNT AND IOLTA","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Bar Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined in Bar Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule45","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4c2e1d2-2c8d-48e3-b9a7-78d1a5670861","ParentId":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined  in Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this Rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this Rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision111"},{"Id":"2473e9df-693d-4c42-8d30-abe6f3a5c393","ParentId":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined  in Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this Rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this Rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision113"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b8b582e1-b6cc-49d2-9bfc-653e18985481","Title":"RULE 1.15(III) RECORD KEEPING; TRUST ACCOUNT OVERDRAFT NOTIFICATION; EXAMINATION OF RECORDS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Required Bank Accounts: Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia and who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall maintain, in an approved financial institution as defined by this rule, a trust account or accounts, separate from any business and personal accounts. Funds received by the lawyer on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited into this account. The financial institution shall be in Georgia or in the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third person.</li> \n <li> Description of Accounts:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether general or specific, as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as an \"Attorney Trust Account,\"\"Attorney Escrow Account \"\"IOLTA Account \"or \"Attorney Fiduciary Account.\"The name of the attorney or law firm responsible for the account shall also appear on all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all business accounts, as well as all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, as a \"Business Account,\"a \"Professional Account,\"an \"Office Account,\"a \"General Account,\"a \"Payroll Account,\"\"Operating Account \"or a \"Regular Account.\"</li> \n <li>Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from using any additional description or designation for a specific business or trust account including fiduciary accounts maintained by the lawyer as executor, guardian, trustee, receiver, agent or in any other fiduciary capacity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Procedure:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Approved Institutions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall maintain his or her trust account only in a financial institution approved by the State Bar of Georgia, which shall annually publish a list of approved institutions.\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>Such institutions shall be located within the state of Georgia, within the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third-person. The institution shall be authorized by federal or state law to do business in the jurisdiction where located and shall be federally insured. A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer trust accounts if it abides by an agreement to report to the Office of the General Counsel whenever any properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds, and the instrument is not honored. The agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and shall not be canceled except upon 30-days notice in writing to the Office of the General Counsel. The agreement shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel on a form approved by the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall provide that all reports made by the financial institution shall be in writing and shall include the same information customarily forwarded to the depositor when an instrument is presented against insufficient funds. If the financial institution is located outside of the state of Georgia, it shall also agree in writing to honor any properly issued State Bar of Georgia subpoena.</li> \n <li>In addition to the requirements above, the financial institution must also be approved by the Georgia Bar Foundation and agree to offer IOLTA Accounts in compliance with the additional requirements set out in Part XV of the rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Georgia Bar Foundation may waive the provisions of this rule in whole or in part for good cause shown. A lawyer or law firm may appeal the decision of the Georgia Bar Foundation by application to the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Timing of Reports:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The financial institution shall file a report with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia in every instance where a properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds.</li> \n <li>The report shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel within 15 days of the date of the presentation of the instrument, even if the instrument is subsequently honored.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Nothing shall preclude a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this rule.</li> \n <li>Every lawyer and law firm maintaining a trust account as provided by these rules is hereby and shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements mandated by this rule and shall indemnify and hold harmless each financial institution for its compliance with the aforesaid reporting and production requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Effect on Financial Institution of Compliance: The agreement by a financial institution to offer accounts pursuant to this rule shall be a procedure to advise the State Disciplinary Board of conduct by lawyers and shall not be deemed to create a duty to exercise a standard of care or a contract with third parties that may sustain a loss as a result of lawyers overdrawing lawyer trust accounts.</li> \n <li>Availability of Records: A lawyer shall not fail to produce any of the records required to be maintained by these rules at the request of theState Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia. This obligation shall be in addition to and not in lieu of the procedures contained in Part IV of these rules for the production of documents and evidence.</li> \n <li>Audit for Cause: A lawyer shall not fail to submit to an audit for cause conducted by the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-111.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Each financial institution wishing to be approved as a depository of client trust funds must file an overdraft notification agreement with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia will publish a list of approved institutions at least annually. \n \n[2] The overdraft agreement requires that all overdrafts be reported to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia whether or not the instrument is honored. It is improper for a lawyer to accept \"overdraft privileges \"or any other arrangement for a personal loan on a client trust account, particularly in exchange for the institution's promise to delay or not to report an overdraft. The institution must notify the Office of the General Counsel of all overdrafts even where the institution is certain that its own error caused the overdraft or that the matter could have been resolved between the institution and the lawyer within a reasonable period of time. \n \n[3] The overdraft notification provision is not intended to result in the discipline of every lawyer who overdraws a trust account. The lawyer or institution may explain occasional errors. The provision merely intends that the Office of the General Counsel receive an early warning of improprieties so that corrective action, including audits for cause, may be taken. \n \nWaiver \n \n[4] A lawyer may seek to have the provisions of this rule waived if the lawyer or law firm has its principal office in a county where no bank, credit union, or savings and loan association will agree or has agreed to comply with the provisions of this rule. Other grounds for requesting a waiver may include significant financial or business harm to the lawyer or law firm, such as where the unapproved bank is a client of the lawyer or law firm or where the lawyer serves on the board of the unapproved bank. \n \n[5] The request for a waiver should be in writing, sent to the Georgia Bar Foundation, and should include sufficient information to establish good cause for the requested waiver. \n \n[6] The Georgia Bar Foundation may request additional information from the lawyer or law firm if necessary to determine good cause. \nAudits \n[7] Every lawyer's financial records and trust account records are required records and therefore are properly subject to audit for cause. The audit provisions are intended to uncover errors and omissions before the public is harmed, to deter those lawyers who may be tempted to misuse client's funds and to educate and instruct lawyers as to proper trust accounting methods. Although the auditors will be employed by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, it is intended that disciplinary proceedings will be brought only when the auditors have reasonable cause to believe discrepancies or irregularities exist. Otherwise, the auditors should only educate the lawyer and the lawyer's staff as to proper trust accounting methods. \n[8] An audit for cause may be conducted at any time and without advance notice if the Office of the General Counsel receives sufficient evidence that a lawyer poses a threat of harm to clients or the public. The Office of the General Counsel must have the written approval of the Chairman of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia to conduct an audit for cause. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule47","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"fe56572d-3099-4684-a166-9711aeb97df5","ParentId":"b8b582e1-b6cc-49d2-9bfc-653e18985481","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Required Bank Accounts: Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia and who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall maintain, in an approved financial institution as defined by this rule, a trust account or accounts, separate from any business and personal accounts. Funds received by the lawyer on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited into this account. The financial institution shall be in Georgia or in the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third person.</li> \n <li> Description of Accounts:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether general or specific, as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as an \"Attorney Trust Account,\"\"Attorney Escrow Account \"\"IOLTA Account \"or \"Attorney Fiduciary Account.\"The name of the attorney or law firm responsible for the account shall also appear on all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all business accounts, as well as all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, as a \"Business Account,\"a \"Professional Account,\"an \"Office Account,\"a \"General Account,\"a \"Payroll Account,\"\"Operating Account \"or a \"Regular Account.\"</li> \n <li>Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from using any additional description or designation for a specific business or trust account including fiduciary accounts maintained by the lawyer as executor, guardian, trustee, receiver, agent or in any other fiduciary capacity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Procedure:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Approved Institutions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall maintain his or her trust account only in a financial institution approved by the State Bar of Georgia, which shall annually publish a list of approved institutions.\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>Such institutions shall be located within the state of Georgia, within the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third-person. The institution shall be authorized by federal or state law to do business in the jurisdiction where located and shall be federally insured. A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer trust accounts if it abides by an agreement to report to the Office of the General Counsel whenever any properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds, and the instrument is not honored. The agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and shall not be canceled except upon 30-days notice in writing to the Office of the General Counsel. The agreement shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel on a form approved by the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall provide that all reports made by the financial institution shall be in writing and shall include the same information customarily forwarded to the depositor when an instrument is presented against insufficient funds. If the financial institution is located outside of the state of Georgia, it shall also agree in writing to honor any properly issued State Bar of Georgia subpoena.</li> \n <li>In addition to the requirements above, the financial institution must also be approved by the Georgia Bar Foundation and agree to offer IOLTA Accounts in compliance with the additional requirements set out in Part XV of the rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Georgia Bar Foundation may waive the provisions of this rule in whole or in part for good cause shown. A lawyer or law firm may appeal the decision of the Georgia Bar Foundation by application to the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Timing of Reports:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The financial institution shall file a report with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia in every instance where a properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds and said instrument is not honored within three business days of presentation.</li> \n <li>The report shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel within fifteen days of the date of the presentation of the instrument, even if the instrument is subsequently honored after the three business days provided in (2) (i) above.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Nothing shall preclude a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this rule.</li> \n <li>Every lawyer and law firm maintaining a trust account as provided by these rules is hereby and shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements mandated by this rule and shall indemnify and hold harmless each financial institution for its compliance with the aforesaid reporting and production requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Effect on Financial Institution of Compliance: The agreement by a financial institution to offer accounts pursuant to this rule shall be a procedure to advise the State Disciplinary Board of conduct by lawyers and shall not be deemed to create a duty to exercise a standard of care or a contract with third parties that may sustain a loss as a result of lawyers overdrawing lawyer trust accounts.</li> \n <li>Availability of Records: A lawyer shall not fail to produce any of the records required to be maintained by these rules at the request of theState Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia. This obligation shall be in addition to and not in lieu of the procedures contained in Part IV of these rules for the production of documents and evidence.</li> \n <li>Audit for Cause: A lawyer shall not fail to submit to an audit for cause conducted by the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-111.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Each financial institution wishing to be approved as a depository of client trust funds must file an overdraft notification agreement with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia will publish a list of approved institutions at least annually. \n \n[2] The overdraft agreement requires that all overdrafts be reported to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia whether or not the instrument is honored. It is improper for a lawyer to accept \"overdraft privileges \"or any other arrangement for a personal loan on a client trust account, particularly in exchange for the institution's promise to delay or not to report an overdraft. The institution must notify the Office of the General Counsel of all overdrafts even where the institution is certain that its own error caused the overdraft or that the matter could have been resolved between the institution and the lawyer within a reasonable period of time. \n \n[3] The overdraft notification provision is not intended to result in the discipline of every lawyer who overdraws a trust account. The lawyer or institution may explain occasional errors. The provision merely intends that the Office of the General Counsel receive an early warning of improprieties so that corrective action, including audits for cause, may be taken. \n \nWaiver \n \n[4] A lawyer may seek to have the provisions of this rule waived if the lawyer or law firm has its principal office in a county where no bank, credit union, or savings and loan association will agree or has agreed to comply with the provisions of this rule. Other grounds for requesting a waiver may include significant financial or business harm to the lawyer or law firm, such as where the unapproved bank is a client of the lawyer or law firm or where the lawyer serves on the board of the unapproved bank. \n \n[5] The request for a waiver should be in writing, sent to the Georgia Bar Foundation, and should include sufficient information to establish good cause for the requested waiver. \n \n[6] The Georgia Bar Foundation may request additional information from the lawyer or law firm if necessary to determine good cause. \nAudits \n[7] Every lawyer's financial records and trust account records are required records and therefore are properly subject to audit for cause. The audit provisions are intended to uncover errors and omissions before the public is harmed, to deter those lawyers who may be tempted to misuse client's funds and to educate and instruct lawyers as to proper trust accounting methods. Although the auditors will be employed by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, it is intended that disciplinary proceedings will be brought only when the auditors have reasonable cause to believe discrepancies or irregularities exist. Otherwise, the auditors should only educate the lawyer and the lawyer's staff as to proper trust accounting methods. \n[8] An audit for cause may be conducted at any time and without advance notice if the Office of the General Counsel receives sufficient evidence that a lawyer poses a threat of harm to clients or the public. The Office of the General Counsel must have the written approval of the Chairman of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia to conduct an audit for cause. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision323"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f019eba7-101e-4a2a-8834-5291c6c38c6b","Title":"RULE 1.16 DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is discharged.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;</li> \n <li>the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;</li> \n <li>the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;</li> \n <li>the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;</li> \n <li>the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or</li> \n <li>other good cause for withdrawal exists.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.</li> \n <li>Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. But see Rule 1.2 (c): Scope of Representation. \n \nMandatory Withdrawal \n \n[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation. \n \n[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \nDischarge \n \n[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances. \n \n[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. To the extent possible, the lawyer should give the client an explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to be self-represented. \n \n[6] If the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and, in an extreme case, may initiate proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.14: Client under a Disability. \n \nOptional Withdrawal \n \n[7] The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on a repugnant or imprudent objective. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \n[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. \n \nAssisting the Client upon Withdrawal \n \n[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. \n \n[10] Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may under certain unusual circumstances have a legal obligation to the organization after withdrawing or being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these rules. </div>","UrlName":"rule48","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ab4d791-6703-456d-aae3-c2f9d42df37a","ParentId":"f019eba7-101e-4a2a-8834-5291c6c38c6b","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is discharged.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;</li> \n <li>the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;</li> \n <li>the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;</li> \n <li>the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;</li> \n <li>the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or</li> \n <li>other good cause for withdrawal exists.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.</li> \n <li>Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. But see Rule 1.2(c): Scope of Representation. \n \nMandatory Withdrawal \n \n[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation. \n \n[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \nDischarge \n \n[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances. \n \n[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. To the extent possible, the lawyer should give the client an explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to be self-represented. \n \n[6] If the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and, in an extreme case, may initiate proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.14: Client under a Disability. \n \nOptional Withdrawal \n \n[7] The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on a repugnant or imprudent objective. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \n[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. \n \nAssisting the Client upon Withdrawal \n \n[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. \n \n[10] Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may under certain unusual circumstances have a legal obligation to the organization after withdrawing or being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these Rules. </div>","UrlName":"revision61"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"91ad0a2f-e4fe-449f-a182-e4259678a5ff","Title":"RULE 1.17. SALE OF LAW PRACTICE.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>The practice is sold as an entirety to another lawyer or law firm;</li> \n <li> Actual written notice is given to each of the seller's clients regarding:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the proposed sale;</li> \n <li>the terms of any proposed change in the fee arrangement authorized by paragraph (d);</li> \n <li>the client's right to retain other counsel, or to take possession of the file; and</li> \n <li>the fact that the client's consent to the sale will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of receipt of the notice.</li> \n </ol> \n If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file. </li> \n <li>The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this rule, when another lawyer or firm takes over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer and 5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice. \n \nTermination of Practice by the Seller \n \n[2] The requirement that all of the private practice be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice available for sale to the purchaser. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchaser but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Neither does a return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \nSingle Purchaser \n \n[5] The rule requires a single purchaser. The prohibition against piecemeal sale of a practice protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchaser is required to undertake all client matters in the practice, subject to client consent. If, however, the purchaser is unable to undertake all client matters because of a conflict of interest in a specific matter respecting which the purchaser is not permitted by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest or another rule to represent the client, the requirement that there be a single purchaser is nevertheless satisfied. \n \nClient Confidences, Consent and Notice \n \n[6] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to detailed information relating to the representation, such as the client's file, however, requires client consent. The rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser and any proposed change in the terms of future representation, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed. \n \n[7] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. \n \n[8] All the elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice. \n \nFee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser \n \n[9] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing agreements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser, unless the client consents. The purchaser may, however, advise the client that the purchaser will not undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the higher fees the purchaser usually charges. To prevent client financing of the sale, the higher fee the purchaser may charge must not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for substantially similar services rendered prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations. \n \n[10] The purchaser may not intentionally fragment the practice which is the subject of the sale by charging significantly different fees in substantially similar matters. Doing so would make it possible for the purchaser to avoid the obligation to take over the entire practice by charging arbitrarily higher fees for less lucrative matters, thereby increasing the likelihood that those clients would not consent to the new representation. \n \nOther Applicable Ethical Standards \n \n[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1: Competence); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure client consent after consultation for those conflicts which can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9). \n \n[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation). \n \nApplicability of the Rule \n \n[13] This rule applies to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met. \n \n[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule. \n \n[15] This rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice. </div>","UrlName":"rule49","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f0276f4f-5259-4981-8840-1bbff9517bff","ParentId":"91ad0a2f-e4fe-449f-a182-e4259678a5ff","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>The practice is sold as an entirety to another lawyer or law firm;</li> \n <li> Actual written notice is given to each of the seller's clients regarding:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the proposed sale;</li> \n <li>the terms of any proposed change in the fee arrangement authorized by paragraph (d);</li> \n <li>the client's right to retain other counsel, or to take possession of the file; and</li> \n <li>the fact that the client's consent to the sale will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of receipt of the notice.</li> \n </ol> \n If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file. </li> \n <li>The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this rule, when another lawyer or firm takes over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer and 5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice. \n \nTermination of Practice by the Seller \n \n[2] The requirement that all of the private practice be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice available for sale to the purchaser. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchaser but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Neither does a return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \nSingle Purchaser \n \n[5] The rule requires a single purchaser. The prohibition against piecemeal sale of a practice protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchaser is required to undertake all client matters in the practice, subject to client consent. If, however, the purchaser is unable to undertake all client matters because of a conflict of interest in a specific matter respecting which the purchaser is not permitted by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest or another rule to represent the client, the requirement that there be a single purchaser is nevertheless satisfied. \n \nClient Confidences, Consent and Notice \n \n[6] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to client-specific information relating to the representation and to the file, however, requires client consent. The rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser and any proposed change in the terms of future representation, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed. \n \n[7] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. \n \n[8] All the elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice. \n \nFee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser \n \n[9] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing agreements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser, unless the client consents. The purchaser may, however, advise the client that the purchaser will not undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the higher fees the purchaser usually charges. To prevent client financing of the sale, the higher fee the purchaser may charge must not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for substantially similar services rendered prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations. \n \n[10] The purchaser may not intentionally fragment the practice which is the subject of the sale by charging significantly different fees in substantially similar matters. Doing so would make it possible for the purchaser to avoid the obligation to take over the entire practice by charging arbitrarily higher fees for less lucrative matters, thereby increasing the likelihood that those clients would not consent to the new representation. \n \nOther Applicable Ethical Standards \n \n[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1: Competence); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure client consent after consultation for those conflicts which can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9). \n \n[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation). \n \nApplicability of the Rule \n \n[13] This rule applies to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met. \n \n[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule. \n \n[15] This rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice. </div>","UrlName":"revision278"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"79cd5db1-e60a-4dfe-93c5-bc2570ebc80b","Title":"RULE 1.18. DUTIES TO PROSPECTIVE CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client. \n(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client. \n(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). \n(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's consultations with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients. \n[2] A person becomes a prospective client by consulting with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Whether communications, including written, oral, or electronic communications, constitute a consultation depends on the circumstances. For example, a consultation is likely to have occurred if a lawyer, either in person or through the lawyer’s advertising in any medium, specifically requests or invites the submission of information about a potential representation without clear and reasonably understandable warnings and cautionary statements that limit the lawyer’s obligations, and a person provides information in response. See also Comment [4]. In contrast, a consultation does not occur if a person provides information to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer’s education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal information of general interest. Such a person communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is thus not a \"prospective client.\"Moreover, a person who communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying the lawyer is not a “prospective client.” \n[3] It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by Rule 1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be. \n[4] In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial consultation to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under Rule 1.7, then consent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation. \n[5] A lawyer may condition a consultation with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0 (l) for the definition of informed consent. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer's subsequent use of information received from the prospective client. \n[6] Even in the absence of an agreement, under paragraph (c), the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter. \n[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.10, but, under paragraph (d), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. \n[8] For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer's duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer's care, see Rule 1.15.</div>","UrlName":"rule608","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de4aae0a-e7b5-495d-b898-36b23dbb6bac","Title":"RULE 2.1 ADVISOR","Content":" In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. A lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nScope of Advice \n \n[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. \n \n[2] In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation. Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. \n \n[3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations. \n \n[4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts. \n \nOffering Advice \n \n[5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, duty to the client under Rule 1.4: Communication may require that the lawyer act if the client's course of action is related to the representation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.","UrlName":"rule62","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bf5aa118-f96c-45f6-8cf4-001a331ae3d3","Title":"RULE 2.2 INTERMEDIARY","Content":"Reserved.","UrlName":"rule65","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b9148e26-9da2-467d-81a0-6bb903261fa0","Title":"RULE 2.3 EVALUATION FOR USE BY THIRD PERSONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nDefinition \n \n[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government entity; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business. \n \n[2] Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government entity action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether the opinion is to be made public. \n \n[3] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available. \n \nDuty to Third Person \n \n[4] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings. \n \nAccess to and Disclosure of Information \n \n[5] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. \n \nFinancial Auditors' Requests for Information \n \n[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975. </div>","UrlName":"rule66","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9d14a347-799f-4861-9a49-11305775393e","ParentId":"b9148e26-9da2-467d-81a0-6bb903261fa0","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nDefinition \n \n[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government entity; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business. \n \n[2] Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government entity action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether the opinion is to be made public. \n \n[3] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available. \n \nDuty to Third Person \n \n[4] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings. \n \nAccess to and Disclosure of Information \n \n[5] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. \n \nFinancial Auditors' Requests for Information \n \n[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975. </div>","UrlName":"revision63"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ee3f3057-e1fb-4ad5-9b27-9629d9d9ade2","Title":"RULE 2.4 LAWYER SERVING AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.</li> \n <li>A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.</li> \n <li>When one or more of the parties in a mediation is a current or former client of the neutral lawyer or the neutral's law firm, a lawyer may serve as a neutral only if the matter in which the lawyer serves as a neutral is not the same matter in which the lawyer or law firm represents or represented the party and all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court. \n \n[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. \n \n[3] Unlike non-lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected. \n \n[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12. \n \n[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0 (r)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1. </div>","UrlName":"rule68","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"dc4cd20c-1668-4ee3-9bd8-5fc54c639dbf","ParentId":"ee3f3057-e1fb-4ad5-9b27-9629d9d9ade2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.</li> \n <li>A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.</li> \n <li>When one or more of the parties in a mediation is a current or former client of the neutral lawyer or the neutral's law firm, a lawyer may serve as a neutral only if the matter in which the lawyer serves as a neutral is not the same matter in which the lawyer or law firm represents or represented the party and all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court. \n \n[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. \n \n[3] Unlike non-lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected. \n \n[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12. \n \n[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(r)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1. </div>","UrlName":"revision64"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9487575d-c5ad-4680-9ee1-cf089c18ce38","Title":"RULE 3.1 MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;</li> \n <li>knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. \n \n[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. \n \n[3] It is not ethically improper for a lawyer to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the lawyer determines that a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the lawyer is not required by rules of procedure. or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the lawyer will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. \n \n[4] The decision of a court that a claim is not meritorious is not necessarily conclusive of a violation of this rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule69","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"99f9ad1a-aa70-4081-a8ae-b561636a3ae0","ParentId":"9487575d-c5ad-4680-9ee1-cf089c18ce38","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;</li> \n <li>knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. \n \n[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. \n \n[3] It is not ethically improper for a lawyer to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the lawyer determines that a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the lawyer is not required by rules of procedure. or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the lawyer will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. \n \n[4] The decision of a court that a claim is not meritorious is not necessarily conclusive of a violation of this Rule. </div>","UrlName":"revision65"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"787cc9d4-fe4d-484d-a6d4-e1a3006e108b","Title":"RULE 3.2 EXPEDITING LITIGATION","Content":" A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. \n \n[2] The reasonableness of a lawyer's effort to expedite litigation must be judged by all of the controlling factors. \"Reasonable efforts \"do not equate to \"instant efforts \"and are sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n ","UrlName":"rule71","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a195a719-bb14-4dec-9f7d-5d5e4d9c9dd0","Title":"RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or</li> \n <li>offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.</li> \n <li>In an ex parte proceeding, other than grand jury proceedings, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0 (aa) for the definition of tribunal. It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a) (4) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false. \n \n[2] This rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. \n \nRepresentations by a Lawyer \n \n[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2 (d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2 (d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4 (b). \n \nLegal Argument \n \n[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a) (3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. \n \nOffering Evidence \n \n[5] Paragraph (c) allows that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity. \n \n[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer may refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit from the witness the testimony that the lawyer knows is false. \n \n[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9]. \n \n[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0 (i). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. \n \n[9] Although paragraph (a) (4) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7]. \n \nRemedial Measures \n \n[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done - making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps nothing. \n \n[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2 (d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. \n \nPreserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process \n \n[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. \n \nDuration of Obligation \n \n[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. \n \nEx Parte Proceedings \n \n[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16 (a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16 (b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. </div>","UrlName":"rule72","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"ea43d08b-5a41-4e59-be18-be435a0cce18","ParentId":"a195a719-bb14-4dec-9f7d-5d5e4d9c9dd0","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or</li> \n <li>offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.</li> \n <li>In an ex parte proceeding, other than grand jury proceedings, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(r) for the definition of tribunal. It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(4) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false. \n \n[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. \n \nRepresentations by a Lawyer \n \n[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b). \n \nLegal Argument \n \n[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. \n \nOffering Evidence \n \n[5] Paragraph (c) allows that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity. \n \n[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer may refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit from the witness the testimony that the lawyer knows is false. \n \n[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9]. \n \n[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(i). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. \n \n[9] Although paragraph (a)(4) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7]. \n \nRemedial Measures \n \n[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done - making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps nothing. \n \n[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. \n \nPreserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process \n \n[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. \n \nDuration of Obligation \n \n[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. \n \nEx Parte Proceedings \n \n[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. </div>","UrlName":"revision66"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0e595dc4-c128-4d22-a9ee-b54827dc085b","Title":"RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>falsify evidence;</li> \n <li>counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely; or</li> \n <li> pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparation, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in preparing, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li> request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; or the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information; and</li> \n <li>the information is not otherwise subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the opposing party or counsel; or</li> \n <li>present, participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. \n \n[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2. \n \n[5] As to paragraph (g), the responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of the opposing party or counsel. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence. </div>","UrlName":"rule77","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"bcea26ee-c9b9-489a-8d50-bbc8b7262095","ParentId":"0e595dc4-c128-4d22-a9ee-b54827dc085b","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>falsify evidence;</li> \n <li>counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely; or</li> \n <li> pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparation, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in preparing, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li> request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; or the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information; and</li> \n <li>the information is not otherwise subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the opposing party or counsel; or</li> \n <li>present, participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. \n \n[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2. \n \n[5] As to paragraph (g), the responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of the opposing party or counsel. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence. </div>","UrlName":"revision67"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7e15a371-0bf3-40f4-82e0-125f4df371e6","Title":"RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;</li> \n <li>communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law;</li> \n <li> communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the communication is prohibited by law or court order; or</li> \n <li>the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or</li> \n <li>the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c) of this rule is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (b) or paragraph (d) of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Many forms of improper influence upon the tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. All of those are specified in the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct with which an advocate should be familiar. Attention is also directed to Rule 8.4. Misconduct., which governs other instances of improper conduct by a lawyer/candidate. \n \n[2] If we are to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law. The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process. Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided. The activity proscribed by this rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety. \n \n[3A] The rule with respect to ex parte communications limits direct communications except as may be permitted by law. Thus, court rules or case law must be referred to in order to determine whether certain ex parte communications are legitimate. Ex parte communications may be permitted by statutory authorization. \n \n[3B] A lawyer who obtains a judge's signature on a decree in the absence of the opposing lawyer where certain aspects of the decree are still in dispute, may have violated Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., regardless of the lawyer's good intentions or good faith. \n \n[4] A lawyer may communicate as to the merits of the cause with a judge in the course of official proceedings in the case, in writing if the lawyer simultaneously delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer, or orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer. \n \n[5] If the lawyer knowingly instigates or causes another to instigate a communication proscribed by Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., a violation may occur. \n \n[6] Direct or indirect communication with a juror during the trial is clearly prohibited. A lawyer may not avoid the proscription of Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., by using agents to communicate improperly with jurors. A lawyer may be held responsible if the lawyer was aware of the client's desire to establish contact with jurors and assisted the client in doing so. \n \n[7] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication period. \n \n[8] While a lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge, the lawyer's actions should avoid reciprocation. Fairness and impartiality of the trial process is strengthened by the lawyer's protection of the record for subsequent review and this preserves the professional integrity of the legal profession by patient firmness. </div>","UrlName":"rule78","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"40d626a1-e510-44a9-9471-5e2f78bec600","ParentId":"7e15a371-0bf3-40f4-82e0-125f4df371e6","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;</li> \n <li>communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law;</li> \n <li> communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the communication is prohibited by law or court order; or</li> \n <li>the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or</li> \n <li>the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c) of this Rule is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (b) or paragraph (d) of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Many forms of improper influence upon the tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. All of those are specified in the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct with which an advocate should be familiar. Attention is also directed to Rule 8.4. Misconduct., which governs other instances of improper conduct by a lawyer/candidate. \n \n[2] If we are to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law. The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process. Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided. The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety. \n \n[3A] The Rule with respect to ex parte communications limits direct communications except as may be permitted by law. Thus, court rules or case law must be referred to in order to determine whether certain ex parte communications are legitimate. Ex parte communications may be permitted by statutory authorization. \n \n[3B] A lawyer who obtains a judge's signature on a decree in the absence of the opposing lawyer where certain aspects of the decree are still in dispute, may have violated Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., regardless of the lawyer's good intentions or good faith. \n \n[4] A lawyer may communicate as to the merits of the cause with a judge in the course of official proceedings in the case, in writing if the lawyer simultaneously delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer, or orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer. \n \n[5] If the lawyer knowingly instigates or causes another to instigate a communication proscribed by Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., a violation may occur. \n \n[6] Direct or indirect communication with a juror during the trial is clearly prohibited. A lawyer may not avoid the proscription of Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., by using agents to communicate improperly with jurors. A lawyer may be held responsible if the lawyer was aware of the client's desire to establish contact with jurors and assisted the client in doing so. \n \n[7] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication period. \n \n[8] While a lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge, the lawyer's actions should avoid reciprocation. Fairness and impartiality of the trial process is strengthened by the lawyer's protection of the record for subsequent review and this preserves the professional integrity of the legal profession by patient firmness. </div>","UrlName":"revision68"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"8dfb7354-c1a1-43b5-91a9-a3a62430af36","Title":"RULE 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.</li> \n <li>No lawyer associated in a firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy. \n \n[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. \n \n[3] The rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \n[5A] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;</li> \n <li>in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;</li> \n <li>the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;</li> \n <li>any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;</li> \n <li>information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or</li> \n <li>the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.</li> \n </ol> \n[5B] In addition, there are certain subjects which are more likely than not to have no material prejudicial effect on a proceeding. Thus, a lawyer may usually state: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;</li> \n <li>information contained in a public record;</li> \n <li>that an investigation of a matter is in progress;</li> \n <li>the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;</li> \n <li>a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;</li> \n <li>a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and</li> \n <li> in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;</li> \n <li>if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;</li> \n <li>the fact, time and place of arrest; and</li> \n <li>the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n [6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding. \n \n[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others. </div>","UrlName":"rule80","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d4008c7-81dc-4570-a7c5-fadc0e62e763","ParentId":"8dfb7354-c1a1-43b5-91a9-a3a62430af36","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.</li> \n <li>No lawyer associated in a firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy. \n \n[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. \n \n[3] The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \n[5A] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;</li> \n <li>in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;</li> \n <li>the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;</li> \n <li>any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;</li> \n <li>information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or</li> \n <li>the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.</li> \n </ol> \n[5B] In addition, there are certain subjects which are more likely than not to have no material prejudicial effect on a proceeding. Thus, a lawyer may usually state: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;</li> \n <li>information contained in a public record;</li> \n <li>that an investigation of a matter is in progress;</li> \n <li>the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;</li> \n <li>a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;</li> \n <li>a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and</li> \n <li> in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;</li> \n <li>if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;</li> \n <li>the fact, time and place of arrest; and</li> \n <li>the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n [6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding. \n \n[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others. </div>","UrlName":"revision69"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a27d1536-2fbd-415a-abdf-3d15b8f792a3","Title":"RULE 3.7 LAWYER AS WITNESS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;</li> \n <li>the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or</li> \n <li>disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. \n \n[2] The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a) (2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. \n \n[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a) (3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification has no application to this aspect of the problem. \n \n[5] Whether the combination of roles involves an improper conflict of interest with respect to the client is determined by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule or Rule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification disqualifies the firm also. </div>","UrlName":"rule82","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1a8bd156-3327-4459-9fd5-47902e68ac7a","ParentId":"a27d1536-2fbd-415a-abdf-3d15b8f792a3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;</li> \n <li>the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or</li> \n <li>disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. \n \n[2] The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. \n \n[3] Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. \n \n[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification has no application to this aspect of the problem. \n \n[5] Whether the combination of roles involves an improper conflict of interest with respect to the client is determined by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule or Rule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification disqualifies the firm also. </div>","UrlName":"revision70"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c5237a8c-7ec6-4f31-bf97-99f1ba804338","Title":"RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;</li> \n <li>refrain from making any effort to prevent the accused from exercising a reasonable effort to obtain counsel;</li> \n <li>comply with Rule 4.2;</li> \n <li>make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates the offense;</li> \n <li>exercise reasonable care to prevent persons who are under the direct supervision of the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under subsection (g) of this Rule;</li> \n <li> not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;</li> \n <li>the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and</li> \n <li>there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused;</li> \n <li>promptly disclose new, credible, and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted to an appropriate court or authority. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, the prosecutor shall promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay and undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit;</li> \n <li>seek to remedy a conviction obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction when the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant did not commit the offense.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n \n[2] Reserved. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship. \n \n[5] Paragraph (g) supplements Rule 3.6: Trial Publicity, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6 (b) or 3.6 (c): Trial Publicity. \n [6]\t Reserved. \n [7]\t When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (h) requires prompt disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, paragraph (h) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Consistent with the objectives of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented  defendant,  would  ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. \n [8]\t Under paragraph (i), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Necessary steps may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted. \n [9]\t A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of paragraphs (h) and (i), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule83","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0c97837e-b4b3-442f-b480-60afe6bd6990","ParentId":"c5237a8c-7ec6-4f31-bf97-99f1ba804338","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;</li> \n <li>refrain from making any effort to prevent the accused from exercising a reasonable effort to obtain counsel;</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates the offense;</li> \n <li>exercise reasonable care to prevent persons who are under the direct supervision of the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under subsection (g) of this rule;</li> \n <li> not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;</li> \n <li>the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and</li> \n <li>there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n \n[2] Reserved. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship. \n \n[5] Paragraph (g) supplements Rule 3.6: Trial Publicity, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6 (b) or 3.6 (c): Trial Publicity. </div>","UrlName":"revision391"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4a46f7a1-94ac-4d60-b789-6ebe7708541a","Title":"RULE 3.9 ADVOCATE IN NONADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS","Content":" A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or administrative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3 (a) through (c), 3.4 (a) through (c), and 3.5. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule making or policy making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision making body, like a court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body should deal with the tribunal honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedures. \n \n[2] Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. The requirements of this rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts. \n \n[3] This rule does not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental entity; representation in such a transaction is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4. \n ","UrlName":"rule85","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"748d9636-a16e-43d2-b7d9-5bddf553f1ac","Title":"RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nMisrepresentation \n \n[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act. \n \nStatements of Fact \n \n[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Comments which fall under the general category of \"puffing \"do not violate this rule. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. \n \nFraud by Client \n \n[3] Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information. </div>","UrlName":"rule289","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"16314d93-c9ec-450e-8636-98955fce4f5d","ParentId":"748d9636-a16e-43d2-b7d9-5bddf553f1ac","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nMisrepresentation \n \n[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act. \n \nStatements of Fact \n \n[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Comments which fall under the general category of \"puffing \"do not violate this rule. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. \n \nFraud by Client \n \n[3] Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information. </div>","UrlName":"revision72"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"25645231-5602-4631-b95f-e304dee1c781","Title":"RULE 4.2 COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.</li> \n <li>Attorneys for the State and Federal Government shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as other attorneys in this State.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government entity and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government entity to speak with government officials about the matter. \n \n[2] Communications authorized by law also include constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this Rule or has found this Rule inapplicable. However, the Rule imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional provisions. \n \n[3] This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates. \n \n[4A] In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4 (f). Communication with a former employee of a represented organization is discussed in Formal Advisory Opinion 20-1. \n \n[4B] In administering this Rule it should be anticipated that in many instances, prior to the beginning of the interview, the interviewing lawyer will not possess sufficient information to determine whether the relationship of the interviewee to the entity is sufficiently close to place the person in the \"represented \"category. In those situations the good faith of the lawyer in undertaking the interview should be considered. Evidence of good faith includes an immediate and candid statement of the interest of the person on whose behalf the interview is being taken, a full explanation of why that person's position is adverse to the interests of the entity with which the interviewee is associated, the exploration of the relationship issue at the outset of the interview and the cessation of the interview immediately upon determination that the interview is improper. \n \n[5] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies, however, in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See 1.0. Such an inference may arise in circumstances where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom communication is sought is represented in the matter to be discussed. Thus, a lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by ignoring the obvious. \n \n[6] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3. \n \n[6A] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury. \n \n[7] The anti-contact rule serves important public interests which preserve the proper functioning of the judicial system and the administration of justice by a) protecting against misuse of the imbalance of legal skill between a lawyer and layperson; b) safe-guarding the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel; c) ensuring that all valid claims and defenses are raised in response to inquiry from adverse counsel; d) reducing the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that might harm their interests; and e) maintaining the lawyers ability to monitor the case and effectively represent the client. \n \n[8] Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other because this Rule is not intended to affect communications between parties to an action entered into independent of and not at the request or direction of counsel. </div>","UrlName":"rule296","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"628733fe-c98e-4bf7-8bb3-1abfc627d292","ParentId":"25645231-5602-4631-b95f-e304dee1c781","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.</li> \n <li>Attorneys for the State and Federal Government shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as other attorneys in this State.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government entity and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government entity to speak with government officials about the matter. \n \n[2] Communications authorized by law also include constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this Rule or has found this Rule inapplicable. However, the Rule imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional provisions. \n \n[3] This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates. \n \n[4A] In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. See Formal Advisory Opinion 87-6. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). Communication with a former employee of a represented organization is discussed in Formal Advisory Opinion 94-3. \n \n[4B] In administering this Rule it should be anticipated that in many instances, prior to the beginning of the interview, the interviewing lawyer will not possess sufficient information to determine whether the relationship of the interviewee to the entity is sufficiently close to place the person in the \"represented \"category. In those situations the good faith of the lawyer in undertaking the interview should be considered. Evidence of good faith includes an immediate and candid statement of the interest of the person on whose behalf the interview is being taken, a full explanation of why that person's position is adverse to the interests of the entity with which the interviewee is associated, the exploration of the relationship issue at the outset of the interview and the cessation of the interview immediately upon determination that the interview is improper. \n \n[5] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies, however, in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See 1.0. Such an inference may arise in circumstances where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom communication is sought is represented in the matter to be discussed. Thus, a lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by ignoring the obvious. \n \n[6] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3. \n \n[6A] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury. \n \n[7] The anti-contact rule serves important public interests which preserve the proper functioning of the judicial system and the administration of justice by a) protecting against misuse of the imbalance of legal skill between a lawyer and layperson; b) safe-guarding the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel; c) ensuring that all valid claims and defenses are raised in response to inquiry from adverse counsel; d) reducing the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that might harm their interests; and e) maintaining the lawyers ability to monitor the case and effectively represent the client. \n \n[8] Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other because this Rule is not intended to affect communications between parties to an action entered into independent of and not at the request or direction of counsel. </div>","UrlName":"revision73"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4a6e5ea5-62ee-401b-a772-f70dbf79e097","Title":"RULE 4.3 DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSON","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and</li> \n <li>give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client. </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f). \n \n[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented persons interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations. </div>","UrlName":"rule298","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"a9cc4ee3-7fee-410b-afed-7a63073cff2f","ParentId":"4a6e5ea5-62ee-401b-a772-f70dbf79e097","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and</li> \n <li>give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client. </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f). \n \n[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented persons interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations. </div>","UrlName":"revision74"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bfe134c6-2213-4373-8419-b9ba66e4c40f","Title":"RULE 4.4 RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships. \n[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive a document or electronically stored information that was mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. A document or electronically stored information is inadvertently sent when it is accidentally transmitted, such as when an e-mail or letter is misaddressed or a document or electronically stored information is accidentally included with information that was intentionally transmitted. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document or electronically stored information was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the document or electronically stored information, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document or electronically stored information has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been inappropriately obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, ‘‘document or electronically stored information’’ includes, in addition to paper documents, e-mail and other forms of electronically stored information, including embedded data (commonly referred to as “metadata”), that is subject to being read or put into readable form. Metadata in electronic documents creates an obligation under this Rule only if the receiving lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the metadata was inadvertently sent to the receiving lawyer.</div>","UrlName":"rule300","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"def9f1ce-eb75-4497-ba0e-3477cabad38c","ParentId":"bfe134c6-2213-4373-8419-b9ba66e4c40f","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships.","UrlName":"revision6"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"02b56e63-d751-481f-a3c4-1c665e512de9","Title":"RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTNERS, MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORY LAWYERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A law firm partner as defined in Rule 1.0 (q), and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0 (g) . This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised. \n \n[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules. \n \n[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a) . \n \n[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. \n \n[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation. \n \n[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. \n \n[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a) . </div>","UrlName":"rule302","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"44cce370-1bc0-4f35-ae77-be2507b2c119","ParentId":"02b56e63-d751-481f-a3c4-1c665e512de9","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A law firm partner as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(e) . This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised. \n \n[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules. \n \n[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a) . \n \n[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. \n \n[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation. \n \n[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. \n \n[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a) . </div>","UrlName":"revision75"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f4afeac-58ab-40b7-9489-fdf040ce8227","Title":"RULE 5.2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUBORDINATE LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.</li> \n <li>A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character. \n \n[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged. </div>","UrlName":"rule111","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"46f33fc0-8186-4495-8b64-ca0a3a7c9901","ParentId":"1f4afeac-58ab-40b7-9489-fdf040ce8227","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.</li> \n <li>A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character. \n \n[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged. </div>","UrlName":"revision76"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ff99c726-6ca9-4d61-ae4b-56ea9ec61fbc","Title":"RULE 5.3. RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li>a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li> a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status; or</li> \n <li>provide any legal advice to the clients of the lawyer either in person, by telephone or in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline. \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. \n[3] The prohibitions of paragraph (d) are designed to prevent the unauthorized practice of law in a law office by a person who has been suspended or disbarred. A lawyer who allows a suspended or disbarred lawyer to work in a law office must exercise special care to ensure that the former lawyer complies with these rules, and that clients of the firm understand the former lawyer’s role. \n [4] A lawyer may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal services to the client. When using such assistance outside the firm, a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the assistance is provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations. The extent of this obligation will depend upon the circumstances, including the education, experience and reputation of the nonlawyer; the nature of the assistance involved; the terms of any arrangements concerning the protection of client information; and the legal and ethical environments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly with regard to confidentiality. See also Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Allocation of authority), 1.4 (Communication with client), 1.6 (Confidentiality of information), 5.4 (a) (Professional independence of a lawyer), and 5.5 (a) (Unauthorized practice of law). When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm, a lawyer should communicate directions appropriate under the circumstances to give reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. \n \n[5] Where the client directs the selection of a particular nonlawyer service provider outside the firm, the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the client concerning the allocation of responsibility for monitoring as between the client and the lawyer. See Rule 1.2. When making such an allocation in a matter pending before a tribunal, lawyers and parties may have additional obligations that are a matter of law beyond the scope of these rules. </div>","UrlName":"rule115","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3dafd6d4-7066-4cd3-a407-0afd1189fc27","ParentId":"ff99c726-6ca9-4d61-ae4b-56ea9ec61fbc","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li>a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li> a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status; or</li> \n <li>provide any legal advice to the clients of the lawyer either in person, by telephone or in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline. \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. \n[3] The prohibitions of paragraph (d) are designed to prevent the unauthorized practice of law in a law office by a person who has been suspended or disbarred. A lawyer who allows a suspended or disbarred lawyer to work in a law office must exercise special care to ensure that the former lawyer complies with these Rules, and that clients of the firm understand the former lawyer’s role.</div>","UrlName":"revision276"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"68cd6473-79e8-4913-9202-b7d57d4350df","Title":"RULE 5.4. PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement;</li> \n <li>a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter;</li> \n <li>a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated nonprofit lawyer referral service where such fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>provide legal services to clients while working with other lawyers or law firms practicing in, and organized under the rules of, other jurisdictions, whether domestic or foreign, that permit nonlawyers to participate in the management of such firms, have equity ownership in such firms, or share in legal fees generated by such firms; and</li> \n <li>share legal fees arising from such legal services with such other lawyers or law firms to the same extent as the sharing of legal fees is permitted under applicable Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The activities permitted under the preceding portion of this paragraph (e) are subject to the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The association shall not compromise or interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment, the client-lawyer relationship between the client and the lawyer, or the lawyer’s compliance with these rules; and</li> \n <li>Nothing in paragraph (e) is intended to affect the lawyer’s obligation to comply with other applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, or to alter the forms in which a lawyer is permitted to practice, including but not limited to the creation of an alternative business structure in Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The provisions of this rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment. \n[2] The provisions of paragraphs (e) and (f) of this rule are not intended to allow a Georgia lawyer or law firm to create or participate in alternative business structures (ABS) in Georgia. An alternative business structure is a law firm where a nonlawyer is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. A law firm may also be an ABS where another body is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. This rule only allows a Georgia lawyer to work with an ABS outside of the state of Georgia and to share fees for that work.</div>","UrlName":"rule120","Order":46,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"dc8e5cbc-d8e4-40ba-88ce-a3a3fe392f00","ParentId":"68cd6473-79e8-4913-9202-b7d57d4350df","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.</li> \n <li>a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service where such fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3. Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Provide legal services to clients while working with other lawyers or law firms practicing in, and organized under the rules of, other jurisdictions, whether domestic or foreign, that permit non-lawyers to participate in the management of such firms, have equity ownership in such firms, or share in legal fees generated by such firms; and</li> \n <li>Share legal fees arising from such legal services with such other lawyers or law firms to the same extent as the sharing of legal fees is permitted under applicable Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> The activities permitted under the preceding portion of this paragraph (e) are subject to the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The association shall not compromise or interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment, the client-lawyer relationship between the client and the lawyer, or the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; and</li> \n <li>Nothing in this paragraph (e) is intended to affect the lawyer’s obligation to comply with other applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, or to alter the forms in which a lawyer is permitted to practice, including but not limited to the creation of an alternative business structure in Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment. \n[2] The provisions of paragraph (e) of this Rule are not intended to allow a Georgia lawyer or law firm to create or participate in alternative business structures (ABS) in Georgia. An alternative business structure is a law firm where a non-lawyer is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. A law firm may also be an ABS where another body is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. This Rule only allows a Georgia lawyer to work with an ABS outside of the state of Georgia and to share fees for that work.</div>","UrlName":"revision274"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1ac78e46-95b3-425a-8dfa-49896af55719","Title":"RULE 5.5. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.</li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or</li> \n <li>hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the Domestic Lawyer, or a person the Domestic Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or</li> \n <li>are not within paragraphs (c) (2) or (c) (3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are provided to the Domestic Lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or</li> \n <li>are services that the Domestic Lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Foreign Lawyer shall not, except as authorized by this Rule or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law, or hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. Such a Foreign Lawyer does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in this jurisdiction when on a temporary basis the Foreign Lawyer performs services in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal held or to be held in a jurisdiction outside the United States if the Foreign Lawyer, or a person the Foreign Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or by order of the tribunal to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceedings held or to be held in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice;</li> \n <li> are not within paragraphs (e) (2) or (e) (3) and\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>are performed for a client who resides or has an office in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authorization; or</li> \n <li>arise out of or are reasonably related to a matter that has a substantial connection to a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authorization; or</li> \n <li>are governed primarily by international law or the law of a non-United States jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Foreign Lawyer who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction subject to the following conditions:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The services are provided to the Foreign Lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; and</li> \n <li>The Foreign Lawyer is and remains in this country in lawful immigration status and complies with all relevant provisions of United States immigration laws.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of the grants of authority found in subsections (e) and (f) above, the Foreign Lawyer must be a member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction, the members of which are admitted to practice as lawyers or counselors at law or the equivalent and subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XXI, Rule 121, Provision Of Legal Services Following Determination Of Major Disaster, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XV, Rules 91-95, Student Practice Rule, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XVI, Rules 97-103, Law School Graduates, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XX, Rules 114-120, Extended Public Service Program, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li> Any domestic or foreign lawyer who has been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia pro hac vice, pursuant to the Uniform Rules of the various classes of courts in Georgia, shall pay all required fees and costs annually as set forth in those Rules. Failure to pay the annual fee by January 15 of each year of admission pro hac vice will result in a late fee of $100 that must be paid no later than March 1 of that year. Failure to pay the annual fees may result in disciplinary action, and said lawyer may be subject to prosecution under the unauthorized practice of law statutes of this state. \n   </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n Comment \n[1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Paragraph (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer assisting another person. \n[2] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3. \n[3] A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se. \n[4] Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a Domestic Lawyer violates paragraph (b) and a Foreign Lawyer violates paragraph (e) if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not physically present here. Such Domestic or Foreign Lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. See also Rules 7.1(a) and 7.5(b). \n[5] There are occasions in which a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk to the interests of their clients, the public or the courts. Paragraph (c) identifies four such circumstances for the Domestic Lawyer. Paragraph (e) identifies four such circumstances for the Foreign Lawyer. The fact that conduct is not so identified does not imply that the conduct is or is not authorized. With the exception of paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), this Rule does not authorize a Domestic Lawyer to establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here. \n[6] There is no single test to determine whether a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's services are provided on a \"temporary basis \"in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under paragraph (c) or paragraph (e). Services may be \"temporary \"even though the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when the Domestic Lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation. \n[7] Paragraphs (c) and (d) apply to Domestic Lawyers. Paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) apply to Foreign Lawyers. Paragraphs (c) and (e) contemplate that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice in the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted and excludes a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who while technically admitted is not authorized to practice, because, for example, the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is on inactive status. \n[8] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a Domestic Lawyer associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. Paragraph (e)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a Foreign Lawyer associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For these paragraphs to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the client. \n[9] Domestic Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (c)(2), a Domestic Lawyer does not violate this Rule when the Domestic Lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a Domestic Lawyer to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the Domestic Lawyer to obtain that authority. \n[10] Paragraph (c)(2) also provides that a Domestic Lawyer rendering services in this jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this Rule when the Domestic Lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is authorized to practice law or in which the Domestic Lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted pro hac vice. Examples of such conduct include meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents. Similarly, a Domestic Lawyer may engage in conduct temporarily in this jurisdiction in connection with pending litigation in another jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized to appear, including taking depositions in this jurisdiction. \n[11] When a Domestic Lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted to appear before a court or administrative agency, paragraph (c)(2) also permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinate Domestic Lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in support of the Domestic Lawyer responsible for the litigation. \n[12] Paragraph (c)(3) permits a Domestic Lawyer, and paragraph (e)(3) permits a Foreign Lawyer, to perform services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if those services are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice. The Domestic Lawyer, however, must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so requires. \n[13] Paragraph (c)(4) permits a Domestic Lawyer to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted but are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3). These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers. Paragraph (e)(4)(i) permits a Foreign Lawyer to provide certain legal services in this jurisdiction on behalf of a client who resides or has an office in the jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice. Paragraph (e)(4)(ii) permits a Foreign Lawyer to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to a matter that has a substantial connection to the jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice. These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers. \n[14] Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted. Paragraphs (e)(3) and (e)(4)(ii) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice. A variety of factors may evidence such a relationship. These include but are not limited to the following: \na. The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's client may have been previously represented by the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer; or \nb.  The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's client may be resident in, have an office in, or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nc. The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction in which the Domestic of Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nd. Significant aspects of the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's work in a specific matter might be conducted in the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted or another jurisdiction; or \ne. A significant aspect of a matter may involve the law of the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nf. Some aspect of the matter may be governed by international law or the law of a non-United State jurisdiction; or \ng. The Lawyer's work on the specific matter in this jurisdiction is authorized by the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted; or \nh. The client's activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the services of their Domestic or Foreign Lawyer in assessing the relative merits of each; or \ni. The services may draw on the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law. \n[15] Paragraph (d) identifies two circumstances in which a Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary basis. Except as provided in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), a Domestic Lawyer who establishes an office or other systematic or continuous presence in this jurisdiction must become admitted to practice law generally in this jurisdiction. \n[16] Paragraph (d)(1) applies to a Domestic Lawyer who is employed by a client to provide legal services to the client or its organizational affiliates, i.e., entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common control with the employer. This paragraph does not authorize the provision of personal legal services to the employer's officers or employees. The paragraph applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government lawyers and others who are employed to render legal services to the employer. The Domestic Lawyer's ability to represent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is licensed generally serves the interests of the employer and does not create an unreasonable risk to the client and others because the employer is well situated to assess the Domestic Lawyer's qualifications and the quality of the Domestic Lawyer's work. \n[17] If an employed Domestic Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic presence in this jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering legal services to the employer, the Domestic Lawyer may be subject to registration or other requirements, including assessments for client protection funds and mandatory continuing legal education. \n[18] Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that a Domestic Lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent. Paragraph (e)(4)(iii) recognizes that a Foreign Lawyer may provide legal services when the services provided are governed by international law or the law of a foreign jurisdiction. \n[19] A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c), (d), (e) or (f) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. See Rule 8.5(a). \n[20] In some circumstances, a Domestic Lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the Domestic Lawyer is not licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction. For example, that may be required when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction and requires knowledge of the law of this jurisdiction. See Rule 1.4. \n[21] Paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f) do not authorize communications advertising legal services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction by Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions. Whether and how Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may communicate the availability of their services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction is governed by Rules 7.1 to 7.5. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule129","Order":47,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"834d702e-4fc9-4d8f-ab00-f158dd071475","Title":"RULE 5.6 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or</li> \n <li>an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client. \n \n[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule135","Order":48,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1e9c7303-39be-4831-aa4e-5808b02acf0e","ParentId":"834d702e-4fc9-4d8f-ab00-f158dd071475","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or</li> \n <li>an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client. \n \n[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision79"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7e48566c-b071-4d13-a6e0-9eff52fc699f","Title":"RULE 5.7 RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW-RELATED SERVICES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall be subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or</li> \n <li>by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The term \"law-related services \"denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case. \n[2] Rule 5.7: Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services need not adhere to the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7(a)(1): Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services. \n[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. \n[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a): Conflict of Interest. \n[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing. \n[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit. \n[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity which the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. \n[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a),(b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law. \n [11] When the full protections of all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule139","Order":49,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"a08edb38-d812-49fa-a936-10631a9356cb","ParentId":"7e48566c-b071-4d13-a6e0-9eff52fc699f","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall be subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or</li> \n <li>by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The term \"law-related services \"denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case. \n[2] Rule 5.7: Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services need not adhere to the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7(a)(1): Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services. \n[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. \n[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a): Conflict of Interest. \n[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing. \n[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit. \n[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity which the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. \n[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a),(b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law. \n [11] When the full protections of all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision80"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a5312e3c-cf09-46db-8444-a96cb25db4a2","Title":"RULE 6.1 VOLUNTARY PRO BONO PUBLIC SERVICE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> provide a substantial portion of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> provide any additional services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;</li> \n <li>delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nIn addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. \nNo reporting rules or requirements may be imposed without specific permission of the Supreme Court granted through amendments to these Rules. \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \nComment \n[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. \n[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. \n[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but who nevertheless cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term \"governmental organizations \"includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies. \n[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory lawyers' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. \n[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remain unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). \n[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups. \n[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. \n[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph. \n[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities. \n[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible. \n[11] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.</div>","UrlName":"rule140","Order":50,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b82d9e9a-f4e1-4e29-8f3d-fc80af791c64","ParentId":"a5312e3c-cf09-46db-8444-a96cb25db4a2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> provide a substantial portion of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> provide any additional services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;</li> \n <li>delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nIn addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. \nNo reporting rules or requirements may be imposed without specific permission of the Supreme Court granted through amendments to these Rules. \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \nComment \n[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. \n[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. \n[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but who nevertheless cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term \"governmental organizations \"includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies. \n[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory lawyers' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. \n[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remain unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). \n[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups. \n[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. \n[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph. \n[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities. \n[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible. \n[11] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.</div>","UrlName":"revision81"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"38a8cf58-1c95-4ca8-8e59-954cb89fb0ff","Title":"RULE 6.2 ACCEPTING APPOINTMENTS","Content":" For good cause a lawyer may seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person. \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See Rule 6.1: Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service. An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services. \n \nAppointed Counsel \n \n[2] For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1: Competence, or if undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust. \n \n[3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules. \n \n[4] This Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.","UrlName":"rule141","Order":51,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a747020c-0915-4a74-aaba-7f57f5ab7fdc","Title":"RULE 6.3 MEMBERSHIP IN LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or</li> \n <li>where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed. \n \n[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances. </div>","UrlName":"rule142","Order":52,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3d8678de-66de-44ab-838b-1ff82df79b9d","ParentId":"a747020c-0915-4a74-aaba-7f57f5ab7fdc","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or</li> \n <li>where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed. \n \n[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances. </div>","UrlName":"revision82"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"655d321f-cd27-40fb-be1a-3a6d92569f7b","Title":"RULE 6.4 LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT INTERESTS","Content":" A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefited by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client. \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. See also Rule 1.2(b): Scope of Representation. Without this Rule, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially benefited.","UrlName":"rule144","Order":53,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"RULE 6.5. NONPROFIT & COURT-ANNEXED LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS","Content":"<ol><li>A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided:<ol><li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and\n </li><li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.\n </li></ol></li><li>Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule.</li><li>The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10.\n </li></ol>The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.Comment [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter.[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. ","UrlName":"rule559","Order":54,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"e5063554-dfd3-4187-898d-44ef77085851","ParentId":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided: \n <ol> \n <li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and</li> \n <li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n(b) Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule. \n(c) The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n Comment \n [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10. \n[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation. \n[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter. \n[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program. \n[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision84"},{"Id":"7842ec92-aaa2-4c67-89c9-57477696681e","ParentId":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided: \n <ol> \n <li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and</li> \n <li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n(b) Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule. \n(c) The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n Comment \n [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10. \n[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation. \n[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter. \n[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program. \n[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision86"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bfbb7abc-4b04-4066-b0d1-fed9bf0dd159","Title":"RULE 7.1 COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER'S SERVICES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. By way of illustration, but not limitation, a communication is false or misleading if it:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;</li> \n <li>is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;</li> \n <li>fails to include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content; or</li> \n <li> contains any information regarding contingent fees, and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"Contingent attorneys' fees refers only to those fees charged by attorneys for their legal services. Such fees are not permitted in all types of cases. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client.\" </li> \n <li> contains the language \"no fee unless you win or collect \"or any similar phrase and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"No fee unless you win or collect \"[or insert the similar language used in the communication] refers only to fees charged by the attorney. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client. Contingent fees are not permitted in all types of cases. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A public communication for which a lawyer has given value must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the context that it is such a communication.</li> \n <li>A lawyer retains ultimate responsibility to insure that all communications concerning the lawyer or the lawyer's services comply with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule governs the content of all communications about a lawyer's services, including the various types of advertising permitted by Rules 7.3 through 7.5. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful. \n[2] The prohibition in sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services of statements that may create \"unjustified expectations \"would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances. \nAffirmative Disclosure \n[3] In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally-based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal, and is therefore a preferable form of regulation to absolute bans or other similar restrictions. For example, there is no significant interest in failing to include the name of at least one accountable attorney in all communications promoting the services of a lawyer or law firm as required by sub-paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services. Nor is there any substantial burden imposed as a result of the affirmative disclaimer requirement of sub-paragraph (a)(6) upon a lawyer who wishes to make a claim in the nature of \"no fee unless you win.\"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that affirmative disclosure of a client's liability for costs and expenses of litigation may be required to prevent consumer confusion over the technical distinction between the meaning and effect of the use of such terms as \"fees \"and \"costs \"in an advertisement. \n[4] Certain promotional communications of a lawyer may, as a result of content or circumstance, tend to mislead a consumer to mistakenly believe that the communication is something other than a form of promotional communication for which the lawyer has paid. Examples of such a communication might include advertisements for seminars on legal topics directed to the lay public when such seminars are sponsored by the lawyer, or a newsletter or newspaper column which appears to inform or to educate about the law. Paragraph (b) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services would require affirmative disclosure that a lawyer has given value in order to generate these types of public communications if such is in fact the case. \nAccountability \n[5] Paragraph (c) makes explicit an advertising attorney's ultimate responsibility for all the lawyer's promotional communications and would suggest that review by the lawyer prior to dissemination is advisable if any doubts exist concerning conformity of the end product with these Rules. Although prior review by disciplinary authorities is not required by these Rules, lawyers are certainly encouraged to contact disciplinary authorities prior to authorizing a promotional communication if there are any doubts concerning either an interpretation of these Rules or their application to the communication.</div>","UrlName":"rule145","Order":55,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d2ffbcb-3e31-4917-b9c4-0122fdb5154a","ParentId":"bfbb7abc-4b04-4066-b0d1-fed9bf0dd159","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may advertise through all forms of public media and through written communication not involving personal contact so long as the communication is not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading. By way of illustration, but not limitation, a communication is false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading if it:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;</li> \n <li>is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;</li> \n <li>fails to include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content; or</li> \n <li> contains any information regarding contingent fees, and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"Contingent attorneys' fees refers only to those fees charged by attorneys for their legal services. Such fees are not permitted in all types of cases. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client.\" </li> \n <li> contains the language 'no fee unless you win or collect' or any similar phrase and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"No fee unless you win or collect \"[or insert the similar language used in the communication] refers only to fees charged by the attorney. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client. Contingent fees are not permitted in all types of cases. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A public communication for which a lawyer has given value must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the context that it is such a communication.</li> \n <li>A lawyer retains ultimate responsibility to insure that all communications concerning the lawyer or the lawyer's services comply with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule governs the content of all communications about a lawyer's services, including the various types of advertising permitted by Rules 7.3 through 7.5. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful. \n[2] The prohibition in sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services of statements that may create \"unjustified expectations \"would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances. \nAffirmative Disclosure \n[3] In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally-based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal, and is therefore a preferable form of regulation to absolute bans or other similar restrictions. For example, there is no significant interest in failing to include the name of at least one accountable attorney in all communications promoting the services of a lawyer or law firm as required by sub-paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services. Nor is there any substantial burden imposed as a result of the affirmative disclaimer requirement of sub-paragraph (a)(6) upon a lawyer who wishes to make a claim in the nature of \"no fee unless you win.\"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that affirmative disclosure of a client's liability for costs and expenses of litigation may be required to prevent consumer confusion over the technical distinction between the meaning and effect of the use of such terms as \"fees \"and \"costs \"in an advertisement. \n[4] Certain promotional communications of a lawyer may, as a result of content or circumstance, tend to mislead a consumer to mistakenly believe that the communication is something other than a form of promotional communication for which the lawyer has paid. Examples of such a communication might include advertisements for seminars on legal topics directed to the lay public when such seminars are sponsored by the lawyer, or a newsletter or newspaper column which appears to inform or to educate about the law. Paragraph (b) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services would require affirmative disclosure that a lawyer has given value in order to generate these types of public communications if such is in fact the case. \nAccountability \n[5] Paragraph (c) makes explicit an advertising attorney's ultimate responsibility for all the lawyer's promotional communications and would suggest that review by the lawyer prior to dissemination is advisable if any doubts exist concerning conformity of the end product with these Rules. Although prior review by disciplinary authorities is not required by these Rules, lawyers are certainly encouraged to contact disciplinary authorities prior to authorizing a promotional communication if there are any doubts concerning either an interpretation of these Rules or their application to the communication.</div>","UrlName":"revision272"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e0c4c6e2-31c8-4eaf-b4ba-0568213fc817","Title":"RULE 7.2 ADVERTISING","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical;</li> \n <li>outdoor advertising;</li> \n <li>radio or television;</li> \n <li>written, electronic or recorded communication.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.</li> \n <li> Prominent disclosures.  Any advertisement for legal services directed to potential clients in Georgia, or intended to solicit employment for delivery of any legal services in Georgia, must include prominent disclosures, clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, if written, and clearly intelligible by an average person, if spoken aloud, of the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disclosure of identity and physical location of attorney. Any advertisement shall include the name, physical location and telephone number of each lawyer or law firm who paid for the advertisement and who takes full personal responsibility for the advertisement.  In disclosing the physical location, the responsible lawyer shall state the full address of the location of the principal bona fide office of each lawyer who is prominently identified pursuant to this paragraph.  For the purposes of this Rule, a bona fide office is defined as a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm from which the lawyer or law firm furnishes legal services on a regular and continuing basis. In the absence of a bona fide physical office, the lawyer shall prominently disclose the full address listed with the State Bar of Georgia or other Bar to which the lawyer is admitted.  A lawyer who uses a referral service shall ensure that the service discloses the location of the lawyer's bona fide office, or the registered bar address, when a referral is made.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of referral practice.  If the lawyer or law firm will refer the majority of callers to other attorneys, that fact must be disclosed and the lawyer or law firm must comply with the provisions of Rule 7.3(c) regarding referral services.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of spokespersons and portrayals. Any advertisement that includes a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, portrayal of a client by a non-client, or any paid testimonial or endorsement, shall include prominent disclosure of the use of a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, or of a client by a non-client.</li> \n <li>Disclosures regarding fees. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, which statement shall be available to the client at the time of retainer for any such service.</li> \n <li>Appearance of legal notices or pleadings. Any advertisement that includes any representation that resembles a legal pleading, notice, contract or other legal document shall include prominent disclosure that the document is an advertisement rather than a legal document.</li> \n </ol> \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \n Comment \n \n [1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.\n \n [2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance. \n [3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against \"undignified \"advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. \n [4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation. \n Record of Advertising \n [5] Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule147","Order":56,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"00502313-3b79-42a3-a55c-6c7e9b2d5cc5","ParentId":"e0c4c6e2-31c8-4eaf-b4ba-0568213fc817","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical;</li> \n <li>outdoor advertising;</li> \n <li>radio or television;</li> \n <li>written, electronic or recorded communication.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.</li> \n <li> Prominent disclosures.  Any advertisement for legal services directed to potential clients in Georgia, or intended to solicit employment for delivery of any legal services in Georgia, must include prominent disclosures, clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, if written, and clearly intelligible by an average person, if spoken aloud, of the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disclosure of identity and physical location of attorney. Any advertisement shall include the name, physical location and telephone number of each lawyer or law firm who paid for the advertisement and who takes full personal responsibility for the advertisement.  In disclosing the physical location, the responsible lawyer shall state the full address of the location of the principal bona fide office of each lawyer who is prominently identified pursuant to this paragraph.  For the purposes of this Rule, a bona fide office is defined as a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm from which the lawyer or law firm furnishes legal services on a regular and continuing basis. In the absence of a bona fide physical office, the lawyer shall prominently disclose the full address listed with the State Bar of Georgia or other Bar to which the lawyer is admitted.  A lawyer who uses a referral service shall ensure that the service discloses the location of the lawyer's bona fide office, or the registered bar address, when a referral is made.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of referral practice.  If the lawyer or law firm will refer the majority of callers to other attorneys, that fact must be disclosed and the lawyer or law firm must comply with the provisions of Rule 7.3(c) regarding referral services.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of spokespersons and portrayals. Any advertisement that includes a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, portrayal of a client by a non-client, or any paid testimonial or endorsement, shall include prominent disclosure of the use of a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, or of a client by a non-client.</li> \n <li>Disclosures regarding fees. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, which statement shall be available to the client at the time of retainer for any such service.</li> \n <li>Appearance of legal notices or pleadings. Any advertisement that includes any representation that resembles a legal pleading, notice, contract or other legal document shall include prominent disclosure that the document is an advertisement rather than a legal document.</li> \n </ol> \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \n Comment \n \n [1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.\n \n [2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance. \n [3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against \"undignified \"advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. \n [4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation. \n Record of Advertising \n [5] Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision11"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1b5c4bd6-d92a-4e80-a484-2f534a89761c","Title":"RULE 7.3 DIRECT CONTACT WITH PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS","Content":"<ol><li>A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of the lawyer, the lawyer's firm, lawyer's partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:<ol><li>it has been made known to the lawyer that a person does not desire to receive communications from the lawyer;</li><li>the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence;</li><li>the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication; or</li><li>the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.</li></ol></li><li>Written communications to a prospective client, other than a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes is a former client, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment shall be plainly marked \"Advertisement \"on the face of the envelope and on the top of each page of the written communication in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the letter.</li><li>A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer's employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer's employment by a client; except that the lawyer may pay for public communications permitted by Rule 7.1 and except as follows:<ol><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service, if the service:<ol><li>does not engage in conduct that would violate the Rules if engaged in by a lawyer;</li><li>provides an explanation to the prospective client regarding how the lawyers are selected by the service to participate in the service; and</li><li>discloses to the prospective client how many lawyers are participating in the service and that those lawyers have paid the service a fee to participate in the service.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service, including a fee which is calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter, provided such bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service meets the following criteria:<ol><li>the lawyer referral service shall be operated in the public interest for the purpose of referring prospective clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agencies who can provide the assistance the clients need. Such organization shall file annually with the State Disciplinary Board a report showing its rules and regulations, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating and the names and addresses of the lawyers participating in the service;</li><li>the sponsoring bar association for the lawyer referral service must be open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in this state who maintain an office within the geographical area served, and who meet reasonable objectively determinable experience requirements established by the bar association;</li><li>the combined fees charged by a lawyer and the lawyer referral service to a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges which the client would have paid had no service been involved; and</li><li>a lawyer who is a member of the qualified lawyer referral service must maintain in force a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the use of the lawyer's services, the lawyer's partner or associates services so long as the communications of the organization are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading;</li><li>A lawyer may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment as a private practitioner for the lawyer, a partner or associate through direct personal contact or through live telephone contact, with a nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.</li><li>A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person who seeks to employ the lawyer does so as a result of conduct by any person or organization that would violate these Rules if engaged in by a lawyer.</li></ol>The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.CommentDirect Personal Contact[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in solicitation through direct personal contact by a lawyer of prospective clients known to need legal services. It subjects the lay person to the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a direct interpersonal encounter. A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from the lawyer's own interest, which may color the advice and representation offered the vulnerable prospect.[2] The situation is therefore fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation and overreaching. The potential for abuse inherent in solicitation of prospective clients through personal contact justifies its prohibition, particularly since the direct written contact permitted under paragraph (b) of this Rule offers an alternative means of communicating necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Also included in the prohibited types of personal contact are direct, personal contact through an intermediary and live contact by telephone.Direct Written Solicitation[3] Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule, promotional communication by a lawyer through direct written contact is generally permissible. The public's need to receive information concerning their legal rights and the availability of legal services has been consistently recognized as a basis for permitting direct written communication since this type of communication may often be the best and most effective means of informing. So long as this stream of information flows cleanly, it will be permitted to flow freely.[4] Certain narrowly-drawn restrictions on this type of communication are justified by a substantial state interest in facilitating the public's intelligent selection of counsel, including the restrictions of paragraphs (a) (3) and (a) (4) which proscribe direct mailings to persons such as an injured and hospitalized accident victim or the bereaved family of a deceased.[5] In order to make it clear that the communication is commercial in nature, paragraph (b) requires inclusion of an appropriate affirmative \"advertisement \"disclaimer. Again, the traditional exception for contact with close friends, relatives and former clients is recognized and permits elimination of the disclaimer in direct written contact with these persons.[6] This Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer[7] A lawyer is allowed to pay for communications permitted by these Rules, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency, a prepaid legal services plan or prepaid legal insurance organization may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices.","UrlName":"rule149","Order":57,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"de8287f5-531e-4668-8a96-2fe3b21b971a","ParentId":"1b5c4bd6-d92a-4e80-a484-2f534a89761c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of the lawyer, the lawyer's firm, lawyer's partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>it has been made known to the lawyer that a person does not desire to receive communications from the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence;</li> \n <li>the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Written communications to a prospective client, other than a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes is a former client, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment shall be plainly marked \"Advertisement \"on the face of the envelope and on the top of each page of the written communication in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the letter.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer's employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer's employment by a client; except that the lawyer may pay for public communications permitted by Rule 7.1 and except as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service, if the service:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>does not engage in conduct that would violate the Rules if engaged in by a lawyer;</li> \n <li>provides an explanation to the prospective client regarding how the lawyers are selected by the service to participate in the service; and</li> \n <li>discloses to the prospective client how many lawyers are participating in the service and that those lawyers have paid the service a fee to participate in the service.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/referral-service.cfm/"> bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service </a> , including a fee which is calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter, provided such bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service meets the following criteria:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the lawyer referral service shall be operated in the public interest for the purpose of referring prospective clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agencies who can provide the assistance the clients need. Such organization shall file annually with the State Disciplinary Board a report showing its rules and regulations, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating and the names and addresses of the lawyers participating in the service;</li> \n <li>the sponsoring bar association for the lawyer referral service must be open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in this state who maintain an office within the geographical area served, and who meet reasonable objectively determinable experience requirements established by the bar association;</li> \n <li>the combined fees charged by a lawyer and the lawyer referral service to a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges which the client would have paid had no service been involved; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer who is a member of the qualified lawyer referral service must maintain in force a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the use of the lawyer's services, the lawyer's partner or associates services so long as the communications of the organization are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading;</li> \n <li>A lawyer may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment as a private practitioner for the lawyer, a partner or associate through direct personal contact or through live telephone contact, with a nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person who seeks to employ the lawyer does so as a result of conduct by any person or organization that would violate these Rules if engage in by a lawyer.</li> \n</ol>\nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.\n Comment\n Direct Personal Contact\n[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in solicitation through direct personal contact by a lawyer of prospective clients known to need legal services. It subjects the lay person to the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a direct interpersonal encounter. A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from the lawyer's own interest, which may color the advice and representation offered the vulnerable prospect.\n[2] The situation is therefore fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation and overreaching. The potential for abuse inherent in solicitation of prospective clients through personal contact justifies its prohibition, particularly since the direct written contact permitted under paragraph (b) of this Rule offers an alternative means of communicating necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Also included in the prohibited types of personal contact are direct, personal contact through an intermediary and live contact by telephone.\n Direct Written Solicitation\n[3] Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule, promotional communication by a lawyer through direct written contact is generally permissible. The public's need to receive information concerning their legal rights and the availability of legal services has been consistently recognized as a basis for permitting direct written communication since this type of communication may often be the best and most effective means of informing. So long as this stream of information flows cleanly, it will be permitted to flow freely.\n[4] Certain narrowly-drawn restrictions on this type of communication are justified by a substantial state interest in facilitating the public's intelligent selection of counsel, including the restrictions of paragraphs (a) (3) and (a) (4) which proscribe direct mailings to persons such as an injured and hospitalized accident victim or the bereaved family of a deceased.\n[5] In order to make it clear that the communication is commercial in nature, paragraph (b) requires inclusion of an appropriate affirmative \"advertisement \"disclaimer. Again, the traditional exception for contact with close friends, relatives and former clients is recognized and permits elimination of the disclaimer in direct written contact with these persons.\n[6] This Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.\n Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer\n[7] A lawyer is allowed to pay for communications permitted by these Rules, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency, a prepaid legal services plan or prepaid legal insurance organization may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices.","UrlName":"revision88"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a47de23f-1487-46e7-9b5b-7fb860002ed6","Title":"RULE 7.4 COMMUNICATION OF FIELDS OF PRACTICE","Content":" A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer who is a specialist in a particular field of law by experience, specialized training or education, or is certified by a recognized and bona fide professional entity, may communicate such specialty or certification so long as the statement is not false or misleading. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. \n \n[2] A lawyer may truthfully communicate the fact that the lawyer is a specialist or is certified in a particular field of law by experience or as a result of having been certified as a \"specialist \"by successfully completing a particular program of legal specialization. An example of a proper use of the term would be \"Certified as a Civil Trial Specialist by XYZ Institute \"provided such was in fact the case, such statement would not be false or misleading and provided further that the Civil Trial Specialist program of XYZ Institute is a recognized and bona fide professional entity.","UrlName":"rule151","Order":58,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"839d714d-6690-434e-a388-6b7fdebdcc26","ParentId":"a47de23f-1487-46e7-9b5b-7fb860002ed6","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer who is a specialist in a particular field of law by experience, specialized training or education, or is certified by a recognized and bona fide professional entity, may communicate such specialty or certification so long as the statement is not false or misleading. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. \n \n[2] A lawyer may truthfully communicate the fact that the lawyer is a specialist or is certified in a particular field of law by experience or as a result of having been certified as a \"specialist \"by successfully completing a particular program of legal specialization. An example of a proper use of the term would be \"Certified as a Civil Trial Specialist by XYZ Institute \"provided such was in fact the case, such statement would not be false or misleading and provided further that the Civil Trial Specialist program of XYZ Institute is a recognized and bona fide professional entity. </div>","UrlName":"revision10"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ed01a76-f677-4498-8f1f-892cfa61bcb0","Title":"RULE 7.5 FIRM NAMES AND LETTERHEADS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use a firm name, trade name, letterhead, or other professional designation that is false or misleading.</li> \n <li>A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer holding public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.</li> \n <li>Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] Firm names and letterheads are subject to the general requirement of all advertising that the communication must not be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. Therefore, lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for example, \"Smith and Jones,\"for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law. \n[2] Firm names consisting entirely of the names of deceased or retired partners are permitted and have proven a useful means of identification.</div>","UrlName":"rule153","Order":59,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"77822a2f-afaa-4b47-8b0c-f4f084c47b38","ParentId":"2ed01a76-f677-4498-8f1f-892cfa61bcb0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.</li> \n <li>A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer holding public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.</li> \n <li>Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.</li> \n <li> A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the trade name includes the name of at least one of the lawyers practicing under said name. A law firm name consisting solely of the name or names of deceased or retired members of the firm does not have to include the name of an active member of the firm; and</li> \n <li>the trade name does not imply a connection with a government entity, with a public or charitable legal services organization or any other organization, association or institution or entity, unless there is, in fact, a connection.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] Firm names and letterheads are subject to the general requirement of all advertising that the communication must not be false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading. Therefore, lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for example, \"Smith and Jones,\"for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law. \n [2] Trade names may be used so long as the name includes the name of at least one or more of the lawyers actively practicing with the firm. Firm names consisting entirely of the names of deceased or retired partners have traditionally been permitted and have proven a useful means of identification. Sub-paragraph (e)(1) permits their continued use as an exception to the requirement that a firm name include the name of at least one active member. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision292"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"29e3311e-ee9c-48d1-bec2-87e9e90d46d2","Title":"RULE 8.1 BAR ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY MATTERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware. \n \n[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule. \n \n[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship. </div>","UrlName":"rule154","Order":60,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2ed5246a-3d47-4a8a-b200-3eb31db8b84f","ParentId":"29e3311e-ee9c-48d1-bec2-87e9e90d46d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware. \n \n[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule. \n \n[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship. </div>","UrlName":"revision90"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"50e8e9d0-27d2-4d37-9a3f-bed1bafa6807","Title":"RULE 8.2 JUDICIAL AND LEGAL OFFICIALS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. \n \n[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity. \n \n[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized. </div>","UrlName":"rule155","Order":61,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"580d4c72-d73b-4b11-9658-ba32379d5370","ParentId":"50e8e9d0-27d2-4d37-9a3f-bed1bafa6807","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. \n \n[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity. \n \n[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized. </div>","UrlName":"revision91"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e0444a85-d7c3-49ad-9ba0-20caeac6f2c3","Title":"RULE 8.3 REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should inform the appropriate authority.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they know of a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense. </div>","UrlName":"rule157","Order":62,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"12edb664-0ca8-4634-9280-5510e9fdc82e","ParentId":"e0444a85-d7c3-49ad-9ba0-20caeac6f2c3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should inform the appropriate authority.</li> \n</ol>\n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they know of a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.","UrlName":"revision92"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"747cef32-18d7-4ab9-927e-7587a7e03e5b","Title":"RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a felony;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law;</li> \n <li>engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;</li> \n <li>fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the time appointed in the order or judgment;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>state an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>state an ability to achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable Rules of judicial conduct or other law; or</li> \n <li>commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer has admitted in judicio, the commission of such act.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, conviction shall have the meaning set forth in Rule 1.0 (e).</li> \n <li>The record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings under these disciplinary Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to cause any infringement of the existing inherent right of Georgia Superior Courts to suspend and disbar lawyers from practice based upon a conviction of a crime as specified in paragraphs (a) (1), (a) (2) and (a) (3) above.</li> \n <li>Rule 8.4 (a) (1) does not apply to any of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for which there is no disciplinary penalty.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) through (c) is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevents a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer can not. \n[2] This Rule, as its predecessor, is drawn in terms of acts involving \"moral turpitude \"with, however, a recognition that some such offenses concern matters of personal morality and have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Here the concern is limited to those matters which fall under both the rubric of \"moral turpitude \"and involve underlying conduct relating to the fitness of the lawyer to practice law. \n[3] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving \"moral turpitude.\"That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. \n[4] Reserved. \n[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. \n[6] Persons holding public office assume responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.</div>","UrlName":"rule160","Order":63,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"d0124638-c0d6-45f2-b59e-01153016f645","ParentId":"747cef32-18d7-4ab9-927e-7587a7e03e5b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a felony;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law;</li> \n <li>engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;</li> \n <li>fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the time appointed in the order or judgment;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>state an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>state an ability to achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or</li> \n <li>commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer has admitted in judicio, the commission of such act.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> For purposes of this Rule, conviction shall include any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>a guilty plea;</li> \n <li>a plea of nolo contendere;</li> \n <li>a verdict of guilty; or</li> \n <li>a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings under these disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to cause any infringement of the existing inherent right of Georgia Superior Courts to suspend and disbar lawyers from practice based upon a conviction of a crime as specified in paragraphs (a) (1), (a) (2) and (a) (3) above.</li> \n <li>Rule 8.4 (a) (1) does not apply to any of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for which there is no disciplinary penalty.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) through (c) is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevents a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer can not. \n[2] This Rule, as its predecessor, is drawn in terms of acts involving \"moral turpitude \"with, however, a recognition that some such offenses concern matters of personal morality and have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Here the concern is limited to those matters which fall under both the rubric of \"moral turpitude \"and involve underlying conduct relating to the fitness of the lawyer to practice law. \n[3] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving \"moral turpitude.\"That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. \n[4] Reserved. \n[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. \n[6] Persons holding public office assume responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.</div>","UrlName":"revision393"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bcc5b884-9b3f-4809-99a8-69f9a43fa6bd","Title":"RULE 8.5 DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF LAW","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.</li> \n <li> Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and</li> \n <li>for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n Comment\n Disciplinary Authority\n[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rule 9.4: Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters.\n Choice of Law\n[2] A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.\n[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.\n[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction.\n[5] When a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule.\n[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.\n[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise. ","UrlName":"rule163","Order":64,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f63d4542-aaf7-4886-b136-e8b35b084856","ParentId":"bcc5b884-9b3f-4809-99a8-69f9a43fa6bd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.</li> \n <li> Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and</li> \n <li>for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n Comment \n Disciplinary Authority \n[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rule 9.4: Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters. \n Choice of Law \n[2] A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction. \n[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty. \n[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction. \n[5] When a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule. \n[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules. \n[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise. </div>","UrlName":"revision94"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b3d91ad7-b726-4a79-8425-78f03a16fd09","Title":"RULE 9.1 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Members of the State Bar of Georgia shall, within sixty days, notify the State Bar of Georgia of:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>being admitted to the practice of law in another jurisdiction and the dates of admission;</li> \n <li>being convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law; or</li> \n <li>the imposition of discipline by any jurisdiction other than the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"discipline \"shall include any sanction imposed as the result of conduct that would be in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if occurring in Georgia.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"jurisdiction \"shall include state, federal, territorial and non-United States courts and authorities.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n [1] The State Bar of Georgia is the regulatory authority created by the Supreme Court of Georgia to oversee the practice of law in Georgia. In order to provide effective disciplinary programs, the State Bar of Georgia needs information about its members. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule166","Order":65,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"94b9b094-1aa5-4da2-b836-58f676f1412f","ParentId":"b3d91ad7-b726-4a79-8425-78f03a16fd09","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Members of the State Bar of Georgia shall, within sixty days, notify the State Bar of Georgia of:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>being admitted to the practice of law in another jurisdiction and the dates of admission;</li> \n <li>being convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law; or</li> \n <li>the imposition of discipline by any jurisdiction other than the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"discipline \"shall include any sanction imposed as the result of conduct that would be in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if occurring in Georgia.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"jurisdiction \"shall include state, federal, territorial and non-United States courts and authorities.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n [1] The State Bar of Georgia is the regulatory authority created by the Supreme Court of Georgia to oversee the practice of law in Georgia. In order to provide effective disciplinary programs, the State Bar of Georgia needs information about its members. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision95"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24dd6504-aaff-4eed-9dad-210ffda7f23e","Title":"RULE 9.2 RESTRICTIONS ON FILING DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINTS","Content":" A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement containing a condition that prohibits or restricts a person from filing a disciplinary complaint, or that requires the person to request dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The disciplinary system provides protection to the general public from those lawyers who are not morally fit to practice law. One problem in the past has been the lawyer who settles the civil claim/disciplinary complaint with the injured party on the basis that the injured party not bring a disciplinary complaint or request the dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint. The lawyer is then is free to injure other members of the general public. \n \n[2] To prevent such abuses, this Rule prohibits a lawyer from entering into any agreement containing a condition which prevents a person from filing or pursuing a disciplinary complaint.","UrlName":"rule182","Order":66,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"RULE 9.3 COOPERATION WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY","Content":" During the investigation of a matter pursuant to these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the State Disciplinary Board charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"rule196","Order":67,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"432150ec-fffc-4697-8cb3-1770af2b95e9","ParentId":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"Version 3","Content":" During the investigation of a grievance filed under these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the State Disciplinary Board charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"revision395"},{"Id":"a89fe2f0-d6b3-429a-800e-db4fb74e5464","ParentId":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"Version 2","Content":" During the investigation of a grievance filed under these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the Investigative Panel charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"revision300"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cfbdd4c5-e0f2-431a-b8bb-f0f79a4778d2","Title":"RULE 9.4: JURISDICTION AND RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Jurisdiction. Any lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts committed prior to resignation, suspension, disbarment, or removal from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar of Georgia, or with respect to acts subsequent thereto that amount to the practice of law or constitute a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any Rules or Code subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in lieu thereof, and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer specially admitted by a court of this jurisdiction for a particular proceeding and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this jurisdiction, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li> Reciprocal Discipline. Upon being suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia has been suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, the Office of the General Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. Nothing in this Rule shall prevent a lawyer suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction from filing a Petition for Voluntary Discipline under Rule 4-227.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia has been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall issue a notice to the respondent that shall show the date of the disbarment or suspension in the other jurisdiction and shall include a copy of the order therefor.  The notice shall direct the respondent to show cause to the State Disciplinary Review Board within 30 days from service of the notice why the imposition of substantially similar discipline in this jurisdiction would be unwarranted. The notice shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1, and any response thereto shall be served upon the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li> If neither party objects within 30 days, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall recommend imposition of substantially similar discipline and shall file that recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia within 60 days after the time for the filing of objections expires. The Office of the General Counsel or the respondent may object to imposition of substantially similar discipline by demonstrating that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or</li> \n <li>There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or</li> \n <li>The reason for the original disciplinary status no longer exists; or</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The conduct did not occur within the state of Georgia; and,</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed by the foreign jurisdiction exceeds the level of discipline allowed under these Rules; or</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The discipline would if imposed in identical form be unduly severe or would require action not contemplated by these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n If the State Disciplinary Review Board finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated that any of those elements exist, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall make such other recommendation to the Supreme Court of Georgia as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. </li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board may consider exceptions from either the Office of the General Counsel or the respondent on the grounds enumerated at paragraph (b) (3) of this Rule and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the State Disciplinary Review Board within 30 days of service of the Notice of Reciprocal Discipline. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond. The State Disciplinary Review Board shall file its report and recommendation within 60 days of receiving the response to exceptions.</li> \n <li>In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct, or has been removed from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar of Georgia, shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the removal from practice for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this State.</li> \n <li>Discipline imposed by another jurisdiction but of a lesser nature than disbarment or suspension may be considered in aggravation of discipline in any other disciplinary proceeding.</li> \n <li>For good cause, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board in a reciprocal discipline proceeding may make an interim recommendation to the Supreme Court of Georgia that the respondent be immediately suspended pending final disposition.</li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, the word “jurisdiction” means any State, Territory, country, or federal court.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdiction and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit. Any procedure that so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified. The spectacle of a lawyer disbarred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. \n[2] Reserved. \n[3] The imposition of discipline in one jurisdiction does not mean that Georgia and every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted must necessarily impose discipline. The State Disciplinary Review Board has jurisdiction to recommend reciprocal discipline when a lawyer is suspended or disbarred in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed or otherwise admitted. \n[4] A judicial determination of misconduct by the respondent in another jurisdiction is conclusive, and not subject to re-litigation in the forum jurisdiction. The State Disciplinary Review Board should recommend substantially similar discipline unless it determines, after review limited to the record of the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, that one of the grounds specified in paragraph (b) (3) exists. \n[5] For purposes of this Rule, the suspension or placement of a lawyer on inactive status in another jurisdiction because of want of sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairment of competency as a lawyer shall be considered a disciplinary suspension under the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule203","Order":68,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"d109c0e2-935b-4278-abaf-561b3255d262","ParentId":"cfbdd4c5-e0f2-431a-b8bb-f0f79a4778d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Jurisdiction. Any lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts committed prior to resignation, suspension, disbarment, or removal from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, or with respect to acts subsequent thereto which amount to the practice of law or constitute a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any Rules or Code subsequently adopted by the court in lieu thereof, and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer specially admitted by a court of this jurisdiction for a particular proceeding and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this jurisdiction, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li> Reciprocal Discipline. Upon being suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia has been suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, the Office of General Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. Nothing in the Rule shall prevent a lawyer suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction from filing a petition for voluntary discipline under Rule 4-227.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia has been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall docket the matter and forthwith issue a notice directed to the lawyer containing:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A copy of the order from the other jurisdiction; and</li> \n <li>A notice approved by the Review Panel that the lawyer must inform the Office of General Counsel and the Review Panel, within thirty days from service of the notice, of any claim by the lawyer predicated upon the grounds set forth in paragraph (b)(3) below, that the imposition of the substantially similar discipline in this jurisdiction would be unwarranted and the reasons for that claim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In the event the discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction has been stayed there, any reciprocal discipline imposed in this jurisdiction shall be deferred until the stay expires.</li> \n <li> Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1), the Review Panel shall recommend to the Georgia Supreme Court substantially similar discipline, or removal from practice on the grounds provided in Rule 4-104, unless the Office of General Counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or the Review Panel finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or</li> \n <li>There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or</li> \n <li>The reason for the original disciplinary status no longer exists; or</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the conduct did not occur within the state of Georgia; and,</li> \n <li>the discipline imposed by the foreign jurisdiction exceeds the level of discipline allowed under these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>the discipline would if imposed in identical form be unduly severe or would require action not contemplated by these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n If the Review Panel determines that any of those elements exists, the Review Panel shall make such other recommendation to the Georgia Supreme Court as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. </li> \n <li>The Review Panel may consider exceptions from either the Office of General Counsel or the Respondent on the grounds enumerated at Part (b)(3) of this Rule, and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions in briefs shall be filed with the Review Panel within 30 days from notice of the Notice of Reciprocal Discipline. The responding party shall have 10 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.</li> \n <li>In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct, or has been removed from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the removal from practice for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state.</li> \n <li>Discipline imposed by another jurisdiction but of a lesser nature than disbarment or suspension may be considered in aggravation of discipline in any other disciplinary proceeding.</li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, the word \"jurisdiction \"means any state, territory, country or federal court.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdiction and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit. Any procedure which so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified. The spectacle of a lawyer disbarred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. \n[2] Reserved. \n[3] The imposition of discipline in one jurisdiction does not mean that Georgia and every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted must necessarily impose discipline. The Review Panel has jurisdiction to recommend reciprocal discipline on the basis of public discipline imposed by a jurisdiction in which the respondent is licensed. \n[4] A judicial determination of misconduct by the respondent in another jurisdiction is conclusive, and not subject to relitigation in the forum jurisdiction. The Review Panel should recommend substantially similar discipline unless it determines, after review limited to the record of the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, that one of the grounds specified in paragraph (b)(3) exists. This Rule applies whether or not the respondent is admitted to practice in the foreign jurisdiction. See also, Rule 8.5, Comment [1]. \n[5] For purposes of this Rule, the suspension or placement of a lawyer on inactive status in another jurisdiction because of want of sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairment of competency as an attorney shall be considered a disciplinary suspension under the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"revision96"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ac435e7c-373e-4aac-b77c-d9c71b932185","Title":"RULE 9.5 LAWYER AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is a public official and represents the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, is bound by the provisions of these Rules.</li> \n <li>No provision of these Rules shall be construed to prohibit such a lawyer from taking a legal position adverse to the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, when such action is authorized or required by the U. S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution or statutes of the United States or Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule207","Order":69,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"8327f56a-6a36-4e71-a8ee-520d4acce0f2","ParentId":"ac435e7c-373e-4aac-b77c-d9c71b932185","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is a public official and represents the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, is bound by the provisions of these Rules.</li> \n <li>No provision of these Rules shall be construed to prohibit such a lawyer from taking a legal position adverse to the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, when such action is authorized or required by the U. S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution or statutes of the United States or Georgia.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"revision97"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f92c6b0e-b411-472c-a4b2-770688d9c965","Title":"Rule 4-103. Multiple Violations","Content":"A finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these Rules shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment. A Special Master and the State Disciplinary Review Board may exercise this discretionary power when the question is appropriately before them. Any discipline imposed by another jurisdiction as contemplated by Rule 9.4 may be considered a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of this Rule.","UrlName":"rule92","Order":70,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b080bb20-ecaf-4931-b232-ddbc4336b93c","ParentId":"f92c6b0e-b411-472c-a4b2-770688d9c965","Title":"Version 2","Content":"A finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these rules shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment. The Review Panel may exercise this discretionary power when the question is appropriately before that Panel. Any discipline imposed by another jurisdiction as contemplated by Rule 9.4 may be considered a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of this Rule.","UrlName":"revision156"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"34e1b5c6-65de-45b3-9fcb-e36449fd8f19","Title":"Rule 4-104. Mental Incapacity and Substance Abuse","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Mental illness, cognitive impairment, alcohol abuse, or substance abuse, to the extent of impairing competency as a lawyer, shall constitute grounds for removing a lawyer from the practice of law.</li> \n <li>Upon a determination by the State Disciplinary Board that a lawyer may be impaired or incapacitated to practice law as a result of one of the conditions described in paragraph (a) above, the Board may, in its sole discretion, make a confidential referral of the matter to an appropriate medical or mental health professional for the purposes of evaluation and possible referral to treatment and/or peer support groups. The Board may, in its discretion, defer disciplinary findings and proceedings based upon the impairment or incapacity of a lawyer to afford the lawyer an opportunity to be evaluated and, if necessary, to begin recovery. In such situations the medical or mental health professional shall report to the State Disciplinary Board and the Office of the General Counsel concerning the lawyer’s progress toward recovery. A lawyer’s refusal to cooperate with the medical or mental health professional or to participate in the evaluation or recommended treatment may be grounds for further proceedings under these Rules, including emergency suspension proceedings pursuant to Rule 4-108.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule94","Order":71,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"75437d69-f8ca-4720-8c3b-9f80419a12a6","ParentId":"34e1b5c6-65de-45b3-9fcb-e36449fd8f19","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Want of a sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairing competency as an attorney, when found to exist under the procedure outlined in Part IV, Chapter 2 of these Rules, shall constitute grounds for removing the attorney from the practice of law. Notice of final judgment taking such action shall be given by the Review Panel as provided in Rule 4-220 (a).</li> \n <li>Upon a finding by either panel of the State Disciplinary Board that an attorney may be impaired or incapacitated to practice law due to mental incapacity or substance abuse, that panel may, in its sole discretion, make a confidential referral of the matter to the Lawyer Assistance Program for the purposes of confrontation and referral of the attorney to treatment centers and peer support groups. Either panel may, in its discretion, defer disciplinary findings and proceedings based upon the impairment or incapacitation of an attorney pending attempts by the Lawyer Assistance Program to afford the attorney an opportunity to begin recovery. In such situations the Program shall report to the referring panel and Office of the General Counsel concerning the attorney's progress toward recovery.</li> \n <li>In the event of a finding by the Supreme Court of Georgia that a lawyer is impaired or incapacitated, the Court may refer the matter to the Lawyer Assistance Program, before or after its entry of judgment under Rules 4-219 or 4-220 (a), so that rehabilitative aid may be provided to the impaired or incapacitated attorney. In such situations the Program shall be authorized to report to the Court, either panel of the State Disciplinary Board and Office of the General Counsel concerning the attorney's progress toward recovery.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision98"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ff0cda5f-a0dd-45ec-919a-8d146f2cdde8","Title":"Rule 4-105.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule96","Order":72,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"126fec90-e385-4e6e-b41c-8983b2eb52e3","ParentId":"ff0cda5f-a0dd-45ec-919a-8d146f2cdde8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"When it appears to the Investigative Panel that an attorney's death, incapacity, imprisonment or disappearance poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public, the Investigative Panel shall immediately investigate the matter. If the Investigative Panel determines that such threat exists and that no partner, associate or other appropriate representative is available to prevent the harm, it shall file its findings and recommendation of action in the Supreme Court and shall seek judgment as provided in Rule 4-219.","UrlName":"revision158"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"abdf0431-189b-4f11-885a-f3f34d07a9cd","Title":"Rule 4-106. Conviction of a Crime; Suspension and Disbarment","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of information or evidence that a conviction for any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude has been entered against a lawyer, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall immediately assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number. The Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the appointment of a Special Master to conduct a show cause hearing.</li> \n <li>The petition shall show the date of the conviction and the court in which the conviction was entered, and shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master, pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b).</li> \n <li>The show cause hearing should be held within 15 days after service of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master upon the respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later. Within 30 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file a recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia which may order such discipline as deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li> If the Supreme Court of Georgia orders the respondent suspended pending any appeal, upon the termination of the appeal (or expiration of time for appeal if no appeal is filed) the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Special Master to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the circumstances of the termination of the appeal indicate that the suspended respondent should:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>be disbarred under Rule 8.4; or</li> \n <li>be reinstated; or</li> \n <li>remain suspended pending retrial as a protection to the public; or</li> \n <li> be reinstated while the facts giving rise to the conviction are investigated and, if proper, prosecuted under regular disciplinary procedures in these Rules. \n \n Reports of the Special Master shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, which may order such discipline as deemed appropriate. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, a certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of Rule 8.4 of Rule 4-102 and shall be admissible in proceedings under the disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule98","Order":73,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"94845a10-e432-4de9-a971-72e5476ff7f2","ParentId":"abdf0431-189b-4f11-885a-f3f34d07a9cd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of information or evidence that an attorney has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, whether by verdict, plea of guilty, plea of nolo contendere or imposition of first offender probation, the Office of the General Counsel shall immediately assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number and petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the appointment of a Special Master to conduct a show cause hearing. </li> \n <li>The petition shall show the date of the verdict or plea and the court in which the respondent was convicted, and shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master as provided in Rule 4-209.3 will appoint a Special Master, pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b).</li> \n <li>The show cause hearing should be held within 15 days after service of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master upon the respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later. Within 30 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file a recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia which shall be empowered to order such discipline as deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li> If the Supreme Court of Georgia orders the respondent suspended pending the appeal, upon the termination of the appeal the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Special Master to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the circumstances of the termination of the appeal indicate that the suspended respondent should:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>be disbarred under Rule 8.4; or</li> \n <li>be reinstated; or</li> \n <li>remain suspended pending retrial as a protection to the public; or</li> \n <li> be reinstated while the facts giving rise to the conviction are investigated and, if proper, prosecuted under regular disciplinary procedures in these Rules. \n \n Reports of the Special Master shall be filed with the Review Panel as provided hereafter in Rule 4-217. The Review Panel shall make its findings and recommendation as provided hereafter in Rule 4-218. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, a certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction based upon a verdict, plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere or the imposition of first offender treatment shall be prima facie evidence of an infraction of Rule 8.4 of Rule 4-102 and shall be admissible in proceedings under the disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision99"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b74db3ae-e41e-4815-afa9-c022bf54c69d","Title":"Rule 4-107.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule100","Order":74,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"84aec9fd-5147-4b88-a758-69bf5368c206","ParentId":"b74db3ae-e41e-4815-afa9-c022bf54c69d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision160"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c5d3ee01-67be-4aab-9d78-5754f868543c","Title":"Rule 4-108. Conduct Constituting Threat of Harm to Clients or Public; Emergency Suspension","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that a lawyer's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public and at the direction of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the suspension of the lawyer pending disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing such petition.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall state the evidence justifying the emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the petition for emergency suspension, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall assign the matter a Supreme Court docket number, and shall notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b) to conduct a hearing where the State Bar of Georgia shall show cause why the Respondent should be suspended pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Within 15 days after service of the petition for emergency suspension upon the Respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later, the Special Master shall hold a hearing on the petition for emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>Within 20 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file his or her recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court may suspend the Respondent pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing the emergency suspension, or order such other action as it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule101","Order":75,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"97a13f66-d8f5-43c1-9a93-3a4f221824b7","ParentId":"c5d3ee01-67be-4aab-9d78-5754f868543c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that an Attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public and with the approval of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia and the Chairperson of the Review Panel, or at the direction of the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel, the Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the suspension of the Attorney pending disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing such petition.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall state the evidence justifying the emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the petition for emergency suspension, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall assign the matter a Supreme Court docket number, and shall notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master will appoint a Special Master pursuant to Bar Rule 4-209(b) to conduct a hearing where the State Bar of Georgia shall show cause why the Respondent should be suspended pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Within fifteen days after service of the petition for emergency suspension upon the Respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later, the Special Master shall hold a hearing on the petition for emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>Within twenty days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file his or her recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court sitting en banc may suspend the Respondent pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing the emergency suspension, or order such other action as it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision100"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"79c672d2-4c6e-45fb-bf95-e2929de470cd","Title":"Rule 4-109. Refusal or Failure to Appear for Reprimand; Suspension","Content":"If a respondent fails to appear for imposition of a Confidential Reprimand without just cause, the State Disciplinary Board shall reconsider the matter to determine whether the case should proceed with a public filing pursuant to Bar Rule 4-208 et seq. If a respondent fails to appear before the State Disciplinary Review Board or the Superior Court for imposition of a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand or a Public Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel may file in the Supreme Court of Georgia a motion for suspension of the respondent. A copy of the motion shall be served on the respondent as provided in Bar Rule 4-203.1. The Supreme Court of Georgia may in its discretion, ten days after the filing of the motion, suspend the respondent until such time as the reprimand is administered.","UrlName":"rule102","Order":76,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"91e726c3-f6d1-40ec-acd9-c829a85f798b","ParentId":"79c672d2-4c6e-45fb-bf95-e2929de470cd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Either panel of the State Disciplinary Board based on the knowledge or belief that a respondent has refused, or failed without just cause, to appear in accordance with Bar Rule 4-220 before a panel or the superior court for the administration of a reprimand may file in the Supreme Court a motion for suspension of the respondent. A copy of the motion shall be served on the respondent as provided in Rule 4-203.1. The Supreme Court may in its discretion, ten days after the filing of the motion, suspend the respondent until such time as the reprimand is administered.","UrlName":"revision162"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"09c3ede3-4ff0-48a3-85cb-af3cb15c36e7","Title":"Rule 4-110.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Reserved</div>","UrlName":"rule103","Order":77,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"91566ced-d57e-4de2-9eeb-306da2cc9ab3","ParentId":"09c3ede3-4ff0-48a3-85cb-af3cb15c36e7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Respondent: A person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>Confidential Proceedings: Any proceeding under these Rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Public Proceedings: Any proceeding under these Rules which has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance: An allegation of unethical conduct filed against an attorney.</li> \n <li>Probable Cause: A finding by the Investigative Panel that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Bar Rules.</li> \n <li>Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License: A Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this State. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>He, Him or His: Generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>Attorney: A member of the State Bar of Georgia or one authorized by law to practice law in the State of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Notice of Discipline: A Notice by the Investigative Panel that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision101"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e53aa28d-ec52-41d5-ac81-b51369e3e4e8","Title":"Rule 4-111. Audit for Cause","Content":"Upon receipt of sufficient evidence that a lawyer who practices law in this State poses a threat of harm to his clients or the public, the State Disciplinary Board may conduct an Audit for Cause of the lawyer's trust and escrow accounts with the written approval of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia. Before approval can be granted, the lawyer shall be given notice that approval is being sought and be given an opportunity to appear and be heard. The sufficiency of the notice and opportunity to be heard shall be left to the sole discretion of the persons giving the approval. The State Disciplinary Board must inform the person being audited that the audit is an Audit for Cause.","UrlName":"rule105","Order":78,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"e19654e1-3d52-4091-a048-d45e48c79c8c","ParentId":"e53aa28d-ec52-41d5-ac81-b51369e3e4e8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Upon receipt of sufficient evidence that a lawyer who practices law in this State poses a threat of harm to his clients or the public, the State Disciplinary Board may conduct an Audit for Cause with the written approval of the Chairman of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia. Before approval can be granted, the lawyer shall be given notice that approval is being sought and be given an opportunity to appear and be heard. The sufficiency of the notice and opportunity to be heard shall be left to the sole discretion of the persons giving the approval. The State Disciplinary Board must inform the person being audited that the audit is an Audit for Cause.","UrlName":"revision164"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d2b29f44-6392-487b-8802-3863f6fc0c80","Title":"Part III (After January 1, 2001) - Reserved","Content":"Part III: Reserved","UrlName":"part3","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Title":"Current Rules","Content":"","UrlName":"hasa2","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"d2b29f44-6392-487b-8802-3863f6fc0c80","Title":"Part III (After January 1, 2001) - Reserved","Content":"Part III: Reserved","UrlName":"part3","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Title":"Part IV - Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (also includes Disciplinary Proceedings and Advisory Opinion rules)","Content":"","UrlName":"part4","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Title":"CHAPTER 1 GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND ENFORCEMENT THEREOF","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter13","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"c083cea2-60f5-4f66-8277-3ce6f50cff7e","Title":"Rule 4-101. Enforcement of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia is hereby authorized to maintain and enforce, as set forth in rules hereinafter stated, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in the state of Georgia and to institute disciplinary action in the event of the violation thereof.","UrlName":"rule87","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Rule 4-102. Disciplinary Action; Levels of Discipline; Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Public Reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Public Reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand but less than suspension. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Review Board at a meeting of the State Disciplinary Review Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Confidential Reprimand but less than a Public Reprimand. This level of discipline includes publication on the official State Bar of Georgia website as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Confidential Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Confidential Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Board at a meeting of the Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Formal Letter of Admonition but less than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Letter of Admonition: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Formal Letter of Admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Bar Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Board pursuant to the provisions of Bar Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Definitions and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n1.18                                  Duties to Prospective Client \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"rule89","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"fcbf296b-3b7c-44ee-beae-70f2bc53cab4","ParentId":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline removing the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline which removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a public reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A public reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a review panel reprimand but less than suspension.</li> \n <li>Review Panel Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Review Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Review Panel at a meeting of the Review Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than an investigative panel reprimand but less than a public reprimand.</li> \n <li>Investigative Panel Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. An Investigative Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Investigative Panel at a meeting of the Investigative Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a formal admonition but less than a review panel reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Admonition: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A formal admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the Court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Investigative Panel pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"revision46"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7daabdf1-451a-49d1-9f0f-ad03812aabe1","Title":"Contents","Content":" Rules: Client-Lawyer Relationship \n \n1.0 Terminology and Definitions \n1.1 Competence \n1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3 Diligence \n1.4 Communication \n1.5 Fees \n1.6 Confidentiality of Information \n1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12 Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13 Organization as Client \n1.14 Client under a Disability \n1.15(I) Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II) Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III) Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17 Sale of Law Practice \n1.18 Duties to Prospective Client \n \nCounselor \n \n2.1 Advisor \n2.2 (This rule is reserved.) \n2.3 Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n \nAdvocate \n \n3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions \n3.2 Expediting Litigation \n3.3 Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6 Trial Publicity \n3.7 Lawyer as Witness \n3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9 Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \nTransactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n \n4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \nLaw Firms and Associations \n \n5.1 Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyers \n5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5 Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6 Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7 Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \nPublic Service \n \n6.1 Voluntary Pro Bono Public Service \n6.2 Accepting Appointments \n6.3 Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4 Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n6.5 Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs\n Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services \n7.2 Advertising \n7.3 Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads \n \nMaintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2 Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4 Misconduct \n8.5 Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \nMiscellaneous \n \n9.1 Reporting Requirements \n9.2 Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3 Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4 Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5 Lawyer as a Public Official","UrlName":"rule70","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3254fea5-c24d-461b-8a15-5530a31eed26","Title":"PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES","Content":" [1] A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. \n \n[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. \n \n[3] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the these rules or other law. \n \n[4] A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the law, the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. \n \n[5] As a citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest. \n \n[6] A lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as by substantive and procedural law. A lawyer also is guided by conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service. \n \n[7] Reserved. \n \n[8] In the nature of law practice conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict among a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these rules, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules. \n \n[9] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested in the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n[10] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice. \n \n[11] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves. \n \n[12] The fulfillment of a lawyer's professional responsibility role requires an understanding by them of their relationship to our legal system. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.","UrlName":"rule74","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9afa4c06-904a-4b16-94e0-40aa21e2a658","Title":"SCOPE","Content":" [13] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the rules are imperatives, cast in the terms \"shall \"or \"shall not.\"These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the terms \"may \"or \"should,\"are permissive or aspirational and define areas under the rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. Disciplinary action shall not be taken when the lawyer's conduct falls within the bounds of such discretion. The rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly aspirational and descriptive. Together they define a lawyer's professional role. Comments do not add obligations to or expand the rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the rules. \n \n[14] The rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. Compliance with the rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. \n \n[15] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Bar Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, that may attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship will be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose depends on the circumstances and may be a question of fact. \n \n[16] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government entity may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized by law to represent several government entities in intergovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. They also may have authority to represent the \"public interest \"in circumstances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to do so. These rules do not abrogate any such authority. \n \n[17] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations. \n \n[18] The purpose of these rules is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. These rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the rule. Accordingly, nothing in the rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty. \n \n[19] Moreover, these rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege. In reliance on the attorney-client privilege, clients are entitled to expect that communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected against compelled disclosure. The attorney-client privilege is that of the client and not of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in accordance with recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and work product privileges. \n \n[20]Reserved. \n \n[21] The comment accompanying each rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the rule. The preamble and this note on scope provide general orientation. The comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative.","UrlName":"rule220","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"RULE 1.0. TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li>“Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct against a lawyer filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel and containing the name and signature of the complainant or initiated pursuant to Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law. \n(bb) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(cc) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(dd) “Willfull blindness” denotes awareness of a high probability that a fact exists and deliberate action to avoid learning of the fact. \n(ee) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"rule223","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0915bda9-a785-4194-b214-12b0666b9fa8","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n <li>“Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.</li> \n <li>“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.</li> \n <li>“Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.</li> \n </ol> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision294"},{"Id":"06d293c8-0303-4a5f-bb02-1426dc98b877","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 5","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li>“Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct against a lawyer filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel and containing the name and signature of the complainant or initiated pursuant to Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law. \n(bb) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(cc) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(dd) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision409"},{"Id":"bc1a4859-b8c4-4f17-8fff-17f572ee7964","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 4","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(bb) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(cc) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision389"},{"Id":"5286835f-4415-448b-ac8d-6169d3cf48a3","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer. </li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n <li>“Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.</li> \n <li>“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.</li> \n <li>“Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and e-mail. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.</li> \n </ol> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision282"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f20144b-7054-4d80-84ac-f1211b551489","Title":"RULE 1.1 COMPETENCE","Content":" A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer's level of competence without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in question. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLegal Knowledge and Skill \n \n[1A] The purpose of these rules is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. These rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. \n \n[1B] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances. \n \n[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. \n \n[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest. \n \n[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person subject to Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. \n \nThoroughness and Preparation \n \n[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more elaborate treatment than matters of lesser consequence. \n \nMaintaining Competence \n \n[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should engage in continuing study and education.","UrlName":"rule79","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4d1f67c8-77b9-4b06-a0b8-59b68ffa64f7","Title":"RULE 1.2 SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION AND ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.</li> \n <li>A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not either knowingly or with willful blindness counsel a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct, nor knowingly or with willful blindness assist a client in such conduct. However, a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nAllocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4 (a) (1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4 (a) (2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. \n \n[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16 (b) (4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16 (a) (3). \n \n[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time. \n \n[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering from diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14. \n \nIndependence from Client's Views or Activities \n \n[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities. \n \nAgreements Limiting Scope of Representation \n \n[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. \n \n[7] Although this rule affords the lawyer and the client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1. \n \n[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6. \n \nCriminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions \n \n[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. \n \n[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16 (a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1. \n \n[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary. \n \n[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities. \n \n[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4 (a) (5). </div>","UrlName":"rule50","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9d080d94-78a4-498b-8c17-e968e402cca0","ParentId":"4d1f67c8-77b9-4b06-a0b8-59b68ffa64f7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.</li> \n <li>A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, nor knowingly assist a client in such conduct, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.</li> \n</ol>\n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nAllocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. \n \n[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3). \n \n[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time. \n \n[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering from diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14. \n \nIndependence from Client's Views or Activities \n \n[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities. \n \nAgreements Limiting Scope of Representation \n \n[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. \n \n[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and the client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1. \n \n[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6. \n \nCriminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions \n \n[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. \n \n[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1. \n \n[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary. \n \n[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent voidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities. \n \n[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4(a)(5).","UrlName":"revision48"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0358fab6-2af3-4ea0-b55a-18edc0e83daa","Title":"RULE 1.3 DILIGENCE","Content":"A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.\n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyers duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect. \n  \n[2] A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently. \n \n[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable competence, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client. \n \n[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will serve on a continuing basis. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client but has not been specifically instructed concerning pursuit of an appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter.","UrlName":"rule52","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"39dbb7f3-4d74-4e12-aff1-04eb83ad420b","Title":"RULE 1.4. COMMUNICATION.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), is required by these rules;</li> \n <li>reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;</li> \n <li>keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;</li> \n <li>promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and</li> \n <li>consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation. \n \nCommunicating with Client \n \n[2] If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a) (1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's informed consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2 (a). \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a) (3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation. \n \n[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) (4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. A lawyer should promptly respond to or acknowledge client communications. The timeliness of a lawyer's communication must be judged by all the controlling factors. \"Prompt \"communication with the client does not equate to \"instant \"communication with the client and is sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n \nExplaining Matters \n \n[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, where there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h). \n \n[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. \n \nWithholding Information \n \n[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. </div>","UrlName":"rule54","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"4e5b8c7d-ef0e-41cb-93de-002aca41399f","ParentId":"39dbb7f3-4d74-4e12-aff1-04eb83ad420b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h), is required by these rules;</li> \n <li>reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;</li> \n <li>keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;</li> \n <li>promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and</li> \n <li>consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation. \n \nCommunicating with Client \n \n[2] If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a) (1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's informed consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2 (a). \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a) (3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation. \n \n[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) (4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. Client telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged. The timeliness of a lawyer's communication must be judged by all the controlling factors. \"Prompt \"communication with the client does not equate to \"instant \"communication with the client and is sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n \nExplaining Matters \n \n[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, where there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h). \n \n[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. \n \nWithholding Information \n \n[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. </div>","UrlName":"revision280"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d966e74f-47a5-4d8a-aeb5-236af01deab4","Title":"RULE 1.5 FEES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;</li> \n <li>the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;</li> \n <li>the amount involved and the results obtained;</li> \n <li>the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;</li> \n <li>the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;</li> \n <li>the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and</li> \n <li>whether the fee is fixed or contingent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client. \n To the extent that agreements to arbitrate disputes over fees or expenses are enforceable, a lawyer may enter into such an agreement with a client or prospective client if the client or prospective client gives informed consent in writing signed by the client or prospective client. The agreement to arbitrate and the attorney's disclosures regarding arbitration must be set out in a separate paragraph, written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract, and separately initialed by the client and the lawyer. </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.</li> \n <li> Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the outcome of the matter; and,</li> \n <li> if there is a recovery showing:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>the remittance to the client;</li> \n <li>the method of its determination;</li> \n <li>the amount of the attorney fee; and</li> \n <li>if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or</li> \n <li>a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;</li> \n <li>the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and</li> \n <li>the total fee is reasonable.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n  \n Comment \n \nReasonableness of Fee and Expenses \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer. \n \n[1A] A fee can also be unreasonable if it is illegal. Examples of illegal fees are those taken without required court approval, those that exceed the amount allowed by court order or statute, or those where acceptance of the fee would be unlawful, e.g., accepting controlled substances or sexual favors as payment. \n \nBasis or Rate of Fee \n \n[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth. \n \n[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. \n \nTerms of Payment \n \n[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16 (d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8 (j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8 (a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client. \n \n[5] An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. \n [5A] Paragraph (b) requires informed consent to an agreement to arbitrate disputes over fees and expenses. See Rule 1.0 (l). In obtaining such informed consent, the lawyer should reveal to the client or prospective client the following: (1) in an arbitration, the client or prospective client waives the right to a jury trial because the dispute will be resolved by an individual arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators; (2) generally, there is no right to an appeal from an arbitration decision; (3) arbitration may not permit the broad discovery that would be available in civil litigation; (4) how the costs of arbitration compared to the costs of litigation in a public court, including the requirement that the arbitrator or arbitrators be compensated; and (5) who will bear the cost of arbitration. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client regarding the existence and operation of the State Bar of Georgia's Fee Arbitration Program, regardless of whether the attorney seeks agreement to submit any future fee disputes to that program. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute over fees and expenses is not a waiver of the right to make a disciplinary complaint regarding the lawyer. \n \nProhibited Contingent Fees \n \n[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns. See Formal Advisory Opinions 36 and 47. \n \nDivision of Fee \n \n[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation. \n \n[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. \n \nDisputes over Fees \n \n[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the State Bar of Georgia, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure. </div>","UrlName":"rule55","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2129b43c-aa41-4262-a297-c2073d93a652","ParentId":"d966e74f-47a5-4d8a-aeb5-236af01deab4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;</li> \n <li>the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;</li> \n <li>the amount involved and the results obtained;</li> \n <li>the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;</li> \n <li>the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;</li> \n <li>the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and</li> \n <li>whether the fee is fixed or contingent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.</li> \n <li> Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the outcome of the matter; and,</li> \n <li> if there is a recovery showing:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>the remittance to the client;</li> \n <li>the method of its determination;</li> \n <li>the amount of the attorney fee; and</li> \n <li>if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or</li> \n <li>a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;</li> \n <li>the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and</li> \n <li>the total fee is reasonable.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n  \n \n Comment \n \nReasonableness of Fee and Expenses \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer. \n \n[1A] A fee can also be unreasonable if it is illegal. Examples of illegal fees are those taken without required court approval, those that exceed the amount allowed by court order or statute, or those where acceptance of the fee would be unlawful, e.g., accepting controlled substances or sexual favors as payment. \n \nBasis or Rate of Fee \n \n[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth. \n \n[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. \n \nTerms of Payment \n \n[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client. \n \n[5] An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. \n \nProhibited Contingent Fees \n \n[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns. See Formal Advisory Opinions 36 and 47. \n \nDivision of Fee \n \n[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation. \n \n[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. \n \nDisputes over Fees \n \n[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure. </div>","UrlName":"revision50"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bb7b9ba2-53ef-45ae-a307-e637e4a49b9b","Title":"RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;</li> \n <li>to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by subparagraph (i) above;</li> \n <li>to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules.</li> \n <li>to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer's change of employment or changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In a situation described in paragraph (b) (1), if the client has acted at the time the lawyer learns of the threat of harm or loss to a victim, use or disclosure is permissible only if the harm or loss has not yet occurred.</li> \n <li>Before using or disclosing information pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (i) or (ii), if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duty of confidentiality shall continue after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. See Rule 1.18. \n \n[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance. \n \n[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. \n \n[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. \n \n[4A] RESERVED \n \n[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. Rule 1.6 applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information gained in the professional relationship, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope. The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the client's policy goals. \n \nAuthorized Disclosure \n \n[6] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. \n \n[7] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. \n \n[7A] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized paragraph (b) (1) (iv) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n \nDisclosure Adverse to Client \n \n[8] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. \n \n[9] Several situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3 (a) (4) not to use false evidence. \n \n[10] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2 (d), because to \"knowingly assist \"criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. \n \n[11] Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal and likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b) (1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent death or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes will occur. It is very difficult for a lawyer to \"know \"when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. \n \n[12] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b) (1) does not violate this rule. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[13] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a) (1). \n \n[14] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8 (b) nor Rule 1.16 (d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. \n \n[15] Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b). \n \nDispute Concerning a Lawyer's Conduct \n \n[16] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b) (1) (iii) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n \n[17] If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b) (1) (iii) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure. \nDetection of Conflicts of Interest \n[18] Paragraph (b) (1) (v) recognizes that lawyers in different firms may need to disclose limited information to each other to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, such as when a lawyer is considering an association with another firm, two or more firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering the purchase of a law practice. See Rule 1.17, Comment [6]. Under these circumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to disclose limited information, but only once substantive discussions regarding the new relationship have occurred. Any such disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the persons and entities involved in a matter, a brief summary of the general issues involved, and information about whether the matter has terminated. Even this limited information, however, should be disclosed only to the extent reasonably necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interests that might arise from the possible new relationship. Moreover, the disclosure of any information is prohibited if it would compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client (e.g., the fact that a corporate client is seeking advice on a corporate takeover that has not been publicly announced; that a person has consulted a lawyer about the possibility of divorce before the person’s intentions are known to the person’s spouse; or that a person has consulted a lawyer about a criminal investigation that has not led to a public charge). Under those circumstances, paragraph (a) prohibits disclosure unless the client or former client gives informed consent. A lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the lawyer’s firm may also govern a lawyer’s conduct when exploring an association with another firm and is beyond the scope of these rules. \n[19] Any information disclosed pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (v) may be used or further disclosed only to the extent necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest. Paragraph (b) (1) (v) does not restrict the use of information acquired by means independent of any disclosure pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (v). Paragraph (b) (1) (v) also does not affect the disclosure of information within a law firm when the disclosure is otherwise authorized, see Comment [7], such as when a lawyer in a firm discloses information to another lawyer in the same firm to detect and resolve conflicts of interest that could arise in connection with undertaking a new representation. \nDisclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized \n [20] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client. \n \n[21] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession. \n[22] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n[23] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client’s representation to accomplish the purposes specified. In exercising the discretion conferred by this rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer’s own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer’s decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other rules. Some rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2 (d), 4.1 (b), and 8.1. Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this rule. See Rule 3.3 (b). \nActing Competently to Preserve Confidentiality \n[24] A lawyer should make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information covered by this Rule.  A lawyer should make reasonable efforts to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use). Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of these rules. \n[25] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer should take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to comply with other laws, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these rules.</div>","UrlName":"rule57","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"963c68dc-cfa0-459e-8cc3-b2b5f08dc416","ParentId":"bb7b9ba2-53ef-45ae-a307-e637e4a49b9b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;</li> \n <li>to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by subparagraph (i) above;</li> \n <li>to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In a situation described in paragraph (b) (1), if the client has acted at the time the lawyer learns of the threat of harm or loss to a victim, use or disclosure is permissible only if the harm or loss has not yet occurred.</li> \n <li>Before using or disclosing information pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (i) or (ii), if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The lawyer may, where the law does not otherwise require, reveal information to which the duty of confidentiality does not apply under paragraph (b) without being subjected to disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>The lawyer shall reveal information under paragraph (b) as the applicable law requires.</li> \n <li>The duty of confidentiality shall continue after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. \n \n[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance. \n \n[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. \n \n[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. \n \n[4A] Information gained in the professional relationship includes information gained from a person (prospective client) who discusses the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, the restrictions and exceptions of these rules as to use or revelation of the information apply, e.g. Rules 1.9 and 1.10. \n \n[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. Rule 1.6 applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information gained in the professional relationship, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope. The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the client's policy goals. \n \nAuthorized Disclosure \n \n[6] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. \n \n[7] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. \n \n[7A] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized paragraph (b) (1) (iv) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n \nDisclosure Adverse to Client \n \n[8] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. \n \n[9] Several situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3 (a) (4) not to use false evidence. \n \n[10] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2 (d), because to \"knowingly assist \"criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. \n \n[11] Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal and likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b) (1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent death or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes will occur. It is very difficult for a lawyer to \"know \"when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. \n \n[12] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b) (1) does not violate this rule. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[13] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a) (1). \n \n[14] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8 (b) nor Rule 1.16 (d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. \n \n[15] Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b). \n \nDispute Concerning a Lawyer's Conduct \n \n[16] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b) (1) (iii) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n \n[17] If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b) (1) (iii) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure. \n \nDisclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized \n \n[18] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client. \n \n[19] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession. </div>","UrlName":"revision321"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"179833f9-065d-4c1f-80c1-792594c90dac","Title":"RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).</li> \n <li> If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation after:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0 (c);</li> \n <li>having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation, and</li> \n <li>having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>is prohibited by law or these rules;</li> \n <li>includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or</li> \n <li>involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Though otherwise subject to the provisions of this rule, a part-time prosecutor who engages in the private practice of law may represent a private client adverse to the state or other political subdivision that the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, except with regard to matters for which the part-time prosecutor had or has prosecutorial authority or responsibility.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLoyalty to a Client \n \n[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. If an impermissible conflict of interest exists before representation is undertaken the representation should be declined. The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest. \n \n[2] Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (a) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. \n  \n[3] If an impermissible conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment 4 to Rule 1.3 and Scope. \n \n[4] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. Paragraph (d) states an exception to that general rule. A part-time prosecutor does not automatically have a conflict of interest in representing a private client who is adverse to the state or other political subdivision (such as a city or county) that the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, although it is possible that in a particular case, the part-time prosecutor could have a conflict of interest under paragraph (a). \n \nSimultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require informed consent of the respective clients. \n \nConsultation and Informed Consent \n \n[5] A client may give informed consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's informed consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain informed consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to give informed consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to give informed consent. If informed consent is withdrawn, the lawyer should consult Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.16. \n \n[5A] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0 (b). See also Rule 1.0 (s) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0 (b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. \n \nLawyer's Interests \n \n[6] The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the propriety of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client objective advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. \n \nConflicts in Litigation \n \n[7] Paragraph (c) (2) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same or a similar proceeding including simultaneous representation of parties whose interests may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal, the requirements of paragraph (b) are met, and consent is not prohibited by paragraph (c). \n  \n[8] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients give informed consent as required by paragraph (b). By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government entity is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. \n \n[9] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases while they are pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so should one or more of the cases reach the appellate court. \n \nInterest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service \n \n[10] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and gives informed consent and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8 (f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the clients give informed consent and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. \n \nNon-litigation Conflicts \n \n[11] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for material and adverse effect include the duration and extent of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. \n \n[12] In a negotiation common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest among them. \n \n[13] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved. \n \n[14] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director. \n \nConflict Charged by an Opposing Party \n \n[15] Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope. \n [16] For the purposes of 1.7 (d), part-time prosecutors include but are not limited to part-time solicitors-general, part-time assistant solicitors-general, part-time probate court prosecutors, part-time magistrate court prosecutors, part-time municipal court prosecutors, special assistant attorneys general, part-time juvenile court prosecutors and prosecutors pro tem. \n \n[17] Pragmatic considerations require that the rules treat a lawyer serving as a part-time prosecutor differently. See Thompson v. State, 254 Ga. 393, 396-397 (1985). \n \nSpecial Considerations in Common Representation \n \n[18] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients. \n \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule58","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3c263cdc-75e0-462c-ad1f-5e5a5627313a","ParentId":"179833f9-065d-4c1f-80c1-792594c90dac","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).</li> \n <li> If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation after:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0(c);</li> \n <li>having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation, and</li> \n <li>having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>is prohibited by law or these Rules;</li> \n <li>includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or</li> \n <li>involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLoyalty to a Client \n \n[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. If an impermissible conflict of interest exists before representation is undertaken the representation should be declined. The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest. \n \n[2] Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (a) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. \n  \n[3] If an impermissible conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment 4 to Rule 1.3 and Scope. \n \n[4] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Paragraphs (b) and (c) express that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require informed consent of the respective clients. \n \nConsultation and Informed Consent \n \n[5] A client may give informed consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's informed consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain informed consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to give informed consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to give informed consent. If informed consent is withdrawn, the lawyer should consult Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.16. \n \n[5A] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(s) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. \n \nLawyer's Interests \n \n[6] The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the propriety of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client objective advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. \n \nConflicts in Litigation \n \n[7] Paragraph (c)(2) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same or a similar proceeding including simultaneous representation of parties whose interests may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal, the requirements of paragraph (b) are met, and consent is not prohibited by paragraph (c). \n  \n[8] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients give informed consent as required by paragraph (b). By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government entity is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. \n \n[9] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases while they are pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so should one or more of the cases reach the appellate court. \n \nInterest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service \n \n[10] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and gives informed consent and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the clients give informed consent and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. \n \nNon-litigation Conflicts \n \n[11] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for material and adverse effect include the duration and extent of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. \n \n[12] In a negotiation common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest among them. \n \n[13] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved. \n \n[14] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director. \n \nConflict Charged by an Opposing Party \n \n[15] Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope. \n ","UrlName":"revision4"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"6c1fcca2-0b79-4c3c-94a0-b42a00e94a27","Title":"RULE 1.8 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall neither enter into a business transaction with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer's professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;</li> \n <li>the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use information gained in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these rules.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.</li> \n <li>Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n <ol> \n <li>a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or</li> \n <li>a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:\n <ol> \n <li>the client gives informed consent;</li> \n <li>there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and</li> \n <li>information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for or against the clients, nor in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyers disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law, and the client is independently represented by a lawyer in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith. To the extent that agreements to arbitrate disputes over a lawyer's liability for malpractice are enforceable, a lawyer may enter into such an agreement with a client or a prospective client if the client or prospective client gives informed consent in writing signed by the client or prospective client. The agreement to arbitrate and the attorney's disclosures regarding arbitration must be set out in a separate paragraph, written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract, and separately initialed by the client and the lawyer. </li> \n <li>A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer has actual knowledge is represented by the other lawyer unless his or her client gives informed consent regarding the relationship. The disqualification stated in this paragraph is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:\n <ol> \n <li>acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses as long as the exercise of the lien is not prejudicial to the client with respect to the subject of the representation; and</li> \n <li>contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, except as prohibited by Rule 1.5.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8 (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8 (a) and 1.8 (c)-(j) is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nTransactions Between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1A] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. The client should be fully informed of the true nature of the lawyer's interest or lack of interest in all aspects of the transaction. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's informed consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable. \n  \nUse of Information to the Disadvantage of the Client \n  \n[1B] It is a general rule that an attorney will not be permitted to make use of knowledge, or information, acquired by the attorney through the professional relationship with the client, or in the conduct of the client's business, to the disadvantage of the client. Paragraph (b) follows this general rule and provides that the client may waive this prohibition. However, if the waiver is conditional, the duty is on the attorney to comply with the condition. \n \nGifts from Clients \n \n[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the objective advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial. \n \nLiterary Rights \n \n[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the subject of the representation creates a conflict between the interest of the client and the personal interest of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j) of this rule. \n \nFinancial Assistance to Clients \n \n[4] Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above. \n \nPayment for a Lawyer's Services from One Other Than The Client \n  \n[5] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4 (c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another). \n \nSettlement of Aggregated Claims \n \n[6] Paragraph (g) requires informed consent. This requirement is not met by a blanket consent prior to settlement that the majority decision will rule. \n \nAgreements to Limit Liability \n \n[7] A lawyer may not condition an agreement to withdraw or the return of a client's documents on the client's release of claims. However, this paragraph is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in opinions and memoranda. \n \n[8] A lawyer should not seek prospectively, by contract or other means, to limit the lawyer's individual liability to a client for the lawyer's malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of a client properly has no need to attempt to limit liability for the lawyer's professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of clients properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer may, however, practice law as a partner, member, or shareholder of a limited liability partnership, professional association, limited liability company, or professional corporation. \nArbitration \n [8A] Paragraph (h) requires informed consent to an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims. See Rule 1.0 (l). In obtaining such informed consent, the laywer should reveal to the client or prospective client the following: (1) in an arbitration, the client of prospective client waives the right to a jury because the dispute will be resolved by an individual arbitrator or a panel or arbitrators; (2) generally, there is no right to an appeal from an arbitration decision; (3) arbitration may not permit the broad discovery that would be available in civil litigation; (4) how the costs of arbitration compare to the costs of litigation in a public court, including the requirement that the arbitrator or arbitrators be compensated; and (5) who will bear the costs of arbitration. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client that an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims over fees and expenses is not a waiver of the right to make a disciplinary complaint regarding the lawyer. \n \nFamily Relationships Between Lawyers \n \n[9] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. \n \nAcquisition of Interest in Litigation \n \n[10] Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in the common law prohibition of champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for lawyer's fees and for certain advances of costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e). </div>","UrlName":"rule60","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1547bf53-9f72-45e5-8253-a31aa5d7ae8d","ParentId":"6c1fcca2-0b79-4c3c-94a0-b42a00e94a27","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall neither enter into a business transaction with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer's professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;</li> \n <li>the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use information gained in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.</li> \n <li>Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n <ol> \n <li>a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or</li> \n <li>a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:\n <ol> \n <li>the client gives informed consent;</li> \n <li>there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and</li> \n <li>information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for or against the clients, nor in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyers disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.</li> \n <li>A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer has actual knowledge is represented by the other lawyer unless his or her client gives informed consent regarding the relationship. The disqualification stated in this paragraph is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:\n <ol> \n <li>acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses as long as the exercise of the lien is not prejudicial to the client with respect to the subject of the representation; and</li> \n <li>contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, except as prohibited by Rule 1.5.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(a) and 1.8(c)-(j) is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nTransactions Between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1A] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. The client should be fully informed of the true nature of the lawyer's interest or lack of interest in all aspects of the transaction. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's informed consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable. \n  \nUse of Information to the Disadvantage of the Client \n  \n[1B] It is a general rule that an attorney will not be permitted to make use of knowledge, or information, acquired by the attorney through the professional relationship with the client, or in the conduct of the client's business, to the disadvantage of the client. Paragraph (b) follows this general rule and provides that the client may waive this prohibition. However, if the waiver is conditional, the duty is on the attorney to comply with the condition. \n \nGifts from Clients \n \n[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the objective advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial. \n \nLiterary Rights \n \n[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the subject of the representation creates a conflict between the interest of the client and the personal interest of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j) of this Rule. \n \nFinancial Assistance to Clients \n \n[4] Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above. \n \nPayment for a Lawyer's Services from One Other Than The Client \n  \n[5] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another). \n \nSettlement of Aggregated Claims \n \n[6] Paragraph (g) requires informed consent. This requirement is not met by a blanket consent prior to settlement that the majority decision will rule. \n \nAgreements to Limit Liability \n \n[7] A lawyer may not condition an agreement to withdraw or the return of a client's documents on the client's release of claims. However, this paragraph is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in opinions and memoranda. \n \n[8] A lawyer should not seek prospectively, by contract or other means, to limit the lawyer's individual liability to a client for the lawyer's malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of a client properly has no need to attempt to limit liability for the lawyer's professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of clients properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer may, however, practice law as a partner, member, or shareholder of a limited liability partnership, professional association, limited liability company, or professional corporation. \n \nFamily Relationships Between Lawyers \n \n[9] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. \n \nAcquisition of Interest in Litigation \n \n[10] Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in the common law prohibition of champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for lawyer's fees and for certain advances of costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e). </div>","UrlName":"revision51"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d1647878-baba-429a-8b11-8c4f60290964","Title":"RULE 1.9 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: FORMER CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and</li> \n <li>about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c), that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or</li> \n <li>reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this rule. Under this rule for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11. \n \n[2] The scope of a \"matter \"for purposes of this rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. \n \n[3] Matters are \"substantially related \"for purposes of this rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services. \n \nLawyers Moving Between Firms \n  \n[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. \n \n[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10 (b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm. \n \n[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. \n \n[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c). \n \n[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. \n \n[9] The provisions of this rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0 (b) and (h). With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10. </div>","UrlName":"rule61","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ae93d6f-b0aa-45e5-8088-bf2d4c1fc7e7","ParentId":"d1647878-baba-429a-8b11-8c4f60290964","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and</li> \n <li>about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or</li> \n <li>reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under this Rule for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11. \n \n[2] The scope of a \"matter \"for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. \n \n[3] Matters are \"substantially related \"for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services. \n \nLawyers Moving Between Firms \n  \n[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. \n \n[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm. \n \n[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. \n \n[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). \n \n[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. \n \n[9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(b) and (h). With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10. </div>","UrlName":"revision52"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3d8ef04b-23ce-4883-b52f-67ca784694d4","Title":"RULE 1.10 IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8 (c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.</li> \n <li> When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and</li> \n <li>any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9 (c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \nDefinition of \"Firm \" \n[1] For purposes of these rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. \n[2] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation. \n[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (a) and (b): Successive Government and Private Employment; where a lawyer represents the government after having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (c) (1): Successive Government and Private Employment. The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule and 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. \n[5] Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. However, if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and, thus, has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. \nPrinciples of Imputed Disqualification \n[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9 (b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.10 (b): Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. \n[7] Rule 1.10 (b): Imputed Disqualification operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9 (c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.</div>","UrlName":"rule86","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"39b7e9f5-9ade-497b-8c70-1a8d0a95e14c","ParentId":"3d8ef04b-23ce-4883-b52f-67ca784694d4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.</li> \n <li> When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and</li> \n <li>any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \nDefinition of \"Firm \" \n[1] For purposes of these Rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. \n[2] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation. \n[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b): Successive Government and Private Employment; where a lawyer represents the government after having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(c)(1): Successive Government and Private Employment. The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule and 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. \n[5] Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. However, if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and, thus, has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. \nPrinciples of Imputed Disqualification \n[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. \n[7] Rule 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.</div>","UrlName":"revision53"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0acc2933-f3df-436b-b82d-ad55711fcb4f","Title":"RULE 1.11 SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government entity gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is duly given to the client and to the appropriate government entity to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.</li> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or</li> \n <li>negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12 (b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12 (b).</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> As used in this rule, the term \"matter \"includes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and</li> \n <li>any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government entity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>As used in this rule, the term \"confidential government information \"means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. It is a counterpart of Rule 1.10 (b), which applies to lawyers moving from one firm to another. \n[2] A lawyer representing a government entity, whether employed or specially retained by the government, is subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In addition, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government entity may give consent under this rule. \n[3] Where the successive clients are a public entity and a private client, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government entity should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. \n[4] When the client is an agency of one government, that agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. \n[5] Paragraphs (a) (1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. \n[6] Paragraph (a) (2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the government entity at a time when premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order that the government entity will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer is not complying. \n[7] Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer. \n[8] Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government entity when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law. \n[9] Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the entity with which the lawyer in question has become associated.</div>","UrlName":"rule90","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9819c8a5-48a8-4555-ada1-fd19b5986ad3","ParentId":"0acc2933-f3df-436b-b82d-ad55711fcb4f","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government entity gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is duly given to the client and to the appropriate government entity to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.</li> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or</li> \n <li>negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> As used in this Rule, the term \"matter \"includes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and</li> \n <li>any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government entity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>As used in this Rule, the term \"confidential government information \"means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This Rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. It is a counterpart of Rule 1.10(b), which applies to lawyers moving from one firm to another. \n[2] A lawyer representing a government entity, whether employed or specially retained by the government, is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In addition, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government entity may give consent under this Rule. \n[3] Where the successive clients are a public entity and a private client, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government entity should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. \n[4] When the client is an agency of one government, that agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this Rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. \n[5] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. \n[6] Paragraph (a)(2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the government entity at a time when premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order that the government entity will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer is not complying. \n[7] Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer. \n[8] Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government entity when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law. \n[9] Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the entity with which the lawyer in question has become associated.</div>","UrlName":"revision54"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e39b427e-f692-412a-b382-185913c92ba3","Title":"RULE 1.12 FORMER JUDGE OR ARBITRATOR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.</li> \n <li> If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThis rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term \"personally and substantially \"signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. The term \"adjudicative officer \"includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not \"act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.\"Although phrased differently from this rule, those rules correspond in meaning.</div>","UrlName":"rule93","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"6ebe642e-55da-4665-adee-8bb95321e16f","ParentId":"e39b427e-f692-412a-b382-185913c92ba3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.</li> \n <li> If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThis Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term \"personally and substantially \"signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. The term \"adjudicative officer \"includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not \"act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.\"Although phrased differently from this Rule, those rules correspond in meaning.</div>","UrlName":"revision55"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3f4b6e1c-3da9-448f-b9bc-4c1f8b196f87","Title":"RULE 1.13 ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.</li> \n <li>If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.</li> \n <li> Except as provided in paragraph (d), if\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and</li> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c ), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.</li> \n <li>In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.</li> \n <li>A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThe Organization as the Client \n[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. \"Other constituents \"as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations. \n[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. \n[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0 (i), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. \n[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant consideration. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. \n[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation. \nRelation to Other Rules \n[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other rules. In particular, this rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this rule supplements Rule 1.6 (b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6 (b) (1). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyers' representation of the organization. In such circumstances Rule 1.2 (d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16 (a) (1) may be required. \n[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim. \n[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. \nGovernmental Organization \n[9] The duty defined in this rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these rules. See Scope [16]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business in involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This rule does not limit that authority. See Scope [16]. \nClarifying the Lawyer's Role \n[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged. \n[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case. \nDual Representation \n[12] Paragraph (g) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder. \nDerivative Actions \n[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization. \n[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.</div>","UrlName":"rule97","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"29994363-3ff9-42e9-a318-129638717b79","ParentId":"3f4b6e1c-3da9-448f-b9bc-4c1f8b196f87","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.</li> \n <li>If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.</li> \n <li> Except as provided in paragraph (d), if\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and</li> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c ), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.</li> \n <li>In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.</li> \n <li>A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThe Organization as the Client \n[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. \"Other constituents \"as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations. \n[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. \n[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0(i), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. \n[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant consideration. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. \n[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation. \nRelation to Other Rules \n[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyers' representation of the organization. In such circumstances Rule 1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16(a)(1) may be required. \n[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim. \n[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. \nGovernmental Organization \n[9] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Scope [16]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business in involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This Rule does not limit that authority. See Scope [16]. \nClarifying the Lawyer's Role \n[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged. \n[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case. \nDual Representation \n[12] Paragraph (e) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder. \nDerivative Actions \n[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization. \n[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.</div>","UrlName":"revision56"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b4525c0d-731a-4122-a984-e0f1db856652","Title":"RULE 1.14 CLIENT WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.</li> \n <li>When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.</li> \n <li>Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6 (a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished mental capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions. \n \n[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication. \n \n[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the lawyer should consider such participation in terms of its effect on the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf. \n \n[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2 (d). \n \nTaking Protective Action \n \n[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-making tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections. \n \n[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. \n \n[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client. \n \nDisclosure of the Client's Condition \n \n[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. \n \nEmergency Legal Assistance \n \n[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client. \n \n[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken. \n \n[11] This rule is not violated if a lawyer acts in good faith to comply with the rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule107","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"de6f6d4d-713d-4367-97e2-a05c3318f02b","ParentId":"b4525c0d-731a-4122-a984-e0f1db856652","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.</li> \n <li>When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.</li> \n <li>Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severly incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished mental capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions. \n \n[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication. \n \n[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the lawyer should consider such participation in terms of its effect on the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf. \n \n[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d). \n \nTaking Protective Action \n \n[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections. \n \n[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. \n \n[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client. \n \nDisclosure of the Client's Condition \n \n[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. \n \nEmergency Legal Assistance \n \n[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client. \n \n[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken. \n \n[11] This Rule is not violated if a lawyer acts in good faith to comply with the Rule. </div>","UrlName":"revision57"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fab74617-b734-48a1-ab5a-beca89919b7d","Title":"RULE 1.15(I) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - GENERAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.</li> \n <li> For the purposes of this rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person's interest in funds or other property in the lawyer's possession if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the interest is known to the lawyer, and</li> \n <li> the interest is based upon one of the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A statutory lien;</li> \n <li>A final judgment addressing disposition of those funds or property; or</li> \n <li>A written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The lawyer may disregard the third person's claimed interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement. </li> \n <li>Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.</li> \n <li>When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. \n[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration or interpleader. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed. \n[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party. The obligations of a lawyer under this rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction. \n[3A] In those cases where it is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds or property. \n[4] A \"clients' security fund \"provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.</div>","UrlName":"rule42","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2910a926-e4e3-470b-aaee-83e6228535a2","ParentId":"fab74617-b734-48a1-ab5a-beca89919b7d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.</li> \n <li> For the purposes of this Rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person's interest in funds or other property in the lawyer's possession if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the interest is known to the lawyer, and</li> \n <li> the interest is based upon one of the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A statutory lien;</li> \n <li>A final judgment addressing disposition of those funds or property; or</li> \n <li>A written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The lawyer may disregard the third person's claimed interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement. </li> \n <li>Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.</li> \n <li>When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. \n[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration or interpleader. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed. \n[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party. The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction. \n[3A] In those cases where it is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds or property. \n[4] A \"clients' security fund \"provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.</div>","UrlName":"revision58"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"RULE 1.15(II) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - TRUST ACCOUNT AND IOLTA","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Bar Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined in Bar Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule45","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4c2e1d2-2c8d-48e3-b9a7-78d1a5670861","ParentId":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined  in Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this Rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this Rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision111"},{"Id":"2473e9df-693d-4c42-8d30-abe6f3a5c393","ParentId":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined  in Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this Rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this Rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision113"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b8b582e1-b6cc-49d2-9bfc-653e18985481","Title":"RULE 1.15(III) RECORD KEEPING; TRUST ACCOUNT OVERDRAFT NOTIFICATION; EXAMINATION OF RECORDS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Required Bank Accounts: Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia and who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall maintain, in an approved financial institution as defined by this rule, a trust account or accounts, separate from any business and personal accounts. Funds received by the lawyer on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited into this account. The financial institution shall be in Georgia or in the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third person.</li> \n <li> Description of Accounts:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether general or specific, as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as an \"Attorney Trust Account,\"\"Attorney Escrow Account \"\"IOLTA Account \"or \"Attorney Fiduciary Account.\"The name of the attorney or law firm responsible for the account shall also appear on all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all business accounts, as well as all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, as a \"Business Account,\"a \"Professional Account,\"an \"Office Account,\"a \"General Account,\"a \"Payroll Account,\"\"Operating Account \"or a \"Regular Account.\"</li> \n <li>Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from using any additional description or designation for a specific business or trust account including fiduciary accounts maintained by the lawyer as executor, guardian, trustee, receiver, agent or in any other fiduciary capacity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Procedure:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Approved Institutions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall maintain his or her trust account only in a financial institution approved by the State Bar of Georgia, which shall annually publish a list of approved institutions.\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>Such institutions shall be located within the state of Georgia, within the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third-person. The institution shall be authorized by federal or state law to do business in the jurisdiction where located and shall be federally insured. A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer trust accounts if it abides by an agreement to report to the Office of the General Counsel whenever any properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds, and the instrument is not honored. The agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and shall not be canceled except upon 30-days notice in writing to the Office of the General Counsel. The agreement shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel on a form approved by the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall provide that all reports made by the financial institution shall be in writing and shall include the same information customarily forwarded to the depositor when an instrument is presented against insufficient funds. If the financial institution is located outside of the state of Georgia, it shall also agree in writing to honor any properly issued State Bar of Georgia subpoena.</li> \n <li>In addition to the requirements above, the financial institution must also be approved by the Georgia Bar Foundation and agree to offer IOLTA Accounts in compliance with the additional requirements set out in Part XV of the rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Georgia Bar Foundation may waive the provisions of this rule in whole or in part for good cause shown. A lawyer or law firm may appeal the decision of the Georgia Bar Foundation by application to the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Timing of Reports:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The financial institution shall file a report with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia in every instance where a properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds.</li> \n <li>The report shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel within 15 days of the date of the presentation of the instrument, even if the instrument is subsequently honored.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Nothing shall preclude a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this rule.</li> \n <li>Every lawyer and law firm maintaining a trust account as provided by these rules is hereby and shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements mandated by this rule and shall indemnify and hold harmless each financial institution for its compliance with the aforesaid reporting and production requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Effect on Financial Institution of Compliance: The agreement by a financial institution to offer accounts pursuant to this rule shall be a procedure to advise the State Disciplinary Board of conduct by lawyers and shall not be deemed to create a duty to exercise a standard of care or a contract with third parties that may sustain a loss as a result of lawyers overdrawing lawyer trust accounts.</li> \n <li>Availability of Records: A lawyer shall not fail to produce any of the records required to be maintained by these rules at the request of theState Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia. This obligation shall be in addition to and not in lieu of the procedures contained in Part IV of these rules for the production of documents and evidence.</li> \n <li>Audit for Cause: A lawyer shall not fail to submit to an audit for cause conducted by the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-111.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Each financial institution wishing to be approved as a depository of client trust funds must file an overdraft notification agreement with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia will publish a list of approved institutions at least annually. \n \n[2] The overdraft agreement requires that all overdrafts be reported to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia whether or not the instrument is honored. It is improper for a lawyer to accept \"overdraft privileges \"or any other arrangement for a personal loan on a client trust account, particularly in exchange for the institution's promise to delay or not to report an overdraft. The institution must notify the Office of the General Counsel of all overdrafts even where the institution is certain that its own error caused the overdraft or that the matter could have been resolved between the institution and the lawyer within a reasonable period of time. \n \n[3] The overdraft notification provision is not intended to result in the discipline of every lawyer who overdraws a trust account. The lawyer or institution may explain occasional errors. The provision merely intends that the Office of the General Counsel receive an early warning of improprieties so that corrective action, including audits for cause, may be taken. \n \nWaiver \n \n[4] A lawyer may seek to have the provisions of this rule waived if the lawyer or law firm has its principal office in a county where no bank, credit union, or savings and loan association will agree or has agreed to comply with the provisions of this rule. Other grounds for requesting a waiver may include significant financial or business harm to the lawyer or law firm, such as where the unapproved bank is a client of the lawyer or law firm or where the lawyer serves on the board of the unapproved bank. \n \n[5] The request for a waiver should be in writing, sent to the Georgia Bar Foundation, and should include sufficient information to establish good cause for the requested waiver. \n \n[6] The Georgia Bar Foundation may request additional information from the lawyer or law firm if necessary to determine good cause. \nAudits \n[7] Every lawyer's financial records and trust account records are required records and therefore are properly subject to audit for cause. The audit provisions are intended to uncover errors and omissions before the public is harmed, to deter those lawyers who may be tempted to misuse client's funds and to educate and instruct lawyers as to proper trust accounting methods. Although the auditors will be employed by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, it is intended that disciplinary proceedings will be brought only when the auditors have reasonable cause to believe discrepancies or irregularities exist. Otherwise, the auditors should only educate the lawyer and the lawyer's staff as to proper trust accounting methods. \n[8] An audit for cause may be conducted at any time and without advance notice if the Office of the General Counsel receives sufficient evidence that a lawyer poses a threat of harm to clients or the public. The Office of the General Counsel must have the written approval of the Chairman of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia to conduct an audit for cause. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule47","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"fe56572d-3099-4684-a166-9711aeb97df5","ParentId":"b8b582e1-b6cc-49d2-9bfc-653e18985481","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Required Bank Accounts: Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia and who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall maintain, in an approved financial institution as defined by this rule, a trust account or accounts, separate from any business and personal accounts. Funds received by the lawyer on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited into this account. The financial institution shall be in Georgia or in the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third person.</li> \n <li> Description of Accounts:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether general or specific, as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as an \"Attorney Trust Account,\"\"Attorney Escrow Account \"\"IOLTA Account \"or \"Attorney Fiduciary Account.\"The name of the attorney or law firm responsible for the account shall also appear on all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all business accounts, as well as all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, as a \"Business Account,\"a \"Professional Account,\"an \"Office Account,\"a \"General Account,\"a \"Payroll Account,\"\"Operating Account \"or a \"Regular Account.\"</li> \n <li>Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from using any additional description or designation for a specific business or trust account including fiduciary accounts maintained by the lawyer as executor, guardian, trustee, receiver, agent or in any other fiduciary capacity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Procedure:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Approved Institutions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall maintain his or her trust account only in a financial institution approved by the State Bar of Georgia, which shall annually publish a list of approved institutions.\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>Such institutions shall be located within the state of Georgia, within the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third-person. The institution shall be authorized by federal or state law to do business in the jurisdiction where located and shall be federally insured. A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer trust accounts if it abides by an agreement to report to the Office of the General Counsel whenever any properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds, and the instrument is not honored. The agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and shall not be canceled except upon 30-days notice in writing to the Office of the General Counsel. The agreement shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel on a form approved by the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall provide that all reports made by the financial institution shall be in writing and shall include the same information customarily forwarded to the depositor when an instrument is presented against insufficient funds. If the financial institution is located outside of the state of Georgia, it shall also agree in writing to honor any properly issued State Bar of Georgia subpoena.</li> \n <li>In addition to the requirements above, the financial institution must also be approved by the Georgia Bar Foundation and agree to offer IOLTA Accounts in compliance with the additional requirements set out in Part XV of the rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Georgia Bar Foundation may waive the provisions of this rule in whole or in part for good cause shown. A lawyer or law firm may appeal the decision of the Georgia Bar Foundation by application to the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Timing of Reports:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The financial institution shall file a report with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia in every instance where a properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds and said instrument is not honored within three business days of presentation.</li> \n <li>The report shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel within fifteen days of the date of the presentation of the instrument, even if the instrument is subsequently honored after the three business days provided in (2) (i) above.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Nothing shall preclude a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this rule.</li> \n <li>Every lawyer and law firm maintaining a trust account as provided by these rules is hereby and shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements mandated by this rule and shall indemnify and hold harmless each financial institution for its compliance with the aforesaid reporting and production requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Effect on Financial Institution of Compliance: The agreement by a financial institution to offer accounts pursuant to this rule shall be a procedure to advise the State Disciplinary Board of conduct by lawyers and shall not be deemed to create a duty to exercise a standard of care or a contract with third parties that may sustain a loss as a result of lawyers overdrawing lawyer trust accounts.</li> \n <li>Availability of Records: A lawyer shall not fail to produce any of the records required to be maintained by these rules at the request of theState Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia. This obligation shall be in addition to and not in lieu of the procedures contained in Part IV of these rules for the production of documents and evidence.</li> \n <li>Audit for Cause: A lawyer shall not fail to submit to an audit for cause conducted by the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-111.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Each financial institution wishing to be approved as a depository of client trust funds must file an overdraft notification agreement with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia will publish a list of approved institutions at least annually. \n \n[2] The overdraft agreement requires that all overdrafts be reported to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia whether or not the instrument is honored. It is improper for a lawyer to accept \"overdraft privileges \"or any other arrangement for a personal loan on a client trust account, particularly in exchange for the institution's promise to delay or not to report an overdraft. The institution must notify the Office of the General Counsel of all overdrafts even where the institution is certain that its own error caused the overdraft or that the matter could have been resolved between the institution and the lawyer within a reasonable period of time. \n \n[3] The overdraft notification provision is not intended to result in the discipline of every lawyer who overdraws a trust account. The lawyer or institution may explain occasional errors. The provision merely intends that the Office of the General Counsel receive an early warning of improprieties so that corrective action, including audits for cause, may be taken. \n \nWaiver \n \n[4] A lawyer may seek to have the provisions of this rule waived if the lawyer or law firm has its principal office in a county where no bank, credit union, or savings and loan association will agree or has agreed to comply with the provisions of this rule. Other grounds for requesting a waiver may include significant financial or business harm to the lawyer or law firm, such as where the unapproved bank is a client of the lawyer or law firm or where the lawyer serves on the board of the unapproved bank. \n \n[5] The request for a waiver should be in writing, sent to the Georgia Bar Foundation, and should include sufficient information to establish good cause for the requested waiver. \n \n[6] The Georgia Bar Foundation may request additional information from the lawyer or law firm if necessary to determine good cause. \nAudits \n[7] Every lawyer's financial records and trust account records are required records and therefore are properly subject to audit for cause. The audit provisions are intended to uncover errors and omissions before the public is harmed, to deter those lawyers who may be tempted to misuse client's funds and to educate and instruct lawyers as to proper trust accounting methods. Although the auditors will be employed by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, it is intended that disciplinary proceedings will be brought only when the auditors have reasonable cause to believe discrepancies or irregularities exist. Otherwise, the auditors should only educate the lawyer and the lawyer's staff as to proper trust accounting methods. \n[8] An audit for cause may be conducted at any time and without advance notice if the Office of the General Counsel receives sufficient evidence that a lawyer poses a threat of harm to clients or the public. The Office of the General Counsel must have the written approval of the Chairman of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia to conduct an audit for cause. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision323"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f019eba7-101e-4a2a-8834-5291c6c38c6b","Title":"RULE 1.16 DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is discharged.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;</li> \n <li>the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;</li> \n <li>the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;</li> \n <li>the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;</li> \n <li>the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or</li> \n <li>other good cause for withdrawal exists.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.</li> \n <li>Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. But see Rule 1.2 (c): Scope of Representation. \n \nMandatory Withdrawal \n \n[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation. \n \n[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \nDischarge \n \n[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances. \n \n[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. To the extent possible, the lawyer should give the client an explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to be self-represented. \n \n[6] If the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and, in an extreme case, may initiate proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.14: Client under a Disability. \n \nOptional Withdrawal \n \n[7] The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on a repugnant or imprudent objective. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \n[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. \n \nAssisting the Client upon Withdrawal \n \n[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. \n \n[10] Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may under certain unusual circumstances have a legal obligation to the organization after withdrawing or being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these rules. </div>","UrlName":"rule48","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ab4d791-6703-456d-aae3-c2f9d42df37a","ParentId":"f019eba7-101e-4a2a-8834-5291c6c38c6b","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is discharged.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;</li> \n <li>the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;</li> \n <li>the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;</li> \n <li>the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;</li> \n <li>the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or</li> \n <li>other good cause for withdrawal exists.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.</li> \n <li>Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. But see Rule 1.2(c): Scope of Representation. \n \nMandatory Withdrawal \n \n[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation. \n \n[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \nDischarge \n \n[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances. \n \n[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. To the extent possible, the lawyer should give the client an explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to be self-represented. \n \n[6] If the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and, in an extreme case, may initiate proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.14: Client under a Disability. \n \nOptional Withdrawal \n \n[7] The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on a repugnant or imprudent objective. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \n[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. \n \nAssisting the Client upon Withdrawal \n \n[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. \n \n[10] Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may under certain unusual circumstances have a legal obligation to the organization after withdrawing or being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these Rules. </div>","UrlName":"revision61"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"91ad0a2f-e4fe-449f-a182-e4259678a5ff","Title":"RULE 1.17. SALE OF LAW PRACTICE.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>The practice is sold as an entirety to another lawyer or law firm;</li> \n <li> Actual written notice is given to each of the seller's clients regarding:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the proposed sale;</li> \n <li>the terms of any proposed change in the fee arrangement authorized by paragraph (d);</li> \n <li>the client's right to retain other counsel, or to take possession of the file; and</li> \n <li>the fact that the client's consent to the sale will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of receipt of the notice.</li> \n </ol> \n If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file. </li> \n <li>The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this rule, when another lawyer or firm takes over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer and 5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice. \n \nTermination of Practice by the Seller \n \n[2] The requirement that all of the private practice be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice available for sale to the purchaser. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchaser but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Neither does a return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \nSingle Purchaser \n \n[5] The rule requires a single purchaser. The prohibition against piecemeal sale of a practice protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchaser is required to undertake all client matters in the practice, subject to client consent. If, however, the purchaser is unable to undertake all client matters because of a conflict of interest in a specific matter respecting which the purchaser is not permitted by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest or another rule to represent the client, the requirement that there be a single purchaser is nevertheless satisfied. \n \nClient Confidences, Consent and Notice \n \n[6] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to detailed information relating to the representation, such as the client's file, however, requires client consent. The rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser and any proposed change in the terms of future representation, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed. \n \n[7] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. \n \n[8] All the elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice. \n \nFee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser \n \n[9] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing agreements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser, unless the client consents. The purchaser may, however, advise the client that the purchaser will not undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the higher fees the purchaser usually charges. To prevent client financing of the sale, the higher fee the purchaser may charge must not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for substantially similar services rendered prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations. \n \n[10] The purchaser may not intentionally fragment the practice which is the subject of the sale by charging significantly different fees in substantially similar matters. Doing so would make it possible for the purchaser to avoid the obligation to take over the entire practice by charging arbitrarily higher fees for less lucrative matters, thereby increasing the likelihood that those clients would not consent to the new representation. \n \nOther Applicable Ethical Standards \n \n[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1: Competence); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure client consent after consultation for those conflicts which can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9). \n \n[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation). \n \nApplicability of the Rule \n \n[13] This rule applies to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met. \n \n[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule. \n \n[15] This rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice. </div>","UrlName":"rule49","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f0276f4f-5259-4981-8840-1bbff9517bff","ParentId":"91ad0a2f-e4fe-449f-a182-e4259678a5ff","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>The practice is sold as an entirety to another lawyer or law firm;</li> \n <li> Actual written notice is given to each of the seller's clients regarding:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the proposed sale;</li> \n <li>the terms of any proposed change in the fee arrangement authorized by paragraph (d);</li> \n <li>the client's right to retain other counsel, or to take possession of the file; and</li> \n <li>the fact that the client's consent to the sale will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of receipt of the notice.</li> \n </ol> \n If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file. </li> \n <li>The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this rule, when another lawyer or firm takes over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer and 5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice. \n \nTermination of Practice by the Seller \n \n[2] The requirement that all of the private practice be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice available for sale to the purchaser. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchaser but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Neither does a return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \nSingle Purchaser \n \n[5] The rule requires a single purchaser. The prohibition against piecemeal sale of a practice protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchaser is required to undertake all client matters in the practice, subject to client consent. If, however, the purchaser is unable to undertake all client matters because of a conflict of interest in a specific matter respecting which the purchaser is not permitted by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest or another rule to represent the client, the requirement that there be a single purchaser is nevertheless satisfied. \n \nClient Confidences, Consent and Notice \n \n[6] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to client-specific information relating to the representation and to the file, however, requires client consent. The rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser and any proposed change in the terms of future representation, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed. \n \n[7] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. \n \n[8] All the elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice. \n \nFee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser \n \n[9] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing agreements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser, unless the client consents. The purchaser may, however, advise the client that the purchaser will not undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the higher fees the purchaser usually charges. To prevent client financing of the sale, the higher fee the purchaser may charge must not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for substantially similar services rendered prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations. \n \n[10] The purchaser may not intentionally fragment the practice which is the subject of the sale by charging significantly different fees in substantially similar matters. Doing so would make it possible for the purchaser to avoid the obligation to take over the entire practice by charging arbitrarily higher fees for less lucrative matters, thereby increasing the likelihood that those clients would not consent to the new representation. \n \nOther Applicable Ethical Standards \n \n[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1: Competence); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure client consent after consultation for those conflicts which can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9). \n \n[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation). \n \nApplicability of the Rule \n \n[13] This rule applies to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met. \n \n[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule. \n \n[15] This rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice. </div>","UrlName":"revision278"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"79cd5db1-e60a-4dfe-93c5-bc2570ebc80b","Title":"RULE 1.18. DUTIES TO PROSPECTIVE CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client. \n(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client. \n(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). \n(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's consultations with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients. \n[2] A person becomes a prospective client by consulting with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Whether communications, including written, oral, or electronic communications, constitute a consultation depends on the circumstances. For example, a consultation is likely to have occurred if a lawyer, either in person or through the lawyer’s advertising in any medium, specifically requests or invites the submission of information about a potential representation without clear and reasonably understandable warnings and cautionary statements that limit the lawyer’s obligations, and a person provides information in response. See also Comment [4]. In contrast, a consultation does not occur if a person provides information to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer’s education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal information of general interest. Such a person communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is thus not a \"prospective client.\"Moreover, a person who communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying the lawyer is not a “prospective client.” \n[3] It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by Rule 1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be. \n[4] In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial consultation to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under Rule 1.7, then consent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation. \n[5] A lawyer may condition a consultation with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0 (l) for the definition of informed consent. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer's subsequent use of information received from the prospective client. \n[6] Even in the absence of an agreement, under paragraph (c), the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter. \n[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.10, but, under paragraph (d), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. \n[8] For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer's duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer's care, see Rule 1.15.</div>","UrlName":"rule608","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de4aae0a-e7b5-495d-b898-36b23dbb6bac","Title":"RULE 2.1 ADVISOR","Content":" In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. A lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nScope of Advice \n \n[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. \n \n[2] In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation. Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. \n \n[3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations. \n \n[4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts. \n \nOffering Advice \n \n[5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, duty to the client under Rule 1.4: Communication may require that the lawyer act if the client's course of action is related to the representation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.","UrlName":"rule62","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bf5aa118-f96c-45f6-8cf4-001a331ae3d3","Title":"RULE 2.2 INTERMEDIARY","Content":"Reserved.","UrlName":"rule65","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b9148e26-9da2-467d-81a0-6bb903261fa0","Title":"RULE 2.3 EVALUATION FOR USE BY THIRD PERSONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nDefinition \n \n[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government entity; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business. \n \n[2] Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government entity action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether the opinion is to be made public. \n \n[3] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available. \n \nDuty to Third Person \n \n[4] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings. \n \nAccess to and Disclosure of Information \n \n[5] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. \n \nFinancial Auditors' Requests for Information \n \n[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975. </div>","UrlName":"rule66","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9d14a347-799f-4861-9a49-11305775393e","ParentId":"b9148e26-9da2-467d-81a0-6bb903261fa0","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nDefinition \n \n[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government entity; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business. \n \n[2] Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government entity action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether the opinion is to be made public. \n \n[3] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available. \n \nDuty to Third Person \n \n[4] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings. \n \nAccess to and Disclosure of Information \n \n[5] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. \n \nFinancial Auditors' Requests for Information \n \n[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975. </div>","UrlName":"revision63"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ee3f3057-e1fb-4ad5-9b27-9629d9d9ade2","Title":"RULE 2.4 LAWYER SERVING AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.</li> \n <li>A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.</li> \n <li>When one or more of the parties in a mediation is a current or former client of the neutral lawyer or the neutral's law firm, a lawyer may serve as a neutral only if the matter in which the lawyer serves as a neutral is not the same matter in which the lawyer or law firm represents or represented the party and all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court. \n \n[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. \n \n[3] Unlike non-lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected. \n \n[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12. \n \n[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0 (r)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1. </div>","UrlName":"rule68","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"dc4cd20c-1668-4ee3-9bd8-5fc54c639dbf","ParentId":"ee3f3057-e1fb-4ad5-9b27-9629d9d9ade2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.</li> \n <li>A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.</li> \n <li>When one or more of the parties in a mediation is a current or former client of the neutral lawyer or the neutral's law firm, a lawyer may serve as a neutral only if the matter in which the lawyer serves as a neutral is not the same matter in which the lawyer or law firm represents or represented the party and all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court. \n \n[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. \n \n[3] Unlike non-lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected. \n \n[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12. \n \n[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(r)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1. </div>","UrlName":"revision64"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9487575d-c5ad-4680-9ee1-cf089c18ce38","Title":"RULE 3.1 MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;</li> \n <li>knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. \n \n[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. \n \n[3] It is not ethically improper for a lawyer to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the lawyer determines that a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the lawyer is not required by rules of procedure. or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the lawyer will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. \n \n[4] The decision of a court that a claim is not meritorious is not necessarily conclusive of a violation of this rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule69","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"99f9ad1a-aa70-4081-a8ae-b561636a3ae0","ParentId":"9487575d-c5ad-4680-9ee1-cf089c18ce38","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;</li> \n <li>knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. \n \n[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. \n \n[3] It is not ethically improper for a lawyer to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the lawyer determines that a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the lawyer is not required by rules of procedure. or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the lawyer will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. \n \n[4] The decision of a court that a claim is not meritorious is not necessarily conclusive of a violation of this Rule. </div>","UrlName":"revision65"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"787cc9d4-fe4d-484d-a6d4-e1a3006e108b","Title":"RULE 3.2 EXPEDITING LITIGATION","Content":" A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. \n \n[2] The reasonableness of a lawyer's effort to expedite litigation must be judged by all of the controlling factors. \"Reasonable efforts \"do not equate to \"instant efforts \"and are sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n ","UrlName":"rule71","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a195a719-bb14-4dec-9f7d-5d5e4d9c9dd0","Title":"RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or</li> \n <li>offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.</li> \n <li>In an ex parte proceeding, other than grand jury proceedings, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0 (aa) for the definition of tribunal. It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a) (4) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false. \n \n[2] This rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. \n \nRepresentations by a Lawyer \n \n[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2 (d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2 (d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4 (b). \n \nLegal Argument \n \n[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a) (3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. \n \nOffering Evidence \n \n[5] Paragraph (c) allows that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity. \n \n[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer may refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit from the witness the testimony that the lawyer knows is false. \n \n[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9]. \n \n[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0 (i). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. \n \n[9] Although paragraph (a) (4) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7]. \n \nRemedial Measures \n \n[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done - making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps nothing. \n \n[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2 (d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. \n \nPreserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process \n \n[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. \n \nDuration of Obligation \n \n[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. \n \nEx Parte Proceedings \n \n[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16 (a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16 (b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. </div>","UrlName":"rule72","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"ea43d08b-5a41-4e59-be18-be435a0cce18","ParentId":"a195a719-bb14-4dec-9f7d-5d5e4d9c9dd0","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or</li> \n <li>offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.</li> \n <li>In an ex parte proceeding, other than grand jury proceedings, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(r) for the definition of tribunal. It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(4) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false. \n \n[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. \n \nRepresentations by a Lawyer \n \n[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b). \n \nLegal Argument \n \n[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. \n \nOffering Evidence \n \n[5] Paragraph (c) allows that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity. \n \n[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer may refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit from the witness the testimony that the lawyer knows is false. \n \n[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9]. \n \n[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(i). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. \n \n[9] Although paragraph (a)(4) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7]. \n \nRemedial Measures \n \n[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done - making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps nothing. \n \n[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. \n \nPreserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process \n \n[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. \n \nDuration of Obligation \n \n[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. \n \nEx Parte Proceedings \n \n[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. </div>","UrlName":"revision66"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0e595dc4-c128-4d22-a9ee-b54827dc085b","Title":"RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>falsify evidence;</li> \n <li>counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely; or</li> \n <li> pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparation, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in preparing, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li> request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; or the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information; and</li> \n <li>the information is not otherwise subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the opposing party or counsel; or</li> \n <li>present, participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. \n \n[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2. \n \n[5] As to paragraph (g), the responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of the opposing party or counsel. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence. </div>","UrlName":"rule77","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"bcea26ee-c9b9-489a-8d50-bbc8b7262095","ParentId":"0e595dc4-c128-4d22-a9ee-b54827dc085b","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>falsify evidence;</li> \n <li>counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely; or</li> \n <li> pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparation, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in preparing, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li> request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; or the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information; and</li> \n <li>the information is not otherwise subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the opposing party or counsel; or</li> \n <li>present, participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. \n \n[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2. \n \n[5] As to paragraph (g), the responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of the opposing party or counsel. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence. </div>","UrlName":"revision67"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7e15a371-0bf3-40f4-82e0-125f4df371e6","Title":"RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;</li> \n <li>communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law;</li> \n <li> communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the communication is prohibited by law or court order; or</li> \n <li>the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or</li> \n <li>the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c) of this rule is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (b) or paragraph (d) of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Many forms of improper influence upon the tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. All of those are specified in the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct with which an advocate should be familiar. Attention is also directed to Rule 8.4. Misconduct., which governs other instances of improper conduct by a lawyer/candidate. \n \n[2] If we are to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law. The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process. Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided. The activity proscribed by this rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety. \n \n[3A] The rule with respect to ex parte communications limits direct communications except as may be permitted by law. Thus, court rules or case law must be referred to in order to determine whether certain ex parte communications are legitimate. Ex parte communications may be permitted by statutory authorization. \n \n[3B] A lawyer who obtains a judge's signature on a decree in the absence of the opposing lawyer where certain aspects of the decree are still in dispute, may have violated Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., regardless of the lawyer's good intentions or good faith. \n \n[4] A lawyer may communicate as to the merits of the cause with a judge in the course of official proceedings in the case, in writing if the lawyer simultaneously delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer, or orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer. \n \n[5] If the lawyer knowingly instigates or causes another to instigate a communication proscribed by Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., a violation may occur. \n \n[6] Direct or indirect communication with a juror during the trial is clearly prohibited. A lawyer may not avoid the proscription of Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., by using agents to communicate improperly with jurors. A lawyer may be held responsible if the lawyer was aware of the client's desire to establish contact with jurors and assisted the client in doing so. \n \n[7] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication period. \n \n[8] While a lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge, the lawyer's actions should avoid reciprocation. Fairness and impartiality of the trial process is strengthened by the lawyer's protection of the record for subsequent review and this preserves the professional integrity of the legal profession by patient firmness. </div>","UrlName":"rule78","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"40d626a1-e510-44a9-9471-5e2f78bec600","ParentId":"7e15a371-0bf3-40f4-82e0-125f4df371e6","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;</li> \n <li>communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law;</li> \n <li> communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the communication is prohibited by law or court order; or</li> \n <li>the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or</li> \n <li>the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c) of this Rule is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (b) or paragraph (d) of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Many forms of improper influence upon the tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. All of those are specified in the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct with which an advocate should be familiar. Attention is also directed to Rule 8.4. Misconduct., which governs other instances of improper conduct by a lawyer/candidate. \n \n[2] If we are to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law. The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process. Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided. The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety. \n \n[3A] The Rule with respect to ex parte communications limits direct communications except as may be permitted by law. Thus, court rules or case law must be referred to in order to determine whether certain ex parte communications are legitimate. Ex parte communications may be permitted by statutory authorization. \n \n[3B] A lawyer who obtains a judge's signature on a decree in the absence of the opposing lawyer where certain aspects of the decree are still in dispute, may have violated Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., regardless of the lawyer's good intentions or good faith. \n \n[4] A lawyer may communicate as to the merits of the cause with a judge in the course of official proceedings in the case, in writing if the lawyer simultaneously delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer, or orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer. \n \n[5] If the lawyer knowingly instigates or causes another to instigate a communication proscribed by Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., a violation may occur. \n \n[6] Direct or indirect communication with a juror during the trial is clearly prohibited. A lawyer may not avoid the proscription of Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., by using agents to communicate improperly with jurors. A lawyer may be held responsible if the lawyer was aware of the client's desire to establish contact with jurors and assisted the client in doing so. \n \n[7] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication period. \n \n[8] While a lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge, the lawyer's actions should avoid reciprocation. Fairness and impartiality of the trial process is strengthened by the lawyer's protection of the record for subsequent review and this preserves the professional integrity of the legal profession by patient firmness. </div>","UrlName":"revision68"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"8dfb7354-c1a1-43b5-91a9-a3a62430af36","Title":"RULE 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.</li> \n <li>No lawyer associated in a firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy. \n \n[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. \n \n[3] The rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \n[5A] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;</li> \n <li>in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;</li> \n <li>the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;</li> \n <li>any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;</li> \n <li>information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or</li> \n <li>the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.</li> \n </ol> \n[5B] In addition, there are certain subjects which are more likely than not to have no material prejudicial effect on a proceeding. Thus, a lawyer may usually state: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;</li> \n <li>information contained in a public record;</li> \n <li>that an investigation of a matter is in progress;</li> \n <li>the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;</li> \n <li>a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;</li> \n <li>a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and</li> \n <li> in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;</li> \n <li>if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;</li> \n <li>the fact, time and place of arrest; and</li> \n <li>the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n [6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding. \n \n[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others. </div>","UrlName":"rule80","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d4008c7-81dc-4570-a7c5-fadc0e62e763","ParentId":"8dfb7354-c1a1-43b5-91a9-a3a62430af36","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.</li> \n <li>No lawyer associated in a firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy. \n \n[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. \n \n[3] The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \n[5A] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;</li> \n <li>in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;</li> \n <li>the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;</li> \n <li>any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;</li> \n <li>information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or</li> \n <li>the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.</li> \n </ol> \n[5B] In addition, there are certain subjects which are more likely than not to have no material prejudicial effect on a proceeding. Thus, a lawyer may usually state: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;</li> \n <li>information contained in a public record;</li> \n <li>that an investigation of a matter is in progress;</li> \n <li>the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;</li> \n <li>a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;</li> \n <li>a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and</li> \n <li> in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;</li> \n <li>if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;</li> \n <li>the fact, time and place of arrest; and</li> \n <li>the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n [6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding. \n \n[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others. </div>","UrlName":"revision69"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a27d1536-2fbd-415a-abdf-3d15b8f792a3","Title":"RULE 3.7 LAWYER AS WITNESS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;</li> \n <li>the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or</li> \n <li>disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. \n \n[2] The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a) (2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. \n \n[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a) (3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification has no application to this aspect of the problem. \n \n[5] Whether the combination of roles involves an improper conflict of interest with respect to the client is determined by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule or Rule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification disqualifies the firm also. </div>","UrlName":"rule82","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1a8bd156-3327-4459-9fd5-47902e68ac7a","ParentId":"a27d1536-2fbd-415a-abdf-3d15b8f792a3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;</li> \n <li>the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or</li> \n <li>disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. \n \n[2] The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. \n \n[3] Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. \n \n[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification has no application to this aspect of the problem. \n \n[5] Whether the combination of roles involves an improper conflict of interest with respect to the client is determined by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule or Rule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification disqualifies the firm also. </div>","UrlName":"revision70"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c5237a8c-7ec6-4f31-bf97-99f1ba804338","Title":"RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;</li> \n <li>refrain from making any effort to prevent the accused from exercising a reasonable effort to obtain counsel;</li> \n <li>comply with Rule 4.2;</li> \n <li>make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates the offense;</li> \n <li>exercise reasonable care to prevent persons who are under the direct supervision of the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under subsection (g) of this Rule;</li> \n <li> not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;</li> \n <li>the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and</li> \n <li>there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused;</li> \n <li>promptly disclose new, credible, and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted to an appropriate court or authority. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, the prosecutor shall promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay and undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit;</li> \n <li>seek to remedy a conviction obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction when the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant did not commit the offense.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n \n[2] Reserved. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship. \n \n[5] Paragraph (g) supplements Rule 3.6: Trial Publicity, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6 (b) or 3.6 (c): Trial Publicity. \n [6]\t Reserved. \n [7]\t When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (h) requires prompt disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, paragraph (h) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Consistent with the objectives of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented  defendant,  would  ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. \n [8]\t Under paragraph (i), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Necessary steps may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted. \n [9]\t A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of paragraphs (h) and (i), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule83","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0c97837e-b4b3-442f-b480-60afe6bd6990","ParentId":"c5237a8c-7ec6-4f31-bf97-99f1ba804338","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;</li> \n <li>refrain from making any effort to prevent the accused from exercising a reasonable effort to obtain counsel;</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates the offense;</li> \n <li>exercise reasonable care to prevent persons who are under the direct supervision of the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under subsection (g) of this rule;</li> \n <li> not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;</li> \n <li>the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and</li> \n <li>there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n \n[2] Reserved. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship. \n \n[5] Paragraph (g) supplements Rule 3.6: Trial Publicity, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6 (b) or 3.6 (c): Trial Publicity. </div>","UrlName":"revision391"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4a46f7a1-94ac-4d60-b789-6ebe7708541a","Title":"RULE 3.9 ADVOCATE IN NONADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS","Content":" A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or administrative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3 (a) through (c), 3.4 (a) through (c), and 3.5. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule making or policy making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision making body, like a court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body should deal with the tribunal honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedures. \n \n[2] Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. The requirements of this rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts. \n \n[3] This rule does not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental entity; representation in such a transaction is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4. \n ","UrlName":"rule85","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"748d9636-a16e-43d2-b7d9-5bddf553f1ac","Title":"RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nMisrepresentation \n \n[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act. \n \nStatements of Fact \n \n[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Comments which fall under the general category of \"puffing \"do not violate this rule. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. \n \nFraud by Client \n \n[3] Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information. </div>","UrlName":"rule289","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"16314d93-c9ec-450e-8636-98955fce4f5d","ParentId":"748d9636-a16e-43d2-b7d9-5bddf553f1ac","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nMisrepresentation \n \n[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act. \n \nStatements of Fact \n \n[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Comments which fall under the general category of \"puffing \"do not violate this rule. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. \n \nFraud by Client \n \n[3] Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information. </div>","UrlName":"revision72"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"25645231-5602-4631-b95f-e304dee1c781","Title":"RULE 4.2 COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.</li> \n <li>Attorneys for the State and Federal Government shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as other attorneys in this State.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government entity and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government entity to speak with government officials about the matter. \n \n[2] Communications authorized by law also include constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this Rule or has found this Rule inapplicable. However, the Rule imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional provisions. \n \n[3] This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates. \n \n[4A] In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4 (f). Communication with a former employee of a represented organization is discussed in Formal Advisory Opinion 20-1. \n \n[4B] In administering this Rule it should be anticipated that in many instances, prior to the beginning of the interview, the interviewing lawyer will not possess sufficient information to determine whether the relationship of the interviewee to the entity is sufficiently close to place the person in the \"represented \"category. In those situations the good faith of the lawyer in undertaking the interview should be considered. Evidence of good faith includes an immediate and candid statement of the interest of the person on whose behalf the interview is being taken, a full explanation of why that person's position is adverse to the interests of the entity with which the interviewee is associated, the exploration of the relationship issue at the outset of the interview and the cessation of the interview immediately upon determination that the interview is improper. \n \n[5] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies, however, in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See 1.0. Such an inference may arise in circumstances where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom communication is sought is represented in the matter to be discussed. Thus, a lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by ignoring the obvious. \n \n[6] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3. \n \n[6A] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury. \n \n[7] The anti-contact rule serves important public interests which preserve the proper functioning of the judicial system and the administration of justice by a) protecting against misuse of the imbalance of legal skill between a lawyer and layperson; b) safe-guarding the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel; c) ensuring that all valid claims and defenses are raised in response to inquiry from adverse counsel; d) reducing the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that might harm their interests; and e) maintaining the lawyers ability to monitor the case and effectively represent the client. \n \n[8] Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other because this Rule is not intended to affect communications between parties to an action entered into independent of and not at the request or direction of counsel. </div>","UrlName":"rule296","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"628733fe-c98e-4bf7-8bb3-1abfc627d292","ParentId":"25645231-5602-4631-b95f-e304dee1c781","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.</li> \n <li>Attorneys for the State and Federal Government shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as other attorneys in this State.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government entity and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government entity to speak with government officials about the matter. \n \n[2] Communications authorized by law also include constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this Rule or has found this Rule inapplicable. However, the Rule imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional provisions. \n \n[3] This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates. \n \n[4A] In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. See Formal Advisory Opinion 87-6. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). Communication with a former employee of a represented organization is discussed in Formal Advisory Opinion 94-3. \n \n[4B] In administering this Rule it should be anticipated that in many instances, prior to the beginning of the interview, the interviewing lawyer will not possess sufficient information to determine whether the relationship of the interviewee to the entity is sufficiently close to place the person in the \"represented \"category. In those situations the good faith of the lawyer in undertaking the interview should be considered. Evidence of good faith includes an immediate and candid statement of the interest of the person on whose behalf the interview is being taken, a full explanation of why that person's position is adverse to the interests of the entity with which the interviewee is associated, the exploration of the relationship issue at the outset of the interview and the cessation of the interview immediately upon determination that the interview is improper. \n \n[5] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies, however, in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See 1.0. Such an inference may arise in circumstances where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom communication is sought is represented in the matter to be discussed. Thus, a lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by ignoring the obvious. \n \n[6] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3. \n \n[6A] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury. \n \n[7] The anti-contact rule serves important public interests which preserve the proper functioning of the judicial system and the administration of justice by a) protecting against misuse of the imbalance of legal skill between a lawyer and layperson; b) safe-guarding the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel; c) ensuring that all valid claims and defenses are raised in response to inquiry from adverse counsel; d) reducing the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that might harm their interests; and e) maintaining the lawyers ability to monitor the case and effectively represent the client. \n \n[8] Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other because this Rule is not intended to affect communications between parties to an action entered into independent of and not at the request or direction of counsel. </div>","UrlName":"revision73"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4a6e5ea5-62ee-401b-a772-f70dbf79e097","Title":"RULE 4.3 DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSON","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and</li> \n <li>give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client. </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f). \n \n[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented persons interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations. </div>","UrlName":"rule298","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"a9cc4ee3-7fee-410b-afed-7a63073cff2f","ParentId":"4a6e5ea5-62ee-401b-a772-f70dbf79e097","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and</li> \n <li>give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client. </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f). \n \n[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented persons interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations. </div>","UrlName":"revision74"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bfe134c6-2213-4373-8419-b9ba66e4c40f","Title":"RULE 4.4 RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships. \n[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive a document or electronically stored information that was mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. A document or electronically stored information is inadvertently sent when it is accidentally transmitted, such as when an e-mail or letter is misaddressed or a document or electronically stored information is accidentally included with information that was intentionally transmitted. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document or electronically stored information was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the document or electronically stored information, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document or electronically stored information has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been inappropriately obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, ‘‘document or electronically stored information’’ includes, in addition to paper documents, e-mail and other forms of electronically stored information, including embedded data (commonly referred to as “metadata”), that is subject to being read or put into readable form. Metadata in electronic documents creates an obligation under this Rule only if the receiving lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the metadata was inadvertently sent to the receiving lawyer.</div>","UrlName":"rule300","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"def9f1ce-eb75-4497-ba0e-3477cabad38c","ParentId":"bfe134c6-2213-4373-8419-b9ba66e4c40f","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships.","UrlName":"revision6"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"02b56e63-d751-481f-a3c4-1c665e512de9","Title":"RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTNERS, MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORY LAWYERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A law firm partner as defined in Rule 1.0 (q), and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0 (g) . This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised. \n \n[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules. \n \n[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a) . \n \n[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. \n \n[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation. \n \n[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. \n \n[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a) . </div>","UrlName":"rule302","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"44cce370-1bc0-4f35-ae77-be2507b2c119","ParentId":"02b56e63-d751-481f-a3c4-1c665e512de9","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A law firm partner as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(e) . This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised. \n \n[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules. \n \n[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a) . \n \n[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. \n \n[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation. \n \n[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. \n \n[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a) . </div>","UrlName":"revision75"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f4afeac-58ab-40b7-9489-fdf040ce8227","Title":"RULE 5.2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUBORDINATE LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.</li> \n <li>A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character. \n \n[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged. </div>","UrlName":"rule111","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"46f33fc0-8186-4495-8b64-ca0a3a7c9901","ParentId":"1f4afeac-58ab-40b7-9489-fdf040ce8227","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.</li> \n <li>A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character. \n \n[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged. </div>","UrlName":"revision76"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ff99c726-6ca9-4d61-ae4b-56ea9ec61fbc","Title":"RULE 5.3. RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li>a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li> a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status; or</li> \n <li>provide any legal advice to the clients of the lawyer either in person, by telephone or in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline. \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. \n[3] The prohibitions of paragraph (d) are designed to prevent the unauthorized practice of law in a law office by a person who has been suspended or disbarred. A lawyer who allows a suspended or disbarred lawyer to work in a law office must exercise special care to ensure that the former lawyer complies with these rules, and that clients of the firm understand the former lawyer’s role. \n [4] A lawyer may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal services to the client. When using such assistance outside the firm, a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the assistance is provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations. The extent of this obligation will depend upon the circumstances, including the education, experience and reputation of the nonlawyer; the nature of the assistance involved; the terms of any arrangements concerning the protection of client information; and the legal and ethical environments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly with regard to confidentiality. See also Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Allocation of authority), 1.4 (Communication with client), 1.6 (Confidentiality of information), 5.4 (a) (Professional independence of a lawyer), and 5.5 (a) (Unauthorized practice of law). When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm, a lawyer should communicate directions appropriate under the circumstances to give reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. \n \n[5] Where the client directs the selection of a particular nonlawyer service provider outside the firm, the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the client concerning the allocation of responsibility for monitoring as between the client and the lawyer. See Rule 1.2. When making such an allocation in a matter pending before a tribunal, lawyers and parties may have additional obligations that are a matter of law beyond the scope of these rules. </div>","UrlName":"rule115","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3dafd6d4-7066-4cd3-a407-0afd1189fc27","ParentId":"ff99c726-6ca9-4d61-ae4b-56ea9ec61fbc","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li>a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li> a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status; or</li> \n <li>provide any legal advice to the clients of the lawyer either in person, by telephone or in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline. \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. \n[3] The prohibitions of paragraph (d) are designed to prevent the unauthorized practice of law in a law office by a person who has been suspended or disbarred. A lawyer who allows a suspended or disbarred lawyer to work in a law office must exercise special care to ensure that the former lawyer complies with these Rules, and that clients of the firm understand the former lawyer’s role.</div>","UrlName":"revision276"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"68cd6473-79e8-4913-9202-b7d57d4350df","Title":"RULE 5.4. PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement;</li> \n <li>a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter;</li> \n <li>a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated nonprofit lawyer referral service where such fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>provide legal services to clients while working with other lawyers or law firms practicing in, and organized under the rules of, other jurisdictions, whether domestic or foreign, that permit nonlawyers to participate in the management of such firms, have equity ownership in such firms, or share in legal fees generated by such firms; and</li> \n <li>share legal fees arising from such legal services with such other lawyers or law firms to the same extent as the sharing of legal fees is permitted under applicable Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The activities permitted under the preceding portion of this paragraph (e) are subject to the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The association shall not compromise or interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment, the client-lawyer relationship between the client and the lawyer, or the lawyer’s compliance with these rules; and</li> \n <li>Nothing in paragraph (e) is intended to affect the lawyer’s obligation to comply with other applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, or to alter the forms in which a lawyer is permitted to practice, including but not limited to the creation of an alternative business structure in Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The provisions of this rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment. \n[2] The provisions of paragraphs (e) and (f) of this rule are not intended to allow a Georgia lawyer or law firm to create or participate in alternative business structures (ABS) in Georgia. An alternative business structure is a law firm where a nonlawyer is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. A law firm may also be an ABS where another body is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. This rule only allows a Georgia lawyer to work with an ABS outside of the state of Georgia and to share fees for that work.</div>","UrlName":"rule120","Order":46,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"dc8e5cbc-d8e4-40ba-88ce-a3a3fe392f00","ParentId":"68cd6473-79e8-4913-9202-b7d57d4350df","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.</li> \n <li>a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service where such fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3. Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Provide legal services to clients while working with other lawyers or law firms practicing in, and organized under the rules of, other jurisdictions, whether domestic or foreign, that permit non-lawyers to participate in the management of such firms, have equity ownership in such firms, or share in legal fees generated by such firms; and</li> \n <li>Share legal fees arising from such legal services with such other lawyers or law firms to the same extent as the sharing of legal fees is permitted under applicable Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> The activities permitted under the preceding portion of this paragraph (e) are subject to the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The association shall not compromise or interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment, the client-lawyer relationship between the client and the lawyer, or the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; and</li> \n <li>Nothing in this paragraph (e) is intended to affect the lawyer’s obligation to comply with other applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, or to alter the forms in which a lawyer is permitted to practice, including but not limited to the creation of an alternative business structure in Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment. \n[2] The provisions of paragraph (e) of this Rule are not intended to allow a Georgia lawyer or law firm to create or participate in alternative business structures (ABS) in Georgia. An alternative business structure is a law firm where a non-lawyer is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. A law firm may also be an ABS where another body is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. This Rule only allows a Georgia lawyer to work with an ABS outside of the state of Georgia and to share fees for that work.</div>","UrlName":"revision274"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1ac78e46-95b3-425a-8dfa-49896af55719","Title":"RULE 5.5. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.</li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or</li> \n <li>hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the Domestic Lawyer, or a person the Domestic Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or</li> \n <li>are not within paragraphs (c) (2) or (c) (3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are provided to the Domestic Lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or</li> \n <li>are services that the Domestic Lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Foreign Lawyer shall not, except as authorized by this Rule or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law, or hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. Such a Foreign Lawyer does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in this jurisdiction when on a temporary basis the Foreign Lawyer performs services in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal held or to be held in a jurisdiction outside the United States if the Foreign Lawyer, or a person the Foreign Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or by order of the tribunal to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceedings held or to be held in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice;</li> \n <li> are not within paragraphs (e) (2) or (e) (3) and\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>are performed for a client who resides or has an office in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authorization; or</li> \n <li>arise out of or are reasonably related to a matter that has a substantial connection to a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authorization; or</li> \n <li>are governed primarily by international law or the law of a non-United States jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Foreign Lawyer who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction subject to the following conditions:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The services are provided to the Foreign Lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; and</li> \n <li>The Foreign Lawyer is and remains in this country in lawful immigration status and complies with all relevant provisions of United States immigration laws.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of the grants of authority found in subsections (e) and (f) above, the Foreign Lawyer must be a member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction, the members of which are admitted to practice as lawyers or counselors at law or the equivalent and subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XXI, Rule 121, Provision Of Legal Services Following Determination Of Major Disaster, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XV, Rules 91-95, Student Practice Rule, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XVI, Rules 97-103, Law School Graduates, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XX, Rules 114-120, Extended Public Service Program, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li> Any domestic or foreign lawyer who has been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia pro hac vice, pursuant to the Uniform Rules of the various classes of courts in Georgia, shall pay all required fees and costs annually as set forth in those Rules. Failure to pay the annual fee by January 15 of each year of admission pro hac vice will result in a late fee of $100 that must be paid no later than March 1 of that year. Failure to pay the annual fees may result in disciplinary action, and said lawyer may be subject to prosecution under the unauthorized practice of law statutes of this state. \n   </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n Comment \n[1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Paragraph (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer assisting another person. \n[2] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3. \n[3] A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se. \n[4] Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a Domestic Lawyer violates paragraph (b) and a Foreign Lawyer violates paragraph (e) if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not physically present here. Such Domestic or Foreign Lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. See also Rules 7.1(a) and 7.5(b). \n[5] There are occasions in which a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk to the interests of their clients, the public or the courts. Paragraph (c) identifies four such circumstances for the Domestic Lawyer. Paragraph (e) identifies four such circumstances for the Foreign Lawyer. The fact that conduct is not so identified does not imply that the conduct is or is not authorized. With the exception of paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), this Rule does not authorize a Domestic Lawyer to establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here. \n[6] There is no single test to determine whether a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's services are provided on a \"temporary basis \"in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under paragraph (c) or paragraph (e). Services may be \"temporary \"even though the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when the Domestic Lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation. \n[7] Paragraphs (c) and (d) apply to Domestic Lawyers. Paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) apply to Foreign Lawyers. Paragraphs (c) and (e) contemplate that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice in the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted and excludes a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who while technically admitted is not authorized to practice, because, for example, the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is on inactive status. \n[8] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a Domestic Lawyer associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. Paragraph (e)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a Foreign Lawyer associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For these paragraphs to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the client. \n[9] Domestic Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (c)(2), a Domestic Lawyer does not violate this Rule when the Domestic Lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a Domestic Lawyer to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the Domestic Lawyer to obtain that authority. \n[10] Paragraph (c)(2) also provides that a Domestic Lawyer rendering services in this jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this Rule when the Domestic Lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is authorized to practice law or in which the Domestic Lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted pro hac vice. Examples of such conduct include meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents. Similarly, a Domestic Lawyer may engage in conduct temporarily in this jurisdiction in connection with pending litigation in another jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized to appear, including taking depositions in this jurisdiction. \n[11] When a Domestic Lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted to appear before a court or administrative agency, paragraph (c)(2) also permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinate Domestic Lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in support of the Domestic Lawyer responsible for the litigation. \n[12] Paragraph (c)(3) permits a Domestic Lawyer, and paragraph (e)(3) permits a Foreign Lawyer, to perform services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if those services are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice. The Domestic Lawyer, however, must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so requires. \n[13] Paragraph (c)(4) permits a Domestic Lawyer to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted but are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3). These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers. Paragraph (e)(4)(i) permits a Foreign Lawyer to provide certain legal services in this jurisdiction on behalf of a client who resides or has an office in the jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice. Paragraph (e)(4)(ii) permits a Foreign Lawyer to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to a matter that has a substantial connection to the jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice. These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers. \n[14] Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted. Paragraphs (e)(3) and (e)(4)(ii) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice. A variety of factors may evidence such a relationship. These include but are not limited to the following: \na. The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's client may have been previously represented by the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer; or \nb.  The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's client may be resident in, have an office in, or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nc. The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction in which the Domestic of Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nd. Significant aspects of the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's work in a specific matter might be conducted in the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted or another jurisdiction; or \ne. A significant aspect of a matter may involve the law of the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nf. Some aspect of the matter may be governed by international law or the law of a non-United State jurisdiction; or \ng. The Lawyer's work on the specific matter in this jurisdiction is authorized by the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted; or \nh. The client's activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the services of their Domestic or Foreign Lawyer in assessing the relative merits of each; or \ni. The services may draw on the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law. \n[15] Paragraph (d) identifies two circumstances in which a Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary basis. Except as provided in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), a Domestic Lawyer who establishes an office or other systematic or continuous presence in this jurisdiction must become admitted to practice law generally in this jurisdiction. \n[16] Paragraph (d)(1) applies to a Domestic Lawyer who is employed by a client to provide legal services to the client or its organizational affiliates, i.e., entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common control with the employer. This paragraph does not authorize the provision of personal legal services to the employer's officers or employees. The paragraph applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government lawyers and others who are employed to render legal services to the employer. The Domestic Lawyer's ability to represent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is licensed generally serves the interests of the employer and does not create an unreasonable risk to the client and others because the employer is well situated to assess the Domestic Lawyer's qualifications and the quality of the Domestic Lawyer's work. \n[17] If an employed Domestic Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic presence in this jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering legal services to the employer, the Domestic Lawyer may be subject to registration or other requirements, including assessments for client protection funds and mandatory continuing legal education. \n[18] Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that a Domestic Lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent. Paragraph (e)(4)(iii) recognizes that a Foreign Lawyer may provide legal services when the services provided are governed by international law or the law of a foreign jurisdiction. \n[19] A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c), (d), (e) or (f) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. See Rule 8.5(a). \n[20] In some circumstances, a Domestic Lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the Domestic Lawyer is not licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction. For example, that may be required when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction and requires knowledge of the law of this jurisdiction. See Rule 1.4. \n[21] Paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f) do not authorize communications advertising legal services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction by Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions. Whether and how Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may communicate the availability of their services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction is governed by Rules 7.1 to 7.5. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule129","Order":47,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"834d702e-4fc9-4d8f-ab00-f158dd071475","Title":"RULE 5.6 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or</li> \n <li>an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client. \n \n[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule135","Order":48,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1e9c7303-39be-4831-aa4e-5808b02acf0e","ParentId":"834d702e-4fc9-4d8f-ab00-f158dd071475","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or</li> \n <li>an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client. \n \n[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision79"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7e48566c-b071-4d13-a6e0-9eff52fc699f","Title":"RULE 5.7 RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW-RELATED SERVICES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall be subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or</li> \n <li>by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The term \"law-related services \"denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case. \n[2] Rule 5.7: Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services need not adhere to the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7(a)(1): Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services. \n[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. \n[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a): Conflict of Interest. \n[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing. \n[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit. \n[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity which the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. \n[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a),(b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law. \n [11] When the full protections of all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule139","Order":49,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"a08edb38-d812-49fa-a936-10631a9356cb","ParentId":"7e48566c-b071-4d13-a6e0-9eff52fc699f","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall be subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or</li> \n <li>by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The term \"law-related services \"denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case. \n[2] Rule 5.7: Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services need not adhere to the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7(a)(1): Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services. \n[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. \n[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a): Conflict of Interest. \n[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing. \n[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit. \n[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity which the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. \n[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a),(b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law. \n [11] When the full protections of all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision80"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a5312e3c-cf09-46db-8444-a96cb25db4a2","Title":"RULE 6.1 VOLUNTARY PRO BONO PUBLIC SERVICE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> provide a substantial portion of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> provide any additional services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;</li> \n <li>delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nIn addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. \nNo reporting rules or requirements may be imposed without specific permission of the Supreme Court granted through amendments to these Rules. \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \nComment \n[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. \n[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. \n[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but who nevertheless cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term \"governmental organizations \"includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies. \n[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory lawyers' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. \n[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remain unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). \n[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups. \n[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. \n[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph. \n[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities. \n[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible. \n[11] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.</div>","UrlName":"rule140","Order":50,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b82d9e9a-f4e1-4e29-8f3d-fc80af791c64","ParentId":"a5312e3c-cf09-46db-8444-a96cb25db4a2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> provide a substantial portion of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> provide any additional services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;</li> \n <li>delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nIn addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. \nNo reporting rules or requirements may be imposed without specific permission of the Supreme Court granted through amendments to these Rules. \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \nComment \n[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. \n[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. \n[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but who nevertheless cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term \"governmental organizations \"includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies. \n[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory lawyers' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. \n[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remain unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). \n[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups. \n[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. \n[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph. \n[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities. \n[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible. \n[11] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.</div>","UrlName":"revision81"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"38a8cf58-1c95-4ca8-8e59-954cb89fb0ff","Title":"RULE 6.2 ACCEPTING APPOINTMENTS","Content":" For good cause a lawyer may seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person. \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See Rule 6.1: Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service. An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services. \n \nAppointed Counsel \n \n[2] For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1: Competence, or if undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust. \n \n[3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules. \n \n[4] This Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.","UrlName":"rule141","Order":51,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a747020c-0915-4a74-aaba-7f57f5ab7fdc","Title":"RULE 6.3 MEMBERSHIP IN LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or</li> \n <li>where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed. \n \n[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances. </div>","UrlName":"rule142","Order":52,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3d8678de-66de-44ab-838b-1ff82df79b9d","ParentId":"a747020c-0915-4a74-aaba-7f57f5ab7fdc","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or</li> \n <li>where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed. \n \n[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances. </div>","UrlName":"revision82"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"655d321f-cd27-40fb-be1a-3a6d92569f7b","Title":"RULE 6.4 LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT INTERESTS","Content":" A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefited by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client. \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. See also Rule 1.2(b): Scope of Representation. Without this Rule, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially benefited.","UrlName":"rule144","Order":53,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"RULE 6.5. NONPROFIT & COURT-ANNEXED LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS","Content":"<ol><li>A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided:<ol><li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and\n </li><li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.\n </li></ol></li><li>Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule.</li><li>The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10.\n </li></ol>The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.Comment [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter.[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. ","UrlName":"rule559","Order":54,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"e5063554-dfd3-4187-898d-44ef77085851","ParentId":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided: \n <ol> \n <li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and</li> \n <li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n(b) Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule. \n(c) The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n Comment \n [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10. \n[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation. \n[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter. \n[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program. \n[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision84"},{"Id":"7842ec92-aaa2-4c67-89c9-57477696681e","ParentId":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided: \n <ol> \n <li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and</li> \n <li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n(b) Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule. \n(c) The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n Comment \n [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10. \n[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation. \n[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter. \n[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program. \n[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision86"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bfbb7abc-4b04-4066-b0d1-fed9bf0dd159","Title":"RULE 7.1 COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER'S SERVICES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. By way of illustration, but not limitation, a communication is false or misleading if it:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;</li> \n <li>is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;</li> \n <li>fails to include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content; or</li> \n <li> contains any information regarding contingent fees, and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"Contingent attorneys' fees refers only to those fees charged by attorneys for their legal services. Such fees are not permitted in all types of cases. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client.\" </li> \n <li> contains the language \"no fee unless you win or collect \"or any similar phrase and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"No fee unless you win or collect \"[or insert the similar language used in the communication] refers only to fees charged by the attorney. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client. Contingent fees are not permitted in all types of cases. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A public communication for which a lawyer has given value must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the context that it is such a communication.</li> \n <li>A lawyer retains ultimate responsibility to insure that all communications concerning the lawyer or the lawyer's services comply with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule governs the content of all communications about a lawyer's services, including the various types of advertising permitted by Rules 7.3 through 7.5. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful. \n[2] The prohibition in sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services of statements that may create \"unjustified expectations \"would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances. \nAffirmative Disclosure \n[3] In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally-based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal, and is therefore a preferable form of regulation to absolute bans or other similar restrictions. For example, there is no significant interest in failing to include the name of at least one accountable attorney in all communications promoting the services of a lawyer or law firm as required by sub-paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services. Nor is there any substantial burden imposed as a result of the affirmative disclaimer requirement of sub-paragraph (a)(6) upon a lawyer who wishes to make a claim in the nature of \"no fee unless you win.\"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that affirmative disclosure of a client's liability for costs and expenses of litigation may be required to prevent consumer confusion over the technical distinction between the meaning and effect of the use of such terms as \"fees \"and \"costs \"in an advertisement. \n[4] Certain promotional communications of a lawyer may, as a result of content or circumstance, tend to mislead a consumer to mistakenly believe that the communication is something other than a form of promotional communication for which the lawyer has paid. Examples of such a communication might include advertisements for seminars on legal topics directed to the lay public when such seminars are sponsored by the lawyer, or a newsletter or newspaper column which appears to inform or to educate about the law. Paragraph (b) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services would require affirmative disclosure that a lawyer has given value in order to generate these types of public communications if such is in fact the case. \nAccountability \n[5] Paragraph (c) makes explicit an advertising attorney's ultimate responsibility for all the lawyer's promotional communications and would suggest that review by the lawyer prior to dissemination is advisable if any doubts exist concerning conformity of the end product with these Rules. Although prior review by disciplinary authorities is not required by these Rules, lawyers are certainly encouraged to contact disciplinary authorities prior to authorizing a promotional communication if there are any doubts concerning either an interpretation of these Rules or their application to the communication.</div>","UrlName":"rule145","Order":55,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d2ffbcb-3e31-4917-b9c4-0122fdb5154a","ParentId":"bfbb7abc-4b04-4066-b0d1-fed9bf0dd159","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may advertise through all forms of public media and through written communication not involving personal contact so long as the communication is not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading. By way of illustration, but not limitation, a communication is false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading if it:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;</li> \n <li>is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;</li> \n <li>fails to include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content; or</li> \n <li> contains any information regarding contingent fees, and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"Contingent attorneys' fees refers only to those fees charged by attorneys for their legal services. Such fees are not permitted in all types of cases. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client.\" </li> \n <li> contains the language 'no fee unless you win or collect' or any similar phrase and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"No fee unless you win or collect \"[or insert the similar language used in the communication] refers only to fees charged by the attorney. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client. Contingent fees are not permitted in all types of cases. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A public communication for which a lawyer has given value must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the context that it is such a communication.</li> \n <li>A lawyer retains ultimate responsibility to insure that all communications concerning the lawyer or the lawyer's services comply with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule governs the content of all communications about a lawyer's services, including the various types of advertising permitted by Rules 7.3 through 7.5. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful. \n[2] The prohibition in sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services of statements that may create \"unjustified expectations \"would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances. \nAffirmative Disclosure \n[3] In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally-based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal, and is therefore a preferable form of regulation to absolute bans or other similar restrictions. For example, there is no significant interest in failing to include the name of at least one accountable attorney in all communications promoting the services of a lawyer or law firm as required by sub-paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services. Nor is there any substantial burden imposed as a result of the affirmative disclaimer requirement of sub-paragraph (a)(6) upon a lawyer who wishes to make a claim in the nature of \"no fee unless you win.\"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that affirmative disclosure of a client's liability for costs and expenses of litigation may be required to prevent consumer confusion over the technical distinction between the meaning and effect of the use of such terms as \"fees \"and \"costs \"in an advertisement. \n[4] Certain promotional communications of a lawyer may, as a result of content or circumstance, tend to mislead a consumer to mistakenly believe that the communication is something other than a form of promotional communication for which the lawyer has paid. Examples of such a communication might include advertisements for seminars on legal topics directed to the lay public when such seminars are sponsored by the lawyer, or a newsletter or newspaper column which appears to inform or to educate about the law. Paragraph (b) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services would require affirmative disclosure that a lawyer has given value in order to generate these types of public communications if such is in fact the case. \nAccountability \n[5] Paragraph (c) makes explicit an advertising attorney's ultimate responsibility for all the lawyer's promotional communications and would suggest that review by the lawyer prior to dissemination is advisable if any doubts exist concerning conformity of the end product with these Rules. Although prior review by disciplinary authorities is not required by these Rules, lawyers are certainly encouraged to contact disciplinary authorities prior to authorizing a promotional communication if there are any doubts concerning either an interpretation of these Rules or their application to the communication.</div>","UrlName":"revision272"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e0c4c6e2-31c8-4eaf-b4ba-0568213fc817","Title":"RULE 7.2 ADVERTISING","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical;</li> \n <li>outdoor advertising;</li> \n <li>radio or television;</li> \n <li>written, electronic or recorded communication.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.</li> \n <li> Prominent disclosures.  Any advertisement for legal services directed to potential clients in Georgia, or intended to solicit employment for delivery of any legal services in Georgia, must include prominent disclosures, clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, if written, and clearly intelligible by an average person, if spoken aloud, of the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disclosure of identity and physical location of attorney. Any advertisement shall include the name, physical location and telephone number of each lawyer or law firm who paid for the advertisement and who takes full personal responsibility for the advertisement.  In disclosing the physical location, the responsible lawyer shall state the full address of the location of the principal bona fide office of each lawyer who is prominently identified pursuant to this paragraph.  For the purposes of this Rule, a bona fide office is defined as a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm from which the lawyer or law firm furnishes legal services on a regular and continuing basis. In the absence of a bona fide physical office, the lawyer shall prominently disclose the full address listed with the State Bar of Georgia or other Bar to which the lawyer is admitted.  A lawyer who uses a referral service shall ensure that the service discloses the location of the lawyer's bona fide office, or the registered bar address, when a referral is made.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of referral practice.  If the lawyer or law firm will refer the majority of callers to other attorneys, that fact must be disclosed and the lawyer or law firm must comply with the provisions of Rule 7.3(c) regarding referral services.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of spokespersons and portrayals. Any advertisement that includes a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, portrayal of a client by a non-client, or any paid testimonial or endorsement, shall include prominent disclosure of the use of a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, or of a client by a non-client.</li> \n <li>Disclosures regarding fees. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, which statement shall be available to the client at the time of retainer for any such service.</li> \n <li>Appearance of legal notices or pleadings. Any advertisement that includes any representation that resembles a legal pleading, notice, contract or other legal document shall include prominent disclosure that the document is an advertisement rather than a legal document.</li> \n </ol> \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \n Comment \n \n [1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.\n \n [2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance. \n [3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against \"undignified \"advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. \n [4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation. \n Record of Advertising \n [5] Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule147","Order":56,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"00502313-3b79-42a3-a55c-6c7e9b2d5cc5","ParentId":"e0c4c6e2-31c8-4eaf-b4ba-0568213fc817","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical;</li> \n <li>outdoor advertising;</li> \n <li>radio or television;</li> \n <li>written, electronic or recorded communication.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.</li> \n <li> Prominent disclosures.  Any advertisement for legal services directed to potential clients in Georgia, or intended to solicit employment for delivery of any legal services in Georgia, must include prominent disclosures, clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, if written, and clearly intelligible by an average person, if spoken aloud, of the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disclosure of identity and physical location of attorney. Any advertisement shall include the name, physical location and telephone number of each lawyer or law firm who paid for the advertisement and who takes full personal responsibility for the advertisement.  In disclosing the physical location, the responsible lawyer shall state the full address of the location of the principal bona fide office of each lawyer who is prominently identified pursuant to this paragraph.  For the purposes of this Rule, a bona fide office is defined as a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm from which the lawyer or law firm furnishes legal services on a regular and continuing basis. In the absence of a bona fide physical office, the lawyer shall prominently disclose the full address listed with the State Bar of Georgia or other Bar to which the lawyer is admitted.  A lawyer who uses a referral service shall ensure that the service discloses the location of the lawyer's bona fide office, or the registered bar address, when a referral is made.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of referral practice.  If the lawyer or law firm will refer the majority of callers to other attorneys, that fact must be disclosed and the lawyer or law firm must comply with the provisions of Rule 7.3(c) regarding referral services.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of spokespersons and portrayals. Any advertisement that includes a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, portrayal of a client by a non-client, or any paid testimonial or endorsement, shall include prominent disclosure of the use of a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, or of a client by a non-client.</li> \n <li>Disclosures regarding fees. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, which statement shall be available to the client at the time of retainer for any such service.</li> \n <li>Appearance of legal notices or pleadings. Any advertisement that includes any representation that resembles a legal pleading, notice, contract or other legal document shall include prominent disclosure that the document is an advertisement rather than a legal document.</li> \n </ol> \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \n Comment \n \n [1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.\n \n [2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance. \n [3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against \"undignified \"advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. \n [4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation. \n Record of Advertising \n [5] Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision11"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1b5c4bd6-d92a-4e80-a484-2f534a89761c","Title":"RULE 7.3 DIRECT CONTACT WITH PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS","Content":"<ol><li>A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of the lawyer, the lawyer's firm, lawyer's partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:<ol><li>it has been made known to the lawyer that a person does not desire to receive communications from the lawyer;</li><li>the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence;</li><li>the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication; or</li><li>the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.</li></ol></li><li>Written communications to a prospective client, other than a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes is a former client, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment shall be plainly marked \"Advertisement \"on the face of the envelope and on the top of each page of the written communication in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the letter.</li><li>A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer's employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer's employment by a client; except that the lawyer may pay for public communications permitted by Rule 7.1 and except as follows:<ol><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service, if the service:<ol><li>does not engage in conduct that would violate the Rules if engaged in by a lawyer;</li><li>provides an explanation to the prospective client regarding how the lawyers are selected by the service to participate in the service; and</li><li>discloses to the prospective client how many lawyers are participating in the service and that those lawyers have paid the service a fee to participate in the service.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service, including a fee which is calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter, provided such bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service meets the following criteria:<ol><li>the lawyer referral service shall be operated in the public interest for the purpose of referring prospective clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agencies who can provide the assistance the clients need. Such organization shall file annually with the State Disciplinary Board a report showing its rules and regulations, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating and the names and addresses of the lawyers participating in the service;</li><li>the sponsoring bar association for the lawyer referral service must be open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in this state who maintain an office within the geographical area served, and who meet reasonable objectively determinable experience requirements established by the bar association;</li><li>the combined fees charged by a lawyer and the lawyer referral service to a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges which the client would have paid had no service been involved; and</li><li>a lawyer who is a member of the qualified lawyer referral service must maintain in force a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the use of the lawyer's services, the lawyer's partner or associates services so long as the communications of the organization are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading;</li><li>A lawyer may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment as a private practitioner for the lawyer, a partner or associate through direct personal contact or through live telephone contact, with a nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.</li><li>A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person who seeks to employ the lawyer does so as a result of conduct by any person or organization that would violate these Rules if engaged in by a lawyer.</li></ol>The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.CommentDirect Personal Contact[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in solicitation through direct personal contact by a lawyer of prospective clients known to need legal services. It subjects the lay person to the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a direct interpersonal encounter. A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from the lawyer's own interest, which may color the advice and representation offered the vulnerable prospect.[2] The situation is therefore fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation and overreaching. The potential for abuse inherent in solicitation of prospective clients through personal contact justifies its prohibition, particularly since the direct written contact permitted under paragraph (b) of this Rule offers an alternative means of communicating necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Also included in the prohibited types of personal contact are direct, personal contact through an intermediary and live contact by telephone.Direct Written Solicitation[3] Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule, promotional communication by a lawyer through direct written contact is generally permissible. The public's need to receive information concerning their legal rights and the availability of legal services has been consistently recognized as a basis for permitting direct written communication since this type of communication may often be the best and most effective means of informing. So long as this stream of information flows cleanly, it will be permitted to flow freely.[4] Certain narrowly-drawn restrictions on this type of communication are justified by a substantial state interest in facilitating the public's intelligent selection of counsel, including the restrictions of paragraphs (a) (3) and (a) (4) which proscribe direct mailings to persons such as an injured and hospitalized accident victim or the bereaved family of a deceased.[5] In order to make it clear that the communication is commercial in nature, paragraph (b) requires inclusion of an appropriate affirmative \"advertisement \"disclaimer. Again, the traditional exception for contact with close friends, relatives and former clients is recognized and permits elimination of the disclaimer in direct written contact with these persons.[6] This Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer[7] A lawyer is allowed to pay for communications permitted by these Rules, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency, a prepaid legal services plan or prepaid legal insurance organization may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices.","UrlName":"rule149","Order":57,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"de8287f5-531e-4668-8a96-2fe3b21b971a","ParentId":"1b5c4bd6-d92a-4e80-a484-2f534a89761c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of the lawyer, the lawyer's firm, lawyer's partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>it has been made known to the lawyer that a person does not desire to receive communications from the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence;</li> \n <li>the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Written communications to a prospective client, other than a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes is a former client, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment shall be plainly marked \"Advertisement \"on the face of the envelope and on the top of each page of the written communication in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the letter.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer's employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer's employment by a client; except that the lawyer may pay for public communications permitted by Rule 7.1 and except as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service, if the service:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>does not engage in conduct that would violate the Rules if engaged in by a lawyer;</li> \n <li>provides an explanation to the prospective client regarding how the lawyers are selected by the service to participate in the service; and</li> \n <li>discloses to the prospective client how many lawyers are participating in the service and that those lawyers have paid the service a fee to participate in the service.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/referral-service.cfm/"> bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service </a> , including a fee which is calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter, provided such bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service meets the following criteria:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the lawyer referral service shall be operated in the public interest for the purpose of referring prospective clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agencies who can provide the assistance the clients need. Such organization shall file annually with the State Disciplinary Board a report showing its rules and regulations, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating and the names and addresses of the lawyers participating in the service;</li> \n <li>the sponsoring bar association for the lawyer referral service must be open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in this state who maintain an office within the geographical area served, and who meet reasonable objectively determinable experience requirements established by the bar association;</li> \n <li>the combined fees charged by a lawyer and the lawyer referral service to a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges which the client would have paid had no service been involved; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer who is a member of the qualified lawyer referral service must maintain in force a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the use of the lawyer's services, the lawyer's partner or associates services so long as the communications of the organization are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading;</li> \n <li>A lawyer may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment as a private practitioner for the lawyer, a partner or associate through direct personal contact or through live telephone contact, with a nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person who seeks to employ the lawyer does so as a result of conduct by any person or organization that would violate these Rules if engage in by a lawyer.</li> \n</ol>\nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.\n Comment\n Direct Personal Contact\n[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in solicitation through direct personal contact by a lawyer of prospective clients known to need legal services. It subjects the lay person to the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a direct interpersonal encounter. A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from the lawyer's own interest, which may color the advice and representation offered the vulnerable prospect.\n[2] The situation is therefore fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation and overreaching. The potential for abuse inherent in solicitation of prospective clients through personal contact justifies its prohibition, particularly since the direct written contact permitted under paragraph (b) of this Rule offers an alternative means of communicating necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Also included in the prohibited types of personal contact are direct, personal contact through an intermediary and live contact by telephone.\n Direct Written Solicitation\n[3] Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule, promotional communication by a lawyer through direct written contact is generally permissible. The public's need to receive information concerning their legal rights and the availability of legal services has been consistently recognized as a basis for permitting direct written communication since this type of communication may often be the best and most effective means of informing. So long as this stream of information flows cleanly, it will be permitted to flow freely.\n[4] Certain narrowly-drawn restrictions on this type of communication are justified by a substantial state interest in facilitating the public's intelligent selection of counsel, including the restrictions of paragraphs (a) (3) and (a) (4) which proscribe direct mailings to persons such as an injured and hospitalized accident victim or the bereaved family of a deceased.\n[5] In order to make it clear that the communication is commercial in nature, paragraph (b) requires inclusion of an appropriate affirmative \"advertisement \"disclaimer. Again, the traditional exception for contact with close friends, relatives and former clients is recognized and permits elimination of the disclaimer in direct written contact with these persons.\n[6] This Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.\n Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer\n[7] A lawyer is allowed to pay for communications permitted by these Rules, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency, a prepaid legal services plan or prepaid legal insurance organization may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices.","UrlName":"revision88"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a47de23f-1487-46e7-9b5b-7fb860002ed6","Title":"RULE 7.4 COMMUNICATION OF FIELDS OF PRACTICE","Content":" A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer who is a specialist in a particular field of law by experience, specialized training or education, or is certified by a recognized and bona fide professional entity, may communicate such specialty or certification so long as the statement is not false or misleading. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. \n \n[2] A lawyer may truthfully communicate the fact that the lawyer is a specialist or is certified in a particular field of law by experience or as a result of having been certified as a \"specialist \"by successfully completing a particular program of legal specialization. An example of a proper use of the term would be \"Certified as a Civil Trial Specialist by XYZ Institute \"provided such was in fact the case, such statement would not be false or misleading and provided further that the Civil Trial Specialist program of XYZ Institute is a recognized and bona fide professional entity.","UrlName":"rule151","Order":58,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"839d714d-6690-434e-a388-6b7fdebdcc26","ParentId":"a47de23f-1487-46e7-9b5b-7fb860002ed6","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer who is a specialist in a particular field of law by experience, specialized training or education, or is certified by a recognized and bona fide professional entity, may communicate such specialty or certification so long as the statement is not false or misleading. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. \n \n[2] A lawyer may truthfully communicate the fact that the lawyer is a specialist or is certified in a particular field of law by experience or as a result of having been certified as a \"specialist \"by successfully completing a particular program of legal specialization. An example of a proper use of the term would be \"Certified as a Civil Trial Specialist by XYZ Institute \"provided such was in fact the case, such statement would not be false or misleading and provided further that the Civil Trial Specialist program of XYZ Institute is a recognized and bona fide professional entity. </div>","UrlName":"revision10"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ed01a76-f677-4498-8f1f-892cfa61bcb0","Title":"RULE 7.5 FIRM NAMES AND LETTERHEADS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use a firm name, trade name, letterhead, or other professional designation that is false or misleading.</li> \n <li>A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer holding public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.</li> \n <li>Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] Firm names and letterheads are subject to the general requirement of all advertising that the communication must not be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. Therefore, lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for example, \"Smith and Jones,\"for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law. \n[2] Firm names consisting entirely of the names of deceased or retired partners are permitted and have proven a useful means of identification.</div>","UrlName":"rule153","Order":59,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"77822a2f-afaa-4b47-8b0c-f4f084c47b38","ParentId":"2ed01a76-f677-4498-8f1f-892cfa61bcb0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.</li> \n <li>A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer holding public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.</li> \n <li>Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.</li> \n <li> A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the trade name includes the name of at least one of the lawyers practicing under said name. A law firm name consisting solely of the name or names of deceased or retired members of the firm does not have to include the name of an active member of the firm; and</li> \n <li>the trade name does not imply a connection with a government entity, with a public or charitable legal services organization or any other organization, association or institution or entity, unless there is, in fact, a connection.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] Firm names and letterheads are subject to the general requirement of all advertising that the communication must not be false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading. Therefore, lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for example, \"Smith and Jones,\"for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law. \n [2] Trade names may be used so long as the name includes the name of at least one or more of the lawyers actively practicing with the firm. Firm names consisting entirely of the names of deceased or retired partners have traditionally been permitted and have proven a useful means of identification. Sub-paragraph (e)(1) permits their continued use as an exception to the requirement that a firm name include the name of at least one active member. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision292"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"29e3311e-ee9c-48d1-bec2-87e9e90d46d2","Title":"RULE 8.1 BAR ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY MATTERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware. \n \n[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule. \n \n[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship. </div>","UrlName":"rule154","Order":60,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2ed5246a-3d47-4a8a-b200-3eb31db8b84f","ParentId":"29e3311e-ee9c-48d1-bec2-87e9e90d46d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware. \n \n[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule. \n \n[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship. </div>","UrlName":"revision90"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"50e8e9d0-27d2-4d37-9a3f-bed1bafa6807","Title":"RULE 8.2 JUDICIAL AND LEGAL OFFICIALS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. \n \n[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity. \n \n[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized. </div>","UrlName":"rule155","Order":61,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"580d4c72-d73b-4b11-9658-ba32379d5370","ParentId":"50e8e9d0-27d2-4d37-9a3f-bed1bafa6807","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. \n \n[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity. \n \n[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized. </div>","UrlName":"revision91"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e0444a85-d7c3-49ad-9ba0-20caeac6f2c3","Title":"RULE 8.3 REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should inform the appropriate authority.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they know of a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense. </div>","UrlName":"rule157","Order":62,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"12edb664-0ca8-4634-9280-5510e9fdc82e","ParentId":"e0444a85-d7c3-49ad-9ba0-20caeac6f2c3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should inform the appropriate authority.</li> \n</ol>\n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they know of a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.","UrlName":"revision92"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"747cef32-18d7-4ab9-927e-7587a7e03e5b","Title":"RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a felony;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law;</li> \n <li>engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;</li> \n <li>fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the time appointed in the order or judgment;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>state an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>state an ability to achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable Rules of judicial conduct or other law; or</li> \n <li>commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer has admitted in judicio, the commission of such act.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, conviction shall have the meaning set forth in Rule 1.0 (e).</li> \n <li>The record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings under these disciplinary Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to cause any infringement of the existing inherent right of Georgia Superior Courts to suspend and disbar lawyers from practice based upon a conviction of a crime as specified in paragraphs (a) (1), (a) (2) and (a) (3) above.</li> \n <li>Rule 8.4 (a) (1) does not apply to any of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for which there is no disciplinary penalty.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) through (c) is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevents a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer can not. \n[2] This Rule, as its predecessor, is drawn in terms of acts involving \"moral turpitude \"with, however, a recognition that some such offenses concern matters of personal morality and have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Here the concern is limited to those matters which fall under both the rubric of \"moral turpitude \"and involve underlying conduct relating to the fitness of the lawyer to practice law. \n[3] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving \"moral turpitude.\"That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. \n[4] Reserved. \n[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. \n[6] Persons holding public office assume responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.</div>","UrlName":"rule160","Order":63,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"d0124638-c0d6-45f2-b59e-01153016f645","ParentId":"747cef32-18d7-4ab9-927e-7587a7e03e5b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a felony;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law;</li> \n <li>engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;</li> \n <li>fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the time appointed in the order or judgment;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>state an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>state an ability to achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or</li> \n <li>commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer has admitted in judicio, the commission of such act.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> For purposes of this Rule, conviction shall include any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>a guilty plea;</li> \n <li>a plea of nolo contendere;</li> \n <li>a verdict of guilty; or</li> \n <li>a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings under these disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to cause any infringement of the existing inherent right of Georgia Superior Courts to suspend and disbar lawyers from practice based upon a conviction of a crime as specified in paragraphs (a) (1), (a) (2) and (a) (3) above.</li> \n <li>Rule 8.4 (a) (1) does not apply to any of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for which there is no disciplinary penalty.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) through (c) is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevents a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer can not. \n[2] This Rule, as its predecessor, is drawn in terms of acts involving \"moral turpitude \"with, however, a recognition that some such offenses concern matters of personal morality and have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Here the concern is limited to those matters which fall under both the rubric of \"moral turpitude \"and involve underlying conduct relating to the fitness of the lawyer to practice law. \n[3] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving \"moral turpitude.\"That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. \n[4] Reserved. \n[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. \n[6] Persons holding public office assume responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.</div>","UrlName":"revision393"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bcc5b884-9b3f-4809-99a8-69f9a43fa6bd","Title":"RULE 8.5 DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF LAW","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.</li> \n <li> Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and</li> \n <li>for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n Comment\n Disciplinary Authority\n[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rule 9.4: Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters.\n Choice of Law\n[2] A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.\n[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.\n[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction.\n[5] When a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule.\n[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.\n[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise. ","UrlName":"rule163","Order":64,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f63d4542-aaf7-4886-b136-e8b35b084856","ParentId":"bcc5b884-9b3f-4809-99a8-69f9a43fa6bd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.</li> \n <li> Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and</li> \n <li>for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n Comment \n Disciplinary Authority \n[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rule 9.4: Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters. \n Choice of Law \n[2] A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction. \n[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty. \n[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction. \n[5] When a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule. \n[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules. \n[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise. </div>","UrlName":"revision94"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b3d91ad7-b726-4a79-8425-78f03a16fd09","Title":"RULE 9.1 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Members of the State Bar of Georgia shall, within sixty days, notify the State Bar of Georgia of:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>being admitted to the practice of law in another jurisdiction and the dates of admission;</li> \n <li>being convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law; or</li> \n <li>the imposition of discipline by any jurisdiction other than the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"discipline \"shall include any sanction imposed as the result of conduct that would be in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if occurring in Georgia.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"jurisdiction \"shall include state, federal, territorial and non-United States courts and authorities.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n [1] The State Bar of Georgia is the regulatory authority created by the Supreme Court of Georgia to oversee the practice of law in Georgia. In order to provide effective disciplinary programs, the State Bar of Georgia needs information about its members. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule166","Order":65,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"94b9b094-1aa5-4da2-b836-58f676f1412f","ParentId":"b3d91ad7-b726-4a79-8425-78f03a16fd09","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Members of the State Bar of Georgia shall, within sixty days, notify the State Bar of Georgia of:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>being admitted to the practice of law in another jurisdiction and the dates of admission;</li> \n <li>being convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law; or</li> \n <li>the imposition of discipline by any jurisdiction other than the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"discipline \"shall include any sanction imposed as the result of conduct that would be in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if occurring in Georgia.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"jurisdiction \"shall include state, federal, territorial and non-United States courts and authorities.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n [1] The State Bar of Georgia is the regulatory authority created by the Supreme Court of Georgia to oversee the practice of law in Georgia. In order to provide effective disciplinary programs, the State Bar of Georgia needs information about its members. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision95"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24dd6504-aaff-4eed-9dad-210ffda7f23e","Title":"RULE 9.2 RESTRICTIONS ON FILING DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINTS","Content":" A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement containing a condition that prohibits or restricts a person from filing a disciplinary complaint, or that requires the person to request dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The disciplinary system provides protection to the general public from those lawyers who are not morally fit to practice law. One problem in the past has been the lawyer who settles the civil claim/disciplinary complaint with the injured party on the basis that the injured party not bring a disciplinary complaint or request the dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint. The lawyer is then is free to injure other members of the general public. \n \n[2] To prevent such abuses, this Rule prohibits a lawyer from entering into any agreement containing a condition which prevents a person from filing or pursuing a disciplinary complaint.","UrlName":"rule182","Order":66,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"RULE 9.3 COOPERATION WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY","Content":" During the investigation of a matter pursuant to these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the State Disciplinary Board charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"rule196","Order":67,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"432150ec-fffc-4697-8cb3-1770af2b95e9","ParentId":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"Version 3","Content":" During the investigation of a grievance filed under these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the State Disciplinary Board charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"revision395"},{"Id":"a89fe2f0-d6b3-429a-800e-db4fb74e5464","ParentId":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"Version 2","Content":" During the investigation of a grievance filed under these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the Investigative Panel charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"revision300"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cfbdd4c5-e0f2-431a-b8bb-f0f79a4778d2","Title":"RULE 9.4: JURISDICTION AND RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Jurisdiction. Any lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts committed prior to resignation, suspension, disbarment, or removal from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar of Georgia, or with respect to acts subsequent thereto that amount to the practice of law or constitute a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any Rules or Code subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in lieu thereof, and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer specially admitted by a court of this jurisdiction for a particular proceeding and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this jurisdiction, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li> Reciprocal Discipline. Upon being suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia has been suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, the Office of the General Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. Nothing in this Rule shall prevent a lawyer suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction from filing a Petition for Voluntary Discipline under Rule 4-227.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia has been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall issue a notice to the respondent that shall show the date of the disbarment or suspension in the other jurisdiction and shall include a copy of the order therefor.  The notice shall direct the respondent to show cause to the State Disciplinary Review Board within 30 days from service of the notice why the imposition of substantially similar discipline in this jurisdiction would be unwarranted. The notice shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1, and any response thereto shall be served upon the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li> If neither party objects within 30 days, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall recommend imposition of substantially similar discipline and shall file that recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia within 60 days after the time for the filing of objections expires. The Office of the General Counsel or the respondent may object to imposition of substantially similar discipline by demonstrating that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or</li> \n <li>There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or</li> \n <li>The reason for the original disciplinary status no longer exists; or</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The conduct did not occur within the state of Georgia; and,</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed by the foreign jurisdiction exceeds the level of discipline allowed under these Rules; or</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The discipline would if imposed in identical form be unduly severe or would require action not contemplated by these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n If the State Disciplinary Review Board finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated that any of those elements exist, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall make such other recommendation to the Supreme Court of Georgia as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. </li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board may consider exceptions from either the Office of the General Counsel or the respondent on the grounds enumerated at paragraph (b) (3) of this Rule and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the State Disciplinary Review Board within 30 days of service of the Notice of Reciprocal Discipline. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond. The State Disciplinary Review Board shall file its report and recommendation within 60 days of receiving the response to exceptions.</li> \n <li>In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct, or has been removed from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar of Georgia, shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the removal from practice for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this State.</li> \n <li>Discipline imposed by another jurisdiction but of a lesser nature than disbarment or suspension may be considered in aggravation of discipline in any other disciplinary proceeding.</li> \n <li>For good cause, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board in a reciprocal discipline proceeding may make an interim recommendation to the Supreme Court of Georgia that the respondent be immediately suspended pending final disposition.</li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, the word “jurisdiction” means any State, Territory, country, or federal court.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdiction and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit. Any procedure that so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified. The spectacle of a lawyer disbarred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. \n[2] Reserved. \n[3] The imposition of discipline in one jurisdiction does not mean that Georgia and every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted must necessarily impose discipline. The State Disciplinary Review Board has jurisdiction to recommend reciprocal discipline when a lawyer is suspended or disbarred in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed or otherwise admitted. \n[4] A judicial determination of misconduct by the respondent in another jurisdiction is conclusive, and not subject to re-litigation in the forum jurisdiction. The State Disciplinary Review Board should recommend substantially similar discipline unless it determines, after review limited to the record of the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, that one of the grounds specified in paragraph (b) (3) exists. \n[5] For purposes of this Rule, the suspension or placement of a lawyer on inactive status in another jurisdiction because of want of sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairment of competency as a lawyer shall be considered a disciplinary suspension under the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule203","Order":68,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"d109c0e2-935b-4278-abaf-561b3255d262","ParentId":"cfbdd4c5-e0f2-431a-b8bb-f0f79a4778d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Jurisdiction. Any lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts committed prior to resignation, suspension, disbarment, or removal from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, or with respect to acts subsequent thereto which amount to the practice of law or constitute a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any Rules or Code subsequently adopted by the court in lieu thereof, and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer specially admitted by a court of this jurisdiction for a particular proceeding and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this jurisdiction, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li> Reciprocal Discipline. Upon being suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia has been suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, the Office of General Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. Nothing in the Rule shall prevent a lawyer suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction from filing a petition for voluntary discipline under Rule 4-227.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia has been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall docket the matter and forthwith issue a notice directed to the lawyer containing:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A copy of the order from the other jurisdiction; and</li> \n <li>A notice approved by the Review Panel that the lawyer must inform the Office of General Counsel and the Review Panel, within thirty days from service of the notice, of any claim by the lawyer predicated upon the grounds set forth in paragraph (b)(3) below, that the imposition of the substantially similar discipline in this jurisdiction would be unwarranted and the reasons for that claim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In the event the discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction has been stayed there, any reciprocal discipline imposed in this jurisdiction shall be deferred until the stay expires.</li> \n <li> Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1), the Review Panel shall recommend to the Georgia Supreme Court substantially similar discipline, or removal from practice on the grounds provided in Rule 4-104, unless the Office of General Counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or the Review Panel finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or</li> \n <li>There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or</li> \n <li>The reason for the original disciplinary status no longer exists; or</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the conduct did not occur within the state of Georgia; and,</li> \n <li>the discipline imposed by the foreign jurisdiction exceeds the level of discipline allowed under these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>the discipline would if imposed in identical form be unduly severe or would require action not contemplated by these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n If the Review Panel determines that any of those elements exists, the Review Panel shall make such other recommendation to the Georgia Supreme Court as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. </li> \n <li>The Review Panel may consider exceptions from either the Office of General Counsel or the Respondent on the grounds enumerated at Part (b)(3) of this Rule, and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions in briefs shall be filed with the Review Panel within 30 days from notice of the Notice of Reciprocal Discipline. The responding party shall have 10 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.</li> \n <li>In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct, or has been removed from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the removal from practice for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state.</li> \n <li>Discipline imposed by another jurisdiction but of a lesser nature than disbarment or suspension may be considered in aggravation of discipline in any other disciplinary proceeding.</li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, the word \"jurisdiction \"means any state, territory, country or federal court.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdiction and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit. Any procedure which so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified. The spectacle of a lawyer disbarred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. \n[2] Reserved. \n[3] The imposition of discipline in one jurisdiction does not mean that Georgia and every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted must necessarily impose discipline. The Review Panel has jurisdiction to recommend reciprocal discipline on the basis of public discipline imposed by a jurisdiction in which the respondent is licensed. \n[4] A judicial determination of misconduct by the respondent in another jurisdiction is conclusive, and not subject to relitigation in the forum jurisdiction. The Review Panel should recommend substantially similar discipline unless it determines, after review limited to the record of the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, that one of the grounds specified in paragraph (b)(3) exists. This Rule applies whether or not the respondent is admitted to practice in the foreign jurisdiction. See also, Rule 8.5, Comment [1]. \n[5] For purposes of this Rule, the suspension or placement of a lawyer on inactive status in another jurisdiction because of want of sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairment of competency as an attorney shall be considered a disciplinary suspension under the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"revision96"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ac435e7c-373e-4aac-b77c-d9c71b932185","Title":"RULE 9.5 LAWYER AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is a public official and represents the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, is bound by the provisions of these Rules.</li> \n <li>No provision of these Rules shall be construed to prohibit such a lawyer from taking a legal position adverse to the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, when such action is authorized or required by the U. S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution or statutes of the United States or Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule207","Order":69,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"8327f56a-6a36-4e71-a8ee-520d4acce0f2","ParentId":"ac435e7c-373e-4aac-b77c-d9c71b932185","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is a public official and represents the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, is bound by the provisions of these Rules.</li> \n <li>No provision of these Rules shall be construed to prohibit such a lawyer from taking a legal position adverse to the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, when such action is authorized or required by the U. S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution or statutes of the United States or Georgia.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"revision97"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f92c6b0e-b411-472c-a4b2-770688d9c965","Title":"Rule 4-103. Multiple Violations","Content":"A finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these Rules shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment. A Special Master and the State Disciplinary Review Board may exercise this discretionary power when the question is appropriately before them. Any discipline imposed by another jurisdiction as contemplated by Rule 9.4 may be considered a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of this Rule.","UrlName":"rule92","Order":70,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b080bb20-ecaf-4931-b232-ddbc4336b93c","ParentId":"f92c6b0e-b411-472c-a4b2-770688d9c965","Title":"Version 2","Content":"A finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these rules shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment. The Review Panel may exercise this discretionary power when the question is appropriately before that Panel. Any discipline imposed by another jurisdiction as contemplated by Rule 9.4 may be considered a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of this Rule.","UrlName":"revision156"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"34e1b5c6-65de-45b3-9fcb-e36449fd8f19","Title":"Rule 4-104. Mental Incapacity and Substance Abuse","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Mental illness, cognitive impairment, alcohol abuse, or substance abuse, to the extent of impairing competency as a lawyer, shall constitute grounds for removing a lawyer from the practice of law.</li> \n <li>Upon a determination by the State Disciplinary Board that a lawyer may be impaired or incapacitated to practice law as a result of one of the conditions described in paragraph (a) above, the Board may, in its sole discretion, make a confidential referral of the matter to an appropriate medical or mental health professional for the purposes of evaluation and possible referral to treatment and/or peer support groups. The Board may, in its discretion, defer disciplinary findings and proceedings based upon the impairment or incapacity of a lawyer to afford the lawyer an opportunity to be evaluated and, if necessary, to begin recovery. In such situations the medical or mental health professional shall report to the State Disciplinary Board and the Office of the General Counsel concerning the lawyer’s progress toward recovery. A lawyer’s refusal to cooperate with the medical or mental health professional or to participate in the evaluation or recommended treatment may be grounds for further proceedings under these Rules, including emergency suspension proceedings pursuant to Rule 4-108.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule94","Order":71,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"75437d69-f8ca-4720-8c3b-9f80419a12a6","ParentId":"34e1b5c6-65de-45b3-9fcb-e36449fd8f19","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Want of a sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairing competency as an attorney, when found to exist under the procedure outlined in Part IV, Chapter 2 of these Rules, shall constitute grounds for removing the attorney from the practice of law. Notice of final judgment taking such action shall be given by the Review Panel as provided in Rule 4-220 (a).</li> \n <li>Upon a finding by either panel of the State Disciplinary Board that an attorney may be impaired or incapacitated to practice law due to mental incapacity or substance abuse, that panel may, in its sole discretion, make a confidential referral of the matter to the Lawyer Assistance Program for the purposes of confrontation and referral of the attorney to treatment centers and peer support groups. Either panel may, in its discretion, defer disciplinary findings and proceedings based upon the impairment or incapacitation of an attorney pending attempts by the Lawyer Assistance Program to afford the attorney an opportunity to begin recovery. In such situations the Program shall report to the referring panel and Office of the General Counsel concerning the attorney's progress toward recovery.</li> \n <li>In the event of a finding by the Supreme Court of Georgia that a lawyer is impaired or incapacitated, the Court may refer the matter to the Lawyer Assistance Program, before or after its entry of judgment under Rules 4-219 or 4-220 (a), so that rehabilitative aid may be provided to the impaired or incapacitated attorney. In such situations the Program shall be authorized to report to the Court, either panel of the State Disciplinary Board and Office of the General Counsel concerning the attorney's progress toward recovery.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision98"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ff0cda5f-a0dd-45ec-919a-8d146f2cdde8","Title":"Rule 4-105.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule96","Order":72,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"126fec90-e385-4e6e-b41c-8983b2eb52e3","ParentId":"ff0cda5f-a0dd-45ec-919a-8d146f2cdde8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"When it appears to the Investigative Panel that an attorney's death, incapacity, imprisonment or disappearance poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public, the Investigative Panel shall immediately investigate the matter. If the Investigative Panel determines that such threat exists and that no partner, associate or other appropriate representative is available to prevent the harm, it shall file its findings and recommendation of action in the Supreme Court and shall seek judgment as provided in Rule 4-219.","UrlName":"revision158"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"abdf0431-189b-4f11-885a-f3f34d07a9cd","Title":"Rule 4-106. Conviction of a Crime; Suspension and Disbarment","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of information or evidence that a conviction for any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude has been entered against a lawyer, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall immediately assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number. The Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the appointment of a Special Master to conduct a show cause hearing.</li> \n <li>The petition shall show the date of the conviction and the court in which the conviction was entered, and shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master, pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b).</li> \n <li>The show cause hearing should be held within 15 days after service of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master upon the respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later. Within 30 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file a recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia which may order such discipline as deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li> If the Supreme Court of Georgia orders the respondent suspended pending any appeal, upon the termination of the appeal (or expiration of time for appeal if no appeal is filed) the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Special Master to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the circumstances of the termination of the appeal indicate that the suspended respondent should:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>be disbarred under Rule 8.4; or</li> \n <li>be reinstated; or</li> \n <li>remain suspended pending retrial as a protection to the public; or</li> \n <li> be reinstated while the facts giving rise to the conviction are investigated and, if proper, prosecuted under regular disciplinary procedures in these Rules. \n \n Reports of the Special Master shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, which may order such discipline as deemed appropriate. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, a certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of Rule 8.4 of Rule 4-102 and shall be admissible in proceedings under the disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule98","Order":73,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"94845a10-e432-4de9-a971-72e5476ff7f2","ParentId":"abdf0431-189b-4f11-885a-f3f34d07a9cd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of information or evidence that an attorney has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, whether by verdict, plea of guilty, plea of nolo contendere or imposition of first offender probation, the Office of the General Counsel shall immediately assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number and petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the appointment of a Special Master to conduct a show cause hearing. </li> \n <li>The petition shall show the date of the verdict or plea and the court in which the respondent was convicted, and shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master as provided in Rule 4-209.3 will appoint a Special Master, pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b).</li> \n <li>The show cause hearing should be held within 15 days after service of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master upon the respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later. Within 30 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file a recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia which shall be empowered to order such discipline as deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li> If the Supreme Court of Georgia orders the respondent suspended pending the appeal, upon the termination of the appeal the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Special Master to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the circumstances of the termination of the appeal indicate that the suspended respondent should:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>be disbarred under Rule 8.4; or</li> \n <li>be reinstated; or</li> \n <li>remain suspended pending retrial as a protection to the public; or</li> \n <li> be reinstated while the facts giving rise to the conviction are investigated and, if proper, prosecuted under regular disciplinary procedures in these Rules. \n \n Reports of the Special Master shall be filed with the Review Panel as provided hereafter in Rule 4-217. The Review Panel shall make its findings and recommendation as provided hereafter in Rule 4-218. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, a certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction based upon a verdict, plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere or the imposition of first offender treatment shall be prima facie evidence of an infraction of Rule 8.4 of Rule 4-102 and shall be admissible in proceedings under the disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision99"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b74db3ae-e41e-4815-afa9-c022bf54c69d","Title":"Rule 4-107.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule100","Order":74,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"84aec9fd-5147-4b88-a758-69bf5368c206","ParentId":"b74db3ae-e41e-4815-afa9-c022bf54c69d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision160"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c5d3ee01-67be-4aab-9d78-5754f868543c","Title":"Rule 4-108. Conduct Constituting Threat of Harm to Clients or Public; Emergency Suspension","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that a lawyer's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public and at the direction of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the suspension of the lawyer pending disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing such petition.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall state the evidence justifying the emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the petition for emergency suspension, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall assign the matter a Supreme Court docket number, and shall notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b) to conduct a hearing where the State Bar of Georgia shall show cause why the Respondent should be suspended pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Within 15 days after service of the petition for emergency suspension upon the Respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later, the Special Master shall hold a hearing on the petition for emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>Within 20 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file his or her recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court may suspend the Respondent pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing the emergency suspension, or order such other action as it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule101","Order":75,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"97a13f66-d8f5-43c1-9a93-3a4f221824b7","ParentId":"c5d3ee01-67be-4aab-9d78-5754f868543c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that an Attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public and with the approval of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia and the Chairperson of the Review Panel, or at the direction of the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel, the Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the suspension of the Attorney pending disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing such petition.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall state the evidence justifying the emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the petition for emergency suspension, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall assign the matter a Supreme Court docket number, and shall notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master will appoint a Special Master pursuant to Bar Rule 4-209(b) to conduct a hearing where the State Bar of Georgia shall show cause why the Respondent should be suspended pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Within fifteen days after service of the petition for emergency suspension upon the Respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later, the Special Master shall hold a hearing on the petition for emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>Within twenty days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file his or her recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court sitting en banc may suspend the Respondent pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing the emergency suspension, or order such other action as it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision100"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"79c672d2-4c6e-45fb-bf95-e2929de470cd","Title":"Rule 4-109. Refusal or Failure to Appear for Reprimand; Suspension","Content":"If a respondent fails to appear for imposition of a Confidential Reprimand without just cause, the State Disciplinary Board shall reconsider the matter to determine whether the case should proceed with a public filing pursuant to Bar Rule 4-208 et seq. If a respondent fails to appear before the State Disciplinary Review Board or the Superior Court for imposition of a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand or a Public Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel may file in the Supreme Court of Georgia a motion for suspension of the respondent. A copy of the motion shall be served on the respondent as provided in Bar Rule 4-203.1. The Supreme Court of Georgia may in its discretion, ten days after the filing of the motion, suspend the respondent until such time as the reprimand is administered.","UrlName":"rule102","Order":76,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"91e726c3-f6d1-40ec-acd9-c829a85f798b","ParentId":"79c672d2-4c6e-45fb-bf95-e2929de470cd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Either panel of the State Disciplinary Board based on the knowledge or belief that a respondent has refused, or failed without just cause, to appear in accordance with Bar Rule 4-220 before a panel or the superior court for the administration of a reprimand may file in the Supreme Court a motion for suspension of the respondent. A copy of the motion shall be served on the respondent as provided in Rule 4-203.1. The Supreme Court may in its discretion, ten days after the filing of the motion, suspend the respondent until such time as the reprimand is administered.","UrlName":"revision162"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"09c3ede3-4ff0-48a3-85cb-af3cb15c36e7","Title":"Rule 4-110.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Reserved</div>","UrlName":"rule103","Order":77,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"91566ced-d57e-4de2-9eeb-306da2cc9ab3","ParentId":"09c3ede3-4ff0-48a3-85cb-af3cb15c36e7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Respondent: A person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>Confidential Proceedings: Any proceeding under these Rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Public Proceedings: Any proceeding under these Rules which has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance: An allegation of unethical conduct filed against an attorney.</li> \n <li>Probable Cause: A finding by the Investigative Panel that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Bar Rules.</li> \n <li>Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License: A Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this State. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>He, Him or His: Generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>Attorney: A member of the State Bar of Georgia or one authorized by law to practice law in the State of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Notice of Discipline: A Notice by the Investigative Panel that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision101"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e53aa28d-ec52-41d5-ac81-b51369e3e4e8","Title":"Rule 4-111. Audit for Cause","Content":"Upon receipt of sufficient evidence that a lawyer who practices law in this State poses a threat of harm to his clients or the public, the State Disciplinary Board may conduct an Audit for Cause of the lawyer's trust and escrow accounts with the written approval of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia. Before approval can be granted, the lawyer shall be given notice that approval is being sought and be given an opportunity to appear and be heard. The sufficiency of the notice and opportunity to be heard shall be left to the sole discretion of the persons giving the approval. The State Disciplinary Board must inform the person being audited that the audit is an Audit for Cause.","UrlName":"rule105","Order":78,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"e19654e1-3d52-4091-a048-d45e48c79c8c","ParentId":"e53aa28d-ec52-41d5-ac81-b51369e3e4e8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Upon receipt of sufficient evidence that a lawyer who practices law in this State poses a threat of harm to his clients or the public, the State Disciplinary Board may conduct an Audit for Cause with the written approval of the Chairman of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia. Before approval can be granted, the lawyer shall be given notice that approval is being sought and be given an opportunity to appear and be heard. The sufficiency of the notice and opportunity to be heard shall be left to the sole discretion of the persons giving the approval. The State Disciplinary Board must inform the person being audited that the audit is an Audit for Cause.","UrlName":"revision164"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Title":"CHAPTER 2 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter14","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Rule 4-201. State Disciplinary Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The powers to investigate and discipline lawyers for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors; two nonlawyer members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; and two nonlawyer members appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors. The Court and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Board. No State Disciplinary Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors, whichever appointed the member whose term has expired.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant. </li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work investigating cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule63","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"07f753ca-7fed-4fb2-a326-4be45d9389ca","ParentId":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The powers to investigate and discipline members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct set forth in Bar Rule 4-102 are hereby vested in a State Disciplinary Board and a Consumer Assistance Program. The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of two panels. The first panel shall be the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Investigative Panel). The second panel shall be the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Review Panel). The Consumer Assistance Program shall operate as described in Part XII of these Rules. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Investigative Panel shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the President with the approval of the Board of Governors, and six public members appointed by the Supreme Court to serve as public members of the Panel.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> All members shall be appointed for three-year terms subject to the following exceptions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed;</li> \n <li>ex-officio members shall serve during the term of their office; and shall not increase the quorum requirement; and</li> \n <li>certain initial members as set forth in paragraph (2) below.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>It shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third (1/3) of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually.</li> \n <li>A member may be removed from the Panel pursuant to procedures set by the Panel for failure to attend regular meetings of the Panel. The vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the current President of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel shall annually elect a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, or a vice-chairperson for any subcommittee for which the chairperson is not a member to serve as chairperson for that subcommittee, and such other officers as it may deem proper. The Panel shall meet in its entirety in July of each year to elect a chairperson. At any time the Panel may decide to divide itself into subcommittees or to consolidate after having divided. A majority shall constitute a quorum and a majority of a quorum shall be authorized to act. However, in any matter in which one or more Investigative Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the matter.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel is authorized to organize itself into as many subcommittees as the Panel deems necessary to conduct the expeditious investigation of disciplinary matters referred to it by the Office of General Counsel. However, no subcommittee shall consist of fewer than seven (7) members of the Panel and each such subcommittee shall include at least one (1) of the public members.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The Review Panel shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President, nine (9) members of the State Bar, three (3) from each of the three (3) federal judicial districts of the State appointed as described below, and four (4) public members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The nine (9) members of the Bar from the federal judicial districts shall be appointed for three (3) year terms so that the term of one Panel member from each district will expire each year. The three (3) vacant positions will be filled in odd years by appointment by the President, with the approval of the Board of Governors, and in even years by appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Panel members serving at the time this Rule goes into effect shall continue to serve until their respective terms expire. New Panel members shall be appointed as set forth above.</li> \n <li>Any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed.</li> \n <li>Ex-officio members shall serve during the term or terms of their offices and shall not increase the quorum requirement.</li> \n <li>The Review Panel shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper in July of each year. The presence of six (6) members of the Panel shall constitute a quorum. Four (4) members of the Panel shall be authorized to act except that a recommendation of the Review Panel to suspend or disbar shall require the affirmative vote of at least six (6) members of the Review Panel, with not more than four (4) negative votes. However, in any case in which one or more Review Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum and the number of members necessary to vote affirmatively for disbarment or suspension, shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the case. No recommendation of disbarment or suspension may be made by fewer than four (4) affirmative votes. For the purposes of this Rule the recusal of a member shall have the same effect as disqualification.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision102"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e7e149e7-e023-4ce6-ae8d-3e0cce1b9ceb","Title":"Rule 4-201.1. State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The power to review for error final reports and recommendations of Special Masters in public proceedings arising under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct is hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Review Board shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia; the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President; seven members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia and one at large appointed as described below; and two nonlawyer members appointed as described below. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Review Board. No State Disciplinary Review Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia and the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia (or member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President) shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires in an even-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia for a term of three years; and when the term of appointment of a member expires in an odd-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Review Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Review Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Review Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work reviewing cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule602","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Rule 4-202. Receipt of Grievances; Initial Review by Bar Counsel","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of a Memorandum of Grievance, an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program, or credible information from any source. If the investigation is based upon receipt of credible information, the Office of the General Counsel must first notify the respondent lawyer and provide a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may also deliver the information from any source to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any matter under investigation. The screening process may include forwarding information received to the respondent so that the respondent may respond.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring the respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided in Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a matter, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those matters that do not present sufficient merit to proceed.</li> \n <li>Those matters that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule106","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"4d838131-f92a-4eb5-9a08-5517ba7ed783","ParentId":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Grievances shall be filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. In lieu of a Memorandum of Grievance the Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program. All grievances must include the name of the complainant and must be signed by the complainant.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may investigate conduct upon receipt of credible information from any source after notifying the respondent lawyer and providing a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation. The Office of the General Counsel may deliver the information it obtains to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any grievance. The screening process may include forwarding a copy of the grievance to the respondent in order that the respondent may respond to the grievance.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring a respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided at Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a grievance, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those grievances that do not present sufficient merit to proceed. Rejection of such grievances by the Office of the General Counsel shall not deprive the complaining party of any right of action he might otherwise have at law or in equity against the respondent.</li> \n <li>Those grievances that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision397"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0d18e960-68e3-48cb-bc1b-bb426f81e3a7","Title":"Rule 4-203. Powers and Duties","Content":"In accordance with these Rules, the State Disciplinary Board shall have the following powers and duties:\n(1) to receive and evaluate any and all written grievances against lawyers and to frame such charges and grievances as shall conform to the requirements of these Rules. A copy of the information serving as the basis for investigation or proceedings before the State Disciplinary Board shall be furnished to the respondent by the procedures set forth in Rule 4-203.1;\n(2) to initiate grievances on its own motion, to require additional information from a complainant, where appropriate, and to dismiss and reject matters that seem unjustified, frivolous, or patently unfounded;\n(3) to issue letters of instruction when dismissing a matter;\n(4) to delegate the duties of the State Disciplinary Board enumerated in paragraphs (1), (2), (8), (9), (10), and (11) hereof to the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or such other members as the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair may designate subject to review and approval by the full State Disciplinary Board;\n(5) to conduct Probable Cause investigations, to collect evidence and information concerning matters under investigation, and to certify matters to the Supreme Court of Georgia for hearings by Special Masters as hereinafter provided;\n(6) to prescribe its own Rules of conduct and procedure;\n(7) to receive, investigate, and collect evidence and information, and review and accept or reject Petitions for Voluntary Discipline pursuant to Rule 4-227 (b) (1);\n(8) to sign and enforce, as hereinafter described, subpoenas for the appearance of persons and the production of documents, things and records at investigations both during the screening process and the State Disciplinary Board’s investigation;\n(9) to issue a subpoena as provided in this Rule whenever a subpoena is sought in this State pursuant to the law of another jurisdiction for use in lawyer discipline or disability proceedings, where the issuance of the subpoena has been duly approved under the law of the other jurisdiction. Upon petition for good cause the State Disciplinary Board may compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents in the county where the witness resides or is employed or elsewhere as agreed by the witness. Service of the subpoena shall be as provided in the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Enforcement or challenges to the subpoena shall be as provided at Rule 4-221 (c);\n(10) to extend the time within which a formal complaint may be filed;\n(11) to issue Formal Letters of Admonition and Confidential Reprimands as hereinafter provided;\n(12) to issue a Notice of Discipline providing that unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice, the respondent shall be sanctioned as ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia;\n(13) to refer a lawyer who appears to be impaired for an evaluation by an appropriate medical or mental health professional; and\n(14) to use the staff of the Office of the General Counsel in performing its duties.\n<div></div>\n<div></div>\n","UrlName":"rule108","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7fe7960c-10b9-469c-9f35-a2a95244a2d2","Title":"Rule 4-203.1. Uniform Service Rule","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Lawyers shall inform the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, in writing, of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address on file with the Membership Department in all efforts to contact, communicate with, and perfect service upon a lawyer. The choice of a lawyer to provide only a post office box or commercial equivalent address to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall constitute an election to waive personal service. Notification of a change of address given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the Membership Department shall not satisfy the requirement herein.</li> \n <li> In all matters requiring personal service under Part IV of the Bar Rules, service may be perfected in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Acknowledgment of Service: An acknowledgment of service from the respondent shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li>Written Response from Respondent: A written response from the respondent or respondent’s counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li> In the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent’s counsel, and subject to the provisions of subparagraph (b) (4) below, the respondent shall be served in the following manner: \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>Personal Service: Service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or any other person authorized to serve a summons under the provisions of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, as approved by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or the Chair’s designee. Receipt of a Return of Service Non Est Inventus shall constitute conclusive proof that service cannot be perfected by personal service.</li> \n <li>Service by Publication: If personal service cannot be perfected, or when the respondent has only provided a post office box or commercial equivalent address to the Membership Department and the respondent has not acknowledged service within 10 days of a mailing to respondent’s post office box or commercial equivalent address, service may be accomplished by publication once a week for two weeks in the legal organ of the county of respondent’s address, as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and, contemporaneously with the publication, mailing a copy of the service documents by first class mail to respondent’s address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When it appears from an affidavit made by the Office of the General Counsel that the respondent has departed from the State, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the State, or seeks to avoid the service, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, or the Chair’s designee, may authorize service by publication without the necessity of first attempting personal service. The affidavit made by the Office of the General Counsel must demonstrate recent unsuccessful attempts at personal service upon the respondent regarding other or related disciplinary matters and that such personal service was attempted at respondent’s address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Whenever service of pleadings or other documents subsequent to the original complaint is required or permitted to be made upon a respondent represented by a lawyer, the service shall be made upon the respondent’s lawyer. Service upon the respondent’s lawyer or upon an unrepresented respondent shall be made by hand-delivery or by delivering a copy or mailing a copy to the respondent’s lawyer or to the respondent’s official address on file with the Membership Department, unless the respondent’s lawyer specifies a different address for the lawyer in a filed pleading. As used in this Rule, the term “delivering a copy” means handing it to the respondent’s lawyer or to the respondent, or leaving it at the lawyer’s or respondent’s office with a person of suitable age or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion. Service by mail is complete upon mailing and includes transmission by U.S. Mail, or by a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within three business days, shown by the official postmark or by the commercial carrier’s transmittal form. Proof of service may be made by certificate of a lawyer or of his employee, written admission, affidavit, or other satisfactory proof. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service.\t </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule109","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b41a4675-2b95-426d-9d60-acf01d16b66f","ParentId":"7fe7960c-10b9-469c-9f35-a2a95244a2d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Attorneys authorized to practice law in Georgia shall inform the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, in writing, of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address on file with the Membership Department in all efforts to contact, communicate with, and perfect service upon an attorney. The choice of an attorney to provide only a post office box or equivalent commercial address to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall constitute an election to waive personal service. Notification of a change of address given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the Membership Department shall not satisfy the requirement herein.</li> \n <li> In all matters requiring personal service under Part IV of the Bar Rules, service may be perfected in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Acknowledgment of Service: An acknowledgment of service from the Respondent shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li>Written Response from Respondent: A written response from the Respondent or Respondent's counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li> In the absence of an acknowledgment of service, or a written response from the Respondent or Respondent's counsel, and subject to the provisions of paragraph (4) below, the Respondent shall be served in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>Personal service: Service may be accomplished by the Sheriff, or a Court approved agent for service of process, or any person approved by the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or the Chair's designee. Receipt of a Return of Service Non Est Inventus from the Sheriff or any other person approved for service of the service documents, shall constitute conclusive proof that service cannot be perfected by personal service.</li> \n <li>Service by publication: In the event that personal service cannot be perfected, or when the Respondent has only provided a post office box to the Membership Department and Respondent has not acknowledged service within twenty (20) days of a mailing to Respondent's post office box, service may be accomplished by publication once a week for two weeks in the legal organ of the county of Respondent's address, as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and, contemporaneously with the publication, mailing a copy of the service documents by first class mail to Respondent's address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When it appears from an affidavit made by the Office of General Counsel that the Respondent has departed from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or seeks to avoid the service, the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel, or the chair's designee, may authorize service by publication without the necessity of first attempting personal service. The affidavit made by the Office of General Counsel must demonstrate recent unsuccessful attempts at personal service upon the Respondent regarding other or related disciplinary matters and that such personal service was attempted at Respondent's address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Whenever service of pleadings or other documents subsequent to the original complaint is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is otherwise required by these Rules. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his last known address. As used in this Rule, the term \"delivery of a copy \"means handing it to the attorney or to the party, or leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. Proof of service may be made by certificate of an attorney or of his employee, by written admission, by affidavit, or by other proof satisfactory to the court. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision105"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5e552308-5c15-4eb4-9150-ccc522670691","Title":"Rule 4-204. Investigation and Disposition by State Disciplinary Board-Generally","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> Each matter that presents sufficient merit to proceed may be referred with a Notice of Investigation to the State Disciplinary Board for investigation and disposition in accordance with its Rules. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign a lawyer member of the State Disciplinary Board to be responsible for the investigation. The Office of the General Counsel shall simultaneously assign a staff investigator to assist the State Disciplinary Board member with the investigation. If the investigation of the State Disciplinary Board establishes Probable Cause to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, it shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>issue a Formal Letter of Admonition;</li> \n <li>issue a Confidential Reprimand;</li> \n <li>issue a Notice of Discipline; </li> \n <li>refer the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia for hearing before a Special Master and file a formal complaint with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all as hereinafter provided; or</li> \n <li>refer a respondent for evaluation by an appropriate medical or mental health professional pursuant to Rule 4-104 upon the State Disciplinary Board’s determination that there is cause to believe the lawyer is impaired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n All other cases may be either dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board or referred to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.\n <li>The primary investigation shall be conducted by the member of the State Disciplinary Board responsible for the investigation, assisted by the staff of the Office of the General Counsel, upon request of the State Disciplinary Board member. The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia shall fund the Office of the General Counsel so that the Office of the General Counsel will be able to adequately investigate and prosecute all cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule110","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Rule 4-204.1. Notice of Investigation","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a) is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a);</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the grievance and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule76","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"c017b578-1033-45d1-a54e-20293af130ec","ParentId":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (b) is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (b);</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision399"},{"Id":"1ca382d2-6b2c-4dc8-983d-934b03e898b2","ParentId":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance;</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the grievance and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision325"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"32f62174-44c4-4bf1-8d41-2bcb39bf0f76","Title":"Rule 4-204.2.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule112","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ddd647f-da37-479d-ab5f-9e0d2850e21a","ParentId":"32f62174-44c4-4bf1-8d41-2bcb39bf0f76","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1.","UrlName":"revision166"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ebbb95c7-c350-4c76-8f3f-285d058bc3ac","Title":"Rule 4-204.3. Answer to Notice of Investigation Required","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The respondent shall deliver to the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter a written response under oath to the Notice of Investigation within 30 days of service.</li> \n <li>The written response must address specifically all of the issues set forth in the Notice of Investigation.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter may, in the State Disciplinary Board member’s discretion, grant extensions of time for the respondent’s answer. Any request for extension of time must be made in writing, and the grant of an extension of time must also be in writing. Extensions of time shall not exceed 30 days and should not be routinely granted.</li> \n <li> In cases where the maximum sanction is disbarment or suspension and the respondent fails to properly respond within the time required by these Rules, the Office of the General Counsel may seek authorization from the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to file a motion for interim suspension of the respondent.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>When an investigating member of the State Disciplinary Board notifies the Office of the General Counsel that the respondent has failed to respond and that the respondent should be suspended, the Office of the General Counsel shall, with the approval of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, file a Motion for Interim Suspension of the respondent. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an appropriate order.</li> \n <li>When the State Disciplinary Board member and the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board determine that a respondent who has been suspended for failure to respond has filed an appropriate response and should be reinstated, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a Motion to Lift Interim Suspension. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an appropriate order. The determination that an adequate response has been filed is within the discretion of the investigating State Disciplinary Board member and the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule113","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"45b9c5b6-dd60-41ec-9214-e8964ebb7919","Title":"Rule 4-204.4. Finding of Probable Cause; Referral to Special Master","Content":"In the event the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause of the respondent’s violation of one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, it may refer the matter to the Supreme Court of Georgia by directing the Office of the General Counsel to file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia either:\n(a) A formal complaint, as herein provided, along with a petition for the appointment of a Special Master and a notice of its finding of Probable Cause, within 30 days of the finding of Probable Cause unless the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair grants an extension of time for the filing; or\n(b) A Notice of Discipline pursuant to Rules 4-208.1, 4-208.2 and 4-208.3.","UrlName":"rule114","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d96d2620-410a-4333-950f-3c3cd562c88e","ParentId":"45b9c5b6-dd60-41ec-9214-e8964ebb7919","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In the event the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, finds Probable Cause of the Respondent's violation of one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 or these rules it may refer the matter to the Supreme Court by directing the Office of the General Counsel to file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia either: \n \n    (1) a formal complaint, as herein provided; \n \n    (2) a petition for the appointment of a Special Master; and \n \n    (3) a notice of its finding of Probable Cause.\n The documents specified above shall be filed in duplicate within thirty (30) days of the finding of Probable Cause unless the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, or its Chairperson grants an extension of time for the filing. \n \n(b) A Notice of Discipline in the matter shall thereafter proceed pursuant to Bar Rule 4-208.1, 4-208.2 and 4-208.3.","UrlName":"revision168"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"572c5f31-1365-45f8-a60d-d38d78516aba","Title":"Rule 4-204.5. Letters of Instruction","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> In addition to dismissing a complaint, the State Disciplinary Board may issue a letter of instruction to the respondent upon the following conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to a quorum of the State Disciplinary Board assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; and</li> \n <li> the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent either: \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>has not engaged in conduct that is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules; or</li> \n <li>has engaged in conduct that although technically in violation of such Rules is not reprehensible, and has resulted in no harm or injury to any third person, and is not in violation of the spirit of such Rules; or</li> \n <li>has engaged in conduct in violation of any recognized voluntary creed of professionalism.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A letter of instruction shall not constitute a finding of any disciplinary infraction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule116","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"41c7d017-7599-40ef-b753-1f43ce4c34bd","ParentId":"572c5f31-1365-45f8-a60d-d38d78516aba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In addition to dismissing a complaint, the Investigative Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, may issue a letter of instruction in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n \n    (1) the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to the entire Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; and \n \n    (2) the Investigative Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent either: \n \n        (i) has not engaged in conduct which is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules; or \n \n        (ii) has engaged in conduct that although technically in violation of such rules is not reprehensible, and has resulted in no harm or injury to any third person, and is not in violation of the spirit of such rules; or \n \n        (iii) has engaged in conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of Part III of these rules or any recognized voluntary creed of professionalism; \n \n(b) Letters of instruction shall contain a statement of the conduct of the respondent which may have violated Part III of these rules or the voluntary creed of professionalism. \n \n(c) A letter of instruction shall not constitute a finding of any disciplinary infraction.","UrlName":"revision170"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"77052b66-6315-44fa-adad-251f283e8018","Title":"Rule 4-205. Confidential Discipline; In General","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Disciplinary Board may issue a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to a quorum of the State Disciplinary Board assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting;</li> \n <li>the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent has engaged in conduct that is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules; and</li> \n <li> the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the conduct referred to in paragraph (b) hereof was engaged in:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>inadvertently; or</li> \n <li>purposefully, but in ignorance of the applicable disciplinary rule or rules; or</li> \n <li>under such circumstances that it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that the protection of the public and rehabilitation of the respondent would be best achieved by the issuance of a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand rather than by any other form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule118","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b2ad539d-868b-476a-94ef-263b3350a018","ParentId":"77052b66-6315-44fa-adad-251f283e8018","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In lieu of the imposition of any other discipline, the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Investigative Panel may issue letters of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n \n(a) the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to the entire Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; \n \n(b) the Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent has engaged in conduct which is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules; \n \n(c) the Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the conduct referred to in subpart (b) hereof was engaged in: \n \n    (1) inadvertently; or \n \n    (2) purposefully, but in ignorance of the applicable disciplinary rule or rules; or \n \n    (3) under such circumstances that it is the opinion of the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Investigative Panel that the protection of the public and rehabilitation of the respondent would be best achieved by the issuance of a letter of admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand rather than by any other form of discipline.","UrlName":"revision172"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9c775694-8d7c-4937-8be2-d161f55e3dbd","Title":"Rule 4-206. Confidential Discipline; Contents","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Formal Letters of Admonition and Confidential Reprimands shall contain a statement of the specific conduct of the respondent that violates Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, shall state the name of the complainant, if any, and shall state the reasons for issuance of such confidential discipline.</li> \n <li> A Formal Letter of Admonition shall also contain the following information:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the right of the respondent to reject the Formal Letter of Admonition under Rule 4-207;</li> \n <li>the procedure for rejecting the Formal Letter of Admonition under Rule 4-207; and</li> \n <li>the effect of an accepted Formal Letter of Admonition in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A Confidential Reprimand shall also contain information concerning the effect of the acceptance of such reprimand in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule119","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0b364013-3666-4c0a-907d-bd5bf6941a32","ParentId":"9c775694-8d7c-4937-8be2-d161f55e3dbd","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Letters of formal admonition and Investigative Panel Reprimands shall contain a statement of the specific conduct of the respondent which violates Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules, shall state the name of the complainant and shall state the reasons for issuance of such confidential discipline. \n \n(b) A letter of formal admonition shall also contain the following information: \n \n    (1) the right of the respondent to reject the letter of formal admonition under Rule 4-207; \n \n    (2) the procedure for rejecting the letter of formal admonition under Rule 4-207; and \n \n    (3) the effect of an accepted letter of formal admonition in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline. \n \n(c) An Investigative Panel Reprimand shall also contain information concerning the effect of the acceptance of such reprimand in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline.","UrlName":"revision174"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"973c39ff-b307-4891-bf21-eab08c74c0e4","Title":"Rule 4-207. Letters of Formal Admonition and Confidential Reprimands; Notification and Right of Rejection","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In any case where the State Disciplinary Board votes to impose discipline in the form of a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand, such vote shall constitute the State Disciplinary Board’s finding of Probable Cause. The respondent shall have the right to reject, in writing, the imposition of such discipline.  \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Notification to respondent shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>in the case of a Formal Letter of Admonition, the letter of admonition;</li> \n <li> in the case of a Confidential Reprimand, the letter notifying the respondent to appear for the administration of the reprimand; \n sent to the respondent at his or her address as reflected in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia, via certified mail, return receipt requested. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Rejection by respondent shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>in writing, within 30 days of notification; and</li> \n <li>sent to the State Disciplinary Board via any of the methods authorized under Rule 4-203.1 (c) and directed to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the current headquarters address of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>If the respondent rejects the imposition of a Formal Letter of Admonition or Confidential Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel may file a formal complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia unless the State Disciplinary Board reconsiders its decision.</li> \n <li>Confidential Reprimands shall be administered before the State Disciplinary Board by the Chair or his designee.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule121","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"37680a37-9dc5-4ca1-8e81-0a57628591e8","ParentId":"973c39ff-b307-4891-bf21-eab08c74c0e4","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In any case where the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, votes to impose discipline in the form of a letter of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand, such vote shall constitute the Panel's finding of probable cause. The respondent shall have the right to reject, in writing, the imposition of such discipline. A written rejection shall be deemed an election by the respondent to continue disciplinary proceedings under these rules and shall cause the Investigative Panel to proceed under Rule 4-204.4 \n \n(a) Notification to respondent shall be as follows: \n \n    (1) in the case of letters of formal admonition, the letter of admonition; \n \n    (2) in the case of an Investigative Panel Reprimand, the letter notifying the respondent to appear for the administration of the reprimand; \n \n    (3) sent to the respondent at his address as reflected in State Bar records, via certified mail, return receipt requested. \n \n(b) Rejection by respondent shall be as follows: \n \n    (1) in writing, within thirty days of notification; \n \n    (2) sent to the Investigative Panel via certified mail, return receipt requested, directed to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the current headquarters address of the State Bar. \n \n(c) If the respondent rejects the imposition of a formal admonition or Investigative Panel Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a formal complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within thirty days of receipt of the rejection unless the Investigative Panel or its Chairperson grants an extension of time for the filing of the formal complaint. \n \n(d) Investigative Panel Reprimands shall be administered before the Panel by the Chairperson or his or her designee.","UrlName":"revision176"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1e4711b7-d594-4651-b32d-a487d5feb8aa","Title":"Rule 4-208. Confidential Discipline; Effect in Event of Subsequent Discipline","Content":"In the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of confidential discipline shall be waived and the Office of the General Counsel may use such information as aggravation of discipline.","UrlName":"rule122","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"62bd0945-172f-4d4e-a682-44e53509227b","ParentId":"1e4711b7-d594-4651-b32d-a487d5feb8aa","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An accepted letter of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand shall be considered as a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Bar Rule 4-103. In the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of confidential discipline shall be waived and the Office of the General Counsel may use such information as aggravation of discipline.","UrlName":"revision178"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ca6b3d1-3b2e-45ec-95eb-b055d8b26364","Title":"Rule 4-208.1. Notice of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>In any case where the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause, the State Disciplinary Board may issue a Notice of Discipline requesting that the Supreme Court of Georgia impose any level of public discipline authorized by these Rules.</li> \n <li>Unless the Notice of Discipline is rejected by the respondent as provided in Rule 4-208.3, (1) the respondent shall be in default; (2) the respondent shall have no right to any evidentiary hearing; and (3) the respondent shall be subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia is not bound by the State Disciplinary Board’s recommendation and may impose any level of discipline it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule124","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"79a6bd3c-89d6-4107-9dca-37aa06ce8477","ParentId":"2ca6b3d1-3b2e-45ec-95eb-b055d8b26364","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In any case where the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel finds Probable Cause, the Panel may issue a Notice of Discipline imposing any level of public discipline authorized by these rules. \n \n(b) Unless the Notice of Discipline is rejected by the Respondent as provided in Rule 4-208.3, (1) the Respondent shall be in default; (2) the Respondent shall have no right to any evidentiary hearing; and (3) the Respondent shall be subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by the Supreme Court.","UrlName":"revision180"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Rule 4-208.2. Notice of Discipline; Contents; Service","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Notice of Discipline shall include: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the Rules that the State Disciplinary Board found the respondent violated;</li> \n <li>the allegations of facts that, if unrebutted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated;</li> \n <li>the level of public discipline recommended to be imposed;</li> \n <li>the reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the State Disciplinary Board to be relevant to such recommendation;</li> \n <li>the entire provisions of Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of a Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing the same in the notice;</li> \n <li>a copy of the Memorandum of Grievance or written description pursuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a); and</li> \n <li>a statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the respondent, including confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file documents evidencing service with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the State Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia in subsequent proceedings in the same matter.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule125","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"508b411a-242e-45c5-b595-74262b4b03b4","ParentId":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Notice of Discipline shall include: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the Rules that the State Disciplinary Board found the respondent violated;</li> \n <li>the allegations of facts that, if unrebutted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated;</li> \n <li>the level of public discipline recommended to be imposed;</li> \n <li>the reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the State Disciplinary Board to be relevant to such recommendation;</li> \n <li>the entire provisions of Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of a Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing the same in the notice;</li> \n <li>a copy of the Memorandum of Grievance; and</li> \n <li>a statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the respondent, including confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file documents evidencing service with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the State Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia in subsequent proceedings in the same matter.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision401"},{"Id":"88f1164f-fca6-433a-8c71-f7b662e6027b","ParentId":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Notice of Discipline shall state the following: \n \n    (1) The Rules which the Investigative Panel found that the Respondent violated; \n \n    (2) The facts which, if unrefuted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated; \n \n    (3) The level of public discipline recommended to be imposed; \n \n    (4) The reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the Investigative Panel to be relevant to such recommendation; \n \n    (5) The entire provisions of Bar Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing same in the Notice; \n \n    (6) A copy of the Memorandum of Grievance; and \n \n    (7) A statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the Respondent, including confidential discipline under Bar Rules 4-205 to 4-208. \n \n(b) The original Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(c) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(d) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(e) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(f) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(g) The Office of the General Counsel shall file the documents by which service was accomplished with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(h) The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the Respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"revision182"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"eb93af9b-e8a9-4570-aaf1-d72804590d12","Title":"Rule 4-208.3. Rejection of Notice of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In order to reject the Notice of Discipline, the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel must file a Notice of Rejection of the Notice of Discipline with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within 30 days following service of the Notice of Discipline.</li> \n <li>Any Notice of Rejection by the respondent shall be served upon the opposing party. In accordance with Rule 4-204.3 if the respondent has not previously filed a sworn response to the Notice of Investigation the rejection must include a sworn response in order to be considered valid. The respondent must also file a copy of such written response with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time of filing the Notice of Rejection.</li> \n <li>The timely filing of a Notice of Rejection shall constitute an election for the matter to proceed pursuant to Rule 4-208.4 et seq.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule126","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d6a72f5e-f34f-48ef-a481-3ab6dedd8bc3","ParentId":"eb93af9b-e8a9-4570-aaf1-d72804590d12","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In order to reject the Notice of Discipline the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel must file a Notice of Rejection of the Notice of Discipline with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within 30 days following service of the Notice of Discipline.  \n  \n(b) Any Notice of Rejection by the respondent shall be served by the respondent upon the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Any Notice of Rejection by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia shall be served by the General Counsel upon the respondent. No rejection by the respondent shall be considered valid unless the respondent files a written response as required by Rule 4-204.3 at or before the filing of the rejection. The respondent must also file a copy of such written response with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time of filing the Notice of Rejection. \n \n(c) The timely filing of a Notice of Rejection shall constitute an election for the Coordinating Special Master to appoint a Special Master and the matter shall thereafter proceed pursuant to Rules 4-209 through 4-225.","UrlName":"revision184"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"19154403-0c33-4593-b66b-2a3d173c2038","Title":"Rule 4-208.4. Formal Complaint Following Notice of Rejection of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia a formal complaint and a Petition for Appointment of Special Master within 30 days following the filing of a Notice of Rejection. The Notice of Discipline shall operate as the notice of finding of Probable Cause by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may obtain extensions of time for the filing of the formal complaint from the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or his designee.</li> \n <li>After the rejection of a Notice of Discipline and prior to the time of the filing of the formal complaint, the State Disciplinary Board may reconsider the matter and take appropriate action.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule128","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b5738bbf-cfd8-4488-b84d-1259e2ab4d9a","ParentId":"19154403-0c33-4593-b66b-2a3d173c2038","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Office of the General Counsel shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia a formal complaint and a Petition for Appointment of Special Master within thirty (30) days following the filing of a Notice of Rejection. The Notice of Discipline shall operate as the notice of finding of Probable Cause by the Investigative Panel. \n \n(b) The Office of the General Counsel may obtain extensions of time for the filing of the formal complaint from the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or his or her designee. \n \n(c) After the rejection of a Notice of Discipline and prior to the time of the filing of the formal complaint, the Investigative Panel may consider any new evidence regarding the grievance and take appropriate action.","UrlName":"revision186"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"48246a5f-fb57-45e0-8fdf-4699503baeee","Title":"Rule 4-209. Docketing by Supreme Court; Appointment of Special Master; Challenges to Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon receipt of a notice of finding of Probable Cause, a petition for appointment of a Special Master and a formal complaint, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, give the matter a Supreme Court of Georgia docket number, and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate. In those proceedings where a Notice of Discipline has been filed, the notice of finding of Probable Cause need not be filed.</li> \n <li>Within a reasonable time after receipt of a petition for appointment of a Special Master or notification that a Special Master previously appointed has been disqualified, withdrawn, or is otherwise unable to serve, the Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings in such complaint. The Coordinating Special Master shall select a Special Master from the list approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve the signed Order Appointing Special Master on the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon notification of the appointment of a Special Master, the State Bar of Georgia shall immediately serve the respondent with the order of appointment of a Special Master and with its formal complaint as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li>Within 10 days of service of the notice of appointment of a Special Master, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file any and all objections or challenges either of them may have to the competency, qualifications or impartiality of the Special Master with the Coordinating Special Master. The party filing such objections or challenges must also serve a copy of the objections or challenges upon the opposing party and the Special Master, who may respond to such objections or challenges. Within a reasonable time, the Coordinating Special Master shall consider the challenges and the responses of respondent, the State Bar of Georgia, and the Special Master, if any, determine whether the Special Master is disqualified and notify the parties, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Special Master of the decision. Exceptions to the Coordinating Special Master’s denial of disqualification are subject to review by the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time the record in the matter is filed with the Court pursuant to Rule 4-216 (e). If a Special Master is disqualified, appointment of a successor Special Master shall proceed as provided in this Rule.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule130","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d9980b44-4051-4feb-b4e9-81742f936147","ParentId":"48246a5f-fb57-45e0-8fdf-4699503baeee","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon receipt of a finding of Probable Cause, a petition for appointment of a Special Master and a formal complaint from the Investigative Panel, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate. In those proceedings where a Notice of Discipline has been filed, the finding of Probable Cause need not be filed. \n \n(b) Within a reasonable time after receipt of a petition/motion for appointment of a Special Master or notification that a Special Master previously appointed has been disqualified, the Coordinating Special Master will appoint a Special Master to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings in such complaint. The Coordinating Special Master shall select as Special Masters experienced members of the State Bar of Georgia who possess a reputation in the Bar for ethical practice; \nprovided, that a Special Master may not be appointed to hear a complaint against a Respondent who resides in the same circuit as that in which the Special Master resides.\n (c) Upon being advised of appointment of a Special Master by the Coordinating Special Master, the Clerk of the Court shall return the original Notice of Discipline, rejection of Notice of Discipline, if applicable, formal complaint, Probable Cause finding, petition for appointment of Special Master and the signed order thereon to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon notification of the appointment of a Special Master, the Office of the General Counsel shall immediately serve the Respondent with the order of appointment of a Special Master and with its formal complaint as hereinafter provided. \n \n(d) Within ten days of service of the notice of appointment of a Special Master, the Respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall lodge any and all objections or challenges they may have to the competency, qualifications or impartiality of the Special Master with the chairperson of the Review Panel. The party filing such objections or challenges must also serve a copy of the objections or challenges upon the opposing counsel, the Coordinating Special Master and the \nSpecial Master, who may respond to such objections or challenges. Within a reasonable time the chairperson of the Review Panel shall consider the challenges, the responses of Respondent, the State Bar of Georgia, the Coordinating Special Master and the Special Master, if any, determine whether the Special Master is disqualified and notify the parties, the Coordinating Special Master and the Special Master of the chairperson’s decision. Exceptions to the chairperson’s \ndenial of disqualification are subject to review by the entire Review Panel and, thereafter, by the Supreme Court of Georgia when exceptions arising during the evidentiary hearing and exceptions to the report of the Special Master and the Review Panel are properly before the Court. In the event of disqualification of a Special Master by the chairperson of the Review Panel, said chairperson shall notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Coordinating Special \nMaster, the Special Master, the State Bar of Georgia and the Respondent of the disqualification and appointment of a successor Special Master shall proceed as provided in this rule.","UrlName":"revision188"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"dc2ddd92-ce46-4035-ba0d-7f2c51a8b20a","Title":"Rule 4-209.1. Coordinating Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia shall appoint a lawyer to serve as the Coordinating Special Master for disciplinary cases.</li> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia annually shall appoint up to 20 lawyers to serve as Special Masters in disciplinary cases. The Court may reappoint lawyers appointed in prior years, although it generally is preferable for a lawyer to serve as a Special Master for no more than five consecutive years. When a case is assigned to a lawyer appointed as Special Master, such lawyer shall continue to serve as Special Master in that case until final disposition, unless the Coordinating Special Master or the Court directs otherwise, irrespective of whether such lawyer is reappointed to serve as Special Master for another year.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master and Special Masters shall serve at the pleasure of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>No member of the State Disciplinary Board, State Disciplinary Review Board, Special Master Compensation Commission, or Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia shall be appointed to serve as Coordinating Special Master or as a Special Master.</li> \n <li>A list of the lawyers appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia as Special Masters shall be published on the website of the State Bar of Georgia and annually in a regular publication of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Training for Special Masters is expected, and the Coordinating Special Master shall be responsible for the planning and conduct of training sessions, which the State Bar of Georgia shall make available without cost to Special Masters. At a minimum, a lawyer appointed for the first time as a Special Master should attend a training session within six months of his appointment. The failure of a Special Master to complete the minimum required training session shall not be a basis for a motion to disqualify a Special Master. </li> \n <li>A Special Master (including the Coordinating Special Master) shall be disqualified to serve in a disciplinary case when circumstances exist, which, if the Special Master were a judge, would require the recusal of the Special Master under the Code of Judicial Conduct. In the event that the Coordinating Special Master is disqualified in any case, the Supreme Court of Georgia shall assign the case to a Special Master, and the Court shall designate another Special Master to act as Coordinating Special Master for purposes of that case only.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule131","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"accca273-ede6-4400-a09c-a04bdad8ddcb","ParentId":"dc2ddd92-ce46-4035-ba0d-7f2c51a8b20a","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The appointment of and the determination of the compensation of the Coordinating Special Master shall be the duty of the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. The Commission shall be comprised of the second, third and fourth immediate past presidents of the State Bar of Georgia. If any of the above named ex officio individuals should be unable to serve, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(b) The Coordinating Special Master shall be selected by the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission, with the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Coordinating Special Master shall serve as an independent contractor at the pleasure of the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. \n \n(c) The Coordinating Special Master shall be compensated by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds of the State Bar of Georgia in an amount specified by the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. The Coordinating Special Master’s compensation shall be approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia. On or before the first day of each calendar year, the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission shall submit to the Supreme Court of Georgia for approval the hourly rate to be paid to the Coordinating Special Master during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year, which rate shall continue until the conclusion of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(d) The Coordinating Special Master shall have such office space, furniture and equipment and may incur such operating expenses in such amounts as may be specified by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Such amounts shall be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds. On or before the first day of each calendar year, the Supreme Court of Georgia will set the amount to be paid for the above items during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year.\n(e) If the Coordinating Special Master position is vacant or the Coordinating Special Master has recused or been disqualified from a particular matter, the Supreme Court of Georgia may appoint a temporary Acting Coordinating Special Master to act until the position can be filled or to act in any particular matter.","UrlName":"revision190"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4f566031-7216-473f-aa71-81ad232243b7","Title":"Rule 4-209.2. Special Masters","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master and the Special Masters shall be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating fund at rates to be set by the Supreme Court of Georgia, which the Court may adjust from time to time.</li> \n <li>To advise the Supreme Court of Georgia with respect to the compensation of the Coordinating Special Master and Special Masters, the Court shall appoint a Special Master Compensation Commission, which shall consist of the current Treasurer of the State Bar of Georgia; the second, third, and fourth immediate past presidents of the State Bar of Georgia, unless any such past president should decline to serve; and such other persons as the Court may designate. The Commission shall make annual recommendations to the Court about the rate to be paid to the Coordinating Special Master and the rate to be paid to the Special Masters, and the Commission shall report such recommendations to the Court no later than January 1 of each year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule133","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"1ee12620-f5ee-4b93-beee-f813133bd44c","ParentId":"4f566031-7216-473f-aa71-81ad232243b7","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The Coordinating Special Master, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia, shall select and maintain a limited pool of qualified lawyers to serve as Special Masters for the State Disciplinary Board and Hearing Officers for the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants pursuant to Part A, Section 8 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia. The names of those so selected shall be placed on a list maintained by the Coordinating Special Master. Said list shall be published annually in a regular State Bar of Georgia publication. Although not mandatory, it is preferable that a lawyer so selected shall only remain on such list for five years, so that the term may generally be considered to be five years. Any lawyer whose name is removed from such list shall be eligible to be selected and placed on the list at any subsequent time.\n (b) Training for Special Masters and Hearing Officers is expected, subject to the terms of this Rule, and shall consist of one training session within twelve months after selection. The Special Master and Hearing Officer training shall be planned and conducted by the Coordinating Special Master. Special Masters and Hearing Officers who fail to attend such a minimum training session shall periodically be removed from consideration for appointment in future cases. Failure to attend such a training session shall not be the basis for a disqualification of any Special Master or Hearing Officer; as such qualifications shall remain in the sole discretion of the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(c) The Special Masters may be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds on a per case rate to be set by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Hearing Officers may be paid pursuant to Part A, Section 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia.\n(d) On or before the first day of March of each calendar year, the Supreme Court of Georgia may set the amount to be paid to the Special Masters during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year, which rate shall continue until the conclusion of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"revision192"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3ee26eaa-e752-484a-bf5e-9e65269cc3eb","Title":"Rule 4-209.3 Powers and Duties of the Coordinating Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Coordinating Special Master shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to establish requirements for, conduct, and supervise Special Master training;</li> \n <li>to assign cases to Special Masters from the list provided in Rule 4-209 (b);</li> \n <li>to exercise all of the powers and duties provided in Rule 4-210 when acting as a Special Master under paragraph (h) below;</li> \n <li>to monitor and evaluate the performance of Special Masters and to submit a report to the Supreme Court of Georgia regarding such performance annually;</li> \n <li>to remove Special Masters for such cause as may be deemed proper by the Coordinating Special Master;</li> \n <li>to fill all vacancies occasioned by incapacity, disqualification, recusal, or removal;</li> \n <li>to administer Special Master compensation, as provided in Rule 4-209.2 (b);</li> \n <li>to hear pretrial motions when no Special Master is serving; </li> \n <li>to perform all other administrative duties necessary for an efficient and effective hearing system;</li> \n <li>to allow a late filing of the respondent’s answer where there has been no final selection of a Special Master within 30 days of service of the formal complaint upon the respondent;</li> \n <li>to receive and pass upon challenges and objections to the appointment of Special Masters; and</li> \n <li>to extend the time for a Special Master to file a report, in accordance with Rule 4-214 (a).</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule552","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"eefc4188-d502-482d-91a8-d54da3e49a16","ParentId":"3ee26eaa-e752-484a-bf5e-9e65269cc3eb","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Coordinating Special Master shall have the following powers and duties:\n (1) to establish requirements for and supervise Special Master and Hearing Officer training; \n \n (2) to assign cases to Special Masters and Hearing Officers from the pool provided in Bar Rule 4-209 (b); \n \n (3) to exercise all of the powers and duties provided in Bar Rule 4-210 when acting as a Special Master under subparagraph (8) below; \n \n (4) to monitor and evaluate the performance of Special Masters and Hearing Officers; \n \n (5) to remove Special Masters and Hearing Officers for such cause as may be deemed proper by the Coordinating Special Master; \n \n (6) to fill all vacancies occasioned by incapacity, disqualification, recusal or removal; \n \n (7) to administer Special Master and Hearing Officer compensation, if authorized as provided in Bar Rule 4-209.2 or Part A, Section 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia; \n \n (8) to hear pretrial motions when no Special Master has been assigned; and \n \n(9) to perform all other administrative duties necessary for an efficient and effective hearing system.","UrlName":"revision194"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cf41204d-18f9-4302-801c-b3cfeb38cd2d","Title":"Rule 4-210. Powers and Duties of Special Masters","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In accordance with these Rules a duly appointed Special Master shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to exercise general supervision over assigned disciplinary proceedings, including emergency suspension cases as provided in Rule 4-108, and to perform all duties specifically enumerated in these Rules;</li> \n <li>to rule on all questions concerning the sufficiency of the formal complaint;</li> \n <li>to encourage negotiations between the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent, whether at a pretrial meeting set by the Special Master or at any other time;</li> \n <li>to receive and evaluate any Petition for Voluntary Discipline filed after the filing of a formal complaint;</li> \n <li>to grant continuances and to extend any time limit provided for herein as to any pending matter subject to Rule 4-214 (a);</li> \n <li>to apply to the Coordinating Special Master for leave to withdraw and for the appointment of a successor in the event that he becomes incapacitated or otherwise unable to perform his duties;</li> \n <li>to hear, determine and consolidate action on the complaints, where there are multiple complaints against a respondent growing out of different transactions, whether they involve one or more complainants, and to make recommendations on each complaint as constituting a separate offense;</li> \n <li>to sign subpoenas and to exercise the powers described in Rule 4-221 (c);</li> \n <li>to preside over evidentiary hearings and to decide questions of law and fact raised during such hearings;</li> \n <li>to make findings of fact and conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline as hereinafter provided and to submit his findings for consideration by the Supreme Court of Georgia in accordance with Rule 4-214;</li> \n <li>to exercise general supervision over discovery by parties to disciplinary proceedings and to conduct such hearings and sign all appropriate pleadings and orders pertaining to such discovery as are provided for by the law of Georgia applicable to discovery in civil cases; and</li> \n <li>in disciplinary cases, to make a recommendation of discipline, and in emergency suspension cases a recommendation as to whether the respondent should be suspended pending further disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule134","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"63d9ed19-1843-48c9-8df6-230c3b31f099","ParentId":"cf41204d-18f9-4302-801c-b3cfeb38cd2d","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In accordance with these Rules a duly appointed Special Master or Hearing Officer shall have the following powers and duties: \n \n(1) to exercise general supervision over assigned disciplinary proceedings and to perform all duties specifically enumerated in these Rules; \n \n(2) to rule on all questions concerning the sufficiency of the formal complaint;\n(3) to conduct the negotiations between the State Bar of Georgia and the Respondent, whether at a pretrial meeting set by the Special Master or at any other time;\n (4) to receive and evaluate any Petition for Voluntary Discipline; \n \n(5) to grant continuances and to extend any time limit provided for herein as to any pending matter; \n \n(6) to apply to the Coordinating Special Master for leave to withdraw and for the appointment of a successor in the event that he or she becomes incapacitated to perform his or her duties or in the event that he or she learns that he or she and the Respondent reside in the same circuit; \n \n(7) to hear, determine and consolidate action on the complaints, where there are multiple complaints against a Respondent growing out of different transactions, whether they involve one or more complainants, and may proceed to make recommendations on each complaint as constituting a separate offense;\n(8) to sign subpoenas and exercise the powers described in Bar Rule 4-221(b);\n (9) to preside over evidentiary hearings and to decide questions of law and fact raised during such hearings; \n \n(10) to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter provided and to submit his or her findings for consideration by the Review Panel; \n \n(11) to exercise general supervision over discovery by parties to disciplinary proceedings and to conduct such hearings and sign all appropriate pleadings and orders pertaining to such discovery as are provided for by the law of Georgia applicable to discovery in civil cases;\n(12) in disciplinary cases, to make a recommendation of discipline, and in emergency suspension cases a recommendation as to whether the Respondent should be suspended pending further disciplinary proceedings; and\n(13) to conduct and exercise general supervision over hearings for the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants and to make written findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to Part A, Section 8 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia.","UrlName":"revision196"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ee826a71-c151-48fe-8edb-41abef22de27","Title":"Rule 4-211. Formal Complaint; Service","Content":"<ol> \n <li>Within 30 days after a finding of Probable Cause, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a formal complaint that specifies with reasonable particularity the acts complained of and the grounds for disciplinary action. A copy of the formal complaint shall be served upon the respondent after appointment of a Special Master. In those cases where a Notice of Discipline has been filed and rejected, the filing of the formal complaint shall be governed by the time period set forth in Rule 4-208.4. The formal complaint shall be served pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>At all stages of the proceeding, both the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may be represented by counsel. Counsel representing the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to prepare and sign notices, pleadings, motions, complaints, and certificates for and in behalf of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"rule136","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0d430cfa-e7d7-4ab5-a7e2-f1ec9bc56986","ParentId":"ee826a71-c151-48fe-8edb-41abef22de27","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Within thirty days after a finding of Probable Cause, a formal complaint shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel which shall specify with reasonable particularity the acts complained of and the grounds for disciplinary action. A formal complaint shall include the names and addresses of witnesses so far as then known. A copy of the formal complaint shall be served upon the Respondent after appointment of a Special Master by the Coordinating Special \nMaster. In those cases where a Notice of Discipline has been filed and rejected, the filing of the formal complaint shall be governed by the time period set forth in Bar Rule 4-208.4. The formal complaint shall be served pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(b) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(c) At all stages of the proceeding, both the Respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may be represented by counsel. Counsel representing the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to prepare and sign notices, pleadings, motions, complaints, and certificates for and in behalf of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Disciplinary Board.","UrlName":"revision198"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"86e94ba5-a26d-40bd-9bdd-9920d0e0e1a3","Title":"Rule 4-211.1 Dismissal after Formal Complaint","Content":"At any time after the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause, the Office of the General Counsel may dismiss the proceeding with the consent of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or with the consent of any three members of the State Disciplinary Board.","UrlName":"rule138","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"36e51b06-b1bc-48ca-a8b7-8e019fc1c829","ParentId":"86e94ba5-a26d-40bd-9bdd-9920d0e0e1a3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"At any time after the Investigative Panel finds probable cause, the Office of General Counsel may dismiss the proceeding with the consent of the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or with the consent of any three members of the Investigative Panel.","UrlName":"revision200"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d3caa485-b0cd-4823-9271-428068980047","Title":"Rule 4-212. Answer of Respondent; Discovery","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The respondent shall file and serve his answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-221 (b) within 30 days after service of the formal complaint. If the respondent fails to answer or to obtain an extension of time for his answer, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint shall be deemed admitted. In the event the respondent’s answer fails to address specifically the issues raised in the formal complaint, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint and not specifically addressed in the answer shall be deemed admitted. A respondent may obtain an extension of time not to exceed 15 days to file the answer from the Special Master. Extensions of time for the filing of an answer shall not be routinely granted.</li> \n <li>The pendency of objections or challenges to one or more Special Masters shall provide no justification for a respondent’s failure to file his answer or for failure of the State Bar of Georgia or the respondent to engage in discovery.</li> \n <li>Both parties to the disciplinary proceeding may engage in discovery under the rules of practice and procedure then applicable to civil cases in the State of Georgia.</li> \n <li>In lieu of filing an answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar of Georgia, the respondent may submit to the Special Master a Petition for Voluntary Discipline as provided in Rule 4-227 (c). Each such petition shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. As provided in Rule 4-227 (c) (1), the Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule117","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"415ec974-0089-4913-a142-be55ce96b55a","ParentId":"d3caa485-b0cd-4823-9271-428068980047","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The respondent shall serve his or her answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar within thirty days after service of the formal complaint. In the event that respondent fails to answer or to obtain an extension of time for his answer, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint shall be deemed admitted. In the event the respondent's answer fails to address specifically the issues raised in the formal complaint, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint and not specifically addressed in the answer shall be deemed admitted. A respondent may obtain an extension of time not to exceed fifteen days to file the answer from the special master, or, when a challenge to the special master is pending, from the chairperson of the Review Panel. Extensions of time for the filing of an answer shall not be routinely granted. \n \n(b) The pendency of objections or challenges to one or more special masters shall provide no justification for a respondent's failure to file his answer or for failure of the State Bar or the respondent to engage in discovery. \n \n(c) Both parties to the disciplinary proceeding may engage in discovery under the rules of practice and procedure then applicable to civil cases in the State of Georgia. \n \n(d) In lieu of filing an answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar, the respondent may submit to the special master a Petition for Voluntary Discipline; provided, however, that each such petition shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. As provided in Rule 4-210(d), the special master may solicit a response to such petition from Bar counsel.","UrlName":"revision202"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"8127673b-ac9f-4f79-8fcb-17a808c4feba","Title":"Rule 4-213. Evidentiary Hearing","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Within 90 days after the filing of respondent’s answer to the formal complaint or the expiration of the time for filing of the answer, whichever is later, the Special Master shall proceed to hear the case. The evidentiary hearing shall be reported and transcribed at the expense of the State Bar of Georgia. When the hearing is complete, the Special Master shall proceed to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline and file a report with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards as hereinafter provided. Alleged errors in the hearing may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia when the findings and recommendations of discipline are filed with the Court. There shall be no interlocutory appeal of alleged errors in the hearing.</li> \n <li>Upon respondent’s showing of necessity and financial inability to pay for a copy of the transcript, the Special Master shall order the State Bar of Georgia to purchase a copy of the transcript for respondent.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule127","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"e7e60296-f99b-46a6-86f6-e4f2818f7cb5","ParentId":"8127673b-ac9f-4f79-8fcb-17a808c4feba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Within 90 days after the filing of respondent's answer to the formal complaint or the time for filing of the answer, whichever is later, the Special Master shall proceed to hear the case. The evidentiary hearing shall be reported and transcribed at the expense of the State Bar of Georiga. When the hearing is complete, the Special Master shall proceed to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline and file a report with the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia as hereinafter provided. Alleged errors in the trial may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia when the findings and recommendations of discipline of the Review Panel are filed with the Court. There shall be no direct appeal from such proceedings of the Special Master. \n \n(b) Upon respondent's showing of necessity and financial inability to pay for a copy of the transcript, the Special Master shall order the State Bar of Georgia to purchase a copy of the transcript for respondent.","UrlName":"revision204"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9622baf4-fd64-4aec-bb7f-b587c58b1dbd","Title":"Rule 4-214. Report of the Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Unless the Coordinating Special Master extends the deadline for good cause, the Special Master shall prepare a report within 45 days from receipt of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing. Failure of the Special Master to issue the report within 45 days shall not be grounds for dismissal. The report shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>findings of fact on the issues raised by the formal complaint;</li> \n <li>conclusions of law on the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties; and</li> \n <li>a recommendation of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Special Master shall file his or her original report and recommendation with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards and shall serve a copy on the respondent and counsel for the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall file the original record in the case directly with the Supreme Court of Georgia, unless any party files with the Clerk a request for review by the State Disciplinary Review Board and exceptions to the report within 30 days of the date the report is filed as provided in Rule 4-216 et seq. The Clerk shall inform the State Disciplinary Review Board when a request for review and exceptions are filed.</li> \n <li>In the event any party requests review, the responding party shall file a response to the exceptions within 30 days of the filing. Within 10 days after the receipt of a response or the expiration of the time for responding, the Clerk shall transmit the record in the case to the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule53","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"1c0dc62c-cf9e-4ece-9e50-bbc3f2e76594","ParentId":"9622baf4-fd64-4aec-bb7f-b587c58b1dbd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Rule 4-214. This rule is reserved. ","UrlName":"revision206"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"943ffb9b-7630-4dd3-a8fe-4b6b6c0d12da","Title":"Rule 4-215. Powers and Duties of the State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In accordance with these Rules, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to review reports of Special Masters, and to recommend to the Supreme Court of Georgia the imposition of punishment and discipline or dismissal of the complaint;</li> \n <li>to adopt forms for notices and any other written instruments necessary or desirable under these Rules;</li> \n <li>to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure; </li> \n <li>to receive Notice of Reciprocal Discipline and to recommend to the Supreme Court of Georgia the imposition of punishment and discipline pursuant to Bar Rule 9.4 (b) (3); and</li> \n <li>to administer State Disciplinary Review Board reprimands.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule137","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b62dff75-584a-4a6e-969c-ffe4dd865ff7","ParentId":"943ffb9b-7630-4dd3-a8fe-4b6b6c0d12da","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision208"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"137e355a-d385-4b45-ae79-6a737d44c0c1","Title":"Rule 4-216. Proceedings Before the State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon receipt of the record and exceptions to the report of the Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-214, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall consider the record, review findings of fact and conclusions of law, and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court of Georgia and the nature of such recommended discipline. The findings of fact made by a Special Master may be reversed if the State Disciplinary Review Board finds them to be clearly erroneous or manifestly in error. Conclusions of law and determinations of appropriate sanctions shall be reviewed de novo.</li> \n <li>The respondent shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Review Board considering the case under a procedure as provided for in the Rules of the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li>There shall be no de novo hearing before the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board may consider exceptions to the report of the Special Master and may in its discretion grant oral argument if requested by any party within 15 days of transmission of the record and exceptions to the State Disciplinary Review Board. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards, in accordance with Rule 4-214. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.</li> \n <li>Within 90 days after receipt of the record including any exceptions to the report of the Special Master and responses thereto the State Disciplinary Review Board shall file its report with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. The 90-day deadline may be extended by agreement of the parties or with the consent of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board for good cause shown. A copy of the State Disciplinary Review Board’s report shall be served upon the respondent, and the Clerk shall file the record in the case with the Supreme Court of Georgia within 10 days after the report is filed. If no report is filed by the State Disciplinary Review Board within 90 days of receipt by it of the record and no extension is granted, the Clerk shall file the original record in the case with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the case shall be considered by the Court on the record.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule143","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"75367abc-39d4-4199-b939-3f62e23582eb","ParentId":"137e355a-d385-4b45-ae79-6a737d44c0c1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision210"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"662bb234-462b-4dfa-8aa7-6a1370a125b9","Title":"Rule 4-217.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule146","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"e1472412-4b90-4b6b-bec0-aea3970475d9","ParentId":"662bb234-462b-4dfa-8aa7-6a1370a125b9","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Within 30 days from receipt of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing, the Special Master shall prepare a report which shall contain the following:\n(1) findings of fact on the issues raised by the formal complaint, and\n(2) conclusions of law on the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties; and\n(3) a recommendation of discipline.\n (b) The Special Master shall file his or her original report and recommendation with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board and shall serve a copy on the respondent and counsel for the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(c) Thirty days after the Special Master's report and recommendation is filed, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board  shall file the original record in the case directly with the Supreme Court of Georgia unless either party requests review by the Review Panel as provided in paragraph (d) of this Rule. In the event neither party requests review by the Review Panel and the matter goes directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, both parties shall be deemed to have waived any right they may have under the Rules to file exceptions with or make request for oral argument to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Any review undertaken by the Supreme Court of Georgia shall be solely on the original record. \n \n(d) Upon receipt of the Special Master’s report and recommendation, either party may request review by the Review Panel as provided in Rule 4-218. Such party shall file the request and exceptions with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with Rule 4-221 (f) and serve them on the opposing party within 30 days after the Special Master's report is filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. Upon receipt of a timely written request and exceptions, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall prepare and file the record and report with the Review Panel. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.","UrlName":"revision212"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a0d831a8-8c52-4efe-9000-b94fc429538b","Title":"Rule 4-218. Judgments","Content":"After the Special Master's report and any report of the State Disciplinary Review Board are filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file with the Court any written exceptions, supported by written argument, either may have to the reports. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Court within 30 days of the date that the record is filed with the Court and a copy served upon the opposing party. The responding party shall have an additional 30 days to file a response with the Court. The Court may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by a party to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court will promptly consider the report of the Special Master, any report of the State Disciplinary Review Board, any exceptions, and any responses filed by any party to such exceptions, and enter judgment upon the formal complaint. A copy of the Court’s judgment shall be transmitted to the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent by the Court.","UrlName":"rule148","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"89aa92fa-6cc4-46c8-b9ae-8d02469a53d1","ParentId":"a0d831a8-8c52-4efe-9000-b94fc429538b","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon receipt of the report from a Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-217(d), the Review Panel shall consider the record, make findings of fact and conclusions of law and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court and the nature of such recommended discipline. The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a Special Master shall not be binding on the Panel and may be reversed by it on the basis of the record submitted to the Panel by the Special Master. \n \n(b) The Respondent shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any member of the Review Panel considering the case against him under a procedure as provided for in the rules of the Panel. \n \n(c) There shall be no de novo hearing before the Review Panel except by unanimous consent of the Panel. \n \n(d) The Review Panel may grant rehearings, or new trials, for such reasons, in such manner, on such issues and within such times as the ends of justice may require. \n \n(e) The Review Panel may consider exceptions to the report of the special master and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with Bar Rules 4-217(d) and 4-221(f). The responding party shall have ten (10) days after service of the exceptions within which to respond. \n \n(f) The Review Panel shall file its report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. A copy of the Panel's report shall be served upon the Respondent.","UrlName":"revision214"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"34cf176e-9770-4ae2-8545-e40c320883fc","Title":"Rule 4-219. Publication and Protective Orders","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>In cases in which a lawyer is publicly reprimanded, suspended, disbarred, or voluntarily surrenders his license, the Office of the General Counsel shall publish notice of the discipline in a local newspaper or newspapers. The Office of the General Counsel shall publish notice of all public discipline on the official State Bar of Georgia website, including the respondent’s full name and business address, the nature of the discipline imposed and the effective dates.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall immediately cease the practice of law in Georgia and shall, within 30 days, notify all clients of his inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients. Within 45 days after a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, the respondent shall certify to the Court that he has satisfied the requirements of this Rule. Should the respondent fail to comply with the requirements of this Rule, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its own motion or upon motion of the Office of the General Counsel, and after 10 days’ notice to the respondent and proof of his failure to notify or protect his clients, may hold the respondent in contempt and, pursuant to Rule 4-228, order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of the respondent and proceed to notify all clients and to take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Motions for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by either the respondent or by the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension under Part IV of these Rules the respondent shall take such action necessary to cause the removal of any indicia of the respondent as a lawyer, legal assistant, legal clerk or person with similar status. In the event the respondent should maintain a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted, the respondent shall not represent himself as a lawyer or person with similar status and shall not provide any legal advice to clients of the law office.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule150","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"765c0956-e960-4f80-be7b-207b5f653097","ParentId":"34cf176e-9770-4ae2-8545-e40c320883fc","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) After either the Review Panel's report or the Special Master's report is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file with the Court any written exceptions, supported by written argument, each may have to the report subject to the provisions of Rule 4-217 (c). All such exceptions shall be filed with the Court within 30 days of the date that the report is filed with the Court and a copy served upon the opposing party. The responding party shall have an additional 30 days to file its response with the Court. The Court may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by a party to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court will promptly consider the report of the Review Panel or the Special Master, any exceptions, and any responses filed by any party to such exceptions, and enter judgment upon the formal complaint. A copy of the Court's judgment shall be transmitted to the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent by the Court. \n \n(b) In cases in which the Supreme Court of Georgia orders disbarment, voluntary surrender of license or suspension, or the respondent is disbarred or suspended on a Notice of Discipline, the Review Panel shall publish in a local newspaper or newspapers and on the official State Bar of Georgia website, notice of the discipline, including the respondent's full name and business address, the nature of the discipline imposed and the effective dates. \n \n(c) (1) After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall immediately cease the practice of law in Georgia and shall, within 30 days, notify all clients of his inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients. Within 45 days after a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, the respondent shall certify to the Court that he has satisfied the requirements of this Rule. Should the respondent fail to comply with the requirements of this Rule, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its own motion or upon motion of the Office of the General Counsel, and after ten days notice to the respondent and proof of his failure to notify or protect his clients, may hold the respondent in contempt and, pursuant to Rule 4-228, order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of the respondent and proceed to notify all clients and to take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Motions for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by either the respondent or by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(2) After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension under Part IV of these Rules, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall take such action necessary to cause the removal of any indicia of the respondent as a lawyer, legal assistant, legal clerk or person with similar status. In the event the respondent should maintain a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted, the respondent shall not:\n (i) have any contact with the clients of the office either in person, by telephone or in writing; or \n \n(ii) have any contact with persons who have legal dealings with the office either in person, by telephone or in writing.","UrlName":"revision216"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Rule 4-220. Notice of Punishment or Acquittal; Administration of Reprimands","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia for the prescribed period.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record. State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be issued by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board, or his designee, at a regular meeting of the Board.</li> \n <li>Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record in the case. They shall be read in open court in the presence of the respondent by the judge of a Superior Court in the county of the respondent's address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Notice of issuance of the reprimand shall be published in advance in the legal organ of the county of the respondent’s address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia, and provided to the complainant in the underlying case.</li> \n <li>After a Public Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. </li> \n <li>In the event of a final judgment in favor of the respondent, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule152","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4f50c5b-d625-418d-8049-012836748219","ParentId":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Secretary of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia either permanently, in case of disbarment, or for the prescribed period in case of suspension. \n \n(b) Review Panel Reprimands shall be administered before the Panel by the chairperson or his or her designee. \n \n(c) Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Review Panel, the Chairperson of the Review Panel or his or her designee, and shall be read in open court, in the presence of the respondent, by the judge of the superior court in the county in which the respondent resides or in the county in which the disciplinary infraction occurred, with the location to be specified by the Review Panel, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. \n \n(d) After a Public or Review Panel Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. \n \n(e) In the event of a final judgment of acquittal, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the respondent resides. The respondent may give reasonable public notice of the judgment or acquittal.","UrlName":"revision218"},{"Id":"36663b15-9666-4b27-b56c-48e43efb1c12","ParentId":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia for the prescribed period.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record. State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be issued by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board, or his designee, at a regular meeting of the Board.</li> \n <li>Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record in the case. They shall be read in open court in the presence of the respondent by the judge of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides or the county in which the disciplinary infraction occurred, with the location to be specified by the Special Master subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Notice of issuance of the reprimand shall be published in advance in the legal organ of the county of the respondent’s address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia, and provided to the complainant in the underlying case.</li> \n <li>After a Public Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. </li> \n <li>In the event of a final judgment in favor of the respondent, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision270"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"97c32cdd-b655-4893-b2ed-0f800248552f","Title":"Rule 4-221. Hearing Procedures","Content":"(a) Oaths. Before entering upon his duties as herein provided, each member of the State Disciplinary Board, each member of the State Disciplinary Review Board, and each Special Master shall swear or affirm to the following oath by signing a copy and returning it to the Clerk of the Boards or to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, as appropriate.\n “I do solemnly swear or affirm that I will faithfully and impartially \t discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as a member of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia/member of the State Disciplinary Review Board of the State Bar of Georgia/Special Master according to the best of my ability and \t understanding and agreeable to the laws and Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States.”\nThe Clerk of the Boards shall maintain the completed Oaths of Board members, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the completed Oaths of Special Masters.\n(b) Pleadings and Copies. Original pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia, and the parties shall serve copies upon the Special Master and the opposing party pursuant to the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Depositions and other original discovery shall be retained by counsel and shall not be filed except as permitted under the Uniform Superior Court Rules.\n(c) Witnesses and Evidence; Contempt.\n(1) The respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall have the right to require the issuance of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses to testify or to produce books and papers. The Special Master shall have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents relevant to the matter under investigation, by subpoena, and as further provided by law in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n(2) The following shall subject a person to rule for contempt of the Special Master or State Disciplinary Board:\n(i) disregard, in any manner whatsoever, of a subpoena issued pursuant to Rules 4-203 (9), 4-210 (h) or 4-221 (c) (1);\n(ii) refusal to answer any pertinent or proper question of a Special Master; or\n(iii) willful or flagrant violation of a lawful directive of a Special Master.\nIt shall be the duty of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or Special Master to report the facts supporting contempt to the Chief Judge of the Superior Court in and for the county in which the investigation, trial or hearing is being held. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of the matter and shall follow the procedures for contempt as are applicable in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil case before the Superior Court under the laws in Georgia.\n (3) Any Special Master shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue any subpoena herein provided for. \n \n(4) Depositions may be taken by the respondent or the State Bar of Georgia in the same manner and under the same provisions as may be done in civil cases under the laws of Georgia, and such depositions may be used upon the trial or an investigation or hearing in the same manner as such depositions may be used in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n(5) All witnesses attending any hearing provided for under these Rules shall be entitled to the same fees as now are allowed by law to witnesses attending trials in civil cases in the Superior Courts of this State under subpoena.\n(d) Venue of Hearings.\n (1) The hearings on all complaints and charges against a resident respondent shall be held in the county of the respondent’s main office or the county of residence of the respondent unless he otherwise agrees. \n \n(2) Where the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the complaint arose in the State of Georgia, the hearing shall be held in the county where the complaint arose. \n \n(3) When the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the offense occurs outside the State, the hearing may be held in the county of the State Bar of Georgia headquarters.\n","UrlName":"rule156","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"5c9f9944-ca22-4108-8823-d32bea898b29","ParentId":"97c32cdd-b655-4893-b2ed-0f800248552f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Oaths. Before entering upon his duties as herein provided, each member of the State Disciplinary Board and each Special Master shall subscribe to an oath to be administered by any person authorized to administer oaths under the laws of this State, such oath to be in writing and filed with the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia. The form of such oath shall be:\n\"I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as a member of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia/Special Master according to the best of my ability and understanding and agreeable to the laws and Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States so help me God.\"\n(b) Witnesses and Evidence; Contempt.\n(1) The respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall have the right to require the issuance of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses to testify or to produce books and papers. The State Disciplinary Board or a special master shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents, relevant to the matter under investigation, by subpoena, and as further provided by law in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n \n(2) The following shall subject a person to rule for contempt of the Special Master or Panel:\n \n(i) disregard, in any manner whatever, of a subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 4-221 (b) (1),\n \n(ii) refusal to answer any pertinent or proper question of a Special Master or Board member, or\n \n(iii) wilful or flagrant violation of a lawful directive of a Special Master or Board member.\n \nIt shall be the duty of the chairperson of the affected Panel or Special Master to report the fact to the Chief Judge of the superior court in and for the county in which said investigation, trial or hearing is being held. The superior court shall have jurisdiction of the matter and shall follow the procedures for contempt as are applicable in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil case before the superior court under the laws in Georgia.\n \n(3) Any member of the State Disciplinary Board and any Special Master shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue any subpoena herein provided for. \n \n(4) Depositions may be taken by the respondent or the State Bar of Georgia in the same manner and under the same provisions as may be done in civil cases under the laws of Georgia, and such depositions may be used upon the trial or an investigation or hearing in the same manner as such depositions are admissible in evidence in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n \n(5) All witnesses attending any hearing provided for under these Rules shall be entitled to the same fees as now are allowed by law to witnesses attending trials in civil cases in the superior courts of this State under subpoena, and said fees shall be assessed against the parties to the proceedings under the rule of law applicable to civil suits in the superior courts of this State. \n \n(6) Whenever the deposition of any person is to be taken in this State pursuant to the laws of another state, territory, province or commonwealth, or of the United States or of another country for use in attorney discipline, fitness or disability proceedings there, the chairperson of the Investigative Panel, or his or her designee upon petition, may issue a summons or subpoena as provided in this Rule to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents at such deposition.\n \n(c) Venue of Hearings.\n \n(1) The hearings on all complaints and charges against resident respondents shall be held in the county of residence of the respondent unless he otherwise agrees. \n \n(2) Where the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the complaint arose in the State of Georgia, the hearing shall be held in the county where the complaint arose. \n \n(3) When the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the offense occurs outside the State, the hearing may be held in the county of the State Bar of Georgia headquarters.\n \n(d) Confidentiality of Investigations and Proceedings.\n \n(1) The State Bar of Georgia shall maintain as confidential all disciplinary investigations and proceedings pending at the screening or investigative stage, unless otherwise provided by these Rules. \n \n(2) After a proceeding under these Rules is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all evidentiary and motions hearings shall be open to the public and all reports rendered shall be public documents. \n \n(3) Nothing in these Rules shall prohibit the complainant, respondent or third party from disclosing information regarding a disciplinary proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia or a Special Master in proceedings under these Rules. \n \n(4) The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia or the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board may reveal or authorize disclosure of information which would otherwise be confidential under this Rule under the following circumstances:\n \n(i) In the event of a charge of wrongful conduct against any member of the State Disciplinary Board or any person who is otherwise connected with the disciplinary proceeding in any way, either Panel of the Board or its Chairperson or his or her designee, may authorize the use of information concerning disciplinary investigations or proceedings to aid in the defense against such charge. \n \n(ii) In the event the Office of the General Counsel receives information that suggests criminal activity, such information may be revealed to the appropriate criminal prosecutor. \n \n(iii) In the event of subsequent disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, the Office of the General Counsel may, in aggravation of discipline in the pending disciplinary case, reveal the imposition of confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208 and facts underlying the imposition of discipline. \n \n(iv) A complainant or lawyer representing the complainant may be notified of the status or disposition of the complaint. \n \n(v) When public statements that are false or misleading are made about any otherwise confidential disciplinary case, the Office of the General Counsel may disclose all information necessary to correct such false or misleading statements.\n \n(5) The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information to the following persons if it appears that the information may assist them in the discharge of their duties:\n \n(i) The Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(ii) The Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(iii) The Judicial Nominating Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(iv) The Lawyer Assistance Program or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(v) The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(vi) The Judicial Qualifications Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(vii) The Executive Committee with the specific approval of the following representatives of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board: the chairperson, the vice-chairperson and a third representative designated by the chairperson; \n \n(viii) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board; \n \n(ix) The Consumer Assistance Program; \n \n(x) The General Counsel Overview Committee; \n  \n(xi) An office or committee charged with discipline appointed by the United States Circuit or District Court or the highest court of any state, District of Columbia, commonwealth or possession of the United States; and \n \n(xii) The Unlicensed Practice of Law Department.\n \n(6) Any information used by the Office of the General Counsel in a proceeding under Rule 4-108 or in a proceeding to obtain a Receiver to administer the files of a member of the State Bar of Georgia, shall not be confidential under this Rule. \n \n(7) The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information when required by law or court order. \n \n(8) The authority or discretion to reveal confidential information under this Rule shall not constitute a waiver of any evidentiary, statutory or other privilege which may be asserted by the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board under Bar Rules or applicable law. \n \n(9) Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit the Office of the General Counsel or the Investigative Panel from interviewing potential witnesses or placing the Notice of Investigation out for service by sheriff or other authorized person. \n \n(10) Members of the Office of the General Counsel and State Disciplinary Board may respond to specific inquiries concerning matters that have been made public by the complainant, respondent or third parties but are otherwise confidential under these Rules by acknowledging the existence and status of the proceeding. \n \n(11) The State Bar of Georgia shall not disclose information concerning discipline imposed on a lawyer under prior Supreme Court Rules that was confidential when imposed, unless authorized to do so by said prior Rules.\n \n(e) Burden of Proof; Evidence.\n \n(1) In all proceedings under this Chapter the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Georgia, except for proceedings under Rule 4-106. \n \n(2) In all proceedings under this chapter occurring after a finding of probable cause as described in Rule 4-204.4, the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of proof required of the State Bar of Georgia shall be clear and convincing evidence.\n \n(f) Pleadings and Copies. Original pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. Depositions and other original discovery shall be retained by counsel and shall not be filed except as permitted under the Uniform Superior Court Rules. \n \n(g) Pleadings and Communications Privileged. Pleadings and oral and written statements of members of the State Disciplinary Board, members and designees of the Lawyer Assistance Program, Special Masters, Bar counsel and investigators, complainants, witnesses, and respondents and their counsel made to one another or filed in the record during any investigation, intervention, hearing or other disciplinary proceeding under this Part IV, and pertinent to the disciplinary proceeding, are made in performance of a legal and public duty, are absolutely privileged, and under no circumstances form the basis for a right of action.","UrlName":"revision220"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"62b2a0db-ca20-4090-a530-abeb09736218","Title":"Rule 4-221.1 Confidentiality of Investigations and Proceedings","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall maintain as confidential all disciplinary investigations and proceedings pending at the screening or investigative stage, unless otherwise provided by these Rules.</li> \n <li>After a proceeding under these Rules is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all evidentiary and motions hearings shall be open to the public and all documents and pleadings filed of record shall be public documents, unless the Special Master or the Supreme Court of Georgia orders otherwise.</li> \n <li>Nothing in these Rules shall prohibit the complainant, respondent, or a third party from disclosing information regarding a disciplinary proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia or a Special Master in proceedings under these Rules.</li> \n <li> The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board may reveal or authorize disclosure of information that would otherwise be confidential under this Rule under the following circumstances: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>In the event of a charge of wrongful conduct against any member of the State Disciplinary Board, the State Disciplinary Review Board, or any person who is otherwise connected with the disciplinary proceeding in any way, the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair or his designee, may authorize the use of information concerning disciplinary investigations or proceedings to aid in the defense against such charge.</li> \n <li>In the event the Office of the General Counsel receives information that suggests criminal activity, such information may be revealed to the appropriate criminal prosecutor.</li> \n <li>In the event of subsequent disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, the Office of the General Counsel may, in aggravation of discipline in the pending disciplinary case, reveal the imposition of confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208 and facts underlying the imposition of discipline.</li> \n <li>A complainant and/or lawyer representing the complainant shall be notified of the status or disposition of the complaint.</li> \n <li>When public statements that are false or misleading are made about any otherwise confidential disciplinary case, the Office of the General Counsel may disclose all information necessary to correct such false or misleading statements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information to the following persons if it appears that the information may assist them in the discharge of their duties:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Judicial Nominating Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Lawyer Assistance Program or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Judicial Qualifications Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee with the specific approval of the following representatives of the State Disciplinary Board: the Chair, the Vice-Chair, and a third representative designated by the Chair;</li> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board;</li> \n <li>The Client Assistance Program;</li> \n <li>The General Counsel Overview Committee; </li> \n <li>An office or committee charged with discipline appointed by the United States Circuit or District Court or the highest court of any state, District of Columbia, commonwealth or possession of the United States; and</li> \n <li>The Unlicensed Practice of Law Department.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Any information used by the Office of the General Counsel in a proceeding under Rule 4-108 or in a proceeding to obtain a receiver to administer the files of a lawyer, shall not be confidential under this Rule.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information when required by law or court order.</li> \n <li>The authority or discretion to reveal confidential information under this Rule shall not constitute a waiver of any evidentiary, statutory or other privilege which may be asserted by the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board under Bar Rules or applicable law.</li> \n <li>Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit the Office of the General Counsel or the State Disciplinary Board from interviewing potential witnesses or placing the Notice of Investigation out for service by the sheriff or other authorized person.</li> \n <li>Members of the Office of the General Counsel and State Disciplinary Board may respond to specific inquiries concerning matters that have been made public by the complainant, respondent, or third parties but are otherwise confidential under these Rules by acknowledging the existence and status of the proceeding.</li> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall not disclose information concerning discipline imposed on a lawyer under prior Supreme Court of Georgia Rules that was confidential when imposed, unless authorized to do so by said prior Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule603","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"af4ea35a-2419-4a09-b5c3-0756c324d60c","Title":"Rule 4-221.2. Burden of Proof; Evidence","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In all proceedings under this Chapter, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Georgia, except for proceedings under Rule 4-106.</li> \n <li>In all proceedings under this Chapter occurring after a finding of Probable Cause as described in Rule 4-204.4, the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of proof required of the State Bar shall be clear and convincing evidence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule604","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"49a36f5e-540c-43ec-a804-da706530090f","Title":"Rule 4-221.3. Pleadings and Communications Privileged","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Pleadings and oral and written statements of members of the Boards, members and designees of the Lawyer Assistance Program, Special Masters, Bar counsel and investigators, complainants, witnesses, and respondents and their counsel made to one another or filed in the record during any investigation, intervention, hearing, or other disciplinary proceeding under this Part IV, and pertinent to the disciplinary proceeding, are made in performance of a legal and public duty, are absolutely privileged, and under no circumstances form the basis for a right of action.</div>","UrlName":"rule605","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Rule 4-222. Limitation","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance, a written description pursuant to Rule 4-202 (a), or a Client Assistance Program referral form has been received at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted pursuant to these Rules within four years after the commission of the act; provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender’s whereabouts are unknown, or the offender’s name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State.</li> \n <li>Referral of a matter to the State Disciplinary Board shall occur within 12 months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance by the Office of the General Counsel or notification to the respondant of the written description pursuant to Rule 4-202 (a).</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule158","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"14564682-9ff9-4467-9a33-a3b548b47980","ParentId":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance or a Client Assistance Program referral form has been received at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted pursuant to these Rules within four years after the commission of the act; provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender’s whereabouts are unknown, or the offender’s name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State.</li> \n <li>Referral of a matter to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel shall occur within 12 months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or institution of an investigation.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision403"},{"Id":"3e73be77-4c87-40d4-bbdd-dc450b57681e","ParentId":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance has been received at State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted by the Investigative Panel within four years after the commission of the act. Provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender's whereabouts are unknown, or the offender's name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State. \n \n(b) Referral of a matter to the Investigative Panel by the Office of the General Counsel shall occur within twelve months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance at State Bar of Georgia headquarters or institution of a Memorandum of Grievance by the Investigative Panel.","UrlName":"revision222"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1df80583-9d16-4d87-a330-42a90e455f89","Title":"Rule 4-223. Advisory Opinions","Content":"<div>(a) Any Formal Advisory Opinion issued pursuant to Rule 4-403 which is not thereafter disapproved by the Supreme Court of Georgia shall be binding on the State Bar of Georgia, the State Disciplinary Board, and the person who requested the opinion, in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding involving that person. Formal Advisory Opinions which have been approved or modified by the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 4-403 shall also be binding in subsequent disciplinary proceedings which do not involve the person who requested the opinion.</div><div> </div><div>(b) It shall be considered as mitigation to any matter being investigated under these Rules that the respondent has acted in accordance with and in reasonable reliance upon a written Informal Advisory Opinion requested by the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-401 or a Formal Advisory Opinion issued pursuant to Rule 4-403, but not reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule161","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Rule 4-224. Expungement of Records","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The record of any matter against a respondent under these Rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the Office of the General Counsel in accordance with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>those matters closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202 (e) shall be expunged after one year;</li> \n <li>those matters dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board after a Probable Cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and</li> \n <li>those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court of Georgia after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Definition. The term “expunge” shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed.</li> \n <li>Effect of Expungement. After a file has been expunged, any response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record of such matter has been expunged and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the matter or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged.</li> \n <li>Retention of Records. Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel, for good cause shown, with notice to the respondent and an opportunity to be heard, records which would otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this Rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm that the record was expunged and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked the lawyer has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary Rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been referred to the Client Assistance Program, dismissed, or dismissed with a letter of instruction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule165","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"82fb7844-7595-48b9-83be-4471f2052c22","ParentId":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The record of any grievance against a respondent under these Rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the Office of the General Counsel in accordance with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>those grievances closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202 (e) shall be expunged after one year;</li> \n <li>those grievances dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board after a Probable Cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and</li> \n <li>those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court of Georgia after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Definition. The term “expunge” shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed.</li> \n <li>Effect of Expungement. After a file has been expunged, any response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record of such matter has been expunged and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the grievance or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged.</li> \n <li>Retention of Records. Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel, for good cause shown, with notice to the respondent and an opportunity to be heard, records that would otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this Rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm that the record was expunged and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if he has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been referred to the Consumer Assistance Program, dismissed, or dismissed with a letter of instruction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision405"},{"Id":"b7f7fce2-13bc-4974-bfe2-74b8996b5020","ParentId":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The record of any grievance against a respondent under these rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with the following:\n \n(1) those grievances closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202(c) shall be expunged after one year; \n \n(2) those grievances dismissed by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board after a probable cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and \n \n(3) those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.\n \n(b) Definition . The terms \"expunge \"and \"expunction \"shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed. \n \n(c) Effect of Expungement . After a file has been expunged, any agency response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record the agency may have had of such matter has been expunged pursuant to court rule and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the grievance or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged pursuant to court rule. \n \n(d) Retention of Records . Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by bar counsel, for good cause shown and with notice to the respondent and opportunity to be heard, records which should otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the State Disciplinary Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder. \n \n(e) A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm the expunction of the record and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged. \n \n(f) A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if he has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been dismissed or dismissed with a letter of instruction. \n ","UrlName":"revision224"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24ba975c-fd01-47a2-90c6-a115ce801d66","Title":"Rule 4-225. Jurisdiction","Content":"The State Disciplinary Board and any person who is connected with disciplinary proceedings in any way shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of any court other than the Supreme Court with respect thereto, except as provided in Rules 4-214, 4-215 and 4-216.","UrlName":"rule175","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"803a6c4e-72bb-403c-8840-d5138b9a5ba8","Title":"Rule 4-226. Immunity","Content":"The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the disciplinary proceedings of the State Bar of Georgia to be judicial and quasi-judicial in nature and within the Court’s regulatory function, and in connection with such disciplinary proceedings, members of the State Disciplinary Boards, the Coordinating Special Master, Special Masters, Bar counsel, special prosecutors, investigators, and staff are entitled to those immunities customarily afforded to persons so participating in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings or engaged in such regulatory activities.","UrlName":"rule184","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"25ef804c-3d2b-4ce9-a5ee-0a54d7c00520","ParentId":"803a6c4e-72bb-403c-8840-d5138b9a5ba8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The regulatory proceedings of the State Bar are judicial in nature. Therefore, members of the State Disciplinary Board, members and designees of the Committee on Lawyer Impairment, special masters, Bar counsel, special prosecutors, investigators and staff are entitled to judicial immunity when engaged in regulatory activities.","UrlName":"revision226"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4c187325-b7ad-49a5-b4db-ae05a2dda250","Title":"Rule 4-227. Petitions for Voluntary Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A Petition for Voluntary Discipline shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline.</li> \n <li> Prior to the issuance of a formal complaint, a respondent may submit a Petition for Voluntary Discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Those petitions seeking confidential discipline shall be served on the Office of the General Counsel and assigned to a member of the State Disciplinary Board. The State Disciplinary Board shall conduct an investigation and determine whether to accept or reject the petition as outlined at Rule 4-203 (7). </li> \n <li>Those petitions seeking public discipline shall be filed directly with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Office of the General Counsel shall have 30 days within which to file a response. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> After the issuance of a formal complaint a respondent may submit a Petition for Voluntary Discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond. The Office of the General Counsel may assent to the petition or may file a response, stating objections and giving the reasons therefor. The Office of the General Counsel shall serve a copy of its response upon the respondent.</li> \n <li>The Special Master shall consider the petition, the State Bar of Georgia’s response, and the record as it then exists and may accept or reject the Petition for Voluntary Discipline.</li> \n <li> The Special Master may reject a petition for such cause or causes as seem appropriate to the Special Master. Such causes may include but are not limited to a finding that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the petition fails to contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline;</li> \n <li>the petition fails to request appropriate discipline;</li> \n <li>the petition fails to contain sufficient information concerning the admissions of fact and the admissions of conduct;</li> \n <li>the record in the proceeding does not contain sufficient information upon which to base a decision to accept or reject.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Special Master’s decision to reject a Petition for Voluntary Discipline does not preclude the filing of a subsequent petition and is not subject to review by the Supreme Court of Georgia. If the Special Master rejects a Petition for Voluntary Discipline, the disciplinary case shall proceed as provided by these Rules.</li> \n <li>The Special Master may accept the Petition for Voluntary Discipline by entering a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law and delivering same to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall file the report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. A copy of the Special Master’s report shall be served upon the respondent. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.</li> \n <li>Pursuant to Rule 4-210 (e), the Special Master may, in his discretion, extend any of the time limits in these Rules in order to adequately consider a Petition for Voluntary Discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule195","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"66b0daa0-6bd1-49f0-99c4-b6c277f7a4ea","ParentId":"4c187325-b7ad-49a5-b4db-ae05a2dda250","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) A petition for voluntary discipline shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. \n \n(b) Prior to the issuance of a formal complaint, a respondent may submit a petition for voluntary discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n \n(1) Those petitions seeking private discipline shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel and assigned to a member of the Investigative Panel. The Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board shall conduct an investigation and determine whether to accept or reject the petition as outlined at Rule 4-203 (a) (9). \n \n(2) Those petitions seeking public discipline shall be filed directly with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The Office of the General Counsel shall have 30 days within which to file a response. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.\n \n(c) After the issuance of a formal complaint a respondent may submit a petition for voluntary discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n \n(1) The petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond. The Office of the General Counsel may assent to the petition or may file a response, stating objections and giving the reasons therefor. The Office of the General Counsel shall serve a copy of its response upon the respondent. \n \n(2) The Special Master shall consider the petition, the State Bar of Georgia's response, and the record as it then exists and may accept or reject the petition for voluntary discipline. \n \n(3) The Special Master may reject a petition for such cause or causes as seem appropriate to the Special Master. Such causes may include but are not limited to a finding that:\n \n(i) the petition fails to contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline; \n \n(ii) the petition fails to request appropriate discipline; \n \n(iii) the petition fails to contain sufficient information concerning the admissions of fact and the admissions of conduct; \n \n(iv) the record in the proceeding does not contain sufficient information upon which to base a decision to accept or reject.\n \n(4) The Special Master's decision to reject a petition for voluntary discipline does not preclude the filing of a subsequent petition and is not subject to review by either the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia. If the Special Master rejects a petition for voluntary discipline, the disciplinary case shall proceed as provided by these Rules. \n \n(5) If the Special Master accepts the petition for voluntary discipline, s/he shall enter a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law and deliver same to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall file the report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. A copy of the Special Master's report shall be served upon the respondent. The Court shall issue an appropriate order. \n \n(6) Pursuant to Rule 4-210 (5), the Special Master may, in his or her discretion, extend any of the time limits in these Rules in order to adequately consider a petition for voluntary discipline. \n ","UrlName":"revision228"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5b65d67a-c560-4dc6-afb7-72db029c7be1","Title":"Rule 4-228. Receiverships","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Definitions.  \n Absent Lawyer: A member of the State Bar of Georgia (or a Domestic or Foreign lawyer authorized to practice law in Georgia) who has disappeared, died, been disbarred, disciplined or incarcerated, become so impaired as to be unable to properly represent clients, or who poses such a substantial threat of harm to clients or the public that it is necessary for the Supreme Court of Georgia to appoint a receiver. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Receiver.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Upon a final determination by the Supreme Court of Georgia, on a petition filed by the State Bar of Georgia, that a lawyer has become an absent lawyer, and that no partner, associate, or other appropriate representative is available to notify his clients of this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia may order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia be appointed as receiver to take charge of the absent lawyer’s files and records. Such receiver shall review the files, notify the absent lawyer’s clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect the interests of the clients and the public. A motion for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by the respondent, his partners, associates, or legal representatives or by the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>If the receiver should encounter, or anticipate, situations or issues not covered by the order of appointment, including but not limited to, those concerning proper procedure and scope of authority, the receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for such further order or orders as may be necessary or appropriate to address the situation or issue so encountered or anticipated.</li> \n <li>The receiver shall be entitled to release to each client the papers, money, or other property to which the client is entitled. Before releasing the property, the receiver may require a receipt from the client for the property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Applicability of Lawyer-Client Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Confidentiality. The receiver shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or, upon application, by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Lawyer-Client Relationship; Privilege. The receiver relationship standing alone does not create a lawyer-client relationship between the receiver and the clients of the absent lawyer. However, the lawyer-client privilege shall apply to communications by or between the receiver and the clients of the absent lawyer to the same extent as it would have applied to communications by or to the absent lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Trust Account.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>If after appointment the receiver should determine that the absent lawyer maintained one or more trust accounts and that there are no provisions extant that would allow the clients, or other appropriate entities, to receive from the accounts the funds to which they are entitled, the receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for an order extending the scope of the receivership to include the management of the said trust account or accounts. In the event the scope of the receivership is extended to include the management of the trust account or accounts, the receiver shall file quarterly with the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee a report showing the activity in and status of said accounts.</li> \n <li>Service on a bank or financial institution of a copy of the order extending the scope of the receivership to include management of the trust account or accounts shall operate as a modification of any agreement of deposit among such bank or financial institution, the absent lawyer and any other party to the account so as to make the receiver a necessary signatory on any trust account maintained by the absent lawyer with such bank or financial institution. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee, on application by the receiver, may order that the receiver shall be sole signatory on any such account to the extent necessary for the purposes of these Rules and may direct the disposition and distribution of client and other funds.</li> \n <li>In determining ownership of funds in the trust accounts, including by subrogation or indemnification, the receiver should act as a reasonably prudent lawyer maintaining a client trust account. The receiver may (i) rely on a certification of ownership issued by an auditor employed by the receiver; or (ii) interplead any funds of questionable ownership into the appropriate Superior Court; or (iii) proceed under the terms of the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (OCGA § 44-12-190 et seq.). If the absent lawyer’s trust account does not contain sufficient funds to meet known client balances, the receiver may disburse funds on a pro rata basis.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Payment of Expenses of Receiver. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The receiver shall be entitled to reimbursement for actual and reasonable costs incurred by the receiver for expenses, including, but not limited to, (i) the actual and reasonable costs associated with the employment of accountants, auditors, and bookkeepers as necessary to determine the source and ownership of funds held in the absent lawyer’s trust account, and (ii) reasonable costs of secretarial, postage, bond premiums, and moving and storage expenses associated with carrying out the receiver’s duties. Application for allowance of costs and expenses shall be made by affidavit to the Supreme Court of Georgia, or its designee, who may determine the amount of the reimbursement. The application shall be accompanied by an accounting in a form and substance acceptable to the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be paid to the receiver by the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia may seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a judgment against the absent lawyer or his or her estate in an amount equal to the amount paid by the State Bar of Georgia to the receiver. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the amount, and the burden of proof shall shift to the absent lawyer or his estate to prove otherwise.</li> \n <li>The provision of paragraph (e) (1) above shall apply to all receivers serving on the effective date of this Rule and thereafter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Receiver-Client Relationship. With full disclosure and the informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), of any client of the absent lawyer, the receiver may, but need not, accept employment to complete any legal matter. Any written consent by the client shall include an acknowledgment that the client is not obligated to use the receiver.</li> \n <li> Unclaimed Files.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>If upon completion of the receivership there are files belonging to the clients of the absent lawyer that have not been claimed, the receiver shall deliver them to the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia shall store the files for six years, after which time the State Bar of Georgia may exercise its discretion in maintaining or destroying the files.</li> \n <li>If the receiver determines that an unclaimed file contains a Last Will and Testament, the receiver may, but shall not be required to do so, file said Last Will and Testament in the office of the Probate Court in such county as to the receiver may seem appropriate.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Professional Liability Insurance. Only lawyers who maintain errors and omissions insurance, or other appropriate insurance, may be appointed to the position of receiver.</li> \n <li>Requirement of Bond. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee may require the receiver to post bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duties.</li> \n <li> Immunity.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the actions of the State Bar of Georgia and the appointed receiver to be within the Court’s regulatory function, and being regulatory in nature, the State Bar of Georgia and the receiver are entitled to that immunity customarily afforded to court-appointed receivers.</li> \n <li>The immunity granted in paragraph (j) (1) above shall not apply if the receiver is employed by a client of the absent lawyer to continue the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Service. Service under this Rule may be perfected under Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule570","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ae1002e-8cc7-40fe-8558-fd5dd286fbee","ParentId":"5b65d67a-c560-4dc6-afb7-72db029c7be1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a)  Definitions \nAbsent Attorney – a member of the State Bar of Georgia (or a foreign or domestic lawyer authorized to practice law in Georgia) who shall have disappeared, died, become disbarred, disciplined or incarcerated, or become so impaired as to be unable to properly represent his or her clients or as to pose a substantial threat of harm to his or her clients or the public as to justify appointment of a Receiver hereunder by the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(b)  Appointment of Receiver\n(1) Upon a final determination by the Supreme Court of Georgia, on a petition filed by the State Bar of Georgia, that an attorney has become an Absent Attorney, and that no partner, associate or other appropriate representative is available to notify his or her clients of this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia may order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia be appointed as Receiver to take charge of the Absent Attorney's files and records. Such Receiver shall review the files, notify the Absent Attorney's clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect the interests of the clients, and the public. A motion for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by the respondent, his or her partners, associates or legal representatives or by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(2) If the Receiver should encounter, or anticipate, situations or issues not covered by the Order of appointment, including but not limited to, those concerning proper procedure and scope of authority, the Receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for such further order or orders as may be necessary or appropriate to address the situation or issue so encountered or anticipated.\n(3) The receiver shall be entitled to release to each client the papers, money or other property to which the client is entitled. Before releasing the property, the Receiver may require a receipt from the client for the property.\n(c) Applicability of Attorney-Client Rules\n(1) Confidentiality – The Receiver shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or, upon application, by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(2) Attorney-Client Relationship; Privilege – The Receiver relationship standing alone does not create an attorney-client relationship between the Receiver and the clients of the Absent Attorney. However, the attorney-client privilege shall apply to communications by or between the Receiver and the clients of the Absent Attorney to the same extent as it would have applied to communications by or to the Absent Attorney.\n(d)  Trust Account\n(1) If after appointment the Receiver should determine that the Absent Attorney maintained one or more trust accounts and that there are no provisions extant that would allow the clients, or other appropriate entities, to receive from the accounts the funds to which they are entitled, the Receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for an order extending the scope of the Receivership to include the management of the said trust account or accounts. In the event the scope of the Receivership is extended to include the management of the trust account or accounts, the Receiver shall file quarterly with the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee a report showing the activity in and status of said accounts.\n(2) Service on a bank or financial institution of a copy of the order extending the scope of the Receivership to include management of the trust account or accounts shall operate as a modification of any agreement of deposit among such bank or financial institution, the Absent Attorney and any other party to the account so as to make the Receiver a necessary signatory on any trust account maintained by the Absent Attorney with such bank or financial institution. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee, on application by the Receiver, may order that the Receiver shall be sole signatory on any such account to the extent necessary for the purposes of these Rules and may direct the disposition and distribution of client and other funds. \n(3) In determining ownership of funds in the trust accounts, including by subrogation or indemnification, the Receiver should act as a reasonably prudent lawyer maintaining a client trust account. The Receiver may (1) rely on a certification of ownership issued by an auditor employed by the Receiver; or (2) interplead any funds of questionable ownership into the appropriate Superior Court; or (3) proceed under the terms of the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (O.G.C.A. §44-12-190 et seq.).  If the Absent Attorney’s trust account does not contain sufficient funds to meet known client balances, the Receiver may disburse funds on a pro rata basis.\n(e)  Payment of Expenses of Receiver\n(1) The Receiver shall be entitled to reimbursement for actual and reasonable costs incurred by the Receiver for expenses, including, but not limited to, (i) the actual and reasonable costs associated with the employment of accountants, auditors and bookkeepers as necessary to determine the source and ownership of funds held in the Absent Attorney’s trust account, and (ii) reasonable costs of secretarial, postage, bond premiums, and moving and storage expenses associated with carrying out the Receiver’s duties. Application for allowance of costs and expenses shall be made by affidavit to the Supreme Court of Georgia, or its designee, who may determine the amount of the reimbursement. The application shall be accompanied by an accounting in a form and substance acceptable to the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be paid to the Receiver by the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia may seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a judgment against the Absent Attorney or his or her estate in an amount equal to the amount paid by the State Bar of Georgia to the Receiver. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the amount, and the burden of proof shall shift to the Absent Attorney or his or her estate to prove otherwise. \n(2) The provision of paragraph (1) above shall apply to all Receivers serving on the effective date of this Rule and thereafter.\n(f)  Receiver-Client Relationship\nWith full disclosure and the informed consent, as defined in Bar Rule 1.0 (h), of any client of the Absent Attorney, the Receiver may, but need not, accept employment to complete any legal matter. Any written consent by the client shall include an acknowledgment that the client is not obligated to use the Receiver.\n(g) Unclaimed Files\n(1) If upon completion of the Receivership there are files belonging to the clients of the Absent Attorney that have not been claimed, the Receiver shall deliver them to the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia shall store the files for six years, after which time the State Bar of Georgia may exercise its discretion in maintaining or destroying the files.\n(2) If the Receiver determines that an unclaimed file contains a Last Will and Testament, the Receiver may, but shall not be required to do so, file said Last Will and Testament in the office of the Probate Court in such county as to the Receiver may seem appropriate.\n(h)  Professional Liability Insurance\nOnly attorneys who maintain errors and omissions insurance that  includes coverage for conduct as a Receiver may be appointed to the position of Receiver.\n(i) Requirement of Bond\nThe Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee may require the Receiver to post bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his or her duties. \n(j) Immunity\n(1) The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the actions of the State Bar of Georgia and the appointed Receiver to be within the court's judicial and regulatory functions, and being regulatory and judicial in nature, the State Bar of Georgia and Receiver are entitled to judicial immunity. Any person serving as a Receiver under these rules shall be immune from suit for any conduct undertaken in good faith in the course of his or her official duties.\n(2) The immunity granted in paragraph (1) above shall not apply if the Receiver is employed by a client of the Absent Attorney to continue the representation.\n(k) Service\n Service under this Rule may be perfected under Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n ","UrlName":"revision230"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Title":"CHAPTER 3 This Chapter is Reserved","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter27","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"9352c34c-e065-400d-b993-906e86f9970a","Title":"Rule 4-301","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule218","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"30447727-9b59-4979-909e-06676d7b0368","Title":"Rule 4-302","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule219","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bafec039-e06f-478e-9b11-41d0c6c75154","Title":"Rule 4-303","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule221","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e12e2da1-f716-48af-aa0b-7b06c5ad2041","Title":"Rule 4-304","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule225","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"795a5e24-8385-4369-885c-ceeb0b68ae0c","Title":"Rule 4-305","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule228","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"96205185-2293-4cab-b827-3b0d1b523ee4","Title":"Rule 4-306","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule234","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Title":"CHAPTER 4 ADVISORY OPINIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter28","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"6e17c812-cd79-45f4-a404-f95b8e7c29b9","Title":"Rule 4-401. Informal Advisory Opinions","Content":"The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to render Informal Advisory Opinions concerning the Office of the General Counsel's interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Informal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may be issued in oral or written form. An Informal Advisory Opinion is the personal opinion of the issuing attorney of the Office of the General Counsel and is neither a defense to any complaint nor binding on the State Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court of Georgia, or the State Bar of Georgia. If the person requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion desires, the Office of the General Counsel will transmit the Informal Advisory Opinion to the Formal Advisory Opinion Board for discretionary consideration of the drafting of a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.","UrlName":"rule241","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Rule 4-402. The Formal Advisory Opinion Board","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the State Disciplinary Review Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the State Disciplinary Board and State Disciplinary Review Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"rule243","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"d2387df8-46e6-47b7-b689-b77c9f82b987","ParentId":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the Investigative Panel and Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"revision296"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Rule 4-403. Formal Advisory Opinions","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct.</li> \n <li>When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate.</li> \n <li>If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court.</li> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule248","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"174b3a3d-b53f-4ed3-ade3-857d1d6801c6","ParentId":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(b) When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct. \n \n(c) When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(d) After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notificaiton by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate. \n \n(e) If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court. \n \n(f) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions. \n \n(g) The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.","UrlName":"revision110"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"35733557-f94e-4a97-b5d4-2c0e5fa949d4","Title":"Rule 4-404. Immunity","Content":"The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board, as well as staff persons and counsel assisting the Board and its members, including, but not limited to staff counsel, advisors and the State Bar of Georgia, its officers and employees, members of the Executive Committee, and members of the Board of Governors, shall have absolute immunity from civil liability for all acts performed in the course of their official duties. ","UrlName":"rule253","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fa6bc53e-105d-41e9-ad2c-eb8cb682cc1d","Title":"Internal Rules - State Disciplinary Board","Content":"RULES OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE OF THE STATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD\nPursuant to Rule 4-203 (6) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia establishes the following rules of conduct and procedure (“Internal Rules”):\n Rule 1. Powers and Duties.\nThe State Disciplinary Board shall have the powers and perform the duties set forth in Part IV of the Bar Rules.\n Rule 2. Meetings.\nThe Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall establish a meeting schedule for the Board in consultation with the Office of the General Counsel and the members of the Board. The Board may also meet at other times at the request of a majority of its members. Ten members present and voting constitute a quorum. Ex officio members are counted in determining whether a quorum is present at a meeting. The Board may issue reprimands in the absence of a quorum but may not otherwise decide any disciplinary matter unless a quorum is present.\nBoard meetings are generally conducted informally but in accordance with the requirements of Part IV of the Bar Rules. Robert’s Rules of Order govern any procedural matters that are not addressed in the Bar Rules.\n Rule 3. Election of Officers; Powers and Duties.\nPursuant to Bar Rule 4-201 (b) (5), the State Disciplinary Board shall elect a chair and a vice-chair each Bar year at the first meeting after the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia.\nThe chair shall exercise such powers and assume such duties as provided herein and at Bar Rule 4-203. In case of the absence, disqualification or incapacity of the chair, the vice-chair shall assume the duties and powers of the chair. If both the chair and vice-chair are disqualified from consideration of a matter while a meeting is in session, the remaining members of the Board shall vote upon a member to preside over consideration of the matter at issue. In case of disqualification of both the chair and vice-chair when the Panel is not in session, the president-elect of the State Bar of Georgia shall designate another member of the Board to preside over consideration of the matter at issue.\n Rule 4. Initiation of Grievances; Duties and Powers of the Office of the General Counsel.\n \t (a)\t All grievances against members of the State Bar of Georgia shall be in written memorandum form. Grievances other than those initiated by the State Disciplinary Board shall be signed by the complainant. The State Disciplinary Board shall annually approve the Memorandum of Grievance form.\n \t (b)\t The Office of the General Counsel shall review and screen each Memorandum of Grievance pursuant to Bar Rule 4-202 and shall report to the Board at each meeting the number of grievances it has dismissed since the previous meeting. The Office of the General Counsel shall maintain the file of each dismissed grievance until it is expunged pursuant to Bar Rule 4-224 (a) (1) or (2).\n Rule 5. Evaluation of Grievances; Selection of Investigating Member.\nPursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign cases for investigation by individual lawyer members of the Board. Such assignment shall be in the sound discretion of the Clerk, except that no assignment shall be made to the president-elect of the State Bar of Georgia, the president-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, or the chair of the Board without that member’s prior approval.\n Rule 6. Investigation by the State Disciplinary Board.\n \t (a)\t The investigation of a grievance assigned to a member of the State Disciplinary Board shall be within that member’s exclusive jurisdiction. No other member of the Board shall enter the investigation of the case or engage either the complainant or respondent in communication concerning the investigation without the express prior authorization of the investigating member.\n \t (b)\t The investigating member is encouraged to attempt communication with both the respondent and the complainant as part of the investigation.\n \t (c)\t The investigating member should complete investigation of a matter within 180 days of service of the Notice of Investigation in the case. A member is expected to request an extension and provide an explanation to the rest of the Board when an investigation will take more than 180 days.\n \t (d)\t The investigating Board member is encouraged to report to the full Board when a respondent’s answer is more than 30 days past due so that the matter may be considered for imposition of an interim suspension pursuant to Rule 4-204.3.\n \t (e)\t The Office of the General Counsel will assign each Board member an investigator to assist with the investigation. Board members may also request assistance from other staff of the Office of the General Counsel when investigating files.\n Rule 7. Report of the Investigating Member.\nAt each meeting of the State Disciplinary Board members shall report those cases in which the investigation is complete. The investigating member shall describe his or her findings and make a recommendation regarding disposition of the case. Board members who are not able to attend a meeting may provide a written report and recommendation to be presented to the Board in their absence.\nThe Office of the General Counsel shall provide a copy of the entire investigative file or any portion thereof to any Board member upon request.\n Rule 8. Investigation of Petitions for Voluntary Discipline.\n \t (a)\t If a respondent files a petition seeking confidential discipline in a matter pending at the screening stage, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall assign the matter to a member of the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 4-227. The Office of the General Counsel may file a response to the petition with the investigating member.\n \t (b)\t If a respondent files a petition seeking confidential discipline in a matter pending before the State Disciplinary Board, the petition shall be served on both the investigating Board member and the Office of the General Counsel. The member may continue the investigation and the Office of the General Counsel may file a response to the petition with the investigating member.\n \t (c)\t The investigating member shall report to the State Disciplinary Board on the petition for voluntary discipline and the Office of the General Counsel’s response, and make a recommendation regarding acceptance or rejection of the petition for voluntary discipline.\n Rule 9. Original Documents.\nOriginal documents and other information obtained during the investigation shall be delivered to the Office of the General Counsel following the completion of the member’s investigation.\n Rule 10. Expedited Treatment for Certain Cases.\nAfter the State Disciplinary Board has found probable cause for filing a formal complaint, any member may move that the case be given expedited treatment under the circumstances outlined at Rule 4-108 regarding emergency suspensions.\n Rule 11. Challenges to the Competency, Qualifications or Objectivity of State Disciplinary Board Members.\n \t (a)\t A respondent lawyer shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Board. Within 10 days after service of the Notice of Investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204.1, the respondent lawyer shall deliver to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards written objection to the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Board. The objection shall set forth the factual basis for the challenge. The challenged member may answer the respondent lawyer’s objection in writing and shall deliver the answer to the respondent lawyer and the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. At a regularly scheduled meeting prior to consideration of the case the Board shall consider the objection. The affirmative vote of three members shall be sufficient to sustain the objection.\n \t (b)\t Any member of the Board may decline to participate when the Board considers a grievance.\n Rule 12. Notification to Complainants.\nThe State Disciplinary Board shall notify the complainant or complainants of the disposition of all grievances considered by the Board.\n Rule 13. Violation of Criminal Statute.\nIf the charge against a respondent lawyer amounts to a possible violation of a criminal statute, the State Disciplinary Board may direct the Office of the General Counsel to refer the matter to the appropriate authority for criminal prosecution and the Board may defer any further action to await the disposition of any criminal charges.\n Rule 14. Appearances Before the State Disciplinary Board.\nThe State Disciplinary Board does not permit personal appearances before the Board at meetings, except as otherwise specifically provided in these Rules. Any presentations to the Board should be by brief, memorandum or in other written form unless otherwise decided by a majority vote of the Board members present at a meeting at which a personal appearance is requested.\n Rule 15. Chair’s Review of Screening Decisions.\nWhen requested to do so by the complainant, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board shall have discretionary authority to review a decision of the Office of the General Counsel to dismiss a grievance. If the Chair agrees with the decision to dismiss the grievance, the complainant shall be notified of that decision in writing. If the Chair disagrees with the decision to dismiss the grievance, the grievance shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for further investigation pursuant to Rules 4-204 ff.\n Rule 16. Reconsideration.\nThe Office of the General Counsel, the complainant or the respondent may request reconsideration of the Board’s decision in a matter at any time before a Formal Complaint is filed in the Supreme Court. The investigating member may review the request and decide if the matter should be presented to the entire Board. If the investigating member is no longer on the Board, the Chair may review the request.\n Rule 17. Removal of Board Members.\n \t (a)\t Any State Disciplinary Board member who is absent from either three consecutive meetings or any four meetings in a bar year shall be considered for removal from the Board. The Board shall take the matter up in Executive Session and shall remove the member unless the Board determines, by majority vote, that bona fide, unavoidable reasons exist for some or all of the absences, and that such Board member is not in violation of the case time limits set forth in sub-paragraph (b).\n \t (b)\t Any Board member who fails to meet the deadlines for reporting a case or obtaining an extension as outlined at Rule 6 (c) may be considered for removal from the Board. At the next meeting following said occurrence, the Board may consider the matter in Executive Session to determine whether bona fide, unavoidable reasons exist for the delay and whether the member has met the attendance requirements set forth in subparagraph (a). Cases in which the Supreme Court of Georgia has entered an order imposing an Interim Suspension are excluded from this rule.\n \t (c)\t The Board member being considered for removal shall not vote on the issue of removal and shall not be present during the Board’s deliberation and vote. The Board member under consideration may address the Board in writing, or personally, prior to the Board’s deliberation and vote.\n \t (d)\t The failure of a Board member to comply with any of the provisions of this Rule shall not affect the resolution of any case by the Board and shall not operate as a defense to the Board’s ruling.\n \t (e)\t The vacancy created by any Board member who is removed from the State Disciplinary Board under the provisions of this Rule shall be filled as outlined at Rule 4-201 (b) (3).\n Rule 18. Pending Litigation.\nIn those grievances where there is related litigation pending, the Board may, in its discretion, defer action on the matter until the litigation is completed.\n Rule 19. Disqualification.\nNo member of the State Disciplinary Board shall represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding. If a Board member’s partners or associates represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding, then the Board member is automatically recused from any participation in the investigation, discussion or determination of the disciplinary proceeding.\n Rule 20. Reimbursement of Expenses\nMembers of the State Disciplinary Board may be reimbursed for expenses as follows:\n \t (a)\t Transportation. Members may be reimbursed at the maximum tax free rate permitted by the IRS for automobile travel (currently $0.545) to and from meetings of the Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will calculate the appropriate amount for each meeting using the Board member’s home or work address (as designated by the Board member) and the address of the meeting location, and will submit a request for reimbursement at the member’s request. Although members are encouraged to carpool, only the member providing the vehicle will be approved for reimbursement.\nOther forms of transportation (including flights and rental car expenses) will not be reimbursed, but a member who elects to rent a car or fly to a meeting may receive the mileage reimbursement that would have been due had the member driven a personal vehicle. \nTolls and any cost for parking at a meeting site may be reimbursed at the actual rate. Valet parking expenses will only be reimbursed when self-parking is not available.\nTransportation rates may be adjusted or capped for meetings that take place outside of Georgia. At least 20 days before any out-of-state meeting the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will notify members of the mileage reimbursement for the meeting.\n \t (b)\t Meals. If meals are not provided during the meeting at the Bar’s expense, the State Bar of Georgia will provide a per diem at the same rate as the federal per diem rate for the location where the meeting is held. See https://www.gsa.gov/travel/plan-book/per-diem-rates/meals-and-incidental-expenses-mie-breakdown for a current list of reimbursement amounts for meals and incidentals. The Clerk will advise members of the applicable per diem before each meeting. Section (d) below contains special rules for the meal expenses of lay members of the Board who attend the Bar’s Annual Meeting.\n \t (c)\t Lodging. The Bar shall reimburse the actual cost of hotel sleeping rooms at the group rate obtained by the Bar. The maximum reimbursement to a Board member who elects to stay at a facility other than the designated hotel is the Bar rate. Reimbursement is limited to one night before the meeting, except for meetings that occur in conjunction with a State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors meeting, which shall qualify for two nights’ reimbursement. Members will not be reimbursed if they obtain lodging at no cost to themselves; i.e., for stays with friends or at the expense of others.\n \t (d)\t Annual Meeting – Special Rules for Lay Members. Lay members may receive a total of four nights of per diem and lodging reimbursement for the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. Lay members may receive two tickets for the group dinner events held as part of the meeting, including the Opening Reception, YLD Dinner, and the Presidential Gala. The usual per diem described in Section 2 will otherwise apply to lay member meals during the Annual Meeting. \n \t (e)\t Other expenses. Members may request reimbursement for copying, postage or other expenses related to their investigation with prior notice to the Clerk. Receipts are required for expenditures over $25.\n \t (f)\t Procedure for reimbursement. After each meeting, the Clerk of the Boards will send an email to every Board member asking whether the member will request reimbursement for the meeting. In order to receive reimbursement, a member must respond to the Clerk’s email and make a request within 30 days of the date of the meeting. The Clerk will provide forms for requesting reimbursement via email.\n \t (g)\t Waivers. The General Counsel may waive the requirements of this Rule for good cause.\n<div></div>","UrlName":"part5","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f6fa205f-16f1-432d-b171-9c3877eb4892","Title":"Internal Rules - State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":" RULES OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE OF THE STATE DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD\nPursuant to the powers and duties accorded it in Rule 4-215 (c) in Part IV of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, the State Disciplinary Review Board of the State Bar of Georgia establishes the following Rules of Conduct and Procedure. (Approved January 11, 2019.)\n Rule 1. Oaths of Office.\nMembers of the State Disciplinary Review Board shall, upon their selection, sign the oath of office. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards will preserve the oaths in the records of the State Bar of Georgia at State Bar Headquarters.\n Rule 2. Powers and Duties.\nThe State Disciplinary Review Board shall have such powers and perform such duties as are set forth in Part IV of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Rule 3. Meetings.\nThe State Disciplinary Review Board shall meet at such times and places as may be set by the Board. The Review Board shall also meet at other times on the call of the chair of the Review Board.\n Rule 4. Election of Offices; Powers and Duties.\nAt the first meeting of the Review Board subsequent to the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia, the members of the Review Board shall elect a chair and a vice-chair. The chair shall preside at all meetings of the Review Board and shall serve until a successor is elected or the chair’s term on the Review Board expires.\nThe chair shall also exercise such powers and assume such duties as are hereinafter provided. In case of the absence, disqualification or incapacity of the chair, the vice-chair shall assume the duties and powers of the chair. In case of a disqualification of both the chair and vice-chair, the members of the Review Board shall elect another member of the Board to preside over consideration of the matter at issue.\n Rule 5. Original Pleadings.\nOriginal pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Bar Rule 4-221 (b). Bar Counsel and the respondent lawyer shall be responsible for serving copies of all pleadings on the special master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The original pleadings shall be maintained at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia by the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards until the Clerk files the record in the case with the Supreme Court pursuant to Bar Rule 4-216 (e).\n Rule 6.  Review of the Report of the Special Master.\n(a) If a party requests review by the Review Board pursuant to Rule 4-214 (c), the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards or a designee of the Clerk shall cause copies of the report of the special master and the complete record in the case to be delivered to the members of the Review Board. The Clerk shall transmit the record after the exceptions and the opposing party’s response to the exceptions have been filed, or within 10 days after the time for the response has expired. Pursuant to Rule 4-216 (a), the Review Board shall consider the record, review the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the special master, consider the exceptions and responses filed by the parties, and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court.\n(b) At the time the report of the special master and the record in the case are transmitted to the Board members, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall notify the Respondent in writing of his or her right under Bar Rule 4-216(b) to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any Board member. The procedure for filing such a challenge is set forth in Rule 9 of these Rules.\n(c) In disciplinary proceedings initiated prior to July 1, 2018, the Review Board may grant rehearings or new trials either before itself or before a special master on such issues and within such times as appear to it appropriate to serve the ends of justice. A majority vote of the members present shall be sufficient to order a rehearing or new trial except that there may be no de novo hearing before the Review Board without the unanimous vote of the members present.\n(d) The Review Board may in its discretion grant oral argument. Either party may request oral argument by filing such request with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards within 15 days of transmission of the record, including exceptions and responses to exceptions, to the Review Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall notify the chair of the Review Board upon the filing of a request for oral argument. A subcommittee consisting of the chair, vice-chair and the reviewing Board member shall review the request and shall decide the issue at least 10 days prior to the meeting of the Board at which the case will be considered, and shall notify the parties of the subcommittee’s decision. Any decision denying oral argument shall be subject to review by the entire Review Board.\n Rule 7.  Report to the Supreme Court and Recommendation of Discipline.\nAfter completion of its review of the final report of the special master, or review of a disciplinary proceeding, the Review Board shall prepare a report and recommendation to the Supreme Court. The Review Board may delegate responsibility for the preparation of its report to any member of the Board or to either party.\nThe chairperson of the Review Board shall file the report of the Board with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards and serve a copy of the report on the parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Clerk shall file the report and the complete record with the Supreme Court pursuant to Bar Rule 4-216 (e).\n Rule 8. Preparation of Reprimands.\nUpon final judgment of a Review Board reprimand by the Supreme Court, the chair of the Review Board shall cause to be prepared a written reprimand. The chair may delegate responsibility for preparing written reprimands to the Office of the General Counsel or any Board member, but such written reprimand shall be reviewed and approved by the chair prior to administration to the respondent lawyer.\nThe chair or a designee shall administer the Review Board reprimand at a subsequent meeting of the Review Board. The chair shall be authorized to compel the attendance of the respondent lawyer by subpoena.\n Rule 9.  Challenges to the Competency, Qualifications or Objectivity of Review Board.\n(a) The respondent lawyer shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member of the Review Board considering a disciplinary proceeding against him or her. Within 10 days after the special master’s report or a Notice of Reciprocal Discipline is transmitted to the Review Board, the respondent lawyer may file written objection to the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member or members of the Review Board setting forth a specific factual basis for the challenge. The respondent lawyer shall file a copy of the challenge with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board, and serve a copy of the challenge upon each member of the Review Board and upon the Office of the General Counsel.\nThe challenged member may answer the respondent lawyer’s challenge in writing, at his or her option, but is not required to do so. Any such written answer shall be served on the remaining members of the Review Board, the respondent lawyer and the Office of the General Counsel.\nThe challenged member may also respond to the challenge orally at the next meeting of the Review Board.\nAt its next meeting, the Review Board shall consider the objection and any response. The affirmative vote of three members that the challenged member should be excluded shall be sufficient to sustain the challenge.\n(b) Any member of the Review Board shall have the right to withdraw voluntarily from consideration of any complaint in which his or her competency, qualifications or objectivity are challenged by the respondent lawyer.\n Rule 10. Removal of Board Members.\nAny Review Board member who is absent from either three (3) consecutive Review Board meetings or any four meetings in a bar year, shall be removed from the Review Board. The vacancy shall be filled by appointment pursuant to Rule 4-201.1 (b) (3).\n Rule 11.  Disqualification.\nNo member of the Review Board shall represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding. If a Review Board member’s partners or associates represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding, then the Board member is automatically recused from determination, investigation, or review regarding the case during all phases of the disciplinary proceeding.\n Rule 12. Petitions for Reinstatement.\nIn the event the Supreme Court orders a respondent to file a petition for reinstatement with the Review Board for review and recommendation, the petition for reinstatement shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards in accordance with Bar Rule 4-221(b). The Office of the General Counsel shall have 20 days after service of the petition to respond. When all responses and reports have been filed, the record shall be delivered to the Review Board by the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards.\n Rule 13. Reimbursement of Expenses.\nMembers of the Disciplinary Review Board may be reimbursed for expenses as follows:\n(a) Transportation. Members may be reimbursed at the maximum tax free rate permitted by the IRS for automobile travel to and from meetings of the Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will calculate the appropriate amount for each meeting using the Board member’s home or work address (as designated by the Board member) and the address of the meeting location, and will submit a request for reimbursement at the member’s request. Although members are encouraged to carpool, only the member providing the vehicle will be approved for reimbursement.\nOther forms of transportation (including flights and rental car expenses) will not be reimbursed, but a member who elects to rent a car or fly to a meeting may receive the mileage reimbursement that would have been due had the member driven a personal vehicle.\nTolls and any cost for parking at a meeting site may be reimbursed at the actual rate. Valet parking expenses will only be reimbursed when self-parking is not available.\nTransportation rates may be adjusted or capped for meetings that take place outside of Georgia. At least 20 days before any out-of-state meeting the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will notify members of the mileage reimbursement for the meeting.\n(b) Meals. If meals are not provided during the meeting at the Bar’s expense, the State Bar of Georgia will provide a per diem at the same rate as the federal per diem rate for the location where the meeting is held. See https://www.gsa.gov/travel/plan-book/per-diem-rates/meals-and-incidental-expenses-mie-breakdown for a current list of reimbursement amounts for meals and incidentals. The Clerk will advise members of the applicable per diem before each meeting. Section (d) below contains special rules for the meal expenses of lay members of the Board who attend the Bar’s Annual Meeting.\n(c) Lodging. The Bar shall reimburse the actual cost of hotel sleeping rooms at the group rate obtained by the Bar. The maximum reimbursement to a Board member who elects to stay at a facility other than the designated hotel is the Bar rate. Reimbursement is limited to one night before the meeting, except for meetings that occur in conjunction with a State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors meeting, which shall qualify for two nights’ reimbursement. Members will not be reimbursed if they obtain lodging at no cost to themselves; i.e., for stays with friends or at the expense of others.\n(d) Annual Meeting. Special Rules for Lay Members. Lay members may receive a total of four nights of per diem and lodging reimbursement for the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. Lay members may receive two tickets for the group dinner events held as part of the meeting, including the Opening Reception, YLD Dinner, and the Presidential Gala. The usual per diem described in Section 2 will otherwise apply to lay member meals during the Annual Meeting.\n(e) Other expenses. Members may request reimbursement for copying, postage or other expenses related to their investigation with prior notice to the Clerk. Receipts are required for expenditures over $25.\n(f) Transportation. Procedure for reimbursement. After each meeting, the Clerk of the Boards will send an email to every Board member asking whether the member will request reimbursement for the meeting. In order to receive reimbursement, a member must respond to the Clerk’s email and make a request within 30 days of the date of the meeting. The Clerk will provide forms for requesting reimbursement via email.\n(g) Waivers. The General Counsel may waive the requirements of this Rule for good cause.\n","UrlName":"part7","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"776a56f9-1936-4b66-a139-84b9fd2cccf2","Title":"Rules of the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards","Content":" Rules of the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards\n (Effective date 10/4/2021) \n Rule 1. Office of the Clerk.\n In accordance with Bar Rule <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule156\">4-221 (b)</a> , pleadings or documents in disciplinary cases pending before a special master shall be filed with Office of the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards of the State Bar of Georgia. In lieu of delivering original pleadings to the Clerk for filing, you may e-file in accordance with Rule 3 (a) of these Rules.\n Rule 2. Hours.\nFilings and communications relating to cases shall be directed to the Clerk’s office during office hours. The Clerk’s office is open from 8:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. whenever the State Bar of Georgia is open for business. The telephone number for the Clerk’s office is (404) 527-8721.\n \n Rule 3. Filing.\n (a)\t E-Filing\n Attorneys are highly encouraged to file documents electronically. Pleadings or documents shall be submitted for filing through the State Disciplinary Board E- Filing System <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/SDB-eFiling.cfm/">here . E-filings received by 11:59 p.m. EDT/EST will be considered filed on that date. Only proper pleadings will be accepted for filing. See Rules 5 and 6.\n (b)\t Conventional Paper Filing\nThough e-filing is strongly preferred, paper pleadings or documents may be mailed or delivered to the Clerk’s Office for filing. A document or pleading will be filed when actually received by or delivered to the Clerk’s Office during the days and times the Clerk’s Office is open. A document transmitted by priority, express, or first-class (including certified or registered) mail via the United States Postal Service, or by a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards within three days, shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the official postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service (not a private or commercial postage meter) or the commercial carrier’s transmittal form on the envelope or package containing the document, but only if the envelope or package is properly addressed, postage is prepaid, and the postmark or transmittal date is legible.\n Rule 4. Docket Numbers.\nPleadings or other documents shall bear the appropriate State Disciplinary Board docket number. If a pleading lists more than one State Disciplinary Board docket number, the pleading should be electronically filed in each docket number listed.\n Rule 5. Discovery Documents.\n As provided in Bar Rule <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule156\">4-221(b)</a> , depositions and other original discovery shall not be filed, except in accordance with the Uniform Superior Court Rules.\n Rule 6. Certificate of Service.\nThe parties shall serve copies on opposing parties and the special master, and on counsel for the State Disciplinary Review Board where appropriate, pursuant to the Georgia Civil Practice Act. All pleadings must bear a signed certificate of service, showing service on all parties and on the special master. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards will not file a pleading that does not have an executed certificate of service.\n Rule 7. Filing of Record in the Supreme Court.\n Once the record of a disciplinary proceeding is filed with the Supreme Court in accordance with Bar Rule <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule98\">4-106 (e)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule53\">4-214 (c)</a> or <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule143\">4-216 (e)</a> , subsequent pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and directed to the Court. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards will not file any pleading after the record has been transmitted to the Supreme Court.\n Rule 8. Changes to these Rules.\nThe Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards may amend these Rules at any time consistent with Part IV of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and Enforcement Thereof.","UrlName":"part6","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b613a862-cd32-404a-9d93-ae6929b03ae2","Title":"Section 1. Effective Date.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> These Bylaws shall become effective upon approval by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule643","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3a88e514-3202-4c3a-9518-05713178d26c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3a88e514-3202-4c3a-9518-05713178d26c","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"abf89351-0e8d-4b64-a628-f9d4a771bd7b","Title":" Section 1. Education.","Content":"The Center shall, from time to time, conduct programs for continuing education in the area of lawyer wellbeing and may coordinate its efforts in this regard with other programs, divisions, and sections of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule639","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0098994d-7f11-4d20-8f87-c99dd913f7d6","Title":"Section 1. Depository Requirements.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Funds of the Center shall be deposited in the treasury of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be disbursed to pay the financial obligations of the Center after approval by the Chairperson and Treasurer of the Center. The Finance Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall, from time to time, make available to the Treasurer for the Center a financial accounting for the Center so the Center Treasurer can provide a report of the financial condition of the Center to its members.</div>","UrlName":"rule634","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a2dfd2c5-363f-4750-ace8-c9281d420727","Title":"Section 1. Center Annual Meeting.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Center shall hold an annual meeting of its leadership and membership at or about the time and place of the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia, at a date, time, and location to be fixed by the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule625","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b68d0fff-f821-4d7f-9131-729db364d25c","Title":"Section 1. Requirement for Membership.","Content":"Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia may be a member of the Center for Lawyer Wellbeing. Any member of the State Bar, upon election on the annual fee statement or by request and payment of annual Center membership fees, will be enrolled as a member of the Center. Thereafter, membership fees are due each year on the same schedule as the payment of fees to the State Bar. Members so enrolled and whose membership fees are paid shall constitute the membership of the Center. Any member whose annual membership fees are not paid by the deadline for annual State Bar fee payments shall cease to be a member of the Center subject to reinstatement at any time upon the payment of fees for the current year.","UrlName":"rule623","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bc27f1f0-2dd6-459b-ad47-0f635ded8d77","Title":"Section 1. Composition of the Center Executive Committee. Terms of Office.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Center Executive Committee shall consist of the Officers of the Center and three other members of the Center elected by the members. Center officers shall serve for one Bar year. Other members of the Center Executive Committee shall serve two-year terms that coincide with the Bar year. The initial appointments shall be staggered so that the terms of the non-officer members do not all expire in the same year.</div>","UrlName":"rule620","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"309e9994-7408-41f9-acc2-b98c77f2c307","Title":"Section 1. Officers.","Content":"The general Center operation will be overseen by its officers and a Center Executive Committee. Officers of the Center shall be a Chairperson, a Vice Chairperson, a Secretary, and a Treasurer, all of whom shall be members in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. The initial officers will be selected by the President of the State Bar of Georgia and, thereafter, elected by members of the Center for Lawyer Wellbeing.","UrlName":"rule614","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6d06f04c-f7bc-4763-afe5-2a7be73d5bc0","Title":"ARTICLE I PURPOSE AND GOALS","Content":"PurposeThe Center for Lawyer Wellbeing (“the Center”) shall serve as an umbrella group to coordinate the work of the State Bar of Georgia on issues related to wellbeing. The purpose of the Center is to advocate for the physical and mental health of lawyers through increased awareness, programming, policy development and research. By promoting lawyer wellbeing, the Center will ensure that lawyers are able to meet their obligations to clients, the public, and the profession. The Center and its constituent entities will work to help lawyers excel in both their personal and professional lives, in recognition of the connection between wellbeing, competence, and professionalism.GoalsThe Center for Lawyer Wellbeing will have as its goals:(1) collaborating with Bar Sections, Committees, and other entities to provide high-quality, up-to-date programming that will educate lawyers, judges, law students and other stakeholders on the significance of wellbeing issues and provide them with the tools they need to make a positive impact;(2) serving as a clearinghouse and repository of information on the work of the State Bar of Georgia, its’ Sections, Committees, Divisions, and Programs, in the area of wellbeing;(3) encouraging continued study of the connection between wellbeing, professionalism, and discipline;(4) developing and sharing policies and best practices that move the profession towards healthier behaviors; and(5) eliminating the stigma associated with help-seeking behaviors.The Center’s work will be funded by voluntary Center membership fees and by grants or donations received in response to fundraising efforts.","UrlName":"chapter85","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5ccb08a5-90cd-4e60-ad6f-6ecf6909ca4e","Title":"Section 1. Qualification and Application","Content":"Any young lawyers organization or younger lawyers unit of any bar association, city, Superior Court Circuit, Congressional District, or other jurisdiction in which membership is restricted to younger lawyers in good standing may apply to be an “Affiliate Unit” of the Young Lawyers Division. The applying organization shall submit to the Secretary a petition containing: (a) a copy of a resolution or letter regularly adopted by the applying organization authorizing affiliation; (b) a petition or letter signed by at least three (3) members of the applying organization describing its organization and listing the size of its membership; and (c) a copy of any constitution, bylaws, or articles of procedure of the applying organization, if any exist. In the event that the applying organization has no constitution, bylaws, or articles of procedure at the time of application, said organization shall adopt and operate under the YLD bylaws in effect at the time of application until such time as they adopt their own constitution, bylaws, or articles of procedure.","UrlName":"rule581","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"920aad6c-699d-4888-aa4f-708383100b8f","Title":"Section 1. Legislation","Content":" No legislation shall be recommended, approved or disapproved in the name of the Young Lawyers Division unless that recommendation, approval, or disapproval is done in the manner set forth and consistent with Article II, Section 6 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. \n ","UrlName":"rule375","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"1f727ce3-2645-4c8d-8fba-02702db81392","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["1f727ce3-2645-4c8d-8fba-02702db81392","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"54a5d020-d316-4fce-9e1f-be4f25752398","Title":"Section 1. Business Meetings of the YLD Members","Content":" YLD members shall meet not less than four (4) times during each Bar Year. \n \n (a) Midyear Meeting . The YLD members shall meet annually at the time and place designated by the Board of Governors for the Midyear Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia unless the President designates a different place and time. The Secretary shall cause notice of the Midyear Meeting to be given to all YLD members not less than thirty (30) days before such Midyear Meeting. \n (b) Other Meetings . The President shall call three (3) other meetings of the YLD members at such times as he or she shall designate. The Secretary shall cause notice of such meetings to be given to all YLD members not less than thirty (30) days before such meetings.\n (c) Annual Meeting . YLD members may, at the discretion of the President, meet annually at the time and place designated by the Board of Governors for the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia. In the event the President elects to conduct this meeting, the Secretary shall cause notice of the meeting to be given to all YLD members not less than thirty (30) days before the Annual Meeting.","UrlName":"rule387","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"4f4c47bd-3a9a-4cc8-a30a-303b422fc86b","Title":"Section 1. Standing Committees","Content":"Each Standing Committee shall include in its membership at least six (6) members of the Representative Council, including two (2) from each Federal Judicial District. The mandatory members described herein (other than nonvoting members) shall count towards fulfilling the minimum member requirement. The membership of each Standing Committee shall be selected by the President, subject to the requirements set forth in this Section. The Standing Committees of the Young Lawyers Division shall be as follows:\n (a) Membership and Meetings . This committee, which shall include the Secretary and President-Elect as members, shall consider and make recommendations on ways to improve the membership’s involvement and attendance at meetings. \n (b) Rules, Bylaws and Procedures . This committee shall consider and make recommendations on all proposed amendments or changes concerning the organization of the Young Lawyers Division and its rules, bylaws, procedures and standing policies. \n (c) Nominating . This committee, which shall be chaired by the President-Elect, who shall act as chairperson but shall have no vote on the committee, shall be charged with making nominations for all elections. The President-Elect shall notify all committee members of the time and place of meetings. Three (3) voting members of the Nominating Committee shall constitute a quorum for such meetings. \n (d) Election . This committee, which shall be chaired by the President-Elect, shall be charged with conducting all elections, except to the extent the conducting of any election called for by these bylaws is, pursuant to these bylaws, to be conducted by another entity.\n (e) Communications . This committee, which shall include the Secretary and the Editor(s) as members, shall consider and make recommendations on proposed publications of the Young Lawyers Division and the number and types of publications issued or sponsored by the Young Lawyers Division. \n (f) Public Relations and Policy . This committee shall consider and make recommendations on ways to promote a positive public image of young lawyers in the State of Georgia and shall inform the membership of any legislation relevant to the legal profession. The actions of this committee shall comply with the requirements of Article XI, Section 1. \n \n ","UrlName":"rule383","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"69b91772-0816-4027-b34e-6ced064affa9","Title":"Section 1. Removal of Officer For Cause","Content":"The YLD membership may, at any meeting called in accordance with these bylaws, by two-thirds majority vote of the total voting membership present and qualified to vote at said meeting, remove any Officer from office for cause.","UrlName":"rule376","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1fe5e897-2e5b-4327-8b82-0e402827aae5","Title":"Section 1. Qualifications for Voting and Making Nomination","Content":"Only active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing who are also YLD members (other than Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) shall be eligible to vote or nominate in any election in the Young Lawyers Division.","UrlName":"rule389","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bf5bf1d8-1d9b-483b-b353-a3e232e774a2","Title":"YLD ABA Delegates","Content":"The President shall appoint all delegates to the American Bar Association Young Lawyers Division (“ABA/YLD”) Annual and Mid-Year meetings for the term during which he or she is President. Such appointments shall be made according to the following priority, in descending order, from the YLD members, as follows: (1) Officers; (2) Directors; (3) other Representative Council members; (4) other YLD members, with priority being given to those members who have previously held leadership positions within the State Bar of Georgia YLD, including any Affiliate Unit, or who have attended any State Bar of Georgia YLD, including Affiliate Unit, activities, meetings, or events. To receive priority as outlined herein, a potential delegate must notify the President of his or her desire to be a delegate at least forty-five (45) days before the delegate certification deadline published by the ABA/YLD for the ABA/YLD meeting at issue.","UrlName":"rule379","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c70f314-4fb3-4f80-90ee-c6b486024188","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c70f314-4fb3-4f80-90ee-c6b486024188","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a83ddd2f-d312-411f-ae9c-e934826efe10","Title":"Section 1. Purpose and Powers","Content":" There shall be a Representative Council of the Young Lawyers Division (the “Representative Council ”). The Representative Council shall exercise the powers granted to it hereunder. ","UrlName":"rule377","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"4505f2a2-14d2-4abb-a8f8-631878579837","Title":"Section 1. Purpose and Powers","Content":" There shall be an Executive Committee of the Young Lawyers Division (the “Executive Committee ”). The Executive Committee shall conduct all business of the YLD between meetings of the YLD membership or the Representative Council, except those enumerated in Sections 1 and 3(c) of Article VIII, Section 1 of Article X, and Section 1 of Article XI. ","UrlName":"rule386","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"4a5386ce-6a0d-48c8-905a-d3217380c7be","Title":"Section 1. Officers","Content":" The “Officers ” of the Young Lawyers Division shall consist of: (a) President, (b) President-Elect, (c) Treasurer, (d) Secretary, (e) Immediate Past-President, and (f) Newsletter Editor(s).","UrlName":"rule382","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"14d71c00-1600-4124-9c44-65d432e9c703","Title":"Section 1 Qualification for Membership","Content":" A \"YLD member \"is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia whose membership in the Young Lawyers Division has not terminated pursuant to Section 4 of this Article. Membership in the Young Lawyers Division is automatic.","UrlName":"rule374","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"8633f99f-7f47-414d-be15-24d10dbc8852","Title":"Section 1. Name","Content":" The name of this organization shall be the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia (the \"Young Lawyers Division \"or \"YLD \").","UrlName":"rule385","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","Title":"ARTICLE I NAME AND PURPOSE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter58","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8633f99f-7f47-414d-be15-24d10dbc8852","Title":"Section 1. Name","Content":" The name of this organization shall be the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia (the \"Young Lawyers Division \"or \"YLD \").","UrlName":"rule385","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0c084e4f-0de6-41c9-bf89-e81236e8a044","Title":"Section 2. Purpose","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the Young Lawyers Division shall be: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to encourage the interest and participation of YLD members in the activities, objectives, and purpose of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to aid and promote the advancement of YLD members in the activities of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to foster among YLD members the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to provide YLD members with an opportunity to participate in activities directed toward improving the administration of justice;</li> \n <li>to foster discussion and interchange of ideas among YLD members relating to the duties, responsibilities, and problems of YLD members; and</li> \n <li> to provide a full and complete program of activities and projects in those areas of the State Bar of Georgia in which YLD members are particularly suited. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule406","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","Revisions":[{"Id":"34713ad7-3bf8-406b-add1-f560900ad881","ParentId":"0c084e4f-0de6-41c9-bf89-e81236e8a044","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the Young Lawyers Division shall be: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to encourage the interest and participation of YLD members in the activities, objectives, and purpose of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to aid and promote the advancement of YLD members in the activities of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to foster among YLD members the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to provide YLD members with an opportunity to participate in activities directed toward improving the administration of justice;</li> \n <li>to foster discussion and interchange of ideas among YLD members relating to the duties, responsibilities, and problems of YLD members; and</li> \n <li> to provide a full and complete program of activities and projects in those areas of the State Bar of Georgia in which YLD members are particularly suited. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision41"}],"Ancestors":["9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3c706518-e4a1-49a2-9c6a-337edc5972bd","Title":"Section 1. Resignation of Officers.","Content":"An officer may resign at any time upon settling his or her accounts with the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule323","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9b20699b-13a1-410d-b8af-5d35583de73f","Title":"Section 1. Death, Disability, or Resignation of Officers, Members of the Executive Committee, or Delegates to the American Bar Association.","Content":"In the event of a vacancy for any cause in the following offices or positions, President-elect, Secretary, Treasurer, member of the Executive Committee elected by the Board of Governors, or a delegate of the State Bar to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, his or her temporary successor shall be appointed by the President to hold office until the next regular meeting of the Board of Governors when a successor for the unexpired term shall be elected by majority vote. However, any person appointed to fill the unexpired term of President-elect shall not automatically succeed to the office of President, but that office shall be filled by majority vote of the entire membership after nomination as provided in Article VII.","UrlName":"rule311","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"153eda26-ca28-4c73-b824-f45016d98776","Title":"Section 1. Delegates: Designation; Nomination and Election; Alternates.","Content":"The delegates of the State Bar to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association shall be active members in good standing of the State Bar and of the American Bar Association. There shall be a separate post for each delegate of the State Bar to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. The posts shall be consecutively numbered by the Board of Governors as \"Post Number 1,\"\"Post Number 2,\"etc. Numbering shall be solely for the purposes of designations, nominations and elections.\nElected delegates shall be nominated and elected to staggered two year terms beginning with an even numbered year, so that the terms are staggered as equally as possible. Delegates for the elected posts shall be nominated and elected in the same manner as provided in these Bylaws for the election of the Secretary of the State Bar; however, a nomination shall designate the post for which the candidate is nominated.\nSo long as the State Bar is entitled to six or more delegates, Post 5 and Post 6 shall be designated as follows: beginning with a term to start at the adjournment of the year 2000 annual meeting of the American Bar Association, Post 6 shall be filled by the immediate past president of the State Bar; and beginning with a term to start at the adjournment of the year 2002 annual meeting of the American Bar Association, Post 5 shall be filled by the immediate past president of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar, provided that person is under the age of 35 years when the term begins. Otherwise, Post 5 shall be filled by a person who is under the age of 35 appointed by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar.\nShould any designated or elected post become vacant prior to the end of the term for which the person filling that post was selected because of resignation, death or disability, the President of the State Bar shall appoint another member to fill the unexpired term.","UrlName":"rule318","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0c96002e-5120-4582-aba3-79acdbd462f5","Title":"Section 1. Young Lawyers Division.","Content":"The Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar shall be composed of (1) all members of the State Bar who have not reached their thirty-sixth birthday prior to the close of the preceding Annual Meeting of the State Bar and (2) all members of the State Bar who have been admitted to their first bar less than five years. This Division shall foster discussion of ideas relating to the duties, responsibilities, and problems of the younger members of the profession, aiding and promoting their advancement and encouraging their interest and participation in the activities of the State Bar. It shall elect officers and a governing board annually, and shall adopt regulations subject to the Rules and Bylaws of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule325","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"447daa62-264c-47c9-8b71-1a3786bbc466","Title":"Section 1. Standing Committees.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Standing Committees; Statement of Purpose. The Board of Governors may create standing committees for such purposes as it deems appropriate. The members of each standing committee shall be appointed by the President. Any request for the creation of a standing committee shall be accompanied by a statement of purpose. A listing of the standing committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose, the names of current committee members and their respective terms. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Members. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Three-year Terms. There shall be a minimum of nine members of each standing committee appointed for three-year terms. Regardless of when the appointment is made, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office, and expire on June 30 three years later, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 of the Bar year the appointing President took office and expire on December 31 three years later, whose members shall be appointed by the President-elect. The term of all such appointments shall be staggered so that one-third of all committee members appointed for three-year terms shall retire at the end of each year.</li> \n <li>One-year Terms. The President may appoint additional members of each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when such additional committee members are appointed, the term of such appointees shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Non-voting Advisory and Liaison Members. The President may appoint non-voting advisory and liaison members to each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when appointed, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. The presence of non-voting advisory and liaison members at a committee meeting will not be considered when determining a quorum for the committee, nor may they vote in any committee meeting.</li> \n <li>Appointments to Fulfill Quorum Requirements. In the event of any appointee's resignation, incapacitation, or persistent inability to perform committee business, the President shall have the authority to appoint a replacement to serve for the duration of the original appointee's term. The President shall exercise all foregoing discretionary powers of appointment to advance the objective of enabling committees to obtain quorums and conduct regular committee business.</li> \n <li>Notice of Three-year Term Appointments. Incoming Presidents shall inform the Board of appointments to fill expiring or vacant three-year terms on standing committees at the State Bar of Georgia's Annual Meeting.</li> \n <li>Notice of Other Appointments. Appointments to one-year terms or to non-voting advisory or liaison capacity on any standing committee shall be published on the official State Bar of Georgia website.</li> \n <li>Executive Committee Liaison Members. No later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee liaison member to such standing committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee liaison members shall serve for a one-year term that expires on the first June 30 after such appointment, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a standing committee.</li> \n <li>Ex-Officio Members. Ex-officio members shall have voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of the standing committee.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, and Vice Chairperson or Vice Co-chairs . Each year the President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs, and a vice chairperson or vice co-chairs of each standing committee. A chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Abolition of Standing Committees . Standing committees may be abolished by the Board of Governors following written notice to the chairperson and members of the committee. </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule324","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","Revisions":[{"Id":"84c4bd26-ee4f-4b5b-a2d7-951acd6a96a3","ParentId":"447daa62-264c-47c9-8b71-1a3786bbc466","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Standing Committees; Statement of Purpose. The Board of Governors may create standing committees for such purposes as it deems appropriate. The members of each standing committee shall be appointed by the President. Any request for the creation of a standing committee shall be accompanied by a statement of purpose. A listing of the standing committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose, the names of current committee members and their respective terms. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Members. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Three-year terms. There shall be a minimum of nine members of each standing committee appointed for three-year terms. Regardless of when the appointment was made, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office, and expire on June 30 three years later, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 of the Bar year the appointing President took office, and expire on December 31 three years later whose members shall be appointed by the President-elect. The term of all such appointments shall staggered so that one-third  of all committee members appointed for three year terms shall retire at the end of each year.</li> \n <li>One-year terms. The President may appoint additional members of each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when such additional committee members are appointed, the term of such appointees shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Non-voting advisory members. The President may appoint non-voting advisory and liaison members to each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when appointed, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Appointments to fulfill quorum requirements. In the event of any appointee's resignations, incapacitation, or persistent inability to perform committee business, the President shall have the authority to appoint a replacement to serve for the duration of the original appointee's term. The President shall exercise all foregoing discretionary powers of appointment to advance the objective of enabling committees to obtain quorums and conduct regular committee business.</li> \n <li>Notice of Three-Year Term Appointments. Incoming Presidents shall inform the Board of appointments to fill expiring or vacant three-year terms on standing committees at the State Bar of Georgia's Annual Meeting.</li> \n <li>Notice of Other Appointments. Appointments to one-year terms or to non-voting advisory or liaison capacity on any standing committee shall be published on the official State Bar of Georgia website.</li> \n <li>Executive Committee Liaison Members. No later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee liaison member to such standing committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee liaison members shall serve for a one-year term that expires on the first June 30 after such appointment, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a standing committee.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs and Vice Chairperson or Vice Co-chairs . Each year the President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs and a vice chairperson or vice co-chairs of each standing committee. A chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Abolition of Standing Committees . Standing Committees may be abolished by the Board of Governors following written notice to the chairperson and members of the Committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision288"},{"Id":"7b79a9db-b30e-418c-ae68-c896b5e7355d","ParentId":"447daa62-264c-47c9-8b71-1a3786bbc466","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Standing Committees; Statement of Purpose. The Board of Governors may create standing committees for such purposes as it deems appropriate. The members of each standing committee shall be appointed by the President. Any request for the creation of a standing committee shall be accompanied by a statement of purpose. A listing of the standing committees of the State Bar shall be published annually on the official State Bar of Georgia website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose, the names of current committee members and their respective terms. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Members. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Three-year terms. There shall be a minimum of nine members of each standing committee appointed for three-year terms. Regardless of when the appointment was made, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office, and expire on June 30 three years later, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 of the Bar year the appointing President took office, and expire on December 31 three years later whose members shall be appointed by the President-elect. The term of all such appointments shall staggered so that one-third  of all committee members appointed for three year terms shall retire at the end of each year.</li> \n <li>One-year terms. The President may appoint additional members of each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when such additional committee members are appointed, the term of such appointees shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Non-voting advisory members. The President may appoint non-voting advisory and liaison members to each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when appointed, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Appointments to fulfill quorum requirements. In the event of any appointee's resignations, incapacitation, or persistent inability to perform committee business, the President shall have the authority to appoint a replacement to serve for the duration of the original appointee's term. The President shall exercise all foregoing discretionary powers of appointment to advance the objective of enabling committees to obtain quorums and conduct regular committee business.</li> \n <li>Notice of Three-Year Term Appointments. Incoming Presidents shall inform the Board of appointments to fill expiring or vacant three-year terms on standing committees at the State Bar's Annual Meeting.</li> \n <li>Notice of Other Appointments. Appointments to one-year terms or to non-voting advisory or liaison capacity on any standing committee shall be published in the State Bar Directory, provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall prohibit a President from exercising discretion to make additional such appointments after the Directory has been published or sent for publication.</li> \n <li>Executive Committee Liaison Members. Not later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee Liaison member to such standing committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee Liaison Members shall serve for a term of one year, with such term expiring on the First June 30 after such appointment, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count towards a quorum at any meeting of a standing committee.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs and Vice Chairperson or Vice Co-chairs . Each year the President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs and a vice chairperson or vice co-chairs of each standing committee. A chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Abolition of Standing Committees . Standing Committees may be abolished by the Board of Governors following written notice to the chairperson and members of the Committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision286"},{"Id":"ab213ec5-581e-4812-be18-d90d3b960352","ParentId":"447daa62-264c-47c9-8b71-1a3786bbc466","Title":"Version 4","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Standing Committees; Statement of Purpose. The Board of Governors may create standing committees for such purposes as it deems appropriate. The members of each standing committee shall be appointed by the President. Any request for the creation of a standing committee shall be accompanied by a statement of purpose. A listing of the standing committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose, the names of current committee members and their respective terms. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Members. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Three-year Terms. There shall be a minimum of nine members of each standing committee appointed for three-year terms. Regardless of when the appointment is made, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office, and expire on June 30 three years later, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 of the Bar year the appointing President took office and expire on December 31 three years later, whose members shall be appointed by the President-elect. The term of all such appointments shall be staggered so that one-third  of all committee members appointed for three-year terms shall retire at the end of each year.</li> \n <li>One-year Terms. The President may appoint additional members of each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when such additional committee members are appointed, the term of such appointees shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Non-voting Advisory Members. The President may appoint non-voting advisory and liaison members to each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when appointed, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Appointments to Fulfill Quorum Requirements. In the event of any appointee's resignation, incapacitation, or persistent inability to perform committee business, the President shall have the authority to appoint a replacement to serve for the duration of the original appointee's term. The President shall exercise all foregoing discretionary powers of appointment to advance the objective of enabling committees to obtain quorums and conduct regular committee business.</li> \n <li>Notice of Three-year Term Appointments. Incoming Presidents shall inform the Board of appointments to fill expiring or vacant three-year terms on standing committees at the State Bar of Georgia's Annual Meeting.</li> \n <li>Notice of Other Appointments. Appointments to one-year terms or to non-voting advisory or liaison capacity on any standing committee shall be published on the official State Bar of Georgia website.</li> \n <li>Executive Committee Liaison Members. No later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee liaison member to such standing committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee liaison members shall serve for a one-year term that expires on the first June 30 after such appointment, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a standing committee.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, and Vice Chairperson or Vice Co-chairs . Each year the President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs, and a vice chairperson or vice co-chairs of each standing committee. A chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Abolition of Standing Committees . Standing committees may be abolished by the Board of Governors following written notice to the chairperson and members of the committee. </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision411"}],"Ancestors":["859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"8f94f0d2-bcc7-4973-956c-b718e9b85d09","Title":"Section 1. Nomination of Officers.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Board of Governors shall annually nominate candidates for each of the following offices: President-elect, Secretary, and Treasurer, and if the office of President-elect is vacant, for the office of President. No nominee shall be proposed to the Board as a candidate for any office unless the member making the proposal is satisfied that the proposed nominee intends to accept the nomination and serve if elected.</li> \n <li>After nominations are made by the Board, ten members of the Board of Governors representing at least five different circuits, or thirty active members of the State Bar, including at least five active members from each of three different circuits, may nominate candidates for President-elect, Secretary, and Treasurer (and when the office of President-elect is vacant, for President) by filing with the Executive Director within ten days after nominations by the Board a petition in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article. No nominee shall be proposed to the Board as a candidate for any office unless the members making the proposal are satisfied that the proposed nominee intends to accept the nomination and serve if elected.</li> \n <li>No person, other than a candidate nominated as provided in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, may be elected by \"write-in \"ballots or otherwise to any office described in this Section, unless that person shall have filed with the Executive Director, not less than ten days prior to the date on which the ballots are to be mailed to the membership, a written statement that he or she is a \"write-in \"candidate for the office indicated and intends to serve if elected.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule322","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[{"Id":"d6c5b86e-e205-4ced-ada6-ab22c3eee01b","ParentId":"8f94f0d2-bcc7-4973-956c-b718e9b85d09","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Board of Governors shall annually nominate candidates for each of the following offices: President-elect, Secretary, and Treasurer, and if the office of President-elect is vacant, for the office of President. No nominee shall be proposed to the Board as a candidate for any office unless the member making the proposal is satisfied that the proposed nominee intends to accept the nomination and serve if elected.</li> \n <li>After nominations are made by the Board, ten members of the Board of Governors representing at least five different circuits, or thirty active members of the State Bar, including at least five active members from each of three different circuits, may nominate candidates for President-elect, Secretary, and Treasurer (and when the office of President-elect is vacant, for President) by filing with the Executive Director within ten days after nominations by the Board a petition in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article. No nominee shall be proposed to the Board as a candidate for any office unless the members making the proposal are satisfied that the proposed nominee intends to accept the nomination and serve if elected.</li> \n <li>No person, other than a candidate nominated as provided in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, may be elected by \"write-in \"ballots or otherwise to any office described in this Section, unless that person shall have filed with the Executive Director, not less than ten days prior to the date on which the ballots are to be mailed to the membership, a written statement that he or she is a \"write-in \"candidate for the office indicated and intends to serve if elected.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision33"}],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fdd14e41-d629-4929-b540-11d03fbaa1d1","Title":"Section 1. Election.","Content":"The Executive Director shall be nominated and elected by the Board of Governors of the State Bar at its first meeting of each year.","UrlName":"rule319","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"892d4cc4-1ae8-4f3f-b1ab-87216e68021c","Title":"Section 1. Generally.","Content":"Officers of the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of a President, a President-Elect, an Immediate Past President, a Secretary, and a Treasurer. Officers shall be installed each year during the Annual Meeting and shall take an oath of office administered by an installation officer selected by the President-Elect. The President-Elect shall be sworn in separately from the other officers. After their installation, the Secretary and the Treasurer shall serve until the next annual meeting. The Secretary and the Treasurer may not serve more than three consecutive terms.\nThe President, Immediate Past President, and the President-Elect of the Young Lawyers Division shall be ex-officio officers of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule320","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5f6bd3ca-161c-48a8-a46b-d07b7dc335f5","Title":"Section 1. Members.","Content":"There shall be an Executive Committee of the Board of Governors composed of the following: the President, the President-Elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-Elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and six (6) members of the Board of Governors elected by the Board. The election of members of the Executive Committee by the Board of Governors shall take place at the meeting of the Board following adjournment of the annual meeting for the State Bar of Georgia, and they shall serve for the term for which they are elected and until their successors are elected and qualified. Elections shall be by majority vote of those members of the Board of Governors present and voting. A ballot must contain one (1) vote for each position to be filled in order for it to be counted. No candidate may receive more than one vote per ballot. After the first or any succeeding ballot, those candidates with the votes of a majority of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting shall be declared elected to the office. If more candidates receive the votes of a majority of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting than there are vacancies to be filled, the vacancies shall be filled from the candidates receiving the greatest number of votes. If, after any ballot, one or more positions remain unfilled, or there is a tie for the last position, additional ballots shall be cast until all positions are filled. Those persons declared elected shall be dropped from all succeeding ballots. If on any ballot no candidate is declared elected, on the next succeeding ballot the person or persons who received the lowest number of votes cast shall be dropped from this and all future ballots, unless to do so would reduce the number of candidates to a number less than the positions to be filled plus one.\nAt the first election of members of the Executive Committee by the Board of Governors after adjournment of the 1998 Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia six (6) members of the Executive Committee shall be elected, three (3) of whom shall serve for two-year terms and three (3) of whom shall serve for one-year terms; and the President of the State Bar of Georgia shall determine by lot which three (3) of the six (6) members elected at such first election shall serve for one year and which three (3) shall serve for two (2) years. Thereafter all members of the Executive Committee elected by the Board of Governors shall be elected for terms of two (2) years each.","UrlName":"rule321","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"98044720-6463-456f-b055-8193d16b3025","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["98044720-6463-456f-b055-8193d16b3025","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2dd13fb9-fd5d-4e8d-92bd-3d22cc49b7de","Title":"Section 1.","Content":"This Article is restated to conform to an amendment to Rule 1-302 as adopted by the Supreme Court on Nov. 7, 2001.","UrlName":"rule312","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"51ad7581-bebc-4c3d-a602-c46bf3ecabf1","Title":"Section 1. Annual and Midyear Meeting.","Content":"(a) The members of the State Bar of Georgia shall meet at least once each Bar year at a time and place designated by the Board of Governors. That meeting may be held at either the Annual or Midyear meeting or both.\n(b) The members of the State Bar of Georgia may meet at other times during the Bar year as designated by the Board of Governors.\n(c) The Board of Governors, or in its absence, the Executive Committee, may vote to hold a meeting of members by electronic means as deemed prudent or necessary.\n(d) A meeting of members may be held at a location designated by the Board of Governors, or by electronic means, including but not limited to telephone conferencing and live video conferencing, subject to any limitations established by the Board of Governors.\n(e) If approved by the Board of Governors, any meeting of members may be held electronically by live video conferencing, social media broadcast, or by any other electronic means approved by the Board of Governors.\n(f) Any voting required by the membership may be conducted electronically with a ballot provided directly to the member or available on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia. Instructions for electronic voting will be provided to every member and posted on the official State Bar of Georgia website at least ten days before any meeting to be held electronically.","UrlName":"rule317","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[{"Id":"3cdf5a27-d589-400a-a75c-7b61eb190c9c","ParentId":"51ad7581-bebc-4c3d-a602-c46bf3ecabf1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The members of the State Bar shall meet at least once each year at a time and place designated by the Board of Governors. That meeting shall be called the Annual Meeting.","UrlName":"revision310"}],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1b135031-6e52-4769-9131-6358292ac3fb","Title":"Section 1. Registration of Members.","Content":"Persons admitted by the courts to the practice of law shall, within 60 days after admission to the bar of the Superior Court, register with the State Bar of Georgia and pay a monthly pro-rated dues amount calculated from the date of the Superior Court admission through the remainder of the State Bar of Georgia’s fiscal year. If the date of admission is on or after May 15, the member shall not be required to pay any dues or assessments for the remainder of that fiscal year. Those members admitted by examination shall begin making the mandatory assessments outlined in Rules in the second full fiscal year following their admission.","UrlName":"rule309","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"c7a757d9-633e-4ad6-a62b-cdae0d5ceb96","ParentId":"1b135031-6e52-4769-9131-6358292ac3fb","Title":"Version 2","Content":" Persons admitted by the courts to the practice of law shall, within sixty days after admission to the bar of the Superior Court, register with the State Bar and pay a monthly pro-rated dues amount calculated from the date of the Superior Court admission through the remainder of the State Bar's fiscal year. ","UrlName":"revision150"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Title":"ARTICLE I MEMBERS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter45","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"1b135031-6e52-4769-9131-6358292ac3fb","Title":"Section 1. Registration of Members.","Content":"Persons admitted by the courts to the practice of law shall, within 60 days after admission to the bar of the Superior Court, register with the State Bar of Georgia and pay a monthly pro-rated dues amount calculated from the date of the Superior Court admission through the remainder of the State Bar of Georgia’s fiscal year. If the date of admission is on or after May 15, the member shall not be required to pay any dues or assessments for the remainder of that fiscal year. Those members admitted by examination shall begin making the mandatory assessments outlined in Rules in the second full fiscal year following their admission.","UrlName":"rule309","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"c7a757d9-633e-4ad6-a62b-cdae0d5ceb96","ParentId":"1b135031-6e52-4769-9131-6358292ac3fb","Title":"Version 2","Content":" Persons admitted by the courts to the practice of law shall, within sixty days after admission to the bar of the Superior Court, register with the State Bar and pay a monthly pro-rated dues amount calculated from the date of the Superior Court admission through the remainder of the State Bar's fiscal year. ","UrlName":"revision150"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e81fa00c-7c65-4003-9f48-31a86f43e5b7","Title":"Section 2. Active Members and Foreign Law Consultants.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>Only active members of the State Bar are entitled to give legal advice and otherwise practice law.</li> \n <li>Only foreign law consultants are entitled to give legal advice as authorized by their license.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule338","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"c1e39857-301b-4bab-9d0e-f8a118abfa98","ParentId":"e81fa00c-7c65-4003-9f48-31a86f43e5b7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>Only active members of the State Bar are entitled to give legal advice and otherwise practice law.</li> \n <li>Only foreign law consultants are entitled to give legal advice as authorized by their license.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision130"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fd7d3544-95ba-4007-b042-5b85fcb69600","Title":"Section 3. Inactive Members Status.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive members shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>pay annual dues as set forth in Bar Rule 1-502;</li> \n <li>be exempt from continuing legal education requirements, subject to the requirements in (b);</li> \n <li>affirmatively represent their status as inactive members of the State Bar of Georgia when any statement of State Bar membership is made;</li> \n <li>not hold themselves out as being able to practice law in Georgia or render advice on matters of Georgia law;</li> \n <li>not hold any position that requires the person to be a licensed Georgia lawyer;</li> \n <li>inactive members shall not nominate a member for office, hold any office, serve on a Standing or Special Committee, or as an officer of a Section. An inactive member shall not vote in a State Bar of Georgia election, or on any matter or proposal pending before an entity of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li> not receive State Bar of Georgia publications, including theGeorgia Bar Journal , unless the inactive member so requests; </li> \n <li>keep the membership department advised of their current name, address and phone number as provided in Bar Rule 1-207.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An inactive member in good standing may return to Active Member Status by contacting the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia and requesting a membership status change. Before being returned to Active Member Status, the Inactive Status Member shall pay the difference between inactive and active member dues for the year returned to active status, including any applicable fees and costs. An inactive member shall complete all unfulfilled continuing legal education requirements owed during the Bar year of being returned to Active Member Status.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule364","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"e676ef05-4a80-4666-959c-141e1b9085ab","ParentId":"fd7d3544-95ba-4007-b042-5b85fcb69600","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive members shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>pay annual dues as set forth in Bar Rule 1-502;</li> \n <li>be exempt from continuing legal education requirements (except for years in which the member is on active membership status for any part of the calendar year);</li> \n <li>affirmatively represent their status as inactive members of the State Bar of Georgia when any statement of State Bar membership is made;</li> \n <li>not hold themselves out as being able to practice law in Georgia or render advice on matters of Georgia law;</li> \n <li>not hold any position that requires the person to be a licensed Georgia attorney;</li> \n <li>not nominate a member for office, hold a State Bar office, hold a section or committee office, or vote on any candidate or proposal concerning the State Bar;</li> \n <li>not receive State Bar publications, including the State Bar Directory and State Bar Journal, unless the inactive member so requests;</li> \n <li>keep the membership department advised of their current name, address and phone number as provided in Bar Rule 1-207.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An inactive member in good standing may on application become an active member. The application shall be accompanied by payment of the dues of an active member for the year in which the change is made, less dues paid by the member for that year as an inactive member. In addition, the member must satisfy the continuing legal education requirements for the calendar year in which the member is on active status.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision24"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0f37991b-8a48-4e3c-b413-9a3cb6186dde","Title":"Section 4. Failure to Register.","Content":"(1) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant as defined in the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia, but who failed to register as required by the Rules and Article I, Section 1 of these Bylaws, shall be entitled to register at any time for a period one year after the day upon which the person first became eligible upon the following terms and conditions:\n (a) the payment of the dues for the year in which the applicant registers, together with unpaid dues for any previous year, should the period of time in which the applicant failed to register, extend between two fiscal years of the State Bar, plus a late fee of $100; and \n \n(b) the submission of an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules concerning registration, that the applicant has not practiced law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, and that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration; or \n \n(c) in the event the applicant cannot aver that he or she did not practice law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant actually registered, the applicant shall submit an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules and that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules concerning registration. The affidavit shall also provide a detailed description of the applicant's practice of law during the period and state that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration. A copy of the affidavit shall be supplied to either the Standing Committee or District Committee for the Unauthorized Practice of Law.\n(2) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant as defined in the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia, but who failed to register within one year, but less than three years of the date the applicant was first eligible as required by the Rules and these Bylaws, shall be entitled to register upon the following terms and conditions:\n (a) the payment of the dues for the year in which the applicant registers, payment of all unpaid dues for all past years at the active member level, and payment of a late fee of $100 for the year in which the applicant registers plus $100 per year for all past years; \n \n(b) submission of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants; and \n \n(c) the submission of an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules concerning registration, that the applicant has not practiced law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, and that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration; or \n \n(d) in the event the applicant cannot aver that he or she did not practice law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, the applicant shall submit an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules and that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules concerning registration. The affidavit shall also provide a detailed description of the applicant's practice of law during the period, and state that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration. A copy of the affidavit shall be supplied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants and either the Standing Committee or District Committee for the Unauthorized Practice of Law.\n(3) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant in Georgia as defined in the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia, but who failed to register within three years of the date the applicant was first eligible must follow the rules of the Office of Bar Admissions for admission to the practice of law in this state.","UrlName":"rule373","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"ad6ef3b5-4c46-46b7-ace5-ad67a1863a23","ParentId":"0f37991b-8a48-4e3c-b413-9a3cb6186dde","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(1) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant as defined in the Rules of the State Bar, but who failed to register as required by the Rules and Article I, Section 1 of these Bylaws, shall be entitled to register at any time for a period one year after the day upon which the person first became eligible upon the following terms and conditions:\n \n(a) the payment of the dues for the year in which the applicant registers, together with unpaid dues for any previous year should the period of time in which the applicant failed to register extend between two fiscal years of the State Bar, plus a late fee of $100.00; and \n \n(b) the submission of an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules with respect to registration, that the applicant has not practiced law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, and that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration; or \n \n(c) in the event the applicant cannot aver that he or she did not practice law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant actually registered, the applicant shall submit an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, and that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules with respect to registration. The affidavit shall also provide a detailed description of the applicant's practice of law during the period, and state that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration. A copy of the affidavit shall be supplied to either the Standing Committee or District Committee for the Unauthorized Practice of Law.\n \n(2) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant as defined in the Rules of the State Bar, but who failed to register within one year of the date the applicant was first eligible as required by the Rules and these Bylaws, shall be entitled to register within five years of becoming eligible upon the following terms and conditions:\n \n(a) the payment of the dues for the year in which the applicant registers, payment of all unpaid dues for all past years at the active member level, and payment of a late fee of $100 for the year in which the applicant registers plus $100 per year for all past years; \n \n(b) submission of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants; and \n \n(c) the submission of an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules with respect to registration, that the applicant has not practiced law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, and that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration; or \n \n(d) in the event the applicant cannot aver that he or she did not practice law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, the applicant shall submit an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules and that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules with respect to registration. The affidavit shall also provide a detailed description of the applicant's practice of law during the period, and state that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration. A copy of the affidavit shall be supplied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants and either the Standing Committee or District Committee for the Unauthorized Practice of Law\n \n(3) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant in Georgia as defined in the Rules of the State Bar, but who failed to register within five years of the date the applicant was first eligible as required by the Rules and these Bylaws, may apply to the Executive Committee for permission to register without reapplying to the Office of Bar Admissions. The Executive Committee shall have complete discretion in considering such application and may impose such requirements, restrictions and qualifications, including penalty fees and past dues, upon the applicant as it deems appropriate. In the event the Executive Committee denies or refuses to consider such waiver application, the person shall be required to reapply to the Office of Bar Admissions.","UrlName":"revision306"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"768983c8-0cf2-4778-bb5e-f604bc25c146","Title":"Section 5. List of Active Members.","Content":"As soon as practical after July 1 of each year, the State Bar shall furnish a copy of the membership directory to the clerks of every court of record in the State. On or before November 1, the State Bar shall furnish to the clerks of every court of record in the State a list of members of all membership categories, who are for any reason not in good standing with the State Bar. No later than six months after November 1 of each year, the State Bar shall update the list of members who are not in good standing and furnish the list to the clerks of the courts of records. A lawyer not in good standing shall be prohibited from appearing as counsel in any court, filing papers therein, or otherwise practicing law, unless and until that lawyer has a certificate from the Executive Director of the State Bar stating that he or she has become an active member in good standing. The list of all registered lawyers in good standing within the State shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and the clerks of the various federal courts in Georgia.  ","UrlName":"rule402","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c814c77c-d1e6-42a9-871c-0965cd47d9ba","Title":"Section 6. Affiliate Membership and Law Student Membership.","Content":"In addition to the classes of membership provided in Rule 1-202, Organization of the State Bar and Admissions, the Board of Governors or the Executive Committee may consider and approve or disapprove applications for Affiliate or Law Student membership with the State Bar of Georgia. Affiliate and Law Student members shall have the right to attend State Bar of Georgia meetings and receive State Bar official publications. Neither Affiliate nor Law Student members may hold office, vote or have any other rights and privileges incident to the membership classes set forth in Rule 1-202 with the State Bar of Georgia. Affiliate or Law Student members shall not hold themselves out or imply to the public, courts or members of the legal profession that they are members of the State Bar of Georgia as defined in Rule 1-202 of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar retains the right to deny or revoke the membership privileges of any Affiliate or Law Student member who violates this Section.\n(a) Affiliate Membership. The application form for an Affiliate shall include a recommendation signed by an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. Affiliate membership may be renewed each Bar year without additional application. The Board of Governors may set an amount of annual dues or fees for Affiliate membership. Affiliate membership shall be approved only when the applicant is a Domestic Lawyer who is in good standing in all jurisdictions in which he or she is licensed, is an employee of the government, the armed services, a private or commercial institution or a law school, and is not otherwise authorized to practice law in Georgia.\n(b) Law Student Membership. The application form for a Law Student member shall include a certification by the applicant that he or she is a student in good standing at an ABA accredited law school in Georgia. Law Student membership may be renewed each Bar year by certifying to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia that the student is currently enrolled in law school and in good standing. The Board of Governors may set annual dues or fees for Law Student membership.","UrlName":"rule333","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"7e914e44-334d-41a7-a219-6069a2df5367","ParentId":"c814c77c-d1e6-42a9-871c-0965cd47d9ba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In addition to the classes of membership provided in the preceding sections of this Article, the Board of Governors or the Executive Committee of the Board may consider and approve or disapprove applications for Affiliate or Law Student membership with the State Bar. Any Affiliate member or Law Student member shall have the right to attend State Bar meetings and receive State Bar official publications, but shall not have the right to hold office or vote or have other rights and privileges incident to membership. An Affiliate or Law Student member shall not hold himself or herself out to the public or imply in any manner that he or she is a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia or entitled to practice law in this State. An Affiliate or Law Student member shall not use his or her membership number for any purpose other than communicating with the State Bar. The State Bar retains the right to deny or revoke the membership privileges of any Affiliate or Law Student member who violates this Section. \n \nThe application form for an Affiliate or Law Student membership shall include the recommendation of the applicant by an active member in good standing of the State Bar. Affiliate or Law Student membership may be renewed each fiscal year without additional application. The Board of Governors shall prescribe the dues or fees for Affiliate or Law Student membership. Affiliate membership shall be approved only when the applicant is licensed to practice law in another state or the District of Columbia, and is in good standing in all jurisdictions in which he or she is licensed, and is an employee of government, the armed services, a private or commercial institution or a law school, and is not otherwise authorized to practice law in Georgia. Application to become a Law Student member shall be approved when the applicant is enrolled in a law school approved by the American Bar Association or the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners.","UrlName":"revision152"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f8f9ac38-7fc1-4861-913e-61f67d536ce0","Title":"Section 7. Emeritus Members.","Content":" In addition to the classes of membership provided in the preceding sections of this Article, the Membership Department may approve or disapprove applications for emeritus member status as provided for in Rule 1-202 (d) of the Bar Rules. Applications for emeritus membership shall be on forms prescribed by the Membership Department. \n \nEmeritus membership shall have the same privileges, rights, duties and responsibilities as active membership, except that emeritus members shall not give legal advice or otherwise practice law, except as set out in Rule 1-202 (d), nor hold office in the State Bar of Georgia.\n Emeritus members may be required to pay section dues at the option of each section of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \nAt the sole discretion of the Membership Department, a member who attains the age of 70 years during a Bar year, and who has been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, may be placed in emeritus status in the event the Membership Department is unable to locate or contact the qualifying member and provided there is no pending disciplinary action against the member.","UrlName":"rule348","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"e001f4f0-fb71-46fc-b850-481ab0fe0259","ParentId":"f8f9ac38-7fc1-4861-913e-61f67d536ce0","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In addition to the classes of membership provided in the preceding sections of this Article, the Membership Department may approve or disapprove applications for emeritus member status as provided for in Rule 1-202(d) of the Bar Rules. Applications for emeritus membership shall be on forms prescribed by the Membership Department. \n \nEmeritus membership shall have the same privileges, rights, duties and responsibilities as active membership, except that emeritus members shall not give legal advice or otherwise practice law, except as set out in Rule 1-202(d), nominate a member for office or hold office in the State Bar, or vote on any candidate for elected position in or proposal concerning the State Bar.\n Emeritus members may be required to pay section dues at the option of each section of the State Bar. \n \nAt the sole discretion of the Membership Department, a member who has attained the age of 70 years, and who has been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, may be placed in emeritus status in the event the Membership Department is unable to locate or contact the qualifying member and provided there is no pending disciplinary action against the member.","UrlName":"revision154"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0f3dc665-6a63-4b41-a3ab-7f20694c49c3","Title":"Section 8. Active Duty Traditional Guardsmen or Reservists.","Content":"The Executive Committee may provide an annual waiver of dues to Traditional Guardsmen or Traditional Reservists who have been called to active duty and whose activation or deployment is causing a financial hardship. The policies and procedures for requesting such waiver shall be determined by the Executive Committee.","UrlName":"rule354","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ef8fa604-21ec-4c6f-b0c0-43809a85038c","Title":"Section 9. Retired Status Member","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is not engaged in the active practice of law in any state, district, or territory of the United States may transfer to Retired Status by submitting a request in writing to the Executive Director and General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon approval by the Executive Director and General Counsel the Membership Department shall transfer the member to Retired Status. A member in Retired Status shall not be entitled to practice law in this state and may not practice law in any other jurisdiction. Further, such members shall not be eligible to vote or hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. Any member transferred to Retired Status shall be relieved of their membership fees and CLE obligations.</li> \n <li>A request for Retired Status must be unqualified, is irrevocable and permanent. A member in Retired Status will appear in the State Bar of Georgia member directory as “Retired.”</li> \n <li>A member of the State Bar of Georgia with a pending disciplinary matter may transfer to Retired Status with the consent of the Office of the General Counsel. Grievances received after a member has transferred to Retired Status may be investigated and prosecuted through the disciplinary process at the option of the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li>Members who are suspended from the practice of law because of failure to meet CLE requirements or failure to pay Bar membership fees are not eligible for Retired Status until the suspension is lifted.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule606","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3776ae52-c88b-4540-8cc2-41904adeca71","Title":"Section 10. Members Unable to Practice Law Due to a Disability","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>For the purposes of this section, a “Member with a Disability” is defined as a lawyer who has a physical or mental impairment that has a substantial and long-term effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.</li> \n <li> Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is temporarily or permanently disabled may submit to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia a written request to be transferred to Disabled Status. Members who elect this status must submit adequate medical and/or psychological documentation of their disability with the written request. Adequate documentation includes: (a) Documentation from Social Security of approval of disability; (b) Documentation from an insurance company of receipt of benefits based upon disability; (c) Documentation from a medical doctor that the member is disabled; (d) Other documentation from a licensed medical professional providing proof of disability. \n Members electing Disabled Status shall not be entitled to practice law in this state, or to vote or hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. Any member transferred to Disabled Status is relieved of their obligation to pay license fees and to complete the required annual CLE hours. </li> \n <li>A Disabled Status member may submit a written petition to the Executive Committee for reinstatement to another membership status. The petition must include sufficient information from a medical professional for the Executive Committee to review that professional’s determination that the member’s disability is no longer substantial and/or having long-term effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. If the member seeks Active status, he or she must provide documentation from a licensed medical professional showing that the member no longer qualifies for Disabled Status. Medical and/or psychological information provided pursuant to this subparagraph is confidential and shall not be disclosed by the Bar absent satisfactory written permission or a court order.</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia shall consider and act on any petition from a Disabled Status member in disabled status seeking reinstatement to another membership status, taking into account the recommendation of the Executive Director and General Counsel. If there are any grievances or disciplinary matters pending when the Executive Committee receives a petition for reinstatement or if there is credible evidence that the member appears to continue to suffer from a disability, the Executive Committee shall defer consideration of the petition until those issues are fully resolved.</li> \n <li>If the Executive Committee approves the petition, the member shall be returned to the membership status of their choice upon payment of the appropriate membership fees, satisfaction of any other required membership obligations, and payment of any outstanding financial obligations to the Bar. Before being reinstated to Active Status, the member must complete Continuing Legal Education for the year reinstatement is being sought.</li> \n <li>The Membership Department shall not be required to verify disability beyond the initial determination under this section. A member who has been transferred to Disabled Status shall remain in that status unless the status is changed pursuant to this section. A member transferred to Disabled Status will appear as “Inactive” on the State Bar of Georgia website and the Bar will respond to requests about the current status of the Disabled Status member by stating that the member is “Inactive Status.”</li> \n <li>Disability Status under this section does not toll any disciplinary proceeding that occurs before or after a member elects Disabled Status.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule607","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"8144b7fa-6279-4729-b8ff-3208b55c7a21","Title":"Rule 5-201. Effective Date","Content":" These rules, as recodified, shall be effective January 1, 1977 except that Part IV, Chapter 2, Disciplinary Proceedings, shall be effective April 1, 1977; provided, however, any complaints pending before grievance tribunals on such date shall be handled to conclusion under the disciplinary proceedings now in effect. ","UrlName":"rule171","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bb6b0b77-e980-439b-8eda-01f15008d55c","Title":"Rule 5-101. Amendment; Filing, Notice.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Supreme Court of Georgia may, on motion of the State Bar of Georgia, amend the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia at any time; provided, however, that no motion to amend these rules may be filed until 30 days after a notice setting forth the proposed amendment has been published in the Georgia Bar Journal or on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia. The said notice shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the date after which the motion to amend these rules shall be filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the verbatim text of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a statement that the publication of the proposal to amend these rules is intended to comply with the notice requirement of this rule;</li> \n <li>a statement that any objection to the proposed amendment shall be made only in accordance with Bar Rule 5-102.</li> \n </ol> \nAt the same time that notice is published to its membership, the State Bar of Georgia shall file a copy of such notice with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule167","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"c9996385-c078-48a5-a447-cc8ef863b6f0","ParentId":"bb6b0b77-e980-439b-8eda-01f15008d55c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Supreme Court of Georgia may, on motion of the State Bar of Georgia, amend the rules of the State Bar of Georgia at any time; provided, however, that no motion to amend these rules may be filed until thirty (30) days after a notice setting forth the proposed amendment has been published in the Georgia Bar Journal or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia. The said notice shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the date upon which the motion to amend these rules shall be filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the verbatim text of the said motion as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a statement that the publication of the said motion to amend these rules is intended to comply with the notice requirement of this rule;</li> \n <li>a statement that any objection to the proposed amendment shall be made only in accordance with Rule 5-102.</li> \n </ol> \nAt the same time that notice is sent to its membership, the State Bar of Georgia shall file a copy of such a notice with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"revision21"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Title":"CHAPTER 1 AMENDMENT","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter15","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"bb6b0b77-e980-439b-8eda-01f15008d55c","Title":"Rule 5-101. Amendment; Filing, Notice.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Supreme Court of Georgia may, on motion of the State Bar of Georgia, amend the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia at any time; provided, however, that no motion to amend these rules may be filed until 30 days after a notice setting forth the proposed amendment has been published in the Georgia Bar Journal or on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia. The said notice shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the date after which the motion to amend these rules shall be filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the verbatim text of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a statement that the publication of the proposal to amend these rules is intended to comply with the notice requirement of this rule;</li> \n <li>a statement that any objection to the proposed amendment shall be made only in accordance with Bar Rule 5-102.</li> \n </ol> \nAt the same time that notice is published to its membership, the State Bar of Georgia shall file a copy of such notice with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule167","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"c9996385-c078-48a5-a447-cc8ef863b6f0","ParentId":"bb6b0b77-e980-439b-8eda-01f15008d55c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Supreme Court of Georgia may, on motion of the State Bar of Georgia, amend the rules of the State Bar of Georgia at any time; provided, however, that no motion to amend these rules may be filed until thirty (30) days after a notice setting forth the proposed amendment has been published in the Georgia Bar Journal or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia. The said notice shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the date upon which the motion to amend these rules shall be filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the verbatim text of the said motion as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a statement that the publication of the said motion to amend these rules is intended to comply with the notice requirement of this rule;</li> \n <li>a statement that any objection to the proposed amendment shall be made only in accordance with Rule 5-102.</li> \n </ol> \nAt the same time that notice is sent to its membership, the State Bar of Georgia shall file a copy of such a notice with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"revision21"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9e6fd451-bd43-48ad-a02d-9da3806827d9","Title":"Rule 5-102. Objection to Amendment.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall be entitled to file a written objection to any motion to amend these rules by the State Bar of Georgia. Each objection shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the grounds on which the objection is based;</li> \n <li>a request for oral argument on the proposed amendment if such argument is desired by the objecting member.</li> \n </ol> \nAll written objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia before the date which the State Bar of Georgia has designated for filing its said motion to amend these rules under Bar Rule 5-101. Any member filing a written objection shall serve the State Bar of Georgia with a copy thereof by mailing the same to the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the address of its headquarters.</div>","UrlName":"rule168","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0863f3ed-29f9-4771-9797-6b0a9a5737db","ParentId":"9e6fd451-bd43-48ad-a02d-9da3806827d9","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall be entitled to file a written objection to any motion to amend these rules by the State Bar of Georgia. Each objection shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the grounds on which the objection is based;</li> \n <li>a request for oral argument on the proposed amendment if such argument is desired by the objecting member.</li> \n </ol> \nAll written objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia before the date which the State Bar of Georgia has designated for filing its said motion to amend these rules under Rule 5-101. Any member filing a written objection shall serve the State Bar of Georgia with a copy thereof by mailing the same to the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the address of its headquarters.</div>","UrlName":"revision22"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"aa1de930-30e2-4985-b0fc-72efb20a3d5e","Title":"Rule 5-103. Oral Argument.","Content":" The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant or refuse the objecting member's request for oral argument on the State Bar of Georgia's proposed amendment to these rules at its sole discretion. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall notify the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia and the objecting member of the date of any oral argument granted by the Supreme Court of Georgia under the provisions of Rule 23 (b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule169","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48e67660-4f39-4365-8c8c-36998b4395dd","Title":"Rule 5-104. Dues Increase or Decrease; Special Procedure.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In addition to the procedures described in Bar Rules 5-101 through 5-103, at least 30 days notice shall be given to the membership of the State Bar of Georgia in the Georgia State Bar Journal, the Georgia State Bar News or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia of any meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which amendment of Bar Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) will be considered and acted upon. The notice to the general membership of the State Bar of Georgia shall contain: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a statement that the amendment of Bar Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) shall be considered by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a verbatim copy of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the date, time and location of the meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which such amendment will be considered;</li> \n <li>a statement that each member of the State Bar of Georgia has a right to present his views concerning the proposed amendment either through his circuit representative to the Board of Governors or in person before such Board; and</li> \n <li>the address to which all written objections to the proposed amendment may be sent.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule170","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3b270332-51e2-44fe-afa4-00de51a41155","ParentId":"48e67660-4f39-4365-8c8c-36998b4395dd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In addition to the procedures described in Rules 5-101 through 5-103, at least thirty (30) days notice shall be given to the membership of the State Bar of Georgia in the Georgia State Bar Journal, the Georgia State Bar News or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia of any meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which amendment of Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) will be considered and acted upon. The notice to the general membership of the State Bar of Georgia shall contain: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a statement that the amendment of Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) shall be considered by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a verbatim copy of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the date, time and location of the meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which such amendment will be considered;</li> \n <li>a statement that each member of the State Bar of Georgia has a right to present his views concerning the proposed amendment either through his circuit representative to the Board of Governors or in person before such Board; and</li> \n <li>the address to which all written objections to the proposed amendment may be sent.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision23"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"833c2dff-d778-433d-b2f3-1a28757f9761","Title":"Rule 2-101. Admission to the Bar.","Content":"No person may be admitted to the State Bar as an active, emeritus or inactive member, or licensed as an attorney to practice law in this State without complying with the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule44","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","Title":"CHAPTER 1 ADMISSION TO THE BAR","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter12","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"833c2dff-d778-433d-b2f3-1a28757f9761","Title":"Rule 2-101. Admission to the Bar.","Content":"No person may be admitted to the State Bar as an active, emeritus or inactive member, or licensed as an attorney to practice law in this State without complying with the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule44","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3e4100fb-91e1-44cc-8aa2-26700a3da0e3","Title":"Rule 1-801. Annual Meeting","Content":"An annual meeting of the State Bar of Georgia shall be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors. If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct an annual meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.","UrlName":"rule31","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"b40839a4-68b8-4d10-b299-46188736281c","ParentId":"3e4100fb-91e1-44cc-8aa2-26700a3da0e3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An annual meeting of the State Bar of Georgia shall be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors. ","UrlName":"revision341"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"29a3a882-d203-4d2d-b038-a709ae60df3d","Title":"Rule 1-701. Executive Committee","Content":" There shall be an Executive Committee composed of such officers and members of the Board of Governors as may be designated in the bylaws, which shall exercise the powers and duties of the Board of Governors when it is not in session, subject to such limitations as the bylaws may provide. The Executive Committee shall also have the authority to supervise the election of the members of the Board of Governors as outlined in Bar Rule 1-304 hereof, and, in particular, to ascertain on or after the first day of January of each year, the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who reside in each judicial circuit as of the last day in December of the preceding year; and thereupon to make a determination of whether any judicial circuit may be entitled to additional members of the Board of Governors as provided in Bar Rule 1-302 (b) hereof. In addition, whenever a new judicial circuit is created, the Executive Committee shall determine, under the provisions of Bar Rule 1-302 (b) and the bylaws, the number of members of the Board of Governors the new circuit is entitled to elect and shall supervise the elections of such members. In the event that the composition of the Board of Governors must be changed, as a result of an increase or decrease in the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who reside in each judicial circuit, as a result of the creation of a new judicial circuit, or as a result of a change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit, the Executive Committee is empowered to take appropriate action to insure that the composition of the Board complies with the provisions of Bar Rule 1-302 (b), including but not limited to the implementing of the election of additional members and the designation of numerical posts. The Executive Committee shall generally have broad discretionary powers in the conduct of elections. \n ","UrlName":"rule95","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"55dee768-bc9a-4288-b9fe-4cc0de22708b","Title":"Rule 1-601","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia may adopt or amend the bylaws at any members meeting not inconsistent with these Rules or the bylaws.","UrlName":"rule88","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4059c13-657f-433e-8e1a-e6f6f6a08f9d","ParentId":"55dee768-bc9a-4288-b9fe-4cc0de22708b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia, at its first annual meeting, shall adopt bylaws as directed herein, and at such meeting and any subsequent annual, annual midyear, or special meeting may adopt such other bylaws not inconsistent herewith as it may deem necessary and proper and may amend its bylaws from time to time. ","UrlName":"revision387"}],"Ancestors":["c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"368390e6-0a86-42fb-8f3d-bff6e9654e7d","Title":"Rule 1-501. License Fees","Content":"(a) Annual license fees for membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall be due and payable on July 1 of each year. Upon the failure of a member to pay the license fee by September 1, the member shall cease to be a member in good standing. When such license fees, including any late fees, costs, charges or penalties incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind for the current and prior years have been paid in full, the member shall automatically be reinstated to the status of member in good standing, except as provided in subsection (b) of this rule.\n(b) In the event a member of the State Bar of Georgia is delinquent in the payment of any license fee, late fee, assessment, reinstatement fee, or cost, charge or penalty incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind and of any nature for a period of one year, the member shall be automatically suspended, and shall not practice law in this state. The suspended member may thereafter lift such suspension only upon the successful completion of all of the following terms and conditions:\n(1)  payment of all outstanding dues, assessments, late fees, reinstatement fees, and any and all penalties due and owing before or accruing after the suspension of membership;\n(2) provision to the membership section of the State Bar of Georgia of the following:\n (i) a certificate from the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia that the suspended member is not presently subject to any disciplinary procedure; \n(ii) a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; \n(iii) a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants;\n(3)  payment to the State Bar of Georgia of a non-waivable reinstatement fee as follows:\n (i)  $150 for the first reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $150 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(ii)  $250 for the second reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $250 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(iii)  $500 for the third reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $500 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; or \n(iv)  $750 for each subsequent reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $750 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years.\nThe yearly increase in the reinstatement fee shall become due and owing in its entirety upon the first day of each next fiscal year and shall not be prorated for any fraction of the fiscal year in which it is actually paid.\nA member who has been suspended pursuant to this rule may submit in writing to the Executive Committee a request for an extension of time to complete any of the requirements contained in subsection (b). The request must state with particularity the reasons and need for the extension. The Executive Committee, upon sufficient and reasonable cause, may grant such an extension.\n(c)  A member suspended under subsection (b) above for a total of five years in succession shall be immediately terminated as a member without further action on the part of the State Bar of Georgia. The terminated member shall not be entitled to a hearing as set out in subsection (d) below. The terminated member shall be required to apply for membership to the Office of Bar Admissions for readmission to the State Bar of Georgia. Upon completion of the requirements for readmission, the terminated member shall be required to pay the total reinstatement fee due under subsection (b) (3) above plus an additional $750 as a readmission fee to the State Bar of Georgia.\n (d)  Prior to suspending a member under subsection (b) above, the State Bar of Georgia shall send by certified mail a notice thereof to the last known address of the member as contained in the official membership records. It shall specify the years for which the license fee is delinquent and state that unless either the fee and all penalties related thereto are paid within 60 days or a hearing to establish reasonable cause is requested within 60 days, the membership shall be suspended. \n \nIf a hearing is requested, it shall be held at State Bar of Georgia Headquarters within 90 days of receipt of the request by the Executive Committee. Notice of time and place of the hearing shall be mailed at least ten days in advance. The party cited may be represented by counsel. Witnesses shall be sworn; and, if requested by the party cited, a complete electronic record or a transcript shall be made of all proceedings and testimony. The expense of the record shall be paid by the party requesting it, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the Executive Committee. The presiding member or Special Master shall have the authority to rule on all motions, objections, and other matters presented in connection with the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure, and the practice in the trial of civil cases. The party cited may not be required to testify over his or her objection. \n \nThe Executive Committee shall (1) make findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall determine whether the party cited was delinquent in violation of Bar Rule 1-501; and (2) upon a finding of delinquency shall determine whether there was reasonable cause for the delinquency. Financial hardship short of adjudicated bankruptcy shall not constitute reasonable cause. A copy of the findings and the determination shall be sent to the party cited. If it is determined that no delinquency has occurred, the matter shall be dismissed. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred but that there was reasonable cause therefor, the matter shall be deferred for one year at which time the matter will be reconsidered. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred without reasonable cause therefor, the membership shall be suspended immediately upon such determination. An appropriate notice of suspension shall be sent to the clerks of all Georgia courts and shall be published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia. Alleged errors of law in the proceedings or findings of the Executive Committee or its delegate shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Executive Committee may delegate to a special master any or all of its responsibilities and authority with respect to suspending membership for license fee delinquency in which event the Special Master shall make a report to the Committee of its findings for its approval or disapproval. \n \nAfter a finding of delinquency, a copy of the finding shall be served upon the respondent attorney. The respondent attorney may file with the Supreme Court of Georgia any written exceptions (supported by the written argument) said respondent may have to the findings of the Executive Committee. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and served on the Executive Committee by service on the General Counsel within 20 days of the date that the findings were served on the respondent attorney. Upon the filing of exceptions by the respondent attorney, the Executive Committee shall within 20 days of said filing file a report of its findings and the complete record and transcript of evidence with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant extensions of time for filing in appropriate cases. Findings of fact by the Executive Committee shall be conclusive if supported by any evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by the respondent attorney or the Executive Committee. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall promptly consider the report of the Executive Committee, exceptions thereto, and the responses filed by any party to such exceptions, if any, and enter its judgment. A copy of the Supreme Court of Georgia's judgment shall be transmitted to the Executive Committee and to the respondent attorney by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \nWithin 30 days after a final judgment which suspends membership, the suspended member shall, under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, notify all clients of said suspended member's inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of said suspended member's clients. Should the suspended member fail to notify said clients or fail to protect their interests as herein required, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its motion, or upon the motion of the State Bar of Georgia, and after ten-days notice to the suspended member and proof of failure to notify or protect said clients, may hold the suspended member in contempt and order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of said suspended member and proceed to notify all clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Any member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia to take charge of the files and records of the suspended member under these rules shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule46","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[{"Id":"77fcd2ae-0fc0-4dbe-8e70-562b6da23d37","ParentId":"368390e6-0a86-42fb-8f3d-bff6e9654e7d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) Annual license fees for membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall be due and payable on July 1 of each year. Upon the failure of a member to pay the license fee by September 1, the member shall cease to be a member in good standing. When such license fees, including any late fees, costs, charges or penalties incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind for the current and prior years have been paid in full, the member shall automatically be reinstated to the status of member in good standing, except as provided in subsection (b) of this Rule. \n(b) In the event a member of the State Bar of Georgia is delinquent in the payment of any license fee, late fee, assessment, reinstatement fee, or cost, charge or penalty incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind and of any nature for a period of one year, the member shall be automatically suspended, and shall not practice law in this state. The suspended member may thereafter lift such suspension only upon the successful completion of all of the following terms and conditions: \n(1)  payment of all outstanding dues, assessments, late fees, reinstatement fees, and any and all penalties due and owing before or accruing after the suspension of membership; \n(2) provision to the membership section of the State Bar of Georgia of the following: \n (i) a certificate from the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia that the suspended member is not presently subject to any disciplinary procedure; \n(ii) a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; \n(iii) a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants; \n(3)  payment to the State Bar of Georgia of a non-waivable reinstatement fee as follows: \n (i)  $150 for the first reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $150 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(ii)  $250 for the second reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $250 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(iii)  $500 for the third reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $500 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; or \n(iv)  $750 for each subsequent reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $750 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years. \nThe yearly increase in the reinstatement fee shall become due and owing in its entirety upon the first day of each next fiscal year and shall not be prorated for any fraction of the fiscal year in which it is actually paid. \nA member who has been suspended pursuant to this Rule may submit in writing to the Executive Committee a request for an extension of time to complete any of the requirements contained in subsection (b). The request must state with particularity the reasons and need for the extension. The Executive Committee, upon sufficient and reasonable cause, may grant such an extension. \n(c)  A member suspended under subsection (b) above for a total of five years in succession shall be immediately terminated as a member without further action on the part of the State Bar of Georgia. The terminated member shall not be entitled to a hearing as set out in subsection (d) below. The terminated member shall be required to apply for membership to the Office of Bar Admissions for readmission to the State Bar of Georgia. Upon completion of the requirements for readmission, the terminated member shall be required to pay the total reinstatement fee due under subsection (b) (3) above plus an additional $750 as a readmission fee to the State Bar of Georgia. \n (d)  Prior to suspending a member under subsection (b) above, the State Bar of Georgia shall send by certified mail a notice thereof to the last known address of the member as contained in the official membership records. It shall specify the years for which the license fee is delinquent and state that unless either the fee and all penalties related thereto are paid within 60 days or a hearing to establish reasonable cause is requested within 60 days, the membership shall be suspended. \n \nIf a hearing is requested, it shall be held at State Bar of Georgia Headquarters within 90 days of receipt of the request by the Executive Committee. Notice of time and place of the hearing shall be mailed at least ten days in advance. The party cited may be represented by counsel. Witnesses shall be sworn; and, if requested by the party cited, a complete electronic record or a transcript shall be made of all proceedings and testimony. The expense of the record shall be paid by the party requesting it, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the Executive Committee. The presiding member or Special Master shall have the authority to rule on all motions, objections, and other matters presented in connection with the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure, and the practice in the trial of civil cases. The party cited may not be required to testify over his or her objection. \n \nThe Executive Committee shall (1) make findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall determine whether the party cited was delinquent in violation of  Rule 1-501; and (2) upon a finding of delinquency shall determine whether there was reasonable cause for the delinquency. Financial hardship short of adjudicated bankruptcy shall not constitute reasonable cause. A copy of the findings and the determination shall be sent to the party cited. If it is determined that no delinquency has occurred, the matter shall be dismissed. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred but that there was reasonable cause therefor, the matter shall be deferred for one year at which time the matter will be reconsidered. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred without reasonable cause therefor, the membership shall be suspended immediately upon such determination. An appropriate notice of suspension shall be sent to the clerks of all Georgia courts and shall be published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia. Alleged errors of law in the proceedings or findings of the Executive Committee or its delegate shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Executive Committee may delegate to a special master any or all of its responsibilities and authority with respect to suspending membership for license fee delinquency in which event the Special Master shall make a report to the Committee of its findings for its approval or disapproval. \n \nAfter a finding of delinquency, a copy of the finding shall be served upon the respondent attorney. The respondent attorney may file with the Court any written exceptions (supported by the written argument) said respondent may have to the findings of the Executive Committee. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and served on the Executive Committee by service on the General Counsel within 20 days of the date that the findings were served on the respondent attorney. Upon the filing of exceptions by the respondent attorney, the Executive Committee shall within 20 days of said filing file a report of its findings and the complete record and transcript of evidence with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant extensions of time for filing in appropriate cases. Findings of fact by the Executive Committee shall be conclusive if supported by any evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by the respondent attorney or the Executive Committee. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall promptly consider the report of the Executive Committee, exceptions thereto, and the responses filed by any party to such exceptions, if any, and enter its judgment. A copy of the Supreme Court of Georgia's judgment shall be transmitted to the Executive Committee and to the respondent attorney by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \nWithin 30 days after a final judgment which suspends membership, the suspended member shall, under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, notify all clients of said suspended member's inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of said suspended member's clients. Should the suspended member fail to notify said clients or fail to protect their interests as herein required, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its motion, or upon the motion of the State Bar of Georgia, and after ten days notice to the suspended member and proof of failure to notify or protect said clients, may hold the suspended member in contempt and order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of said suspended member and proceed to notify all clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Any member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia to take charge of the files and records of the suspended member under these Rules shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia. </div>","UrlName":"revision18"}],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"53e7f7a3-b877-465b-aafb-d2b93415e95b","Title":"Rule 1-401. Designation and Terms","Content":"The officers of the State Bar of Georgia shall include a President, a President-elect, a Secretary, and a Treasurer and may include such other officers as may be specified in the bylaws. The President-elect, the Secretary and the Treasurer shall be elected by the membership in accordance with the bylaws and the results published at the annual meeting. The Secretary and Treasurer shall serve until the next annual meeting. The President-elect shall succeed to the presidency at the next annual meeting. If there is no President-elect, a President shall also be elected at the same time and in the same manner as the other officers. In the event of death or resignation of the President, the President-elect shall succeed to the presidency, shall serve out the unexpired term, and shall continue to serve for the term during which he would regularly have served as President. The officers shall have duties, rights, and powers as the bylaws may provide.","UrlName":"rule36","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a8836307-7cb1-4e2a-8f72-17deed13e04c","Title":"Rule 1-301. Government by the Board of Governors","Content":"The government of the State Bar of Georgia shall be vested in a Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule23","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f1dc3d58-7f1e-4a81-93ca-6f4eda03d2da","Title":"Rule 1-201. Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> All persons now or hereafter who are: \n <ol> \n <li>authorized to practice law in this State or;</li> \n <li>authorized to act as a Foreign Legal Consultant shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule11","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5184bedf-ae75-47de-9fba-0723f7ea48c4","Title":"Rule 1-101. Creation","Content":"Pursuant to the authority of this court and the Act of the General Assembly approved by the Governor on March 11, 1963 (Georgia Laws 1963, page 70) the State Bar of Georgia is hereby created and established.","UrlName":"rule6","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Title":"CHAPTER 1 CREATION AND ORGANIZATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter3","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"5184bedf-ae75-47de-9fba-0723f7ea48c4","Title":"Rule 1-101. Creation","Content":"Pursuant to the authority of this court and the Act of the General Assembly approved by the Governor on March 11, 1963 (Georgia Laws 1963, page 70) the State Bar of Georgia is hereby created and established.","UrlName":"rule6","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b7d724f8-0863-4dbf-8187-660d1b24a48d","Title":"Rule 1-102. Powers","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia shall be a legal entity; may sue and be sued; shall have perpetual existence; may contract; may purchase, receive, lease, acquire, own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal with real and personal property and any legal or equitable interest in property, wherever located; may sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property; may adopt and use an official seal; shall establish a principal office; and shall have such other powers, privileges and duties as may be reasonable and necessary for the proper fulfillment of its purposes.","UrlName":"rule7","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"127c5c68-7426-4f25-9d59-939a522a49c4","Title":"Rule 1-103. Purposes","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the State Bar of Georgia shall be: \n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>to foster among the members of the bar of this State the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to improve the administration of justice; and</li> \n <li>to advance the science of law.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule8","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[{"Id":"9fb13d29-239c-42e5-b02d-b83b1c3ae11e","ParentId":"127c5c68-7426-4f25-9d59-939a522a49c4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the State Bar of Georgia shall be: \n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>to foster among the members of the bar of this State the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to improve the administration of justice; and</li> \n <li>to advance the science of law.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision9"}],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Title":"Part I - Creation & Organization","Content":"","UrlName":"part12","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Title":"CHAPTER 1 CREATION AND ORGANIZATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter3","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"5184bedf-ae75-47de-9fba-0723f7ea48c4","Title":"Rule 1-101. Creation","Content":"Pursuant to the authority of this court and the Act of the General Assembly approved by the Governor on March 11, 1963 (Georgia Laws 1963, page 70) the State Bar of Georgia is hereby created and established.","UrlName":"rule6","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b7d724f8-0863-4dbf-8187-660d1b24a48d","Title":"Rule 1-102. Powers","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia shall be a legal entity; may sue and be sued; shall have perpetual existence; may contract; may purchase, receive, lease, acquire, own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal with real and personal property and any legal or equitable interest in property, wherever located; may sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property; may adopt and use an official seal; shall establish a principal office; and shall have such other powers, privileges and duties as may be reasonable and necessary for the proper fulfillment of its purposes.","UrlName":"rule7","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"127c5c68-7426-4f25-9d59-939a522a49c4","Title":"Rule 1-103. Purposes","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the State Bar of Georgia shall be: \n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>to foster among the members of the bar of this State the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to improve the administration of justice; and</li> \n <li>to advance the science of law.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule8","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[{"Id":"9fb13d29-239c-42e5-b02d-b83b1c3ae11e","ParentId":"127c5c68-7426-4f25-9d59-939a522a49c4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the State Bar of Georgia shall be: \n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>to foster among the members of the bar of this State the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to improve the administration of justice; and</li> \n <li>to advance the science of law.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision9"}],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Title":"CHAPTER 2 MEMBERSHIP","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter5","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"f1dc3d58-7f1e-4a81-93ca-6f4eda03d2da","Title":"Rule 1-201. Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> All persons now or hereafter who are: \n <ol> \n <li>authorized to practice law in this State or;</li> \n <li>authorized to act as a Foreign Legal Consultant shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule11","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6c08a734-b5e8-4fbe-9bfe-72e39fc62151","Title":"Rule 1-202. Membership Status","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of six categories: active, inactive, foreign law consultant, emeritus, members unable to practice law due to a disability, and retired status members. The bylaws shall make provision for the registration of each active member and the location of his or her principal office for the practice of law, the registration of each foreign law consultant and the location of his or her principal office, and the registration of emeritus and inactive members and their mailing addresses. Only Active Status members and Emeritus Status members may vote on any State Bar of Georgia matter or election or nominate an active member for office. Emeritus Status members can vote only in person or electronically. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive Status Members . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia may contact the Membership Department and elect to be transferred to Inactive Status membership provided that the member:\n <ol> \n <li>is not engaged in the practice of law;</li> \n <li>does not hold himself or herself out as a practicing lawyer or attorney;</li> \n <li>does not occupy any public or private position in which the member may be called upon to give legal advice or counsel; and</li> \n <li>does not examine the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law for the benefit of another person, company, or corporation.</li> \n </ol> \n Members who are in active military service may choose inactive status if they so elect. </li> \n <li> Active Status Members . Active Status members shall be all other lawyers, including judges but excluding foreign law consultants. Only Active Status members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Foreign Law Consultant Status . Foreign Law Consultants shall be those persons, who are licensed under the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Emeritus Status Members . Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia who will attain the age of 70 years in a Bar year and who shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, five years of which must be as a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia, may request Emeritus Status from the State Bar of Georgia upon petition to and approval by the Membership Department. When approved, the member shall be transferred to Emeritus Status. An Emeritus Status member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be required to pay license fees or other fees and may not hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. An Emeritus Status member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be privileged to practice law except that an Emeritus Status member may handle pro bono cases referred by either an organized pro bono program recognized by the Pro Bono Project of the State Bar of Georgia or a non-profit corporation that delivers legal services to the poor. An Emeritus Status member may be reinstated to active or inactive membership upon application to the Membership Department and payment of non-prorated license fees for the year in which the Emeritus Status member returns to Active Status or Inactive Status membership. </li> \n <li> Members Unable to Practice Law Due to Disability . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is temporarily or permanently disabled may submit to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia a written request to be transferred to Disabled Status. Members who elect this status must submit adequate medical and/or psychological documentation of their disability with the written request. Adequate documentation includes:\n <ol> \n <li>documentation from the Social Security Administration of approval of disability;</li> \n <li>documentation from an insurance company of receipt of benefits based upon disability; or</li> \n <li>documentation from a medical doctor that the member is disabled.</li> \n </ol> \n Any request by a member to be transferred to Disabled Status must comply with all of the provisions contained in Article I, Section 10 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Retired Status Members .\n <ol> \n <li>Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is not engaged in the active practice of law in any state, district, or territory of the United States may transfer to Retired Status by submitting a request in writing to the Executive Director and General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon approval by the Executive Director and General Counsel, the Membership Department shall transfer the member to Retired Status. A member in Retired Status shall not be entitled to practice law in this state and may not practice law in any other jurisdiction. Further, such member shall not be eligible to vote or hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. Any member transferred to Retired Status shall be relieved of his or her membership fees and CLE obligations.</li> \n <li>A request for Retired Status must be unqualified, is irrevocable, and permanent. A member in Retired Status will appear in the State Bar of Georgia member directory as “Retired.”</li> \n <li>A member of the State Bar of Georgia with a pending disciplinary matter may transfer to Retired Status with the consent of the Office of the General Counsel. Grievances received after a member has transferred to Retired Status may be investigated and prosecuted through the disciplinary process at the option of the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li>A member suspended from the practice of law because of failure to meet CLE requirements or failure to pay Bar membership fees is not eligible for Retired Status.</li> \n </ol> \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule12","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"84ad6676-28b9-4f47-9574-000b6e7c9439","ParentId":"6c08a734-b5e8-4fbe-9bfe-72e39fc62151","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of five classes: active, foreign law consultant, emeritus, disabled and inactive. The bylaws shall make provision for the registration of each active member and the location of his or her principal office for the practice of law, the registration of each foreign law consultant and the location of his or her principal office, and the registration of emeritus and inactive members and their mailing addresses. Only active members and emeritus members may vote on any State Bar matter or election or nominate an active member for office. Emeritus members can vote only in person or electronically. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive Members . All lawyers who are neither engaged in the practice of law nor holding themselves out as practicing attorneys nor occupying any public or private position in which they may be called upon to give legal advice or counsel, to examine the law or to pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law may be inactive members at their election. Members who are in military service may be inactive if they so elect. </li> \n <li> Active Members . Active members shall be all other lawyers including judges but excluding foreign law consultants. Only active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Foreign Law Consultants . Foreign Law Consultants shall be those persons, who are licensed under the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Emeritus Members . Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia who will attain the age of 70 years in a Bar year and who shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, five years of which must be as a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia, may request emeritus status from the State Bar of Georgia upon petition to and approval by the membership department. When approved, the member shall hold emeritus status. An emeritus member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be required to pay dues or annual fees, and may not hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. An emeritus member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be privileged to practice law except that an emeritus member may handle pro bono cases referred by either an organized pro bono program recognized by the Pro Bono Project of the State Bar of Georgia or a non-profit corporation that delivers legal services to the poor. An emeritus member may be reinstated to active or inactive membership upon application to the membership department and payment of non-prorated dues for the year in which the emeritus members return to active or inactive service. </li> \n <li> Disabled Members . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Executive Committee for disabled status provided the member meets one of the following criteria:\n <ol> \n <li>the member has been determined to be permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration; or</li> \n <li>the member is in the process of applying to the Social Security Administration for permanent disability status; or </li> \n <li>the member has been determined to be permanently disabled or disabled for a period in excess of one year by an insurance company and is receiving payments pursuant to a disability insurance policy; or</li> \n <li>the member has a signed statement from a medical doctor that the member is permanently disabled, or disabled for a period in excess of one year, and unable to practice law.</li> \n </ol> \n Upon the Executive Committee’s grant of the member’s petition for disability status, the disabled member shall be treated as an inactive member of the State Bar of Georgia and shall not be privileged to practice law. A member holding disabled status shall not be required to pay dues or annual fees. A disabled member shall continue in such status until the member requests reinstatement by written application to the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia. \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision385"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fba14cfd-a73b-4163-84c9-18a132c4f63f","Title":"Rule 1-203. Practice by Active Members; Nonresidents","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No person shall practice law in this state unless such person is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing; except as provided below: \n <ol> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state in isolated cases in the discretion of the judge of such court; or</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state if such person:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>is enrolled in a full time graduate degree program at an accredited law school in this state; and</li> \n <li>is under the supervision of a resident attorney; and</li> \n <li>limits his or her practice to the appearance in the courts of this state to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities of such graduate degree program.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A person who is admitted to the State Bar of Georgia as a foreign law consultant pursuant to Part E of the Rules Governing the Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gasupreme.us/">www.gasupreme.us , may render legal services in the state of Georgia solely with respect to the laws of the foreign country (i.e., a country other than the United States of America, its possessions and territories) where such person is admitted to practice, to the extent provided by and in strict compliance with the provisions of Part D of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law, but shall not otherwise render legal services in this state. </li> \n <li> Persons who are authorized to practice law in this state are hereby authorized to practice law as sole proprietorships or as partners, shareholders, or members of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>partnerships under OCGA § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability partnerships under OCGA § 14-8-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional corporations under OCGA § 14-7-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional associations under OCGA § 14-10-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability companies under OGCA § 14-11-100 et seq.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XV, Rules 91-95, Student Practice Rule.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XVI, Rules 97-103, Law School Graduates, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XX, Rules 114-120, Extended Public Service Program, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XXI, Rule 121, Provision of Legal Services Following Determination of Major Disaster. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule13","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"67da6646-3933-45cf-a9f3-5bd64ddcff21","ParentId":"fba14cfd-a73b-4163-84c9-18a132c4f63f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"No person shall practice law in this State unless such person is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing; except as provided below:\n<ol> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state in isolated cases in the discretion of the judge of such court; or</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state if such person:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>is enrolled in a full time graduate degree program at an accredited law school in this state; and</li> \n <li>is under the supervision of a resident attorney; and</li> \n <li>limits his or her practice to the appearance in the courts of this state to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities of such graduate degree program.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A person who is admitted to the Bar as a foreign law consultant pursuant to Part E of the Rules Governing the Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, Ga. Ct. &Bar Rules, p. 12-1 et seq., may render legal services in the state of Georgia solely with respect to the laws of the foreign country (i.e., a country other than the United States of America, its possessions and territories) where such person is admitted to practice, to the extent provided by and in strict compliance with the provisions of Part D of the Rules Governing Admission to Practice, but shall not otherwise render legal services in this State.</li> \n <li> Persons who are authorized to practice law in this State are hereby authorized to practice law as sole proprietorships or as partners, shareholders, or members of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>partnerships under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability partnerships under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional corporations under O.C.G.A. § 14-7-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional associations under O.C.G.A. § 14-10-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability companies under O.C.G.A. § 14-11-100 et. seq.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n","UrlName":"revision8"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ed518433-bfb5-4ff7-9abd-1d2a819f46cd","Title":"Rule 1-204. Good Standing","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No lawyer shall be deemed a member in good standing: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>while delinquent after September 1 of any year for nonpayment of the annual license fee and any costs or fees of any type as prescribed in Chapter 5, Bar Rule 1-501 (a)-(c);</li> \n <li>while suspended for disciplinary reasons;</li> \n <li>while disbarred;</li> \n <li>while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements; or</li> \n <li>while in violation of Bar Rule 1-209 for failure to pay child support obligations.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule14","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"9867c2be-d9e8-4f01-b3d2-f2b96c9cf38e","ParentId":"ed518433-bfb5-4ff7-9abd-1d2a819f46cd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No lawyer shall be deemed a member in good standing: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>while delinquent after September 1 of any year for nonpayment of the annual license fee and any costs or fees of any type as prescribed in Chapter 5, Rule 1-501 (a)-(c);</li> \n <li>while suspended for disciplinary reasons;</li> \n <li>while disbarred;</li> \n <li>while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements; or</li> \n <li>while in violation of Rule 1-209 for failure to pay child support obligations.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision13"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"93927872-3c21-4742-b79c-f7a5937c5647","Title":"Rule 1-205. Bar of Judicial Circuit","Content":"Each member who is a resident of this state shall be considered a member of the bar of the judicial circuit in which his principal office for the practice of law is located, or, at his election, the circuit in which he resides, or if he has no office, the circuit in which he resides or last resided.\n","UrlName":"rule15","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b9a37083-773c-4ce7-8ce8-88269bc55266","Title":"Rule 1-206. Affiliate Members","Content":"In addition to the membership and classes of membership provided in this chapter, the State Bar of Georgia may recognize as affiliates, without the rights and privileges of membership, members of the legal profession not authorized to practice law in Georgia, but who are licensed to practice law in another state or the District of Columbia, and are in good standing in all jurisdictions in which they are licensed. Affiliate members may be furnished copies of appropriate publications and may be entitled to attend and participate, without the right to vote or hold office, in those meetings and activities conducted by the State Bar of Georgia and any of its component parts or sections.\n","UrlName":"rule16","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6e87a3b6-6173-4c3a-a2c4-178843aa70a3","Title":"Rule 1-206.1. Law Student Members","Content":"In addition to the membership and classes of membership provided in this chapter, the State Bar of Georgia may recognize as law student members, without the rights and privileges of membership, those law students currently enrolled in a law school approved by the American Bar Association or any law school approved by the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners. Law student members may be furnished copies of appropriate publications electronically and may be entitled to attend and participate, without the right to vote or hold office, in those meetings and activities conducted by the State Bar of Georgia and any of its component parts or sections.\n","UrlName":"rule17","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0835bb73-8231-43bf-a560-8c59908439fd","Title":"Rule 1-207. Change of Address","Content":" All members of the State Bar of Georgia shall keep the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia informed of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address given to the membership department and failure on the part of a member to notify the membership department may have adverse consequences to a member. The choice of a member to use only a post office box address on the State Bar of Georgia membership records shall constitute an election to waive personal service in any proceedings between the bar and the member. Notification given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the membership department shall not satisfy this requirement.\n","UrlName":"rule18","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"97fc1270-8ef5-4b57-be01-91223448bdaa","Title":"Rule 1-208. Resignation from Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Resignation while in good standing. A member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar of Georgia. Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing unless such person complies with part (f) or part (g) of this rule.</li> \n <li>Resignation while delinquent or suspended for failure to pay dues or for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements. A member of the State Bar of Georgia who is delinquent or suspended (but not terminated) for failure to pay dues or failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar of Georgia. Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar of Georgia unless such person complies with part (f) or part (g) of this rule.</li> \n <li> A petition for leave to resign from membership with the State Bar of Georgia shall comply with the following:  \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the petition shall be filed under oath with the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia and shall contain a statement that there are no disciplinary actions or criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner; and</li> \n <li>the petition shall contain a statement as to whether the petition is being filed under part (a) or part (b) of this rule. If the petition is being filed under part (b), the petition shall state the term of the delinquency and/or suspension for failure to pay dues or to comply with continuing legal education requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No petition for leave to resign shall be accepted if there are disciplinary proceedings or criminal charges pending against the member, or if the member is not in good standing for failure to pay child support obligations under Bar Rule 1-209. A petition filed under this rule shall constitute a waiver of the confidentiality provisions of Bar Rule 4-221 (d) as to any pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Resignation shall not be a bar to institution of subsequent disciplinary proceedings for any conduct of the resigned person occurring prior to the resignation. If the penalty imposed on the resigned member is disbarment or suspension, the status of the member shall be changed from “resigned member” to that of a person so disciplined.</li> \n <li>A petition filed under this rule shall not toll the provisions of Bar Rule 1-501 (c).</li> \n <li> Readmission within five years after resignation. For a period of five years after the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the member of the State Bar of Georgia who has resigned pursuant to this rule may apply for readmission to the State Bar of Georgia upon completion of the following terms and conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>payment in full of any delinquent dues, late fees and penalties owing at the time the petition for leave to resign was accepted, and payment in full of the current dues for the year in which readmission is sought;</li> \n <li>payment of a readmission fee to the State Bar of Georgia equal to the amount the member seeking readmission would have paid during the period of resignation if he or she had instead elected inactive status;</li> \n <li>for resignations while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements under part (b) of this rule, submission of a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency declaring that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; and</li> \n <li>submission to the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants. Provided the former member seeking readmission has applied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants before the expiration of the five-year period after his or her resignation, the former member shall be readmitted upon submitting a determination of fitness even if the five-year period has expired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Readmission after five years. After the expiration of five years from the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the former member must comply with the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule19","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"865943ac-a42d-44b7-839d-3d9105500eca","ParentId":"97fc1270-8ef5-4b57-be01-91223448bdaa","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Resignation while in good standing. A member of the State Bar in good standing may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar. Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar in good standing unless such person \n complies with part (f) or part (g) of this Rule. </li> \n <li>Resignation while delinquent or suspended for failure to pay dues or for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements:  A member of the State Bar who is delinquent or suspended (but not terminated) for failure to pay dues or failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar.  Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar unless such person complies with part (f) or part (g) of this Rule.</li> \n <li> A petition for leave to resign from membership with the State Bar shall comply with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> the petition shall be filed under oath with the Executive Director of the State Bar and shall contain a statement that there are no disciplinary actions or criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner; and \n   </li> \n <li>the petition shall contain a statement as to whether the petition is being filed under part (a) or part (b) of this Rule. If the petition is being filed under part (b), the petition shall state the term of the delinquency and/or suspension for failure to pay dues or to comply with continuing legal education requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No petition for leave to resign shall be accepted if there are disciplinary proceedings or criminal charges pending against the member, or if the member is not in good standing for failure to pay child support obligations under Bar Rule 1-209.</li> \n <li>A petition filed under this Rule shall constitute a waiver of the confidentiality provisions of Rule 4-221(d) as to any pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li> Readmission within five years after resignation. For a period of five years after the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the member of the State Bar who has resigned pursuant to this Rule may apply for readmission to the State Bar upon completion of the following terms and conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> payment in full of any delinquent dues, late fees and penalties  owing at the time the petition for leave to resign was accepted, and payment in full of the current dues for the year in which readmission is sought; \n   </li> \n <li> payment of a readmission fee to the State Bar equal to the amount the member seeking readmission would have paid during the period of resignation if he or she had instead elected inactive status; \n   </li> \n <li> for resignations while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements under part (b) of this Rule, submission of a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency declaring that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; and \n   </li> \n <li>submission to the membership department of the State Bar of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants. Provided the former member seeking readmission has applied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants before the expiration of the five year period after his or her resignation, the former member shall be readmitted upon submitting a determination of fitness even if the five year period has expired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Readmission after five years. After the expiration of five years from the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the former member must comply with the Rules governing admission to the practice of law in Georgia as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision14"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1b4ac2a9-af48-4439-a51a-5e7145202db3","Title":"Rule 1-209. Failure to Pay Child Support Obligations","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Obligation to Pay Child Support. A Bar member shall not willfully refuse, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction under the procedures of OCGA § 19-6-28.1, to timely pay a child support obligation and continue such refusal for 30 days after said determination becomes final. A certified copy of a court order finding that the member has willfully failed to maintain compliance with child support obligations shall be conclusive evidence of an infraction of this rule. So long as a member is complying fully with the purge provisions of a court order of contempt for non-payment of child support, this rule shall not apply. </li> \n <li> Not in Good Standing Upon Non Compliance. In the event a court of competent jurisdiction makes a finding, under the procedures of OCGA § 19-6-28.1, that a member has willfully failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for 30 days after said determination becomes final, the member shall be deemed not to be in good standing and shall remain in such status until such time as the noncompliance is corrected. </li> \n <li> Action by State Bar of Georgia. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, under the procedures of OCGA § 19-6-28.1, finding that a member has failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for 30 days after said determination becomes final, a notice shall be mailed by certified mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia. The notice is deemed received whenever actually received or five days after the notice is mailed, whichever is sooner. </li> \n <li> Return to Good Standing. A member deemed not to be in good standing under this rule shall be deemed to be in good standing upon providing the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia a certified copy of a court order finding that the delinquency has been satisfied and by paying an administrative fee set by the Executive Committee. The member shall be returned to good standing only upon compliance with the foregoing conditions.  </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule20","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"3334e7a0-542a-4f6e-b855-d46b5386d701","ParentId":"1b4ac2a9-af48-4439-a51a-5e7145202db3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Obligation to Pay Child Support. A Bar member shall not willfully refuse, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction under the procedures of O.G.C.A. § 19-6-28.1, to timely pay a child support obligation and continue such refusal for thirty days after said determination becomes final. A certified copy of a court order finding that the member has willfully failed to maintain compliance with child support obligations shall be conclusive evidence of an infraction of this Rule. So long as a member is complying fully with the purge provisions of a court order of contempt for non-payment of child support, this Rule shall not apply. </li> \n <li> Not in Good Standing Upon Non Compliance. In the event a court of competent jurisdiction makes a finding, under the procedures of O.G.C.A. § 19-6-28.1, that a member has willfully failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for thirty days after said determination becomes final, the member shall be deemed not to be in good standing and shall remain in such status until such time as the noncompliance is corrected. </li> \n <li> Action by State Bar of Georgia. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, under the procedures of O.G.C.A. § 19-6-28.1, finding that a member has failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for thirty days after said determination becomes final, a notice shall be mailed by certified mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar. The notice is deemed received whenever actually received or five days after the notice is mailed, whichever is sooner. </li> \n <li> Return to Good Standing. A member deemed not to be in good standing under this Rule shall be deemed to be in good standing upon providing the Executive Director of the State Bar a certified copy of a court order finding that the delinquency has been satisfied and by paying an administrative fee set by the Executive Committee. The member shall be returned to good standing only upon compliance with the foregoing conditions.  </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision15"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Title":"CHAPTER 3 BOARD OF GOVERNORS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter6","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"a8836307-7cb1-4e2a-8f72-17deed13e04c","Title":"Rule 1-301. Government by the Board of Governors","Content":"The government of the State Bar of Georgia shall be vested in a Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule23","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"db94abe0-413c-469f-88ed-67188923c732","Title":"Rule 1-302. Composition","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> The President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and the Attorney General of Georgia; \n   </li> \n <li> the number of Board of Governors members for each Judicial Circuit as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governor members to be elected from the Atlanta Circuit. \n \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> Each Judicial Circuit shall have an additional member for each additional five hundred active members of the State Bar of Georgia added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. The size of the Board of Governors, excluding those designated in subsection (a)(1) above, shall not exceed 150, except as set out in subsection (b) below. \n   </li> \n <li> If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of superior court judges to which that circuit was entitled on July 1, 1979, then and in that event, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board of Governors representing that circuit provided there was more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event that there is such a reduction, the last created post will be the first post eliminated. \n   </li> \n <li> If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of superior court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board of Governors as it had on July 1, 1979. Additional Board representation will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing in that circuit as provided above. A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon that circuit's Board of Governors' representatives, except as otherwise provided. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> two representatives of the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state of Georgia, who themselves must be residents of different states of the United States. The nonresident representative shall be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing residing outside of the state of Georgia. \n   </li> \n <li> three members appointed as follows: The President-elect in office when this rule becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint the number of such members whose term expired at the annual meeting at which the President-elect assumed office. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Upon the creation of a new circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to elect one member to the Board of Governors even if the cap of 150 Board of Governors members has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to elect additional members depending on the number of active members of the state of Georgia residing in the circuit as provided above. \n   </li> \n <li> A member of the Board of Governors must be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. A member representing a judicial circuit shall be a member of the bar of that circuit. \n   </li> \n <li>Members of the Board of Governors shall receive no compensation for their services.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule21","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"3b61d104-26c7-4e13-8f9f-50ad90ec8de1","ParentId":"db94abe0-413c-469f-88ed-67188923c732","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> The President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and the Attorney General of Georgia; \n   </li> \n <li> the number of Board of Governors members for each Judicial Circuit as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governor members to be elected from the Atlanta Circuit. \n \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> Each Judicial Circuit shall have an additional member for each additional five hundred active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. The size of the Board of Governors, excluding those designated in subsection (a)(1) above, shall not exceed 150, except as set out in subsection (b) below. \n   </li> \n <li> If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges to which that circuit was entitled on July 1, 1979, then and in that event, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board of Governors representing that circuit provided there was more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event that there is such a reduction, the last created post will be the first post eliminated. \n   </li> \n <li> If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board of Governors as it had on July 1, 1979. Additional Board representation will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar residing in that circuit as provided above. A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon that circuit's Board of Governors' representatives, except as otherwise provided. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> two representatives of the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State of Georgia, who themselves must be residents of different states of the United States. The nonresident representative shall be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing residing outside of the State of Georgia. \n   </li> \n <li> three members appointed as follows: The President-elect in office when this rule becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint the number of such members whose term expired at the annual meeting at which the President-elect assumed office. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Upon the creation of a new circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to elect one member to the Board of Governors even if the cap of 150 Board of Governors members has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to elect additional members depending on the number of active members of the State of Georgia residing in the circuit as provided above. \n   </li> \n <li> A member of the Board of Governors must be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. A member representing a judicial circuit shall be a member of the bar of that circuit. \n   </li> \n <li>Members of the Board of Governors shall receive no compensation for their services.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision16"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"da944fcb-8a47-40ef-b66e-b279d64bef46","Title":"Rule 1-303. Meetings","Content":"(a) The Board of Governors shall hold at least three regular meetings in each Bar year at such times and places as may be determined in accordance with the bylaws and upon such call and notice as may be set forth in the bylaws.\n(b) If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct any meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.\n","UrlName":"rule22","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"8cdb6c27-0508-489c-a576-396dde63cc8b","ParentId":"da944fcb-8a47-40ef-b66e-b279d64bef46","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Board of Governors shall hold at least three regular meetings in each year at such times and places as may be determined in accordance with the bylaws and upon such call and notice as may be set forth in the bylaws.","UrlName":"revision339"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d80125b1-bc60-466b-b06e-d4e8d52081a3","Title":"Rule 1-304. Election of Members of Board of Governors","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Bar of Georgia shall, in its bylaws, establish the term of office and the method of election of the members of the Board of Governors representing judicial circuits and nonresident members. Such method of election shall ensure that: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the election will be by secret written or secure electronic ballot;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in conjunction with a specified number of other active members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from his judicial circuit (or candidates in circuits electing more than one member of the Board of Governors in such election) whose name will be placed on the ballot for his circuit;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state, in conjunction with a specified number of other active nonresident members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state.</li> \n <li>any nominating petition shall bear or be accompanied by a statement signed by the nominee indicating his willingness to serve if elected;</li> \n <li>a ballot for his judicial circuit will be mailed to each active resident member and a ballot will be mailed to each active nonresident member in the case of election of nonresident board member, having printed thereon the names of all qualified nominees for such circuit or nonresident post and space for a write-in vote in ample time for the member to cast the ballot before the time fixed for the election. In lieu of a written ballot, a secure electronic ballot, which meets the requirements above, may be provided to members;</li> \n <li>each nominee shall be entitled to have at least one observer present at the counting of the ballots from his judicial circuit; and</li> \n <li>any change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit or circuits shall automatically terminate the terms of all members elected to the Board of Governors, accordingly in such manners as the bylaws may provide. In the event the geographical limits of a circuit are changed after the notices of election have been distributed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, then and in that event, the terms of the members of the Board of Governors from such circuits will remain as they were before the change in geographical limits until the election of the Board of Governors to be held the following year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule26","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"3c46fa2b-a530-4755-a8f8-878db3edb823","ParentId":"d80125b1-bc60-466b-b06e-d4e8d52081a3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Bar of Georgia shall, in its bylaws, establish the term of office and the method of election of the members of the Board of Governors representing judicial circuits and nonresident members. Such method of election shall ensure that: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the election will be by secret written or secure electronic ballot;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in conjunction with a specified number of other active members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from his judicial circuit (or candidates in circuits electing more than one member of the Board of Governors in such election) whose name will be placed on the ballot for his circuit;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State, in conjunction with a specified number of other active nonresident members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State.</li> \n <li>any nominating petition shall bear or be accompanied by a statement signed by the nominee indicating his willingness to serve if elected;</li> \n <li>a ballot for his judicial circuit will be mailed to each active resident member and a ballot will be mailed to each active nonresident member in the case of election of nonresident board member, having printed thereon the names of all qualified nominees for such circuit or nonresident post and space for a write-in vote in ample time for the member to cast the ballot before the time fixed for the election. In lieu of a written ballot, a secure electronic ballot, which meets the requirements above, may be provided to members;</li> \n <li>each nominee shall be entitled to have at least one observer present at the counting of the ballots from his judicial circuit; and</li> \n <li>any change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit or circuits shall automatically terminate the terms of all members elected to the Board of Governors, accordingly in such manners as the bylaws may provide. In the event the geographical limits of a circuit are changed after the notices of election have been distributed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, then and in that event, the terms of the members of the Board of Governors from such circuits will remain as they were before the change in geographical limits until the election of the Board of Governors to be held the following year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision17"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3db9a742-501a-49b5-a4f9-c2702f7f7d22","Title":"Rule 1-305. Change in Geographical limits of Judicial Circuits","Content":"The number and terms of members of the Board of Governors from judicial circuits that have experienced a change in geographical limits shall be determined according to provisions of Bar Rules 1-302 (b), 1-304 and as hereinafter provided by Bar Rule 1-701 and the bylaws.","UrlName":"rule29","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c58fe53f-969f-42eb-9240-29d054268f0d","Title":"Rule 1-306. Vacancies; Ties","Content":"The bylaws shall provide for filling vacancies in the Board of Governors and for deciding the outcome of tie votes.","UrlName":"rule34","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Title":"CHAPTER 4 OFFICERS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter7","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"53e7f7a3-b877-465b-aafb-d2b93415e95b","Title":"Rule 1-401. Designation and Terms","Content":"The officers of the State Bar of Georgia shall include a President, a President-elect, a Secretary, and a Treasurer and may include such other officers as may be specified in the bylaws. The President-elect, the Secretary and the Treasurer shall be elected by the membership in accordance with the bylaws and the results published at the annual meeting. The Secretary and Treasurer shall serve until the next annual meeting. The President-elect shall succeed to the presidency at the next annual meeting. If there is no President-elect, a President shall also be elected at the same time and in the same manner as the other officers. In the event of death or resignation of the President, the President-elect shall succeed to the presidency, shall serve out the unexpired term, and shall continue to serve for the term during which he would regularly have served as President. The officers shall have duties, rights, and powers as the bylaws may provide.","UrlName":"rule36","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d49dab6c-ff52-4a9c-adf2-bca1fa65dae7","Title":"Rule 1-402. Election of Officers","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia shall, in its bylaws, establish the method of election of the officers. Such method of election shall contain provisions equivalent to those required by Bar Rule 1-304 relating to election of members of the Board of Governors. Officers may be nominated by the Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule37","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f66b6cd2-b7b7-47f3-8741-baf4bd91f4a6","Title":"Rule 1-403. Vacancies; Ties","Content":"The bylaws shall provide for filling vacancies in any office and for deciding the outcome of tie votes.","UrlName":"rule41","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"dac576f0-9e2a-465a-8335-b12ed283d063","Title":"Rule 1-404. Eligibility of President-elect","Content":"No person shall be eligible for election as President-elect if a member of the judicial circuit in which such person is a member was elected to the office of President-elect at any time within one year immediately prior to the election in which such person is a candidate.","UrlName":"rule43","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Title":"CHAPTER 5 FINANCE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter8","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"368390e6-0a86-42fb-8f3d-bff6e9654e7d","Title":"Rule 1-501. License Fees","Content":"(a) Annual license fees for membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall be due and payable on July 1 of each year. Upon the failure of a member to pay the license fee by September 1, the member shall cease to be a member in good standing. When such license fees, including any late fees, costs, charges or penalties incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind for the current and prior years have been paid in full, the member shall automatically be reinstated to the status of member in good standing, except as provided in subsection (b) of this rule.\n(b) In the event a member of the State Bar of Georgia is delinquent in the payment of any license fee, late fee, assessment, reinstatement fee, or cost, charge or penalty incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind and of any nature for a period of one year, the member shall be automatically suspended, and shall not practice law in this state. The suspended member may thereafter lift such suspension only upon the successful completion of all of the following terms and conditions:\n(1)  payment of all outstanding dues, assessments, late fees, reinstatement fees, and any and all penalties due and owing before or accruing after the suspension of membership;\n(2) provision to the membership section of the State Bar of Georgia of the following:\n (i) a certificate from the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia that the suspended member is not presently subject to any disciplinary procedure; \n(ii) a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; \n(iii) a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants;\n(3)  payment to the State Bar of Georgia of a non-waivable reinstatement fee as follows:\n (i)  $150 for the first reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $150 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(ii)  $250 for the second reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $250 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(iii)  $500 for the third reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $500 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; or \n(iv)  $750 for each subsequent reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $750 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years.\nThe yearly increase in the reinstatement fee shall become due and owing in its entirety upon the first day of each next fiscal year and shall not be prorated for any fraction of the fiscal year in which it is actually paid.\nA member who has been suspended pursuant to this rule may submit in writing to the Executive Committee a request for an extension of time to complete any of the requirements contained in subsection (b). The request must state with particularity the reasons and need for the extension. The Executive Committee, upon sufficient and reasonable cause, may grant such an extension.\n(c)  A member suspended under subsection (b) above for a total of five years in succession shall be immediately terminated as a member without further action on the part of the State Bar of Georgia. The terminated member shall not be entitled to a hearing as set out in subsection (d) below. The terminated member shall be required to apply for membership to the Office of Bar Admissions for readmission to the State Bar of Georgia. Upon completion of the requirements for readmission, the terminated member shall be required to pay the total reinstatement fee due under subsection (b) (3) above plus an additional $750 as a readmission fee to the State Bar of Georgia.\n (d)  Prior to suspending a member under subsection (b) above, the State Bar of Georgia shall send by certified mail a notice thereof to the last known address of the member as contained in the official membership records. It shall specify the years for which the license fee is delinquent and state that unless either the fee and all penalties related thereto are paid within 60 days or a hearing to establish reasonable cause is requested within 60 days, the membership shall be suspended. \n \nIf a hearing is requested, it shall be held at State Bar of Georgia Headquarters within 90 days of receipt of the request by the Executive Committee. Notice of time and place of the hearing shall be mailed at least ten days in advance. The party cited may be represented by counsel. Witnesses shall be sworn; and, if requested by the party cited, a complete electronic record or a transcript shall be made of all proceedings and testimony. The expense of the record shall be paid by the party requesting it, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the Executive Committee. The presiding member or Special Master shall have the authority to rule on all motions, objections, and other matters presented in connection with the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure, and the practice in the trial of civil cases. The party cited may not be required to testify over his or her objection. \n \nThe Executive Committee shall (1) make findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall determine whether the party cited was delinquent in violation of Bar Rule 1-501; and (2) upon a finding of delinquency shall determine whether there was reasonable cause for the delinquency. Financial hardship short of adjudicated bankruptcy shall not constitute reasonable cause. A copy of the findings and the determination shall be sent to the party cited. If it is determined that no delinquency has occurred, the matter shall be dismissed. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred but that there was reasonable cause therefor, the matter shall be deferred for one year at which time the matter will be reconsidered. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred without reasonable cause therefor, the membership shall be suspended immediately upon such determination. An appropriate notice of suspension shall be sent to the clerks of all Georgia courts and shall be published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia. Alleged errors of law in the proceedings or findings of the Executive Committee or its delegate shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Executive Committee may delegate to a special master any or all of its responsibilities and authority with respect to suspending membership for license fee delinquency in which event the Special Master shall make a report to the Committee of its findings for its approval or disapproval. \n \nAfter a finding of delinquency, a copy of the finding shall be served upon the respondent attorney. The respondent attorney may file with the Supreme Court of Georgia any written exceptions (supported by the written argument) said respondent may have to the findings of the Executive Committee. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and served on the Executive Committee by service on the General Counsel within 20 days of the date that the findings were served on the respondent attorney. Upon the filing of exceptions by the respondent attorney, the Executive Committee shall within 20 days of said filing file a report of its findings and the complete record and transcript of evidence with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant extensions of time for filing in appropriate cases. Findings of fact by the Executive Committee shall be conclusive if supported by any evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by the respondent attorney or the Executive Committee. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall promptly consider the report of the Executive Committee, exceptions thereto, and the responses filed by any party to such exceptions, if any, and enter its judgment. A copy of the Supreme Court of Georgia's judgment shall be transmitted to the Executive Committee and to the respondent attorney by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \nWithin 30 days after a final judgment which suspends membership, the suspended member shall, under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, notify all clients of said suspended member's inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of said suspended member's clients. Should the suspended member fail to notify said clients or fail to protect their interests as herein required, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its motion, or upon the motion of the State Bar of Georgia, and after ten-days notice to the suspended member and proof of failure to notify or protect said clients, may hold the suspended member in contempt and order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of said suspended member and proceed to notify all clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Any member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia to take charge of the files and records of the suspended member under these rules shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule46","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[{"Id":"77fcd2ae-0fc0-4dbe-8e70-562b6da23d37","ParentId":"368390e6-0a86-42fb-8f3d-bff6e9654e7d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) Annual license fees for membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall be due and payable on July 1 of each year. Upon the failure of a member to pay the license fee by September 1, the member shall cease to be a member in good standing. When such license fees, including any late fees, costs, charges or penalties incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind for the current and prior years have been paid in full, the member shall automatically be reinstated to the status of member in good standing, except as provided in subsection (b) of this Rule. \n(b) In the event a member of the State Bar of Georgia is delinquent in the payment of any license fee, late fee, assessment, reinstatement fee, or cost, charge or penalty incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind and of any nature for a period of one year, the member shall be automatically suspended, and shall not practice law in this state. The suspended member may thereafter lift such suspension only upon the successful completion of all of the following terms and conditions: \n(1)  payment of all outstanding dues, assessments, late fees, reinstatement fees, and any and all penalties due and owing before or accruing after the suspension of membership; \n(2) provision to the membership section of the State Bar of Georgia of the following: \n (i) a certificate from the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia that the suspended member is not presently subject to any disciplinary procedure; \n(ii) a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; \n(iii) a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants; \n(3)  payment to the State Bar of Georgia of a non-waivable reinstatement fee as follows: \n (i)  $150 for the first reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $150 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(ii)  $250 for the second reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $250 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(iii)  $500 for the third reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $500 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; or \n(iv)  $750 for each subsequent reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $750 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years. \nThe yearly increase in the reinstatement fee shall become due and owing in its entirety upon the first day of each next fiscal year and shall not be prorated for any fraction of the fiscal year in which it is actually paid. \nA member who has been suspended pursuant to this Rule may submit in writing to the Executive Committee a request for an extension of time to complete any of the requirements contained in subsection (b). The request must state with particularity the reasons and need for the extension. The Executive Committee, upon sufficient and reasonable cause, may grant such an extension. \n(c)  A member suspended under subsection (b) above for a total of five years in succession shall be immediately terminated as a member without further action on the part of the State Bar of Georgia. The terminated member shall not be entitled to a hearing as set out in subsection (d) below. The terminated member shall be required to apply for membership to the Office of Bar Admissions for readmission to the State Bar of Georgia. Upon completion of the requirements for readmission, the terminated member shall be required to pay the total reinstatement fee due under subsection (b) (3) above plus an additional $750 as a readmission fee to the State Bar of Georgia. \n (d)  Prior to suspending a member under subsection (b) above, the State Bar of Georgia shall send by certified mail a notice thereof to the last known address of the member as contained in the official membership records. It shall specify the years for which the license fee is delinquent and state that unless either the fee and all penalties related thereto are paid within 60 days or a hearing to establish reasonable cause is requested within 60 days, the membership shall be suspended. \n \nIf a hearing is requested, it shall be held at State Bar of Georgia Headquarters within 90 days of receipt of the request by the Executive Committee. Notice of time and place of the hearing shall be mailed at least ten days in advance. The party cited may be represented by counsel. Witnesses shall be sworn; and, if requested by the party cited, a complete electronic record or a transcript shall be made of all proceedings and testimony. The expense of the record shall be paid by the party requesting it, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the Executive Committee. The presiding member or Special Master shall have the authority to rule on all motions, objections, and other matters presented in connection with the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure, and the practice in the trial of civil cases. The party cited may not be required to testify over his or her objection. \n \nThe Executive Committee shall (1) make findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall determine whether the party cited was delinquent in violation of  Rule 1-501; and (2) upon a finding of delinquency shall determine whether there was reasonable cause for the delinquency. Financial hardship short of adjudicated bankruptcy shall not constitute reasonable cause. A copy of the findings and the determination shall be sent to the party cited. If it is determined that no delinquency has occurred, the matter shall be dismissed. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred but that there was reasonable cause therefor, the matter shall be deferred for one year at which time the matter will be reconsidered. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred without reasonable cause therefor, the membership shall be suspended immediately upon such determination. An appropriate notice of suspension shall be sent to the clerks of all Georgia courts and shall be published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia. Alleged errors of law in the proceedings or findings of the Executive Committee or its delegate shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Executive Committee may delegate to a special master any or all of its responsibilities and authority with respect to suspending membership for license fee delinquency in which event the Special Master shall make a report to the Committee of its findings for its approval or disapproval. \n \nAfter a finding of delinquency, a copy of the finding shall be served upon the respondent attorney. The respondent attorney may file with the Court any written exceptions (supported by the written argument) said respondent may have to the findings of the Executive Committee. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and served on the Executive Committee by service on the General Counsel within 20 days of the date that the findings were served on the respondent attorney. Upon the filing of exceptions by the respondent attorney, the Executive Committee shall within 20 days of said filing file a report of its findings and the complete record and transcript of evidence with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant extensions of time for filing in appropriate cases. Findings of fact by the Executive Committee shall be conclusive if supported by any evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by the respondent attorney or the Executive Committee. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall promptly consider the report of the Executive Committee, exceptions thereto, and the responses filed by any party to such exceptions, if any, and enter its judgment. A copy of the Supreme Court of Georgia's judgment shall be transmitted to the Executive Committee and to the respondent attorney by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \nWithin 30 days after a final judgment which suspends membership, the suspended member shall, under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, notify all clients of said suspended member's inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of said suspended member's clients. Should the suspended member fail to notify said clients or fail to protect their interests as herein required, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its motion, or upon the motion of the State Bar of Georgia, and after ten days notice to the suspended member and proof of failure to notify or protect said clients, may hold the suspended member in contempt and order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of said suspended member and proceed to notify all clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Any member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia to take charge of the files and records of the suspended member under these Rules shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia. </div>","UrlName":"revision18"}],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"17c92ac4-ffe4-4796-835e-40234198055d","Title":"Rule 1-501.1. License Fees - Late Fee","Content":" Any member who has not paid his or her license fee for the State Bar of Georgia on or before August 1 shall be penalized in the amount of $75, which will be added to the member’s outstanding license fee. Any member who has not paid his or her license fee on or after January 1 of each year shall be penalized an additional amount of $100 for a total of $175, which will be added to the member’s outstanding license fee. \n \nA member may submit a request for waiver of any late fees in writing to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon good cause shown, any late fee or penalty imposed by this rule may be waived by a majority vote of the Executive Committee.","UrlName":"rule56","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"86b568a8-63c4-404f-b916-d1fec0ebe1da","Title":"Rule 1-502. Amount of License Fees","Content":"The amount of such license fees for active members shall not exceed $350.00, and shall annually be fixed by the Board of Governors for the ensuing year; provided, however, that except in the case of an emergency, such annual dues shall not be increased in any one year by more than $25 over those set for the next preceding year. The annual license fees for inactive members shall be in an amount not to exceed one-half of those set for active members. Subject to the above limitations, license fees may be fixed in differing amounts for different classifications of active and inactive membership, as may be established in the bylaws. ","UrlName":"rule59","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f2217c14-3460-4151-97d8-a715397fc1e8","Title":"Rule 1-502.1. Fees for Associates","Content":"The amount of fees for associates as provided in Bar Rule 1-206 shall be fixed by the Board of Governors at an amount less than the amount prescribed for active members pursuant to Bar Rule 1-502, but for such amount as will reasonably cover the cost of the publications furnished; provided, however law student association fees may be fixed at a nominal level.","UrlName":"rule64","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f621cd67-976b-44c0-8a2b-3851f04346b2","Title":"Rule 1-503. Disbursements","Content":"The Board of Governors shall have the power to direct the disbursement of funds of the State Bar of Georgia. No officer named herein and no member of the Board of Governors shall receive any compensation for his or her services except that the Board of Governors may provide for the reimbursement of the actual and necessary expenses incurred by officers in the discharge of their duties.","UrlName":"rule67","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"dadb22b0-88d2-4698-9177-26eec2fc0413","Title":"Rule 1-504. Bonds","Content":"Every person having the duty or right to receive or disburse the funds of the State Bar of Georgia shall be required to furnish bond conditioned on his or her faithful performance with such security as the bylaws or the Board of Governors may require.","UrlName":"rule73","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d8da40a6-4b12-40a7-aeca-b8637797b2e6","Title":"Rule 1-505. Audit","Content":"The Board of Governors shall annually cause an audit of the financial affairs of the State Bar of Georgia to be made, and the bylaws shall provide for the communication of the findings thereof to the membership.","UrlName":"rule75","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f9987308-d538-4d4a-a92c-71925d25feba","Title":"Rule 1-506. Clients' Security Fund Assessment","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia is authorized to assess each member an annual fee of $15. This assessment shall be used only to fund the Clients’ Security Fund and shall be in addition to the annual license fee as provided in Bar Rule 1-501 through Bar Rule 1-502.</li> \n <li>The failure of a dues-paying member to pay the assessment shall subject the member to the same penalty provisions, including late fees and suspension of membership, as apply to the failure to pay the annual license fee as set forth in Bar Rules 1-501 and 1-501.1.</li> \n <li>A member who is admitted as a Foreign Law Consultant or who joins without taking the Georgia Bar Examination shall be responsible for the annual assessment upon registration with the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule81","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[{"Id":"541ad67c-5fa4-4e51-b9ca-c59169e4f455","ParentId":"f9987308-d538-4d4a-a92c-71925d25feba","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia is authorized to assess each member a fee of $100. This $100 fee may be paid in minimum annual installments of $25 for a period of four years. Each new member of the State Bar of Georgia will also be assessed a similar amount upon admission to the State Bar of Georgia. This fee shall be used only to fund the Clients’ Security Fund and shall be in addition to the annual license fee as provided in Bar Rule 1-501 through Bar Rule 1-502.</li> \n <li>For a member who joins the State Bar of Georgia after taking the Georgia Bar Examination, the Clients’ Security Fund Assessment shall be due and payable in $25 installments on July 1 of each year, beginning with the second full fiscal year following the year of admission, until the balance of $100 is paid. The failure of a member to pay the minimum annual installments shall subject the member to the same penalty provisions, including late fees and suspension of membership, as pertain to the failure to pay the annual license fee as set forth in Bar Rules 1-501 and 1-501.1.</li> \n <li>For a member who is admitted as a Foreign Law Consultant or who joins without taking the Georgia Bar Examination, and who has not previously paid the Clients’ Security Fund Assessment, the full assessment shall be due and payable prior to or upon registration with the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision353"}],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a89dc3e6-0488-4006-9bd5-49760c540dbd","Title":"Rule 1-507. Bar Facility Assessment","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia is authorized to assess each member of the State Bar of Georgia a fee of $200. This $200 fee may be paid in minimum annual installments of $50 for a period of four years. This fee shall be used to maintain and operate the State Bar offices and shall be in addition to the annual license fee as provided in Bar Rule 1-501 through Bar Rule 1-502 and the Clients’ Security Fund Assessment as provided in Bar Rule 1-506.</li> \n <li>For a member who joins the State Bar of Georgia after taking the Georgia Bar Examination, the Bar Facility Assessment shall be due and payable in $50 installments on July 1 of each year, beginning with the second full fiscal year following the year of admission, until the balance of $200 is paid. The failure of a member to pay the minimum annual installments shall subject the member to the same penalty provisions, including late fees and suspension of membership, as pertain to the failure to pay the annual license fee as set forth in Bar Rules 1-501 and 1-501.1.</li> \n <li>For a member who is admitted as a foreign law consultant or joins the State Bar of Georgia without taking the Georgia Bar Examination, and who has not previously paid the Bar Facility Assessment, the full assessment shall be due and payable prior to or upon registration with the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule84","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[{"Id":"d5938721-d984-4f82-bdfd-b94c34f403cd","ParentId":"a89dc3e6-0488-4006-9bd5-49760c540dbd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar is authorized to assess each member of the State Bar a fee of $200.00. This $200.00 fee may be paid in minimum annual installments of $50.00 for a period of four (4) years. This fee shall be used to purchase, maintain, and operate a facility for the State Bar offices and shall be in addition to the annual license fee as provided in Rule 1-501 through Rule 1-502 and the Clients' Security Fund Assessment as provided in Rule 1-506.</li> \n <li>For a member who joins the State Bar after taking the Georgia Bar Examination, the Bar Facility assessment shall be due and payable in $50.00 installments on July 1 of each year until the balance of $200.00 is paid. For members admitted to the State Bar prior to July 1, 1997, such installments shall begin on July 1, 1997. For newly admitted members of the State Bar, such installments shall begin when a new member is admitted to the State Bar. The failure of a member to pay the minimum annual installments shall subject the member to the same penalty provisions, including late fees and suspension of membership, as pertain to the failure to pay the annual license fee as set forth in Bar Rules 1-501 and 1-501.1.</li> \n <li>For a member who is admitted as a Foreign Law Consultant or joins the State Bar without taking the Georgia Bar Examination, and who has not previously paid the Bar Facility Assessment, the full assessment shall be due and payable prior to or upon registration with the State Bar.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision20"}],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","Title":"CHAPTER 6 BYLAWS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter9","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"55dee768-bc9a-4288-b9fe-4cc0de22708b","Title":"Rule 1-601","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia may adopt or amend the bylaws at any members meeting not inconsistent with these Rules or the bylaws.","UrlName":"rule88","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4059c13-657f-433e-8e1a-e6f6f6a08f9d","ParentId":"55dee768-bc9a-4288-b9fe-4cc0de22708b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia, at its first annual meeting, shall adopt bylaws as directed herein, and at such meeting and any subsequent annual, annual midyear, or special meeting may adopt such other bylaws not inconsistent herewith as it may deem necessary and proper and may amend its bylaws from time to time. ","UrlName":"revision387"}],"Ancestors":["c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"10f78a46-1a55-46a1-ada7-c3593c52f792","Title":"Rule 1-602","Content":"The Board of Governors, the Executive Committee or any ten members of the State Bar of Georgia may propose bylaws and amendments thereto for consideration at a midyear, annual or special called membership meeting. Proposals from ten or more members of the State Bar of Georgia must be provided to the Secretary at least 60 days prior to the midyear, annual or special called membership meeting. Written notice of proposed bylaws and amendments shall be published 20 days prior to the midyear, annual or special called meeting of the membership through any one or more of the official publications of the State Bar of Georgia including the official website for the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule91","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Title":"CHAPTER 7 COMMITTEES AND SECTIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter10","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"29a3a882-d203-4d2d-b038-a709ae60df3d","Title":"Rule 1-701. Executive Committee","Content":" There shall be an Executive Committee composed of such officers and members of the Board of Governors as may be designated in the bylaws, which shall exercise the powers and duties of the Board of Governors when it is not in session, subject to such limitations as the bylaws may provide. The Executive Committee shall also have the authority to supervise the election of the members of the Board of Governors as outlined in Bar Rule 1-304 hereof, and, in particular, to ascertain on or after the first day of January of each year, the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who reside in each judicial circuit as of the last day in December of the preceding year; and thereupon to make a determination of whether any judicial circuit may be entitled to additional members of the Board of Governors as provided in Bar Rule 1-302 (b) hereof. In addition, whenever a new judicial circuit is created, the Executive Committee shall determine, under the provisions of Bar Rule 1-302 (b) and the bylaws, the number of members of the Board of Governors the new circuit is entitled to elect and shall supervise the elections of such members. In the event that the composition of the Board of Governors must be changed, as a result of an increase or decrease in the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who reside in each judicial circuit, as a result of the creation of a new judicial circuit, or as a result of a change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit, the Executive Committee is empowered to take appropriate action to insure that the composition of the Board complies with the provisions of Bar Rule 1-302 (b), including but not limited to the implementing of the election of additional members and the designation of numerical posts. The Executive Committee shall generally have broad discretionary powers in the conduct of elections. \n ","UrlName":"rule95","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d18cf30d-c7f6-4399-a812-f4d7b9458ad5","Title":"Rule 1-702. Standing Committees; Special Committees","Content":"Unless otherwise provided in these rules, there shall be standing and special committees, which shall be composed of such members, serving such terms, appointed in such manner, and having such duties as the bylaws may provide. A statement of the purpose of each committee shall be published annually on the official State Bar of Georgia website.","UrlName":"rule99","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[{"Id":"b554a052-a70a-4b72-a7d0-945286b71bed","ParentId":"d18cf30d-c7f6-4399-a812-f4d7b9458ad5","Title":"Version 2","Content":" Unless otherwise provided in these rules, there shall be standing and special committees, which shall be composed of such members, serving such terms, appointed in such manner, and having such duties as the bylaws may provide. A statement of the purpose of each committee shall be published annually in the State Bar Directory .","UrlName":"revision319"}],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"486fa268-ec1e-479f-9454-eedf8ba16777","Title":"Rule 1-703. Young Lawyers Division","Content":"There shall be a division of the State Bar of Georgia composed of (1) all members of the State Bar who have not reached their 36th birthday prior to the close of the preceding Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia and (2) all members of the State Bar of Georgia who have been admitted to their first bar less than five years. All persons holding an elective office or post in the Young Lawyers Division who are qualified by age to assume such office or post on the date of his or her election shall remain members of the Young Lawyers Division for the duration of their offices or posts. In the case of a President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division who is qualified by age to assume such office on the date of such person's election, such person shall remain a member of the Young Lawyers Division for the duration of the terms of President and Immediate Past President to which he or she succeeds.\nThe Young Lawyers Division shall have such organization, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule27","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b17f6e47-e6eb-4484-925e-a76ba4343749","Title":"Rule 1-704. Sections","Content":"Such additional sections may be created by the bylaws as may be deemed desirable.","UrlName":"rule28","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c4cb519a-cef1-4ec5-93ec-e05f65df75fe","Title":"Rule 1-705. Senior Lawyers Section","Content":" There shall be a section of the State Bar of Georgia composed from time to time of all members of the State Bar of Georgia who have reached their 65th birthday prior to the close of the preceding Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia provided, however, that all those members of the State Bar of Georgia who are between 60 and 65 years of age and are members in good standing of the Senior Section (sometimes called the Senior Law Section) at the time this amendment is adopted shall become members of the Senior Lawyers Section. \n \nThe Senior Lawyers Section shall have such organization, powers and duties as may be prescribed by the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule30","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a6332df4-2803-4847-a640-c1443673f17f","Title":"Rule 1-706. Center for Lawyer Wellbeing","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia Center for Lawyer Wellbeing (“the Center”) will focus on lawyer wellbeing, quality of life, and health. The Center shall coordinate the efforts of all State Bar of Georgia entities that provide programming in the area of wellbeing. It may collaborate with other State Bar of Georgia entities, create new programs, and provide resources to lawyers seeking information and advice about wellbeing. As approved by the Board of Governors, the Center may offer memberships to members of the State Bar of Georgia and collect fees in an amount approved by the Board of Governors.The organization, powers, and duties of the Center shall be set out in the bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule612","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Title":"CHAPTER 8 MEETINGS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter11","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"3e4100fb-91e1-44cc-8aa2-26700a3da0e3","Title":"Rule 1-801. Annual Meeting","Content":"An annual meeting of the State Bar of Georgia shall be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors. If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct an annual meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.","UrlName":"rule31","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"b40839a4-68b8-4d10-b299-46188736281c","ParentId":"3e4100fb-91e1-44cc-8aa2-26700a3da0e3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An annual meeting of the State Bar of Georgia shall be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors. ","UrlName":"revision341"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48d18380-5591-4a80-9130-1c469fa12873","Title":"Rule 1-801.1. Annual Midyear Meeting","Content":"An annual midyear meeting of the State Bar of Georgia may be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors. If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct an annual midyear meeting by an electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.\n","UrlName":"rule32","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"f37c69ca-79d6-4579-9b5c-08ae2743319f","ParentId":"48d18380-5591-4a80-9130-1c469fa12873","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An annual midyear meeting of the State Bar of Georgia may be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors.\n","UrlName":"revision343"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"99126ab7-b8e6-42a1-9320-be9a25565762","Title":"Rule 1-802. Special Meetings","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Special meetings of the State Bar of Georgia may be held at such times and places as may be determined by the Board of Governors or the President.</li> \n <li>The Secretary shall call a special meeting of the State Bar of Georgia upon petition signed by not less than ten percent of the active members in good standing, and such special meetings shall be specified in the call. hall be held within 60 days after the petition is filed with the Secretary. The business to be transacted at special meetings shall be specified in the call.</li> \n <li>If deemed prudent and necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct a special meeting by an electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule33","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"d662b639-fe2a-41d5-bdc6-cf5df7a34184","ParentId":"99126ab7-b8e6-42a1-9320-be9a25565762","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Special meetings of the State Bar of Georgia may be held at such times and places as may be determined by the Board of Governors. The Secretary shall call a special meeting of the State Bar of Georgia upon petition signed by not less than ten percent of the active members and such special meetings shall be held within 60 days after the petition is filed with the Secretary. The business to be transacted at special meetings shall be specified in the call.","UrlName":"revision345"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2f51e527-3cef-429e-8ed6-b1646a0244b7","Title":"Rule 1-803. Notice","Content":" At least 30-days notice of the time and place of each annual meeting or annual midyear meeting, and any special meeting, shall be provided by email or by U.S. mail to each member according to the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia. The notice may also be provided through any official publication of the State Bar of Georgia and by posting the notice on the official State Bar of Georgia website. \n ","UrlName":"rule35","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"37bb4045-3ddf-4210-8f9b-19ee8278e260","ParentId":"2f51e527-3cef-429e-8ed6-b1646a0244b7","Title":"Version 2","Content":" At least 30-days notice of the time and place of each annual meeting, annual midyear meeting, and any special meeting shall be given in writing by mail to each member at his address shown on the records of the State Bar of Georgia. The notice by mail herein required may be by or through any one or more of the official publications of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n ","UrlName":"revision347"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Title":"Organization of the State Bar & Admissions","Content":"","UrlName":"ha3","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Title":"Part I - Creation & Organization","Content":"","UrlName":"part12","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Title":"CHAPTER 1 CREATION AND ORGANIZATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter3","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"5184bedf-ae75-47de-9fba-0723f7ea48c4","Title":"Rule 1-101. Creation","Content":"Pursuant to the authority of this court and the Act of the General Assembly approved by the Governor on March 11, 1963 (Georgia Laws 1963, page 70) the State Bar of Georgia is hereby created and established.","UrlName":"rule6","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b7d724f8-0863-4dbf-8187-660d1b24a48d","Title":"Rule 1-102. Powers","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia shall be a legal entity; may sue and be sued; shall have perpetual existence; may contract; may purchase, receive, lease, acquire, own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal with real and personal property and any legal or equitable interest in property, wherever located; may sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property; may adopt and use an official seal; shall establish a principal office; and shall have such other powers, privileges and duties as may be reasonable and necessary for the proper fulfillment of its purposes.","UrlName":"rule7","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"127c5c68-7426-4f25-9d59-939a522a49c4","Title":"Rule 1-103. Purposes","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the State Bar of Georgia shall be: \n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>to foster among the members of the bar of this State the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to improve the administration of justice; and</li> \n <li>to advance the science of law.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule8","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[{"Id":"9fb13d29-239c-42e5-b02d-b83b1c3ae11e","ParentId":"127c5c68-7426-4f25-9d59-939a522a49c4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the State Bar of Georgia shall be: \n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>to foster among the members of the bar of this State the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to improve the administration of justice; and</li> \n <li>to advance the science of law.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision9"}],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Title":"CHAPTER 2 MEMBERSHIP","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter5","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"f1dc3d58-7f1e-4a81-93ca-6f4eda03d2da","Title":"Rule 1-201. Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> All persons now or hereafter who are: \n <ol> \n <li>authorized to practice law in this State or;</li> \n <li>authorized to act as a Foreign Legal Consultant shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule11","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6c08a734-b5e8-4fbe-9bfe-72e39fc62151","Title":"Rule 1-202. Membership Status","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of six categories: active, inactive, foreign law consultant, emeritus, members unable to practice law due to a disability, and retired status members. The bylaws shall make provision for the registration of each active member and the location of his or her principal office for the practice of law, the registration of each foreign law consultant and the location of his or her principal office, and the registration of emeritus and inactive members and their mailing addresses. Only Active Status members and Emeritus Status members may vote on any State Bar of Georgia matter or election or nominate an active member for office. Emeritus Status members can vote only in person or electronically. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive Status Members . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia may contact the Membership Department and elect to be transferred to Inactive Status membership provided that the member:\n <ol> \n <li>is not engaged in the practice of law;</li> \n <li>does not hold himself or herself out as a practicing lawyer or attorney;</li> \n <li>does not occupy any public or private position in which the member may be called upon to give legal advice or counsel; and</li> \n <li>does not examine the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law for the benefit of another person, company, or corporation.</li> \n </ol> \n Members who are in active military service may choose inactive status if they so elect. </li> \n <li> Active Status Members . Active Status members shall be all other lawyers, including judges but excluding foreign law consultants. Only Active Status members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Foreign Law Consultant Status . Foreign Law Consultants shall be those persons, who are licensed under the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Emeritus Status Members . Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia who will attain the age of 70 years in a Bar year and who shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, five years of which must be as a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia, may request Emeritus Status from the State Bar of Georgia upon petition to and approval by the Membership Department. When approved, the member shall be transferred to Emeritus Status. An Emeritus Status member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be required to pay license fees or other fees and may not hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. An Emeritus Status member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be privileged to practice law except that an Emeritus Status member may handle pro bono cases referred by either an organized pro bono program recognized by the Pro Bono Project of the State Bar of Georgia or a non-profit corporation that delivers legal services to the poor. An Emeritus Status member may be reinstated to active or inactive membership upon application to the Membership Department and payment of non-prorated license fees for the year in which the Emeritus Status member returns to Active Status or Inactive Status membership. </li> \n <li> Members Unable to Practice Law Due to Disability . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is temporarily or permanently disabled may submit to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia a written request to be transferred to Disabled Status. Members who elect this status must submit adequate medical and/or psychological documentation of their disability with the written request. Adequate documentation includes:\n <ol> \n <li>documentation from the Social Security Administration of approval of disability;</li> \n <li>documentation from an insurance company of receipt of benefits based upon disability; or</li> \n <li>documentation from a medical doctor that the member is disabled.</li> \n </ol> \n Any request by a member to be transferred to Disabled Status must comply with all of the provisions contained in Article I, Section 10 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Retired Status Members .\n <ol> \n <li>Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is not engaged in the active practice of law in any state, district, or territory of the United States may transfer to Retired Status by submitting a request in writing to the Executive Director and General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon approval by the Executive Director and General Counsel, the Membership Department shall transfer the member to Retired Status. A member in Retired Status shall not be entitled to practice law in this state and may not practice law in any other jurisdiction. Further, such member shall not be eligible to vote or hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. Any member transferred to Retired Status shall be relieved of his or her membership fees and CLE obligations.</li> \n <li>A request for Retired Status must be unqualified, is irrevocable, and permanent. A member in Retired Status will appear in the State Bar of Georgia member directory as “Retired.”</li> \n <li>A member of the State Bar of Georgia with a pending disciplinary matter may transfer to Retired Status with the consent of the Office of the General Counsel. Grievances received after a member has transferred to Retired Status may be investigated and prosecuted through the disciplinary process at the option of the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li>A member suspended from the practice of law because of failure to meet CLE requirements or failure to pay Bar membership fees is not eligible for Retired Status.</li> \n </ol> \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule12","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"84ad6676-28b9-4f47-9574-000b6e7c9439","ParentId":"6c08a734-b5e8-4fbe-9bfe-72e39fc62151","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of five classes: active, foreign law consultant, emeritus, disabled and inactive. The bylaws shall make provision for the registration of each active member and the location of his or her principal office for the practice of law, the registration of each foreign law consultant and the location of his or her principal office, and the registration of emeritus and inactive members and their mailing addresses. Only active members and emeritus members may vote on any State Bar matter or election or nominate an active member for office. Emeritus members can vote only in person or electronically. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive Members . All lawyers who are neither engaged in the practice of law nor holding themselves out as practicing attorneys nor occupying any public or private position in which they may be called upon to give legal advice or counsel, to examine the law or to pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law may be inactive members at their election. Members who are in military service may be inactive if they so elect. </li> \n <li> Active Members . Active members shall be all other lawyers including judges but excluding foreign law consultants. Only active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Foreign Law Consultants . Foreign Law Consultants shall be those persons, who are licensed under the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Emeritus Members . Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia who will attain the age of 70 years in a Bar year and who shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, five years of which must be as a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia, may request emeritus status from the State Bar of Georgia upon petition to and approval by the membership department. When approved, the member shall hold emeritus status. An emeritus member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be required to pay dues or annual fees, and may not hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. An emeritus member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be privileged to practice law except that an emeritus member may handle pro bono cases referred by either an organized pro bono program recognized by the Pro Bono Project of the State Bar of Georgia or a non-profit corporation that delivers legal services to the poor. An emeritus member may be reinstated to active or inactive membership upon application to the membership department and payment of non-prorated dues for the year in which the emeritus members return to active or inactive service. </li> \n <li> Disabled Members . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Executive Committee for disabled status provided the member meets one of the following criteria:\n <ol> \n <li>the member has been determined to be permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration; or</li> \n <li>the member is in the process of applying to the Social Security Administration for permanent disability status; or </li> \n <li>the member has been determined to be permanently disabled or disabled for a period in excess of one year by an insurance company and is receiving payments pursuant to a disability insurance policy; or</li> \n <li>the member has a signed statement from a medical doctor that the member is permanently disabled, or disabled for a period in excess of one year, and unable to practice law.</li> \n </ol> \n Upon the Executive Committee’s grant of the member’s petition for disability status, the disabled member shall be treated as an inactive member of the State Bar of Georgia and shall not be privileged to practice law. A member holding disabled status shall not be required to pay dues or annual fees. A disabled member shall continue in such status until the member requests reinstatement by written application to the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia. \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision385"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fba14cfd-a73b-4163-84c9-18a132c4f63f","Title":"Rule 1-203. Practice by Active Members; Nonresidents","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No person shall practice law in this state unless such person is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing; except as provided below: \n <ol> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state in isolated cases in the discretion of the judge of such court; or</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state if such person:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>is enrolled in a full time graduate degree program at an accredited law school in this state; and</li> \n <li>is under the supervision of a resident attorney; and</li> \n <li>limits his or her practice to the appearance in the courts of this state to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities of such graduate degree program.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A person who is admitted to the State Bar of Georgia as a foreign law consultant pursuant to Part E of the Rules Governing the Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gasupreme.us/">www.gasupreme.us , may render legal services in the state of Georgia solely with respect to the laws of the foreign country (i.e., a country other than the United States of America, its possessions and territories) where such person is admitted to practice, to the extent provided by and in strict compliance with the provisions of Part D of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law, but shall not otherwise render legal services in this state. </li> \n <li> Persons who are authorized to practice law in this state are hereby authorized to practice law as sole proprietorships or as partners, shareholders, or members of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>partnerships under OCGA § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability partnerships under OCGA § 14-8-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional corporations under OCGA § 14-7-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional associations under OCGA § 14-10-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability companies under OGCA § 14-11-100 et seq.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XV, Rules 91-95, Student Practice Rule.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XVI, Rules 97-103, Law School Graduates, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XX, Rules 114-120, Extended Public Service Program, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XXI, Rule 121, Provision of Legal Services Following Determination of Major Disaster. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule13","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"67da6646-3933-45cf-a9f3-5bd64ddcff21","ParentId":"fba14cfd-a73b-4163-84c9-18a132c4f63f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"No person shall practice law in this State unless such person is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing; except as provided below:\n<ol> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state in isolated cases in the discretion of the judge of such court; or</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state if such person:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>is enrolled in a full time graduate degree program at an accredited law school in this state; and</li> \n <li>is under the supervision of a resident attorney; and</li> \n <li>limits his or her practice to the appearance in the courts of this state to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities of such graduate degree program.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A person who is admitted to the Bar as a foreign law consultant pursuant to Part E of the Rules Governing the Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, Ga. Ct. &Bar Rules, p. 12-1 et seq., may render legal services in the state of Georgia solely with respect to the laws of the foreign country (i.e., a country other than the United States of America, its possessions and territories) where such person is admitted to practice, to the extent provided by and in strict compliance with the provisions of Part D of the Rules Governing Admission to Practice, but shall not otherwise render legal services in this State.</li> \n <li> Persons who are authorized to practice law in this State are hereby authorized to practice law as sole proprietorships or as partners, shareholders, or members of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>partnerships under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability partnerships under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional corporations under O.C.G.A. § 14-7-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional associations under O.C.G.A. § 14-10-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability companies under O.C.G.A. § 14-11-100 et. seq.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n","UrlName":"revision8"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ed518433-bfb5-4ff7-9abd-1d2a819f46cd","Title":"Rule 1-204. Good Standing","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No lawyer shall be deemed a member in good standing: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>while delinquent after September 1 of any year for nonpayment of the annual license fee and any costs or fees of any type as prescribed in Chapter 5, Bar Rule 1-501 (a)-(c);</li> \n <li>while suspended for disciplinary reasons;</li> \n <li>while disbarred;</li> \n <li>while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements; or</li> \n <li>while in violation of Bar Rule 1-209 for failure to pay child support obligations.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule14","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"9867c2be-d9e8-4f01-b3d2-f2b96c9cf38e","ParentId":"ed518433-bfb5-4ff7-9abd-1d2a819f46cd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No lawyer shall be deemed a member in good standing: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>while delinquent after September 1 of any year for nonpayment of the annual license fee and any costs or fees of any type as prescribed in Chapter 5, Rule 1-501 (a)-(c);</li> \n <li>while suspended for disciplinary reasons;</li> \n <li>while disbarred;</li> \n <li>while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements; or</li> \n <li>while in violation of Rule 1-209 for failure to pay child support obligations.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision13"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"93927872-3c21-4742-b79c-f7a5937c5647","Title":"Rule 1-205. Bar of Judicial Circuit","Content":"Each member who is a resident of this state shall be considered a member of the bar of the judicial circuit in which his principal office for the practice of law is located, or, at his election, the circuit in which he resides, or if he has no office, the circuit in which he resides or last resided.\n","UrlName":"rule15","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b9a37083-773c-4ce7-8ce8-88269bc55266","Title":"Rule 1-206. Affiliate Members","Content":"In addition to the membership and classes of membership provided in this chapter, the State Bar of Georgia may recognize as affiliates, without the rights and privileges of membership, members of the legal profession not authorized to practice law in Georgia, but who are licensed to practice law in another state or the District of Columbia, and are in good standing in all jurisdictions in which they are licensed. Affiliate members may be furnished copies of appropriate publications and may be entitled to attend and participate, without the right to vote or hold office, in those meetings and activities conducted by the State Bar of Georgia and any of its component parts or sections.\n","UrlName":"rule16","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6e87a3b6-6173-4c3a-a2c4-178843aa70a3","Title":"Rule 1-206.1. Law Student Members","Content":"In addition to the membership and classes of membership provided in this chapter, the State Bar of Georgia may recognize as law student members, without the rights and privileges of membership, those law students currently enrolled in a law school approved by the American Bar Association or any law school approved by the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners. Law student members may be furnished copies of appropriate publications electronically and may be entitled to attend and participate, without the right to vote or hold office, in those meetings and activities conducted by the State Bar of Georgia and any of its component parts or sections.\n","UrlName":"rule17","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0835bb73-8231-43bf-a560-8c59908439fd","Title":"Rule 1-207. Change of Address","Content":" All members of the State Bar of Georgia shall keep the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia informed of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address given to the membership department and failure on the part of a member to notify the membership department may have adverse consequences to a member. The choice of a member to use only a post office box address on the State Bar of Georgia membership records shall constitute an election to waive personal service in any proceedings between the bar and the member. Notification given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the membership department shall not satisfy this requirement.\n","UrlName":"rule18","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"97fc1270-8ef5-4b57-be01-91223448bdaa","Title":"Rule 1-208. Resignation from Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Resignation while in good standing. A member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar of Georgia. Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing unless such person complies with part (f) or part (g) of this rule.</li> \n <li>Resignation while delinquent or suspended for failure to pay dues or for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements. A member of the State Bar of Georgia who is delinquent or suspended (but not terminated) for failure to pay dues or failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar of Georgia. Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar of Georgia unless such person complies with part (f) or part (g) of this rule.</li> \n <li> A petition for leave to resign from membership with the State Bar of Georgia shall comply with the following:  \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the petition shall be filed under oath with the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia and shall contain a statement that there are no disciplinary actions or criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner; and</li> \n <li>the petition shall contain a statement as to whether the petition is being filed under part (a) or part (b) of this rule. If the petition is being filed under part (b), the petition shall state the term of the delinquency and/or suspension for failure to pay dues or to comply with continuing legal education requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No petition for leave to resign shall be accepted if there are disciplinary proceedings or criminal charges pending against the member, or if the member is not in good standing for failure to pay child support obligations under Bar Rule 1-209. A petition filed under this rule shall constitute a waiver of the confidentiality provisions of Bar Rule 4-221 (d) as to any pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Resignation shall not be a bar to institution of subsequent disciplinary proceedings for any conduct of the resigned person occurring prior to the resignation. If the penalty imposed on the resigned member is disbarment or suspension, the status of the member shall be changed from “resigned member” to that of a person so disciplined.</li> \n <li>A petition filed under this rule shall not toll the provisions of Bar Rule 1-501 (c).</li> \n <li> Readmission within five years after resignation. For a period of five years after the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the member of the State Bar of Georgia who has resigned pursuant to this rule may apply for readmission to the State Bar of Georgia upon completion of the following terms and conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>payment in full of any delinquent dues, late fees and penalties owing at the time the petition for leave to resign was accepted, and payment in full of the current dues for the year in which readmission is sought;</li> \n <li>payment of a readmission fee to the State Bar of Georgia equal to the amount the member seeking readmission would have paid during the period of resignation if he or she had instead elected inactive status;</li> \n <li>for resignations while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements under part (b) of this rule, submission of a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency declaring that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; and</li> \n <li>submission to the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants. Provided the former member seeking readmission has applied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants before the expiration of the five-year period after his or her resignation, the former member shall be readmitted upon submitting a determination of fitness even if the five-year period has expired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Readmission after five years. After the expiration of five years from the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the former member must comply with the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule19","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"865943ac-a42d-44b7-839d-3d9105500eca","ParentId":"97fc1270-8ef5-4b57-be01-91223448bdaa","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Resignation while in good standing. A member of the State Bar in good standing may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar. Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar in good standing unless such person \n complies with part (f) or part (g) of this Rule. </li> \n <li>Resignation while delinquent or suspended for failure to pay dues or for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements:  A member of the State Bar who is delinquent or suspended (but not terminated) for failure to pay dues or failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar.  Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar unless such person complies with part (f) or part (g) of this Rule.</li> \n <li> A petition for leave to resign from membership with the State Bar shall comply with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> the petition shall be filed under oath with the Executive Director of the State Bar and shall contain a statement that there are no disciplinary actions or criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner; and \n   </li> \n <li>the petition shall contain a statement as to whether the petition is being filed under part (a) or part (b) of this Rule. If the petition is being filed under part (b), the petition shall state the term of the delinquency and/or suspension for failure to pay dues or to comply with continuing legal education requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No petition for leave to resign shall be accepted if there are disciplinary proceedings or criminal charges pending against the member, or if the member is not in good standing for failure to pay child support obligations under Bar Rule 1-209.</li> \n <li>A petition filed under this Rule shall constitute a waiver of the confidentiality provisions of Rule 4-221(d) as to any pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li> Readmission within five years after resignation. For a period of five years after the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the member of the State Bar who has resigned pursuant to this Rule may apply for readmission to the State Bar upon completion of the following terms and conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> payment in full of any delinquent dues, late fees and penalties  owing at the time the petition for leave to resign was accepted, and payment in full of the current dues for the year in which readmission is sought; \n   </li> \n <li> payment of a readmission fee to the State Bar equal to the amount the member seeking readmission would have paid during the period of resignation if he or she had instead elected inactive status; \n   </li> \n <li> for resignations while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements under part (b) of this Rule, submission of a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency declaring that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; and \n   </li> \n <li>submission to the membership department of the State Bar of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants. Provided the former member seeking readmission has applied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants before the expiration of the five year period after his or her resignation, the former member shall be readmitted upon submitting a determination of fitness even if the five year period has expired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Readmission after five years. After the expiration of five years from the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the former member must comply with the Rules governing admission to the practice of law in Georgia as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision14"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1b4ac2a9-af48-4439-a51a-5e7145202db3","Title":"Rule 1-209. Failure to Pay Child Support Obligations","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Obligation to Pay Child Support. A Bar member shall not willfully refuse, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction under the procedures of OCGA § 19-6-28.1, to timely pay a child support obligation and continue such refusal for 30 days after said determination becomes final. A certified copy of a court order finding that the member has willfully failed to maintain compliance with child support obligations shall be conclusive evidence of an infraction of this rule. So long as a member is complying fully with the purge provisions of a court order of contempt for non-payment of child support, this rule shall not apply. </li> \n <li> Not in Good Standing Upon Non Compliance. In the event a court of competent jurisdiction makes a finding, under the procedures of OCGA § 19-6-28.1, that a member has willfully failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for 30 days after said determination becomes final, the member shall be deemed not to be in good standing and shall remain in such status until such time as the noncompliance is corrected. </li> \n <li> Action by State Bar of Georgia. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, under the procedures of OCGA § 19-6-28.1, finding that a member has failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for 30 days after said determination becomes final, a notice shall be mailed by certified mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia. The notice is deemed received whenever actually received or five days after the notice is mailed, whichever is sooner. </li> \n <li> Return to Good Standing. A member deemed not to be in good standing under this rule shall be deemed to be in good standing upon providing the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia a certified copy of a court order finding that the delinquency has been satisfied and by paying an administrative fee set by the Executive Committee. The member shall be returned to good standing only upon compliance with the foregoing conditions.  </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule20","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"3334e7a0-542a-4f6e-b855-d46b5386d701","ParentId":"1b4ac2a9-af48-4439-a51a-5e7145202db3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Obligation to Pay Child Support. A Bar member shall not willfully refuse, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction under the procedures of O.G.C.A. § 19-6-28.1, to timely pay a child support obligation and continue such refusal for thirty days after said determination becomes final. A certified copy of a court order finding that the member has willfully failed to maintain compliance with child support obligations shall be conclusive evidence of an infraction of this Rule. So long as a member is complying fully with the purge provisions of a court order of contempt for non-payment of child support, this Rule shall not apply. </li> \n <li> Not in Good Standing Upon Non Compliance. In the event a court of competent jurisdiction makes a finding, under the procedures of O.G.C.A. § 19-6-28.1, that a member has willfully failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for thirty days after said determination becomes final, the member shall be deemed not to be in good standing and shall remain in such status until such time as the noncompliance is corrected. </li> \n <li> Action by State Bar of Georgia. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, under the procedures of O.G.C.A. § 19-6-28.1, finding that a member has failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for thirty days after said determination becomes final, a notice shall be mailed by certified mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar. The notice is deemed received whenever actually received or five days after the notice is mailed, whichever is sooner. </li> \n <li> Return to Good Standing. A member deemed not to be in good standing under this Rule shall be deemed to be in good standing upon providing the Executive Director of the State Bar a certified copy of a court order finding that the delinquency has been satisfied and by paying an administrative fee set by the Executive Committee. The member shall be returned to good standing only upon compliance with the foregoing conditions.  </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision15"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Title":"CHAPTER 3 BOARD OF GOVERNORS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter6","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"a8836307-7cb1-4e2a-8f72-17deed13e04c","Title":"Rule 1-301. Government by the Board of Governors","Content":"The government of the State Bar of Georgia shall be vested in a Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule23","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"db94abe0-413c-469f-88ed-67188923c732","Title":"Rule 1-302. Composition","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> The President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and the Attorney General of Georgia; \n   </li> \n <li> the number of Board of Governors members for each Judicial Circuit as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governor members to be elected from the Atlanta Circuit. \n \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> Each Judicial Circuit shall have an additional member for each additional five hundred active members of the State Bar of Georgia added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. The size of the Board of Governors, excluding those designated in subsection (a)(1) above, shall not exceed 150, except as set out in subsection (b) below. \n   </li> \n <li> If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of superior court judges to which that circuit was entitled on July 1, 1979, then and in that event, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board of Governors representing that circuit provided there was more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event that there is such a reduction, the last created post will be the first post eliminated. \n   </li> \n <li> If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of superior court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board of Governors as it had on July 1, 1979. Additional Board representation will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing in that circuit as provided above. A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon that circuit's Board of Governors' representatives, except as otherwise provided. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> two representatives of the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state of Georgia, who themselves must be residents of different states of the United States. The nonresident representative shall be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing residing outside of the state of Georgia. \n   </li> \n <li> three members appointed as follows: The President-elect in office when this rule becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint the number of such members whose term expired at the annual meeting at which the President-elect assumed office. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Upon the creation of a new circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to elect one member to the Board of Governors even if the cap of 150 Board of Governors members has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to elect additional members depending on the number of active members of the state of Georgia residing in the circuit as provided above. \n   </li> \n <li> A member of the Board of Governors must be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. A member representing a judicial circuit shall be a member of the bar of that circuit. \n   </li> \n <li>Members of the Board of Governors shall receive no compensation for their services.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule21","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"3b61d104-26c7-4e13-8f9f-50ad90ec8de1","ParentId":"db94abe0-413c-469f-88ed-67188923c732","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> The President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and the Attorney General of Georgia; \n   </li> \n <li> the number of Board of Governors members for each Judicial Circuit as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governor members to be elected from the Atlanta Circuit. \n \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> Each Judicial Circuit shall have an additional member for each additional five hundred active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. The size of the Board of Governors, excluding those designated in subsection (a)(1) above, shall not exceed 150, except as set out in subsection (b) below. \n   </li> \n <li> If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges to which that circuit was entitled on July 1, 1979, then and in that event, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board of Governors representing that circuit provided there was more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event that there is such a reduction, the last created post will be the first post eliminated. \n   </li> \n <li> If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board of Governors as it had on July 1, 1979. Additional Board representation will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar residing in that circuit as provided above. A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon that circuit's Board of Governors' representatives, except as otherwise provided. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> two representatives of the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State of Georgia, who themselves must be residents of different states of the United States. The nonresident representative shall be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing residing outside of the State of Georgia. \n   </li> \n <li> three members appointed as follows: The President-elect in office when this rule becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint the number of such members whose term expired at the annual meeting at which the President-elect assumed office. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Upon the creation of a new circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to elect one member to the Board of Governors even if the cap of 150 Board of Governors members has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to elect additional members depending on the number of active members of the State of Georgia residing in the circuit as provided above. \n   </li> \n <li> A member of the Board of Governors must be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. A member representing a judicial circuit shall be a member of the bar of that circuit. \n   </li> \n <li>Members of the Board of Governors shall receive no compensation for their services.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision16"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"da944fcb-8a47-40ef-b66e-b279d64bef46","Title":"Rule 1-303. Meetings","Content":"(a) The Board of Governors shall hold at least three regular meetings in each Bar year at such times and places as may be determined in accordance with the bylaws and upon such call and notice as may be set forth in the bylaws.\n(b) If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct any meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.\n","UrlName":"rule22","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"8cdb6c27-0508-489c-a576-396dde63cc8b","ParentId":"da944fcb-8a47-40ef-b66e-b279d64bef46","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Board of Governors shall hold at least three regular meetings in each year at such times and places as may be determined in accordance with the bylaws and upon such call and notice as may be set forth in the bylaws.","UrlName":"revision339"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d80125b1-bc60-466b-b06e-d4e8d52081a3","Title":"Rule 1-304. Election of Members of Board of Governors","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Bar of Georgia shall, in its bylaws, establish the term of office and the method of election of the members of the Board of Governors representing judicial circuits and nonresident members. Such method of election shall ensure that: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the election will be by secret written or secure electronic ballot;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in conjunction with a specified number of other active members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from his judicial circuit (or candidates in circuits electing more than one member of the Board of Governors in such election) whose name will be placed on the ballot for his circuit;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state, in conjunction with a specified number of other active nonresident members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state.</li> \n <li>any nominating petition shall bear or be accompanied by a statement signed by the nominee indicating his willingness to serve if elected;</li> \n <li>a ballot for his judicial circuit will be mailed to each active resident member and a ballot will be mailed to each active nonresident member in the case of election of nonresident board member, having printed thereon the names of all qualified nominees for such circuit or nonresident post and space for a write-in vote in ample time for the member to cast the ballot before the time fixed for the election. In lieu of a written ballot, a secure electronic ballot, which meets the requirements above, may be provided to members;</li> \n <li>each nominee shall be entitled to have at least one observer present at the counting of the ballots from his judicial circuit; and</li> \n <li>any change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit or circuits shall automatically terminate the terms of all members elected to the Board of Governors, accordingly in such manners as the bylaws may provide. In the event the geographical limits of a circuit are changed after the notices of election have been distributed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, then and in that event, the terms of the members of the Board of Governors from such circuits will remain as they were before the change in geographical limits until the election of the Board of Governors to be held the following year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule26","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"3c46fa2b-a530-4755-a8f8-878db3edb823","ParentId":"d80125b1-bc60-466b-b06e-d4e8d52081a3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Bar of Georgia shall, in its bylaws, establish the term of office and the method of election of the members of the Board of Governors representing judicial circuits and nonresident members. Such method of election shall ensure that: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the election will be by secret written or secure electronic ballot;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in conjunction with a specified number of other active members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from his judicial circuit (or candidates in circuits electing more than one member of the Board of Governors in such election) whose name will be placed on the ballot for his circuit;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State, in conjunction with a specified number of other active nonresident members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State.</li> \n <li>any nominating petition shall bear or be accompanied by a statement signed by the nominee indicating his willingness to serve if elected;</li> \n <li>a ballot for his judicial circuit will be mailed to each active resident member and a ballot will be mailed to each active nonresident member in the case of election of nonresident board member, having printed thereon the names of all qualified nominees for such circuit or nonresident post and space for a write-in vote in ample time for the member to cast the ballot before the time fixed for the election. In lieu of a written ballot, a secure electronic ballot, which meets the requirements above, may be provided to members;</li> \n <li>each nominee shall be entitled to have at least one observer present at the counting of the ballots from his judicial circuit; and</li> \n <li>any change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit or circuits shall automatically terminate the terms of all members elected to the Board of Governors, accordingly in such manners as the bylaws may provide. In the event the geographical limits of a circuit are changed after the notices of election have been distributed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, then and in that event, the terms of the members of the Board of Governors from such circuits will remain as they were before the change in geographical limits until the election of the Board of Governors to be held the following year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision17"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3db9a742-501a-49b5-a4f9-c2702f7f7d22","Title":"Rule 1-305. Change in Geographical limits of Judicial Circuits","Content":"The number and terms of members of the Board of Governors from judicial circuits that have experienced a change in geographical limits shall be determined according to provisions of Bar Rules 1-302 (b), 1-304 and as hereinafter provided by Bar Rule 1-701 and the bylaws.","UrlName":"rule29","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c58fe53f-969f-42eb-9240-29d054268f0d","Title":"Rule 1-306. Vacancies; Ties","Content":"The bylaws shall provide for filling vacancies in the Board of Governors and for deciding the outcome of tie votes.","UrlName":"rule34","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Title":"CHAPTER 4 OFFICERS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter7","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"53e7f7a3-b877-465b-aafb-d2b93415e95b","Title":"Rule 1-401. Designation and Terms","Content":"The officers of the State Bar of Georgia shall include a President, a President-elect, a Secretary, and a Treasurer and may include such other officers as may be specified in the bylaws. The President-elect, the Secretary and the Treasurer shall be elected by the membership in accordance with the bylaws and the results published at the annual meeting. The Secretary and Treasurer shall serve until the next annual meeting. The President-elect shall succeed to the presidency at the next annual meeting. If there is no President-elect, a President shall also be elected at the same time and in the same manner as the other officers. In the event of death or resignation of the President, the President-elect shall succeed to the presidency, shall serve out the unexpired term, and shall continue to serve for the term during which he would regularly have served as President. The officers shall have duties, rights, and powers as the bylaws may provide.","UrlName":"rule36","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d49dab6c-ff52-4a9c-adf2-bca1fa65dae7","Title":"Rule 1-402. Election of Officers","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia shall, in its bylaws, establish the method of election of the officers. Such method of election shall contain provisions equivalent to those required by Bar Rule 1-304 relating to election of members of the Board of Governors. Officers may be nominated by the Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule37","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f66b6cd2-b7b7-47f3-8741-baf4bd91f4a6","Title":"Rule 1-403. Vacancies; Ties","Content":"The bylaws shall provide for filling vacancies in any office and for deciding the outcome of tie votes.","UrlName":"rule41","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"dac576f0-9e2a-465a-8335-b12ed283d063","Title":"Rule 1-404. Eligibility of President-elect","Content":"No person shall be eligible for election as President-elect if a member of the judicial circuit in which such person is a member was elected to the office of President-elect at any time within one year immediately prior to the election in which such person is a candidate.","UrlName":"rule43","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Title":"CHAPTER 5 FINANCE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter8","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"368390e6-0a86-42fb-8f3d-bff6e9654e7d","Title":"Rule 1-501. License Fees","Content":"(a) Annual license fees for membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall be due and payable on July 1 of each year. Upon the failure of a member to pay the license fee by September 1, the member shall cease to be a member in good standing. When such license fees, including any late fees, costs, charges or penalties incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind for the current and prior years have been paid in full, the member shall automatically be reinstated to the status of member in good standing, except as provided in subsection (b) of this rule.\n(b) In the event a member of the State Bar of Georgia is delinquent in the payment of any license fee, late fee, assessment, reinstatement fee, or cost, charge or penalty incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind and of any nature for a period of one year, the member shall be automatically suspended, and shall not practice law in this state. The suspended member may thereafter lift such suspension only upon the successful completion of all of the following terms and conditions:\n(1)  payment of all outstanding dues, assessments, late fees, reinstatement fees, and any and all penalties due and owing before or accruing after the suspension of membership;\n(2) provision to the membership section of the State Bar of Georgia of the following:\n (i) a certificate from the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia that the suspended member is not presently subject to any disciplinary procedure; \n(ii) a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; \n(iii) a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants;\n(3)  payment to the State Bar of Georgia of a non-waivable reinstatement fee as follows:\n (i)  $150 for the first reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $150 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(ii)  $250 for the second reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $250 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(iii)  $500 for the third reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $500 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; or \n(iv)  $750 for each subsequent reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $750 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years.\nThe yearly increase in the reinstatement fee shall become due and owing in its entirety upon the first day of each next fiscal year and shall not be prorated for any fraction of the fiscal year in which it is actually paid.\nA member who has been suspended pursuant to this rule may submit in writing to the Executive Committee a request for an extension of time to complete any of the requirements contained in subsection (b). The request must state with particularity the reasons and need for the extension. The Executive Committee, upon sufficient and reasonable cause, may grant such an extension.\n(c)  A member suspended under subsection (b) above for a total of five years in succession shall be immediately terminated as a member without further action on the part of the State Bar of Georgia. The terminated member shall not be entitled to a hearing as set out in subsection (d) below. The terminated member shall be required to apply for membership to the Office of Bar Admissions for readmission to the State Bar of Georgia. Upon completion of the requirements for readmission, the terminated member shall be required to pay the total reinstatement fee due under subsection (b) (3) above plus an additional $750 as a readmission fee to the State Bar of Georgia.\n (d)  Prior to suspending a member under subsection (b) above, the State Bar of Georgia shall send by certified mail a notice thereof to the last known address of the member as contained in the official membership records. It shall specify the years for which the license fee is delinquent and state that unless either the fee and all penalties related thereto are paid within 60 days or a hearing to establish reasonable cause is requested within 60 days, the membership shall be suspended. \n \nIf a hearing is requested, it shall be held at State Bar of Georgia Headquarters within 90 days of receipt of the request by the Executive Committee. Notice of time and place of the hearing shall be mailed at least ten days in advance. The party cited may be represented by counsel. Witnesses shall be sworn; and, if requested by the party cited, a complete electronic record or a transcript shall be made of all proceedings and testimony. The expense of the record shall be paid by the party requesting it, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the Executive Committee. The presiding member or Special Master shall have the authority to rule on all motions, objections, and other matters presented in connection with the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure, and the practice in the trial of civil cases. The party cited may not be required to testify over his or her objection. \n \nThe Executive Committee shall (1) make findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall determine whether the party cited was delinquent in violation of Bar Rule 1-501; and (2) upon a finding of delinquency shall determine whether there was reasonable cause for the delinquency. Financial hardship short of adjudicated bankruptcy shall not constitute reasonable cause. A copy of the findings and the determination shall be sent to the party cited. If it is determined that no delinquency has occurred, the matter shall be dismissed. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred but that there was reasonable cause therefor, the matter shall be deferred for one year at which time the matter will be reconsidered. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred without reasonable cause therefor, the membership shall be suspended immediately upon such determination. An appropriate notice of suspension shall be sent to the clerks of all Georgia courts and shall be published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia. Alleged errors of law in the proceedings or findings of the Executive Committee or its delegate shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Executive Committee may delegate to a special master any or all of its responsibilities and authority with respect to suspending membership for license fee delinquency in which event the Special Master shall make a report to the Committee of its findings for its approval or disapproval. \n \nAfter a finding of delinquency, a copy of the finding shall be served upon the respondent attorney. The respondent attorney may file with the Supreme Court of Georgia any written exceptions (supported by the written argument) said respondent may have to the findings of the Executive Committee. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and served on the Executive Committee by service on the General Counsel within 20 days of the date that the findings were served on the respondent attorney. Upon the filing of exceptions by the respondent attorney, the Executive Committee shall within 20 days of said filing file a report of its findings and the complete record and transcript of evidence with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant extensions of time for filing in appropriate cases. Findings of fact by the Executive Committee shall be conclusive if supported by any evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by the respondent attorney or the Executive Committee. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall promptly consider the report of the Executive Committee, exceptions thereto, and the responses filed by any party to such exceptions, if any, and enter its judgment. A copy of the Supreme Court of Georgia's judgment shall be transmitted to the Executive Committee and to the respondent attorney by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \nWithin 30 days after a final judgment which suspends membership, the suspended member shall, under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, notify all clients of said suspended member's inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of said suspended member's clients. Should the suspended member fail to notify said clients or fail to protect their interests as herein required, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its motion, or upon the motion of the State Bar of Georgia, and after ten-days notice to the suspended member and proof of failure to notify or protect said clients, may hold the suspended member in contempt and order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of said suspended member and proceed to notify all clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Any member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia to take charge of the files and records of the suspended member under these rules shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule46","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[{"Id":"77fcd2ae-0fc0-4dbe-8e70-562b6da23d37","ParentId":"368390e6-0a86-42fb-8f3d-bff6e9654e7d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) Annual license fees for membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall be due and payable on July 1 of each year. Upon the failure of a member to pay the license fee by September 1, the member shall cease to be a member in good standing. When such license fees, including any late fees, costs, charges or penalties incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind for the current and prior years have been paid in full, the member shall automatically be reinstated to the status of member in good standing, except as provided in subsection (b) of this Rule. \n(b) In the event a member of the State Bar of Georgia is delinquent in the payment of any license fee, late fee, assessment, reinstatement fee, or cost, charge or penalty incurred by the State Bar of Georgia as a result of a cancelled or dishonored payment of any type or kind and of any nature for a period of one year, the member shall be automatically suspended, and shall not practice law in this state. The suspended member may thereafter lift such suspension only upon the successful completion of all of the following terms and conditions: \n(1)  payment of all outstanding dues, assessments, late fees, reinstatement fees, and any and all penalties due and owing before or accruing after the suspension of membership; \n(2) provision to the membership section of the State Bar of Georgia of the following: \n (i) a certificate from the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia that the suspended member is not presently subject to any disciplinary procedure; \n(ii) a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; \n(iii) a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants; \n(3)  payment to the State Bar of Georgia of a non-waivable reinstatement fee as follows: \n (i)  $150 for the first reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $150 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(ii)  $250 for the second reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $250 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; \n(iii)  $500 for the third reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $500 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years; or \n(iv)  $750 for each subsequent reinstatement paid within the first year of suspension, plus $750 for each year of suspension thereafter up to a total of five years. \nThe yearly increase in the reinstatement fee shall become due and owing in its entirety upon the first day of each next fiscal year and shall not be prorated for any fraction of the fiscal year in which it is actually paid. \nA member who has been suspended pursuant to this Rule may submit in writing to the Executive Committee a request for an extension of time to complete any of the requirements contained in subsection (b). The request must state with particularity the reasons and need for the extension. The Executive Committee, upon sufficient and reasonable cause, may grant such an extension. \n(c)  A member suspended under subsection (b) above for a total of five years in succession shall be immediately terminated as a member without further action on the part of the State Bar of Georgia. The terminated member shall not be entitled to a hearing as set out in subsection (d) below. The terminated member shall be required to apply for membership to the Office of Bar Admissions for readmission to the State Bar of Georgia. Upon completion of the requirements for readmission, the terminated member shall be required to pay the total reinstatement fee due under subsection (b) (3) above plus an additional $750 as a readmission fee to the State Bar of Georgia. \n (d)  Prior to suspending a member under subsection (b) above, the State Bar of Georgia shall send by certified mail a notice thereof to the last known address of the member as contained in the official membership records. It shall specify the years for which the license fee is delinquent and state that unless either the fee and all penalties related thereto are paid within 60 days or a hearing to establish reasonable cause is requested within 60 days, the membership shall be suspended. \n \nIf a hearing is requested, it shall be held at State Bar of Georgia Headquarters within 90 days of receipt of the request by the Executive Committee. Notice of time and place of the hearing shall be mailed at least ten days in advance. The party cited may be represented by counsel. Witnesses shall be sworn; and, if requested by the party cited, a complete electronic record or a transcript shall be made of all proceedings and testimony. The expense of the record shall be paid by the party requesting it, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the Executive Committee. The presiding member or Special Master shall have the authority to rule on all motions, objections, and other matters presented in connection with the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure, and the practice in the trial of civil cases. The party cited may not be required to testify over his or her objection. \n \nThe Executive Committee shall (1) make findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall determine whether the party cited was delinquent in violation of  Rule 1-501; and (2) upon a finding of delinquency shall determine whether there was reasonable cause for the delinquency. Financial hardship short of adjudicated bankruptcy shall not constitute reasonable cause. A copy of the findings and the determination shall be sent to the party cited. If it is determined that no delinquency has occurred, the matter shall be dismissed. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred but that there was reasonable cause therefor, the matter shall be deferred for one year at which time the matter will be reconsidered. If it is determined that delinquency has occurred without reasonable cause therefor, the membership shall be suspended immediately upon such determination. An appropriate notice of suspension shall be sent to the clerks of all Georgia courts and shall be published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia. Alleged errors of law in the proceedings or findings of the Executive Committee or its delegate shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Executive Committee may delegate to a special master any or all of its responsibilities and authority with respect to suspending membership for license fee delinquency in which event the Special Master shall make a report to the Committee of its findings for its approval or disapproval. \n \nAfter a finding of delinquency, a copy of the finding shall be served upon the respondent attorney. The respondent attorney may file with the Court any written exceptions (supported by the written argument) said respondent may have to the findings of the Executive Committee. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and served on the Executive Committee by service on the General Counsel within 20 days of the date that the findings were served on the respondent attorney. Upon the filing of exceptions by the respondent attorney, the Executive Committee shall within 20 days of said filing file a report of its findings and the complete record and transcript of evidence with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant extensions of time for filing in appropriate cases. Findings of fact by the Executive Committee shall be conclusive if supported by any evidence. The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by the respondent attorney or the Executive Committee. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall promptly consider the report of the Executive Committee, exceptions thereto, and the responses filed by any party to such exceptions, if any, and enter its judgment. A copy of the Supreme Court of Georgia's judgment shall be transmitted to the Executive Committee and to the respondent attorney by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \nWithin 30 days after a final judgment which suspends membership, the suspended member shall, under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, notify all clients of said suspended member's inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of said suspended member's clients. Should the suspended member fail to notify said clients or fail to protect their interests as herein required, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its motion, or upon the motion of the State Bar of Georgia, and after ten days notice to the suspended member and proof of failure to notify or protect said clients, may hold the suspended member in contempt and order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of said suspended member and proceed to notify all clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Any member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia to take charge of the files and records of the suspended member under these Rules shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia. </div>","UrlName":"revision18"}],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"17c92ac4-ffe4-4796-835e-40234198055d","Title":"Rule 1-501.1. License Fees - Late Fee","Content":" Any member who has not paid his or her license fee for the State Bar of Georgia on or before August 1 shall be penalized in the amount of $75, which will be added to the member’s outstanding license fee. Any member who has not paid his or her license fee on or after January 1 of each year shall be penalized an additional amount of $100 for a total of $175, which will be added to the member’s outstanding license fee. \n \nA member may submit a request for waiver of any late fees in writing to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon good cause shown, any late fee or penalty imposed by this rule may be waived by a majority vote of the Executive Committee.","UrlName":"rule56","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"86b568a8-63c4-404f-b916-d1fec0ebe1da","Title":"Rule 1-502. Amount of License Fees","Content":"The amount of such license fees for active members shall not exceed $350.00, and shall annually be fixed by the Board of Governors for the ensuing year; provided, however, that except in the case of an emergency, such annual dues shall not be increased in any one year by more than $25 over those set for the next preceding year. The annual license fees for inactive members shall be in an amount not to exceed one-half of those set for active members. Subject to the above limitations, license fees may be fixed in differing amounts for different classifications of active and inactive membership, as may be established in the bylaws. ","UrlName":"rule59","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f2217c14-3460-4151-97d8-a715397fc1e8","Title":"Rule 1-502.1. Fees for Associates","Content":"The amount of fees for associates as provided in Bar Rule 1-206 shall be fixed by the Board of Governors at an amount less than the amount prescribed for active members pursuant to Bar Rule 1-502, but for such amount as will reasonably cover the cost of the publications furnished; provided, however law student association fees may be fixed at a nominal level.","UrlName":"rule64","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f621cd67-976b-44c0-8a2b-3851f04346b2","Title":"Rule 1-503. Disbursements","Content":"The Board of Governors shall have the power to direct the disbursement of funds of the State Bar of Georgia. No officer named herein and no member of the Board of Governors shall receive any compensation for his or her services except that the Board of Governors may provide for the reimbursement of the actual and necessary expenses incurred by officers in the discharge of their duties.","UrlName":"rule67","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"dadb22b0-88d2-4698-9177-26eec2fc0413","Title":"Rule 1-504. Bonds","Content":"Every person having the duty or right to receive or disburse the funds of the State Bar of Georgia shall be required to furnish bond conditioned on his or her faithful performance with such security as the bylaws or the Board of Governors may require.","UrlName":"rule73","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d8da40a6-4b12-40a7-aeca-b8637797b2e6","Title":"Rule 1-505. Audit","Content":"The Board of Governors shall annually cause an audit of the financial affairs of the State Bar of Georgia to be made, and the bylaws shall provide for the communication of the findings thereof to the membership.","UrlName":"rule75","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f9987308-d538-4d4a-a92c-71925d25feba","Title":"Rule 1-506. Clients' Security Fund Assessment","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia is authorized to assess each member an annual fee of $15. This assessment shall be used only to fund the Clients’ Security Fund and shall be in addition to the annual license fee as provided in Bar Rule 1-501 through Bar Rule 1-502.</li> \n <li>The failure of a dues-paying member to pay the assessment shall subject the member to the same penalty provisions, including late fees and suspension of membership, as apply to the failure to pay the annual license fee as set forth in Bar Rules 1-501 and 1-501.1.</li> \n <li>A member who is admitted as a Foreign Law Consultant or who joins without taking the Georgia Bar Examination shall be responsible for the annual assessment upon registration with the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule81","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[{"Id":"541ad67c-5fa4-4e51-b9ca-c59169e4f455","ParentId":"f9987308-d538-4d4a-a92c-71925d25feba","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia is authorized to assess each member a fee of $100. This $100 fee may be paid in minimum annual installments of $25 for a period of four years. Each new member of the State Bar of Georgia will also be assessed a similar amount upon admission to the State Bar of Georgia. This fee shall be used only to fund the Clients’ Security Fund and shall be in addition to the annual license fee as provided in Bar Rule 1-501 through Bar Rule 1-502.</li> \n <li>For a member who joins the State Bar of Georgia after taking the Georgia Bar Examination, the Clients’ Security Fund Assessment shall be due and payable in $25 installments on July 1 of each year, beginning with the second full fiscal year following the year of admission, until the balance of $100 is paid. The failure of a member to pay the minimum annual installments shall subject the member to the same penalty provisions, including late fees and suspension of membership, as pertain to the failure to pay the annual license fee as set forth in Bar Rules 1-501 and 1-501.1.</li> \n <li>For a member who is admitted as a Foreign Law Consultant or who joins without taking the Georgia Bar Examination, and who has not previously paid the Clients’ Security Fund Assessment, the full assessment shall be due and payable prior to or upon registration with the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision353"}],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a89dc3e6-0488-4006-9bd5-49760c540dbd","Title":"Rule 1-507. Bar Facility Assessment","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia is authorized to assess each member of the State Bar of Georgia a fee of $200. This $200 fee may be paid in minimum annual installments of $50 for a period of four years. This fee shall be used to maintain and operate the State Bar offices and shall be in addition to the annual license fee as provided in Bar Rule 1-501 through Bar Rule 1-502 and the Clients’ Security Fund Assessment as provided in Bar Rule 1-506.</li> \n <li>For a member who joins the State Bar of Georgia after taking the Georgia Bar Examination, the Bar Facility Assessment shall be due and payable in $50 installments on July 1 of each year, beginning with the second full fiscal year following the year of admission, until the balance of $200 is paid. The failure of a member to pay the minimum annual installments shall subject the member to the same penalty provisions, including late fees and suspension of membership, as pertain to the failure to pay the annual license fee as set forth in Bar Rules 1-501 and 1-501.1.</li> \n <li>For a member who is admitted as a foreign law consultant or joins the State Bar of Georgia without taking the Georgia Bar Examination, and who has not previously paid the Bar Facility Assessment, the full assessment shall be due and payable prior to or upon registration with the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule84","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[{"Id":"d5938721-d984-4f82-bdfd-b94c34f403cd","ParentId":"a89dc3e6-0488-4006-9bd5-49760c540dbd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar is authorized to assess each member of the State Bar a fee of $200.00. This $200.00 fee may be paid in minimum annual installments of $50.00 for a period of four (4) years. This fee shall be used to purchase, maintain, and operate a facility for the State Bar offices and shall be in addition to the annual license fee as provided in Rule 1-501 through Rule 1-502 and the Clients' Security Fund Assessment as provided in Rule 1-506.</li> \n <li>For a member who joins the State Bar after taking the Georgia Bar Examination, the Bar Facility assessment shall be due and payable in $50.00 installments on July 1 of each year until the balance of $200.00 is paid. For members admitted to the State Bar prior to July 1, 1997, such installments shall begin on July 1, 1997. For newly admitted members of the State Bar, such installments shall begin when a new member is admitted to the State Bar. The failure of a member to pay the minimum annual installments shall subject the member to the same penalty provisions, including late fees and suspension of membership, as pertain to the failure to pay the annual license fee as set forth in Bar Rules 1-501 and 1-501.1.</li> \n <li>For a member who is admitted as a Foreign Law Consultant or joins the State Bar without taking the Georgia Bar Examination, and who has not previously paid the Bar Facility Assessment, the full assessment shall be due and payable prior to or upon registration with the State Bar.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision20"}],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","Title":"CHAPTER 6 BYLAWS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter9","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"55dee768-bc9a-4288-b9fe-4cc0de22708b","Title":"Rule 1-601","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia may adopt or amend the bylaws at any members meeting not inconsistent with these Rules or the bylaws.","UrlName":"rule88","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4059c13-657f-433e-8e1a-e6f6f6a08f9d","ParentId":"55dee768-bc9a-4288-b9fe-4cc0de22708b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia, at its first annual meeting, shall adopt bylaws as directed herein, and at such meeting and any subsequent annual, annual midyear, or special meeting may adopt such other bylaws not inconsistent herewith as it may deem necessary and proper and may amend its bylaws from time to time. ","UrlName":"revision387"}],"Ancestors":["c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"10f78a46-1a55-46a1-ada7-c3593c52f792","Title":"Rule 1-602","Content":"The Board of Governors, the Executive Committee or any ten members of the State Bar of Georgia may propose bylaws and amendments thereto for consideration at a midyear, annual or special called membership meeting. Proposals from ten or more members of the State Bar of Georgia must be provided to the Secretary at least 60 days prior to the midyear, annual or special called membership meeting. Written notice of proposed bylaws and amendments shall be published 20 days prior to the midyear, annual or special called meeting of the membership through any one or more of the official publications of the State Bar of Georgia including the official website for the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule91","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Title":"CHAPTER 7 COMMITTEES AND SECTIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter10","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"29a3a882-d203-4d2d-b038-a709ae60df3d","Title":"Rule 1-701. Executive Committee","Content":" There shall be an Executive Committee composed of such officers and members of the Board of Governors as may be designated in the bylaws, which shall exercise the powers and duties of the Board of Governors when it is not in session, subject to such limitations as the bylaws may provide. The Executive Committee shall also have the authority to supervise the election of the members of the Board of Governors as outlined in Bar Rule 1-304 hereof, and, in particular, to ascertain on or after the first day of January of each year, the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who reside in each judicial circuit as of the last day in December of the preceding year; and thereupon to make a determination of whether any judicial circuit may be entitled to additional members of the Board of Governors as provided in Bar Rule 1-302 (b) hereof. In addition, whenever a new judicial circuit is created, the Executive Committee shall determine, under the provisions of Bar Rule 1-302 (b) and the bylaws, the number of members of the Board of Governors the new circuit is entitled to elect and shall supervise the elections of such members. In the event that the composition of the Board of Governors must be changed, as a result of an increase or decrease in the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who reside in each judicial circuit, as a result of the creation of a new judicial circuit, or as a result of a change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit, the Executive Committee is empowered to take appropriate action to insure that the composition of the Board complies with the provisions of Bar Rule 1-302 (b), including but not limited to the implementing of the election of additional members and the designation of numerical posts. The Executive Committee shall generally have broad discretionary powers in the conduct of elections. \n ","UrlName":"rule95","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d18cf30d-c7f6-4399-a812-f4d7b9458ad5","Title":"Rule 1-702. Standing Committees; Special Committees","Content":"Unless otherwise provided in these rules, there shall be standing and special committees, which shall be composed of such members, serving such terms, appointed in such manner, and having such duties as the bylaws may provide. A statement of the purpose of each committee shall be published annually on the official State Bar of Georgia website.","UrlName":"rule99","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[{"Id":"b554a052-a70a-4b72-a7d0-945286b71bed","ParentId":"d18cf30d-c7f6-4399-a812-f4d7b9458ad5","Title":"Version 2","Content":" Unless otherwise provided in these rules, there shall be standing and special committees, which shall be composed of such members, serving such terms, appointed in such manner, and having such duties as the bylaws may provide. A statement of the purpose of each committee shall be published annually in the State Bar Directory .","UrlName":"revision319"}],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"486fa268-ec1e-479f-9454-eedf8ba16777","Title":"Rule 1-703. Young Lawyers Division","Content":"There shall be a division of the State Bar of Georgia composed of (1) all members of the State Bar who have not reached their 36th birthday prior to the close of the preceding Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia and (2) all members of the State Bar of Georgia who have been admitted to their first bar less than five years. All persons holding an elective office or post in the Young Lawyers Division who are qualified by age to assume such office or post on the date of his or her election shall remain members of the Young Lawyers Division for the duration of their offices or posts. In the case of a President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division who is qualified by age to assume such office on the date of such person's election, such person shall remain a member of the Young Lawyers Division for the duration of the terms of President and Immediate Past President to which he or she succeeds.\nThe Young Lawyers Division shall have such organization, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule27","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b17f6e47-e6eb-4484-925e-a76ba4343749","Title":"Rule 1-704. Sections","Content":"Such additional sections may be created by the bylaws as may be deemed desirable.","UrlName":"rule28","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c4cb519a-cef1-4ec5-93ec-e05f65df75fe","Title":"Rule 1-705. Senior Lawyers Section","Content":" There shall be a section of the State Bar of Georgia composed from time to time of all members of the State Bar of Georgia who have reached their 65th birthday prior to the close of the preceding Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia provided, however, that all those members of the State Bar of Georgia who are between 60 and 65 years of age and are members in good standing of the Senior Section (sometimes called the Senior Law Section) at the time this amendment is adopted shall become members of the Senior Lawyers Section. \n \nThe Senior Lawyers Section shall have such organization, powers and duties as may be prescribed by the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule30","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a6332df4-2803-4847-a640-c1443673f17f","Title":"Rule 1-706. Center for Lawyer Wellbeing","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia Center for Lawyer Wellbeing (“the Center”) will focus on lawyer wellbeing, quality of life, and health. The Center shall coordinate the efforts of all State Bar of Georgia entities that provide programming in the area of wellbeing. It may collaborate with other State Bar of Georgia entities, create new programs, and provide resources to lawyers seeking information and advice about wellbeing. As approved by the Board of Governors, the Center may offer memberships to members of the State Bar of Georgia and collect fees in an amount approved by the Board of Governors.The organization, powers, and duties of the Center shall be set out in the bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule612","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Title":"CHAPTER 8 MEETINGS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter11","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"3e4100fb-91e1-44cc-8aa2-26700a3da0e3","Title":"Rule 1-801. Annual Meeting","Content":"An annual meeting of the State Bar of Georgia shall be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors. If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct an annual meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.","UrlName":"rule31","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"b40839a4-68b8-4d10-b299-46188736281c","ParentId":"3e4100fb-91e1-44cc-8aa2-26700a3da0e3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An annual meeting of the State Bar of Georgia shall be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors. ","UrlName":"revision341"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48d18380-5591-4a80-9130-1c469fa12873","Title":"Rule 1-801.1. Annual Midyear Meeting","Content":"An annual midyear meeting of the State Bar of Georgia may be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors. If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct an annual midyear meeting by an electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.\n","UrlName":"rule32","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"f37c69ca-79d6-4579-9b5c-08ae2743319f","ParentId":"48d18380-5591-4a80-9130-1c469fa12873","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An annual midyear meeting of the State Bar of Georgia may be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors.\n","UrlName":"revision343"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"99126ab7-b8e6-42a1-9320-be9a25565762","Title":"Rule 1-802. Special Meetings","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Special meetings of the State Bar of Georgia may be held at such times and places as may be determined by the Board of Governors or the President.</li> \n <li>The Secretary shall call a special meeting of the State Bar of Georgia upon petition signed by not less than ten percent of the active members in good standing, and such special meetings shall be specified in the call. hall be held within 60 days after the petition is filed with the Secretary. The business to be transacted at special meetings shall be specified in the call.</li> \n <li>If deemed prudent and necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct a special meeting by an electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule33","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"d662b639-fe2a-41d5-bdc6-cf5df7a34184","ParentId":"99126ab7-b8e6-42a1-9320-be9a25565762","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Special meetings of the State Bar of Georgia may be held at such times and places as may be determined by the Board of Governors. The Secretary shall call a special meeting of the State Bar of Georgia upon petition signed by not less than ten percent of the active members and such special meetings shall be held within 60 days after the petition is filed with the Secretary. The business to be transacted at special meetings shall be specified in the call.","UrlName":"revision345"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2f51e527-3cef-429e-8ed6-b1646a0244b7","Title":"Rule 1-803. Notice","Content":" At least 30-days notice of the time and place of each annual meeting or annual midyear meeting, and any special meeting, shall be provided by email or by U.S. mail to each member according to the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia. The notice may also be provided through any official publication of the State Bar of Georgia and by posting the notice on the official State Bar of Georgia website. \n ","UrlName":"rule35","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"37bb4045-3ddf-4210-8f9b-19ee8278e260","ParentId":"2f51e527-3cef-429e-8ed6-b1646a0244b7","Title":"Version 2","Content":" At least 30-days notice of the time and place of each annual meeting, annual midyear meeting, and any special meeting shall be given in writing by mail to each member at his address shown on the records of the State Bar of Georgia. The notice by mail herein required may be by or through any one or more of the official publications of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n ","UrlName":"revision347"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","Title":"Part II - Admission to the Bar","Content":"","UrlName":"part14","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","Title":"CHAPTER 1 ADMISSION TO THE BAR","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter12","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"833c2dff-d778-433d-b2f3-1a28757f9761","Title":"Rule 2-101. Admission to the Bar.","Content":"No person may be admitted to the State Bar as an active, emeritus or inactive member, or licensed as an attorney to practice law in this State without complying with the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule44","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","Title":"Part V - Amendment & Effective Date","Content":"","UrlName":"part23","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Title":"CHAPTER 1 AMENDMENT","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter15","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"bb6b0b77-e980-439b-8eda-01f15008d55c","Title":"Rule 5-101. Amendment; Filing, Notice.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Supreme Court of Georgia may, on motion of the State Bar of Georgia, amend the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia at any time; provided, however, that no motion to amend these rules may be filed until 30 days after a notice setting forth the proposed amendment has been published in the Georgia Bar Journal or on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia. The said notice shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the date after which the motion to amend these rules shall be filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the verbatim text of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a statement that the publication of the proposal to amend these rules is intended to comply with the notice requirement of this rule;</li> \n <li>a statement that any objection to the proposed amendment shall be made only in accordance with Bar Rule 5-102.</li> \n </ol> \nAt the same time that notice is published to its membership, the State Bar of Georgia shall file a copy of such notice with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule167","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"c9996385-c078-48a5-a447-cc8ef863b6f0","ParentId":"bb6b0b77-e980-439b-8eda-01f15008d55c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Supreme Court of Georgia may, on motion of the State Bar of Georgia, amend the rules of the State Bar of Georgia at any time; provided, however, that no motion to amend these rules may be filed until thirty (30) days after a notice setting forth the proposed amendment has been published in the Georgia Bar Journal or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia. The said notice shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the date upon which the motion to amend these rules shall be filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the verbatim text of the said motion as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a statement that the publication of the said motion to amend these rules is intended to comply with the notice requirement of this rule;</li> \n <li>a statement that any objection to the proposed amendment shall be made only in accordance with Rule 5-102.</li> \n </ol> \nAt the same time that notice is sent to its membership, the State Bar of Georgia shall file a copy of such a notice with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"revision21"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9e6fd451-bd43-48ad-a02d-9da3806827d9","Title":"Rule 5-102. Objection to Amendment.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall be entitled to file a written objection to any motion to amend these rules by the State Bar of Georgia. Each objection shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the grounds on which the objection is based;</li> \n <li>a request for oral argument on the proposed amendment if such argument is desired by the objecting member.</li> \n </ol> \nAll written objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia before the date which the State Bar of Georgia has designated for filing its said motion to amend these rules under Bar Rule 5-101. Any member filing a written objection shall serve the State Bar of Georgia with a copy thereof by mailing the same to the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the address of its headquarters.</div>","UrlName":"rule168","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0863f3ed-29f9-4771-9797-6b0a9a5737db","ParentId":"9e6fd451-bd43-48ad-a02d-9da3806827d9","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall be entitled to file a written objection to any motion to amend these rules by the State Bar of Georgia. Each objection shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the grounds on which the objection is based;</li> \n <li>a request for oral argument on the proposed amendment if such argument is desired by the objecting member.</li> \n </ol> \nAll written objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia before the date which the State Bar of Georgia has designated for filing its said motion to amend these rules under Rule 5-101. Any member filing a written objection shall serve the State Bar of Georgia with a copy thereof by mailing the same to the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the address of its headquarters.</div>","UrlName":"revision22"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"aa1de930-30e2-4985-b0fc-72efb20a3d5e","Title":"Rule 5-103. Oral Argument.","Content":" The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant or refuse the objecting member's request for oral argument on the State Bar of Georgia's proposed amendment to these rules at its sole discretion. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall notify the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia and the objecting member of the date of any oral argument granted by the Supreme Court of Georgia under the provisions of Rule 23 (b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule169","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48e67660-4f39-4365-8c8c-36998b4395dd","Title":"Rule 5-104. Dues Increase or Decrease; Special Procedure.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In addition to the procedures described in Bar Rules 5-101 through 5-103, at least 30 days notice shall be given to the membership of the State Bar of Georgia in the Georgia State Bar Journal, the Georgia State Bar News or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia of any meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which amendment of Bar Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) will be considered and acted upon. The notice to the general membership of the State Bar of Georgia shall contain: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a statement that the amendment of Bar Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) shall be considered by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a verbatim copy of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the date, time and location of the meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which such amendment will be considered;</li> \n <li>a statement that each member of the State Bar of Georgia has a right to present his views concerning the proposed amendment either through his circuit representative to the Board of Governors or in person before such Board; and</li> \n <li>the address to which all written objections to the proposed amendment may be sent.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule170","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3b270332-51e2-44fe-afa4-00de51a41155","ParentId":"48e67660-4f39-4365-8c8c-36998b4395dd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In addition to the procedures described in Rules 5-101 through 5-103, at least thirty (30) days notice shall be given to the membership of the State Bar of Georgia in the Georgia State Bar Journal, the Georgia State Bar News or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia of any meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which amendment of Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) will be considered and acted upon. The notice to the general membership of the State Bar of Georgia shall contain: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a statement that the amendment of Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) shall be considered by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a verbatim copy of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the date, time and location of the meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which such amendment will be considered;</li> \n <li>a statement that each member of the State Bar of Georgia has a right to present his views concerning the proposed amendment either through his circuit representative to the Board of Governors or in person before such Board; and</li> \n <li>the address to which all written objections to the proposed amendment may be sent.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision23"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","Title":"CHAPTER 2 EFFECTIVE DATE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter16","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8144b7fa-6279-4729-b8ff-3208b55c7a21","Title":"Rule 5-201. Effective Date","Content":" These rules, as recodified, shall be effective January 1, 1977 except that Part IV, Chapter 2, Disciplinary Proceedings, shall be effective April 1, 1977; provided, however, any complaints pending before grievance tribunals on such date shall be handled to conclusion under the disciplinary proceedings now in effect. ","UrlName":"rule171","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Title":"State Bar of Georgia Bylaws","Content":"Approved June 5, 1964, and as subsequently amended, including substantial revision adopted June 20, 1992.","UrlName":"part25","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Title":"ARTICLE I MEMBERS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter45","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"1b135031-6e52-4769-9131-6358292ac3fb","Title":"Section 1. Registration of Members.","Content":"Persons admitted by the courts to the practice of law shall, within 60 days after admission to the bar of the Superior Court, register with the State Bar of Georgia and pay a monthly pro-rated dues amount calculated from the date of the Superior Court admission through the remainder of the State Bar of Georgia’s fiscal year. If the date of admission is on or after May 15, the member shall not be required to pay any dues or assessments for the remainder of that fiscal year. Those members admitted by examination shall begin making the mandatory assessments outlined in Rules in the second full fiscal year following their admission.","UrlName":"rule309","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"c7a757d9-633e-4ad6-a62b-cdae0d5ceb96","ParentId":"1b135031-6e52-4769-9131-6358292ac3fb","Title":"Version 2","Content":" Persons admitted by the courts to the practice of law shall, within sixty days after admission to the bar of the Superior Court, register with the State Bar and pay a monthly pro-rated dues amount calculated from the date of the Superior Court admission through the remainder of the State Bar's fiscal year. ","UrlName":"revision150"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e81fa00c-7c65-4003-9f48-31a86f43e5b7","Title":"Section 2. Active Members and Foreign Law Consultants.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>Only active members of the State Bar are entitled to give legal advice and otherwise practice law.</li> \n <li>Only foreign law consultants are entitled to give legal advice as authorized by their license.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule338","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"c1e39857-301b-4bab-9d0e-f8a118abfa98","ParentId":"e81fa00c-7c65-4003-9f48-31a86f43e5b7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>Only active members of the State Bar are entitled to give legal advice and otherwise practice law.</li> \n <li>Only foreign law consultants are entitled to give legal advice as authorized by their license.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision130"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fd7d3544-95ba-4007-b042-5b85fcb69600","Title":"Section 3. Inactive Members Status.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive members shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>pay annual dues as set forth in Bar Rule 1-502;</li> \n <li>be exempt from continuing legal education requirements, subject to the requirements in (b);</li> \n <li>affirmatively represent their status as inactive members of the State Bar of Georgia when any statement of State Bar membership is made;</li> \n <li>not hold themselves out as being able to practice law in Georgia or render advice on matters of Georgia law;</li> \n <li>not hold any position that requires the person to be a licensed Georgia lawyer;</li> \n <li>inactive members shall not nominate a member for office, hold any office, serve on a Standing or Special Committee, or as an officer of a Section. An inactive member shall not vote in a State Bar of Georgia election, or on any matter or proposal pending before an entity of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li> not receive State Bar of Georgia publications, including theGeorgia Bar Journal , unless the inactive member so requests; </li> \n <li>keep the membership department advised of their current name, address and phone number as provided in Bar Rule 1-207.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An inactive member in good standing may return to Active Member Status by contacting the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia and requesting a membership status change. Before being returned to Active Member Status, the Inactive Status Member shall pay the difference between inactive and active member dues for the year returned to active status, including any applicable fees and costs. An inactive member shall complete all unfulfilled continuing legal education requirements owed during the Bar year of being returned to Active Member Status.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule364","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"e676ef05-4a80-4666-959c-141e1b9085ab","ParentId":"fd7d3544-95ba-4007-b042-5b85fcb69600","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive members shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>pay annual dues as set forth in Bar Rule 1-502;</li> \n <li>be exempt from continuing legal education requirements (except for years in which the member is on active membership status for any part of the calendar year);</li> \n <li>affirmatively represent their status as inactive members of the State Bar of Georgia when any statement of State Bar membership is made;</li> \n <li>not hold themselves out as being able to practice law in Georgia or render advice on matters of Georgia law;</li> \n <li>not hold any position that requires the person to be a licensed Georgia attorney;</li> \n <li>not nominate a member for office, hold a State Bar office, hold a section or committee office, or vote on any candidate or proposal concerning the State Bar;</li> \n <li>not receive State Bar publications, including the State Bar Directory and State Bar Journal, unless the inactive member so requests;</li> \n <li>keep the membership department advised of their current name, address and phone number as provided in Bar Rule 1-207.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An inactive member in good standing may on application become an active member. The application shall be accompanied by payment of the dues of an active member for the year in which the change is made, less dues paid by the member for that year as an inactive member. In addition, the member must satisfy the continuing legal education requirements for the calendar year in which the member is on active status.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision24"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0f37991b-8a48-4e3c-b413-9a3cb6186dde","Title":"Section 4. Failure to Register.","Content":"(1) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant as defined in the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia, but who failed to register as required by the Rules and Article I, Section 1 of these Bylaws, shall be entitled to register at any time for a period one year after the day upon which the person first became eligible upon the following terms and conditions:\n (a) the payment of the dues for the year in which the applicant registers, together with unpaid dues for any previous year, should the period of time in which the applicant failed to register, extend between two fiscal years of the State Bar, plus a late fee of $100; and \n \n(b) the submission of an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules concerning registration, that the applicant has not practiced law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, and that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration; or \n \n(c) in the event the applicant cannot aver that he or she did not practice law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant actually registered, the applicant shall submit an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules and that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules concerning registration. The affidavit shall also provide a detailed description of the applicant's practice of law during the period and state that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration. A copy of the affidavit shall be supplied to either the Standing Committee or District Committee for the Unauthorized Practice of Law.\n(2) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant as defined in the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia, but who failed to register within one year, but less than three years of the date the applicant was first eligible as required by the Rules and these Bylaws, shall be entitled to register upon the following terms and conditions:\n (a) the payment of the dues for the year in which the applicant registers, payment of all unpaid dues for all past years at the active member level, and payment of a late fee of $100 for the year in which the applicant registers plus $100 per year for all past years; \n \n(b) submission of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants; and \n \n(c) the submission of an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules concerning registration, that the applicant has not practiced law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, and that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration; or \n \n(d) in the event the applicant cannot aver that he or she did not practice law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, the applicant shall submit an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules and that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules concerning registration. The affidavit shall also provide a detailed description of the applicant's practice of law during the period, and state that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration. A copy of the affidavit shall be supplied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants and either the Standing Committee or District Committee for the Unauthorized Practice of Law.\n(3) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant in Georgia as defined in the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia, but who failed to register within three years of the date the applicant was first eligible must follow the rules of the Office of Bar Admissions for admission to the practice of law in this state.","UrlName":"rule373","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"ad6ef3b5-4c46-46b7-ace5-ad67a1863a23","ParentId":"0f37991b-8a48-4e3c-b413-9a3cb6186dde","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(1) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant as defined in the Rules of the State Bar, but who failed to register as required by the Rules and Article I, Section 1 of these Bylaws, shall be entitled to register at any time for a period one year after the day upon which the person first became eligible upon the following terms and conditions:\n \n(a) the payment of the dues for the year in which the applicant registers, together with unpaid dues for any previous year should the period of time in which the applicant failed to register extend between two fiscal years of the State Bar, plus a late fee of $100.00; and \n \n(b) the submission of an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules with respect to registration, that the applicant has not practiced law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, and that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration; or \n \n(c) in the event the applicant cannot aver that he or she did not practice law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant actually registered, the applicant shall submit an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, and that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules with respect to registration. The affidavit shall also provide a detailed description of the applicant's practice of law during the period, and state that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration. A copy of the affidavit shall be supplied to either the Standing Committee or District Committee for the Unauthorized Practice of Law.\n \n(2) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant as defined in the Rules of the State Bar, but who failed to register within one year of the date the applicant was first eligible as required by the Rules and these Bylaws, shall be entitled to register within five years of becoming eligible upon the following terms and conditions:\n \n(a) the payment of the dues for the year in which the applicant registers, payment of all unpaid dues for all past years at the active member level, and payment of a late fee of $100 for the year in which the applicant registers plus $100 per year for all past years; \n \n(b) submission of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants; and \n \n(c) the submission of an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules, that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules with respect to registration, that the applicant has not practiced law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, and that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration; or \n \n(d) in the event the applicant cannot aver that he or she did not practice law in Georgia during the period between the time the applicant first became eligible and the day the applicant submits the affidavit, the applicant shall submit an affidavit stating that the applicant's failure to sooner register was not intended as a violation of the State Bar Rules and that the applicant was not aware of the requirements of the Rules with respect to registration. The affidavit shall also provide a detailed description of the applicant's practice of law during the period, and state that the applicant will submit to the jurisdiction of the State Disciplinary Board for any complaints or grievances filed regarding the applicant's conduct for the period between eligibility and registration. A copy of the affidavit shall be supplied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants and either the Standing Committee or District Committee for the Unauthorized Practice of Law\n \n(3) A person who is otherwise eligible to practice law or practice as a foreign law consultant in Georgia as defined in the Rules of the State Bar, but who failed to register within five years of the date the applicant was first eligible as required by the Rules and these Bylaws, may apply to the Executive Committee for permission to register without reapplying to the Office of Bar Admissions. The Executive Committee shall have complete discretion in considering such application and may impose such requirements, restrictions and qualifications, including penalty fees and past dues, upon the applicant as it deems appropriate. In the event the Executive Committee denies or refuses to consider such waiver application, the person shall be required to reapply to the Office of Bar Admissions.","UrlName":"revision306"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"768983c8-0cf2-4778-bb5e-f604bc25c146","Title":"Section 5. List of Active Members.","Content":"As soon as practical after July 1 of each year, the State Bar shall furnish a copy of the membership directory to the clerks of every court of record in the State. On or before November 1, the State Bar shall furnish to the clerks of every court of record in the State a list of members of all membership categories, who are for any reason not in good standing with the State Bar. No later than six months after November 1 of each year, the State Bar shall update the list of members who are not in good standing and furnish the list to the clerks of the courts of records. A lawyer not in good standing shall be prohibited from appearing as counsel in any court, filing papers therein, or otherwise practicing law, unless and until that lawyer has a certificate from the Executive Director of the State Bar stating that he or she has become an active member in good standing. The list of all registered lawyers in good standing within the State shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and the clerks of the various federal courts in Georgia.  ","UrlName":"rule402","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c814c77c-d1e6-42a9-871c-0965cd47d9ba","Title":"Section 6. Affiliate Membership and Law Student Membership.","Content":"In addition to the classes of membership provided in Rule 1-202, Organization of the State Bar and Admissions, the Board of Governors or the Executive Committee may consider and approve or disapprove applications for Affiliate or Law Student membership with the State Bar of Georgia. Affiliate and Law Student members shall have the right to attend State Bar of Georgia meetings and receive State Bar official publications. Neither Affiliate nor Law Student members may hold office, vote or have any other rights and privileges incident to the membership classes set forth in Rule 1-202 with the State Bar of Georgia. Affiliate or Law Student members shall not hold themselves out or imply to the public, courts or members of the legal profession that they are members of the State Bar of Georgia as defined in Rule 1-202 of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar retains the right to deny or revoke the membership privileges of any Affiliate or Law Student member who violates this Section.\n(a) Affiliate Membership. The application form for an Affiliate shall include a recommendation signed by an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. Affiliate membership may be renewed each Bar year without additional application. The Board of Governors may set an amount of annual dues or fees for Affiliate membership. Affiliate membership shall be approved only when the applicant is a Domestic Lawyer who is in good standing in all jurisdictions in which he or she is licensed, is an employee of the government, the armed services, a private or commercial institution or a law school, and is not otherwise authorized to practice law in Georgia.\n(b) Law Student Membership. The application form for a Law Student member shall include a certification by the applicant that he or she is a student in good standing at an ABA accredited law school in Georgia. Law Student membership may be renewed each Bar year by certifying to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia that the student is currently enrolled in law school and in good standing. The Board of Governors may set annual dues or fees for Law Student membership.","UrlName":"rule333","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"7e914e44-334d-41a7-a219-6069a2df5367","ParentId":"c814c77c-d1e6-42a9-871c-0965cd47d9ba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In addition to the classes of membership provided in the preceding sections of this Article, the Board of Governors or the Executive Committee of the Board may consider and approve or disapprove applications for Affiliate or Law Student membership with the State Bar. Any Affiliate member or Law Student member shall have the right to attend State Bar meetings and receive State Bar official publications, but shall not have the right to hold office or vote or have other rights and privileges incident to membership. An Affiliate or Law Student member shall not hold himself or herself out to the public or imply in any manner that he or she is a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia or entitled to practice law in this State. An Affiliate or Law Student member shall not use his or her membership number for any purpose other than communicating with the State Bar. The State Bar retains the right to deny or revoke the membership privileges of any Affiliate or Law Student member who violates this Section. \n \nThe application form for an Affiliate or Law Student membership shall include the recommendation of the applicant by an active member in good standing of the State Bar. Affiliate or Law Student membership may be renewed each fiscal year without additional application. The Board of Governors shall prescribe the dues or fees for Affiliate or Law Student membership. Affiliate membership shall be approved only when the applicant is licensed to practice law in another state or the District of Columbia, and is in good standing in all jurisdictions in which he or she is licensed, and is an employee of government, the armed services, a private or commercial institution or a law school, and is not otherwise authorized to practice law in Georgia. Application to become a Law Student member shall be approved when the applicant is enrolled in a law school approved by the American Bar Association or the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners.","UrlName":"revision152"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f8f9ac38-7fc1-4861-913e-61f67d536ce0","Title":"Section 7. Emeritus Members.","Content":" In addition to the classes of membership provided in the preceding sections of this Article, the Membership Department may approve or disapprove applications for emeritus member status as provided for in Rule 1-202 (d) of the Bar Rules. Applications for emeritus membership shall be on forms prescribed by the Membership Department. \n \nEmeritus membership shall have the same privileges, rights, duties and responsibilities as active membership, except that emeritus members shall not give legal advice or otherwise practice law, except as set out in Rule 1-202 (d), nor hold office in the State Bar of Georgia.\n Emeritus members may be required to pay section dues at the option of each section of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \nAt the sole discretion of the Membership Department, a member who attains the age of 70 years during a Bar year, and who has been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, may be placed in emeritus status in the event the Membership Department is unable to locate or contact the qualifying member and provided there is no pending disciplinary action against the member.","UrlName":"rule348","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"e001f4f0-fb71-46fc-b850-481ab0fe0259","ParentId":"f8f9ac38-7fc1-4861-913e-61f67d536ce0","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In addition to the classes of membership provided in the preceding sections of this Article, the Membership Department may approve or disapprove applications for emeritus member status as provided for in Rule 1-202(d) of the Bar Rules. Applications for emeritus membership shall be on forms prescribed by the Membership Department. \n \nEmeritus membership shall have the same privileges, rights, duties and responsibilities as active membership, except that emeritus members shall not give legal advice or otherwise practice law, except as set out in Rule 1-202(d), nominate a member for office or hold office in the State Bar, or vote on any candidate for elected position in or proposal concerning the State Bar.\n Emeritus members may be required to pay section dues at the option of each section of the State Bar. \n \nAt the sole discretion of the Membership Department, a member who has attained the age of 70 years, and who has been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, may be placed in emeritus status in the event the Membership Department is unable to locate or contact the qualifying member and provided there is no pending disciplinary action against the member.","UrlName":"revision154"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0f3dc665-6a63-4b41-a3ab-7f20694c49c3","Title":"Section 8. Active Duty Traditional Guardsmen or Reservists.","Content":"The Executive Committee may provide an annual waiver of dues to Traditional Guardsmen or Traditional Reservists who have been called to active duty and whose activation or deployment is causing a financial hardship. The policies and procedures for requesting such waiver shall be determined by the Executive Committee.","UrlName":"rule354","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ef8fa604-21ec-4c6f-b0c0-43809a85038c","Title":"Section 9. Retired Status Member","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is not engaged in the active practice of law in any state, district, or territory of the United States may transfer to Retired Status by submitting a request in writing to the Executive Director and General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon approval by the Executive Director and General Counsel the Membership Department shall transfer the member to Retired Status. A member in Retired Status shall not be entitled to practice law in this state and may not practice law in any other jurisdiction. Further, such members shall not be eligible to vote or hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. Any member transferred to Retired Status shall be relieved of their membership fees and CLE obligations.</li> \n <li>A request for Retired Status must be unqualified, is irrevocable and permanent. A member in Retired Status will appear in the State Bar of Georgia member directory as “Retired.”</li> \n <li>A member of the State Bar of Georgia with a pending disciplinary matter may transfer to Retired Status with the consent of the Office of the General Counsel. Grievances received after a member has transferred to Retired Status may be investigated and prosecuted through the disciplinary process at the option of the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li>Members who are suspended from the practice of law because of failure to meet CLE requirements or failure to pay Bar membership fees are not eligible for Retired Status until the suspension is lifted.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule606","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3776ae52-c88b-4540-8cc2-41904adeca71","Title":"Section 10. Members Unable to Practice Law Due to a Disability","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>For the purposes of this section, a “Member with a Disability” is defined as a lawyer who has a physical or mental impairment that has a substantial and long-term effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.</li> \n <li> Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is temporarily or permanently disabled may submit to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia a written request to be transferred to Disabled Status. Members who elect this status must submit adequate medical and/or psychological documentation of their disability with the written request. Adequate documentation includes: (a) Documentation from Social Security of approval of disability; (b) Documentation from an insurance company of receipt of benefits based upon disability; (c) Documentation from a medical doctor that the member is disabled; (d) Other documentation from a licensed medical professional providing proof of disability. \n Members electing Disabled Status shall not be entitled to practice law in this state, or to vote or hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. Any member transferred to Disabled Status is relieved of their obligation to pay license fees and to complete the required annual CLE hours. </li> \n <li>A Disabled Status member may submit a written petition to the Executive Committee for reinstatement to another membership status. The petition must include sufficient information from a medical professional for the Executive Committee to review that professional’s determination that the member’s disability is no longer substantial and/or having long-term effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. If the member seeks Active status, he or she must provide documentation from a licensed medical professional showing that the member no longer qualifies for Disabled Status. Medical and/or psychological information provided pursuant to this subparagraph is confidential and shall not be disclosed by the Bar absent satisfactory written permission or a court order.</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia shall consider and act on any petition from a Disabled Status member in disabled status seeking reinstatement to another membership status, taking into account the recommendation of the Executive Director and General Counsel. If there are any grievances or disciplinary matters pending when the Executive Committee receives a petition for reinstatement or if there is credible evidence that the member appears to continue to suffer from a disability, the Executive Committee shall defer consideration of the petition until those issues are fully resolved.</li> \n <li>If the Executive Committee approves the petition, the member shall be returned to the membership status of their choice upon payment of the appropriate membership fees, satisfaction of any other required membership obligations, and payment of any outstanding financial obligations to the Bar. Before being reinstated to Active Status, the member must complete Continuing Legal Education for the year reinstatement is being sought.</li> \n <li>The Membership Department shall not be required to verify disability beyond the initial determination under this section. A member who has been transferred to Disabled Status shall remain in that status unless the status is changed pursuant to this section. A member transferred to Disabled Status will appear as “Inactive” on the State Bar of Georgia website and the Bar will respond to requests about the current status of the Disabled Status member by stating that the member is “Inactive Status.”</li> \n <li>Disability Status under this section does not toll any disciplinary proceeding that occurs before or after a member elects Disabled Status.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule607","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Title":"ARTICLE II MEETINGS OF MEMBERS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter46","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"51ad7581-bebc-4c3d-a602-c46bf3ecabf1","Title":"Section 1. Annual and Midyear Meeting.","Content":"(a) The members of the State Bar of Georgia shall meet at least once each Bar year at a time and place designated by the Board of Governors. That meeting may be held at either the Annual or Midyear meeting or both.\n(b) The members of the State Bar of Georgia may meet at other times during the Bar year as designated by the Board of Governors.\n(c) The Board of Governors, or in its absence, the Executive Committee, may vote to hold a meeting of members by electronic means as deemed prudent or necessary.\n(d) A meeting of members may be held at a location designated by the Board of Governors, or by electronic means, including but not limited to telephone conferencing and live video conferencing, subject to any limitations established by the Board of Governors.\n(e) If approved by the Board of Governors, any meeting of members may be held electronically by live video conferencing, social media broadcast, or by any other electronic means approved by the Board of Governors.\n(f) Any voting required by the membership may be conducted electronically with a ballot provided directly to the member or available on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia. Instructions for electronic voting will be provided to every member and posted on the official State Bar of Georgia website at least ten days before any meeting to be held electronically.","UrlName":"rule317","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[{"Id":"3cdf5a27-d589-400a-a75c-7b61eb190c9c","ParentId":"51ad7581-bebc-4c3d-a602-c46bf3ecabf1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The members of the State Bar shall meet at least once each year at a time and place designated by the Board of Governors. That meeting shall be called the Annual Meeting.","UrlName":"revision310"}],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"47f33920-1cad-43f9-a12c-19ee07a79b76","Title":"Section 2. Rules of Order.","Content":" At all meetings of the members of the State Bar, its Board of Governors, or any committee thereof, Robert's Rules of Order, Newly Revised shall govern as to parliamentary procedure, except where those rules conflict with any provision of the Rules or Bylaws of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule343","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"579d8fb2-4528-4651-8eb1-5f825d1225e2","Title":"Section 3. Order of Business.","Content":"At each meeting of the members of the State Bar, the order of business may be prescribed by the Board of Governors, except as provided in these Bylaws. The order of business may be changed by majority vote of the members present. ","UrlName":"rule365","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1ba05433-8d7f-49af-9b6c-5ed6bb178138","Title":"Section 4. Quorum.","Content":"A quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the members of the State Bar shall consist of fifty active members in attendance.","UrlName":"rule384","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3ecd1e37-0965-4882-a6d5-7d7e8ae31ee4","Title":"Section 5. Reserved.","Content":"","UrlName":"rule407","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bc6dda3b-3981-4a84-a927-10297696efc4","Title":"Section 6. Proposed Legislation.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li> No legislation shall be recommended, supported or opposed by the State Bar unless:\n <ol style=\"list-style: decimal outside none\"> \n <li>such action has been initiated by an appropriate committee or section, or by any ten members of the Board of Governors; and</li> \n <li>the text of the legislation is furnished to the President, the President-elect and the Advisory Committee on Legislation at least thirty days prior to its submission for approval or disapproval as set forth below; and</li> \n <li> provided further:\n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-roman outside none\"> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a majority vote of the members of the State Bar present at a meeting; or</li> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting; or</li> \n <li>when the Board of Governors is not in session, such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Executive Committee voting.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In addition to and in aid of these legislative powers, the Board shall have the power to adopt, by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Board present and voting, a Standing Board Policy regarding legislation. Such Standing Board Policy shall be binding from session to session unless suspended, modified or rescinded pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board present and voting.</li> \n <li>No committee or section of the State Bar shall recommend, support or oppose any legislation except in the manner herein provided.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule339","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[{"Id":"42bf3308-9f47-4240-96de-67928cd4da40","ParentId":"bc6dda3b-3981-4a84-a927-10297696efc4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li> No legislation shall be recommended, supported or opposed by the State Bar unless:\n <ol style=\"list-style: decimal outside none\"> \n <li>such action has been initiated by an appropriate committee or section, or by any ten members of the Board of Governors; and</li> \n <li>the text of the legislation is furnished to the President, the President-elect and the Advisory Committee on Legislation at least thirty days prior to its submission for approval or disapproval as set forth below; and</li> \n <li> provided further:\n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-roman outside none\"> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a majority vote of the members of the State Bar present at a meeting; or</li> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting; or</li> \n <li>when the Board of Governors is not in session, such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Executive Committee voting.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In addition to and in aid of these legislative powers, the Board shall have the power to adopt, by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Board present and voting, a Standing Board Policy regarding legislation. Such Standing Board Policy shall be binding from session to session unless suspended, modified or rescinded pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board present and voting.</li> \n <li>No committee or section of the State Bar shall recommend, support or oppose any legislation except in the manner herein provided.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision25"}],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Title":"ARTICLE III BOARD OF GOVERNORS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter47","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"2dd13fb9-fd5d-4e8d-92bd-3d22cc49b7de","Title":"Section 1.","Content":"This Article is restated to conform to an amendment to Rule 1-302 as adopted by the Supreme Court on Nov. 7, 2001.","UrlName":"rule312","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"35ca45b6-8020-4bcf-b7ed-8d77b0b66c11","Title":"Section 2.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Officer Members. The Officer Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of the President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, and the Attorney General.</li> \n <li>Circuit Members. The Circuit Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of a number of members from each Judicial Circuit equal to the number of members as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governors members to be elected from the Atlanta Judicial Circuit. Each Judicial Circuit may gain an additional member for each additional 500 active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. Every judicial circuit shall be entitled to elect at least one member of the Board.</li> \n <li>Nonresident Members. There shall be two nonresident members of the Board of Governors who shall be an active members of the State Bar in good standing residing outside of Georgia. The nonresident members shall be from different states. One nonresident member seat shall be an \"odd \"seat and the other an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below.</li> \n <li>Appointed Members. The President-elect in office when this Bylaw becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. The first two positions will be considered \"odd \"seats, and the third will be considered an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint two members in years when the \"odd \"seats expire and one member in the years \"even \"seats expire. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>The number of the circuit members, plus the nonresident members, plus the appointed members of the Board of Governors shall not exceed 150, except as set out in Section 6(a) below.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule337","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"a59adb57-f942-45ff-8497-173c151b86a0","ParentId":"35ca45b6-8020-4bcf-b7ed-8d77b0b66c11","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Officer Members. The Officer Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of the President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, and the Attorney General.</li> \n <li>Circuit Members. The Circuit Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of a number of members from each Judicial Circuit equal to the number of members as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governors members to be elected from the Atlanta Judicial Circuit. Each Judicial Circuit may gain an additional member for each additional 500 active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. Every judicial circuit shall be entitled to elect at least one member of the Board.</li> \n <li>Nonresident Members. There shall be two nonresident members of the Board of Governors who shall be an active members of the State Bar in good standing residing outside of Georgia. The nonresident members shall be from different states. One nonresident member seat shall be an \"odd \"seat and the other an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below.</li> \n <li>Appointed Members. The President-elect in office when this Bylaw becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. The first two positions will be considered \"odd \"seats, and the third will be considered an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint two members in years when the \"odd \"seats expire and one member in the years \"even \"seats expire. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>The number of the circuit members, plus the nonresident members, plus the appointed members of the Board of Governors shall not exceed 150, except as set out in Section 6(a) below.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision26"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ede95347-4710-4e40-a1b4-7b6dbc3c88e1","Title":"Section 3. Term of Office.","Content":"The term of office of the circuit members, nonresident members, and the appointed members of the Board of Governors shall be two years; the word “year” as used here shall mean the period from the adjournment of an annual meeting until the adjournment of the next annual meeting of the members. Each circuit member, nonresident member, and appointed member shall continue to serve (a) until the term for which the member was elected or appointed has expired, and (b) until a successor has been elected or appointed. Notwithstanding the above, the Board may adopt attendance requirements which condition or terminate the term of a Board member for failure to attend Board meetings.","UrlName":"rule368","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ab1aaad4-1ce9-4ed2-84e3-35dc4ed3dc2e","Title":"Section 4.","Content":"The terms of the circuit members, nonresident members, and appointed members of the Board shall be staggered so that those designated \"odd \"will expire at the annual meeting in odd-numbered years and those designated \"even \"will expire in even-numbered years. ","UrlName":"rule371","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"591411de-4ca5-431e-8b20-f9906f4ca26d","Title":"Section 5.","Content":"The current circuit membership, with the \"odd \"and \"even \"posts now in existence, is as follows:\n<table style=\"\" width=\"100%\" border=\"1\" align=\"center\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td colspan=\"4\" style=\"\" width=\"100%\"> \n ODD \n </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Alapaha #1 \n Alcovy #1 \n Appalachian \n Atlanta #1 \n Atlanta #3 \n Atlanta #5 \n Atlanta #7 \n Atlanta #9 \n Atlanta #11 \n Atlanta #13 \n Atlanta #15 \n Atlanta #17 \n Atlanta #19 \n Atlanta #21 \n Atlanta #23 \n Atlanta #25 \n Atlanta #27 \n Atlanta #29 \n Atlanta #30 </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Atlanta #32 \n Atlanta #34 \n Atlanta #36 \n Atlanta #39 \n Atlantic #2 \n Augusta #1 \n Augusta #3 \n Blue Ridge #2 \n Brunswick #1 \n Chattahoochee #2 \n Chattahoochee #4 \n Cherokee #2 \n Clayton #1 \n Clayton #3 \n Cobb #2 \n Cobb #4 \n Cobb #6 \n Conasauga #2 \n Cordele \n Coweta #2 \n Dougherty #2 </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> \n Dublin \n Eastern #2 \n Eastern #4 \n Flint #1 \n Griffin #2 \n Gwinnett #1 \n Gwinnett #3 \n Lookout Mtn. #2 \n Macon #1 \n Macon #3 \n Member-at-Large #1 \n Member-at-Large #2 \n Middle #2 \n Mountain \n Northeastern #2 \n Northern #1 \n Ocmulgee #2 \n Oconee #2 \n Ogeechee #2 \n </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Pataula \n Piedmont \n Rome #1 \n South Georgia #2 \n Southern #2 \n Southwestern \n Stone Mountain #2 \n Stone Mountain #4 \n Stone Mountain #6 \n Stone Mountain #8 \n Stone Mountain #10 \n Tallapoosa #1 \n Toombs \n Towaliga \n Waycross #2 \n Western #1 \n Out of State #1 \n   </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n<table style=\"\" width=\"100%\" border=\"1\" align=\"center\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td colspan=\"4\" style=\"\" width=\"100%\"> \n EVEN \n </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Alapaha #2 \n Alcovy #2 \n Atlanta #2 \n Atlanta #4 \n Atlanta #6 \n Atlanta #8 \n Atlanta #10 \n Atlanta #12 \n Atlanta #14 \n Atlanta #16 \n Atlanta #18 \n Atlanta #20 \n Atlanta #22 \n Atlanta #24 \n Atlanta #26 \n Atlanta #28 \n Atlanta #31 \n Atlanta #33 </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> \n Atlanta #35 \n Atlanta #37 \n Atlanta #38 \n Atlanta #40 \n Atlantic #1 \n Augusta #2 \n Augusta #4 \n Bell Forsyth \n Blue Ridge #1 \n Brunswick #2 \n Chattahoochee #1 \n Chattahoochee #3 \n Cherokee #1 \n Clayton #2 \n Cobb #1 \n Cobb #3 \n Cobb #5 \n Cobb #7 \n Conasauga #1 \n Coweta #1 \n Dougherty #1 \n Douglas \n Eastern #1 \n </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Eastern #3 \n Enotah \n Flint #2 \n Griffin #1 \n Gwinnett #2 \n Gwinnett #4 \n Houston \n Lookout Mtn. #1 \n Lookout Mtn. #3 \n Macon #2 \n Member-at-Large #3 \n Middle #1 \n Northeastern #1 \n Northern #2 \n Ocmulgee #1 \n Ocmulgee #3 \n Oconee #1 \n Ogeechee #1 \n Paulding </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Rockdale \n Rome #2 \n South Georgia #1 \n Southern #1 \n Southern #3 \n Stone Mountain #1 \n Stone Mountain #3 \n Stone Mountain #5 \n Stone Mountain #7 \n Stone Mountain #9 \n Tallapoosa #2 \n Tifton \n Waycross #1 \n Western #2 \n Out of State #2 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>","UrlName":"rule392","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"42c36d46-4cd8-4adf-a5aa-5a0e58d0b986","Title":"Section 6. Alterations of Positions on Board of Governors.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> After the organization of the Board of Governors as provided for in Section 5 above, when alterations in positions on the Board occur because of additional circuit members of the State Bar as referred to in Section 2 above or because of the creation or abolition of circuits or when the terms of members are terminated because of a change in geographical limits of circuits the terms of the members affected shall be determined as follows: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> When additional positions are created in existing circuits because of additional members of the State Bar in such circuits, the position or post on the Board thus created shall be given the next higher number after the last existing post (the member in a circuit having theretofore only one member being considered as occupying Post No. 1) and the new post shall have a term expiring one year after that of the highest numbered existing post. The newly created post(s) shall be inserted in the appropriate column in Section 5 above. If a circuit is abolished, the name of the circuit and all post(s) therein shall be stricken from the appropriate column(s) in Section 5 above. Upon the creation of a new judicial circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to at least one membership on the Board even if the cap of 150 members set out in Section 2(d) above has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to additional members depending on the number of active members of the State Bar residing in the circuit, according to the formula set forth in Section 2 of this Article. Likewise, the terms of office and method of designating \"odd \"or \"even \"posts shall be in accordance with the provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 5 of this Article. \n \n If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges to which that circuit was entitled to on July 1, 1979, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board representing that circuit if there were more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event of a reduction, the last-created post will be the first post eliminated. If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board as it had on July 1, 1979. The terms of office of said members of the Board shall remain as they were prior to the change in the geographical limits of the circuit. \n \n Additional members of the circuit which has experienced a change in geographical limits, if the cap has not been reached, will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar residing in that circuit as provided in Section 2 of this Article. \n A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon the circuit's Board's representatives, except as otherwise provided. </li> \n <li>When the geographical limits of circuits are altered, the term(s) of the member(s) from the new circuit with the same name as the former circuit shall be the same as the term(s) of the member(s) from the former circuit. The term of the first member from the new circuit with a new name shall be determined by adding the name of that circuit to the column in Section 5 above containing the least number of positions.</li> \n <li>If two or more of the events referred to in this Section occur in the same year, the terms of members affected shall be determined by performing the steps in subparagraphs (a) and (b) in that order, and as between two or more alterations of geographical limits, in the order of their effective dates or if they have the same effective date, in order of the introduction of the legislation making the alteration.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Section, legislation shall be deemed effective on the date of its enactment and elections shall be held accordingly, notwithstanding that by its terms the legislation is not effective until a later date. However, a person elected to a position on the Board of Governors as a result of legislation shall not become a member until the actual effective date of the legislation.</li> \n <li>Whenever, under subparagraphs (a) and (b) hereof, it is directed that a circuit or post be added or stricken from the columns in Section 5 above, the section is automatically amended accordingly.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule316","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"f459b600-6dfa-4377-866b-30526ea7fe5e","ParentId":"42c36d46-4cd8-4adf-a5aa-5a0e58d0b986","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> After the organization of the Board of Governors as provided for in Section 5 above, when alterations in positions on the Board occur because of additional circuit members of the State Bar as referred to in Section 2 above or because of the creation or abolition of circuits or when the terms of members are terminated because of a change in geographical limits of circuits the terms of the members affected shall be determined as follows: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> When additional positions are created in existing circuits because of additional members of the State Bar in such circuits, the position or post on the Board thus created shall be given the next higher number after the last existing post (the member in a circuit having theretofore only one member being considered as occupying Post No. 1) and the new post shall have a term expiring one year after that of the highest numbered existing post. The newly created post(s) shall be inserted in the appropriate column in Section 5 above. If a circuit is abolished, the name of the circuit and all post(s) therein shall be stricken from the appropriate column(s) in Section 5 above. Upon the creation of a new judicial circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to at least one membership on the Board even if the cap of 150 members set out in Section 2(d) above has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to additional members depending on the number of active members of the State Bar residing in the circuit, according to the formula set forth in Section 2 of this Article. Likewise, the terms of office and method of designating \"odd \"or \"even \"posts shall be in accordance with the provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 5 of this Article. \n \n If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges to which that circuit was entitled to on July 1, 1979, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board representing that circuit if there were more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event of a reduction, the last-created post will be the first post eliminated. If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board as it had on July 1, 1979. The terms of office of said members of the Board shall remain as they were prior to the change in the geographical limits of the circuit. \n \n Additional members of the circuit which has experienced a change in geographical limits, if the cap has not been reached, will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar residing in that circuit as provided in Section 2 of this Article.A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon the circuit's Board's representatives, except as otherwise provided. </li> \n <li>When the geographical limits of circuits are altered, the term(s) of the member(s) from the new circuit with the same name as the former circuit shall be the same as the term(s) of the member(s) from the former circuit. The term of the first member from the new circuit with a new name shall be determined by adding the name of that circuit to the column in Section 5 above containing the least number of positions.</li> \n <li>If two or more of the events referred to in this Section occur in the same year, the terms of members affected shall be determined by performing the steps in subparagraphs (a) and (b) in that order, and as between two or more alterations of geographical limits, in the order of their effective dates or if they have the same effective date, in order of the introduction of the legislation making the alteration.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Section, legislation shall be deemed effective on the date of its enactment and elections shall be held accordingly, notwithstanding that by its terms the legislation is not effective until a later date. However, a person elected to a position on the Board of Governors as a result of legislation shall not become a member until the actual effective date of the legislation.</li> \n <li>Whenever, under subparagraphs (a) and (b) hereof, it is directed that a circuit or post be added or stricken from the columns in Section 5 above, the section is automatically amended accordingly.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision27"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"aedffa90-4cb0-4b10-8490-bbb935622a12","Title":"Section 7. Honorary Members.","Content":"All past Presidents of the Georgia Bar Association, all past Presidents of the State Bar, except the Immediate Past President, and all past Presidents of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar shall be honorary members of the Board of Governors, provided they are members in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. Honorary members may attend all meetings of the Board and participate in its proceedings but shall not bring forward or vote on any question arising in the meetings of the Board, nor be counted in ascertaining a quorum; however, honorary members may nominate or second a member of the Bar to serve as an officer of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule351","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"086d1fa2-cd6d-43ef-aaec-08703438d8a4","ParentId":"aedffa90-4cb0-4b10-8490-bbb935622a12","Title":"Version 2","Content":"All past Presidents of the Georgia Bar Association, all past Presidents of the State Bar, except the Immediate Past President, and all past Presidents of the Younger Lawyers Section of the State Bar shall be honorary members of the Board of Governors, provided they are members of the State Bar. Honorary members may attend all meetings of the Board and participate in its proceedings, but shall not vote on any question arising in the meetings of the Board, nor be counted in ascertaining a quorum.","UrlName":"revision349"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fda99865-b889-4ac6-9844-066ab5518b30","Title":"Section 8. New Positions, Unfilled Positions, Vacancies, and Lost Positions.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>If any new position is created in a circuit because of an increase in membership of such circuit, or if any new position is created as a result of legislation establishing a new judicial circuit, the President shall appoint an active member of the State Bar in such circuit to hold office for the remaining term.</li> \n <li>If no successor is elected as provided for in Section 3 of this Article III, the President shall, at the annual meeting or within thirty days thereafter, appoint a successor to the Board from the circuit so failing to elect, or in the case of a nonresident member, from the active nonresident members of the State Bar.</li> \n <li>If any other vacancy on the Board of Governors occurs at or between annual meetings of the State Bar, the President shall appoint an active member of the circuit in which the vacancy occurs to hold office for the unexpired term.</li> \n <li>In the event a position is eliminated for any reason under this Article III, the representative filling the post to be eliminated shall serve for the remainder of the term for which said representative was elected.</li> \n <li>If as a result of a change in the geographical boundaries of any judicial circuit a board member is no longer located within the geographic boundaries of the post to which the member was elected, the president shall appoint such representative to the circuit in which the member is actually located if a vacancy is created or exists in such circuit. If no vacancy exists in the circuit, the board member shall serve out the remainder of his or her term as described in subsection (d) above.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule359","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"07f1a40c-8caa-49af-b2a6-a03379d9c59b","ParentId":"fda99865-b889-4ac6-9844-066ab5518b30","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>If any new position is created in a circuit because of an increase in membership of such circuit, or if any new position is created as a result of legislation establishing a new judicial circuit, the President shall appoint an active member of the State Bar in such circuit to hold office for the remaining term.</li> \n <li>If no successor is elected as provided for in Section 3 of this Article III, the President shall, at the annual meeting or within thirty days thereafter, appoint a successor to the Board from the circuit so failing to elect, or in the case of a nonresident member, from the active nonresident members of the State Bar.</li> \n <li>If any other vacancy on the Board of Governors occurs at or between annual meetings of the State Bar, the President shall appoint an active member of the circuit in which the vacancy occurs to hold office for the unexpired term.</li> \n <li>In the event a position is eliminated for any reason under this Article III, the representative filling the post to be eliminated shall serve for the remainder of the term for which said representative was elected.</li> \n <li>If as a result of a change in the geographical boundaries of any judicial circuit a board member is no longer located within the geographic boundaries of the post to which the member was elected, the president shall appoint such representative to the circuit in which the member is actually located if a vacancy is created or exists in such circuit. If no vacancy exists in the circuit, the board member shall serve out the remainder of his or her term as described in subsection (d) above.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision28"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"631d0e0e-fa95-421e-8f73-cc44920a6866","Title":"Section 9. Quorum.","Content":"Forty members of the Board of Governors representing at least five judicial circuits shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at any Board meeting.","UrlName":"rule362","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"804ef735-3d4e-4a2d-9692-12483c54dd61","Title":"Section 10. Powers and Duties.","Content":"The government of the State Bar shall be vested in the Board of Governors. The Board shall control and administer the affairs of the State Bar and shall have the power to do all things and take all actions which in its judgment may be necessary or desirable to carry out the purposes of the State Bar in keeping with the Rules and these Bylaws. It shall keep a record of its proceedings and shall report at the annual meeting of the members of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule327","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"76b66f5e-a3e5-443a-9a2b-d984d25fbdf2","Title":"Section 11. Meetings.","Content":"(a) The Board of Governors shall meet during or immediately after the adjournment of the the annual and midyear meetings of the members or on the following day, as the incoming President may direct. There shall be at least one additional regular meeting of the Board in the Spring of each year, at such times and places as may be fixed by the Board or its President.\n(b) Special meetings may be called by the President. Upon the request of 20 members of the Board of Governors, the President or the Executive Director shall give notice of a special meeting not less than 10 nor more than 20 days after such request is received. Each member of the Board shall receive at least 10 days notice by email of each meeting of the Board of Governors, other than a meeting held in conjunction with the annual or midyear meetings.\n(c) If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct any meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.","UrlName":"rule328","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"47e3bed4-f00a-47fc-b0f9-0cf052e05b20","ParentId":"76b66f5e-a3e5-443a-9a2b-d984d25fbdf2","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Board of Governors shall meet during or immediately after the adjournment of the annual meeting of the members or on the following day, as the incoming President may direct. There shall be at least three additional regular meetings of the Board each year at such times and places as may be fixed by the Board or its President. Special meetings may be called by the President. Upon the request of twenty members of the Board, the President or the Executive Director shall give notice of a meeting not less than ten nor more than twenty days after such request is received. Each member of the Board shall have at least ten days' notice by mail of each meeting of the Board of Governors, other than the meeting held in conjunction with the annual meeting.","UrlName":"revision312"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a7fefe24-e085-41ef-966d-503aaa70268f","Title":"Section 12. Budget.","Content":"The Board of Governors shall, at its meeting held in conjunction with the spring meeting, adopt a budget for the following fiscal year showing the anticipated income and tentative appropriations to cover estimated expenses of the State Bar, which budget the Board shall have authority from time to time to amend. In no event shall the officers have authority to spend money or incur indebtedness except as provided for in the budget fixed by the Board.","UrlName":"rule331","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"98044720-6463-456f-b055-8193d16b3025","Title":"ARTICLE IV EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter48","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"5f6bd3ca-161c-48a8-a46b-d07b7dc335f5","Title":"Section 1. Members.","Content":"There shall be an Executive Committee of the Board of Governors composed of the following: the President, the President-Elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-Elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and six (6) members of the Board of Governors elected by the Board. The election of members of the Executive Committee by the Board of Governors shall take place at the meeting of the Board following adjournment of the annual meeting for the State Bar of Georgia, and they shall serve for the term for which they are elected and until their successors are elected and qualified. Elections shall be by majority vote of those members of the Board of Governors present and voting. A ballot must contain one (1) vote for each position to be filled in order for it to be counted. No candidate may receive more than one vote per ballot. After the first or any succeeding ballot, those candidates with the votes of a majority of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting shall be declared elected to the office. If more candidates receive the votes of a majority of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting than there are vacancies to be filled, the vacancies shall be filled from the candidates receiving the greatest number of votes. If, after any ballot, one or more positions remain unfilled, or there is a tie for the last position, additional ballots shall be cast until all positions are filled. Those persons declared elected shall be dropped from all succeeding ballots. If on any ballot no candidate is declared elected, on the next succeeding ballot the person or persons who received the lowest number of votes cast shall be dropped from this and all future ballots, unless to do so would reduce the number of candidates to a number less than the positions to be filled plus one.\nAt the first election of members of the Executive Committee by the Board of Governors after adjournment of the 1998 Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia six (6) members of the Executive Committee shall be elected, three (3) of whom shall serve for two-year terms and three (3) of whom shall serve for one-year terms; and the President of the State Bar of Georgia shall determine by lot which three (3) of the six (6) members elected at such first election shall serve for one year and which three (3) shall serve for two (2) years. Thereafter all members of the Executive Committee elected by the Board of Governors shall be elected for terms of two (2) years each.","UrlName":"rule321","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"98044720-6463-456f-b055-8193d16b3025","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["98044720-6463-456f-b055-8193d16b3025","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a1904a34-6251-49f2-8669-e6a36fcf138f","Title":"Section 2. Duties.","Content":"The Executive Committee shall exercise all of the powers of the Board of Governors between meetings of the Board and shall report to each meeting of the Board. In lieu of meeting in person, and with notice to all Executive Committee members, the Executive Committee may meet by telephone or by electronic conference. Specially called Executive Committee meetings may occur upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the entire membership of the Executive Committee.","UrlName":"rule340","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"98044720-6463-456f-b055-8193d16b3025","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["98044720-6463-456f-b055-8193d16b3025","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Title":"ARTICLE V OFFICERS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter49","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"892d4cc4-1ae8-4f3f-b1ab-87216e68021c","Title":"Section 1. Generally.","Content":"Officers of the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of a President, a President-Elect, an Immediate Past President, a Secretary, and a Treasurer. Officers shall be installed each year during the Annual Meeting and shall take an oath of office administered by an installation officer selected by the President-Elect. The President-Elect shall be sworn in separately from the other officers. After their installation, the Secretary and the Treasurer shall serve until the next annual meeting. The Secretary and the Treasurer may not serve more than three consecutive terms.\nThe President, Immediate Past President, and the President-Elect of the Young Lawyers Division shall be ex-officio officers of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule320","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"20105829-5a6d-43e3-b12f-59d11fb03609","Title":"Section 2. The President.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The President shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>preside at all meetings of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>chair the Board of Governors and preside at all of its meetings;</li> \n <li>submit to the Board of Governors no later than the second meeting of the Board which the President chairs, a proposed program of activities for the year, a list of the appointments of chairpersons and members of standing committees for the year as provided by the Rules and these Bylaws, and budgetary recommendations as deemed appropriate; and</li> \n <li>choose the site for the Annual Meeting to be held at the end of his or her term and deliver a report at the Annual Meeting of the members on the activities of the State Bar of Georgia during his or her term of office.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule358","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[{"Id":"84155d4d-3c78-49c2-8475-b80ca8817626","ParentId":"20105829-5a6d-43e3-b12f-59d11fb03609","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The President shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>preside at all meetings of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>chair the Board of Governors and preside at all of its meetings;</li> \n <li>submit to the Board of Governors no later than the second meeting of the Board which the President chairs, a proposed program of activities for the year, a list of the appointments of chairpersons and members of standing committees for the year as provided by the Rules and these Bylaws, and budgetary recommendations as deemed appropriate; and</li> \n <li>choose the site for the Annual Meeting to be held at the end of his or her term and deliver a report at the Annual Meeting of the members on the activities of the State Bar of Georgia during his or her term of office.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision29"}],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0feb626d-4e02-44a5-ac10-d4918584a202","Title":"Section 3. The President-Elect.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The President-Elect shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>perform duties delegated to him or her by the President, prescribed by the Board of Governors and as otherwise provided in the Bar Rules and Bylaws;</li> \n <li>upon the absence, death, disability, or resignation of the President, the President-Elect shall preside at all meetings of the State Bar of Georgia and the Board, and shall perform all other duties of the President;</li> \n <li>plan the program for the year in which he or she shall act as President, including activities associated with the inaugural event during the Annual Meeting;</li> \n <li>in planning his or her year, ensure continuity in the program of the State Bar of Georgia for the benefit of the legal profession and the public, and make needed arrangements for the prompt implementation of the program upon taking office as President; and</li> \n <li>serve as an ex-officio member of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule369","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[{"Id":"41f890a6-8768-44f4-a5c2-85b325ff7b9d","ParentId":"0feb626d-4e02-44a5-ac10-d4918584a202","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The President-Elect shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>perform duties delegated to him or her by the President, prescribed by the Board of Governors and as otherwise provided in the Bar Rules and Bylaws;</li> \n <li>upon the absence, death, disability, or resignation of the President, the President-Elect shall preside at all meetings of the State Bar of Georgia and the Board, and shall perform all other duties of the President;</li> \n <li>plan the program for the year in which he or she shall act as President, including activities associated with the inaugural event during the Annual Meeting;</li> \n <li>in planning his or her year, ensure continuity in the program of the State Bar of Georgia for the benefit of the legal profession and the public, and make needed arrangements for the prompt implementation of the program upon taking office as President; and</li> \n <li>serve as an ex-officio member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision301"}],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"368a2062-07dd-4404-8d75-b9c153d63f24","Title":"Section 4. The Immediate Past President.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Immediate Past President shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>chair the Board of Trustees for the Institute of Continuing Legal Education;</li> \n <li>serve as an ex-officio member of the State Disciplinary Review Board and the Commission on Lawyer Competency; and</li> \n <li>perform other duties delegated to him or her by the President and prescribed by the Board of Governors.</li> \n </ol> \nUpon the absence, death, resignation, or disability of the Immediate Past President, the next most immediate past president shall assume the duties of the Immediate Past President.</div>","UrlName":"rule390","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[{"Id":"22ece494-f563-421b-b482-ba10c866ba79","ParentId":"368a2062-07dd-4404-8d75-b9c153d63f24","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Immediate Past President shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>chair the Board of Trustees for the Institute of Continuing Legal Education;</li> \n <li>serve as an ex-officio member of the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the Commission on Lawyer Competency; and</li> \n <li>perform other duties delegated to him or her by the President and prescribed by the Board of Governors.</li> \n </ol> \nUpon the absence, death, resignation, or disability of the Immediate Past President, the next most immediate past president shall assume the duties of the Immediate Past President.</div>","UrlName":"revision302"}],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5e3e099b-9b06-4872-b546-ecc1a8d03730","Title":"Section 5. The Secretary.","Content":"The Secretary shall have general charge of the records of the State Bar and shall act as secretary for meetings of the Board of Governors and of the Executive Committee. The Secretary shall also perform duties prescribed by the Board.","UrlName":"rule409","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"56fb9286-56de-4a6d-b26e-e4a2254cf1e5","Title":"Section 6. The Treasurer.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Treasurer shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>deposit in accordance with the investment policy approved by the Board of Governors all funds received by the State Bar in a bank or banks, or investment firm or firms, designated by the Board of Governors;</li> \n <li>disburse all funds of the State Bar pursuant to the budget by means of checks or vouchers signed by the Treasurer and by one of the following: the Secretary, the President, the Immediate Past President, the President-elect, the Executive Director, the Acting Executive Director, the Assistant Executive Director or the General Counsel; however, in the absence of the Treasurer, the President or the Secretary shall sign all checks or vouchers;</li> \n <li>keep regular accounts which at all times shall be open to inspection by the members of the State Bar;</li> \n <li>report annually, and more frequently if required by the President or the Board of Governors, with regard to the financial affairs of the State Bar; and</li> \n <li>direct an annual audit of all funds, property and accounts of the State Bar performed by an independent certified public accountant selected by the Board of Governors, the report of which shall be delivered to the officers and made available to the membership.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule345","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[{"Id":"9abb2f02-5acd-43cc-88c9-a06c3d2ce94d","ParentId":"56fb9286-56de-4a6d-b26e-e4a2254cf1e5","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Treasurer shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>deposit in accordance with the investment policy approved by the Board of Governors all funds received by the State Bar in a bank or banks, or investment firm or firms, designated by the Board of Governors;</li> \n <li>disburse all funds of the State Bar pursuant to the budget by means of checks or vouchers signed by the Treasurer and by one of the following: the Secretary, the President, the Immediate Past President, the President-elect, the Executive Director, the Acting Executive Director, the Assistant Executive Director or the General Counsel; however, in the absence of the Treasurer, the President or the Secretary shall sign all checks or vouchers;</li> \n <li>keep regular accounts which at all times shall be open to inspection by the members of the State Bar;</li> \n <li>report annually, and more frequently if required by the President or the Board of Governors, with regard to the financial affairs of the State Bar; and</li> \n <li>direct an annual audit of all funds, property and accounts of the State Bar performed by an independent certified public accountant selected by the Board of Governors, the report of which shall be delivered to the officers and made available to the membership.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision32"}],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d5baeb19-a394-41ff-b29a-94b8beb77cc0","Title":"Section 7. Ex-officio Officers.","Content":"The President, Immediate Past President, and President-elect of the Younger Lawyers Section shall be ex-officio officers of the State Bar. Their duties shall be prescribed by the Board of Governors or delegated by the President, President-elect, or the Executive Committee of the State Bar. ","UrlName":"rule350","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a9365342-1f91-40b6-b59e-6b0d65b74542","Title":"Section 8. Bond.","Content":"A blanket fidelity bond shall be obtained to cover all officers, employees, or other persons handling funds of the State Bar. The bond shall be payable to the State Bar in an amount, not less than $25,000, to be determined by the Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule356","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","Title":"ARTICLE VI THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter50","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"fdd14e41-d629-4929-b540-11d03fbaa1d1","Title":"Section 1. Election.","Content":"The Executive Director shall be nominated and elected by the Board of Governors of the State Bar at its first meeting of each year.","UrlName":"rule319","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"aeab8063-7c51-4c82-bceb-392280f202c8","Title":"Section 2. Salary, Duties, and Term.","Content":"The salary and duties of the Executive Director shall be fixed and outlined by the Board of Governors. The term of office of the Executive Director shall be one year. Upon the death, resignation, or disability of the Secretary or the Treasurer, the duties of the Secretary or Treasurer shall be performed by the Executive Director until a successor is appointed as provided in Article XII, Section 1. ","UrlName":"rule346","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6b691bbc-17e8-4e7a-8d32-20a6242656b3","Title":"Section 3. Duties.","Content":"The Executive Director shall perform the duties prescribed by the Board of Governors and those delegated by the President, Secretary, and Treasurer.","UrlName":"rule314","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Title":"ARTICLE VII NOMINATIONS AND ELECTIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter51","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8f94f0d2-bcc7-4973-956c-b718e9b85d09","Title":"Section 1. Nomination of Officers.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Board of Governors shall annually nominate candidates for each of the following offices: President-elect, Secretary, and Treasurer, and if the office of President-elect is vacant, for the office of President. No nominee shall be proposed to the Board as a candidate for any office unless the member making the proposal is satisfied that the proposed nominee intends to accept the nomination and serve if elected.</li> \n <li>After nominations are made by the Board, ten members of the Board of Governors representing at least five different circuits, or thirty active members of the State Bar, including at least five active members from each of three different circuits, may nominate candidates for President-elect, Secretary, and Treasurer (and when the office of President-elect is vacant, for President) by filing with the Executive Director within ten days after nominations by the Board a petition in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article. No nominee shall be proposed to the Board as a candidate for any office unless the members making the proposal are satisfied that the proposed nominee intends to accept the nomination and serve if elected.</li> \n <li>No person, other than a candidate nominated as provided in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, may be elected by \"write-in \"ballots or otherwise to any office described in this Section, unless that person shall have filed with the Executive Director, not less than ten days prior to the date on which the ballots are to be mailed to the membership, a written statement that he or she is a \"write-in \"candidate for the office indicated and intends to serve if elected.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule322","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[{"Id":"d6c5b86e-e205-4ced-ada6-ab22c3eee01b","ParentId":"8f94f0d2-bcc7-4973-956c-b718e9b85d09","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Board of Governors shall annually nominate candidates for each of the following offices: President-elect, Secretary, and Treasurer, and if the office of President-elect is vacant, for the office of President. No nominee shall be proposed to the Board as a candidate for any office unless the member making the proposal is satisfied that the proposed nominee intends to accept the nomination and serve if elected.</li> \n <li>After nominations are made by the Board, ten members of the Board of Governors representing at least five different circuits, or thirty active members of the State Bar, including at least five active members from each of three different circuits, may nominate candidates for President-elect, Secretary, and Treasurer (and when the office of President-elect is vacant, for President) by filing with the Executive Director within ten days after nominations by the Board a petition in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article. No nominee shall be proposed to the Board as a candidate for any office unless the members making the proposal are satisfied that the proposed nominee intends to accept the nomination and serve if elected.</li> \n <li>No person, other than a candidate nominated as provided in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, may be elected by \"write-in \"ballots or otherwise to any office described in this Section, unless that person shall have filed with the Executive Director, not less than ten days prior to the date on which the ballots are to be mailed to the membership, a written statement that he or she is a \"write-in \"candidate for the office indicated and intends to serve if elected.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision33"}],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5f5ca23d-7efd-4047-b88d-032fb8c383b8","Title":"Section 2. Nomination of Members for the Board of Governors.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Circuit Members. When the term of a member of the Board of Governors representing a circuit is to expire at the next Annual Meeting, members of that circuit may nominate a candidate for that office for the ensuing two-year term by filing with the Executive Director, on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article, a petition in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article. If an incumbent member of the Board of Governors intends to offer as a candidate for re-election, the incumbent shall file a petition, in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article, with the Executive Director on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article. The petition shall be signed by a minimum number of active members of the State Bar from the circuit as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>three from a circuit having less than twenty-five members;</li> \n <li>seven from a circuit having more than twenty-four but less than one hundred members; or</li> \n <li>twenty from a circuit having more than ninety-nine members.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Nonresident Members. Nominations for election of a nonresident member of the Board of Governors shall be filed with the Executive Director on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article and shall be in written form as prescribed in this Article. The petition shall be signed by at least five active nonresident members of the State Bar. </li> \n <li> Write-in Candidates. No person, other than a candidate nominated as provided in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, may be elected by \"write-in \"ballots or otherwise to any position described in this Section, unless that person shall have filed with the Executive Director, not less than ten days prior to the date on which the ballots are to be mailed to the membership, a written statement that he or she is a \"write-in \"candidate for the Board of Governors for the circuit indicated and intends to serve if elected. </li> \n <li> Vacant Positions. Should any position on the Board of Governors which is scheduled for an election not receive a nomination as provided in subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) above, such position shall be declared vacant, and shall be filled under Article III, Section 8 of these bylaws. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule342","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[{"Id":"c4f466e2-2220-4f1e-9a74-39e482dec8a2","ParentId":"5f5ca23d-7efd-4047-b88d-032fb8c383b8","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Circuit Members. When the term of a member of the Board of Governors representing a circuit is to expire at the next Annual Meeting, members of that circuit may nominate a candidate for that office for the ensuing two-year term by filing with the Executive Director, on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article, a petition in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article. If an incumbent member of the Board of Governors intends to offer as a candidate for re-election, the incumbent shall file a petition, in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article, with the Executive Director on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article. The petition shall be signed by a minimum number of active members of the State Bar from the circuit as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>three from a circuit having less than twenty-five members;</li> \n <li>seven from a circuit having more than twenty-four but less than one hundred members; or</li> \n <li>twenty from a circuit having more than ninety-nine members.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Nonresident Members. Nominations for election of a nonresident member of the Board of Governors shall be filed with the Executive Director on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article and shall be in written form as prescribed in this Article. The petition shall be signed by at least five active nonresident members of the State Bar. </li> \n <li> Write-in Candidates. No person, other than a candidate nominated as provided in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, may be elected by \"write-in \"ballots or otherwise to any position described in this Section, unless that person shall have filed with the Executive Director, not less than ten days prior to the date on which the ballots are to be mailed to the membership, a written statement that he or she is a \"write-in \"candidate for the Board of Governors for the circuit indicated and intends to serve if elected. </li> \n <li> Vacant Positions. Should any position on the Board of Governors which is scheduled for an election not receive a nomination as provided in subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) above, such position shall be declared vacant, and shall be filled under Article III, Section 8 of these bylaws. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision34"}],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ee91fe95-4b3d-4f1c-ab0c-9e399b00a332","Title":"Section 3. Circuits Having More Than One Member of Board of Governors.","Content":"In circuits having more than one member of the Board of Governors, the positions shall be designated consecutively as \"Post No. 1,\"\"Post No. 2,\"etc. The numbering shall be solely for nominations and elections. Nominating petitions shall designate the number of the post for which the candidate is nominated. No person shall be nominated for more than one post. A separate nominating petition shall be filed for each post. Members of the State Bar from a circuit electing more than one member of the Board of Governors in any year shall be entitled to cast one vote for a candidate for each post. ","UrlName":"rule363","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9233c32d-b599-4615-9b38-8b13a3b98e96","Title":"Section 4. Nominating Petitions.","Content":" Nominating petitions shall be in substantially the following form: \n \nSTATE BAR OF GEORGIA NOMINATING PETITION \n \nThe undersigned active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing (or members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia) hereby nominate _______________ for the office of member of the Board of Governors from the _________ Circuit, Post _________ (if applicable) or ____ Nonresident Post [or, the office of President-Elect, Secretary, Treasurer (or, when the office of President-Elect is vacant, President)] for the term beginning at the close of the Annual Meeting in 20__. \n \nSignature Name (Please Print) Bar # Circuit/Nonresident \n \n________ _________________ _____ ________________ \n \n________ _________________ _____ ________________ \n \n________ _________________ _____ ________________ \n \n________ _________________ _____ ________________ \n \nI intend to accept the nomination and, if elected, to serve by attending meetings of the Board and reporting the activities of the Board to my constituents. \n \n______________________________ (Name) \n \nPetitions shall be signed personally by the nominators. More than one counterpart of a petition for a candidate may be filed and, in determining whether the petition meets the requirements of Sections 1 (b) and 2 of this Article, shall together be treated as a single petition. The petition (or at least one counterpart) shall be signed by the nominee indicating his or her intention to accept the nomination and to serve if elected.","UrlName":"rule380","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f8b4243e-74db-4202-a0fd-6211bc9f0e1c","Title":"Section 5. Accepting Nominations.","Content":"Each nominee for office in the State Bar nominated by the Board of Governors pursuant to Section 1(a), shall immediately be notified of the nomination and of all other persons nominated for the same position and shall, within ten days, accept or reject the nomination. Nominees failing to respond shall be deemed to have accepted the nomination. ","UrlName":"rule399","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"cf7fa4ad-0d4b-4331-98d8-35710a2f21cc","Title":"Section 6. Ballots.","Content":"The Elections Committee shall determine the list of candidates and have ballots prepared. The ballot shall include the name of each candidate and a space for a write-in vote for each position to which the ballot applies. If practicable, the space for a write-in vote may be eliminated from ballots for which no write-in candidate has declared under Article VII, Section 1 (c) or Article VII, Section 2 (c) above. The ballot shall contain voting instructions and a notice of the location and last date by which the ballot must be received. The Board of Governors shall annually determine this date. The ballots may be in written or electronic form, or both.","UrlName":"rule335","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3a4649a1-6ae2-40cc-8ac5-1a9c63803291","Title":"Section 7. Voters Lists; Distribution of Ballots.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A voters list shall be prepared containing the names of the members qualified to vote in elections for officers, ABA delegates, circuit board members and nonresident board members. Each member shall be assigned a distinguishing number.</li> \n <li>On the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article, all active members in good standing shall be furnished by regular mail a ballot for the elections in which they are qualified to vote and a return envelope.</li> \n <li>In lieu of the written ballot described above, a member may vote by a secure electronic ballot which meets all the requirements for integrity as determined by the Elections Committee. Should any member submit both a paper ballot and an electronic ballot, only the electronic ballot shall be counted.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule353","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[{"Id":"f8d22a27-7e5d-4d38-b8bd-70f9389ed867","ParentId":"3a4649a1-6ae2-40cc-8ac5-1a9c63803291","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A voters list shall be prepared containing the names of the members qualified to vote in elections for officers, ABA delegates, circuit board members and nonresident board members. Each member shall be assigned a distinguishing number.</li> \n <li>On the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article, all active members in good standing shall be furnished by regular mail a ballot for the elections in which they are qualified to vote and a return envelope.</li> \n <li>In lieu of the written ballot described above, a member may vote by a secure electronic ballot which meets all the requirements for integrity as determined by the Elections Committee. Should any member submit both a paper ballot and an electronic ballot, only the electronic ballot shall be counted.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision35"}],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"13705680-3789-400b-bf14-53bea858a2cc","Title":"Section 8. Method of Voting.","Content":"For written ballots, the member shall mark the ballot according to its instructions and shall return the ballot or ballots in the envelope provided on or before the date specified by the Board of Governors. Only written ballots of an individual member, timely returned in the envelope provided with the ballot, shall be deemed valid. Electronic ballots shall be cast according to the instructions provided with the electronic ballot.","UrlName":"rule357","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a8958702-9ffa-4283-8d40-a2e52b0f5a5d","Title":"Section 9. Elections Committee","Content":"The Elections Committee shall conduct the election, count or supervise the counting of the ballots, and report the results on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article under procedures established by the Board of Governors. The Elections Committee may utilize State Bar and independent and impartial contract staff and facilities as the Committee deem appropriate.\nIn computing the number of votes constituting a majority of those cast in each election of officers, the Committee shall exclude from the computation the votes cast for a properly declared \"write-in \"candidate receiving less than two percent of the total votes cast.","UrlName":"rule361","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3c02211e-f7df-4015-ba93-6191ed6da8b7","Title":"Section 10. Declaration of Results of Elections.","Content":"The candidate in any election for officers receiving a majority of the votes in each election or a candidate for the Board of Governors who receives a plurality of the vote (according to the report of the Election Committee or of the Recount Committee) shall be declared elected.","UrlName":"rule326","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d5eedb23-1a41-46b9-8f06-748274ec2e0c","Title":"Section 11. Tie Vote","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Officers and ABA delegates. If there is a tie vote between two or more candidates receiving the highest number of votes in any election for officers or ABA delegates, the incumbent shall continue to serve until the Board of Governors elects one of the tying candidates as the successor. If more than one election results in a tie vote, the Board of Governors shall first determine who shall be elected in this order: Treasurer, Secretary, President-elect and, when appropriate, President.</li> \n <li> Circuit Posts. If there is a tie vote between two or more candidates receiving the highest number of votes in any election for a circuit post, a run-off election shall be held pursuant to Article VII, Section 12 of these Bylaws. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule329","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[{"Id":"e317791c-2715-46c1-a9b9-d439401297e1","ParentId":"d5eedb23-1a41-46b9-8f06-748274ec2e0c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Officers and ABA delegates. If there is a tie vote between two or more candidates receiving the highest number of votes in any election for officers or ABA delegates, the incumbent shall continue to serve until the Board of Governors elects one of the tying candidates as the successor. If more than one election results in a tie vote, the Board of Governors shall first determine who shall be elected in this order: Treasurer, Secretary, President-elect and, when appropriate, President.</li> \n <li> Circuit Posts. If there is a tie vote between two or more candidates receiving the highest number of votes in any election for a circuit post, a run-off election shall be held pursuant to Article VII, Section 12 of these Bylaws. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision36"}],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6976fe97-5189-4de6-ae8a-df2affec9587","Title":"Section 12. Run-off.","Content":"If no candidate for office receives a majority of the votes cast or if there is a tie vote for a circuit post, within ten days from the date of the report of the Elections Committee the Board of Governors shall make provisions for a runoff election between the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes or all tied candidates. The runoff election shall be held no later than thirty days from the date of the report of the Elections Committee and shall be conducted as provided for regular elections. The incumbent shall continue to serve until the successor is determined. In run-off elections, members of the Board shall be elected by plurality vote.","UrlName":"rule332","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"951f7711-6901-423f-9cad-6f48a947f9dd","Title":"Section 13. Recount.","Content":"Any candidate dissatisfied with the result of the count may file a written recount request with the Executive Director, within two business days after the winners are declared. The Executive Director shall notify the President of the request for a recount and the President shall direct the Elections Committee to review the request(s). If deemed appropriate, the Elections Committee will direct an independent elections vendor to conduct a recount. Once the certified recount totals are received, the Elections Committee will announce its findings to all candidates in the disputed election and any other concerned parties. The results of the recount shall be final.","UrlName":"rule334","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"39557624-33b1-437a-9db2-a301817aa601","Title":"Section 14. Date of Elections","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Elections Committee shall timely meet and publish a proposed schedule for the upcoming elections which shall set out the specific dates for the following events: the date the Official Election Notice is to be published in the Georgia Bar Journal; the date the Nominating Petition package shall be mailed to Board of Governors Incumbents; the date the Board of Governors shall nominate candidates for officers of the State Bar; the deadline for the receipt of nominating petitions for incumbent Board Members; the deadline for the receipt of nominating petitions for new Board Members; the deadline for receipt of nominations of nonresident members of the Board; the date on which the ballots are to be mailed; the deadline for ballots to be cast in order to be valid; and the date the election results shall be reported and made available.</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee shall review and approve, or modify and approve such schedule as submitted by the Elections Committee. The schedule, as approved by the Executive Committee, shall then be submitted to the Board of Governors no later than the Annual or Summer Meeting preceding the election for approval.</li> \n <li>For good cause, the Executive Committee may modify this approval schedule.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule336","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[{"Id":"d71f83ef-8fa2-4489-bb07-0446486e6419","ParentId":"39557624-33b1-437a-9db2-a301817aa601","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Elections Committee shall timely meet and publish a proposed schedule for the upcoming elections which shall set out the specific dates for the following events: the date the Official Election Notice is to be published in the Georgia Bar Journal; the date the Nominating Petition package shall be mailed to Board of Governors Incumbents; the date the Board of Governors shall nominate candidates for officers of the State Bar; the deadline for the receipt of nominating petitions for incumbent Board Members; the deadline for the receipt of nominating petitions for new Board Members; the deadline for receipt of nominations of nonresident members of the Board; the date on which the ballots are to be mailed; the deadline for ballots to be cast in order to be valid; and the date the election results shall be reported and made available.</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee shall review and approve, or modify and approve such schedule as submitted by the Elections Committee. The schedule, as approved by the Executive Committee, shall then be submitted to the Board of Governors no later than the Annual or Summer Meeting preceding the election for approval.</li> \n <li>For good cause, the Executive Committee may modify this approval schedule.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision37"}],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","Title":"ARTICLE VIII COMMITTEES - GENERALLY","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter52","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"447daa62-264c-47c9-8b71-1a3786bbc466","Title":"Section 1. Standing Committees.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Standing Committees; Statement of Purpose. The Board of Governors may create standing committees for such purposes as it deems appropriate. The members of each standing committee shall be appointed by the President. Any request for the creation of a standing committee shall be accompanied by a statement of purpose. A listing of the standing committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose, the names of current committee members and their respective terms. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Members. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Three-year Terms. There shall be a minimum of nine members of each standing committee appointed for three-year terms. Regardless of when the appointment is made, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office, and expire on June 30 three years later, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 of the Bar year the appointing President took office and expire on December 31 three years later, whose members shall be appointed by the President-elect. The term of all such appointments shall be staggered so that one-third of all committee members appointed for three-year terms shall retire at the end of each year.</li> \n <li>One-year Terms. The President may appoint additional members of each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when such additional committee members are appointed, the term of such appointees shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Non-voting Advisory and Liaison Members. The President may appoint non-voting advisory and liaison members to each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when appointed, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. The presence of non-voting advisory and liaison members at a committee meeting will not be considered when determining a quorum for the committee, nor may they vote in any committee meeting.</li> \n <li>Appointments to Fulfill Quorum Requirements. In the event of any appointee's resignation, incapacitation, or persistent inability to perform committee business, the President shall have the authority to appoint a replacement to serve for the duration of the original appointee's term. The President shall exercise all foregoing discretionary powers of appointment to advance the objective of enabling committees to obtain quorums and conduct regular committee business.</li> \n <li>Notice of Three-year Term Appointments. Incoming Presidents shall inform the Board of appointments to fill expiring or vacant three-year terms on standing committees at the State Bar of Georgia's Annual Meeting.</li> \n <li>Notice of Other Appointments. Appointments to one-year terms or to non-voting advisory or liaison capacity on any standing committee shall be published on the official State Bar of Georgia website.</li> \n <li>Executive Committee Liaison Members. No later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee liaison member to such standing committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee liaison members shall serve for a one-year term that expires on the first June 30 after such appointment, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a standing committee.</li> \n <li>Ex-Officio Members. Ex-officio members shall have voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of the standing committee.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, and Vice Chairperson or Vice Co-chairs . Each year the President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs, and a vice chairperson or vice co-chairs of each standing committee. A chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Abolition of Standing Committees . Standing committees may be abolished by the Board of Governors following written notice to the chairperson and members of the committee. </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule324","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","Revisions":[{"Id":"84c4bd26-ee4f-4b5b-a2d7-951acd6a96a3","ParentId":"447daa62-264c-47c9-8b71-1a3786bbc466","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Standing Committees; Statement of Purpose. The Board of Governors may create standing committees for such purposes as it deems appropriate. The members of each standing committee shall be appointed by the President. Any request for the creation of a standing committee shall be accompanied by a statement of purpose. A listing of the standing committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose, the names of current committee members and their respective terms. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Members. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Three-year terms. There shall be a minimum of nine members of each standing committee appointed for three-year terms. Regardless of when the appointment was made, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office, and expire on June 30 three years later, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 of the Bar year the appointing President took office, and expire on December 31 three years later whose members shall be appointed by the President-elect. The term of all such appointments shall staggered so that one-third  of all committee members appointed for three year terms shall retire at the end of each year.</li> \n <li>One-year terms. The President may appoint additional members of each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when such additional committee members are appointed, the term of such appointees shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Non-voting advisory members. The President may appoint non-voting advisory and liaison members to each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when appointed, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Appointments to fulfill quorum requirements. In the event of any appointee's resignations, incapacitation, or persistent inability to perform committee business, the President shall have the authority to appoint a replacement to serve for the duration of the original appointee's term. The President shall exercise all foregoing discretionary powers of appointment to advance the objective of enabling committees to obtain quorums and conduct regular committee business.</li> \n <li>Notice of Three-Year Term Appointments. Incoming Presidents shall inform the Board of appointments to fill expiring or vacant three-year terms on standing committees at the State Bar of Georgia's Annual Meeting.</li> \n <li>Notice of Other Appointments. Appointments to one-year terms or to non-voting advisory or liaison capacity on any standing committee shall be published on the official State Bar of Georgia website.</li> \n <li>Executive Committee Liaison Members. No later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee liaison member to such standing committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee liaison members shall serve for a one-year term that expires on the first June 30 after such appointment, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a standing committee.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs and Vice Chairperson or Vice Co-chairs . Each year the President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs and a vice chairperson or vice co-chairs of each standing committee. A chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Abolition of Standing Committees . Standing Committees may be abolished by the Board of Governors following written notice to the chairperson and members of the Committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision288"},{"Id":"7b79a9db-b30e-418c-ae68-c896b5e7355d","ParentId":"447daa62-264c-47c9-8b71-1a3786bbc466","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Standing Committees; Statement of Purpose. The Board of Governors may create standing committees for such purposes as it deems appropriate. The members of each standing committee shall be appointed by the President. Any request for the creation of a standing committee shall be accompanied by a statement of purpose. A listing of the standing committees of the State Bar shall be published annually on the official State Bar of Georgia website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose, the names of current committee members and their respective terms. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Members. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Three-year terms. There shall be a minimum of nine members of each standing committee appointed for three-year terms. Regardless of when the appointment was made, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office, and expire on June 30 three years later, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 of the Bar year the appointing President took office, and expire on December 31 three years later whose members shall be appointed by the President-elect. The term of all such appointments shall staggered so that one-third  of all committee members appointed for three year terms shall retire at the end of each year.</li> \n <li>One-year terms. The President may appoint additional members of each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when such additional committee members are appointed, the term of such appointees shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Non-voting advisory members. The President may appoint non-voting advisory and liaison members to each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when appointed, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Appointments to fulfill quorum requirements. In the event of any appointee's resignations, incapacitation, or persistent inability to perform committee business, the President shall have the authority to appoint a replacement to serve for the duration of the original appointee's term. The President shall exercise all foregoing discretionary powers of appointment to advance the objective of enabling committees to obtain quorums and conduct regular committee business.</li> \n <li>Notice of Three-Year Term Appointments. Incoming Presidents shall inform the Board of appointments to fill expiring or vacant three-year terms on standing committees at the State Bar's Annual Meeting.</li> \n <li>Notice of Other Appointments. Appointments to one-year terms or to non-voting advisory or liaison capacity on any standing committee shall be published in the State Bar Directory, provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall prohibit a President from exercising discretion to make additional such appointments after the Directory has been published or sent for publication.</li> \n <li>Executive Committee Liaison Members. Not later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee Liaison member to such standing committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee Liaison Members shall serve for a term of one year, with such term expiring on the First June 30 after such appointment, except for the Finance Committee which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count towards a quorum at any meeting of a standing committee.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs and Vice Chairperson or Vice Co-chairs . Each year the President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs and a vice chairperson or vice co-chairs of each standing committee. A chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Abolition of Standing Committees . Standing Committees may be abolished by the Board of Governors following written notice to the chairperson and members of the Committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision286"},{"Id":"ab213ec5-581e-4812-be18-d90d3b960352","ParentId":"447daa62-264c-47c9-8b71-1a3786bbc466","Title":"Version 4","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Standing Committees; Statement of Purpose. The Board of Governors may create standing committees for such purposes as it deems appropriate. The members of each standing committee shall be appointed by the President. Any request for the creation of a standing committee shall be accompanied by a statement of purpose. A listing of the standing committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose, the names of current committee members and their respective terms. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Members. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Three-year Terms. There shall be a minimum of nine members of each standing committee appointed for three-year terms. Regardless of when the appointment is made, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office, and expire on June 30 three years later, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 of the Bar year the appointing President took office and expire on December 31 three years later, whose members shall be appointed by the President-elect. The term of all such appointments shall be staggered so that one-third  of all committee members appointed for three-year terms shall retire at the end of each year.</li> \n <li>One-year Terms. The President may appoint additional members of each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when such additional committee members are appointed, the term of such appointees shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Non-voting Advisory Members. The President may appoint non-voting advisory and liaison members to each standing committee as the President deems appropriate. Regardless of when appointed, such term shall begin on July 1 of the year the appointing President took office and shall expire on the following June 30, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31.</li> \n <li>Appointments to Fulfill Quorum Requirements. In the event of any appointee's resignation, incapacitation, or persistent inability to perform committee business, the President shall have the authority to appoint a replacement to serve for the duration of the original appointee's term. The President shall exercise all foregoing discretionary powers of appointment to advance the objective of enabling committees to obtain quorums and conduct regular committee business.</li> \n <li>Notice of Three-year Term Appointments. Incoming Presidents shall inform the Board of appointments to fill expiring or vacant three-year terms on standing committees at the State Bar of Georgia's Annual Meeting.</li> \n <li>Notice of Other Appointments. Appointments to one-year terms or to non-voting advisory or liaison capacity on any standing committee shall be published on the official State Bar of Georgia website.</li> \n <li>Executive Committee Liaison Members. No later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee liaison member to such standing committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee liaison members shall serve for a one-year term that expires on the first June 30 after such appointment, except for the Finance Committee, which term shall begin on January 1 and expire on the following December 31. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a standing committee.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, and Vice Chairperson or Vice Co-chairs . Each year the President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs, and a vice chairperson or vice co-chairs of each standing committee. A chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Abolition of Standing Committees . Standing committees may be abolished by the Board of Governors following written notice to the chairperson and members of the committee. </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision411"}],"Ancestors":["859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a76f2b23-51a4-4015-ac91-96e01ed4670f","Title":"Section 2. Special Committees.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Special Committees; Statement of Purpose . The President may create special committees for such purposes as deemed appropriate. A list of the special committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose and the names of current committee members. The President shall designate a specific term, not to exceed the President's term in office, for the work of the committee. The incoming President shall review the special committees whose terms are expiring to determine whether such committee or committees should continue. The incoming President may extend the term of such special committees for a specific term, not to exceed the incoming President's term in office. </li> \n <li> Non-voting Advisory and Liasion Members . There may be non-voting advisory and liaison appointments to special committees appointed by the President at his or her discretion. The presence of non-voting advisory and liaison members at a committee meeting shall not be considered when determining a quorum for the committee, nor may they vote in any committee meeting. </li> \n <li> Ex-Officio Members. Ex-officio members shall have voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a special committee. </li> \n <li> Terms of Members . All appointments shall be for the term of the committee as established by the appointing President. Should an incoming President extend the term of the committee for a specific term, the incoming President may reappoint any current members he or she may choose, appoint new members to replace the original members or appoint additional members to the special committee. The terms of the new or additional members shall be for the extended term as established by the incoming President. </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, Vice Chairperson and Vice Co-chairs . The President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs, and vice-chairperson or vice co-chairs of each special committee. The chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Executive Committee Liaison Members . Not later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee Liaison member to such special committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee Liaison members shall serve for a term of one year, with such term expiring on the first June 30 after such appointment. Executive Committee Liaison members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a special committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule352","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","Revisions":[{"Id":"2e09210e-3737-4753-8c2f-5848a7a768aa","ParentId":"a76f2b23-51a4-4015-ac91-96e01ed4670f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Special Committees; Statement of Purpose . The President may create special committees for such purposes as deemed appropriate. A list of the special committees of the State Bar shall be published annually in the State Bar Directory. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose and the names of current committee members. The President shall designate a specific term, not to exceed three years, for the work of the committee. The incoming President shall review the special committees whose terms are expiring to determine whether such committee of committees should continue. The President may extend the term of such special committees for a specific term, not to exceed three years. </li> \n <li> Non-voting and Liasion Members . There may be non-voting advisory and liaison appointments to special committees appointed by the President at his or her discretion. </li> \n <li> Terms of Members . All appointments shall be for the term of the committee as established by the appointing President. Should the President extend the term of the committee for a specific term, the President may reappoint any current members he or she may choose, appoint new members to replace the original members, or appoint additional members to the special committee. The terms of the new or additional members shall be for the extended term as established by the appointing President. </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, Vice Chairperson and Vice Co-chairs . The President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs and vice-chairperson or vice co-chairs  of each special committee. \n \n The chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Executive Committee Liaison Members . Not later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee Liaison member to such special committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee Liaison Members shall serve for a term of one year, with such term expiring on the first June 30 after such appointment. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count towards a quorum at any meeting of a special committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision290"},{"Id":"90dee42b-0b79-4d91-a836-8db62a691b4a","ParentId":"a76f2b23-51a4-4015-ac91-96e01ed4670f","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Special Committees; Statement of Purpose . The President may create special committees for such purposes as deemed appropriate. A list of the special committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose and the names of current committee members. The President shall designate a specific term, not to exceed the President's term in office, for the work of the committee. The incoming President shall review the special committees whose terms are expiring to determine whether such committee or committees should continue. The incoming President may extend the term of such special committees for a specific term, not to exceed the incoming President's term in office. </li> \n <li> Non-voting and Liasion Members . There may be non-voting advisory and liaison appointments to special committees appointed by the President at his or her discretion. </li> \n <li> Terms of Members . All appointments shall be for the term of the committee as established by the appointing President. Should an incoming President extend the term of the committee for a specific term, the incoming President may reappoint any current members he or she may choose, appoint new members to replace the original members or appoint additional members to the special committee. The terms of the new or additional members shall be for the extended term as established by the incoming President. </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, Vice Chairperson and Vice Co-chairs . The President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs, and vice-chairperson or vice co-chairs of each special committee. The chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Executive Committee Liaison Members . Not later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee Liaison member to such special committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee Liaison members shall serve for a term of one year, with such term expiring on the first June 30 after such appointment. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a special committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision413"}],"Ancestors":["859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"123bc32e-a970-4645-9979-534d335f4330","Title":"Section 3. Program Committees and Boards ","Content":"Committees and Boards created by Part IV and Parts VI through XIV of these rules to oversee Programs of the State Bar shall have such terms and members as set out in said rules. Members of such committees and boards shall be appointed according to the rules establishing such committees and boards.","UrlName":"rule367","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"674ec9a0-ce44-4c0e-a05a-4324601b1676","Title":"Section 4. Meetings.","Content":"Committees shall meet when necessary to perform their duties and may act in writing or by electronic conferencing in accordance with Article XII, Section 7 of these Bylaws. ","UrlName":"rule378","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Title":"ARTICLE IX SECTIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter53","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"0c96002e-5120-4582-aba3-79acdbd462f5","Title":"Section 1. Young Lawyers Division.","Content":"The Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar shall be composed of (1) all members of the State Bar who have not reached their thirty-sixth birthday prior to the close of the preceding Annual Meeting of the State Bar and (2) all members of the State Bar who have been admitted to their first bar less than five years. This Division shall foster discussion of ideas relating to the duties, responsibilities, and problems of the younger members of the profession, aiding and promoting their advancement and encouraging their interest and participation in the activities of the State Bar. It shall elect officers and a governing board annually, and shall adopt regulations subject to the Rules and Bylaws of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule325","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"58132d2b-946f-4479-ac14-8113f7895e54","Title":"Section 2. Senior Lawyers Section.","Content":" There shall be a section of the State Bar to be known as the Senior Lawyers Section composed of all members of the State Bar who have reached their 65th birthday prior to the close of the preceding Annual Meeting of the State Bar provided, however, that all those members of the State Bar who are between 60 and 65 years of age and are members in good standing of the Senior Section (sometimes called the Senior Law Section) at the time this amendment is adopted shall become members of the Senior Lawyers Section. This Section is formed for the purpose of fostering discussion, interchange of ideas, and camaraderie among the older members of the State Bar and to promote professionalism, CLE, CJE and other activities of the State Bar as shall be determined by the Section officers, Executive Committee and members. The Senior Lawyers Section shall have such officers, committees and government as shall be determined by its Bylaws, subject to the Rules and Bylaws of the State Bar. \n \nThe State Bar shall furnish reasonable postage and mailing expense and staff liaison assistance for the Section. All other items of Section expense shall be the responsibility of the Section unless specifically authorized and approved by both the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors as a separate budget item. \n \nThe Section shall be authorized to accept voluntary contributions which shall be held by the State Bar for use by the Section. Any funds of the old Senior Section (which Section is abolished by this amendment) in existence at the time of this amendment shall be held by the State Bar for the use of the new Senior Lawyers Section.","UrlName":"rule349","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b6082bc5-48aa-4916-abdc-1e87d7875ee8","Title":"Section 3. Other Sections - Purposes.","Content":"Other sections may be created for members of the State Bar of Georgia interested in a specialized area of law or practice. Each section must be created per this Article and shall have powers and duties consistent with the Rules and Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia, subject to the approval of the Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule366","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Revisions":[{"Id":"63badc1d-4c96-468a-9f48-794ee8a97d82","ParentId":"b6082bc5-48aa-4916-abdc-1e87d7875ee8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Other sections may be created for members of the bar interested in a specialized area of law or practice. Each section shall have powers and duties consistent with the Rules and Bylaws of the State Bar, subject to the approval of the Board of Governors.","UrlName":"revision314"}],"Ancestors":["e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bb88d576-25f6-49e7-b93e-a8c5f50f0f9e","Title":"Section 4. Establishment of Sections.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Board of Governors may establish a new section dedicated to an area of law or practice not duplicated by any other section of the State Bar of Georgia. Every application to the Board for the establishment of a new section shall set forth: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the area of law or practice to which the proposed section is to be dedicated which shall be within the purposes of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a statement of the need for the proposed section;</li> \n <li>the proposed bylaws for the government of the section that follow the standard bylaws for sections as established by the State Bar of Georgia; and</li> \n <li>the names, address, and Bar numbers of at least ten members applying for the creation of the section.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule372","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Revisions":[{"Id":"012b4685-f592-42c8-b7ab-e6651525cd40","ParentId":"bb88d576-25f6-49e7-b93e-a8c5f50f0f9e","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Board of Governors may establish a new section dedicated to an area of law or practice not duplicated by any other section of the State Bar. Every application to the Board for the establishment of a new section shall set forth: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the area of law or practice to which the proposed section is to be dedicated which shall be within the purposes of the State Bar;</li> \n <li>a statement of the need for the proposed section;</li> \n <li>the proposed bylaws for the government of the section; and</li> \n <li>the names and addresses of at least ten members applying for creation of the section.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision315"}],"Ancestors":["e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5b4c590f-6f0e-4fff-81c8-d20e2146fab7","Title":"Section 5. Abolition of Sections.","Content":"(a) Upon notice to a section established under this Article, the Board of Governors, by a majority vote, may abolish a section.\n(b) Notice to the section shall be to the last known leadership and members of the section either by mail or email and by posting a notice of intent to abolish a section on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) A section may be abolished if:\n(1) the section has been inactive for three or more years;\n(2) the section has repeatedly failed to follow its bylaws or the bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia; or \n(3) the section engages in actions and activities or promotes positions that are not germane to the scope and purpose of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(d) Upon the Board of Governors voting to abolish a section, any remaining funds collected by the State Bar of Georgia on behalf of the section shall be moved from the section account into the general operating account of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule395","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Revisions":[{"Id":"804aa39d-eac4-4265-8793-615afbaa4a0c","ParentId":"5b4c590f-6f0e-4fff-81c8-d20e2146fab7","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Upon notice by mail to the members of a section, the Board of Governors may abolish a section.","UrlName":"revision317"}],"Ancestors":["e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1849d356-cca9-4bdb-8197-8ec7af104cea","Title":"Section 6. Reports.","Content":"Each section shall submit to the regular annual meeting of the members of the State Bar a report of the activities of the section during the year. ","UrlName":"rule344","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","Title":"ARTICLE X DELEGATES TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter54","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"153eda26-ca28-4c73-b824-f45016d98776","Title":"Section 1. Delegates: Designation; Nomination and Election; Alternates.","Content":"The delegates of the State Bar to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association shall be active members in good standing of the State Bar and of the American Bar Association. There shall be a separate post for each delegate of the State Bar to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. The posts shall be consecutively numbered by the Board of Governors as \"Post Number 1,\"\"Post Number 2,\"etc. Numbering shall be solely for the purposes of designations, nominations and elections.\nElected delegates shall be nominated and elected to staggered two year terms beginning with an even numbered year, so that the terms are staggered as equally as possible. Delegates for the elected posts shall be nominated and elected in the same manner as provided in these Bylaws for the election of the Secretary of the State Bar; however, a nomination shall designate the post for which the candidate is nominated.\nSo long as the State Bar is entitled to six or more delegates, Post 5 and Post 6 shall be designated as follows: beginning with a term to start at the adjournment of the year 2000 annual meeting of the American Bar Association, Post 6 shall be filled by the immediate past president of the State Bar; and beginning with a term to start at the adjournment of the year 2002 annual meeting of the American Bar Association, Post 5 shall be filled by the immediate past president of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar, provided that person is under the age of 35 years when the term begins. Otherwise, Post 5 shall be filled by a person who is under the age of 35 appointed by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar.\nShould any designated or elected post become vacant prior to the end of the term for which the person filling that post was selected because of resignation, death or disability, the President of the State Bar shall appoint another member to fill the unexpired term.","UrlName":"rule318","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"26befd6f-9815-4cb5-b1b3-266f68646176","Title":"Section 2. Terms of Office.","Content":"Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the delegates shall serve for two years from the adjournment of the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in the year of election to the adjournment of the annual meeting two years later. ","UrlName":"rule355","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d6c4e749-7137-438d-8a4c-5c0bb029b822","Title":"Section 3. Alternate Appointments.","Content":"If for any reason, an appointed or elected delegate is unable to attend any meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association during the delegate's term of office, the President may appoint a member in good standing of the State Bar and the American Bar Association as an alternate delegate to attend such a single meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. The alternate delegate shall have the same rights and privileges for the single meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association as the appointed or elected delegate for whom he or she has been substituted.","UrlName":"rule313","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","Title":"ARTICLE XI VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter55","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"9b20699b-13a1-410d-b8af-5d35583de73f","Title":"Section 1. Death, Disability, or Resignation of Officers, Members of the Executive Committee, or Delegates to the American Bar Association.","Content":"In the event of a vacancy for any cause in the following offices or positions, President-elect, Secretary, Treasurer, member of the Executive Committee elected by the Board of Governors, or a delegate of the State Bar to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, his or her temporary successor shall be appointed by the President to hold office until the next regular meeting of the Board of Governors when a successor for the unexpired term shall be elected by majority vote. However, any person appointed to fill the unexpired term of President-elect shall not automatically succeed to the office of President, but that office shall be filled by majority vote of the entire membership after nomination as provided in Article VII.","UrlName":"rule311","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f4ae6946-5737-4883-b8ac-be5b6d00115e","Title":"Section 2. Vacancies in Board of Governors.","Content":"Vacancies on the Board of Governors shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Section 8. ","UrlName":"rule360","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"746f6c6e-ea82-4e0e-9208-0a88718df777","Title":"Section 3. Vacancies in Committees.","Content":"A vacancy in any committee, except for the Executive Committee unless otherwise provided for by the Rules or the Bylaws, shall be filled by Presidential appointment, and the appointee shall hold office for the unexpired term or until his or her successor is chosen. ","UrlName":"rule370","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Title":"ARTICLE XII MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter56","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"3c706518-e4a1-49a2-9c6a-337edc5972bd","Title":"Section 1. Resignation of Officers.","Content":"An officer may resign at any time upon settling his or her accounts with the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule323","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b12e0a8a-dc68-4267-8f76-8229000103a7","Title":"Section 2. Filing and Publication of Proceedings.","Content":"All addresses, reports and other papers read at any meeting of the State Bar shall be filed with the Executive Director within thirty days from the adjournment of the meeting. The Board of Governors may publish any part of the proceedings it deems appropriate.","UrlName":"rule341","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b5200cd2-cd07-4d78-bf49-71e7b08f5f6f","Title":"Section 3. Fiscal Year.","Content":"The fiscal year of the State Bar shall begin on July 1 of each year and end on June 30 of the succeeding year.","UrlName":"rule315","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2880c39c-3200-4139-bd98-f1c3def43c93","Title":"Section 4. Seal.","Content":"The seal of the State Bar shall be in the following form:\n <img hspace=\"0\" height=\"141\" border=\"0\" width=\"142\" vspace=\"0\" title=\"State Bar of Georgia Seal\" alt=\"State Bar of Georgia Seal\" id=\"||CPIMAGE:8984|\" src=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/images/bar_seal.jpg/">

","UrlName":"rule388","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"37eaca78-91f1-45ba-a3b4-8cb04e96d610","Title":"Section 5. Referendum to Entire Membership.","Content":"The Board of Governors, upon the vote of two-thirds of the membership of the Board, may refer any question to a vote of the membership of the State Bar. The members present at an annual meeting may, by a two-thirds vote, direct the Board of Governors to conduct a referendum upon any matter presented or acted upon at that meeting. When a referendum is conducted, the Executive Director shall prepare a questionnaire containing the matters upon which the vote is to be taken. The questionnaire submitted to each member shall be returned to the Executive Director. ","UrlName":"rule405","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"56e65bf4-c7c6-4fa0-a7b7-b3f8ff6e79e0","Title":"Section 6. Amendment or Repeal.","Content":"These Bylaws, or any provision of these Bylaws, may be amended or repealed at any annual, midyear or called meeting of the members, by a majority of the members present, provided that the number of voting for the amendment or repeal is not less than fifty.","UrlName":"rule330","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"62e4b468-493e-46af-8391-22b1544672a3","Title":"Section 7. Electronic Conferencing","Content":"If prior notice has been provided, and if such facilities are available, any member of a Section or Committee may attend a meeting by electronic conferencing; provided that the device used enables the absent member to hear the comments of the Section or Committee members present at the meeting and to speak to those present at the meeting; and that the members present at the meeting can hear the comments of and speak to the absent member. Any member attending by electronic conferencing shall count towards a quorum of such meeting, shall have full rights to the floor, and shall be entitled to vote at such meeting as if physically present.","UrlName":"rule347","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"91f0b55b-7852-412f-a5c3-e42614b55055","Title":"Standing Board Policy 100 (Legislative Policy and Procedure)","Content":" LEGISLATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURE \nADOPTED BY BOARD OF GOVERNORS JUNE 14, 1986, \nAMENDED JUNE 20, 1992, JUNE 18, 1994 \n 1.01. General Legislative Policy. \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Bylaws set forth the restrictions on establishing a legislative policy. Article II, Section 6 of the Bylaws provides that: \n \n No legislation shall be recommended, supported or opposed by the State Bar unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>such action has been initiated by an appropriate committee or section, or by any ten members of the Board of Governors; and</li> \n <li>the text of the legislation is furnished to the President, the President-elect and the Advisory Committee on Legislation at least thirty days prior to its submission for support or opposition as set forth below; and</li> \n <li> provided further:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a majority vote of the members of the State Bar present at a meeting; or</li> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting; or</li> \n <li>when the Board of Governors is not in session, such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Executive Committee voting.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n In addition to and in aid of these legislative powers, the Board shall have the power to adopt, by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Board present and voting, a Standing Board Policy regarding legislation. Such Standing Board Policy shall be binding from session to session unless suspended, modified or rescinded pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board present and voting. \n \n No committee or section of the State Bar shall recommend, support or oppose any legislation except in the manner herein provided. </li> \n <li>No legislative position shall be taken by the State Bar or any committee, section or other organizational element thereof except as provided for in this policy. Committees, sections or other organizational elements of the Bar are encouraged to debate and discuss legislation relating to their areas of expertise and to let the Advisory Committee on Legislation know of their positions. The ultimate position of the State Bar, however, will be determined pursuant to this Policy.</li> \n <li>A legislative position, once adopted, shall remain an official position of the State Bar during the full biennial session of the General Assembly in which it was adopted unless rescinded or modified.</li> \n <li>Failure to receive a necessary two thirds vote to favor or oppose legislation shall not be considered adoption of the contrary position.</li> \n <li>All legislative positions adopted by the State Bar shall be reduced to writing and communicated to the General Assembly as the organizational positions of the State Bar.</li> \n <li>The Advisory Committee on Legislation, the Board, or the Executive Committee may allow any interested person to appear before it in person and in writing in support of or in opposition to any legislative proposal being considered subject to reasonable limitations on available time.</li> \n <li>The Board and Executive Committee shall have authority to take reasonable action necessary to communicate and advocate legislative positions adopted pursuant to the Bylaws and this policy.</li> \n <li>The Board or the Executive Committee shall have the authority to designate persons to promote State Bar legislative positions. Persons so designated shall be authorized to agree to and to support amendments and substitute legislation which are consistent with legislative positions previously adopted pursuant to the Bylaws and this Policy. No section, committee or other Bar-related organization shall hire or designate any persons or entities to promote State Bar or their own legislative positions nor shall such sections, committees or Bar-related organization expend any funds of the section, committee or organization in the support of or opposition to any legislative positions unless expressly approved by the Board of Governors or the Executive Committee. Should the Board of Governors or the Executive Committee approve such expenditures, the funds of the section, committee or Bar-related organization shall be paid into the Legislative Advocacy Fund.</li> \n <li>Nothing in this policy shall be construed to prevent members of the State Bar from presenting their own personal views concerning any legislative matter and members are encouraged to do so while making clear that they are speaking only in their personal capacity.</li> \n</ol>\n 1.02. Board of Governors. \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Consideration of any legislative proposal by the Board shall proceed in the following order:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A written proposal shall be presented by an appropriate committee or section or by any 10 members of the Board to the Advisory Committee on Legislation, the President, the President-elect, and each member of the Executive Committee at least 30 days prior to a meeting of the Board. Such proposal shall, as a minimum, include the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the specific legislation, if any, which is pending or proposed;</li> \n <li>if no specific legislation is pending or proposed, a statement of the issues to be addressed by the legislation;</li> \n <li>a summary of the existing law;</li> \n <li>principal known proponents or opponents of the legislation and, if possible, a brief statement of the reasons for opposition or support by the other interests;</li> \n <li>a listing of any other committees or sections which may have an interest in the legislation and a certification that any such committees have been provided a copy of the proposal simultaneous to its transmission to the Advisory Committee on Legislation; and</li> \n <li>the position which the committee, section or group recommends be adopted by the State Bar.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Advisory Committee on Legislation, after consideration of the legislative proposal in accordance with Rule 1.04 of this policy, shall make a written recommendation concerning the proposal to the Board at its next meeting. A copy of the written recommendation shall be furnished to each member of the Executive Committee at least ten (10) days prior to the Board meeting.</li> \n <li>The Board shall determine specifically by a majority vote of members present and voting whether the proposed legislative action is germane to the legitimate purposes of the State Bar.</li> \n <li>If the determination in section (3) above is affirmative, then at least two thirds of the members of the Board present and voting must vote to recommend, to support, or to oppose the legislative proposal.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Legislative positions may be considered and adopted by the Board at any special or regular meeting.</li> \n</ol>\n 1.03. Executive Committee. \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Consideration of any legislative proposal by the Executive Committee shall proceed in the following order:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a proposal adopted by the Advisory Committee on Legislation or from a member of the Executive Committee shall be presented;</li> \n <li>the Executive Committee shall specifically determine by a majority of members voting whether the proposed legislative action is germane to the legitimate purposes of the State Bar;</li> \n <li>if the determination in subsection (2) above is affirmative, then the Executive Committee shall then determine by a majority vote of those voting either that (i) the requested legislative action could not reasonably have been submitted for consideration by the Board of Governors in accordance with existing policies, or: (ii) that a significant material change in circumstances since the last Board of Governors has made the Executive Committee action necessary;</li> \n <li>if either determination in subsection (3) above is affirmative, at least two thirds of the members of the Executive Committee voting must vote to recommend, to support, or to oppose the legislative proposal.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Executive Committee shall take no action inconsistent with previous action of the Board on substantially identical legislation unless there has been a significant material change in circumstances since the last meeting of the Board of Governors. The failure to receive the required two thirds vote of the Board of Governors shall not be considered \"previous action \"by the Board.</li> \n <li>If any emergency exists and is not feasible for the Executive Committee to act, then the president, upon consultation with and agreement by any two from among the president-elect, the immediate past president and the chairman of the Advisory Committee on Legislation may act upon pending or proposed legislation.</li> \n <li>Any action taken by the Executive Committee or president shall be reported to the Board at its next meeting.</li> \n</ol>\n 1.04. Advisory Committee on Legislation. \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Structure--The Advisory Committee shall be composed of at least nine members, at least six of whom shall be members of the Board at the time of their appointment and the Immediate Past President.</li> \n <li> Initial Terms--The nine members of the Advisory Committee appointed to serve effective July 1, 1986, shall be appointed for initially staggered terms as set out below:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>three members, including two members of the Board, shall be appointed by the immediate past president for one-year terms.</li> \n <li>three members, including two members of the Board, shall be appointed by the president for two-year terms.</li> \n <li>three members, including two members of the Board, shall be appointed by the president-elect for three year terms.</li> \n <li>the chairman shall be appointed by the president.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Terms--Commencing July 1, 1987, the president-elect shall appoint three members, at least two of whom shall be members of the Board at the time of their appointment, to three-year terms and shall name a chairman-elect. The chairman-elect shall become chairman when the president-elect becomes president. The President, upon consultation and with agreement by the President-elect shall have the power to appoint additional voting members to the Advisory Committee who shall serve during the one-year term of his presidency. However, in any event at least two-thirds of this Committee will be members of the Board at the time of their appointment.</li> \n <li>The Advisory Committee will meet for the purpose of developing its recommendations to the Board and Executive Committee with regard to requests to adopt a legislative position.</li> \n <li> In each case involving a proposed legislative position, the Advisory Committee shall make a recommendation to the Board or the Executive Committee on the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>whether the proposed legislative action is germane to the legitimate purposes of the State Bar; and</li> \n <li>the legislative position which the Board or Executive Committee should adopt.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In addition to the above, the Advisory Committee shall also have the authority to draft and submit to the Board or the Executive Committee, legislative concepts which may or should be the subject of legislation and recommend positions with respect thereto.</li> \n <li>When the General Assembly is in session, appropriate committees and sections of the State Bar may submit legislative proposals to the Advisory Committee for approval by the Executive Committee. All such proposals, however, shall be in writing and satisfy the format requirements set forth in subsection (a)(1) of Rule 1.02 of this policy.</li> \n <li>The Advisory Committee may review legislation filed in the State Legislature which would require an amendment to the State Constitution. The Advisory Committee may determine whether the State Bar should take a position pursuant to this policy regarding the proposed constitutional amendment.</li> \n <li>All matters concerning contract and finance shall be submitted to the Executive Committee for approval.</li> \n</ol>\n 1.05. Legislative Drafting and Consulting Services. \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The State Bar, at the sole discretion of the Executive Committee, may provide legislative drafting, legal research and other similar services to the Office of the Governor and members of the Georgia General Assembly. THE DECISION BY THE STATE BAR TO PROVIDE SUCH SERVICES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ENDORSEMENT BY THE STATE BAR OF ANY LEGISLATION REVIEWED OR DRAFTED.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>All requests for legislative drafting or consulting services should be directed to the President of the State Bar who shall immediately place the request on the agenda of the next Executive Committee Meeting.</li> \n <li> Consideration of any legislative drafting or consulting request by the Executive Committee shall proceed in the following order:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the president shall present the request for legislative drafting or consulting services to the Executive Committee;</li> \n <li>the Executive Committee shall specifically determine by a majority of members voting that the drafting, research or review of the proposed legislation would not be adverse to the interests of the State Bar;</li> \n <li>if the determination in subsection (ii) above is affirmative, then the Executive Committee shall determine by majority vote whether or not to provide such services;</li> \n <li>if the determination in subsection (iii) above is affirmative, the Executive Committee shall refer the matter to the Legislative Research Committee, or other appropriate State Bar committee or section.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Should any emergency exist and it is not feasible for the Executive Committee to act, then the President, upon consultation with and with agreement by any two from among the President-elect, the immediate past President, the Chair of the Advisory Committee on Legislation or the Chair of the Legislative Research Committee, may act upon the pending request for legislative drafting or consulting services.</li> \n <li>The final copy of any proposed legislation drafted by any member or members of the State Bar under this provision shall contain the following disclaimer at the head of the first page, unless the proposed legislation has been considered under the provisions of section 1.01 through 1.04 above: \"The State Bar of Georgia has drafted the following proposed legislation as a service to the Georgia General Assembly and the Office of the Governor. The State Bar takes no position either for or against the enactment of such legislation unless the legislation is approved under the provisions of the State Bar of Georgia's Standing Board Policy 100.\"</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Whenever the Executive Committee grants a request to provide legislative drafting or consulting services under this rule, the President, or his or her designee, shall report to the next meeting of the Board of Governors the nature of the referral and current status.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"part27","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5f8e74eb-c7db-4989-9580-07c85dec502b","Title":"Standing Board Policy 200 (Annual Statement of Revenue and Expenditures)","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Publication of Expenditures . The Bar shall publish at least annually a statement of its revenues and expenditures by category. The purpose of this publication shall be to allow the membership to make a determination as to the nature of the expenditures or categories. </li> \n <li> Objections . Any active or inactive member of the State Bar of Georgia may, within forty-five (45) days of the date of said publication, file with the Executive Director a written objection to a particular expenditure on the grounds that it is nongermane to the legitimate purposes of the State Bar of Georgia. The objection need not state its grounds. Failure to object within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right to object to the particular expenditure.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> After a written objection has been received, the Executive Director shall determine the pro rata amount of the objecting member's mandatory dues at issue, and such amount shall be placed in escrow pending determination of the merits of the objection. </li> \n <li> The Executive Committee shall, within sixty (60) days from the last day for receipt of written objections, determine whether to give a pro rat a refund to the objecting member(s) or to refer the action(s) to arbitration. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Composition of Arbitration Panel . If the matter is referred to arbitration, it shall be considered by a panel of arbitrators. The arbitration panel shall be composed of three (3) active members of the State Bar of Georgia. The objecting member(s) shall select one member of the arbitration panel, the Bar shall choose the second panel member, and the two members shall choose the third member. The objecting party and the State Bar of Georgia shall select their arbitrators within fifteen (15) days of the date on which the matter is referred to arbitration, and the third arbitrator shall be chosen by the two selected within thirty (30) days of said referral. In the event the two members are unable to agree, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia shall appoint the third member. </li> \n <li> Procedures for Arbitration Panel . Within thirty (30) days after the arbitration panel is constituted, the objecting member shall file with the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia a supplemental written objection stating in complete detail the grounds of the objection. The State Bar of Georgia shall, within thirty (30) days of receipt of the supplemental objection, prepare a written response and serve a copy on the objecting member(s). Such response, objection, and supplemental objection shall be forwarded to the arbitration panel. The panel shall schedule a hearing at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia within forty-five (45) days of the date on which the objection, supplemental objection, and response are forwarded to the panel. At said hearing, the objecting member and the Bar may appear in person or be represented by counsel. The arbitration panel shall thereafter confer and decide by majority vote whether the particular expenditure is nongermane to the legitimate purposes of the State Bar of Georgia.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> The scope of the arbitration review shall be to determine solely whether the expenditure at issue is constitutionally appropriate for funding from mandatory dues and whether the pro rata amount was correctly computed. </li> \n <li> The proceeding of arbitration shall be informal in nature and shall not be bound by the rules of evidence. Any briefs filed by either party shall be limited to fifteen (15) pages. Oral argument shall be limited to twenty (20) minutes per side. The decision of the arbitrators shall be binding as to the objecting member(s) and the State Bar of Georgia. If the arbitrators conclude that the expenditure at issue is appropriately funded by mandatory dues, there shall be no refund, and the State Bar of Georgia shall be free to expend the objecting member's pro rata amount of mandatory dues held in escrow. If the arbitrators determine that the expenditure is inappropriately funded from mandatory dues, the arbitrators shall order a refund of the pro rat a amount of mandatory dues to the objecting member. </li> \n <li>The arbitrators shall render a final written report to the objecting member and the Executive Committee within fifteen (15) days of the conclusion of the hearing.</li> \n <li>In the event the arbitrators order a refund, the State Bar of Georgia shall provide such refund within thirty (30) days of the date of the arbitration report, together with interest calculated at the judgment rate provided by law, from the date on which the objecting member(s) mandatory dues payment was received.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"part28","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c8671968-5b3e-4b52-a19b-aa7d6c107611","Title":"Standing Board Policy 300 (Board Attendance Policy)","Content":" An elected member of the Board of Governors shall attend at least 50 percent (50%) of the Board meetings held during the Bar year, unless his/her attendance is otherwise excused by the secretary. The burden of seeking and establishing an excused absence shall be upon the Board member. A written request to the Secretary for an excused absence shall be made within thirty (30) days prior to or after the missed meeting. Should an elected Board member fail to meet the attendance requirement, the position shall become vacant, and the president of the State Bar shall fill the unexpired term by appointment. ","UrlName":"part29","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f390acbf-91a1-446f-b091-bff9bd201c81","Title":"Standing Board Policy 400 (Retired Board Members)","Content":"It shall be the policy of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia that any members of the Board who has served a minimum of ten years shall, upon retirement from the Board, be invited to attend all regularly called meetings of the Board of Governors; provided, such member remains in good standing with the State Bar. Such retired member of the Board may be allowed floor privileges at the sole discretion of the chair, but shall not vote on any question nor be counted in ascertaining a quorum. The affected retired Board members will not receive a copy of the agenda book.","UrlName":"part30","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"4ea8bced-500f-4dfd-bb4b-72a1abe4ab98","Title":"Standing Board Policy 500 (Special Masters)","Content":"O.C.G.A. §17-5-32 provides for a list to be maintained by the State Bar of Georgia for use in the event of the appointment of a special master pursuant to the terms of said code section. This list shall consist of the membership of this Board of Governors as it may be constituted from time to time.","UrlName":"part31","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"79fee394-5bbc-4923-aa18-ca962e82dc10","Title":"Standing Board Policy 600 (Conflicts of Interest)","Content":" POLICY ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST\n Preamble \n   The State Bar of Georgia is an administrative agency created by the Supreme Court of Georgia for the purposes of (a) fostering among the members of the State Bar the principles of duty and service to the public; (b) improving the administration of justice; and (c) advancing the practice of law. The State Bar of Georgia and a family of separately organized non-profit organizations (including, without limitation, the Georgia Bar Foundation, Inc., the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of the State Bar of Georgia, the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, the State Bar of Georgia Foundation, Inc., and the Lawyers Foundation of Georgia, Inc.) (the “Affiliated Organizations”) work together for the benefit of the members of the Bar, the judicial branch of Georgia government, and the public they serve.\nThe Conflicts of Interest Policy of the State Bar of Georgia establishes certain standards regarding conflicts of interest for the following persons: elected State Bar officers; members of the Board of Governors; members of the Bar’s Executive Committee; officers and other members of the Executive Committee and Executive Council of the Young Lawyers Division; and employees and staff of the State Bar (“Covered Persons”). This policy is intended to supplement, but not replace, any applicable state or federal laws or regulations applicable to the State Bar of Georgia or its members, the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, and any other rules or obligations governing Georgia lawyers.\nThe purpose of this policy is to ensure that volunteers and staff who are conducting business on behalf of the State Bar of Georgia do so without any undisclosed conflict of interest. This policy discourages any appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest resulting from a Covered Person receiving “kickbacks,” gifts, rewards, promotion, or favorable hiring decisions.\n Conflicts of Interest \n<ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>When conducting State Bar of Georgia business, Covered Persons must not use their positions with the State Bar for improper personal or financial gain. A Covered Person is required to exercise powers and discharge duties in the interest of the State Bar and/or the Affiliated Organizations, and not in the Covered Person’s interest or the interest of another entity or person.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Covered Person is expected to exercise reasonable diligence in identifying and disclosing any conflicting interest, if:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The Covered Person, a Related Person or Entity is either (a) a party to, (b) has a beneficial interest in, or (c) is so closely linked to a transaction, gift, or favor which is of such financial significance to the Covered Person, Related Person, or Entity as to create a reasonable expectation that such circumstances would exert an influence on the Covered Person’s judgment if called to vote upon, approve, or enter into such a transaction, or</li> \n <li>The Covered Person may receive perks or incentives for hiring certain companies not owned by the Covered Person or holding meetings at certain locations or facilities.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Related Person or Entity” is defined as (a) a spouse, domestic partner, or live-in relationship, and those individuals related by blood or marriage, including ancestors, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and the spouses of those relatives, or any household member; (b) entities of which Covered Persons are directors, general partners, agents, or employees, and entities that are under the control of, or under common control with, entities of which Covered Persons are directors, general partners, agents, or employees; (c) individuals who are general partners, principals, or employers of Covered Persons; (d) trusts, estates, incompetents, conservatees, or minors of which Covered Persons are fiduciaries; and (e) trusts and estates of which Related Persons, as defined above, are substantial beneficiaries. However, a Covered Person is not considered to have a close personal or financial relationship with those persons or entities represented by the Covered Person’s law firm unless the Covered Person’s actions or vote will directly or positively affect a client of his or her firm.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The performance of simultaneous governance roles for both the State Bar and an Affiliated Organization, or any of them, shall not in and of itself be deemed to constitute conflicting interests or give rise to conflicting interest transactions.</li> \n <li>A Covered Person shall disclose any conflict of interest to the entire deliberative body at a meeting before the deliberative body considers and votes on the issue to which the conflict may relate. A Covered Person with a disclosed conflict of interest may remain in the room or location where the deliberative body is conducting business and may answer questions or provide comments. However, such a Covered Person may not vote on the issue that is the subject of the conflict of interest. The Covered Person’s attendance shall continue to count toward the number of members needed to establish a quorum.</li> \n <li>If a Covered Person does not wish to disclose the nature of the conflict of interest, the Covered Person shall declare a conflict of interest to the entire deliberative body and excuse themselves from the room or the location of the meeting until the members have resolved the issue. A Covered Person who declares a conflict of interest without disclosing the nature of the conflict may not remain in the room or location of the deliberations or participate by answering questions or providing comments. The Covered Person’s attendance shall continue to count toward the number of members needed to establish a quorum.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"part32","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0e9210e9-ba93-4e31-8372-1f4939174ad7","Title":"Standing Board Policy 700 (Document Handling and Disclosure)","Content":" POLICY ON DOCUMENT HANDLING AND DISCLOSURE\n Preamble \n   The State Bar of Georgia is an administrative agency created by the Supreme Court of Georgia for the purposes of: (a) fostering among the members of the State Bar the principles of duty and service to the public; (b) improving the administration of justice; and (c) advancing the practice of law. \n   The Policy on Document Handling and Disclosure of the State Bar of Georgia establishes certain standards for the following persons who are elected, appointed, or serve ex officio: elected State Bar officers; members of the Board of Governors; members of the Bar's Executive Committee; officers and other members of the Executive Committee and Executive Council of the Young Lawyers Division; and employees and staff of the State Bar (\"Covered Persons \"). This Policy is intended to supplement, but not replace, any applicable state or federal laws or regulations applicable to the State Bar of Georgia or its members, as well as the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and any other ethical rules or obligations governing Georgia lawyers.\n Policy on Document Handling and Disclosure \n<ol> \n <li>While discharging responsibilities of an office, employment, or other position at the State Bar, no Covered Person, as defined in the Preamble to this policy shall (a) falsify, or fail to make required entries on any record within the person's control, (b) conceal any record within the person's control from any party having a legal right to access or review the record, or (c) destroy or mutilate any record within the person's control in violation of the law, or any policy of the State Bar of Georgia, including the destruction of documents that are the subject of an investigation or a civil or criminal action.</li> \n <li>A Covered Person, as defined in the Preamble to this policy, with reporting responsibilities as a result of his or her office, employment, or other position with the State Bar shall provide full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosures of the subjects on which they are required to report in all reports.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"part33","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"04618c5b-9484-4986-8509-22acc5aa563c","Title":"Standing Board Policy 800 (Confidentiality)","Content":" POLICY ON CONFIDENTIALITY\n Preamble \n   The State Bar of Georgia is an administrative agency created by the Supreme Court of Georgia for the purposes of: (a) fostering among the members of the State Bar the principles of duty and service to the public; (b) improving the administration of justice; and (c) advancing the practice of law. \n   The Policy on Confidentiality of the State Bar of Georgia establishes certain standards for the following persons who are elected, appointed, or serve ex officio: elected State Bar officers; members of the Board of Governors; members of the Bar's Executive Committee; officers and other members of the Executive Committee and Executive Council of the Young Lawyers Division; and employees and staff of the State Bar (\"Covered Persons \"). This Policy is intended to supplement, but not replace, any applicable state or federal laws or regulations applicable to the State Bar of Georgia or its members, as well as the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and any other ethical rules or obligations governing Georgia lawyers.\n Policy on Confidentiality \n<ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A Covered Person, as defined in the Preamble to this policy, may have access to confidential, personal, or proprietary information that, if revealed to outsiders, could be damaging or sensitive to others or harmful to the best interests of the State Bar of Georgia. Information obtained by virtue of such person's position with the State Bar shall be held in the strictest of confidence and shall not be disclosed to any outside party, including other members of the State Bar, without the express written authorization of either the President, the Executive Director, or the General Counsel of the State Bar. \"Confidential information \"shall include, without limitation, matters discussed or handled in executive session and matters as to which the minutes of the proceeding reflect their confidential nature.</li> \n <li>Confidential information covered by this policy shall include, but not be limited to, information revealed under the State Bar of Georgia's Conflicts of Interest Policy.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"part34","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d7de7757-4a43-4e60-bb01-122d93d7c748","Title":"Standing Board Policy 900 (Whistleblower Non-Retaliation)","Content":" POLICY ON WHISTLEBLOWER NON-RETALIATION\n Preamble \n    The State Bar of Georgia is an administrative agency created by the Supreme Court of Georgia for the purposes of: (a) fostering among the members of the State Bar the principles of duty and service to the public; (b) improving the administration of justice; and (c) advancing the practice of law. \n    The Whistleblower Non-Retaliation Policy of the State Bar of Georgia establishes certain standards for the following persons who are elected, appointed, or serve ex officio: elected State Bar officers; members of the Board of Governors; members of the Bar's Executive Committee; officers and other members of the Executive Committee and Executive Council of the Young Lawyers Division; and employees and staff of the State Bar (\"Covered Persons \"). This Policy is intended to supplement, but not replace, any applicable state or federal laws or regulations applicable to the State Bar of Georgia or its members, as well as the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and any other ethical rules or obligations governing Georgia lawyers. With respect to State Bar employees, this policy is not intended to govern any issue covered by the employee manual of the State Bar.\n Whistleblower Non-Retaliation Policy \n<ol> \n <li>Any person may report concerns regarding suspected fraud, violations of law, conflicts of interest, breakdowns in internal controls, financial reporting issues, and other areas of major governance concern regarding the State Bar of Georgia to the General Counsel of the State Bar, or someone designated for that purpose by the General Counsel for investigation and action as it is deemed to be appropriate. Such a report may be made anonymously.</li> \n <li> The State Bar of Georgia forbids any retaliatory action, including harassment, intimidation, or adverse employment actions of any kind, to be taken against an individual who, in good faith, reports a concern about any matter addressed in paragraph 1, or who in good faith complains about or raises a concern about any type of harassment, retaliation, or discrimination prohibited by applicable law or State Bar policy. Retaliation is also prohibited against persons who are not themselves complainants, but who participate in good faith in an investigation. \n     Any person who engages in any form of retaliation will be subject to discipline up to and including employee termination (or removal of a volunteer) from his or her position. Individuals who believe that they or someone they know is or has been subject to retaliation should immediately report this to the General Counsel of the State Bar or someone designated for that purpose by the General Counsel. Any such report shall be investigated and handled in accordance with the State Bar's Anti-Discrimination and Harassment Policy, and Reporting Procedures set forth as § 1.29 in the Personnel Manual of the State Bar of Georgia. The General Counsel and/or his or her designee shall have the authority to set up a process and procedures for the handling of such reports, which shall be published to all potentially affected persons, including but not limited to the establishment of a hotline telephone number. </li> \n <li>Nothing in this policy shall prohibit the State Bar of Georgia from taking disciplinary or other employment action on grounds independent of the acts for which retaliation is forbidden. </li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"part35","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f99ead4f-b3ea-4006-82c4-292f8cdd8d9a","Title":"Standing Board Policy 1000 (Positions, Articles, Programs, Meetings, Activities of Committees and Sections. Guidelines for the State Bar of Georgia)","Content":" POLICY ON POSITIONS, ARTICLES, PROGRAMS, MEETINGS, ACTIVITIES OF COMMITTEES AND SECTIONS. GUIDELINES FOR THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA\n Purpose : The State Bar of Georgia maintains a specific stance on various matters, including the publication of articles, planning of programs, design, and execution of meetings, activities of committees and sections, and other issues that may not align with or exceed the mission and purposes of the State Bar of Georgia. This policy outlines the guidelines and boundaries for such activities, as per Rule 1-103 Purposes.\n1. Mandatory Bar Regulation. As a mandatory Bar regulated by the Supreme Court of Georgia, our organization operates differently from bar associations with voluntary membership. Our primary focus is on lawyer regulation, discipline, and serving the public, while also supporting our members and volunteers. Therefore, all programs and activities must aim to enhance the administration of justice, advance the practice of law, and improve the quality of legal services provided to the citizens of Georgia.\n2. Guiding Principles. Our principles are derived from Rule 1-103, which is referred to in Standing Board Policy 100 and further explained in the landmark case Keller vs. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), and related cases. It is essential to note that political or ideological activities are strictly prohibited under our rules, and all programs and events must always have a clear connection to the practice of law.\n3. Evaluation and Review. As a mandatory Bar, we will continue to evaluate and review all submitted articles for potential publication carefully, considering these guidelines. Recommendations will be provided on the design of programs, activities, and other plans, with strict adherence to these rules. There may be instances where certain materials or activities need to be modified or rejected based on their compliance with our policies.\n4. Adherence to Position. All planned communications or activities must align with the position outlined in this policy. The ultimate decision regarding the appropriate design rests with the offices of the Executive Director and the General Counsel. However, certain matters may require consideration and approval by the Board of Governors, the Executive Committee, or the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n<div></div>","UrlName":"part56","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bcd416c3-1095-404f-b134-0c46292c0189","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 100 (Amicus Brief Policy)","Content":" Amicus Brief Policy (Adopted Feb. 17, 1994)\n No Amicus brief shall be authorized by the Executive Committee of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia except as provided by this policy, unless the filing of an Amicus brief is requested or ordered by the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Georgia or any federal appellate court.\n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The request for an Amicus brief shall be accompanied by 15 copies of the proposed brief, a list of all those individuals and groups within the Bar who support the issuance of the brief, and a list of all those individuals and groups within the Bar who oppose the issuance of the brief. </li> \n <li> All parties to the litigation shall be given notice of the request to file an Amicus brief and an opportunity to be heard as to their position on the granting or denying of the request. </li> \n <li> The Board of Governors shall specifically determine by a majority vote of members present and voting that the subject matter of the proposed Amicus brief is germane to the legitimate purposes of the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> If the determination in section (c) above is affirmative, then at least two-thirds of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting must vote to approve the filing of the proposed Amicus brief. </li> \n <li> The Executive Committee may, by a two-thirds vote of the Committee present and voting, determine that the requested filing of an Amicus brief could not reasonably have been submitted for consideration by the Board of Governors. </li> \n <li> If the determination in section (e) above is affirmative, then the Executive Committee must determine by a two-thirds vote of the Committee present and voting that the subject matter of the proposed Amicus brief is germane to the legitimate purposes of the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> If the determination in sections (c) and (f) are in the affirmative the Executive Committee must determine by a two-thirds vote of the Committee present and voting that the proposed Amicus brief should be filed. </li> \n <li> In determining whether to file an Amicus brief the Executive Committee should, among other considerations, determine that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the outcome of the litigation will effect persons other than the litigants, and;</li> \n <li>the outcome of the litigation will be of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Executive Committee may authorize deviations from this policy in order for the State Bar of Georgia to file an Amicus Brief in federal litigation involving the existence or organization of the unified bar. Any deviation must be approved by a two-thirds vote of Executive Committee members present and voting, and must be reported to the Board of Governors at its next meeting.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"part36","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48f1c8ae-1aec-4f16-8a30-e917cc79b0ce","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 200 (Use of State Bar Letterhead)","Content":" State Bar Letterhead Policy (Adopted Feb. 21, 2002)\nOfficers, Governors, Members and Employees of the State Bar of Georgia may not use stationery and envelopes bearing the letterhead of the State Bar when nominating, endorsing, or commenting on a candidate in any State Bar election. Candidates in any State Bar election shall ensure that no campaign materials state or imply that such campaign materials are being sent or supplied by the State Bar.","UrlName":"part38","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d92d3ca9-e4f9-4d78-a817-61ef94ff8bb7","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 300 (Board At-Large Appointments)","Content":" Appointed Members to the Board of Governors (Adopted Aug. 22, 2003) \n \nArticle III, Section 2, Subsection (d) of the Bylaws of the State Bar provides that the President-elect shall appoint one or two members, depending upon the year, to the Board of Governors. The express purpose of this Section is to promote diversity within the Board of Governors. The Executive Committee believes this goal can be best attained by encouraging those who have been appointed to run for election upon the expiration of their appointment and to allow new minority members to be appointed to the Board under this Rule. The Committee therefore adopts this Policy 300.                     \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>When an appointed member of the Board of Governors has served a full term in office as a result of such appointment, the Executive Committee should encourage such member to seek an elective position on the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee strongly encourages the President-elect not to reappoint to the Board of Governors under this Rule a person who has already served a full two-year term on the Board of Governors.</li> \n</ol>\nThe President-elect should expressly inform the person or persons he or she selects under this Rule that they will only serve a single term in the appointed position.","UrlName":"part39","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5619a93e-b358-4508-b079-d2d3ff07eed5","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 400 (Appointments to Bench and Bar Cmte.)","Content":" Appointments to the Bench and Bar Committee (Adopted August 22, 2003) \nThe members of the Bench and Bar Committee of the State Bar of Georgia shall be appointed as follows:\n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The President of the State Bar of Georgia shall appoint all of the attorney members of the Committee, one Co-Chairperson to the Committee and one Co-Vice Chairperson to the Committee;</li> \n <li>The Chairperson of the Council of Superior Court Judges shall appoint all of the judicial members of the Committee, one Co-Chairperson and one Co-Vice Chairperson on the Committee;</li> \n <li>To the extent possible, the number of members appointed by the President of the State Bar and the Chairperson of the Council of Superior Court Judges should be the same.</li> \n <li> The following organizations may appoint one liaison member to the Committee:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the Supreme Court of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the Court of Appeals of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the Council of Superior Court Judges;</li> \n <li>the Council of State Court Judges;</li> \n <li>the Council of Juvenile Court Judges;</li> \n <li>the Council of Probate Court Judges;</li> \n <li>the Council of Magistrate Court Judges;</li> \n <li>the Council of Municipal Court Judges.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\nThe President of the State Bar shall appoint any Executive Committee Liaison, Staff Liaison and any Advisors to the Committee.","UrlName":"part40","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6e46528b-ba0d-48ea-a831-4e7f5066d403","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 500 (Email Policy)","Content":" Emails To Members (Adopted August 22, 2003; Amended February 20, 2019)\n Purpose \nIt is important for the members of the Bar to be informed about matters related to the judicial system and legal profession. To that end, the State Bar should provide efficient and effective communication with Georgia lawyers. At the same time, it is recognized that unnecessary or unwanted communications, especially mass emails, have a long-term adverse impact on effective communication. Therefore, this policy is designed to enhance communication by authorizing the use of emails for important information with appropriate limits on frequency and content. It is also intended to maintain compliance with Federal and state laws governing mass emails.\n Authorized Communications \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Emails are authorized as limited by this policy.</li> \n <li>All communications shall be for the lawful purpose of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n</ol>\n Authorized Users \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Supreme Court of Georgia , for any communication to all members; </li> \n <li> Court of Appeals of Georgia , for any communication to all members; </li> \n <li> State Bar President , for limited, significant Bar-related matters to all members; </li> \n <li> YLD President , for limited, significant YLD-related matters to YLD members; </li> \n <li> Board of Governors members , for communications with their circuit's members; \n \n (In circuits which have two or more representatives on the Board, each communication shall reflect the view of the majority of the representatives. The intent is for a limited number of emails from the circuit's representatives as a group rather than multiple emails from individual Board members. If the members of a circuit are evenly divided with no majority viewpoint, no email should be sent. The Board members in each circuit may accomplish this by jointly prepared emails, by electing a single spokesperson for the group, or by any other method of their choice that accomplishes the intent of this policy.) </li> \n <li> State Bar Sections and Committees , for communications from Section leaders with their Section members, but not for soliciting new members; and Committee chairs with their committee members; </li> \n <li> Candidates for State Bar elected positions , for Officers of the State Bar or YLD, Executive Committee members, and ABA delegates (limited to contested races and no more than two (2) emails per election); </li> \n <li> State Bar staff, for approved communications-related to Bar elections; </li> \n <li> Administrative Office of the Courts , for use by individual courts to communicate with the lawyers practicing in the courts; </li> \n <li> ICLE , for notifying members of upcoming seminars and institutes; and </li> \n <li> Others , as approved by the Executive Committee for limited, urgent uses. </li> \n</ol>\n All Users Must \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Not sell, give or otherwise redistribute the email addresses of the members;</li> \n <li>Use format that eliminates downloading of data;</li> \n <li>Use only for officially authorized Bar or judicial purpose;</li> \n <li>Not be used for private, commercial purposes; and</li> \n <li>Allow recipients to be removed from list.</li> \n</ol>\n Standards \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The subject line will include enough information so recipients can quickly determine if they want to delete the message without opening it. One subject per message is preferred.</li> \n <li>The message will be brief, sometimes including instructions on where to get additional information. When applicable, web links may be included.</li> \n <li>Attachments in the form of links to PDFs may be included.</li> \n <li>Each email message will include unsubscribe or opt-out instructions. </li> \n</ol>\n Process \n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>All email messages should be coordinated centrally by the Communications Department and are not to be sent by individuals or entities. Because most emails are time sensitive, all participants in this process shall cooperate to perform their duties in a timely manner</li> \n <li>When applicable, the person or entity initiating the email should be sent a final draft for approval prior to the email being sent.</li> \n <li>In emails related to State Bar elections, the entity wishing to send an email message drafts the message and submits it to the Membership Department, in accordance with the direction of the Elections Committee. The Membership Department sends it to the Chief Operating Officer and the Deputy General Counsel for approval. The approved email message is then sent by the Communications Department. The President and Executive Director are available for discussion when deemed appropriate by the Chief Operating Officer.</li> \n <li>The Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer are copied on all email messages. The person(s) initiating the email request is also copied.</li> \n</ol>\n Note :  Due to anti-spam measures and other email filtering software utilized by our membership, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and the various data communications equipment which provides the routing of all equipment internet-related traffic, the State Bar cannot guarantee that every recipient listed in its email address database will successfully receive the email message instituted with the mass email procedures specified above.\n As applicable, these rules also apply to the use of a member’s fax number.","UrlName":"part41","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1be76452-94e8-4811-bbca-0a770e51e2eb","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 600 (Establishment of Website)","Content":" Websites Established by State Bar Entities (Adopted May 17, 2007)\nNo section, division, standing committee, special committee, program, department or other entity of the State Bar of Georgia may establish or maintain a website except as follows:\n<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a mock up of the website, including both visuals and text, shall be submitted to the communications department and the bar counsel for written approval.</li> \n <li>upon approval by both the communications department and bar counsel, the State Bar entity website may go online, but any material change to the website shall first be submitted for approval under subparagraph \"a \"above.</li> \n</ol>\nThe Executive Committee, communications department, or bar counsel may rescind approval of any State Bar entity website at any time, with or without cause.","UrlName":"part42","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"336df2bd-61fa-4403-9452-b22b35ac015c","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 700 (Use of Copyrighted Materials)","Content":" Use of Copyrighted Materials (Approved April 10, 2008)\nAll requests for a license to use materials which are copyrighted by the State Bar shall be referred to the Executive Committee for approval pursuant to this policy.\n<ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Application: Any person seeking a license to use copyrighted material owned by the State Bar shall submit an application, directed to the Executive Committee, which contains the following information:\n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The name, address, and contact information (including phone number and email address) of the applicant. If the applicant is acting as an agent, such contact information for his or her principal shall also be provided;</li> \n <li>A brief description of the purpose and context of the intended use of the material, and any reasons why the license should be granted;</li> \n <li>Whether the material is intended for a single use, multiple uses, or continuing use by the applicant;</li> \n <li>The date or dates during which the applicant intends to use the material;</li> \n <li>Whether the material is to be used commercially or noncommercially; and,</li> \n <li>A statement that the applicant will acknowledge the copyright of the State Bar in any reproduction of the all or part of the material.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A copy of the copyrighted material for which a license is sought shall accompany the application.</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee, by majority vote, shall rule on the application and may attach such terms and conditions on the grant of the license as they deem necessary and desirable.</li> \n <li> In determining whether to grant the requested license the Executive Committee should, among other considerations, determine that:\n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The use of the license will not reflect adversely on the State Bar of Georgia,</li> \n <li>The use of the license will be in aid of and not hinder or be inconsistent with the purposes of the State Bar of Georgia as stated in Bar Rule 1-103,</li> \n <li>The use of the license will be in aid of and not inconsistent with conduct that is germane to the legitimate purposes of the State Bar of Georgia, and</li> \n <li>The purpose for which the license will be used will be of general interest and benefit to the members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No exclusive license shall be provided under this policy and licenses for multiple use or continuing use shall not exceed a term in excess of one year. The Executive Committee, at its sole discretion, may provide for automatic renewal of any license.</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee, at its sole discretion and without cause, may terminate a license at any time by written notice to the grantee.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"part43","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c85aa0fc-65d6-4a5a-ae08-e098ce0e5e9b","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 800 (Fastcase Policy)","Content":" Fastcase Access Policy (Adopted Sept. 29, 2006, Revised May 23, 2013)\nThe Executive Committee, by unanimous voice vote, approved proposed Standing Executive Committee Policy 800 regarding Fastcase as follows:\n Standing Executive Committee Policy 800 - Fastcase \nAll members of the State Bar of Georgia have access to Fastcase for online legal research. There is no user fee or other charge for this member benefit. Access is available at <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/">www.gabar.org in the Members Section with password required.\nOther law-related entities, including Georgia accredited law schools and county law libraries, may also provide access under their own countracts with Fastcase.","UrlName":"part44","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d8e6e1d4-2d5c-4d8c-be04-6a970acc88f0","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 900 (Requests to Inspect State Bar Records)","Content":" Requests to Inspect Records of the State Bar of Georgia (Approved Oct. 7-8, 2005) \n(Adopted as a Standing Executive Committee Policy Feb. 16, 2012)\nWhile the Bar is not required by the \"open records act \"or any other legislation or rule to respond to requests to inspect records, it is its policy to respond to all reasonable requests from individual members of the State Bar in good standing to inspect State Bar records. By this policy the Bar does not waive any right it has to refuse any request for inspection, nor does it by this policy create any right of inspection.  However, before the State Bar will consider a request to inspect records, the member must be in good standing and must comply with the following:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The member must provide the State Bar with a written request to inspect records;</li> \n <li>The written request must be sent to the attention of the Executive Director prior to the date on which the member wishes to inspect;</li> \n <li>The member's request must be made in good faith and for a purpose that is reasonably relevant to the member's legitimate interest as a member;</li> \n <li>The member must describe with reasonable particularity the records the member desires to inspect and the purpose of the inspection; and</li> \n <li>The records must be directly connected with this purpose.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>\nShould the member comply with the above-mentioned procedure, the Executive Director will consider the request, and provide a timely response.\nWhen in the opinion of the Executive Director and General Counsel, a request calls for an inspection of records of a private, personal or confidential nature, or relates to a matter where an inquiry or investigation is pending, the inspection will not be allowed.\nIf the inspection is not allowed, the member may appeal this decision to the Executive Committee.\nIf the inspection is allowed, the following conditions shall apply:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The inspection shall be undertaken by the member in good standing requesting the inspection, and shall occur at such reasonable times and under such reasonable conditions and duration as may be determined by the State Bar;</li> \n <li>The inspection shall occur at State Bar Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia;</li> \n <li>The inspection shall occur in the presence of a State Bar staff member;</li> \n <li>Because of confidentiality issues, no copying of State Bar records will be allowed; and</li> \n <li>The State Bar may impose a reasonable charge, covering the costs of providing a staff member to locate and transport the records, to witness the inspection, and all other reasonable expenses. The requesting member shall pay in advance an estimate of the expenses, said estimate to be adjusted upon conclusion of the inspection by refund or additional payment.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"part45","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a83351f9-5ca7-4e6b-bf04-6790b527ab6c","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 1000 (State Bar of Georgia Elections)","Content":"Active members of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to run for a number of important leadership positions, including officers (President-Elect, Secretary and Treasurer), Executive Committee at large members, Board of Governors members elected by judicial circuit and ABA delegates.\nAs a supplement to the applicable Rules, Bylaws and other provisions listed below in paragraph (j), this policy is designed to:\n 1. Assist members who wish to offer as candidates with information about the election process; \n2. Assist voters by providing to them a reasonable amount of information furnished by candidates in contested races; and \n3. Afford all candidates a fair and equal election process.\n(a) Election Schedule For All Leadership Positions. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 14, of the State Bar Bylaws, the Elections Committee will prepare an Election Schedule with appropriate time lines and dates for review and approval by the Board of Governors. \n(b) Campaigning For All Leadership Positions in Contested Races.\n 1. Professionalism. Candidates are encouraged to conduct positive campaigns and to refrain from sending negative, false or misleading information of any kind. \n2. State Bar Trademarks. The State Bar and YLD logos are registered trademarks of the State Bar of Georgia. Any use of these trademarks without the prior written consent of the State Bar of Georgia is strictly prohibited.  All candidates for office with the State Bar and the YLD must refrain from incorporating these logos or any similar likeness, Bar letterhead, Bar images or any language that might imply an endorsement, into campaign materials. \n3. State Bar Website. Pursuant to the approved Election Schedule ((a) above), the State Bar will provide each candidate a page on the State Bar website. The candidate page will contain the candidate’s biography, candidate message, and photo, as described below. No hyperlinks will be allowed on the State Bar created page for candidates except as provided in 4.d below. Each candidate’s information will remain on the State Bar website throughout the election. Changes submitted after the deadline established for receipt of this information will not be accepted, and no date extensions for submitting the form will be granted for any reason.\na. Biography and Candidate Message Form. The Biography and Candidate Message Form affords an opportunity for candidates to further state qualifications and to better inform voters. Candidates wishing to submit a Biography and Candidate Message Form must provide it in the electronic format supplied by the Bar. Only the Biography and Candidate Message Form submitted via this method will be accepted. Candidates will be advised how to obtain the electronic fillable form at the time they are notified of the contested race. The candidate also will be supplied with the deadline date for submission of the form at that time. Forms received after the designated deadline date will not be published on the State Bar website.\nThere will be no additions, deletions or changes done to the electronic form by the candidate once the form is received by the State Bar. The Elections Committee retains the right to decline to distribute any Biography or Candidate Message Form which is false, misleading, offensive or arguably illegal.\nb. Photo. Each candidate may provide a headshot that will be included on the candidate page on the State Bar’s website.\n4. State Bar Election Email.\na. Executive Committee Elections. The State Bar will distribute one email to officers and members of the Board of Governors for candidates seeking an Executive Committee position.\nb. Announcing Intent to Seek an Officer Position. Prior to the Midyear Meeting when officer nominations are made, the State Bar will distribute one email to officers and members of the Board of Governors to inform them of a candidate’s intent to seek an officer position.\nc. Board of Governors Elections. The State Bar will distribute one email per race per circuit to the eligible voters in the candidates’ circuit, which will contain the name of each candidate within that circuit with a link to his or her candidate page on the State Bar’s website.\nd. Statewide Elections. The State Bar will distribute one email per race to all eligible voters, which will contain the name of each candidate with a link to the candidate’s page on the State Bar’s website. In addition, each candidate in a contested statewide race may send 2 emails to all eligible voters.  The emails can be a letter of any length and may include hyperlinks if desired. The letters will be included in the body of the email and will be sent through the State Bar email system following the guidelines in Standing Executive Committee Policy 500.\n Candidates are free to send additional emails on their own, but email addresses of voting members will not be provided as a list in electronic form or any other form by the State Bar, in accordance with Standing Executive Committee Policy 500.  Such campaign messages must state that the email is coming directly from the candidate and not from the State Bar and that the recipient’s email address was not provided in electronic or any other form to the candidate by the State Bar.  Email addresses for many State Bar members are publicly available through the printed and online directory at <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org//">www.gabar.org .\nAll emails of this type must include the following language:\n This email is being sent directly by (Candidate) (or by ______ on behalf of and authorized by candidate) and not from the State Bar of Georgia.  Email addresses were not provided in electronic or any other form to the candidate by the State Bar of Georgia for this purpose.  Email addresses for many State Bar members are publicly available through the printed and online directory at <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org//">www.gabar.org .\n5. Mailing. A candidate may, upon request, receive one free set of printed or electronic mailing labels for the eligible voters in that candidate’s race for a single mailing in that year’s election only.  Additional sets may be purchased by contacting the State Bar’s Membership Department.  A nominal fee will be charged for additional sets.  Candidates will be provided with the most current number of active members in their circuit to budget accordingly.  A candidate may not copy the printed labels provided, or the information contained on them, and must delete the electronic file after the single use provided herein.  None of the information contained on the labels or in the file may be used at any other time or for any other purpose except as provided in this section.\n(c) Board of Governors Nominating Petitions.  In accordance with the State Bar of Georgia Bylaws, Article VII, Sections 2 and 4, all candidates, including incumbents and non-incumbents, for circuit and out-of-state posts on the Board of Governors, are required to submit petitions of nomination.  Each candidate’s petition must be signed by a minimum number of active members of the State Bar from the circuit in which the candidate’s address as registered with the State Bar of Georgia under Rule 1-205 is located.  The minimum number of signatures varies by circuit size as follows:\n 1. three signatures from a circuit having less than twenty-five members; \n2. seven signatures from a circuit having more than twenty-four but less than one hundred members; \n3. twenty signatures from a circuit having more than ninety-nine members; or \n4. five active non-resident signatures for candidates for out-of-state posts.\nIn no case will nominating petition forms or other election materials be sent to a candidate prior to the date designated for such distribution on the approved election schedule.  The dated nominating petition form for a given election must be used.  Undated forms or dated forms from prior years may not be used.  Petitions on incorrect forms will be rejected and may be returned to the candidate.\n Caution: Candidates are strongly encouraged to submit more than the required minimum number of signatures to compensate for any signatories who either are not active members or whose official address with the State Bar is not in the circuit of the candidate running for the Board of Governors post.  Early submission (approximately one week before deadline) is advised to allow the candidate time to obtain additional signatures, if necessary, before the deadline.  Failure to timely submit a petition with the required number of eligible signatures will result in that candidate’s exclusion from the ballot.\nRegardless of the method of submission, all nominating petitions must be received at the Atlanta headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia no later than 11:59 p.m. on the appropriate deadline date, which is different for incumbent and non-incumbent candidates.  Candidates may submit nominating petitions via U.S. Postal Service, private sector delivery service, hand delivery, facsimile or email.  Time receipt stamps on emails and facsimiles will determine if they were received prior to the deadline. Extensions of time may not be granted for any reason.  If original petitions are not submitted, then it is the responsibility of the candidate to maintain the original petition for thirty days past the date when results for that election are certified and announced.  Failure to provide the original petition at the request of the Elections Committee may result in the disqualification of the candidate, at the discretion of the Elections Committee.\nThe Election Schedule will establish the deadline date for nominating petitions to be submitted by incumbent candidates and a second deadline for petitions to be submitted by non-incumbent candidates.  If an incumbent’s valid petition is not received at the Atlanta headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia by 11:59 p.m. of the deadline date, that candidate will no longer be considered an incumbent.  He or she may run as a non-incumbent and submit the nominating petition by the date established on the approved Election Schedule for non-incumbent candidates.  In such a case, the incumbent will not be listed as an incumbent on the official election ballot.\nIf a non-incumbent’s valid petition is not received at the Atlanta headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia by 11:59 p.m. of the deadline date, that candidate will not be listed on the ballot, but may run as a write-in candidate.\n(d) Board of Governors Circuit/Post Vacancies.  As soon as practicable after the deadline for receipt of incumbent nominating petitions has passed, a list of all expiring Board of Governors terms with the name of the incumbent if they have qualified will be emailed to all eligible voters in the Bar.  All Circuit/Posts with no candidate will be shown as having a vacancy.  In this email, there will also be detailed information instructing members on how to obtain a nominating petition, qualifications to become a candidate for a Board of Governors seat and appropriate election deadlines.  The same information will be included on the State Bar website.\nCandidates may seek election to only one post within their circuit in a given election cycle, but may withdraw and re-qualify for a different post prior to the qualification deadline by submitting a new petition.  During the nomination period, the State Bar will disclose only the names of properly qualified candidates.  Other information, including the number or identities of members who have requested or filed petitions, or the names of signatories on petitions, will not be disclosed.\n(e) Ballots.\n 1. Board of Governors Candidates.  Candidates will be listed on the ballot in alphabetical order by last name.  Candidates’ names will appear on the ballot as they appear in the Bar membership record.  If candidates wish to add a nickname, it will be noted in quotations, along with their official name. Candidates will indicate on their nominating petition forms if they wish to include a nickname on the ballot.  Incumbent candidates who submit their nominating petitions prior to the deadline for incumbents will be designated on the ballot with either the word “(Incumbent)” or “(I).” See item (c) Board of Governors Nominating Petitions. \n2. Statewide Elections.  Candidates will be listed on the ballot in alphabetical order by last name under the heading of the office they are seeking. Candidates’ names will appear on the ballot as they appear in the Bar membership record.  If candidates wish to add a nickname, it will be noted in quotations, along with their official name.  Incumbent candidates will be designated on the ballot with either the word “(Incumbent)” or “(I).”\n(f) Voting. Only those active members who were eligible to vote in a particular circuit at the time the ballot mailing file is transmitted to the printer will be eligible to vote in the election, even if their status changes during the period between the time the ballot mailing file is transmitted and the actual election begins.  Members will receive a ballot for the circuit they were in according to their official address at the time the ballot mailing file was transmitted, or if so elected under rule 1-205, the circuit in which the member resides.  Ballot changes will not be made due to the Bar having an incorrect address for the member (see Rule 1-207) once the mailing file is transmitted.\nThe Elections Committee or its designee will review write-in votes to reasonably assure that slight variations in the spelling of a write-in candidate’s name are identified with the same person.\n(g) Declaration of Results.  After the Elections Committee Chair approves the release of election results, the President and Executive Director will be notified of the results and all candidates in contested races will be notified of the results in their races via email or telephone.  Statewide candidates will be notified by the Chair of the Elections Committee or his/her designee.  Staff liaison will contact all other candidates.  Thereafter, the names of the winning candidates are public information and will be posted on the State Bar website no later than the date for election results release included in the election schedule.  They may be made available to any interested person.  Additional information including vote counts by circuit will be available to any member upon request.  This includes any election for any year for which records are available.  Out of respect for members who did not offer for election, but nevertheless did receive votes, write-in information is available only if deemed relevant by the Chair or Vice-Chair of the Elections Committee.\n(h) Complaints and Appeals.\nProfessionalism. Professionalism is paramount in all State Bar activities and events. Candidates are expected to conduct fair and positive campaigns, and may not distribute information that is false or intentionally misleading. Violation of this policy may result in removal or revocation of the false or misleading content and disqualification of the candidate found in violation.\n1. Election Complaint Process:\na. The Elections Committee will be authorized to investigate and decide all election matters except election challenges to election results.\nb. Only a candidate may submit a complaint alleging a campaign violation.  All complaints must be submitted in writing to the Executive Director within three business days of discovering the alleged violation.\nc. The Executive Director will cause a copy of the complaint to be forwarded to the Chair of the Elections Committee for investigation by the Committee. Upon receiving a complaint, the Elections Committee will provide a copy of all candidates named in the complaint. The candidates may file a response to the Committee and the Executive Director. \nd. Candidates may request a hearing The Executive Committee has the discretion but is not obligated to grant a hearing. All candidates named in the compliant will be invited to attend if a hearing is granted.\ne. The Elections Committee shall decide on any received compliant and provide all interested parties a copy of its decision in writing within ten business days of receiving a compliant or following a hearing.\n2. Appeals Process:\na. Within three business days of a decision by the Committee, any candidate named in the compliant may file an appeal with the Executive Director. All appeals, supporting documentation, and requests for a hearing must be submitted in writing.\nb. The Elections Committee will submit the entire record concerning the complaint to the Executive Director, who will promptly forward the request for appeal and the entire record to the Executive Committee.\nc. The appellant may submit a position statement and memorandum setting forth their position for the appeal. The appellant may request a hearing before the Executive Committee at its next scheduled meeting.\nd. If an appellant requests a hearing, the President may designate a panel of three Executive Committee members to hear the appeal to expedite the appeal process.\ne. If an appellant is a member of the Executive Committee, that party may not participate in the appeal process, any hearing, or the deliberations of any appeal set forth herein.\nf. Any decision by the Executive Committee or its designated panel is final and not subject to further review or appeal.\n3. Election Result Contests. The Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia is the final authority on all election contests, but any contest should first be made to the Elections Committee, which will seek to resolve the matter or make a recommendation to the Executive Committee. Any person receiving one or more votes may file a written contest. All contests shall be received by the Executive Director within ten business days after the result was released and shall specify the re-count or other relief requested. The Executive Committee or its designee has the discretion but is not obligated, to grant a hearing with all interested parties invited in connection with any appeal.\n(i) Executive Committee Elected Positions\n 1. Notification Procedure. No later than 5 days after officer election results are posted and made available, an email notice shall be provided to members of the Board of Governors of the Executive Committee positions to be elected pursuant to the Bylaws, Article IV, Section 1. \n2. Campaigning. Members of the Board of Governors who are candidates for the Executive Committee of the State Bar are entitled to send 2 emails to all members of the Board of Governors.  The emails can be a letter of any length and may include hyperlinks, if desired.  The letters will be included in the body of the email and will be sent through the State Bar email system following the guidelines in Standing Executive Committee Policy 500.  In addition, each candidate is entitled to receive one free set of printed or electronic mailing labels which are to be used to inform the Board of their candidacy.  Additional sets may be purchased by contacting the State Bar’s Membership Department.  A nominal fee will be charged for additional sets.  A candidate may not copy the printed labels provided, or the information contained on them, and must delete the electronic file after the single use provided herein.  None of the information contained on the labels or in the file may be used at any other time or for any other purpose except as provided in this section.\n(j) Related State Bar Rules and Bylaws.\nPart I\nChapter 2\nRule 1-205 Bar of Judicial Circuit\nChapter 3\n Rule 1-304 Election of Members of Board of Governors \nRule 1-306 Vacancies; Ties\nChapter 4\n Rule 1-402 Election of Officers \nRule 1-403 Vacancies; Ties\nChapter 7\nRule 1-701 Executive Committee\nBylaws\nArticle VII\n Section 1.  Nomination of Officers \nSection 2.  Nomination of Members for the Board of Governors \nSection 3.  Circuits Having More Than One Member of Board of Governors \nSection 4.  Nominating Petitions \nSection 5.  Accepting Nominations \nSection 6.  Ballots \nSection 7.  Voters Lists:  Distribution of Ballots \nSection 8.  Method of Voting \nSection 9.  Elections Committee \nSection 10.  Declaration of Results of Elections \nSection 11.  Tie Vote \nSection 12.  Run-Off\nArticle X\n Section 1.  Delegates:  Designation; Nomination and Election; Alternates \nSection 2.  Terms of Office \nSection 3.  Alternate Appointments","UrlName":"part50","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3f1933ca-0b2a-4c91-a106-fac5380e66bd","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 1100 (Member Legal Service Programs)","Content":" Consistent with the purpose of the State Bar of Georgia to foster among its members the principles of duty and service to the public, State Bar sections, divisions, committees, and programs (“State Bar Entities”) are encouraged to adopt, establish or participate in legal service programs and projects, including, but not limited to pro bono legal services through the Pro Bono Project or a 501(c)(3) legal services organization whose services conform to the American Bar Association Standards for Programs Providing Civil Pro Bono Legal Services to Persons of Limited Means. \n \nIn an effort to provide qualified volunteers and to ensure that competent services are provided to the public, the State Bar expects the State Bar Entities to select legal service opportunities that provide their volunteers with adequate training and supervision, and require volunteers to maintain, or be covered by, legal malpractice insurance at all times when volunteering. All volunteers must comply with State Bar of Georgia rules and regulations and the rules and guidelines of the Pro Bono Project or other organizations through which the services are provided. \n \nPrior to adopting, creating, or participating in a legal service program or project, each State Bar Entity must seek advance approval of the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia. All requests for approval of a legal service program or project must be submitted in writing in such form as may be prescribed by the Executive Director. The Executive Director may refer any request for approval to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \nThe State Bar Entity shall provide the Executive Director with an annual report by April 30th of each year the program or project is in operation, which includes: (1) the name of the organization through which the services are offered; (2) a brief summary of the services provided; (3) the number of service events supported; (4) the number of volunteers involved; (5) the total number of service hours; and (6) the number of clients served. ","UrlName":"part51","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ee23e2ae-c23a-42d7-9879-1c0e4ef9f7a1","Title":"Standing Executive Committee Policy 1200 (Endorsement of Political or Judicial Candidates)","Content":" Endorsement of Candidates by Officers, Executive Director and General Counsel \n(Adopted May 19, 2017) \n \nState Bar officers may not use their official title or include their connection to the Bar in any public endorsement of political or judicial candidates. When an officer of the State Bar of Georgia verbally endorses a candidate, the officer shall clearly state that the endorsement is made in his or her personal capacity and is not the endorsement of the State Bar of Georgia.  \n \nA State Bar officer who is running for public office should not use his or her official title or connection to the Bar to imply that the State Bar of Georgia has endorsed his candidacy.  \n \nThe Executive Director and General Counsel may not use their official titles in any public political endorsements.","UrlName":"part54","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Title":"Bylaws of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia","Content":" Adopted January 20, 2007, as amended on April 18, 2009 and August 11, 2012.","UrlName":"part37","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","Title":"ARTICLE I NAME AND PURPOSE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter58","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8633f99f-7f47-414d-be15-24d10dbc8852","Title":"Section 1. Name","Content":" The name of this organization shall be the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia (the \"Young Lawyers Division \"or \"YLD \").","UrlName":"rule385","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0c084e4f-0de6-41c9-bf89-e81236e8a044","Title":"Section 2. Purpose","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the Young Lawyers Division shall be: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to encourage the interest and participation of YLD members in the activities, objectives, and purpose of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to aid and promote the advancement of YLD members in the activities of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to foster among YLD members the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to provide YLD members with an opportunity to participate in activities directed toward improving the administration of justice;</li> \n <li>to foster discussion and interchange of ideas among YLD members relating to the duties, responsibilities, and problems of YLD members; and</li> \n <li> to provide a full and complete program of activities and projects in those areas of the State Bar of Georgia in which YLD members are particularly suited. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule406","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","Revisions":[{"Id":"34713ad7-3bf8-406b-add1-f560900ad881","ParentId":"0c084e4f-0de6-41c9-bf89-e81236e8a044","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the Young Lawyers Division shall be: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to encourage the interest and participation of YLD members in the activities, objectives, and purpose of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to aid and promote the advancement of YLD members in the activities of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to foster among YLD members the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to provide YLD members with an opportunity to participate in activities directed toward improving the administration of justice;</li> \n <li>to foster discussion and interchange of ideas among YLD members relating to the duties, responsibilities, and problems of YLD members; and</li> \n <li> to provide a full and complete program of activities and projects in those areas of the State Bar of Georgia in which YLD members are particularly suited. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision41"}],"Ancestors":["9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Title":"ARTICLE II MEMBERSHIP","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter59","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"14d71c00-1600-4124-9c44-65d432e9c703","Title":"Section 1 Qualification for Membership","Content":" A \"YLD member \"is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia whose membership in the Young Lawyers Division has not terminated pursuant to Section 4 of this Article. Membership in the Young Lawyers Division is automatic.","UrlName":"rule374","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"80252a80-bdc7-4231-94f9-8181a7200df5","Title":"Section 2. Honorary Membership","Content":" Any person who has served as President shall be an “Honorary Member ” of the Young Lawyers Division for his or her lifetime after the date on which such person’s membership would have otherwise terminated pursuant to Section 4(a) of this Article. Honorary Members shall not be eligible to vote or hold office in the Young Lawyers Division; provided, however that the Immediate Past President shall be eligible to vote and shall be a member of the Executive committee during the term of such office. Membership as an Honorary Member shall terminate should an Honorary Member cease to be a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule401","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c6675b8f-15c6-4d43-be20-d9be0c719677","Title":"Section 3. Associate Membership","Content":" The Young Lawyers Division may recognize, as an “Affiliate Member ,” any person who is licensed to practice law, who has not yet reached either of the thresholds for termination of membership in the YLD as set forth in Section 4(a) of this Article, and who is not authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia, but who is (a) employed in Georgia by the government or a governmental agency, the armed services, or a private or commercial institution, or (b) a third-year law student or LLM student attending a law school in the State of Georgia that is approved by the American Bar Association or the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners. Any individual desiring to become an Affiliate Member shall be considered for membership after submitting a letter of interest in the manner provided for and consistent with Article I, Section 6 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. Such letter of interest shall be considered by and approved by the Young Lawyers Division in the manner provided for and consistent with the consideration and approval of Affiliate Membership to the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule412","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"03d405d2-a506-4a60-92f8-e57c29ab5e83","Title":"Section 4. Termination of Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in The Young Lawyers Division shall terminate: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> at the end of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia (the \"Bar Year \") after (1) the member attains the age of thirty-six (36) or (2) the fifth anniversary of the member's being admitted to their first bar, whichever date is later (other than Honorary Members); or </li> \n <li>upon such member ceasing to be an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia; or</li> \n <li>in the case of Affiliate Members, by the vote of a majority of the YLD members in attendance at any meeting of the YLD membership.</li> \n </ol> \nNotwithstanding the foregoing, a person who met the requirements of Section 4(a) above at the time such person was elected President-Elect shall continue to be a YLD Member for the duration of the terms of President and Immediate Past President to which he or she succeeds. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule425","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[{"Id":"cdf005df-9270-4c68-b701-b45cc8677d2c","ParentId":"03d405d2-a506-4a60-92f8-e57c29ab5e83","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in The Young Lawyers Division shall terminate: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> at the end of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia (the \"Bar Year \") after (1) the member attains the age of thirty-six (36) or (2) the fifth anniversary of the member's being admitted to their first bar, whichever date is later (other than Honorary Members); or </li> \n <li>upon such member ceasing to be an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia; or</li> \n <li>in the case of Affiliate Members, by the vote of a majority of the YLD members in attendance at any meeting of the YLD membership.</li> \n </ol> \nNotwithstanding the foregoing, a person who met the requirements of Section 4(a) above at the time such person was elected President-Elect shall continue to be a YLD Member for the duration of the terms of President and Immediate Past President to which he or she succeeds. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision42"}],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Title":"ARTICLE III OFFICERS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter69","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"4a5386ce-6a0d-48c8-905a-d3217380c7be","Title":"Section 1. Officers","Content":" The “Officers ” of the Young Lawyers Division shall consist of: (a) President, (b) President-Elect, (c) Treasurer, (d) Secretary, (e) Immediate Past-President, and (f) Newsletter Editor(s).","UrlName":"rule382","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"120c5f38-9b7f-4df4-aca4-fdba3d21b88e","Title":"Section 2. Eligibility","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election shall be eligible to serve as an Officer of the Young Lawyers Division.</li> \n <li>The President-Elect position may be filled by any YLD Member who is also an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia without regard to the location of his or her residence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule397","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[{"Id":"03f84c3b-8fa1-4dbe-a938-a14fc386f9db","ParentId":"120c5f38-9b7f-4df4-aca4-fdba3d21b88e","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election shall be eligible to serve as an Officer of the Young Lawyers Division.</li> \n <li>The President-Elect position may be filled by any YLD Member who is also an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia without regard to the location of his or her residence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision43"}],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ecc2160f-5a68-4595-ad4c-7d08dc658472","Title":"Section 3. President","Content":"The President shall be responsible for carrying out the purposes of the Young Lawyers Division. The duties of the President shall include, but not be limited to, presiding at all meetings of the Executive Committee, the Representative Council, and the YLD membership, as well as duties assigned by the membership at any regular meeting or by the Representative Council. The President shall be responsible for the preparation and submission of an annual report of the activities of the Young Lawyers Division at the regular Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia. The President shall be an ex officio member of all Standing Committees.","UrlName":"rule413","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"81316aa7-22f7-4e63-8e3f-8533699755b4","Title":"Section 4. President-Elect","Content":"The President-Elect shall perform such duties as may be assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or by the Executive Committee or Representative Council. During any period in which the President is unable to act, the President-Elect shall perform the duties of President.\nThe President-Elect shall also plan for the year in which he or she shall act as President, and make needed arrangements for the prompt inauguration of the program for that year upon assuming office and to prevent interruption in the continuing program then being carried on by the Young Lawyers Division.","UrlName":"rule421","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"23293288-d260-40aa-9df7-4e5d2507c2fc","Title":"Section 5. Treasurer","Content":"The Treasurer shall have general supervision of the finances of the Young Lawyers Division. The Treasurer shall cause to be kept full and accurate records and accounts showing the transactions of the Young Lawyers Division. The Treasurer shall provide a financial report to the YLD membership annually and more frequently if required by the President. The Treasurer shall perform all other duties as may be assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or by the Executive Committee or Representative Council.","UrlName":"rule431","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d2865f6c-90b1-4662-9b19-59a0f5bcfe1e","Title":"Section 6. Secretary","Content":"The Secretary shall keep full minutes of all meetings, including meetings of the the Executive Committee, the Representative Council, and the YLD membership; shall publish such minutes at the proper subsequent meetings; shall give notice of meetings; and shall perform all other duties as may be incidental to the office of Secretary or as assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or by the Executive Committee or Representative Council.\n","UrlName":"rule437","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"afadbf9c-9a06-415f-9b3e-0f232775bfc9","Title":"Section 7. Editor of the Young Lawyers Division Newsletter","Content":" The Editor or Co-Editors of the Young Lawyers Division Newsletter (the “Editor(s) ”) shall cause to be published a quarterly newsletter of the activities and programs of the Young Lawyers Division and shall perform all other duties as may be incidental to said office or assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or the Executive Committee or Representative Council.","UrlName":"rule440","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"37714839-51d5-4b1f-9106-dc023e622fdf","Title":"Section 8. Immediate Past President","Content":"The Immediate Past-President shall be a member of all Standing Committees and shall have such other responsibilities as are assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or the Executive Committee or Representative Council.","UrlName":"rule560","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e05eabff-65b6-4e23-a757-80b09b2fc786","Title":"Section 9. Election or Appointment of Officers","Content":"The President-Elect,  Treasurer and Secretary shall be elected in the manner and shall take office at the time provided for in Article VII of these Bylaws. The Editor(s) shall be appointed by the President to serve at the pleasure of the President. The offices of President and Immediate Past-President shall be filled by the person who was President-Elect and President, respectively, in the immediately preceding Bar Year.","UrlName":"rule561","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"15ea5159-640c-4e3c-9824-c4f58c5e98b3","Title":"Section 10. Terms of Office","Content":"The terms of office of President, President-Elect,  Treasurer, Secretary, and Immediate Past-President shall be for the period beginning immediately upon the adjournment of the Annual Meeting and ending at the adjournment of the next succeeding Annual Meeting or until such officer’s successor is elected or appointed and qualified. The term of office of the Editor(s) shall be concurrent with the term of office of the President who appointed such Editor(s).","UrlName":"rule562","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Title":"ARTICLE IV EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter61","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"4505f2a2-14d2-4abb-a8f8-631878579837","Title":"Section 1. Purpose and Powers","Content":" There shall be an Executive Committee of the Young Lawyers Division (the “Executive Committee ”). The Executive Committee shall conduct all business of the YLD between meetings of the YLD membership or the Representative Council, except those enumerated in Sections 1 and 3(c) of Article VIII, Section 1 of Article X, and Section 1 of Article XI. ","UrlName":"rule386","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b12de819-f879-4bcd-9f93-1818bfd5d464","Title":"Section 2. Composition of the Executive Committee","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Executive Committee shall be composed of: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> the Officers; and\n \n </li> \n <li> the appointed Directors.\n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule400","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[{"Id":"1daac522-a7f6-4606-a668-59456f34136a","ParentId":"b12de819-f879-4bcd-9f93-1818bfd5d464","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Executive Committee shall be composed of: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> the Officers; and\n \n </li> \n <li> the appointed Directors.\n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision44"}],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48c7d7c2-a515-43a9-9bc4-53bbf914f970","Title":"Section 3. Directors","Content":"(a) Appointment. A minimum of four (4) Directors shall be appointed by the President to serve at the pleasure of the President and to be directly responsible to the President.\n (b) Duties. The Directors shall assist the President during his or her term in office and shall perform such duties and responsibilities as designated by the President. The Directors shall also oversee the activities of and advise one or more of the YLD Special Committees as designated by the President. \n ","UrlName":"rule416","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"8228657b-b418-4a6e-9693-9fffe7b33d5d","Title":"Section 4. Terms of Office","Content":"Each member of the Executive Committee shall hold office for the following terms:\n(a) The appointed Directors shall be appointed by the incoming President for terms to be served concurrent with that of the incoming President. \n(b) The Officers shall serve for a period concurrent with the incoming President, beginning upon their swearing-in at the Annual Meeting at which they are sworn-in as Officers and continuing until their successors are sworn-in at the next Annual Meeting.\n","UrlName":"rule424","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[{"Id":"7ade5683-b8bf-4444-ae8d-4552f0912c7c","ParentId":"8228657b-b418-4a6e-9693-9fffe7b33d5d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the Executive Committee shall hold office for the following terms: \n(a) The appointed Directors shall be appointed by the incoming President for terms to be served concurrent with that of the incoming President. \n(b) The Officers shall serve for a period concurrent with the incoming President, beginning upon their swearing-in at the Annual Meeting at which they are sworn-in as Officers and continuing until their successors are sworn-in at the next Annual Meeting. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision45"}],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1f73c49c-8eb7-4831-8867-da89157f0827","Title":"Section 5. Eligibility","Content":"Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election or appointment shall be eligible to serve as a member of the Executive Committee. ","UrlName":"rule432","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Title":"ARTICLE V REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter62","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"a83ddd2f-d312-411f-ae9c-e934826efe10","Title":"Section 1. Purpose and Powers","Content":" There shall be a Representative Council of the Young Lawyers Division (the “Representative Council ”). The Representative Council shall exercise the powers granted to it hereunder. ","UrlName":"rule377","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"4f1f2493-4481-4295-bb3e-ee4e848135a2","Title":"Section 2. Composition of the Representative Council","Content":"The Representative Council shall be composed of:\n(a) the Officers of the Young Lawyers Division.\n(b) No less than six (6) and no more than ten (10) YLD members from each Federal Judicial District within the State of Georgia, provided that each such member is a resident of the Federal Judicial District such person represents. A YLD member shall be considered a resident of a particular Federal Judicial District within the State of Georgia if he or she maintains either his or her residence or his or her primary office in that Federal Judicial District, and residency shall be determined at the time of the YLD member’s election to the Representative Council.\n(c) two (2) YLD members who are not residents of any Federal Judicial District within the State of Georgia. \n(d) twelve (12) YLD members at large.\n(e) the president or chairperson of each Affiliate Unit (as defined in Article XII of these bylaws); provided, however, that each president or chairperson may, by written notice to the Secretary at least ten (10) days prior to each Representative Council meeting, appoint a member of such Affiliate Unit as an alternate delegate to serve on the Representative Council in the event of his or her absence.\n(f) the third-year law student serving as the YLD Law School Fellow from each law school in the State of Georgia participating in the YLD Law School Fellows program. These persons shall be members ex officio but nonvoting.","UrlName":"rule398","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"41f0e6e6-03a5-4ff3-b972-f1d6442e3f63","Title":"Section 3. Eligibility","Content":"Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election or appointment shall be eligible to serve on the Representative Council; provided, however, the any representative serving on the Representative Council pursuant to Section 2(f) of this Article shall be eligible to serve in that capacity without being a YLD Member.","UrlName":"rule546","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0856ad4e-7bbf-4116-8152-ee168c5df953","Title":"Section 4. Elections of Members of Representative Council","Content":"The members of the Representative Council described in Section 2(b), (c), and (d) of this Article shall be elected in the manner provided for in Article VII of these Bylaws and shall take office immediately upon the adjournment of the Annual Meeting at which said election is conducted.","UrlName":"rule563","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"401305cc-a6cc-4838-911e-624b1bbca40a","Title":"Section 5. Terms on Representative Council","Content":"Each member of the Representative Council shall hold office for the following terms:\n(a) The Officers of the Young Lawyers Division and presidents or chairpersons of Affiliate Units shall serve for a period of time concurrent with the term of their respective positions as defined within these bylaws or other organizing document pursuant to which they serve. \n(b) Each member of the Representative Council representing a Federal Judicial District and the nonresident members of the Representative Council shall hold office for a period of two (2) years or until their successors have been duly chosen and qualified. \n(c) Each member at large of the Representative Council shall hold office for a period of one (1) year or until their successors have been duly chosen and qualified. \n(d) Notwithstanding anything contained within this Article, any member of the Representative Council who shall fail to meet the attendance requirement set forth in Article X, Section 2(b) shall be automatically removed from office on the Representative Council, unless such attendance requirement has been suspended by a majority vote of the Representative Council.","UrlName":"rule564","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3f3909ed-23ed-4b9e-a058-a15304a9cbea","Title":"Section 6. Duties","Content":" Each member of the Representative Council shall \n\n (a)    Serve as a liaison between the YLD and the members of the YLD who reside or maintain a law practice in the same Federal Judicial District within the State of Georgia as the member of the Representative Council. \n\n (b)    Comply with the attendance requirement set forth in Article X, Section 2(b) of these bylaws. \n\n (c)    Serve as a member of at least one (1) of the Standing Committees set forth in Article IX, Section 1 of these bylaws. \n\n(d)    Serve as a member of at least one (1) of the Special Committees set forth in Article IX, Section 2 of these bylaws.","UrlName":"rule573","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2c70f314-4fb3-4f80-90ee-c6b486024188","Title":"ARTICLE VI DELEGATES TO THE YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter63","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"bf5bf1d8-1d9b-483b-b353-a3e232e774a2","Title":"YLD ABA Delegates","Content":"The President shall appoint all delegates to the American Bar Association Young Lawyers Division (“ABA/YLD”) Annual and Mid-Year meetings for the term during which he or she is President. Such appointments shall be made according to the following priority, in descending order, from the YLD members, as follows: (1) Officers; (2) Directors; (3) other Representative Council members; (4) other YLD members, with priority being given to those members who have previously held leadership positions within the State Bar of Georgia YLD, including any Affiliate Unit, or who have attended any State Bar of Georgia YLD, including Affiliate Unit, activities, meetings, or events. To receive priority as outlined herein, a potential delegate must notify the President of his or her desire to be a delegate at least forty-five (45) days before the delegate certification deadline published by the ABA/YLD for the ABA/YLD meeting at issue.","UrlName":"rule379","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c70f314-4fb3-4f80-90ee-c6b486024188","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c70f314-4fb3-4f80-90ee-c6b486024188","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Title":"ARTICLE VII ELECTIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter64","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"1fe5e897-2e5b-4327-8b82-0e402827aae5","Title":"Section 1. Qualifications for Voting and Making Nomination","Content":"Only active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing who are also YLD members (other than Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) shall be eligible to vote or nominate in any election in the Young Lawyers Division.","UrlName":"rule389","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"41338f77-f837-4efb-9e24-7edfc41888d3","Title":"Section 2. Offices Filled by Election","Content":"(a) The President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary shall be elected consistent with and in the manner set forth in Section 6 of this Article.\n(b) Members of the Representative Council representing Federal Judicial Districts, non-resident members of the Representative Council, and members at large of the Representative Council shall be elected consistent with and in the manner set forth in Section 7 of this Article. Provided, however, that elections of Representative Council members representing Federal Judicial Districts shall be staggered, with no more than five (5) representatives from each district elected per year.","UrlName":"rule410","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"76bd060b-00a9-4a81-bc7b-939a94b77aef","Title":"Section 3. Notification of Elections","Content":"The Secretary shall cause to be performed the following in connection with elections:\n(a) Officers. The Secretary shall cause to be published a notice distributed to all YLD members not less than seventy-five (75) days prior to the date upon which the State Bar of Georgia’s election is schedule to commence or as provided by these bylaws or any standing policy created hereunder (as such, “Election Commencement Date”), setting forth:\n(1) that the positions of President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary shall be filled by election;\n(2) the eligibility requirements for such positions;\n(3) the nomination and election procedure; and\n(4) the names and addresses of members of the Nominating Committee and the Election Committee.\n(b) Representative Council. The Secretary shall cause to be published a notice distributed to all YLD members not less than sixty (60) days prior to the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting, setting forth:\n(1) the positions on the Representative Council which shall be filled by election at such Annual Meeting;\n(2) the eligibility requirements for such positions;\n(3) the nomination and election procedure; and\n(4) the names and addresses of members of the Nominating Committee and the Election Committee.\n","UrlName":"rule411","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a788d481-6196-435d-b5b5-fe8ce597d49b","Title":"Section 4. Nominations","Content":"Nominations for any office or position may be made by the Nominating Committee (described in Article IX, Section 1(d)) or by any YLD member as follows:\n (a) Nominations from Nominating Committee .\n (1) Nominations of Officers . In conjunction with and during the State Bar of Georgia Midyear Meeting, the Nominating Committee shall nominate one (1) or more candidates for the office of President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary, and shall report the names of all such nominees to the Election Committee. \n(2) Nominations for Representative Council . Not less than forty-five (45) days prior to the date of the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting, the Nominating Committee shall nominate: five (5) or more candidates from each Federal Judicial District for election as members representing such district to fill the terms that will terminate at the next Annual Meeting; twelve (12) or more candidates for election as members at large to the Representative Council; and two (2) or more candidates for election as nonresident members of the Representative Council in the years that the term of such office terminates at the next Annual Meeting. The Nominating Committee shall report the names of all Representative Council nominees to the Election Committee not less than forty-five (45) days prior to the date of the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting.\n (b) Nominations from Members . Nominations for candidates for the offices of President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary and for positions on the Representative Council may be made by the membership of the Young Lawyers Division as follows:\n (1) Nominations of Officers . Any two (2) YLD members who are qualified to vote in accordance with these bylaws may submit a nominating petition in writing to the Election Committee for the nomination of Officers not less than thirty (30) days prior to the Election Commencement Date. .\n (2) Nominations for Representative Council . A nominating petition for the nomination of Representative Council members may be submitted to the Executive Director of the Young Lawyers Division or his or her designee, provided that the nominating petition is submitted prior to the commencement of Representative Council elections.\n (3) Nominating Petition . The nominating petition shall be substantially in the following form:\n Nominating Petition the Young Lawyers Division\n The undersigned member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing  hereby nominate ____________________ for the office of ___________________ for the term beginning at the close of the Annual Meeting in ______. \n_________________________ Nominator \n_________________________ Nominator [if applicable] \nDate ____________ \nI, _________________________, the person nominated in this petition, hereby accept said nomination and, if elected, will serve. \n_________________________ Nominee \n (c) No Nominations . Should a position on the Representative Council which is to be filled at an Annual Meeting lack a nomination properly filed in accordance with these bylaws, then nominations for such position may be made from the floor at the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. \n ","UrlName":"rule426","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5a3882c8-e1b1-49f1-bf0a-db20cd6cb978","Title":"Section 5. Certification of Nominees","Content":" (a) Determination of Eligibility . Upon receipt of the nominations from the Nominating Committee or the members, the Election Committee (as described in Article IX, Section 1(e)) shall determine if the persons nominated are eligible for office. \n (b) Notification of Nominees . Within five (5) days of receipt of the report of the Nominating Committee or receipt of a nomination from the members, the Election Committee shall notify each nominee of such nomination and of the names of other persons nominated for the same position. Each nominee shall have two (2) business days from the date of notification to accept or reject the nomination. Nominees failing to respond shall be deemed to have accepted the nomination. ","UrlName":"rule428","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"05c8039d-bc96-435c-89c2-c8335e505af5","Title":"Section 6. Officer Elections","Content":"The election for the positions of President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary  shall be conducted and resolved consistent with and in the manner set forth for the election of officers for the State Bar of Georgia. This specifically includes but is not limited to the content of ballots; the method of voting; the counting and report of votes; the procedure for requesting, conducting, and resolving a recount; the declaration of election results; the procedure for determining the need for, conducting and resolving a run-off election; and the coordination of elections with the election to determine the officers of the State Bar of Georgia.\n (a) Standing Policy . In the event or to the extent the State Bar of Georgia’s provisions for the election of officers for the State Bar of Georgia are insufficient to govern the election for the positions of YLD President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary, then the YLD Standing Policy on Officer elections shall govern the procedure for conducting the elections of those Officers and shall determine the outcome of that elections.   \n (b) Creation of Standing Policy . Upon approval by the YLD membership of this subsection of this Article of these bylaws, the President at the time of such approval shall appoint a committee to prepare a proposed YLD Standing Policy on Officer elections. This Standing Policy shall be adopted and incorporated as a supplement to these bylaws once it is distributed, considered, and approved as provided for in Article XIII of these bylaws.","UrlName":"rule435","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"7d92d02c-a41b-42fb-b382-f610c6b70f59","Title":"Section 7. Representative Council Elections","Content":"The election of the Representative Council shall occur at the State Bar of Georgia Annual meeting.\n (a) Content of Ballots . The Election Committee shall have ballots prepared, which shall include (1) the name of each person duly nominated for each Representative Council position, (2) space for a write-in for each position, and (3) instructions as to the method by which a vote for a particular candidate shall be indicated.\n (b) Voting . Each YLD member in attendance at the State Bar Annual Meeting who desires to vote shall mark his or her ballot according to the instructions thereon and shall return the ballot to one of the voting places.\n (c) Counting and Report . The Executive Director of the Young Lawyers Division or his or her nominee shall, at the end of the voting, count the votes and report the results at the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. The Executive Director may employ such impartial clerical assistance as he or she may deem necessary.\n (1) The five (5) candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in the elections for members from each of the Federal Judicial Districts to the Representative Council shall be declared elected. \n\n (2) The twelve (12) candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in the elections for members at large to the Representative Council shall be declared elected. \n\n (3) The two (2) candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in the election for nonresident member to the Representative Council shall be declared elected. \n\n(4) In the event two (2) or more candidates receive the same number of votes in any election and such tie is between the candidates who receive the lowest number of votes that still might result in such candidates being elected, the YLD members present at the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting shall, by vote, determine which of such tying candidates shall be declared elected","UrlName":"rule565","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","Title":"ARTICLE VIII REMOVAL AND VACANCIES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter65","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"69b91772-0816-4027-b34e-6ced064affa9","Title":"Section 1. Removal of Officer For Cause","Content":"The YLD membership may, at any meeting called in accordance with these bylaws, by two-thirds majority vote of the total voting membership present and qualified to vote at said meeting, remove any Officer from office for cause.","UrlName":"rule376","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"995dc54a-7a19-4f64-95fe-ad49f3d35ac5","Title":"Section 2. Change of Residence of Office of Certain Persons","Content":"In the event that:\n(a) any member of the Representative Council representing a specific Federal Judicial District ceases to be a resident of the Federal Judicial District which such member represents; or \n (b) a nonresident member of the Representative Council becomes a resident of a Federal Judicial District in the State of Georgia, such member shall continue to serve on the Representative Council only until the next State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. If the term of office of such member does not normally expire at such Annual Meeting, there shall be a special nomination and election to elect a new member to serve for the remainder of such unexpired term. Such special election and nominations shall be conducted as elections and nominations for such position are normally conducted. \n ","UrlName":"rule403","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"4b2e2d9d-29ed-4add-ac8f-29e15aaecad2","Title":"Section 3. Vacancies","Content":"Vacancies occurring in any office shall be filled as follows:\n(a) Any vacancy arising in the office of President shall be filled by the President-Elect who shall continue to hold the office of President-Elect until the expiration of the unexpired term and shall continue to serve as President for the term during which he or she would regularly have served as President. \n(b) Any vacancy arising in the office of President-Elect (except pursuant to Section 3(a) of this Article) shall remain unfilled for the unexpired term. An election for the office of President shall be held at the next election held pursuant to Article VII, Section 6 of these bylaws. \n(c) Any vacancy arising in the office of Secretary or Treasurer shall be filled for the unexpired term by such person elected at the next meeting of the YLD membership by majority vote of those present and qualified to vote and voting.\n(d) Any vacancy arising in the office of Editor(s) shall be filled for the unexpired term by appointment by the President.\n(e) Any vacancy arising in the office of Committee Chairperson (other than those fixed by the terms of these bylaws) shall be filled for the unexpired term by appointment by the President, or the President may delegate the appointment to the members of said committee.\n(f) Any vacancy arising in the office of Director shall be filled for the unexpired term by appointment by the President.\n(g) Any vacancy arising in the office of member of the Representative Council representing a specific Federal Judicial District shall be filled by appointment by the President for the unexpired term, provided that the appointee shall be a resident of the same Federal Judicial District as the member whose position he or she fills.\n(h) Any vacancy arising in the office of member of the Representative Council at large shall be filled by appointment by the President for the unexpired term.\n(i) Any vacancy arising in the office of a nonresident member of the Representative Council shall be filled by appointment by the President for the unexpired term, provided that the appointee shall not be a resident of any Federal Judicial District in the State of Georgia.\n","UrlName":"rule415","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","Title":"ARTICLE IX COMMITTEES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter66","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"4f4c47bd-3a9a-4cc8-a30a-303b422fc86b","Title":"Section 1. Standing Committees","Content":"Each Standing Committee shall include in its membership at least six (6) members of the Representative Council, including two (2) from each Federal Judicial District. The mandatory members described herein (other than nonvoting members) shall count towards fulfilling the minimum member requirement. The membership of each Standing Committee shall be selected by the President, subject to the requirements set forth in this Section. The Standing Committees of the Young Lawyers Division shall be as follows:\n (a) Membership and Meetings . This committee, which shall include the Secretary and President-Elect as members, shall consider and make recommendations on ways to improve the membership’s involvement and attendance at meetings. \n (b) Rules, Bylaws and Procedures . This committee shall consider and make recommendations on all proposed amendments or changes concerning the organization of the Young Lawyers Division and its rules, bylaws, procedures and standing policies. \n (c) Nominating . This committee, which shall be chaired by the President-Elect, who shall act as chairperson but shall have no vote on the committee, shall be charged with making nominations for all elections. The President-Elect shall notify all committee members of the time and place of meetings. Three (3) voting members of the Nominating Committee shall constitute a quorum for such meetings. \n (d) Election . This committee, which shall be chaired by the President-Elect, shall be charged with conducting all elections, except to the extent the conducting of any election called for by these bylaws is, pursuant to these bylaws, to be conducted by another entity.\n (e) Communications . This committee, which shall include the Secretary and the Editor(s) as members, shall consider and make recommendations on proposed publications of the Young Lawyers Division and the number and types of publications issued or sponsored by the Young Lawyers Division. \n (f) Public Relations and Policy . This committee shall consider and make recommendations on ways to promote a positive public image of young lawyers in the State of Georgia and shall inform the membership of any legislation relevant to the legal profession. The actions of this committee shall comply with the requirements of Article XI, Section 1. \n \n ","UrlName":"rule383","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9f268165-1c27-4b6c-b772-a9c0143a6ed8","Title":"Section 2. Special Committees","Content":" The President shall appoint such special committees as he or she shall deem necessary and proper and shall designate their duties and their size. Upon motion of any YLD member and the passage of such motion by a majority vote at any meeting of the YLD membership, a committee for any specific purpose may be formed, and it shall be mandatory for the President to make the appointment of such committee. The President may delegate the appointment of committee members to the Committee Chairperson of the respective committees. \n ","UrlName":"rule404","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1443028e-922c-4f1c-9709-af6463d8f7c8","Title":"Section 3. Committee Chairpersons","Content":" All “Committee Chairpersons ” (other than those mandated by the terms of these bylaws) shall be appointed by the President for a term concurrent with that of the President and shall serve at the pleasure of the President. Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their appointment shall be eligible to serve as a Committee Chairperson. No person shall serve as the Committee Chairperson of any one (1) committee of the Young Lawyers Division for more than two (2) consecutive Bar Years, or any portion of two (2) consecutive Bar Years; provided, however, such person may serve as a Committee Chairperson of any other committee of the Young Lawyers Division. The President reserves the power to remove any Committee Chairperson or committee member. ","UrlName":"rule566","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c242dcf8-bd66-4d3a-a6f9-9c3f8bb43c0c","Title":"Section 4. Reports","Content":"Each Committee Chairperson shall submit to the President, Secretary and such other persons or committees as designated by the President, written reports of the activities of their respective committee. Reports may be submitted at intervals as required or desired by the President.","UrlName":"rule567","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Title":"ARTICLE X MEETINGS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter67","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"54a5d020-d316-4fce-9e1f-be4f25752398","Title":"Section 1. Business Meetings of the YLD Members","Content":" YLD members shall meet not less than four (4) times during each Bar Year. \n \n (a) Midyear Meeting . The YLD members shall meet annually at the time and place designated by the Board of Governors for the Midyear Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia unless the President designates a different place and time. The Secretary shall cause notice of the Midyear Meeting to be given to all YLD members not less than thirty (30) days before such Midyear Meeting. \n (b) Other Meetings . The President shall call three (3) other meetings of the YLD members at such times as he or she shall designate. The Secretary shall cause notice of such meetings to be given to all YLD members not less than thirty (30) days before such meetings.\n (c) Annual Meeting . YLD members may, at the discretion of the President, meet annually at the time and place designated by the Board of Governors for the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia. In the event the President elects to conduct this meeting, the Secretary shall cause notice of the meeting to be given to all YLD members not less than thirty (30) days before the Annual Meeting.","UrlName":"rule387","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0d1d6c61-5a1e-4b00-8c01-f0e342b407a7","Title":"Section 2. Representative Council Meetings","Content":" (a) Scheduling of Meetings . The President or the Representative Council, by majority vote of the members present and voting, may designate the time and location of the Representative Council meetings. The Secretary shall cause notice of such meetings to be given to all members of the Representative Council not less than thirty (30) days before such meetings.\n (b) Attendance Requirement . Unless otherwise modified by majority vote of the Representative Council, or if such provision is waived or suspended by a majority vote of the Representative Council, each member of the Representative Council shall be required to attend at least three (3) of the meetings set forth in Section 1 of this Article. \n \n ","UrlName":"rule396","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a2b18236-51ef-4925-9474-e71936d3e956","Title":"Section 3. Executive Committee Meetings","Content":" (a) The Executive Committee shall meet upon the call of the President or upon the written request addressed to the President of a majority of the voting members of the Executive Committee. \n \n(b) Unless otherwise modified by majority vote of the Executive Committee, or if such provision is waived or suspended by a majority vote of the Executive Committee, each member of the Executive Committee shall be required to attend at least three (3) of the meetings set forth in Section 1 of this Article. \n ","UrlName":"rule417","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bf21e98e-c153-480b-b6c5-d490a109d46c","Title":"Section 4. Committee Meetings","Content":"Each Committee, whether standing or special, shall meet, as often as necessary in order to perform its duties, upon the call of the Committee Chairperson for such Committee. ","UrlName":"rule574","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"eebcc4c7-2336-4f11-91f9-cc5dd18a410c","Title":"Section 5. Conduct of Meetings","Content":"All meetings may be conducted in person or by any means of communication by which all persons participating may simultaneously hear each other during the meeting. Furthermore, all meetings of a special committee, a standing committee or the Executive Committee may be conducted by correspondence or otherwise in writing (including electronically), without assembling in person at any particular place.","UrlName":"rule575","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c7c2ccc8-9f7a-4e95-afa3-1f98e44441ed","Title":"Section 6. Quorum","Content":" (a) Ten (10) members of the Representative Council shall constitute a quorum for Representative Council meetings; \n \n(b) Thirty (30) YLD members shall constitute a quorum for meetings of the YLD members. ","UrlName":"rule577","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2cfa0939-217b-4b3d-8d56-89c23e545e5c","Title":"Section 7. Voting at Meetings","Content":"Except as otherwise provided in these Bylaws, all questions coming before any meeting (YLD members, Representative Council, committee or other) when duly convened shall be decided by a majority of the members present and voting. ","UrlName":"rule578","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0faffe44-d393-4796-bb8d-842c1d2392f7","Title":"Section 8. Rules","Content":"All meetings, including committee meetings, shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of these bylaws and where no provision is made, then in accordance with Robert’s Rules of Order.","UrlName":"rule579","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1f727ce3-2645-4c8d-8fba-02702db81392","Title":"ARTICLE XI LEGISLATION AND PUBLICITY","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter68","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"920aad6c-699d-4888-aa4f-708383100b8f","Title":"Section 1. Legislation","Content":" No legislation shall be recommended, approved or disapproved in the name of the Young Lawyers Division unless that recommendation, approval, or disapproval is done in the manner set forth and consistent with Article II, Section 6 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. \n ","UrlName":"rule375","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"1f727ce3-2645-4c8d-8fba-02702db81392","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["1f727ce3-2645-4c8d-8fba-02702db81392","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e4d6a71d-6c69-4a3a-aae6-2a60069a7c0d","Title":"Section 2. Publications","Content":"No publication shall be distributed, published or publicly endorsed in the name of the Young Lawyers Division except by approval of the President, and only then to the extent consistent with and in the manner set forth for issuing publications by the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia Standing Policies. ","UrlName":"rule580","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"1f727ce3-2645-4c8d-8fba-02702db81392","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["1f727ce3-2645-4c8d-8fba-02702db81392","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","Title":"ARTICLE XII AFFILIATE UNITS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter78","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"5ccb08a5-90cd-4e60-ad6f-6ecf6909ca4e","Title":"Section 1. Qualification and Application","Content":"Any young lawyers organization or younger lawyers unit of any bar association, city, Superior Court Circuit, Congressional District, or other jurisdiction in which membership is restricted to younger lawyers in good standing may apply to be an “Affiliate Unit” of the Young Lawyers Division. The applying organization shall submit to the Secretary a petition containing: (a) a copy of a resolution or letter regularly adopted by the applying organization authorizing affiliation; (b) a petition or letter signed by at least three (3) members of the applying organization describing its organization and listing the size of its membership; and (c) a copy of any constitution, bylaws, or articles of procedure of the applying organization, if any exist. In the event that the applying organization has no constitution, bylaws, or articles of procedure at the time of application, said organization shall adopt and operate under the YLD bylaws in effect at the time of application until such time as they adopt their own constitution, bylaws, or articles of procedure.","UrlName":"rule581","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2bfb79e8-467e-44e1-a898-3f6bbc389ca3","Title":"Section 2. Affiliation","Content":"The Secretary shall present the affiliation petition for approval at the meeting of the YLD membership next following the Secretary’s receipt of the affiliation petition. Upon approval by a majority of the YLD members  present and voting, the applicant shall immediately be an Affiliate Unit. ","UrlName":"rule582","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"821e8e69-07ac-4e36-a4ef-055484baa2dd","Title":"Section 3. Termination of Affiliation","Content":"Any YLD member may at any time submit a motion in writing to the President or Secretary, moving that an entity cease to be an Affiliate Unit. Such motion shall be presented for consideration at the meeting of the YLD membership next following the submission of the motion. If such motion is approved by a majority of the YLD members present and voting at such meeting, the entity shall immediately cease to be an Affiliate Unit.","UrlName":"rule583","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c4d14170-16d7-46f4-b5f3-ef8e1eb2d482","Title":"ARTICLE XIII STANDING POLICIES","Content":"The Bylaws of the Young Lawyers Division may be supplemented by the creation of standing policies as provided for in this Article. A standing policy can be created only at a meeting of the YLD members by motion made in writing and submitted to the President at least thirty (30) days prior to the meeting. Copies of the motion containing the proposed Standing Policy shall be mailed or electronically distributed to all YLD members at least twenty (20) days prior to the meeting. The motion shall thereafter be voted upon at the regularly scheduled meeting of the YLD membership next following the publication of this motion; provided, however, that a quorum of YLD members, as defined by Article X of these bylaws, is present for said meeting. The motion shall be deemed approved and the proposed standing policy adopted if a majority of those YLD members present at the meeting where the vote on the motion is conducted issue votes in favor of the motion. The provisions of this Article imposing certain time requirements may be waived with the unanimous consent of all YLD members present at any such meeting where a proposed standing policy is considered.","UrlName":"chapter79","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e32cb4de-5ab8-4974-915b-d9bed626ecd5","Title":"ARTICLE XIV AMENDMENTS","Content":"The Bylaws of the Young Lawyers Division may be amended only at a meeting of the YLD members by motion made in writing and received by the President or Secretary at least thirty (30) days prior to the meeting. A quorum of members, as defined by Article X of these bylaws, shall be required at any such meeting where a bylaw amendment is being considered for adoption. Copies of the motion containing the proposed amendment shall be mailed or electronically distributed to all YLD members at least twenty (20) days prior to the meeting. The motion to amend shall then be voted upon at the meeting and shall require a majority vote of those YLD members present for adoption. The provisions of this Article imposing certain time requirements may be waived with the unanimous consent of all YLD members present at any such meeting where proposed bylaw provisions are considered.","UrlName":"chapter80","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Title":"Center for Lawyer Wellbeing Bylaws","Content":"By action of the Board of Governors for the State Bar of Georgia, and pursuant to Chapter 7, Rule 1-706 of the Rules of Governance of the State Bar of Georgia and Article IX Divisions, Sections, and Centers, Section 5, the Center for Lawyer Wellbeing is established.","UrlName":"part57","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"6d06f04c-f7bc-4763-afe5-2a7be73d5bc0","Title":"ARTICLE I PURPOSE AND GOALS","Content":"PurposeThe Center for Lawyer Wellbeing (“the Center”) shall serve as an umbrella group to coordinate the work of the State Bar of Georgia on issues related to wellbeing. The purpose of the Center is to advocate for the physical and mental health of lawyers through increased awareness, programming, policy development and research. By promoting lawyer wellbeing, the Center will ensure that lawyers are able to meet their obligations to clients, the public, and the profession. The Center and its constituent entities will work to help lawyers excel in both their personal and professional lives, in recognition of the connection between wellbeing, competence, and professionalism.GoalsThe Center for Lawyer Wellbeing will have as its goals:(1) collaborating with Bar Sections, Committees, and other entities to provide high-quality, up-to-date programming that will educate lawyers, judges, law students and other stakeholders on the significance of wellbeing issues and provide them with the tools they need to make a positive impact;(2) serving as a clearinghouse and repository of information on the work of the State Bar of Georgia, its’ Sections, Committees, Divisions, and Programs, in the area of wellbeing;(3) encouraging continued study of the connection between wellbeing, professionalism, and discipline;(4) developing and sharing policies and best practices that move the profession towards healthier behaviors; and(5) eliminating the stigma associated with help-seeking behaviors.The Center’s work will be funded by voluntary Center membership fees and by grants or donations received in response to fundraising efforts.","UrlName":"chapter85","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Title":"ARTICLE II LEADERSHIP","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"></div>","UrlName":"chapter86","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"309e9994-7408-41f9-acc2-b98c77f2c307","Title":"Section 1. Officers.","Content":"The general Center operation will be overseen by its officers and a Center Executive Committee. Officers of the Center shall be a Chairperson, a Vice Chairperson, a Secretary, and a Treasurer, all of whom shall be members in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. The initial officers will be selected by the President of the State Bar of Georgia and, thereafter, elected by members of the Center for Lawyer Wellbeing.","UrlName":"rule614","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b42adcbd-c619-426d-8f16-a2edd8b08252","Title":"Section 2. Terms of Office.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each Officer shall hold office for a one (1) year term beginning at the close of the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia at which the Officer is elected and ending at the close of the next succeeding Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia, and until his or her successor shall have been elected and qualified. If a vacancy shall arise in the office of the Vice Chairperson, Secretary, or Treasurer, the Chairperson shall appoint a successor for the unexpired term(s). If a vacancy shall arise in the office of the Chairperson, the Vice Chairperson shall become Chairperson for the unexpired term. If a vacancy shall arise in the office of the Chairperson and there shall, at the same time, exist a vacancy in the office of the Vice Chairperson, the president of the State Bar of Georgia, in consultation with the Center Executive Committee, shall appoint a successor Chairperson and Vice Chairperson for the unexpired terms.</div>","UrlName":"rule615","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5d1d5240-fc31-44f8-ab4c-1022d2678d1e","Title":"Section 3. Duties of the Chairperson.","Content":"The Chairperson shall preside at all meetings of the Center and all meetings of the Center Executive Committee, appoint appropriate committees of the Center to serve during the Chairperson’s term, plan and supervise the programs of the Center at its annual meeting, and perform all other executive and administrative duties necessary or proper to the organization and functioning of the Center, including any duty as from time to time may be prescribed by the members of the Center or by the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule616","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"465889e7-fbf9-4adc-b25f-c637a8a1a723","Title":"Section 4. Duties of the Vice Chairperson.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Vice Chairperson shall assist the Chairperson and, in the absence or disability of the Chairperson, shall perform the duties of the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule617","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"219f5979-948a-4b0e-92da-1dacec98c386","Title":"Section 5. Duties of the Secretary.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Secretary shall keep minutes of all meetings of the Center, maintain the permanent records of the Center, give notices of meetings, and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule618","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e5a50b54-e9ca-4b36-b2ba-ee6d6f38511e","Title":"Section 6. Duties of the Treasurer.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Treasurer shall maintain the budget of the Center, update the income and expenses of the Center, ensure that the bills of the Center are paid, maintain contact with the Finance Department of the State Bar of Georgia for purposes of maintaining the budget, and report on the budget at the annual meeting or when otherwise requested by the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule619","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Title":"ARTICLE III CENTER EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter87","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"bc27f1f0-2dd6-459b-ad47-0f635ded8d77","Title":"Section 1. Composition of the Center Executive Committee. Terms of Office.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Center Executive Committee shall consist of the Officers of the Center and three other members of the Center elected by the members. Center officers shall serve for one Bar year. Other members of the Center Executive Committee shall serve two-year terms that coincide with the Bar year. The initial appointments shall be staggered so that the terms of the non-officer members do not all expire in the same year.</div>","UrlName":"rule620","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"7f42beef-8fa3-46c5-bedb-57885b70ecb6","Title":"Section 2. Authority.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except for actions requiring a vote from the members of the Center, the Executive Committee shall have full authority to act for the Center in any way the Center membership itself would be authorized to act. Any such action taken by the Executive Committee under this provision shall be reported to the members of the Center at its next meeting, by email, or by the publication of a newsletter.</div>","UrlName":"rule621","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6a04d2b4-2d0d-4e6f-9c29-197604f78621","Title":"Section 3. Other Committees.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Chairperson shall appoint members to all other committees as needed. Members of the Executive Committee, other than the Officers, and any other members of the Center may serve as Chairperson of appointed committees.</div>","UrlName":"rule622","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","Title":" ARTICLE IV MEMBERSHIP AND FEES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"></div>","UrlName":"chapter88","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"b68d0fff-f821-4d7f-9131-729db364d25c","Title":"Section 1. Requirement for Membership.","Content":"Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia may be a member of the Center for Lawyer Wellbeing. Any member of the State Bar, upon election on the annual fee statement or by request and payment of annual Center membership fees, will be enrolled as a member of the Center. Thereafter, membership fees are due each year on the same schedule as the payment of fees to the State Bar. Members so enrolled and whose membership fees are paid shall constitute the membership of the Center. Any member whose annual membership fees are not paid by the deadline for annual State Bar fee payments shall cease to be a member of the Center subject to reinstatement at any time upon the payment of fees for the current year.","UrlName":"rule623","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"53468669-efe8-4105-9e65-95ea65cbee25","Title":"Section 2. Membership Fees. How Established.","Content":"The annual Membership fees for the Center shall be established from time to time by the Center Executive Committee and submitted to the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia for approval.","UrlName":"rule624","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Title":"ARTICLE V ACTIONS AND MEETINGS OF THE CENTER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"></div>","UrlName":"chapter89","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"a2dfd2c5-363f-4750-ace8-c9281d420727","Title":"Section 1. Center Annual Meeting.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Center shall hold an annual meeting of its leadership and membership at or about the time and place of the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia, at a date, time, and location to be fixed by the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule625","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ed5b1929-f5bc-492c-8f47-e8e0513dd344","Title":"Section 2. Special Meetings.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Subject to the provisions of Section 5 of this Article, the Chairperson may call for a Special or Called Meeting of the Center to be convened at such time and place and with such agenda and order of business as may be fixed by the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule626","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"7b32ec7a-2ec6-46b0-b9ac-83ff215caf88","Title":"Section 3. Requirements for a Special or Called Meeting.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Ten members of the Center present at any Annual, Special, or Called meeting shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. Only members physically or virtually present at an Annual, Special, or Called meeting of the Center count towards a quorum.</div>","UrlName":"rule627","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"714e3f74-a911-4884-9fc4-e11bacceb4d4","Title":"Section 4. Actions of the Center.","Content":"All actions of the Center shall be by a majority vote of the members present and voting at any regular, special, or called meeting. Only members physically or virtually present may vote on Center business at any Annual or Special meeting of the Center. If a regular meeting is not scheduled or conducting a special or called meeting is not practical, the Center Executive Committee may make decisions in the absence of the membership. Decisions of the Center Executive Committee may be reversed by a super-majority vote of the members. A super-majority vote shall be defined as a vote of yea or nay by 3/4 of the membership present and voting where a quorum exists.","UrlName":"rule628","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"edbeb4fd-204d-428c-a477-5ad805341b5d","Title":"Section 5. Notice of Meetings.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Notice of the date, time, and place of each Annual or Special meeting of the Center shall be given to each member in good standing of the Center. Notice of a meeting shall be transmitted to the membership no less than ten days in advance of such scheduled meeting and sent to the member’s e-mail address on record in the office of the State Bar of Georgia and posted on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia. Emailing notice and posting notice on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia shall constitute due, adequate, and sufficient notice of such meeting of the Center. Further, any such notice may, but is not required to be included with other written or printed material mailed or e-mailed to all of the members of the State Bar of Georgia or any part thereof which includes all members of the Center, and such notice shall also be due, adequate, and sufficient notice of such meeting of the Center.</div>","UrlName":"rule629","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"178a9ec3-c97f-4f6e-8534-1d35e40a3cf9","Title":"Section 6. Proxy Voting Not Allowed.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> There shall be no voting by proxy at any meeting of the Center. </div>","UrlName":"rule630","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"051484f4-7885-426e-b7e9-433083a2af08","Title":"Section 7. Parliamentary Procedure.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Parliamentary procedure at all meetings of the Center shall be governed by Roberts Rules of Order, Newly Revised, or by these Bylaws.</div>","UrlName":"rule631","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2f0f5cb8-5ed7-4149-a688-171c31404809","Title":"Section 8. Electronic Meetings Allowed.","Content":"If deemed prudent or necessary, the Center may conduct any meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.","UrlName":"rule632","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Title":"ARTICLE VI FINANCES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"></div>","UrlName":"chapter90","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"0098994d-7f11-4d20-8f87-c99dd913f7d6","Title":"Section 1. Depository Requirements.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Funds of the Center shall be deposited in the treasury of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be disbursed to pay the financial obligations of the Center after approval by the Chairperson and Treasurer of the Center. The Finance Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall, from time to time, make available to the Treasurer for the Center a financial accounting for the Center so the Center Treasurer can provide a report of the financial condition of the Center to its members.</div>","UrlName":"rule634","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"24d67f29-6543-42a4-83fc-13b0eb0be860","Title":"Section 2. Use of Funds.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Funds of the Center shall be expended for such purposes related to the stated activities of the Center as from time to time shall be authorized by the Center’s Executive Committee. All expenditures of the Center are subject to review and approval by the Treasurer and the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule635","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"06add8eb-7362-4022-a8ad-f12f94850910","Title":"Section 3. No compensation. Reimbursable Expenses.","Content":"Officers and members of the Center shall not be compensated for services rendered to the Center. However, officers and members may be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses in the furtherance of Center business upon submission of receipts of any reimbursable expenditure to the Center Treasurer and subsequent approval by the Center Executive Committee. All approved reimbursements shall be submitted to the Finance Department of the State Bar of Georgia for payment.","UrlName":"rule636","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1692aef7-0cd4-4a07-9cbe-749333cd9e70","Title":"Section 4. Annual Financial Report.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A financial report of the funds of the Center shall be transmitted to the members at the annual meeting of the Center and shall be included in the Center’s annual report to the Board of Governors. The Center shall have the same fiscal year as the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule637","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b8ae03fe-8627-4be9-9c52-ac6c3644368a","Title":"Section 5. Tax Status.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> As a duly organized center serving the State Bar of Georgia and its members, the Center shall enjoy the same tax status as the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule638","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","Title":"ARTICLE VII MISCELLANEOUS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"></div>","UrlName":"chapter91","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"abf89351-0e8d-4b64-a628-f9d4a771bd7b","Title":" Section 1. Education.","Content":"The Center shall, from time to time, conduct programs for continuing education in the area of lawyer wellbeing and may coordinate its efforts in this regard with other programs, divisions, and sections of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule639","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f0537a29-5947-4179-a303-ad003d45df74","Title":"Section 2. Legislative Activity. Limitations.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Center may, from time to time, as limited by the Rules, Bylaws, and Standing Board policies of the State Bar of Georgia, sponsor, promote, study, or review proposed legislation. The Center will take no action on its own behalf or on behalf of the State Bar of Georgia concerning any legislative activities except as authorized by Bar Rules, Policies, and Bylaws.</div>","UrlName":"rule641","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f3649151-d3e5-4454-beaa-74fa13151e85","Title":"Section 3. Collaborating with Other Programs.","Content":"The Center for Lawyer Wellbeing may collaborate with other programs of the State Bar of Georgia that serve similar interests as the Center. These other programs may combine under the umbrella of the Center, either on a temporary or permanent basis.","UrlName":"rule640","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bb3c2673-3c95-436f-8591-65beea893e66","Title":"Section 4. Center Staff.","Content":"The Center Executive Committee may petition the State Bar of Georgia to hire a dedicated staff person to assist in running the day-to-day operations of the Center for Lawyer Wellbeing. The Center Executive Committee may submit a request for a full or part-time staff person to the Executive Director and the Personnel Committee of the State Bar of Georgia. The Board of Governors must provide final approval for the Center to hire a staff person.","UrlName":"rule642","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3a88e514-3202-4c3a-9518-05713178d26c","Title":"ARTICLE VIII EFFECTIVE DATE AND AMENDMENT","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter92","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"b613a862-cd32-404a-9d93-ae6929b03ae2","Title":"Section 1. Effective Date.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> These Bylaws shall become effective upon approval by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule643","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3a88e514-3202-4c3a-9518-05713178d26c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3a88e514-3202-4c3a-9518-05713178d26c","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"7826fba6-ef90-4ca7-a5b1-06838914ac24","Title":"Section 2. Amendments.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> These Bylaws may be amended by a majority vote of the members of the Center present and voting at any properly called meeting at which a quorum is present and subsequent approval thereof by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule646","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3a88e514-3202-4c3a-9518-05713178d26c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3a88e514-3202-4c3a-9518-05713178d26c","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":[]},{"Id":"6d02af25-2039-4ab9-9c6e-c61a196c54e3","Title":"Rule 16-102. ICLE BOARD.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>ICLE shall be overseen by a Board composed of 13 members, all of whom shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia as follows: the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia, seven members of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the State Bar of Georgia President with the approval of the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors, and one member from each of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) accredited law schools operating in the State appointed by the dean of the respective law school. Each Board member shall serve for three years with the terms staggered so that the terms of approximately one-third of the members expire each year. No State Bar of Georgia member may serve more than two full terms except that such a member appointed to fill a vacancy may fill the unexpired term of the member replaced in addition to two full terms, if reappointed. There shall be no term limits for the ABA accredited law school members.</li> \n <li>All members of the predecessor ICLE Board of Trustees will be eligible for appointment to serve on the ICLE Board described herein. The State Bar of Georgia President shall appoint seven members to the ICLE Board in staggered terms. Each of the deans of the ABA accredited law schools operating in Georgia shall name one Board member to serve a three-year term. Each year thereafter, the incoming Bar President and the deans of the ABA accredited law schools shall appoint or reappoint members as necessary to fill the seats of those members with expiring terms. The Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia shall serve a one-year term.</li> \n <li>The Board shall meet in conjunction with each regularly scheduled meeting of the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors. The Chair or any seven members of the Board, which must include at least one ABA accredited law school member, may call a special meeting of the Board at a time and place convenient to the Board and upon conditions described in the Internal Operating Procedures of the Board.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting after July 1 of each year, the Board shall elect a Chair, Vice-Chair, and such other officers, as it deems necessary. No Board member may serve as Chair for more than two consecutive terms.</li> \n <li>Seven Board members, including one ABA accredited law school member, shall constitute a quorum of the Board. The act of a majority of the members present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the Board. The Director of ICLE shall attend meetings of the Board and shall serve as Secretary to the Board but shall have no vote.</li> \n <li>No compensation shall be paid to members of the ICLE Board for their service.</li> \n <li>A Board member may be removed from the Board for failure to attend meetings or for other good cause as defined in the Internal Operating Procedures of the Board. The vacancy shall be filled by the original appointing authority.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule593","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"cf8edfa6-5430-4d96-beb0-3009541b2dff","Title":"Rule 15-102. DEFINITIONS.","Content":"(a)   An “IOLTA  Account”  means  a  trust  account  benefiting  the Foundation, established in an approved institution for the deposit of pooled nominal or short-term funds of clients or third persons, and meeting the requirements of the Foundation as further detailed below. The account product may be an interest-bearing checking account; a money market account with, or tied to, check writing; a sweep account, portions of which are regularly moved into a government money market fund or daily overnight financial institution repurchase agreement invested solely in, or fully collateralized by, United States government securities; or an open-end money market fund solely invested in, or fully collateralized by, United States government securities.\n \n(1)   “Nominal or short-term” describes funds of a client or third person that the lawyer has determined cannot provide a positive net return to the client or third person. \n \n(2)   “Open-end money market fund” is a fund that identifies itself as a money market fund as defined by applicable federal statutes and regulations under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and, at the time of the investment, having total assets of at least $250,000,000. \n \n(3)   “United  States  government  securities”  are  United  States Treasury obligations and obligations issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof.\n \n     (b)   An “approved institution” is a bank or savings and loan association which is an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15(III)(c)(1) and which voluntarily chooses to offer IOLTA Accounts consistent with the additional requirements of this Rule, including:\n \n(1)  to remit to the Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees on the IOLTA Account, on the average \n  \nmonthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of the interest earned on that account for any month, and any fees or charges that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution. \n \n(2)   to transmit with each remittance to the Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges or fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance. \n \n(3)   to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors. \n \n(4)   to pay comparable interest rates on IOLTA Accounts, as defined below at Rule 15-103.\n \n     (c)   “Allowable reasonable fees” for IOLTA Accounts are per check charges, per deposit charges, a fee in lieu of a minimum balance, Federal deposit insurance fees, and sweep fees. (“Allowable reasonable fees” do not include check printing charges, NSF charges, overdraft interest charges, account reconciliation charges, stop payment charges, wire transfer fees, and courier fees. Such listing of excluded fees is not intended to be all inclusive.) All other fees are the responsibility of, and may be charged to, the lawyer maintaining the IOLTA Account. Fees or charges in excess of the earnings accrued on the account for any month or quarter shall not be taken from earnings accrued on other IOLTA Accounts. Approved financial institutions may elect to waive any or all fees on IOLTA Accounts. \n ","UrlName":"rule585","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Title":"CHAPTER 1 - IOLTA ACCOUNTS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter82","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"82e9bd5a-e42a-4175-aab0-4aab23929ea4","Title":"Rule 15-101. BANK ACCOUNTS.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether as a sole practitioner or as a member of a firm, association or professional corporation, who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary  capacity  shall  maintain  or  have  available  an  interest-bearing  trust  account  or accounts.</li> \n <li>An “IOLTA Account” is a trust account benefiting the Foundation. The interest generated by an IOLTA Account shall be paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation, Inc. as hereinafter provided.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule584","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"cf8edfa6-5430-4d96-beb0-3009541b2dff","Title":"Rule 15-102. DEFINITIONS.","Content":"(a)   An “IOLTA  Account”  means  a  trust  account  benefiting  the Foundation, established in an approved institution for the deposit of pooled nominal or short-term funds of clients or third persons, and meeting the requirements of the Foundation as further detailed below. The account product may be an interest-bearing checking account; a money market account with, or tied to, check writing; a sweep account, portions of which are regularly moved into a government money market fund or daily overnight financial institution repurchase agreement invested solely in, or fully collateralized by, United States government securities; or an open-end money market fund solely invested in, or fully collateralized by, United States government securities.\n \n(1)   “Nominal or short-term” describes funds of a client or third person that the lawyer has determined cannot provide a positive net return to the client or third person. \n \n(2)   “Open-end money market fund” is a fund that identifies itself as a money market fund as defined by applicable federal statutes and regulations under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and, at the time of the investment, having total assets of at least $250,000,000. \n \n(3)   “United  States  government  securities”  are  United  States Treasury obligations and obligations issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof.\n \n     (b)   An “approved institution” is a bank or savings and loan association which is an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15(III)(c)(1) and which voluntarily chooses to offer IOLTA Accounts consistent with the additional requirements of this Rule, including:\n \n(1)  to remit to the Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees on the IOLTA Account, on the average \n  \nmonthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of the interest earned on that account for any month, and any fees or charges that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution. \n \n(2)   to transmit with each remittance to the Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges or fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance. \n \n(3)   to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors. \n \n(4)   to pay comparable interest rates on IOLTA Accounts, as defined below at Rule 15-103.\n \n     (c)   “Allowable reasonable fees” for IOLTA Accounts are per check charges, per deposit charges, a fee in lieu of a minimum balance, Federal deposit insurance fees, and sweep fees. (“Allowable reasonable fees” do not include check printing charges, NSF charges, overdraft interest charges, account reconciliation charges, stop payment charges, wire transfer fees, and courier fees. Such listing of excluded fees is not intended to be all inclusive.) All other fees are the responsibility of, and may be charged to, the lawyer maintaining the IOLTA Account. Fees or charges in excess of the earnings accrued on the account for any month or quarter shall not be taken from earnings accrued on other IOLTA Accounts. Approved financial institutions may elect to waive any or all fees on IOLTA Accounts. \n ","UrlName":"rule585","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"2f7c318c-2314-46ad-8c62-9e8cf9407fbc","Title":"Rule 15-103. IOLTA ACCOUNTS: INTEREST RATES.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> On any IOLTA Account, the rate of interest payable shall be: \n <ol> \n <li>not less than the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the approved institution to its non-IOLTA customers for each IOLTA Account that meets the same minimum balance or other eligibility qualifications, if any. In determining the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA customers, the institution may consider factors, in addition to the IOLTA Account balance, customarily considered by the institution when setting interest rates or dividends for its customers if such factors do not discriminate between IOLTA Accounts and accounts of non-IOLTA customers. The institution also shall consider all product option types that it offers to its non- IOLTA customers, as noted at Rule 15-102(a), for an IOLTA Account by either establishing the applicable product as an IOLTA Account or paying the comparable interest rate or dividend on the IOLTA Account in lieu of actually establishing the comparable highest interest rate or dividend product; or</li> \n <li>alternatively, if an approved institution so chooses, a rate equal to the greater of (A) 0.65% per annum or (B) a benchmark interest rate, net of allowable reasonable fees, set by the Foundation, which shall be expressed as a percentage (an “index”) of the federal funds target rate, as established from time to time by the Federal Reserve Board. In order to maintain an overall comparable rate, the Foundation will periodically, but not less than annually, publish its index.  The index shall initially be 65% of the federal funds target rate.</li> \n <li>Approved  institutions  may  choose  to  pay  rates  higher  than comparable rates discussed above.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule586","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"86e4ee1d-8eb0-4bf6-9e51-1c5ca3359732","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2010-1","Content":" Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on June 4, 2010. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/committeesprogramssections/programs/upl/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=8061\%22>Approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia on September 12, 2011</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED \nAssuming no traverse has been filed by any party in a garnishment action, is the completion, execution and filing of an answer in the garnishment action by a non-attorney employee of the garnishee considered the unlicensed practice of law?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \nA nonlawyer who answers for a garnishee other than himself in a legal proceeding pending with a Georgia court of record is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.\n OPINION \n \"The summons of garnishment shall be directed to the garnishee, commanding him to file an answer stating what money or other property is subject to garnishment.\"O.C.G.A. § 18-4-62(a). The \"answer must be filed with the court issuing the summons,\"and \"if the garnishee fails to answer the summons, a judgment by default will be entered against the garnishee for the amount claimed by plaintiff against the defendant.\"Id.\n The summons of garnishment form set out in O.C.G.A. § 18-4-66(2) states that the garnishee is to file an \"answer in writing with the clerk of this court....\"The garnishee is warned that \"[s]hould you fail to answer this summons, a judgment will be rendered against you for the amount the plaintiff claims due by the defendant.\"Id. O.C.G.A. § 18-4-82 refers to the document prepared by the garnishee as an \"answer,\"as does O.C.G.A. § 18-4-97(a): \"The garnishee shall be entitled to his actual reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, in making a true answer of garnishment.\"\nA properly served garnishee is bound to file an answer with the appropriate court. If the answer is not filed, the garnishee faces a default judgment. The inescapable conclusion is that a garnishment action is a legal proceeding. That being the case, the Committee examines who is permitted to file an answer to a legal proceeding that is pending with a Georgia court.\n \"Georgia's citizens, of course, have a constitutionally protected right of self-representation.\"In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2002-1 , 277 Ga. 521, 522 n.3 (2004). A party to a legal action can also be represented by a duly licensed attorney at law. Ga. Const. (1983), Art. I, Sec. 1, Para. XII . As far as corporate self-representation, \"[i]n this state, only a licensed attorney is authorized to represent a corporation in a proceeding in a court of record, including any proceeding that may be transferred to a court of record from a court not of record.\"Eckles v. Atlanta Technology Group , 267 Ga. 801, 805 (1997). The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded \"that the rationale and holding of Eckles should, and does, apply to limited liability companies.\"Winzer v. EHCA Dunwoody, LLC , 277 Ga. App 710, 713 (2006). See also Sterling, Winchester &Long, LLC v. Loyd , 280 Ga. App. 416, 417 (2006).\nThe Committee concludes that a nonlawyer who answers for a garnishee other than himself in a proceeding pending in a Georgia court of record is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.","UrlName":"rule537","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"0c46ae97-c528-406e-b0e9-f0cb5254c79f","Title":"RULE 14-6.2 SUBPOENAS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Issuance by Superior Court. Upon receiving a written application of the chair of the Standing Committee or of a District Committee or staff counsel alleging facts indicating that a person or entity is or may be practicing law without a license and that the issuance of a subpoena is necessary for the investigation of such unlicensed practice, the clerk of the Superior Court in which the committee is located shall issue subpoenas in the name of the chief Judge of the Superior Court for the attendance of any person and production of books and records before staff counsel or the investigating District Committee or any member thereof at the time and place within its district designated in such application. Such subpoenas shall be returnable to the Superior Court of the residence or place of business of the person subpoenaed. A like subpoena shall issue upon application by any person or entity under investigation.</li> \n <li>Failure to Comply. Failure to comply with any subpoena shall constitute a contempt of court and may be punished by the Superior Court that issued the subpoena or where the contemnor may be found. The Superior Court shall have the power to enter such orders as may be necessary for the enforcement of the subpoena.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule304","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"784c7c9f-b763-470f-8489-cf00b6ff4b7d","Title":"RULE 14-3.2 STAFF COUNSEL AND COUNSEL FOR THE BAR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> Staff Counsel. The State Bar of Georgia shall provide staff counsel and other employees sufficient to assist the Standing Committee and the District Committee in carrying out their responsibilities as prescribed elsewhere in these rules. \n </li> \n <li> Appointment of Counsel for the Bar. The President of the State Bar of Georgia may appoint one or more Counsel for the Bar to assist the State Bar of Georgia in meeting its duties as prescribed in (a) above. </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule297","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5533f82e-c949-48f7-baf9-a6f13292014b","Title":"14-2. DEFINITIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter34","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"3eab6510-5bbd-4e21-a27d-d0220e45c2f4","Title":"RULE 14-2.1 GENERALLY","Content":" Whenever used in these rules the following words or terms shall have the meaning herein set forth unless the use thereof shall clearly indicate a different meaning: \n \n(a) Unlicensed Practice of Law. The unlicensed practice of law shall mean the practice of law, as prohibited by statute, court rule, and case law of the State of Georgia. \n \n(b) Nonlawyer or Nonattorney. For purposes of this chapter, a nonlawyer or nonattorney is an individual who is not an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. This includes, but is not limited to, lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions, law students, law graduates, applicants to the State Bar of Georgia, inactive lawyers, disbarred lawyers, and suspended lawyers during the period of suspension. \n \n(c) This Court or the Court. This Court or the Court shall mean the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(d) Counsel for the Bar. Counsel for the Bar is a member of the State Bar of Georgia other than Staff Counsel representing the Bar in any proceedings under these rules. \n \n(e) Respondent. A respondent is a nonlawyer who is either accused of engaging in the unlicensed practice of law or whose conduct is under investigation. \n \n(f) Judge. A Judge is the Superior Court Judge who conducts proceedings as provided under these rules. \n \n(g) Standing Committee. The Standing Committee on UPL is the committee constituted according to the directives contained in these rules. \n \n(h) District Committee. A District Committee is a local unlicensed practice of law District Committee. \n \n(i) Staff Counsel. Staff counsel is an attorney employee of the State Bar of Georgia employed to perform such duties as may be assigned. \n \n(j) UPL. UPL is the unlicensed practice of law. \n \n(k) The Board or Board of Governors. The Board or Board of Governors is the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(l) Executive Committee. The Executive Committee is the Executive Committee of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, composed of such officers and members of the Board of Governors as may be designated in the bylaws, which shall exercise the powers and duties of the Board of Governors when it is not in session, subject to such limitations as the bylaws may provide.","UrlName":"rule294","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5533f82e-c949-48f7-baf9-a6f13292014b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5533f82e-c949-48f7-baf9-a6f13292014b","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"27e9308b-35e0-4506-9a6d-47895253b221","Title":"RULE 14-1.2 DUTY OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia, as an official arm of the Court, is charged with the duty of considering, investigating, and seeking the prohibition of matters pertaining to the unlicensed practice of law and the prosecution of alleged offenders. The Court hereby establishes a Standing Committee on the unlicensed practice of law and at least one District Committee on unlicensed practice of law in each judicial district.","UrlName":"rule292","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"19754a27-3bb0-46cd-971b-2665c8d089a9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["19754a27-3bb0-46cd-971b-2665c8d089a9","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"bfb0d9f0-5ac5-4fe7-8c47-27f24ed10928","Title":"Rule 12-101. Client Assistance Committee.","Content":" The advisory and oversight responsibility for this program will be vested in the General Counsel Office Overview Committee. ","UrlName":"rule276","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","Revisions":[{"Id":"80f76520-e553-4811-a180-5faecaee5d7c","ParentId":"bfb0d9f0-5ac5-4fe7-8c47-27f24ed10928","Title":"Version 2","Content":" The advisory and oversight responsibility for this program will be vested in the Consumer Assistance Committee (\"Committee \"). ","UrlName":"revision234"}],"Ancestors":["b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ba0b308b-9123-4ebf-9d90-19cf49fb8189","Title":"Rule 11-202. Membership.","Content":" The Committee shall consist of nine members, at least three of whom shall be members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar at the time of their appointment. The Director of the Law Practice Management Program, the Executive Director of the State Bar, or his or her designee, and the Executive Director of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar shall be non-voting, ex-officio members of the Committee. ","UrlName":"rule266","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"269aa772-115c-4ad7-a865-d1e3d98f0a63","Title":"CHAPTER 1 CONFIDENTIALITY","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter30","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"ee9bd98a-3daa-4962-b06c-6bea6246f600","Title":"Rule 11-101. Confidentiality.","Content":" Information obtained by the staff of the Law Practice Management Program shall be confidential unless the affected attorney otherwise elects or unless the information clearly shows the attorney intends to engage in criminal conduct in the future. ","UrlName":"rule263","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"269aa772-115c-4ad7-a865-d1e3d98f0a63","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["269aa772-115c-4ad7-a865-d1e3d98f0a63","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"93550340-da74-4648-93c8-4646122b543f","Title":"Rule 10-101. Fund Established.","Content":" There is established a separate fund of the State Bar of Georgia designated \"Clients' Security Fund of the State Bar of Georgia.\"There is also established a Clients' Security Fund Board of Trustees, which shall receive, hold, manage and disburse from the Fund such monies as may from time to time be appropriated to it by the State Bar of Georgia, or received through voluntary contributions, income from investments or other funding sources. ","UrlName":"rule242","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"b91acfb8-11a5-4905-99ea-884b1f9bc906","Title":"Rule 9-102. Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism","Content":" (A) Membership, Appointment and Terms \n \nThere is established a permanent Commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism. The Commission shall consist of twenty-two (22) members as follows: (1) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia or his or her designee, who shall serve as Chair of the Commission; (2) The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals or his or her designee; (3) one superior court judge designated by the Council of Superior Court Judges; (4) one state court judge designated by the Council of State Court Judges; (5) five law school faculty members designated by the deans of the accredited law schools in the State of Georgia, one of whom must be a member of the State Bar Committee on Professionalism; provided, however, such faculty members shall not be from the same law school; (6) two non-lawyer citizens from the public at large; (7) the President of the State Bar of Georgia; (8) the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; (9) one Federal District Judge; and (10) eight members of the State Bar of Georgia actively engaged in the practice of law, one of whom must be employed by a unit of federal state, or local government, one must be engaged primarily in criminal defense practice, one must be a federal or state prosecutor, and one must be in-house counsel. \n \nThree of the practicing lawyers and one of the non-lawyer citizens from the public at large shall be appointed by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. The remaining members of the Commission, with the exception of the President of the State Bar of Georgia, the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, the superior court judge, and the state court judge, shall be appointed by the Supreme Court. The terms of the members of the Commission shall be staggered and that shall be accomplished by the initial appointments being as follows: two of the practicing lawyer members appointed by the Board of Governors shall serve until the conclusion of the State Bar Annual Meeting in 1990; the non-lawyer general public member shall serve until the conclusion of the State Bar Annual Meeting in 1990; the superior court judge member, one practicing lawyer member appointed by the Board of Governors and one law faculty member shall serve until the conclusion of the State Bar Annual Meeting in 1991. The remaining members of the Commission shall serve until the conclusion of the Annual Meeting of the State Bar in 1992. Thereafter, the superior court judge member shall serve for a two year term as designated by the Council of Superior Court Judges, the state court judge member shall serve for a two year term as designated by the Council of State Court Judges, and all other members of the Commission shall serve for three (3) year terms, and no member (except the Chief Justice, that member appointed by the Court of Appeals, and the law school representatives) may serve more than two (2) terms on the Commission. \n \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Commission: \n \nThe Commission's major responsibilities shall be: \n \n    (1) To consider efforts by lawyers and judges to improve the administration of justice; \n \n    (2) To examine ways of making the system of justice more accessible to the public; \n \n    (3) To monitor and coordinate Georgia's professionalism efforts in such institutional settings as its bar, courts, law schools and law firms; \n \n    (4) To monitor professionalism efforts in jurisdictions outside Georgia; \n \n    (5) To conduct a study and issue a report on the present state of professionalism within Georgia; \n \n    (6) To plan the yearly Convocation on Professionalism; \n \n    (7) To promote various regional convocations on professionalism; \n \n    (8) To provide guidance and support to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency in its implementation and execution of the continuing legal education professionalism requirement; \n \n    (9) To help implement a professionalism component in the Bridge-the-Gap program; \n \n    (10) To make recommendations to the Supreme Court and the State Bar concerning additional means by which professionalism can be enhanced; \n \n    (11) To receive and administer gifts and grants; and \n \n    (12) The Commission shall have no authority to impose sanctions of any kind upon any member of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(C) Finances \n \nFunding for the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism shall be provided by an additional surcharge for each active State Bar member who attends a course in professionalism sponsored by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education (ICLE) or by any other sponsor approved by the Commission. The rate shall be set annually by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the surcharge shall be remitted directly to it by ICLE, by any other such sponsor, or, in an appropriate case, by the individual State Bar member who attended a course in professionalism approved by the Commission.","UrlName":"rule164","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d5906dc3-8e74-4e63-ba85-0e2f4c5082bb","Title":"Rule 8-102. Definition.","Content":"(a) \"Accredited sponsor \"shall mean an organization whose entire continuing legal education program has been accredited by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. A specific, individual continuing legal education activity presented by such a sponsor constitutes an approved legal education activity.\n(b) \"Active member \"shall include any person who is licensed to practice law in the State of Georgia and who is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, but shall not include the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, other Constitutional Executive Officers elected statewide, members of the Georgia Senate and the Georgia House of Representatives, United States Senators and Representatives, and shall not include judges who are prohibited by law, statute, or ordinance from engaging in the practice of law.\n(c) \"Commission \"shall mean the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (CCLC).\n(d) \"Inactive member \"shall mean a member of the State Bar who is on inactive status.\n(e) \"Supreme Court \"shall mean the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(f) \"Year \"shall mean the calendar year.","UrlName":"rule224","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"16602d5a-7789-4890-b5c5-baa7c707d48f","Title":"Rule 7-302. Confidentiality.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except as provided in this Rule or by court order, all information in the possession or control of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301), or any peer support volunteer or other designee, concerning any person who has sought, has been identified as a potential recipient of, or has received assistance from the LAP, or has volunteered to serve as a peer support volunteer, shall be maintained in confidence unless the person who is the subject of the information otherwise elects, except that any person may reveal: \n <ol> \n <li>to police or emergency responders, or any person in imminent danger, information needed to avoid or prevent death or substantial bodily harm, and</li> \n <li> information that is:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>mandated by statute to be reported;</li> \n <li>necessary to respond in any proceeding to allegation of malfeasance concerning actions taken by such person as a member or designee of the Committee pursuant to any LAP program, including any assistance he or she provided to a lawyer as part of a volunteer network established pursuant to Rule 7-102; or</li> \n <li>necessary for disclosure to counsel in order to secure legal advice about his or her compliance with these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n Confidential information in the possession of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301) or any peer support volunteer or other designee, also may be privileged under OCGA § 24-5-501 (a) (5), (a) (6), (a) (7) or (a) (8). Communications that are needed to carry out the LAP’s purposes are authorized between or among members of the Committee, its staff, any peer support volunteers, and/or the employees, staff or agents of any health care provider selected under Rule 7-301. Such communications shall not constitute breaches of the confidentiality required under this Rule, provided that the identity of any lawyer who has sought assistance directly from a health care provider selected under Rule 7-301 shall not be disclosed to the Committee, its members, staff, or designees, unless said member of the State Bar of Georgia has consented to such disclosure. Statements by a lawyer seeking or receiving assistance from the LAP to the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301), or any peer support volunteer or other designee shall not be admissible against the lawyer in any disciplinary proceeding under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule264","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"5e944b86-4f41-45be-a95d-aab96e2d5526","ParentId":"16602d5a-7789-4890-b5c5-baa7c707d48f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Upon the referral of any case to the Committee by the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, the Committee shall provide assistance to the impaired attorney referred by the Disciplinary Board as otherwise authorized by these rules. The Committee shall report to the Board, from time to time, the progress or lack of progress of the attorney so referred.","UrlName":"revision260"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"0c9649b8-2d6f-403d-b8a7-31e0c3e134bd","Title":"Rule 7-202. Volunteers.","Content":"The Committee may establish a network of peer support volunteers, as defined in Rule 7-204, who can provide support to lawyers in need.","UrlName":"rule254","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"acba73ef-9086-4f21-94c5-f5376c3861ef","ParentId":"0c9649b8-2d6f-403d-b8a7-31e0c3e134bd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee may establish a network of attorneys and lay persons throughout the state of Georgia who are experienced or trained in impairment counseling, treatment or rehabilitation, who can conduct education and awareness programs and assist in counseling and intervention programs and services. The Committee may also establish a network of peer-support volunteers who are members of the State Bar of Georgia who are not trained in impairment counseling, treatment or rehabilitation, who can provide support to impaired or potentially impaired attorneys by sharing their life experiences in dealing with (a) mental or emotional health problems, (b) substance abuse problems or (c) other similar problems that can adversely affect the quality of attorneys’ lives and their ability to function effectively as lawyers.","UrlName":"revision250"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Title":"CHAPTER 2 GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter25","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"139bb72c-2008-477e-ad31-3cf9f56d1ea7","Title":"Rule 7-201. Education, Information and Awareness.","Content":"The Committee shall promote and implement procedures to communicate to State Bar of Georgia members that there are programs within the LAP available and ready to help lawyers in need to overcome mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related problems. All such communication procedures shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule250","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"32c2e946-5a3a-4e6e-b77c-c92d2baf9f96","ParentId":"139bb72c-2008-477e-ad31-3cf9f56d1ea7","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall promote and implement procedures to communicate to impaired attorneys and the Bar in general the fact that there is a program available and ready to assist in helping the impaired attorneys to overcome their problem.","UrlName":"revision248"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"0c9649b8-2d6f-403d-b8a7-31e0c3e134bd","Title":"Rule 7-202. Volunteers.","Content":"The Committee may establish a network of peer support volunteers, as defined in Rule 7-204, who can provide support to lawyers in need.","UrlName":"rule254","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"acba73ef-9086-4f21-94c5-f5376c3861ef","ParentId":"0c9649b8-2d6f-403d-b8a7-31e0c3e134bd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee may establish a network of attorneys and lay persons throughout the state of Georgia who are experienced or trained in impairment counseling, treatment or rehabilitation, who can conduct education and awareness programs and assist in counseling and intervention programs and services. The Committee may also establish a network of peer-support volunteers who are members of the State Bar of Georgia who are not trained in impairment counseling, treatment or rehabilitation, who can provide support to impaired or potentially impaired attorneys by sharing their life experiences in dealing with (a) mental or emotional health problems, (b) substance abuse problems or (c) other similar problems that can adversely affect the quality of attorneys’ lives and their ability to function effectively as lawyers.","UrlName":"revision250"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"28532539-dfc4-468c-b730-9c3f6d3b099c","Title":"Rule 7-203. Procedures for Receiving and Action on Information Concerning Request for Assistance.","Content":"The Committee shall establish, design and implement procedures necessary for a health care provider to directly and confidentially receive information concerning lawyers requesting assistance with mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related issues. All such procedures shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule256","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d02711e-9a3f-493f-a9be-09e71a1a8646","ParentId":"28532539-dfc4-468c-b730-9c3f6d3b099c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The members of the Committee shall establish, design and implement all procedures necessary to receive information concerning impaired attorneys. Upon a determination that an attorney is impaired, the Committee shall implement such resources as to the Committee appear appropriate in each individual case. In carrying out its duties under this rule, the Committee, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee, is authorized to outsource the clinical portion of the Lawyer Assistance Program to private sector health care professionals. Such health care professionals and their related staff, consultants and other designees shall be authorized to communicate with each other and with the Committee regarding the program or persons referred to the program by the Committee. Said communications shall not constitute a violation of the confidentiality rules established herein.","UrlName":"revision252"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5b7f375a-f3c9-429d-ac6e-ec4df5fe7745","Title":"Rule 7-204. Definitions.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Lawyer. A lawyer, for the purposes of this Rule, is a member of the State Bar of Georgia as defined in Part I, Chapter 2, Rule 1-202 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Health Care Provider. A person authorized by the State of Georgia to practice a health care discipline and performing within the scope of his or her practice as defined by State law or an entity under Georgia law to employ such person.</li> \n <li>Peer Support Volunteers. Lawyers who have been approved by the Committee to serve as volunteer members by offering empathy and validation to a lawyer who may be suffering from a mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related problem, generally by providing practical, social, and emotional support, potentially based on their own experiences with a similar illness, stress or condition.</li> \n <li>Professional Clinical Services. Services provided by licensed mental health and substance abuse counselors in connection with the diagnosis, assessment, evaluation, treatment or prevention of psychological, emotional, psychophysiological and behavioral problems and addiction. These services include procedures for understanding, predicting, and alleviating intellectual, emotional, physical, and psychological distress, social and behavioral maladjustment, mental illness and addiction, as well as other forms of discomfort.</li> \n <li>Substance Abuse. A dependence on an addictive substance, especially alcohol or drugs.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule260","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"98e009e3-e914-4a2a-a16b-21f4b87b9111","ParentId":"5b7f375a-f3c9-429d-ac6e-ec4df5fe7745","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> \n <ol> \n <li>Attorney, as used in this Part VII, shall include active, inactive, emeritus and foreign law consultant members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>An impaired attorney is an attorney who, in the opinion of the members of the Committee, the State Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court of Georgia, or the members of the professional health care provider selected in accordance with Rule 7-203 above, who suffers from a medical, psychological, emotional, or stress-related disease or problem, or who is actively abusing alcohol or other chemical substances, or has become dependent upon alcohol or such substances, such that the attorney poses a substantial threat of harm to the attorney or the attorney's clients, or the public.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision253"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ee7bce3a-4857-4d1f-8c1e-fede853e08b5","Title":"Rule 7-101. Committee.","Content":"The LAP shall be administered by the State Bar of Georgia’s Lawyer Assistance Program Committee (“Committee”). The Committee shall monitor and provide advice to the staff and provide recommendations to the Executive Committee and Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia with respect to the rules, procedures, policies and operation of the LAP, while maintaining its obligation of privacy as set forth in these Rules. The Committee shall create internal rules for the day-to-day operation of the LAP and the implementation of these Rules. The internal rules and any amendments thereto shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule232","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"6dad650a-31bc-48c9-9ac4-06c935b10870","ParentId":"ee7bce3a-4857-4d1f-8c1e-fede853e08b5","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The program will be administered by the State Bar's Lawyer Assistance Committee (\"Committee \"). The Committee shall monitor and render advice to the staff, Executive Committee, and Board of Governors with respect to the rules, procedures, policies and operation of a Lawyer Assistance Program (\"LAP \").","UrlName":"revision240"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Title":"Part VII - Lawyer Assistance Program","Content":"","UrlName":"part15","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Title":"CHAPTER 1 LAWYER ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter24","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"3205e5e5-546f-4a68-82ab-11c137545e52","Title":"Preamble.","Content":"The purpose of the Lawyer Assistance Program (“LAP”) is to confidentially assist State Bar of Georgia members who may be experiencing mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related problems that may impact their ability to function effectively as lawyers or judges, through education, peer support and professional clinical services.","UrlName":"rule230","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"b1c0cf7b-27ef-47df-b082-d125b4e66b25","ParentId":"3205e5e5-546f-4a68-82ab-11c137545e52","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The purpose of the Lawyer Assistance Program is to confidentially identify and assist Bar members who are experiencing problems which negatively impact their quality of life and their ability to function effectively as members of the Bar through education, intervention, peer support and professional clinical treatment.","UrlName":"revision238"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ee7bce3a-4857-4d1f-8c1e-fede853e08b5","Title":"Rule 7-101. Committee.","Content":"The LAP shall be administered by the State Bar of Georgia’s Lawyer Assistance Program Committee (“Committee”). The Committee shall monitor and provide advice to the staff and provide recommendations to the Executive Committee and Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia with respect to the rules, procedures, policies and operation of the LAP, while maintaining its obligation of privacy as set forth in these Rules. The Committee shall create internal rules for the day-to-day operation of the LAP and the implementation of these Rules. The internal rules and any amendments thereto shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule232","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"6dad650a-31bc-48c9-9ac4-06c935b10870","ParentId":"ee7bce3a-4857-4d1f-8c1e-fede853e08b5","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The program will be administered by the State Bar's Lawyer Assistance Committee (\"Committee \"). The Committee shall monitor and render advice to the staff, Executive Committee, and Board of Governors with respect to the rules, procedures, policies and operation of a Lawyer Assistance Program (\"LAP \").","UrlName":"revision240"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"13a9ac41-b84b-4415-8fe5-3c5e64e8928d","Title":"Rule 7-102. Membership.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Committee members shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia for a three-year term in accordance with Article VIII, Section 1 of the bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.  In addition, the President shall appoint four non-lawyers to serve on the Committee, provided that such non-lawyers are licensed, certified addiction counselors, certified employee assistance professionals, licensed therapists, or other licensed mental/behavioral health professionals or other persons who have experience in conducting alcohol and drug rehabilitation intervention programs or mental health assistance programs. The term of such non-lawyer appointment shall be three years. Any member of the Committee with a previously identified chemical or alcohol dependence or other addiction must have a period of sobriety of at least five years prior to becoming a member of the Committee. Any member of the Committee who has received inpatient treatment for mental illness must have been released from the facility at which such treatment was provided at least two years prior to becoming a member of the Committee. The Committee may also appoint peer support volunteers as volunteer members in accordance with its rules.  Peer support volunteers must comply with this Rule concerning substance abuse and mental illness. Any Committee member or peer support volunteer with a previously identified chemical or alcohol dependence or other addiction or who has received inpatient treatment for mental illness must certify their recovery, sobriety, or satisfactory completion of medical treatment and release from treatment as provided in the internal rules of the Committee.</li> \n <li>Any Committee member or peer volunteer who suffers a relapse related to a substance use disorder and/or experiences challenges related to a diagnosed mental illness of any type to the degree to which significantly impairs his or her ability to serve shall be removed as a member of the Committee and/or as a peer volunteer pursuant to its internal rules.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule237","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"6349932c-e941-4f2f-b5ba-513e6cbc9845","ParentId":"13a9ac41-b84b-4415-8fe5-3c5e64e8928d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar in accordance with Article VIII, Section 1, of the bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. In addition, the President, at his or her discretion, may appoint up to four non-lawyers to serve on the Committee, provided that such non-lawyers are licensed, certified addiction counselors, certified employee assistance professionals, licensed therapists, or other persons who have experience in conducting alcohol and drug rehabilitation intervention programs or mental health assistance programs. The term of such non-lawyer appointment shall be one year. Any member of the Committee who is a recovered chemical or alcohol dependent person must have a period of sobriety of at least five years.","UrlName":"revision242"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c1bbc00d-3d22-43b9-a931-47f6c3bb75a5","Title":"Rule 7-103. Responsibility.","Content":"The Committee shall be responsible for implementing programs within the scope of these Rules to assist State Bar of Georgia members who request help from the LAP for mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related issues. Such programs shall provide for education, support, and/or professional clinical services through a LAP health care provider or referral for other counseling or treatment where appropriate. All programs shall require approval of the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule240","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"397fe879-f8ee-4b8a-8b75-c65181c535b5","ParentId":"c1bbc00d-3d22-43b9-a931-47f6c3bb75a5","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall be responsible for implementing an impairment program that provides education, referral and intervention.","UrlName":"revision244"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"899b1465-f896-417f-a71a-4fde6e2fb7b0","Title":"Rule 7-104. Funding.","Content":"The work of the Committee and any health care provider selected to assist the Committee in carrying out the work of the LAP, with approval of the Executive Committee, may be funded from the general budget of the State Bar of Georgia and/or through donations and grants from the Georgia Bar Foundation or other public or private sources.","UrlName":"rule247","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"4db66563-97fb-4b10-bb6b-5b2a14b7b3e9","ParentId":"899b1465-f896-417f-a71a-4fde6e2fb7b0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The work of the Committee and any treatment provider selected to assist the Committee in carrying out the work of the program shall be funded from the general budget of the State Bar and/or through donations and grants from the Georgia Bar Foundation or other public or private sources.","UrlName":"revision246"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Title":"CHAPTER 2 GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter25","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"139bb72c-2008-477e-ad31-3cf9f56d1ea7","Title":"Rule 7-201. Education, Information and Awareness.","Content":"The Committee shall promote and implement procedures to communicate to State Bar of Georgia members that there are programs within the LAP available and ready to help lawyers in need to overcome mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related problems. All such communication procedures shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule250","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"32c2e946-5a3a-4e6e-b77c-c92d2baf9f96","ParentId":"139bb72c-2008-477e-ad31-3cf9f56d1ea7","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall promote and implement procedures to communicate to impaired attorneys and the Bar in general the fact that there is a program available and ready to assist in helping the impaired attorneys to overcome their problem.","UrlName":"revision248"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"0c9649b8-2d6f-403d-b8a7-31e0c3e134bd","Title":"Rule 7-202. Volunteers.","Content":"The Committee may establish a network of peer support volunteers, as defined in Rule 7-204, who can provide support to lawyers in need.","UrlName":"rule254","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"acba73ef-9086-4f21-94c5-f5376c3861ef","ParentId":"0c9649b8-2d6f-403d-b8a7-31e0c3e134bd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee may establish a network of attorneys and lay persons throughout the state of Georgia who are experienced or trained in impairment counseling, treatment or rehabilitation, who can conduct education and awareness programs and assist in counseling and intervention programs and services. The Committee may also establish a network of peer-support volunteers who are members of the State Bar of Georgia who are not trained in impairment counseling, treatment or rehabilitation, who can provide support to impaired or potentially impaired attorneys by sharing their life experiences in dealing with (a) mental or emotional health problems, (b) substance abuse problems or (c) other similar problems that can adversely affect the quality of attorneys’ lives and their ability to function effectively as lawyers.","UrlName":"revision250"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"28532539-dfc4-468c-b730-9c3f6d3b099c","Title":"Rule 7-203. Procedures for Receiving and Action on Information Concerning Request for Assistance.","Content":"The Committee shall establish, design and implement procedures necessary for a health care provider to directly and confidentially receive information concerning lawyers requesting assistance with mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related issues. All such procedures shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule256","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d02711e-9a3f-493f-a9be-09e71a1a8646","ParentId":"28532539-dfc4-468c-b730-9c3f6d3b099c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The members of the Committee shall establish, design and implement all procedures necessary to receive information concerning impaired attorneys. Upon a determination that an attorney is impaired, the Committee shall implement such resources as to the Committee appear appropriate in each individual case. In carrying out its duties under this rule, the Committee, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee, is authorized to outsource the clinical portion of the Lawyer Assistance Program to private sector health care professionals. Such health care professionals and their related staff, consultants and other designees shall be authorized to communicate with each other and with the Committee regarding the program or persons referred to the program by the Committee. Said communications shall not constitute a violation of the confidentiality rules established herein.","UrlName":"revision252"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5b7f375a-f3c9-429d-ac6e-ec4df5fe7745","Title":"Rule 7-204. Definitions.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Lawyer. A lawyer, for the purposes of this Rule, is a member of the State Bar of Georgia as defined in Part I, Chapter 2, Rule 1-202 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Health Care Provider. A person authorized by the State of Georgia to practice a health care discipline and performing within the scope of his or her practice as defined by State law or an entity under Georgia law to employ such person.</li> \n <li>Peer Support Volunteers. Lawyers who have been approved by the Committee to serve as volunteer members by offering empathy and validation to a lawyer who may be suffering from a mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related problem, generally by providing practical, social, and emotional support, potentially based on their own experiences with a similar illness, stress or condition.</li> \n <li>Professional Clinical Services. Services provided by licensed mental health and substance abuse counselors in connection with the diagnosis, assessment, evaluation, treatment or prevention of psychological, emotional, psychophysiological and behavioral problems and addiction. These services include procedures for understanding, predicting, and alleviating intellectual, emotional, physical, and psychological distress, social and behavioral maladjustment, mental illness and addiction, as well as other forms of discomfort.</li> \n <li>Substance Abuse. A dependence on an addictive substance, especially alcohol or drugs.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule260","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"98e009e3-e914-4a2a-a16b-21f4b87b9111","ParentId":"5b7f375a-f3c9-429d-ac6e-ec4df5fe7745","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> \n <ol> \n <li>Attorney, as used in this Part VII, shall include active, inactive, emeritus and foreign law consultant members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>An impaired attorney is an attorney who, in the opinion of the members of the Committee, the State Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court of Georgia, or the members of the professional health care provider selected in accordance with Rule 7-203 above, who suffers from a medical, psychological, emotional, or stress-related disease or problem, or who is actively abusing alcohol or other chemical substances, or has become dependent upon alcohol or such substances, such that the attorney poses a substantial threat of harm to the attorney or the attorney's clients, or the public.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision253"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Title":"CHAPTER 3 PROCEDURES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter26","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"f2cb6b1f-2931-480b-bea0-2d433d04dab8","Title":"Rule 7-301. Outsourcing of Clinical Services.","Content":"In carrying out its duties, the Committee, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee, is authorized to outsource the clinical portion(s) of the LAP to private sector health care providers.","UrlName":"rule262","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"e8926b20-cd90-4425-b6ca-6aaf692fdcae","ParentId":"f2cb6b1f-2931-480b-bea0-2d433d04dab8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall be authorized to establish and implement procedures to handle all contacts from or concerning impaired or potentially impaired attorneys, either through its chosen health care professional source, the statewide network established pursuant to Rule 7-202, or by any other procedure through which appropriate counseling or assistance to such attorneys may be provided.","UrlName":"revision255"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"16602d5a-7789-4890-b5c5-baa7c707d48f","Title":"Rule 7-302. Confidentiality.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except as provided in this Rule or by court order, all information in the possession or control of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301), or any peer support volunteer or other designee, concerning any person who has sought, has been identified as a potential recipient of, or has received assistance from the LAP, or has volunteered to serve as a peer support volunteer, shall be maintained in confidence unless the person who is the subject of the information otherwise elects, except that any person may reveal: \n <ol> \n <li>to police or emergency responders, or any person in imminent danger, information needed to avoid or prevent death or substantial bodily harm, and</li> \n <li> information that is:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>mandated by statute to be reported;</li> \n <li>necessary to respond in any proceeding to allegation of malfeasance concerning actions taken by such person as a member or designee of the Committee pursuant to any LAP program, including any assistance he or she provided to a lawyer as part of a volunteer network established pursuant to Rule 7-102; or</li> \n <li>necessary for disclosure to counsel in order to secure legal advice about his or her compliance with these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n Confidential information in the possession of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301) or any peer support volunteer or other designee, also may be privileged under OCGA § 24-5-501 (a) (5), (a) (6), (a) (7) or (a) (8). Communications that are needed to carry out the LAP’s purposes are authorized between or among members of the Committee, its staff, any peer support volunteers, and/or the employees, staff or agents of any health care provider selected under Rule 7-301. Such communications shall not constitute breaches of the confidentiality required under this Rule, provided that the identity of any lawyer who has sought assistance directly from a health care provider selected under Rule 7-301 shall not be disclosed to the Committee, its members, staff, or designees, unless said member of the State Bar of Georgia has consented to such disclosure. Statements by a lawyer seeking or receiving assistance from the LAP to the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301), or any peer support volunteer or other designee shall not be admissible against the lawyer in any disciplinary proceeding under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule264","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"5e944b86-4f41-45be-a95d-aab96e2d5526","ParentId":"16602d5a-7789-4890-b5c5-baa7c707d48f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Upon the referral of any case to the Committee by the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, the Committee shall provide assistance to the impaired attorney referred by the Disciplinary Board as otherwise authorized by these rules. The Committee shall report to the Board, from time to time, the progress or lack of progress of the attorney so referred.","UrlName":"revision260"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"265273d2-e7a2-40ad-9608-2305521f7b94","Title":"Rule 7-303. Reports.","Content":"The Committee shall implement and design such reports and documentation on an annual basis or as requested by the President of the State Bar of Georgia for reporting purposes to the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 7-302. Recognizing that disclosure of the identity of members of the State Bar of Georgia who have sought LAP assistance would be contrary to the purposes for which the Committee was established, neither the Committee, peer support volunteers, nor any health care provider selected under Rule 7-301 shall be required to provide confidential information concerning any such person to any private or government entity except by court order or as provided in Rule 7-302.","UrlName":"rule267","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"d3a1733d-1a6e-43d8-b308-ab3fb9d1946d","ParentId":"265273d2-e7a2-40ad-9608-2305521f7b94","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except as provided in this Rule and in Rule 4-104 (b), Rule 4-104 (c), Rule 7-203 and Rule 7-305, all proceedings and records of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation its contractor for clinical services) and other designees, including any information provided to any of them, shall be confidential unless the attorney who has provided the information or caused the record to be created otherwise elects, except that any such person may reveal (i) to police or emergency responders, or any person in imminent danger, information needed to avoid or prevent death or substantial bodily harm, and (ii) information: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>which is mandated by statute to be reported;</li> \n <li>to respond in any proceeding to allegations of misfeasance concerning the assistance he or she has provided to an impaired attorney as part of a volunteer network established pursuant to Rule 7-202; and</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about his or her compliance with these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision257"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ffceaf66-d6c8-42c8-8028-cf63d43bb8b3","Title":"Rule 7-304. Immunity.","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia, its employees, and members of the Committee and its selected clinical outsource private health care professionals shall be absolutely immune from civil liability for all acts taken in the course of their official duties pursuant to these Rules.","UrlName":"rule269","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"b7cecee4-4602-4186-b714-413b40ffb2f7","ParentId":"ffceaf66-d6c8-42c8-8028-cf63d43bb8b3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall implement and design such reports and documentation as it deems necessary or as is requested by the president of the State Bar, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 7-303.","UrlName":"revision259"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ef81550f-6aa4-4427-9eb1-91fe9f396730","Title":"Rule 6-602. Record Retention.","Content":"The record of any fee dispute under these rules shall be retained by the Committee in accordance with policies adopted by the Committee.","UrlName":"rule555","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"2e4eb30e-dedb-4a6b-893e-b3fc6d5a0344","Title":"Rule 6-502. Confirmation of Award in Favor of Lawyer.","Content":"In cases where an award has been issued in favor of a lawyer, the lawyer may apply to the appropriate Georgia superior court for confirmation of the award in accordance with the Georgia Arbitration Code, OCGA § 9-9-1 et seq. \nThe State Bar will not represent, assist, or advise the lawyer except to provide copies of any necessary papers from the fee arbitration file pursuant to State Bar policies.","UrlName":"rule215","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","Revisions":[{"Id":"9f427d40-d68a-44bc-a6bc-1f90fc3a2ea4","ParentId":"2e4eb30e-dedb-4a6b-893e-b3fc6d5a0344","Title":"Version 2","Content":"In cases where both parties agreed to be bound by the result of the arbitration and an award has been issued in favor of an attorney, the attorney may apply to the appropriate Georgia superior court for confirmation of the award in accordance with the Georgia Arbitration Code, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 et seq. \nThe State Bar will not represent, assist, or advise the attorney except to provide copies of any necessary papers from the fee arbitration file pursuant to State Bar policies.","UrlName":"revision377"}],"Ancestors":["402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"aaa86634-ba25-4cdf-b355-36c7f53fa339","Title":"Rule 6-402. Time and Place of Arbitration Hearing.","Content":"Upon their appointment by the Committee, the arbitrators shall elect a chair and then shall fix a time and place for the arbitration hearing. To the extent feasible, the hearing shall be held no more than 60 days after the appointment of the last arbitrator. At least ten calendar days prior to the hearing, the Committee shall mail notices of the time and place of the hearing to each party by first class mail, addressed to each party’s last known address.","UrlName":"rule188","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a4d46334-9f7d-45fd-b7d1-433a746e77cc","Title":"Rule 6-302. Neutrality of Arbitrators.","Content":"No person shall serve as an arbitrator in any matter in which that person has any financial or personal interest. Upon appointment to a particular arbitration, each arbitrator shall disclose to the Committee any circumstance that may affect his or her neutrality in regard to the dispute in question.\nIf an arbitrator becomes aware of any circumstances that might preclude that arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial determination of the proceeding, the arbitrator must disclose that potential conflict as soon as practicable. If the arbitrator becomes aware of the potential conflict prior to the hearing, the disclosure shall be made to the Committee, which shall forward the disclosure to the parties. If the potential conflict becomes apparent during the hearing, the disclosure shall be made directly to the parties.\nIf a party believes that an arbitrator has a potential conflict of interest and should withdraw or be disqualified, and the arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw, the party shall promptly notify the Committee so that the issue may be addressed and resolved as early in the arbitration process as possible.","UrlName":"rule181","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a7affb39-3c1e-480a-b1e2-bc8eb86219a0","Title":"Rule 6-202. Service of Petition.","Content":"If a petition has been properly completed and appears to have merit, Committee staff shall serve a copy of the petition, along with a Fee Arbitration Answer Form and an acknowledgment of service form, upon the respondent by first class mail addressed to such party’s last known address. A signed acknowledgment of service form or a written answer from the respondent or respondent’s counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.\nIn the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent's counsel, service shall be certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to such party’s last known address.\nIn unusual circumstances as determined by the Committee or its staff, when service has not been accomplished by other less costly measures, service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or a court-approved agent for service of process.\n If service is not accomplished, the Committee shall not accept jurisdiction of the case. \n \n","UrlName":"rule178","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"da76d6ca-f51b-4f59-8c4b-ecab17268315","ParentId":"a7affb39-3c1e-480a-b1e2-bc8eb86219a0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"If a petition has been properly completed and appears to have merit, Committee staff shall serve a copy of the petition, along with a Fee Arbitration Answer Form and an acknowledgment of service form, upon the respondent by first class mail addressed to such party’s last known address. A signed acknowledgment of service form or a written answer from the respondent or respondent’s attorney shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.\nIn the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent's counsel, service shall be certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to such party’s last known address.\nIn unusual circumstances as determined by the Committee or its staff, when service has not been accomplished by other less costly measures, service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or a court-approved agent for service of process.\n If service is not accomplished, the Committee shall not accept jurisdiction of the case. \n \n","UrlName":"revision361"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"29f3f762-3ce4-41d2-a479-5529e061675b","Title":"Rule 6-102. Committee Membership.","Content":"The Committee shall consist of six lawyer members and three public members who are not lawyers. The six lawyer members shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, and the three public members shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule10","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Title":"CHAPTER 1 COMMITTEE ON ARBITRATION OF ATTORNEY FEE DISPUTES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter4","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"642dae74-1c81-41c1-82f3-b1da08d54f39","Title":"Rule 6-101. Administration of Program.","Content":"This program will be administered by the State Bar Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes (\"Committee \").","UrlName":"rule9","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"29f3f762-3ce4-41d2-a479-5529e061675b","Title":"Rule 6-102. Committee Membership.","Content":"The Committee shall consist of six lawyer members and three public members who are not lawyers. The six lawyer members shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, and the three public members shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule10","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a36635da-b8cb-4b17-b5cd-e12e05e7593a","Title":"Rule 6-103. Terms.","Content":"Initially, two members of the Committee, including one of the public members, shall be appointed for a period of three years; two members, including the remaining public members, for a period of two years; and one member for a period of one year. As each member's term of office on the Committee expires, his or her successor shall be appointed for a period of three years. The President of the State Bar shall appoint the chair of the Committee each year from among the members. Vacancies in unexpired terms shall be filled by their respective appointing authorities.","UrlName":"rule172","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"255e70a0-1276-4d24-8aa1-0d397fa52545","Title":"Rule 6-104. Powers and Duties of Committee.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Committee shall have the following powers and duties: \n(a) To determine whether to accept jurisdiction over a dispute; \n(b) To appoint and remove lawyer and nonlawyer arbitrators and panels of arbitrators; \n(c) To oversee the operation of the arbitration process; \n(d) To develop and implement fee arbitration procedures; \n(e) To interpret these rules and to decide any disputes regarding the interpretation and application of these rules; \n(f) To determine challenges to, and rule on, the neutrality of an arbitrator where the arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw; \n(g) To maintain the records of the State Bar of Georgia’s Fee Arbitration Program; and \n (h) To perform all other acts necessary for the effective operation of the Fee Arbitration Program. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule173","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[{"Id":"64c1f09c-e527-429e-9eb0-8d007bc8ab57","ParentId":"255e70a0-1276-4d24-8aa1-0d397fa52545","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Committee shall have the following powers and duties: \n(a) To determine whether to accept jurisdiction over a dispute; \n(b) To appoint and remove lawyer and nonlawyer arbitrators and panels of arbitrators; \n(c) To oversee the operation of the arbitration process; \n(d) To develop and implement fee arbitration procedures; \n(e) To interpret these rules and to decide any disputes regarding the interpretation and application of these rules; \n(f) To determine challenges to the neutrality of an arbitrator where the arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw; \n(g) To maintain the records of the State Bar of Georgia’s Fee Arbitration Program; and \n (h) To perform all other acts necessary for the effective operation of the Fee Arbitration Program. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision357"}],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"752ac92e-7474-4c51-872a-c6f423da39f2","Title":"Rule 6-105. Staff's Responsibilities.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> State Bar of Georgia staff shall be assigned to assist the Committee. The assigned staff will have such administrative responsibilities as may be delegated by the Committee, which may include the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Receive and review arbitration requests and discuss them with the parties, if necessary;</li> \n <li>Conduct inquiries to obtain additional information as needed;</li> \n <li>Make recommendations to the Committee whether to accept or decline jurisdiction; and</li> \n <li>Transmit notices of arbitration hearings, arbitration awards, and other Committee correspondence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule174","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"1cb4a506-933a-4671-8f87-c92840b06c94","Title":"Advisory Opinion 16","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 16 \nSeptember 21, 1973 \n Propriety of An Attorney Who is a County Commissioner in a Rural County Appointing His Own Firm as County Attorney.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, this State Disciplinary Board, upon request made therefore, renders this its opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State of Georgia as applied to a given state of facts.\nAn advisory opinion has been requested upon the following inquiry:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nA partner in a three-member law firm has been elected Commissioner in a small county. The new Commissioner, who at times in the past has served as County Attorney and who intends to remain active in the law firm, wishes to appoint his law firm as County Attorneys. May he do so consistent with the applicable ethical rules? Would the result be different if the Commissioner's partner were appointed County Attorney in his individual capacity and all legal fees paid by the County were paid directly to this partner rather than into the law firm's general account? There is only one other active law firm in the County; and its members were closely associated politically with the candidate who was defeated in the last election by the present Commissioner. \n</div>\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are Rule 3-108 (Canon 8): EC 8-8, and Rule 3-109 (Canon 9): EC 9-1 and EC 9-2.\nCanon 8 provides \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System.\"The ethical considerations under this Canon relevant to the question presented are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n EC 8-8 Lawyers often serve as legislators or as holders of other public offices. This is highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant contributions to the improvement of the legal system. A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties. \n</div>\nDR 8-101(A)(1) states as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(1) use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious that such action is not in the public interest; \n</div>\nCanon 9 provides \"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety \". The relevant ethical considerations under this Canon are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 9-1 Continuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profession. \nEC 9-2 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to be unethical. In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in the matters being handled for the client. While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that has a tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or in the legal profession, his duty to clients or to the public should never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his obligations may be understood or may tend to subject him or the legal profession to criticism. When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal profession. \n</div>\nThere are numerous Formal and Informal Opinions of the American Bar Association on the subject of the attorney as public official, but these opinions seem to be largely useless to the present inquiry as they consistently address themselves to factual situations in which the duty of the attorney as government official comes into conflict with his duty as counselor or advocate for his non-governmental client. The question here presented is much more subtle than the conflict-of-interest cases and the authorities provide little guidance.\nPutting the first inquiry in its simplest form, the State Disciplinary Board must answer the question:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nWould the proposed employment of the Commissioner's law firm present such a danger of public suspicion of self-dealing that public confidence in attorneys, and in our legal governmental system, would be unnecessarily eroded? \n</div>\nIt is obvious that public confidence in the institution of local government would be damaged if the public came to view local politics as merely a battle between law firms for \"the largest client in the County \". Strong support for this view is found in American Bar Association Formal Opinion No. 192 which states:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n Many opinions have been written by this committee applying each of these Canons. Opinions 16, 30, 34, 77, 118 and 134 relate to Canon 6, and pass on questions concerning the propriety of the conduct of an attorney who is a public officer, in representing private interests adverse to those of the public body which he represents. The principle applied in these opinions is that an attorney holding public office should avoid all conduct which might lead the layman to conclude that the attorney is utilizing his public position to further his professional success or personal interests .\"(emphasis ours) \n</div>\n This language has been carried into EC 8-8 of the present Code of Professional Responsibility, which ethical rule was cited above. The mere fact that there is an opportunity for a County Commissioner to allow his firm to charge excessively or to create legal business for himself and for his law firm acting as County Attorney,does not, of course, imply that such impropriety would necessarily follow. However, it is vitally important that no situation be allowed to exist which might tempt the public to conclude that the County's interest has been subordinated to that of any law firm or attorney. It has long been the law in Georgia that one who is entrusted with the business of others will not be allowed to make out of the same a pecuniary profit to himself however honest and fair the circumstances of employment, and that the citizens of Georgia are entitled to have their officials exercise close and totally objective scrutiny of the performance of those doing the work of government. Montgomery v. City of Atlanta 162 Ga. 534 (1926); Mayor of Macon v. Huff , 60 Ga. 221 (1878); Trainer v. City of Covington , 183 Ga. 759 (1937): Opinions of the Attorney General (unofficial), 1971,p. 286. Numerous statutes which regulate the actions of officers and employees of government have as their goal the prevention of any situation in which the official's personal interest and his public duty may conflict. Ga. Code Annotated Â§ Â§ 2-5606,23-1713, 23-1714, 26-2306, 26-2307, 23-2308, 69-201, 89-103, 89-904, and 89-913 to 918.The statutes and cases cited are grounded in strong public policy which provides a dependable guide in the premises. In light of the public policy favoring avoidance of any actual or imagined conflict-of-interest situation by government officials, we conclude that the only effective way to avoid the possibility of public suspicion of self-dealing and conflicts of interest is for the County Commissioner-attorney to refrain from employing himself as County Attorney. A.B.A. Formal Opinions 33, 49, 50, 72, 103 and 128indicate that no partner or associate of a law firm may undertake any professional relationship which any one of the partners or associates, because of adverse influence and conflicting interests, could not undertake. Consequently, employment of the Commissioner's own firm as County Attorney would be inappropriate. The A.B.A. Formal Opinions cited of knowledge and financial resources and the personal and professional closeness which exists in the legal partnership. It must be remembered, too, that public opinion and appearance of propriety are important considerations in this area, and it is highly probable that employment of the attorney-commissioner's own firm would have the same basic deleterious impact on public opinion and public confidence as would his individual employment as County Attorney. Therefore, the State Disciplinary Board holds that the Attorney-Commissioner may not employ himself or his law firm as County Attorney.\n The second part of the question before the Board has to do with the propriety of the hiring of the Commissioner-Attorney's partner as County Attorney on an individual basis. Again, the public policy considerations discussed in Montgomery ,Trainer , and Mayor of Macon provide guidance. The two evils arising from an official's self-employment outlined in these cases are:\n (1) the temptation to be dishonest in the collection of monies from the government, \n(2) the inability of the official to honestly, objectively, and forcefully exercise control over himself, if a way could be found to avoid these dual evils, then the County Commission or the attorney-commissioner might freely employ the attorney-commissioner's partner on an individual basis. Employment of the partner in his individual capacity and use of contract terms stipulating that the attorney-commissioner shall not benefit in any way from the County Attorney's income would destroy objections based on the first evil, but would not avoid those based on the second.It is true that the Commission and attorney-commissioner will always employ a friend and that, consequently, they and he would always be less than totally objective in judging the work of the County Attorney, but it is also true that an attorney-commissioner who would be the Commissioner best qualified to judge the quality of legal work, would be less likely to expose and criticize poor work on the part of one who is his law partner than one who was merely a good friend.\n The temptation to overlook or conceal the faults of professional or business partner is one with which no attorney or other person charged with public duty should be faced. The Board, in answering the second part of the inquiry,seeks to avoid the possibility of such temptation and answers part two of the inquiry in the negative.","UrlName":"rule454","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0c0141bb-2965-4014-8518-d22f8a1cd496","Title":"Topical Index","Content":" IMPORTANT NOTE: The Index IS NOT, and should not be regarded as, ethics authority.  It is a guide for the convenience of lawyers researching ethics questions.  In many cases the Opinion addresses issues not mentioned in the Index summary.  Before taking action in a given situation, reference should be made to the full text of the Advisory Opinion mentioned in the Index. \n \nReferences to opinions designated \"SDB No. ____,\"are to advisory opinions issued by the State Disciplinary Board under the process by which advisory opinions were issued prior to the present <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule248\">Rule 4-403</a> being adopted. \n \nReferences to \"FAO No. _____,\"are to formal advisory opinions that were drafted by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and issued either by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia pursuant to <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule248\">Rule 4-403</a> .  Reference the full text of the Advisory Opinion mentioned in the Index to determine by whom the opinion was issued. \n \nTOPICAL INDEX\n \nADVANCE FEES, see ATTORNEY'S FEES and RETAINER FEES \n \nADVERTISING \n      --Nonlawyer's business card must indicate that they are not a lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n      --An attorney may communicate to other attorneys his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law so long as the communication is accurate and not misleading.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n      --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\" \n<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> \n      --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n \nALIMONY \n      --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n \nAPPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY \n      --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \nATTORNEY'S FEES \n   Advance Fees Paid to Attorney \n      --A lawyer is not required to place attorney's fees paid in advance into a trust account except under special circumstances.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a> \n      --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> and does not violate <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule\">Rule 1.5(a)'s</a> requirement of reasonableness.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n   Advance Payment Made by an Attorney to a Client for Certain Expenses \n      --A third party beneficiary or his or her attorney may advance or reimburse an insured for the purchase of optional PIP coverage.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">SDB No. 46</a> \n      --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n   Collection, see COLLECTION \n   Contingency, see CONTINGENCY FEES \n   Division of Fees, see FEE SHARING and FEE SPLITTING \n   Fee Collection Program \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program that purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n   Interest \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --Considerations applicable to payment of interest charged on a loan obtained to cover advances on litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n  Paid by Opponent \n      --Ethical propriety of attorney's fees being paid by opposing side.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a> \n   Reasonableness \n      --Ethical propriety of including attorney's fees as part of a settlement offer in federal civil rights cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a> \n      --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n      --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n      --Where drafter of will or trust serves as executor or trustee, total combined attorney's fee and executor or trustee fee must be reasonable.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n      --A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a> \n      --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) and does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n   Retainers, see RETAINER FEES \n   Security Interest \n     --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n   Sharing Fees, see FEE SHARING \n   Splitting Fees, see FEE SPLITTING \n  Unpaid Fees \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --May a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a> \n   Worker's Compensation Cases \n      --Attorney must advise their client of his or her right to independent counsel if the attorney appeals award of fees granted by the Workman's Compensation Board. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a> \n \nATTORNEY'S LIEN \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n \nBAD CHECKS \n      --Attorney may send statutory notice to drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Georgia Code Ann. §26-1704. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a> \n \nBUSINESS CARD \n      --Nonlawyer's business card must indicate that they are not a lawyer. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n      --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> \n \nCHILD SUPPORT \n      --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n \nCITY COUNCIL \n      --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n      --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \nCLIENT FUNDS, also see TRUST ACCOUNTS \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nCLIENT PAPERS, also see FILES \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\"> FAO No. 93-4 \n </a> \nCLOSING \n      --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3</a> \n      --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n      --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nCOLLECTION \n      --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by that client to collect a debt. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program which purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n      --May a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a> \n \nCOMMUNICATION \n      --An attorney may communicate to other attorneys his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law so long as the communication is accurate and not misleading. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> \n      --Attorney may send statutory notice to drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Georgia Code Ann. §26-1704. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of attorney's fees being paid by opposing side. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a> \n      --Ethical obligation of attorney to resist disclosure of name and/or identity of his client. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a> \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n      --Permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A § 51-12-14 to an unrepresented adverse party, but must specifically state that it is a notice rather than advice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a> \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n      --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n      --A staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group may contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of non-clients and clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a> \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n      --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n      --A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> \n      --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\"> FAO No. 16-3 \n </a> --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> \n \n COMPETENCE \n --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel’s fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm’s clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as “special counsel” for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter Into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>\n CONFIDENTIALITY \n     --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of revealing confidences and secrets necessary to defend against charges of professional misconduct.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule474\">SDB No. 27</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of attorney to resist disclosure of name and/or identity of his client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a> \n     --Under certain circumstances, an attorney may reveal a client's intent to commit suicide.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule486\">SDB No. 42</a> \n     --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program that purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical considerations of a law firm interested in obtaining a loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --May a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n     --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n \nCONFLICTS OF INTEREST \n   Claims and Complaints \n      --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n   Criminal Cases \n      --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n   Domestic Relations \n      --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n   Independent Professional Judgment \n      --Ethical propriety of attorney's fees being paid by opposing side.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a> \n      --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program that purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n      --While it may be possible to do so, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a> \n      --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n      --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n      --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n   Insurance Practice \n      -- Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a> \n      -- Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n   Law Clerks \n      --A law clerk for a superior court judge may not write appellate briefs on behalf of criminal defendants in death penalty cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n   Malpractice Claims, see MALPRACTICE \n   Multi-Firm Employment \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n   Multiple Representation \n      --Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n    Of Counsel \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n   Private Interest v. Public Duty \n     --County Commissioner may not appoint his or her own firm, or a partner in his or her own firm, as County Attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No. 16</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n   Real Estate Transactions \n      --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n   Referrals \n      --While it may be possible to do so, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a> \n   Settlement \n      --Ethical propriety of including attorney's fees as part of settlement offer in federal civil rights cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a> \n      --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n   Temporary/Contract Attorneys \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n   Wills and Trusts \n      --Drafter of will or trust may serve as the executor or trustee even though the lawyer's independent professional judgment may be affected, provided the client consent after full disclosure.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a> \n  Workers' Compensation Cases \n      --Attorney must advise their client of his or her right to independent counsel if the attorney appeals award of fees granted by the Workman's Compensation Board.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a> \n \nCONSULTANT \n      --An attorney may communicate to other attorneys his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law so long as the communication is accurate and not misleading.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> \n      --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n \nCONTINGENCY FEES \n      --Guidelines for payment of expert witness fees in contingency fee cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a> \n      --A contingency fee arrangement in a divorce case is against public policy and is therefore improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=479\%22>SDB No. 36</a> \n      --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n      --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n \nCORPORATE COUNSEL \n      --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n     --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> \n \nCOUNTY ATTORNEY \n     --County Commissioner may not appoint his or her own firm, or a partner in his or her own firm, as County Attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No. 16</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n \nCRIMINAL PRACTICE \n     --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n     --Attorney may send statutory notice to drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Georgia Code Ann. §26-1704.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n \nDEPARTING ATTORNEY \n     --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n     --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>\n DILIGENCE \n      --Not improper for atorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n      --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact of active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicatble ethics rules. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n       --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n      --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nDISCOVERY \n     --Guidelines for use of subpoenas. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO 05-10</a> \n \nDISQUALIFICATION \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n \nDISTRICT ATTORNEYS, see PROSECUTORS \n \nDOMESTIC RELATIONS \n     --A contingency fee arrangement in a divorce case is against public policy and is therefore improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule479\">SDB No. 36</a> \n     --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n     --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n \nDUAL OCCUPATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT \n     --Ethical considerations applicable to a lawyer who is engaged in both the practice of law and another profession or business.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule477\">SDB No. 31</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. \n     --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \n EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY, see HIRING \n \nESCROW ACCOUNT, see TRUST ACCOUNTS \n \nEXECUTOR, see WILLS/TRUSTS \n \nEXPERT WITNESS, see WITNESSES \n \nFEE BILLS \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program which purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n      --A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a> \n \nFEE SHARING \n      --Prohibition of division of fees with nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n      --Permissible for attorney employee to share attorney's fees with his or her lay organization employer where the attorney's fees are regarded as stipulated liquidated damages.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule513\">FAO No. 88-2</a> \n      --Any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a> \n      --The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his law office in addition to their regular salary is permissible. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n \nFEE SPLITTING \n      --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n \nFIDUCIARY \n      --A lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity may remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule512\">FAO No. 98-2</a> \n      --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nFILES \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\"> FAO No. 96-1 \n </a> \nFILING LAWSUITS \n      --Not improper for attorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n \n FIRM NAME \n --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a>\n FUGITIVES \n      --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n \nGOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, see PUBLIC OFFICIALS and LAW CLERKS\n GUARDIAN AD LITEM \n      --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n \nHOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENTS / INDEMNIFICATION \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a>\n HIRING \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n      --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nIMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION, see DISQUALIFICATION \n \nINSURANCE PRACTICE \n      --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n      --A third party beneficiary or his or her attorney may advance or reimburse an insured for the purchase of optional PIP coverage.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a> \n      --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n      --Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a> \n      --Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n \nIN HOUSE COUNSEL \n      --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO 05-10</a> \n \nINTERPLEADER \n     \nJUDGES \n      --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n      --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member and the city council appoints Recorder's Court judges.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n \nLAW CLERKS \n     --Ethical considerations regarding activities of nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --A law clerk for a superior court judge may not write appellate briefs on behalf of criminal defendants in death penalty cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a> \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n \nLAW FIRMS \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state law with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n     --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law. The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nLEGAL ASSISTANTS, see NONLAWYERS \n \nLETTERHEAD \n     --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by the client to collect a debt.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n     --Nonlawyers use of a lawyer's letterhead for correspondence regarding a \"legal matter \"signed only by a nonlawyer may be improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a> \n     --Nonlawyer's use of attorney's letterhead for routine correspondence is ethical if supervised by the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state firm with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n     --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> \n     --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> \n \nLITIGATION \n     --Not improper for attorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n     --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. \n     --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a>\n LOANS \n     --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n \nLOCAL COUNSEL \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> \n \nMALPRACTICE \n     --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n \nMULTIPLE REPRESENTATION, see CONFLICTS OF INTEREST \n \n MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE \n --Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a>\n MULTI-STATE FIRM \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state firm with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n \nNONLAWYERS \n     --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by that client to collect a debt.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n     --Nonlawyers use of a lawyer's letterhead for correspondence regarding a \"legal matter \"signed only by a nonlawyer may be improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a> \n     --Ethical considerations regarding activities of nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --Any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his law office in addition to their regular salary is permissible. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nOF-COUNSEL \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n \nPARALEGALS, see NONLAWYERS \n \nPARTNERSHIPS \n     --Attorney may not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any partnership activity consists of the practice of law.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n \nPERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE \n     --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n     --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n     --Permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A § 51-12-14  to an unrepresented adverse party, but must specifically state that it is a notice rather than advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a> \n     --Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a> \n     --Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n \nPIP COVERAGE \n     --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n     --A third party beneficiary or his or her attorney may advance or reimburse an insured for the purchase of optional PIP coverage.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a> \n \nPLEA AGREEMENT \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n \nPREPAID FEES, see ATTORNEY'S FEES and RETAINER FEES \n \nPRO HAC VICE \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> \n \nPROSECUTORS \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nPUBLIC OFFICIALS \n     --County Commissioner may not appoint his or her own firm, or a partner in his or her own firm, as County Attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=454\%22>SDB No. 16</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \nREAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3 </a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nREFERRAL AND REFERRAL SERVICES \n     --Any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a> \n     --While it may be possible to do so, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a>\n REINSTATEMENT FOR DISBARRED ATTORNEYS \nSee the Office of Bar Admissions' Website, Rules Governing Admission, Part A, Section 10\n REMOTE PRACTICE \n       --Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a>\n REPRESENTING A CHILD \n --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n \nRETAINER FEES \n     --A lawyer is not required to place attorney's fees paid in advance into a trust account except under special circumstances.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) and does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n \nSETTLEMENT \n     --Ethical propriety of including attorney's fees as part of settlement offer in federal civil rights cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n     \nSECURITY INTEREST \n     --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n \nSIGHT DRAFTS\n SMOOT LETTERS \n     --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n \nSOLICITATION, see ADVERTISING \n \nSPECIAL COUNSEL \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law. The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n \nSTATUTE OF LIMITATIONS \n     --Not improper for attorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n \nSUBPOENAS \n     --Guidelines for use of subpoenas.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a> \n \nSUBROGATION, see INSURANCE PRACTICE \n \nSUICIDE \n     --Under certain circumstances, an attorney may reveal a client's intent to commit suicide.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule486\">SDB No. 42</a> \n \nTERMINATING REPRESENTATION, see WITHDRAWAL \n \nTRANSCRIPTS \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n \nTRUSTS, see WILLS/TRUSTS \n \nTRUST ACCOUNTS \n     --A lawyer is not required to place attorney's fees paid in advance into a trust account except under special circumstances.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a> \n     --A lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity may remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule512\">FAO No. 98-2</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II).  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nTRUSTEE, see WILLS/TRUSTS \n \nUNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW \n     --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by that client to collect a debt.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n     --Nonlawyers use of a lawyer's letterhead for correspondence regarding a \"legal matter \"signed only by a nonlawyer may be improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a> \n     --Ethical considerations regarding activities of nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state firm with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II).  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\"> FAO No. 13-1 \n </a> --Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a> \n \nWAIVER OF LIABILITY \n     --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n     --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n \nWILLS/TRUSTS \n     --Ethical considerations for an attorney named as the executor or trustee for a will or trust he or she prepared.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a> \n \nWITHDRAWAL \n     --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n     --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n     --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) and does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. \n     --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n     --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n \nWITNESSES \n     --Attorney responsibilities with respect to the payment of witness fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a> \n     --Guidelines for payment of expert witness fees in contingency fee cases. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a> \n     --Guidelines for use of Expert Witness consulting service. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule490\">SDB No. 48</a> \n --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\"> FAO No. 16-2 \n </a> --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> \n \nWITNESS ONLY CLOSING \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>\n WORKERS' COMPENSATION \n     --Attorney must advise their client of his or her right to independent counsel if the attorney appeals award of fees granted by the Workman's Compensation Board. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a>\n","UrlName":"part8","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Title":"Advisory Opinions ","Content":"","UrlName":"hasa3","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"2168028f-f1d0-4bc9-af01-a5b617a0655f","Title":"Internal Rules - Formal Advisory Opinion Board","Content":" FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD INTERNAL OPERATING RULES OF PROCEDURE \n(As Amended on April 25, 2023) \n \nRule 1. Meetings \n \n(a) The Chair or Vice-chair of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (\"Board \") shall determine when and where the meetings of the Board shall occur. \n(b) The Chair shall preside over all meetings of the Board and shall serve until a successor is elected (see Rule 12 below). \n(c) All Board business, including voting on opinions, may be conducted by telephone, e-mail, or other electronic communication device. \n(d) Board members may attend meetings by telephone or other electronic communication device. \n(e) In case of the absence, incapacity, or disqualification of the Chair, the Vice-chair shall assume the duties and powers of the Chair.  If both the Chair and Vice-chair are absent or incapacitated, or disqualified from consideration of a matter while a meeting is in session, the remaining members of the Board shall vote upon a member to preside over the meeting or the consideration of the matter at issue. \n \nRule 2. Quorum Requirement \n \nA majority of the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum. \n \n Rule 2A. Voting Requirements \n \n(a) Regular Business - Subject to sub-paragraph (b) below, a majority of the members of the Board present and voting shall be required to transact the business of the Board. \n(b) Publication under Bar Rule 4-403 (d) - The affirmative vote of not less than five (5) members of the Board shall be required in order to submit opinions for second publication under Bar Rule 4-403 (d). \n \nRule 3. Preliminary Determination of Whether Opinion Should Be Drafted \n \nWhen the Office of the General Counsel receives a request for a Formal Advisory Opinion, the request shall be forwarded to each member of the Board and placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Board for preliminary determination of whether a proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. \n \nRule 4. Assignment of Research and Drafting to Board Members \n \nThe Chair of the Board shall have complete discretion in assigning requests for Formal Advisory Opinions to members of the Board for researching and drafting proposed opinions. The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia will provide staff assistance in researching and drafting opinions upon request by the Board members assigned to draft a proposed opinion. \n \nRule 5. Comments \n \n(a) Any comment to a proposed Formal Advisory Opinion filed pursuant to Rule 4-403 (c) shall be filed with the Board through the Office of the General Counsel within thirty (30) days of the date that the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia. \n(b) There shall be filed a minimum number of one copy of any comment pursuant to Rule 4-403 (c) in order for the comment to be considered by the Board. \n(c) A copy of the petition for discretionary review filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-403 (d) must be simultaneously served upon the Board through the Office of the General Counsel. \n(d) Any comment submitted to the Board pursuant to Rule 4-403 (c) is for the Board's internal use in assessing proposed opinions and shall not be released unless the comment has been submitted to the Supreme Court of Georgia in compliance with Bar Rule 4-403 (d). \n \nRule 6. Operating Guidelines \n \n(a) Upon receipt of a request for a Formal Advisory Opinion, the Office of the General Counsel will assign a file number to the request. \n(b) The Office of the General Counsel will transmit the request to the Board. \n(c) The request will be placed on the agenda of the next Board meeting. The Board should make a determination at the meeting as to whether a formal opinion will be drafted. \n(d) At the same meeting, or immediately thereafter, the Board will assign the request to a Board member for the drafting of a proposed opinion. \n(e) The draft opinion should be prepared and transmitted by the drafter to the members of the Board at least one week prior to the next scheduled meeting of the Board. Address labels will be supplied by the Office of the General Counsel for this purpose. \n(f) At the option of the drafter, the draft opinion will be distributed by the Office of the General Counsel at least ten (10) days prior to the next scheduled meeting of the Board. \n(g) At the meeting, the Board will adopt, reject, or revise the opinion. \n(h) Upon adoption, the opinion will be edited for style and published for comment as provided in Bar Rule 4-403 (c). \n(i) As long as the Board complies with Bar Rules, it may take any action it deems necessary to insure that the opinions continue to provide an accurate interpretation of the Bar's ethical rules. \n \nRule 7. Confidentiality \n \n(a) The name of the lawyer making the request will be held confidential unless the lawyer otherwise elects as provided in Bar Rule 4-403 (g). \n(b) The name of the Board member who has been assigned to draft a proposed opinion will be held confidential unless the Board otherwise elects by majority vote. \n(c) All inquiries regarding Formal Advisory Opinions being considered by the Board should be forwarded to the Chair or Vice Chair. \n \nRule 8. E-Mail Voting Procedure \n \nIt is best that the Board meets and holds live discussions as often as possible. However, the Board, in its discretion, may discuss and vote on matters regarding formal advisory opinions by e-mail, rather than at a meeting of the Board. Matters shall be provided to each member of the Board by e-mail, along with a message directing the Board to participate in a discussion by e-mail. The Board Chair determines when the discussion period will end and call for a vote on the matter. At any time, however, any Board member has \"veto power,\"which allows him or her to call for a \"live discussion.\" \n \nRule 9. Presentations to the Board \n \nPresentations to the Board shall be in writing unless oral presentation is permitted in specific cases by the Board. \n \nRule 10. Attendance at Board Meetings \n \nOnly Board members and Office of the General Counsel staff shall be permitted to attend a Formal Advisory Opinion Board meeting during the deliberations of the Board. \n \nRule 11. Contact with the Press \n \nBoard members may be contacted by members of the press regarding opinions and other Board matters. If contacted, Board members must refrain from communicating with the press and immediately contact the Director of the State Bar's Communications Department at 404-527-8761. In compliance with State Bar policy, all inquiries from the press go through the Communications Department to be routed to the appropriate person.\n Rule 12.  Election of Board Officers\n (a) Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-402 (d), the Board will annually elect a Chair and Vice-chair at the first meeting of the Board after July 1 of each year.  At that meeting, the election of the Chair will take place before the election of the Vice-chair.  \n(b) Any Board member may nominate themselves to serve as Chair or Vice-chair. \n(c) The newly elected Chair and Vice-chair term of office will begin at the adjournment of the meeting at which they were elected. \n<div></div>","UrlName":"part10","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0c0141bb-2965-4014-8518-d22f8a1cd496","Title":"Topical Index","Content":" IMPORTANT NOTE: The Index IS NOT, and should not be regarded as, ethics authority.  It is a guide for the convenience of lawyers researching ethics questions.  In many cases the Opinion addresses issues not mentioned in the Index summary.  Before taking action in a given situation, reference should be made to the full text of the Advisory Opinion mentioned in the Index. \n \nReferences to opinions designated \"SDB No. ____,\"are to advisory opinions issued by the State Disciplinary Board under the process by which advisory opinions were issued prior to the present <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule248\">Rule 4-403</a> being adopted. \n \nReferences to \"FAO No. _____,\"are to formal advisory opinions that were drafted by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and issued either by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia pursuant to <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule248\">Rule 4-403</a> .  Reference the full text of the Advisory Opinion mentioned in the Index to determine by whom the opinion was issued. \n \nTOPICAL INDEX\n \nADVANCE FEES, see ATTORNEY'S FEES and RETAINER FEES \n \nADVERTISING \n      --Nonlawyer's business card must indicate that they are not a lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n      --An attorney may communicate to other attorneys his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law so long as the communication is accurate and not misleading.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n      --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\" \n<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> \n      --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n \nALIMONY \n      --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n \nAPPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY \n      --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \nATTORNEY'S FEES \n   Advance Fees Paid to Attorney \n      --A lawyer is not required to place attorney's fees paid in advance into a trust account except under special circumstances.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a> \n      --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> and does not violate <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule\">Rule 1.5(a)'s</a> requirement of reasonableness.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n   Advance Payment Made by an Attorney to a Client for Certain Expenses \n      --A third party beneficiary or his or her attorney may advance or reimburse an insured for the purchase of optional PIP coverage.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">SDB No. 46</a> \n      --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n   Collection, see COLLECTION \n   Contingency, see CONTINGENCY FEES \n   Division of Fees, see FEE SHARING and FEE SPLITTING \n   Fee Collection Program \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program that purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n   Interest \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --Considerations applicable to payment of interest charged on a loan obtained to cover advances on litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n  Paid by Opponent \n      --Ethical propriety of attorney's fees being paid by opposing side.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a> \n   Reasonableness \n      --Ethical propriety of including attorney's fees as part of a settlement offer in federal civil rights cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a> \n      --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n      --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n      --Where drafter of will or trust serves as executor or trustee, total combined attorney's fee and executor or trustee fee must be reasonable.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n      --A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a> \n      --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) and does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n   Retainers, see RETAINER FEES \n   Security Interest \n     --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n   Sharing Fees, see FEE SHARING \n   Splitting Fees, see FEE SPLITTING \n  Unpaid Fees \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --May a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a> \n   Worker's Compensation Cases \n      --Attorney must advise their client of his or her right to independent counsel if the attorney appeals award of fees granted by the Workman's Compensation Board. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a> \n \nATTORNEY'S LIEN \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n \nBAD CHECKS \n      --Attorney may send statutory notice to drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Georgia Code Ann. §26-1704. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a> \n \nBUSINESS CARD \n      --Nonlawyer's business card must indicate that they are not a lawyer. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n      --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> \n \nCHILD SUPPORT \n      --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n \nCITY COUNCIL \n      --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n      --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \nCLIENT FUNDS, also see TRUST ACCOUNTS \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nCLIENT PAPERS, also see FILES \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\"> FAO No. 93-4 \n </a> \nCLOSING \n      --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3</a> \n      --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n      --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nCOLLECTION \n      --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by that client to collect a debt. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program which purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n      --May a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a> \n \nCOMMUNICATION \n      --An attorney may communicate to other attorneys his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law so long as the communication is accurate and not misleading. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> \n      --Attorney may send statutory notice to drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Georgia Code Ann. §26-1704. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of attorney's fees being paid by opposing side. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a> \n      --Ethical obligation of attorney to resist disclosure of name and/or identity of his client. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a> \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n      --Permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A § 51-12-14 to an unrepresented adverse party, but must specifically state that it is a notice rather than advice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a> \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n      --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n      --A staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group may contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of non-clients and clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a> \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n      --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n      --A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> \n      --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\"> FAO No. 16-3 \n </a> --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> \n \n COMPETENCE \n --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel’s fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm’s clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as “special counsel” for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter Into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>\n CONFIDENTIALITY \n     --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of revealing confidences and secrets necessary to defend against charges of professional misconduct.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule474\">SDB No. 27</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of attorney to resist disclosure of name and/or identity of his client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a> \n     --Under certain circumstances, an attorney may reveal a client's intent to commit suicide.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule486\">SDB No. 42</a> \n     --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program that purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical considerations of a law firm interested in obtaining a loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --May a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n     --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n \nCONFLICTS OF INTEREST \n   Claims and Complaints \n      --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n   Criminal Cases \n      --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n   Domestic Relations \n      --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n   Independent Professional Judgment \n      --Ethical propriety of attorney's fees being paid by opposing side.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a> \n      --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program that purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n      --While it may be possible to do so, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a> \n      --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n      --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n      --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n   Insurance Practice \n      -- Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a> \n      -- Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n   Law Clerks \n      --A law clerk for a superior court judge may not write appellate briefs on behalf of criminal defendants in death penalty cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n   Malpractice Claims, see MALPRACTICE \n   Multi-Firm Employment \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n   Multiple Representation \n      --Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n    Of Counsel \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n   Private Interest v. Public Duty \n     --County Commissioner may not appoint his or her own firm, or a partner in his or her own firm, as County Attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No. 16</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n   Real Estate Transactions \n      --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n   Referrals \n      --While it may be possible to do so, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a> \n   Settlement \n      --Ethical propriety of including attorney's fees as part of settlement offer in federal civil rights cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a> \n      --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n   Temporary/Contract Attorneys \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n   Wills and Trusts \n      --Drafter of will or trust may serve as the executor or trustee even though the lawyer's independent professional judgment may be affected, provided the client consent after full disclosure.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a> \n  Workers' Compensation Cases \n      --Attorney must advise their client of his or her right to independent counsel if the attorney appeals award of fees granted by the Workman's Compensation Board.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a> \n \nCONSULTANT \n      --An attorney may communicate to other attorneys his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law so long as the communication is accurate and not misleading.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> \n      --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n \nCONTINGENCY FEES \n      --Guidelines for payment of expert witness fees in contingency fee cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a> \n      --A contingency fee arrangement in a divorce case is against public policy and is therefore improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=479\%22>SDB No. 36</a> \n      --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n      --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n \nCORPORATE COUNSEL \n      --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n     --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> \n \nCOUNTY ATTORNEY \n     --County Commissioner may not appoint his or her own firm, or a partner in his or her own firm, as County Attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No. 16</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n \nCRIMINAL PRACTICE \n     --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n     --Attorney may send statutory notice to drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Georgia Code Ann. §26-1704.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n \nDEPARTING ATTORNEY \n     --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n     --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>\n DILIGENCE \n      --Not improper for atorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n      --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact of active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicatble ethics rules. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n       --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n      --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nDISCOVERY \n     --Guidelines for use of subpoenas. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO 05-10</a> \n \nDISQUALIFICATION \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n \nDISTRICT ATTORNEYS, see PROSECUTORS \n \nDOMESTIC RELATIONS \n     --A contingency fee arrangement in a divorce case is against public policy and is therefore improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule479\">SDB No. 36</a> \n     --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n     --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n \nDUAL OCCUPATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT \n     --Ethical considerations applicable to a lawyer who is engaged in both the practice of law and another profession or business.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule477\">SDB No. 31</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. \n     --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \n EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY, see HIRING \n \nESCROW ACCOUNT, see TRUST ACCOUNTS \n \nEXECUTOR, see WILLS/TRUSTS \n \nEXPERT WITNESS, see WITNESSES \n \nFEE BILLS \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program which purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n      --A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a> \n \nFEE SHARING \n      --Prohibition of division of fees with nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n      --Permissible for attorney employee to share attorney's fees with his or her lay organization employer where the attorney's fees are regarded as stipulated liquidated damages.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule513\">FAO No. 88-2</a> \n      --Any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a> \n      --The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his law office in addition to their regular salary is permissible. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n \nFEE SPLITTING \n      --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n \nFIDUCIARY \n      --A lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity may remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule512\">FAO No. 98-2</a> \n      --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nFILES \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\"> FAO No. 96-1 \n </a> \nFILING LAWSUITS \n      --Not improper for attorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n \n FIRM NAME \n --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a>\n FUGITIVES \n      --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n \nGOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, see PUBLIC OFFICIALS and LAW CLERKS\n GUARDIAN AD LITEM \n      --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n \nHOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENTS / INDEMNIFICATION \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a>\n HIRING \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n      --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nIMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION, see DISQUALIFICATION \n \nINSURANCE PRACTICE \n      --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n      --A third party beneficiary or his or her attorney may advance or reimburse an insured for the purchase of optional PIP coverage.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a> \n      --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n      --Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a> \n      --Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n \nIN HOUSE COUNSEL \n      --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO 05-10</a> \n \nINTERPLEADER \n     \nJUDGES \n      --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n      --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member and the city council appoints Recorder's Court judges.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n \nLAW CLERKS \n     --Ethical considerations regarding activities of nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --A law clerk for a superior court judge may not write appellate briefs on behalf of criminal defendants in death penalty cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a> \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n \nLAW FIRMS \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state law with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n     --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law. The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nLEGAL ASSISTANTS, see NONLAWYERS \n \nLETTERHEAD \n     --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by the client to collect a debt.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n     --Nonlawyers use of a lawyer's letterhead for correspondence regarding a \"legal matter \"signed only by a nonlawyer may be improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a> \n     --Nonlawyer's use of attorney's letterhead for routine correspondence is ethical if supervised by the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state firm with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n     --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> \n     --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> \n \nLITIGATION \n     --Not improper for attorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n     --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. \n     --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a>\n LOANS \n     --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n \nLOCAL COUNSEL \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> \n \nMALPRACTICE \n     --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n \nMULTIPLE REPRESENTATION, see CONFLICTS OF INTEREST \n \n MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE \n --Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a>\n MULTI-STATE FIRM \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state firm with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n \nNONLAWYERS \n     --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by that client to collect a debt.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n     --Nonlawyers use of a lawyer's letterhead for correspondence regarding a \"legal matter \"signed only by a nonlawyer may be improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a> \n     --Ethical considerations regarding activities of nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --Any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his law office in addition to their regular salary is permissible. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nOF-COUNSEL \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n \nPARALEGALS, see NONLAWYERS \n \nPARTNERSHIPS \n     --Attorney may not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any partnership activity consists of the practice of law.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n \nPERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE \n     --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n     --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n     --Permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A § 51-12-14  to an unrepresented adverse party, but must specifically state that it is a notice rather than advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a> \n     --Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a> \n     --Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n \nPIP COVERAGE \n     --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n     --A third party beneficiary or his or her attorney may advance or reimburse an insured for the purchase of optional PIP coverage.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a> \n \nPLEA AGREEMENT \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n \nPREPAID FEES, see ATTORNEY'S FEES and RETAINER FEES \n \nPRO HAC VICE \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> \n \nPROSECUTORS \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nPUBLIC OFFICIALS \n     --County Commissioner may not appoint his or her own firm, or a partner in his or her own firm, as County Attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=454\%22>SDB No. 16</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \nREAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3 </a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nREFERRAL AND REFERRAL SERVICES \n     --Any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a> \n     --While it may be possible to do so, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a>\n REINSTATEMENT FOR DISBARRED ATTORNEYS \nSee the Office of Bar Admissions' Website, Rules Governing Admission, Part A, Section 10\n REMOTE PRACTICE \n       --Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a>\n REPRESENTING A CHILD \n --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n \nRETAINER FEES \n     --A lawyer is not required to place attorney's fees paid in advance into a trust account except under special circumstances.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) and does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n \nSETTLEMENT \n     --Ethical propriety of including attorney's fees as part of settlement offer in federal civil rights cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n     \nSECURITY INTEREST \n     --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n \nSIGHT DRAFTS\n SMOOT LETTERS \n     --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n \nSOLICITATION, see ADVERTISING \n \nSPECIAL COUNSEL \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law. The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n \nSTATUTE OF LIMITATIONS \n     --Not improper for attorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n \nSUBPOENAS \n     --Guidelines for use of subpoenas.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a> \n \nSUBROGATION, see INSURANCE PRACTICE \n \nSUICIDE \n     --Under certain circumstances, an attorney may reveal a client's intent to commit suicide.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule486\">SDB No. 42</a> \n \nTERMINATING REPRESENTATION, see WITHDRAWAL \n \nTRANSCRIPTS \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n \nTRUSTS, see WILLS/TRUSTS \n \nTRUST ACCOUNTS \n     --A lawyer is not required to place attorney's fees paid in advance into a trust account except under special circumstances.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a> \n     --A lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity may remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule512\">FAO No. 98-2</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II).  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nTRUSTEE, see WILLS/TRUSTS \n \nUNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW \n     --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by that client to collect a debt.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n     --Nonlawyers use of a lawyer's letterhead for correspondence regarding a \"legal matter \"signed only by a nonlawyer may be improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a> \n     --Ethical considerations regarding activities of nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state firm with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II).  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\"> FAO No. 13-1 \n </a> --Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a> \n \nWAIVER OF LIABILITY \n     --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n     --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n \nWILLS/TRUSTS \n     --Ethical considerations for an attorney named as the executor or trustee for a will or trust he or she prepared.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a> \n \nWITHDRAWAL \n     --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n     --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n     --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) and does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. \n     --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n     --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n \nWITNESSES \n     --Attorney responsibilities with respect to the payment of witness fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a> \n     --Guidelines for payment of expert witness fees in contingency fee cases. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a> \n     --Guidelines for use of Expert Witness consulting service. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule490\">SDB No. 48</a> \n --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\"> FAO No. 16-2 \n </a> --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> \n \nWITNESS ONLY CLOSING \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>\n WORKERS' COMPENSATION \n     --Attorney must advise their client of his or her right to independent counsel if the attorney appeals award of fees granted by the Workman's Compensation Board. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a>\n","UrlName":"part8","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f7a69edf-8162-48d1-9068-7d8c6c7ed6c5","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion Rules Index","Content":"CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule223\"> Rule 1.0 - Terminology</a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1 - Competence</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule50\">Rule 1.2 - Scope of Representation</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3 - Diligence</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule54\">Rule 1.4 - Communication</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5 - Fees</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule479\">SDB No. 36</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1  </a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule57\">Rule 1.6 - Confidentiality of Information</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule474\">SDB No. 27</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule486\">SDB No. 42</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule588\"> </a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a>   <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7 - Conflict of Interest: General Rule</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No.16</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8 - Conflict of Interest:  Prohibited Transactions</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">Rule 1.9 - Conflict of Interest:  Former Client</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10 - Imputed Disqualification</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule90\">Rule 1.11 - Successive Government and Private Employment</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule93\">Rule 1.12 - Former Judge or Arbitrator</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule97\">Rule 1.13 - Organization as Client</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule107\">Rule 1.14 - Client under a Disability</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule42\">Rule 1.15(I) - Safekeeping Property: General Rule</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule512\">FAO No. 98-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule45\">Rule 1.15(II) - Safekeeping Property: Trust Account and IOLTA</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule47\">Rule 1.15(III) - Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records </a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16 - Declining or Terminating Representation</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2 </a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule49\">Rule 1.17 - Sale of Law Practice</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a> Lawyer As A Counselor<a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule62\">Rule 2.1 - Advisor</a>        <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2 - Intermediary</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule66\">Rule 2.3 - Evaluation for Use by Third Persons</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule68\">Rule 2.4 – Lawyer Serving as a Third-Party Neutral</a> Advocate <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1 - Meritorious Claims and Contentions</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule71\">Rule 3.2 - Expediting Litigation</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule72\">Rule 3.3 - Candor toward the Tribunal</a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule77\"> Rule 3.4 - Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel </a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule490\">SDB No. 48</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule78\">Rule 3.5 - Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule80\"> Rule 3.6 - Trial Publicity </a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule82\">Rule 3.7 - Lawyer as Witness</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule83\">Rule 3.8 - Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule85\">Rule 3.9 - Advocate in Non-adjudicative Proceedings</a> Transactions With Persons Other Than Clients <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule289\">Rule 4.1 - Truthfulness in Statements to Others</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\">Rule 4.2 - Communication with Person Represented by Counsel</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10 </a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule298\">Rule 4.3 - Dealing with Unrepresented Person</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10 </a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule300\">Rule 4.4 - Respect for Rights of Third Persons</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a>Law Firms And Associations <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule302\"> Rule 5.1 - Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyer </a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule111\">Rule 5.2 - Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3 - Responsibilities Regarding Non-Lawyer Assistants</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4 - Professional Independence of a Lawyer</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule513\">FAO No. 88-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5 - Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule490\">SDB No. 48</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule135\">Rule 5.6 - Restrictions on Right to Practice</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule139\">Rule 5.7 - Restrictions Regarding Law-related Services</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule477\">SDB No. 31</a> Public Service <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule140\">Rule 6.1 - Voluntary Pro Bono Public Service</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule141\">Rule 6.2 - Accepting Appointments</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule142\"> Rule 6.3 - Membership in Legal Service Organization </a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule144\">Rule 6.4 - Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule559\">Rule 6.5 - Nonprofit &Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs</a> Information About Legal Services <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1 - Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Service</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule147\">Rule 7.2 - Advertising</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule149\">Rule 7.3 - Direct Contact with Prospective Clients</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule151\">Rule 7.4 - Communication of Fields of Practice</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5 - Firm Names and Letterheads</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> Maintaining The Integrity Of The Profession <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule154\">Rule 8.1 - Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule155\">Rule 8.2 - Judicial and Legal Officials</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule157\">Rule 8.3 - Reporting Professional Misconduct</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4 - Misconduct</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule163\">Rule 8.5 - Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a> Miscellaneous <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule166\">Rule 9.1 - Reporting Requirements</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule182\">Rule 9.2 – Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule196\">Rule 9.3 - Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule203\">Rule 9.4 – Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule207\">Rule 9.5 - Lawyer as a Public Official</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No. 16</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>  ","UrlName":"part9","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinions","Content":"","UrlName":"part46","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"bb655803-b398-4d53-b4ab-9877370f1631","Title":"Advisory Opinion 5","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/opinion-history/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion. State Disciplinary Board September 20, 1968 Amended by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board March 1993 Propriety of an attorney permitting the use of his or her letterhead stationery by a retainer client who is writing as a creditor or as a collection agency seeking to collect an account or debt from the recipient.The question submitted is actually in five differing forms, but each question involves certain ingredients which result in the advisory opinion being the same as to each. DR 3-101(a) provides: \"A lawyer shall not aid a non lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\"See also Standard 24. It may well be that under this rule the varying factual situations may be productive or varying conclusions. The determination of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia is a matter of statutory interpretation, O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50 et.seq., and this opinion is not based on either the above standard or statutes.Standard 4 requires that \"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation.\"In light of these admonitions, it is professionally improper for a lawyer to furnish his or her letterhead to a client for the purpose stated. A lawyer is an officer of the court. As such, the lawyer assumes certain responsibilities, is under certain obligations and the lawyer's conduct is subject to certain restrictions and limitations. The lawyer is obligated to uphold the honor and dignity of the profession. See EC 9-6. The lawyer's participation in conduct contemplated purely and simply to deceive is incompatible with those responsibilities and obligations.In addition, a lawyer has been given certain privileges by the State. Because of these privileges, letters of the character stated in the question purporting to be written by lawyers have a greater weight than those written by laymen. It is obvious that the sole reason for the practice is to give the letter the weight that lawyers alone can contribute. That end can be gained only through the deception which is manifestly out of harmony with the Code of Professional Responsibility. See EC 3-3. The lawyer cannot, therefore, delegate to a nonlawyer.The practice described is violative of both the letter and the spirit of the ethical canons and constitutes unethical practice.","UrlName":"rule492","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1cb4a506-933a-4671-8f87-c92840b06c94","Title":"Advisory Opinion 16","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 16 \nSeptember 21, 1973 \n Propriety of An Attorney Who is a County Commissioner in a Rural County Appointing His Own Firm as County Attorney.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, this State Disciplinary Board, upon request made therefore, renders this its opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State of Georgia as applied to a given state of facts.\nAn advisory opinion has been requested upon the following inquiry:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nA partner in a three-member law firm has been elected Commissioner in a small county. The new Commissioner, who at times in the past has served as County Attorney and who intends to remain active in the law firm, wishes to appoint his law firm as County Attorneys. May he do so consistent with the applicable ethical rules? Would the result be different if the Commissioner's partner were appointed County Attorney in his individual capacity and all legal fees paid by the County were paid directly to this partner rather than into the law firm's general account? There is only one other active law firm in the County; and its members were closely associated politically with the candidate who was defeated in the last election by the present Commissioner. \n</div>\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are Rule 3-108 (Canon 8): EC 8-8, and Rule 3-109 (Canon 9): EC 9-1 and EC 9-2.\nCanon 8 provides \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System.\"The ethical considerations under this Canon relevant to the question presented are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n EC 8-8 Lawyers often serve as legislators or as holders of other public offices. This is highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant contributions to the improvement of the legal system. A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties. \n</div>\nDR 8-101(A)(1) states as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(1) use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious that such action is not in the public interest; \n</div>\nCanon 9 provides \"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety \". The relevant ethical considerations under this Canon are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 9-1 Continuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profession. \nEC 9-2 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to be unethical. In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in the matters being handled for the client. While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that has a tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or in the legal profession, his duty to clients or to the public should never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his obligations may be understood or may tend to subject him or the legal profession to criticism. When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal profession. \n</div>\nThere are numerous Formal and Informal Opinions of the American Bar Association on the subject of the attorney as public official, but these opinions seem to be largely useless to the present inquiry as they consistently address themselves to factual situations in which the duty of the attorney as government official comes into conflict with his duty as counselor or advocate for his non-governmental client. The question here presented is much more subtle than the conflict-of-interest cases and the authorities provide little guidance.\nPutting the first inquiry in its simplest form, the State Disciplinary Board must answer the question:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nWould the proposed employment of the Commissioner's law firm present such a danger of public suspicion of self-dealing that public confidence in attorneys, and in our legal governmental system, would be unnecessarily eroded? \n</div>\nIt is obvious that public confidence in the institution of local government would be damaged if the public came to view local politics as merely a battle between law firms for \"the largest client in the County \". Strong support for this view is found in American Bar Association Formal Opinion No. 192 which states:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n Many opinions have been written by this committee applying each of these Canons. Opinions 16, 30, 34, 77, 118 and 134 relate to Canon 6, and pass on questions concerning the propriety of the conduct of an attorney who is a public officer, in representing private interests adverse to those of the public body which he represents. The principle applied in these opinions is that an attorney holding public office should avoid all conduct which might lead the layman to conclude that the attorney is utilizing his public position to further his professional success or personal interests .\"(emphasis ours) \n</div>\n This language has been carried into EC 8-8 of the present Code of Professional Responsibility, which ethical rule was cited above. The mere fact that there is an opportunity for a County Commissioner to allow his firm to charge excessively or to create legal business for himself and for his law firm acting as County Attorney,does not, of course, imply that such impropriety would necessarily follow. However, it is vitally important that no situation be allowed to exist which might tempt the public to conclude that the County's interest has been subordinated to that of any law firm or attorney. It has long been the law in Georgia that one who is entrusted with the business of others will not be allowed to make out of the same a pecuniary profit to himself however honest and fair the circumstances of employment, and that the citizens of Georgia are entitled to have their officials exercise close and totally objective scrutiny of the performance of those doing the work of government. Montgomery v. City of Atlanta 162 Ga. 534 (1926); Mayor of Macon v. Huff , 60 Ga. 221 (1878); Trainer v. City of Covington , 183 Ga. 759 (1937): Opinions of the Attorney General (unofficial), 1971,p. 286. Numerous statutes which regulate the actions of officers and employees of government have as their goal the prevention of any situation in which the official's personal interest and his public duty may conflict. Ga. Code Annotated Â§ Â§ 2-5606,23-1713, 23-1714, 26-2306, 26-2307, 23-2308, 69-201, 89-103, 89-904, and 89-913 to 918.The statutes and cases cited are grounded in strong public policy which provides a dependable guide in the premises. In light of the public policy favoring avoidance of any actual or imagined conflict-of-interest situation by government officials, we conclude that the only effective way to avoid the possibility of public suspicion of self-dealing and conflicts of interest is for the County Commissioner-attorney to refrain from employing himself as County Attorney. A.B.A. Formal Opinions 33, 49, 50, 72, 103 and 128indicate that no partner or associate of a law firm may undertake any professional relationship which any one of the partners or associates, because of adverse influence and conflicting interests, could not undertake. Consequently, employment of the Commissioner's own firm as County Attorney would be inappropriate. The A.B.A. Formal Opinions cited of knowledge and financial resources and the personal and professional closeness which exists in the legal partnership. It must be remembered, too, that public opinion and appearance of propriety are important considerations in this area, and it is highly probable that employment of the attorney-commissioner's own firm would have the same basic deleterious impact on public opinion and public confidence as would his individual employment as County Attorney. Therefore, the State Disciplinary Board holds that the Attorney-Commissioner may not employ himself or his law firm as County Attorney.\n The second part of the question before the Board has to do with the propriety of the hiring of the Commissioner-Attorney's partner as County Attorney on an individual basis. Again, the public policy considerations discussed in Montgomery ,Trainer , and Mayor of Macon provide guidance. The two evils arising from an official's self-employment outlined in these cases are:\n (1) the temptation to be dishonest in the collection of monies from the government, \n(2) the inability of the official to honestly, objectively, and forcefully exercise control over himself, if a way could be found to avoid these dual evils, then the County Commission or the attorney-commissioner might freely employ the attorney-commissioner's partner on an individual basis. Employment of the partner in his individual capacity and use of contract terms stipulating that the attorney-commissioner shall not benefit in any way from the County Attorney's income would destroy objections based on the first evil, but would not avoid those based on the second.It is true that the Commission and attorney-commissioner will always employ a friend and that, consequently, they and he would always be less than totally objective in judging the work of the County Attorney, but it is also true that an attorney-commissioner who would be the Commissioner best qualified to judge the quality of legal work, would be less likely to expose and criticize poor work on the part of one who is his law partner than one who was merely a good friend.\n The temptation to overlook or conceal the faults of professional or business partner is one with which no attorney or other person charged with public duty should be faced. The Board, in answering the second part of the inquiry,seeks to avoid the possibility of such temptation and answers part two of the inquiry in the negative.","UrlName":"rule454","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"976f93a8-d22a-4926-be94-dd55f7f3e26c","Title":"Advisory Opinion 17","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 17 \nJanuary 18, 1974 \n Duty of an Attorney Representing a Fugitive Upon Warrants for Probation Violation\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, this State Disciplinary Board, upon request made therefor, renders this its opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia as applied to a given state of facts.\nAn advisory opinion has been requested as to the ethical duty of an attorney who, during a professional consultation, learns that his client is a fugitive upon warrants for violation of his probation. The request was made in two parts,as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"When a person who is a fugitive upon warrants for probation violation approaches an attorney and requests that the attorney represent him in any hearings concerning his violation of probation and when the fugitive thus discloses his violations and whereabouts, must the attorney disclose the whereabouts of his client to the proper authorities? If the attorney advises the fugitive to surrender to the authorities and the fugitive refuses to do so, what is the proper course of action of the attorney?\" \n</div>\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are Rule 3-102 (Canon 2); EC 2-32, and DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) are included in that Rule; Rule 3-104(Canon 4); EC 4-1, EC 4-4, DR 4-101(A), DR 4-101(B)(1) and DR 4-101(C)(2) and (3) are all included in that Rule; and Rule 3-107 (Canon 7); EC 7-1, EC 7-5 and DR 7-102(A)(3), (7)and (8) are included under that Rule.\nCanon II provides \"A lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession. Ethical considerations under Canon II which are relevant to the question propounded are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 2-32 A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of compelling circumstances... A lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to minimize the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client and the possibility of prejudice to his client as the result of his withdrawal. Even though he justifiably withdraws a lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by giving due notice of his withdrawal, suggesting employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, cooperating with counsel subsequently employed, and otherwise endeavoring to minimize the possibility of harm... \n</div>\nDR 2-110(C) states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(C) Permissive withdrawal. If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a Tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawals is because: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(1) His client \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (a) ... \n(b) personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct \n</div>\nCanon IV provides \"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.\"Relevant ethical considerations under this Canon are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 4-1 Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. \nEC 4-4 The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to whom the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an obligation to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely assert the privilege unless it is waived by the client. \n</div>\nDR 4-101 states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nDR 4-101 Preservation of Confidence and Secrets of a client \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(A) \"Confidence \"refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law and \"Secret \"refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. \n(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C) a lawyer shall not knowingly \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client \n(2) ... \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(C) A lawyer may reveal: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (1) ... \n(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order; \n(3) the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime; \n</div>\nCanon VII provides \"A lawyer should represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.\"\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 7-1 The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations. The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law, to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means, and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue or defense. \nEC 7-5 A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision. He may continue in the representation of his client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or take a frivolous legal position. A lawyer should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor. \n</div>\nDR 7-102(A) states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) ... \n(2) ... \n(3) conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal;... \n(7) counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent \n(8) knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule. \n</div>\nIn this problem the attorney's duty of loyalty to his client and his duty to the legal system, of which he is an important part, come into direct conflict. The State Disciplinary Board has been asked to resolve this conflict and the applicable rules and advisory opinions of Georgia and of the American Bar Association reflect his conflict as they, too, are in conflict.\nAlthough A.B.A. Formal Opinions 155 and 156 advise of the duty of the attorney to reveal the whereabouts of his fugitive client, the State Disciplinary Board believes that there is no legal or ethical consistency in the rationale of those opinions which would require an attorney whose client is a fugitive from a misdemeanor conviction to notify the authorities while allowing the attorney of a murderer to keep the confession of the murderer secret and confidential.\nThe language of Canon IV is strong and clear, and the importance of the confidentiality between attorney and client in their communications is paramount in our system of justice. EC 4-1, EC 4-4. The exceptions as to revelation of secrets and confidences mentioned in DR 4-101(C), above, would not seem to apply in this situation since the information about the fugitive's whereabouts is privileged in Georgia and the attorney's failure to report the fugitive would not, by itself, be a crime. Of course, the attorney has a duty to report any non-privileged information he knows to the proper authorities, and DR 7-102(A)(7), and (8) indicate clearly that he cannot counsel the client to break the law nor may he take any overt action to aid the fugitive in his flight.\nIn light of the historical importance of the concepts embodied in Canon IV to individuals in our society, the State Disciplinary Board has determined that the attorney of a fugitive has no ethical duty to inform the authorities of the whereabouts of the fugitive. However, once that difficult determination is made, it must be quickly pointed that in the stated situation there is a countervailing duty to our system of law which dictates that the attorney cannot counsel the fugitive to remain in violation of the law. The attorney should, therefore, advise the client to surrender to the authorities at an early date so that the charges against the fugitive may be heard in a fair hearing. By taking such a course of action the attorney observes the spirit of the confidentiality rule while demonstrating the confidence in, and loyalty to, our system of law.\nThe second part of the inquiry asks what should be done if the client refuses the attorney's advice to surrender to the authorities. The ethical considerations and rules under Canon II, stated above, clearly show that in a situation in which a fugitive client refuses to surrender himself, and thus insists on an illegal course of conduct, the attorney should immediately withdraw from the case, taking the precautions he deems necessary to protect his client's interests.","UrlName":"rule465","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"063d68ad-914c-4a5e-b12c-0de2c5de26db","Title":"Advisory Opinion 19","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 19 \nJuly 18, 1975 \n Propriety of a member of the State Bar permitting a paralegal in his employ to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm letterhead under his own signature.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia and the applicable statutes and case law as applied to a specific fact situation.\nAn opinion has been requested concerning the propriety of a member of the State Bar permitting a paralegal in his employ to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm letterhead under his own signature.\n The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia which is applicable to this inquiry is Huber v. State , 234 Ga. at 358, 216 S.E.2d 73 (1975)which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n \"'(W)e are of the opinion that the practice of law...(is) not confined to practice in the courts of this State, but (is) of larger scope, including the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to any action or special proceeding in any court or other judicial body, conveyancing, the preparation of all legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured, the rendering of opinions as to the validity or invalidity of the title to real or personal property, the giving of any legal advice, and any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.' Boykin v. Hopkins , 174 Ga. 511, 519 (162 S.E. 796).\" \n</div>\n Cf. Ga. L. 1931, P. 191 as amended by Ga. L. 1937, p. 753 (Ga.Code Ann. § 9-401).\nThe ethical consideration applicable to this inquiry is State Bar Rule 3-103, EC 3-6 which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries, and other lay persons. Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the delegated work, and has complete professional responsibility for the work product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal services more economically and efficiently.\" \n</div>\nThis disciplinary rule which is applicable to this inquiry is State Bar Rule 4-102.1, DR 3-101(A) which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\" \n</div>\n\"Paralegals,\"\"legal assistants,\"\"law clerks,\"\"paraprofessionals,\"\"litigation assistants,\"etc., are laymen who are not entitled to practice law and who are not entitled to membership in the State Bar of Georgia. Although the State Bar may intercede in a paralegal's activities to the extent that those activities might involve the unauthorized practice of law1, it has not power to discipline paralegals in that its disciplinary jurisdiction is expressly limited to its membership.\nThe State Bar is authorized to advise its members concerning the activities in which their employees, including paralegals, should be allowed to engage. Further, if a member of the State Bar allows a paralegal in his employ to perform functions that amount to the unauthorized practice of law, the Bar is authorized to discipline the member under DR 3-101(A) of State Bar Rule 4-102.1.\nA member of the State Bar may allow a paralegal, as he may allow any other layman, to assist him in such a manner or to perform such tasks on his behalf as do not constitute the practice of law. Therefore, our inquiry must concern:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n (1) The definition of the practice of law in Georgia, and \n(2) Whether the conduct which is the subject of this inquiry transgresses the definition. \n The Supreme Court has defined the practice of law in the Huber case, supra. Does correspondence by a paralegal on his firm's letterhead bearing his own signature and concerning \"legal matters \"fall within the Supreme Court's definition? The answer depends upon the party to whom the correspondence is written and the substance of the correspondence. \n</div>\nWe are of the opinion that the phrase \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law \"in the above quoted definition is intended to comprehend communication connected with any legally enforceable right or remedy without regard to whether a suit is actually pending before a court in this State. Therefore, even pre-litigation communication falls within the definition if it is directed to a potentially adverse party, his agents, assigns, or beneficiaries and if it attempts to suggest or assert an actual or potential claim of right to legal or equitable relief for another upon the condition, either expressed or implied, that a failure to satisfy such suggestion or assertion may result in litigation. Any such correspondence written on a law firm letterhead, by its very nature, implicitly suggests subsequent legal proceedings and thus constitutes the practice of law. To that extent, if a member of the State Bar allows a paralegal in his employ to sign correspondence on the law firm letterhead, he aids the paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law and opens himself to discipline.\nWe specifically restrict the foregoing opinion to letters directed to adverse or potentially adverse parties, their agents, assigns or beneficiaries. Under EC 3-6 of State Bar Rule 3-103, a member may ethically utilize the services of paralegals in a wide range of circumstances such as investigating potential claims and pending cases, taking statements from clients and witnesses, engaging in legal research, preparing legal documents and pleadings under direct supervision of the member, performing administrative duties within and on behalf of the law firm, and performing secretarial or clerical duties. To the extent necessary to perform these functions and to the extent that these functions do not fall within the above-cited definition of the practice of law, a paralegal may correspond on the law firm letterhead in his own name.\nWhen a paralegal in the employ of a member of the State Bar is permitted by the member to correspond on the law firm letterhead, the member must be sure that the paralegal clearly identifies his status by the use of an appropriate designation such as \"paralegal,\"\"legal assistant,\"or \"law clerk.\"The failure to do so could easily mislead the recipient of the correspondence and might constitute a representation on the part of the member that the paralegal in his employ is a member of the State Bar and authorized to practice law in this State.\n 1 Ga. L. 1946, p. 171 (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-306 through 9-411).","UrlName":"rule468","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b4d1ac85-398b-4a45-b8dd-39cbe70d0b0b","Title":"Advisory Opinion 21","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 21 \nSeptember 16, 1977 \n \n \nGuidelines for Attorneys Utilizing Paralegals. \nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government. of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented:\nWhat are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legal assistants or paraprofessionals and permit them to deal with other lawyers, clients and the public?\nThe ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is Rule 3-103 (Canon III): EC 3-1, EC 3-2, ES 3-6, DR 3-101(A) and DR 3-103 are all included in that Rule. It is also noted that the provisions of Canon III appear as Disciplinary Standards 24, 25 and 26 in Part IV (discipline) of the Rules of the State Bar.\nCanon III provides:\n\"A lawyer should assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of law.\"\nEthical Considerations under this Canon relevant to the question propounded are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"EC 3-1 The prohibition against the practice of law by  a layman is grounded in the need of the public for integrity and competence of those who undertake to render legal services. Because of the fiduciary and personal character of  the lawyer-client relationship and the inherently complex nature of our legal system, the public can better be assured of the requisite responsibility and competence if the  practice of law is confined to those who are subject to the requirements and regulations imposed upon members of the legal profession.\" \n\"EC 3-2 The sensitive variations in the considerations that bear on legal determinations often make it difficult even for a lawyer to exercise appropriate professional judgment, and it is therefore essential that  the personal nature of the relationship of client and lawyer be preserved. Competent professional judgment is the product of a trained familiarity with law and legal processes, a disciplined, analytical approach to legal problems, and a firm ethical  commitment.\" \n\"EC 3-6 A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries and other lay persons. Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the delegated work and has complete professional responsibility for the work product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal service more economically and efficiently.\" \n</div>\n\"DR 3-101 Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law. \n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.: \n</div>\n\"DR 3-102 Dividing Legal Fees with a Nonlawyer. \n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that: \n <div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n (1) ... \n    (2) ... \n    (3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.\" \n </div> \n</div>\n\"DR 3-103 Forming a Partnership with a Nonlawyer. \n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of  law.\" \n</div>\nFor purposes of this opinion the terms \"legal assistant \", \"paraprofessional \"and \"paralegal \"are defined as any lay person, not admitted to the practice of law in this State, who is an employee of, or an assistant to, an active member of the State Bar of Georgia or to a partnership or professional corporation comprised of active members of the State Bar of Georgia and who renders services relating to the law to such member, partnership or professional corporation under the direct control, supervision and compensation of a member of the State Bar of Georgia.\nThe overriding consideration in this opinion will be that the definition of the practice of law is very wide in the State of Georgia and that strict adherence to a program of supervision and direction of a paralegal is required in order to avoid any charges that the attorney is aiding his paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law. Ga. Code Ann. 9-401, 9-402. Avoidance of charges that the paralegal is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law may be achieved only by strict observance of the direction found in EC 3-6, quoted above, indicating that delegation of activities which ordinarily comprise the practice of law is proper only if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with the client involved, supervises and directs the work delegated to the paralegal and assumes complete ultimate professional responsibility for the work product produced by the paralegal. Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.\nIt is the opinion of this Board that the following may be delegated to nonlawyer paralegals, provided that proper and effective supervision and control by the attorney exists:\n(1) The interview of clients, witnesses and other persons with information pertinent to any cause being handled by the attorney.\n(2) Legal research and drafting of pleadings, briefs of law and other legal documents for the attorney's review, approval and use.\n(3) Drafting and signing of routine correspondence with the clients of the attorney when such correspondence does not require the application of legal knowledge or the rendering of legal advice to the client.\n(4) Investigation of facts relating to the cause of a client of the attorney, including examinations of land records and reporting of his findings to the attorney.\n(5) Scheduling of the attorney's activities in the law office and scheduling of his appearance before courts, tribunals and administrative agencies.\n(6) Billing of clients and general management of the lawfirm's office and nonlegal staff.\n(7) Routine contacts with opposing counsel on topics not effecting the merits of the cause of action at issue between the attorneys or requiring the use or application of legal knowledge.\n(8) Rendering of specialized advice to the clients of the attorney on scientific and technical topics, provided that such advice does not require the application of legal judgment or knowledge to the facts or opinions to be discussed with the client.\nIt is the opinion of the Board that the following duties should not be delegated to paralegals:\n(1) Any contact with clients or opposite counsel requiring the rendering of legal advice of any type.\n(2) Any appearance as a lawyer at depositions, hearings,calendar calls or trials or before any administrative Tribunal unless otherwise preempted by Federal law or regulation.\n(3) Responsibility for making final decisions as to the ethics of activities of paralegal employees of an attorney.\n(4) Drafting, without review and approval by a member of the Bar, of any pleading or legal document.\n(5) Negotiation with opposing parties or their counsel on substantive issues in expected or pending litigation.\n(6) Contacting an opposite party or his counsel in a situation in which legal rights of the firm's client will be asserted or negotiated.\n(7) Signature of pleadings, briefs or other legal documents for presentation to any court or explanation of legal document s to the client of the lawyer or to the opposite party in any negotiation or litigation.\nIt is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that there are other duties incumbent upon lawyers supervising the work of paralegals as follows:\n(1)     (a) In order to avoid any appearance that the lawyer is aiding the paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law,including unauthorized practice by way of \"holding out as an attorney \"(see Ga.Code Ann. 9-402), any letters or documents signed by the paralegal should clearly indicate the status of the paralegal and such status should be made clear by the nature of the typed signature or by express language in the text of the letter or document. See Advisory Opinion No. 19.\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> (b) The name of the paralegal should not appear on the letterhead or on the office door of any lawyer engaged in private practice. The paralegal may have a business card containing the name of the firm by which he or she is employed, but the card must contain the word \"paralegal \"to clearly convey  that the paralegal is not a lawyer. \n(c) In oral communications, either face-to-face or on the  telephone, the paralegal should begin the conversation with a clear statement that he or she is speaking as a paralegal employee of the lawyer or the law firm. Such  communication concerning the status of the paralegal should be given prior to all oral communications with clients, opposite parties, and other attorneys unless previous contacts with such persons would justify the paralegal in believing that their status  was clearly known to such persons. \n</div>\n(2) A paralegal may not be a partner in a law firm nor have a financial interest that amounts to a partnership interest in such firm other than participation in a profit sharing plan allowed under Bar ethics rules. [DR 2-102 (A) ]\n(3) As the paralegal is the agent of the attorney, the paralegal has a duty to protect and preserve the confidences and secrets of the firm's clients. [EC 4-2 and DR 4-102 ]\n(4) As the paralegal is an agent of the lawyer or law firm, it is the duty of the supervising lawyer to carefully instruct the paralegal so that the paralegal will avoid taking any action which the attorney himself is prohibited from taking, including avoidance of solicitation of cases or clients for the lawyer or the lawfirm and avoiding any other activity which would be improper activity if performed by the supervising lawyer or his firm.","UrlName":"rule469","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4aec2d84-6b6f-406d-bb03-6688acfb2fce","Title":"Advisory Opinion 22","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 22 \nMarch 31, 1978 \nAmended by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board \nJanuary 14, 1993 \n \nEthical propriety of a lawyer communicating to other lawyers his or her availability to act as a consultant in particular areas of the law. \nThe question presented is whether it is unethical for a lawyer to communicate to other lawyers his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law without running afoul of the requirements of Standard 6 and the provisions set forth in EC 2-6, 2-7, and 2-8, Section of a Lawyer: Professional Notices and Listings.\nThe policy considerations upon which Standard 6 and the other advertising and solicitation rules are based are the result of a concern that the public should be protected from misrepresentation, fraud, intimidation , undue influence, and overreaching in the selection of a lawyer. These concerns would not be applicable to a lawyer communicating with another lawyer.\nAn attorney making contact with other members of the profession for the purpose of advising his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law is not in anyway relieved from making certain that all representations are both accurate and not in anyway misleading. Such communication is not in violation of Standard 6.","UrlName":"rule471","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de595ba8-201d-4582-b5db-f6909521b3f2","Title":"Advisory Opinion 23","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 23 \nMay 19, 1978 \n \nMulti-State Law Firm Office Within the State of Georgia.\nPursuant to Bar Rule 4-223, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia renders the following advisory opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the Canons of Ethics as applied to the following state of facts:\nMay an out-of-state law firm open and maintain an office in the State of Georgia under the direction of a full-time associate of that firm, said associate being a full-time Georgia resident and a member of the State Bar of Georgia? Relevant ethics DR 2-102(A)(4); DR 2-102(C) and (D), and DR 3-101(B).\nDR 2-102 (D) [Disciplinary Standard 11] reads as follows:\n\"A partnership shall not be formed or continued between or among lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the members and associates of the firm on its letterhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations of those members and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions. However, the same firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.\"\nThe provision of DR 2-102(D) clearly indicates that it is appropriate for multi-state firms to maintain home or branch offices within the State of Georgia under the same firm name as is used in other jurisdictions. However, an examination of the various ethics rules applicable to such an office indicates that a Georgia attorney practicing in such an office is under an affirmative responsibility to take steps to fully inform the public of limitations on the ability and qualifications of out-of-state attorneys to practice within the State of Georgia and to prevent the unauthorized practice of law within this State.1 The provisions of DR 2-102(A)(4) and of DR 2-102(D) clearly require that the letterhead of the multi-state firm make absolutely clear the jurisdictional limitations on the legal practice of members and associates of the firm who are not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions.\nDR 2-102(C) reads as follows:\n\"A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in fact partners.\"\nEC 2-13 reads as follows:\n\"In order to avoid the possibility of misleading persons with whom he deals, a lawyer should be scrupulous in the representation of his professional status. He should not hold himself out as being a partner or associate of a law firm if he is not one in fact, and thus should not hold himself out as a partner or association if he only shares offices with another lawyer.\"The provisions of EC 2-13 and DR 2-102(C) clearly indicates that any partner, associate or member of a firm, whether fully within the State of Georgia or part of a multi-state firm, must deal honestly with the Bar and the public with respect to his status with the firm.\nDR 3-101 reads as follows:\nAiding Unauthorized Practice of Law \"(A) A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. (B) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction.\"\nEC 3-9 reads, in part, as follows:\n \"Regulation of the practice of law is accomplished principally by the respective states. Authority to engage in the practice of law conferred in any jurisdiction is not per se, a grant of the right to practice elsewhere and it is improper for a lawyer to engage in practice where he is not permitted by law or by court order to do so...\"The provisions of DR 3-101 and EC 3-9 indicates that although a local attorney may be a member of a multi-state law firm, he may not aid lawyers not properly licensed in the State of Georgia to engage in the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. Additionally,\nDR 3-101(B) clearly indicates that practice by nonlicensed lawyers in Georgia will subject them to discipline in Georgia and, possibly, in their home state as well. Consequently, with the exception of those areas of law which fall within federal preemption, only those attorneys who are licensed within the State of Georgia may be based in, and may perform daily services amounting to the practice of law in, Georgia branch offices of multi-state law firms. This does not, however, mean that an out-of-state member of the firm may not cooperate with fully licensed local firm members to advise firm clients on legal problems which involve the law of more than one state or the law of Georgia and any other jurisdiction.\n The establishment of a thorough examination requirement by the Supreme Court of Georgia properly seeks to protect the citizens of the State of Georgia by assuring them that any persons undertaking to perform legal services within this State has met high standards of character and education. The definition of the practice of law found in Ga. Code Ann. § 9-401, et seq ., is quite broad and the resident associate of the out-of-state firm would be responsible for making sure that no improper practice of law results from the presence of his branch office within the State of Georgia.\nSpecial care should be taken by the local associate to insure that, where appropriate, fiduciary funds are placed in Georgia bank accounts as required by DR 9-102(A).\nThe authorities having been reviewed, the Board answers the inquiry in the affirmative, but notes that certain other requirements must also be met by the local associate of the out-of-state firm.","UrlName":"rule472","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d14bd42c-e9c6-48d9-965a-9c36d718da6f","Title":"Advisory Opinion 26","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 26 \nNovember 21, 1980 \n \nEthical Propriety of a Lawyer Sending Statutory Notice to Drawer of Bad Check Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and \"Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\nQuestion Presented:\nIs it ethically improper for a lawyer to send a statutory notice to the drawer of a bad check that states that unless said drawer pays the amount of the check in full within a specified period he will be subject to criminal prosecution?\nThe ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is Rule 3-107 (Canon &), EC-21 and DR 7-105(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Standard 49 of Rule 4-102 of the Georgia Bar Rules).\nDR 7-105(A) (Standard 49) provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> \n\"DR 7-105 - Threatening Criminal Prosecution \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(A) a lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter \". \n </div> \n</div>\nThe ethical consideration under this section states the following:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \nEC 7-21 The civil adjudicative process is primarily designed for the settlement of disputes between parties, while the criminal process is designed for the protection of society as a whole. Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process to coerce adjustment or private civil claims or controversies is a subversion of that process; further, the person against whom the criminal process is so misused may be deterred from asserting his legal rights and thus the usefulness of the civil process in settling private disputes is impaired. As in all cases of abuse of judicial process, the improper use of criminal process tends to diminish public confidence in our legal system \"Also applicable to this inquiry is Section 26-1704(a) of the Georgia Code Annotated, which provides as follows: \n</div>\n\"Bad Checks \"\n(a) A person commits criminal issuance of a bad check when he makes, draws, utters, or delivers a check, draft, or order for the payment of money on any bank or other depository in exchange for a present consideration or wages, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee. For the purposes of this section, it is prima facie evidence that the accused knew the instrument would not be honored if:\n(1) The accused had no account with the drawee at the time the instrument was made, drawn, uttered, or delivered; or,\n(2) Payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon presentation within 30 days after the delivery and the accused, or someone for him shall not have paid the holder thereof the amount due thereon, together with a service charge not to exceed $5 or five percent of the face amount of the instrument, whichever is greater, within 10 days after receiving written notice that payment was refused upon such instrument. For purposes of of this subsection (2):\n(A) Notice mailed by certified or registered mail, evidenced by return receipt, to the address printed on the instrument or given at the time of issuance shall be deemed sufficient and equivalent to notice having been received by the person making, drawing, uttering, or delivering said instrument whether such notice shall be returned undelivered or not.\n(B) The form of notice shall be substantially as follows:\n\"You are hereby notified that a check or instrument numbered _____, issued by you on _____ (date), drawn upon _____, (name of bank), and payable to _____, has been dishonored. Pursuant to Georgia Law, you have 10 days from receipt of this notice to tender payment of the full amount of such check or instrument plus a service charge of $5.00 or 5 percent (of the face amount of the check), whichever is greater, the total amount due being $_____ and _____ cents. Unless this amount is paid in full within the specified time above, the holder of such check or instrument may turn over the dishonored check or instrument and all other available information relating to this incident to the District Attorney or Solicitor for criminal prosecution.'\n(C) Any party holding a worthless check or instrument and giving notice in substantially similar form the that provided in subparagraph (B) shall be immune from civil liability for the giving of such notice and for proceeding under the forms of such notice.\"\n It should be noted that the State Bar directory rule and disciplinary standard provide that a lawyer should not threaten criminal prosecution solely to gain advantage in a civil matter (emphasis added). Before the drawer of a bad check drawn on his bank can be found in violation of Section26-1704 of the Criminal Code, he must be given written notice that payment of the check was refused by the bank. He must then fail to make payment to the holder of the bad check within ten days of the date he received written notice. Thus, notice sent pursuant to Section 26-1704 of the Georgia Code Annotated does not constitute an abuse of the criminal process in order to gain advantage in a civil matter. Rather, the notice allows the drawer of the bad check to avoid criminal liability by making the check good within ten days of the date he receives notice that the check was not honored by the bank. The notice is sent to the issuer of the bad check to make him aware that the instrument had not been honored by the bank and to allow him a reasonable time to correct what could be a valid mistake in accounting made by the drawer himself or by the bank.\nAccordingly, it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that it is not ethically improper for a lawyer to send notice to the drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Section 26-1704 of the Georgia Code Annotated.","UrlName":"rule473","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ce234b2f-f812-4354-b267-ebfbdd4d4056","Title":"Advisory Opinion 27","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 27 \nNovember 21, 1980 \n \nEthical Propriety of Revealing Confidences and Secrets Necessary to Defend Against Charges of Professional Misconduct \nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and \"Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Facts: An attorney represented two defendants who are each charged with criminal offenses arising out of the same incident. Both defendants were later found guilty of crimes in this matter. Subsequently, each defendant filed a Motion for new trial based on, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. At the hearing on the Motion for new trial the issue of the attorney's professional misconduct is raised. Later the attorney is charged by the state Bar with violations of disciplinary standards arising out of the same events.\n Question presented: Would it be ethically proper for the lawyer to reveal confidences or secrets of these clients which may be necessary to the lawyer's defense against the charges of professional misconduct?\nThe ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is RD 4-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Standard 28 of Rule 4-102 of the Georgia Bar Rules). DR 4-101 provides as follows:\nPreservation of Confidences and Secrets of Client\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (A) \"Confidence \"refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and \"secrets \"refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. \n \n(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 \n \n(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client: \n(2) use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client; \n(3) use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure. \n </div> \n</div>\n(C) A lawyer may reveal:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected; \n(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required law or court order; \n(3) the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime; \n(4) confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct. \n </div> \n(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-101 (C) through an employee. \n</div>\nAnother relevant consideration to this inquiry is the evidentiary rule known as the attorney-client privilege. This rule is stated at Georgia Code Annotated 38-419:\n\"38-419 Communications to Attorney by Client\nCommunication to any attorney, or his clerk, to be transmitted to the attorney pending his employment, or in anticipation thereof, shall never be heard by the court. So the attorney shall not disclose the advice or counsel he may give to his client, nor produce or deliver up title deeds or other papers, except evidences of debt left in his possession by his client. This rule will not exclude the attorney as a witness to any facts which may transpire in connection with his employment.\"\nAlso it should be noted that EC 4-4 recognizes that \"the attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client.\"\n With these rules in mind it appears that DR 4-101 (C) (4) specifically controls the situation presented by this inquiry. This rule holds that \"a lawyer may reveal the confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.\"(emphasis added)\n The policy considerations applicable to this situation are stated in Hyde v. State, 70 Ga App. 823, at 827:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n\"Where an attorney's fidelity as to a transaction has been attacked, with the imputation that he has been unfaithful to the interest of his client, it would be a harsh rule to permit testimony by the client in a cause, spread upon the public record, of this character, and not to permit the attorney to explain. The rule is settled by all the authorities that in litigation between the client and his attorney, the attorney, of course, has the right to make a full disclosure bearing upon the litigation, for the purpose of defending his property rights; the defense of character, where publicly attacked is just as important, and to some more so, than property rights; it would violate a principal of natural justice and inherent equity to say that the right of the attorney's defense is merged in a privileged communication when the client himself makes a public accusation (the relationship between client and attorney, having been private as to that particular matter, has become public by the act of the client) the spirit of the rule ceases when the client charges fraud. By making the attack in his unsworn statement upon the character and professional conduct of the attorney, the defendant waived his right to have their transactions considered as privileged (Code, 38-419), and the attorney was competent to give testimony to show that he did not act basely in the transaction, as his one-time client claimed. And it was not error to permit the attorney to testify to facts so far as necessary to defend his character, notwithstanding the rule against the disclosure of confidential communications between attorney and client.\" \n</div>\nAccordingly, the State Disciplinary Board is of the opinion that it would be ethically proper for the lawyer to reveal the confidences or secrets of these clients in any proceedings in which they may be necessary to defend the lawyer against charges of professional misconduct.","UrlName":"rule474","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5ab4c155-ef55-4395-a579-65fff5f4c2f8","Title":"Advisory Opinion 29","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 29 \n November 20, 1981\n Guidelines for Disputes with Attorneys' Fees Set by Workman's Compensation Board\nPursuant to the provisions of the Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Factual Background:\nThe State Board of Workers' Compensation is authorized by Georgia Law to approve the fee of attorneys who represent workers' compensation claimants. Occasionally, the Workers' Compensation Board may approve an attorney's fee, which it has determined is reasonable, but which is less than the amount the attorney and client (workers' compensation claimant) have agreed upon in the fee contract. The lawyer may then appeal the determination of the Workers' Compensation Board concerning his fee to the Superior Court. In such an appeal, the only issue before the Superior Court is the decision of the Superior Court in favor of the attorney is to reduce the client's/claimant's share of the workers' compensation award while increasing proportionately the lawyer's share of the award.\n Question Presented:\nDoes a lawyer who has represented a claimant in a workers' compensation case have an ethical obligation to advise his client of his right to obtain independent counsel to represent the client when the lawyer decides to appeal the amount the Workers' Compensation Board has approved as the lawyer's fee?\nA lawyer has a duty to exercise his independent professional judgment at all times on behalf of and for the protection of his client. Whenever the lawyer's personal interests or the interests of others cause him to compromise his loyalty and objectivity to his client, a conflict of interest exists, and it is improper for the lawyer to undertake or continue representation of the client under these circumstances.\nAn association marked by trust and intimacy develops between a client and a lawyer who has represented that client throughout vigorous workers' compensation litigation, and who has obtained a satisfactory workers' compensation award for the client. If a lawyer decides that he will appeal the attorney's fee award of the workers' Compensation Board to the Superior Court, the client may not understand that suddenly he and the lawyer are adversaries, and the lawyer will no longer be acting his best interest. The lawyer should, therefore, explain to the client that since he is appealing the amount of fees the Board has approved, he is seeking to reduce the amount of money the client will receive in order to increase the amount he will receive. For that reason, the lawyer should take care to make a full disclosure to the client of their respective positions during the appeal and advise the client of his right to obtain independent counsel to advise him during this stage of the litigation.\n The Georgia Supreme Court indicated in Arey v. Davis, 233 Ga. 951 (1975), that even when the original attorney-client relationship has ended, if a fiduciary relationship continues to exist between a lawyer and client, the lawyer is required to advise the client to seek independent legal advice from another lawyer before pursuing a course of conduct to protect the interest of the lawyer at the expense of the client.\nIt should be noted that there is no conflict of interest in those cases in which the claimant's attorney seeks an assessment of punitive attorney's fees under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 114-712 (b). In these instances, the employer-insurer will be responsible for the additional fees rather than the client/claimant.\n Conclusion:\nIn workers' compensation cases in which the employee-claimant's attorney seeks to increase his fee by appealing the Board's fee determination to the Superior Court, the lawyer is involved in a conflict of interest if he does not give the client a full explanation concerning their conflicting positions in the appeal and advise the client of his right to obtain independent legal counsel to protect the client's interests during this stage of litigation.","UrlName":"rule475","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fdc1d4eb-86b0-4daf-b413-a2a9ebaf8552","Title":"Advisory Opinion 30","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 30 \n November 17, 1982\n Ethical Propriety of Agreement by Which Attorney's Fees are Paid by Opposing Party\n Question : A is the plaintiff in a lawsuit against B which is pending in the Northern District of Georgia. B is the debtor in a proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Texas. In addition, there is pending in the same Bankruptcy Court in Texas an action in which B is the plaintiff and C, D, and E are defendants. E is also a full-time employee of A. B contends that C, D, and E are or may be liable to B for all or part of the claims being asserted against B by A in the Georgia litigation.\nA and B have agreed upon a complete settlement of all matters in controversy between them in a settlement agreement which must be approved by the Bankruptcy Court.\nThe settlement agreement provides that the Georgia litigation will be dismissed with prejudice. B will ask the Bankruptcy Court to dismiss E as a defendant in that Court, without prejudice to further proceedings by B against C and D, and will give E a covenant not to sue. however, the parties recognize that there is a possibility that C and/or D will assert claims against E and/or A, seeking contribution from either or both of them, either in the pending action in the Bankruptcy Court or in some other action. In order to protect both E and A, B has agreed to indemnify and hold them harmless from \"expenses and costs of defending such claims, including reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees,\"subject to obtaining a written opinion from the State Bar of Georgia that such agreement is ethical and is not a violation of the Canons of Ethics.\n Opinion : It is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia that the foregoing agreement is ethical and is not a violation of the Canons of Ethics, provided that a full disclosure of all pertinent facts has been made to all parties who may be affected by such agreement, give their written consent to it; and, provided further, that the attorneys at all times exercise their independent professional judgment for their respective clients regardless of who is responsible for paying the fees of the attorneys.","UrlName":"rule476","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a3bad30b-fb21-4d48-9502-6ddfeaa79f95","Title":"Advisory Opinion 31","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 31 \nNovember 19, 1982 \n Dual Occupations: Ethical considerations applicable to a Lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and another profession or business.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and the Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Questions presented:\n(1) Should a Georgia attorney, also possessing a Georgia real estate salesperson's license, who arranges a real estate transaction in his or her capacity as a real estate salesperson decline to perform any title work or other legal work in order to avoid an appearance of professional impropriety?\n(2) If, in the course of representing a client in an unrelated legal matter, the client requests the attorney (also possessing a real estate salesperson's license) to locate a buyer or seller for the client's real estate, is it proper for the attorney to accept?\nThe American Bar Association stated in Formal Opinion No. 328, June 1972, that it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer simultaneously to hold himself out as a lawyer and as a member of another profession or business. However, the American Bar Association concluded that a lawyer that is engaged in the practice of law and another profession which is closely related to law, must govern his conduct according to the professional standards of the legal profession while engaged in the non-legal profession or business.\nFollowing the rationale of the American Bar Association, it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that a Georgia attorney who is also engaged in the real estate business should conform his behavior to the standards of conduct of the State Bar of Georgia while engaged in both professions. Accordingly, it would not be improper for the attorney to perform the work requested in both of your inquiries provided the attorney complies with the provisions of DR 2-103, DR 2-104, and DR 2-105 of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility (Standards 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 of Rule 4-102 of the Georgia Bar Rules).\nWhen an attorney, who is actively practicing law in the State of Georgia, is also engaged in a second profession or business closely related to the practice of law, all of the provisions of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable to the lawyer's conduct in both professions.","UrlName":"rule477","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24ef30af-01cf-4b5c-b5cf-d2841117e5e8","Title":"Advisory Opinion 35","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 35 \nJuly 15, 1983 \n Attorney's Responsibilities with Respect to the Payment of Witness Fees\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations of the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request of such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Attorney (A) represents Client (C), the plaintiff in a civil suit for damages. In the course of preparation for C's case, A uses the services of an expert witness (W); nothing specific is mentioned concerning compensation of W.\nC has no substantial asset other than the claim that is the subject of the suit, and will be able to pay the witness fees only if he is successful in securing a recovery. By the same token, if A advances the fees to W, A will have little or no chance of being reimbursed by C, if C loses his case.\n(1) Would it be proper for A to pay the costs, realizing that he might never be reimbursed by C?\n(2) Would it be proper for A to say nothing and keep W waiting for payment until some recovery has been had?\n(3) Generally, should the State Bar reconsider the ethical prohibition against contingency fees for expert witnesses in light of the practicalities involved?\n Opinion: Standard 58 of Bar Rule 4-102 and DR 7-109 (c) expressly prohibit payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the outcome of a case. Standard 58 does not, however, prohibit an attorney from advancing, guaranteeing or acquiescing in the payment of expenses reasonably incurred by a witness.\nStandard 32 of Bar Rule 4-102 requires that the client must remain ultimately liable for any expenses advanced or guaranteed by the attorney. Ethical Consideration 5-8 (Canon 5) explains that it is not proper for an attorney to have a financial interest in the outcome of his client's case, as such an interest might affect his independent professional judgment; thus, the client must remain ultimately liable for the expenses of litigation.\nA (the attorney in the set of facts above) is not sure what he is ethically required to do in light of Standards 32 and 58. If A pays the fees to W and C loses his case, C will not be able to repay A. Is this, in fact, a violation of Standard 32?\nThe Board's answer to this question must be that such a situation does not violate Standard 32. While it is true that A may never be paid by C for the expenses advanced to W, C is still ultimately liable to A for his expenses. A can pursue legal remedy against C and might be reimbursed at some point in the future. Thus, A's liability to W is at most penultimate.\n It should be noted that in Brown and Huseby, Inc. v. Chrietzberg, 242 Ga. 232, 248 S.E. 2d 631 (1978), the Supreme Court of Georgia held an attorney may be liable for court reporter's fees if he personally guarantees payment therefor and the reporter reasonably relies upon the attorney for their payments. The Court stated that such a holding did not force the attorney to violate Standard 32, as the client would remain ultimately liable to the attorney.\nA also wonders if he can simply make W wait until the final outcome of the case, realizing that, in effect, W can only collect from C if C is successful. A fears that such a course of action (or inaction) might violate Standard 58's prohibition against contingency fees for witnesses.\n The Board, once again, finds no violation of a disciplinary standard here. First, there is no actual contingency. The term contingency implies that no liability will arise without the happening of a certain event. In this case, C will have a legal obligation to pay W even if he cannot, in fact, pay him. Secondly, A might be required to pay W under the doctrine of Brown and Huseby. In either event, W will not be required to await the outcome of the case to have a claim against C and/or A for recovery of the services he has rendered.\nFinally, A thinks that the prohibition against contingency fees for witnesses is impractical and ought to be reconsidered.\n It should be noted that rules substantially similar to Rule 58 have met constitutional challenges (e.g. Pearson v. Association of Bar of City of New York, cert. den. 434 US 924 (1978) ). The Board finds that the problem in A's case does not stem from any impracticality inherent in rule 58. Rather, A's problem arose when he failed to discuss the details of compensation with W, before he used W's services. Witnesses should know who to look to for payment for their services from the outset. An attorney's failure to appraise the witness of such details might put him in A's seemingly no-win (financial, rather than ethical) situation.","UrlName":"rule478","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"99a17efa-1ad2-4b79-b3fb-0c795e3ce6f0","Title":"Advisory Opinion 36","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 36 \nSeptember 23, 1983 \n Contingent Fees in Divorce Cases\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented:\nWhether it is ethically proper for an attorney to enter into a contingency-fee arrangement in a divorce case.\n The question presented for resolution by this Board involves questions of law as well as ethics. It should be noted that the Georgia Appellate Courts have consistently held that contingency fee arrangements in divorce cases are void as against public policy, Evans v. Hartley , 57 Ga. App. 598 (1938); Fleming v. Phinizy , 35 Ga. App. 792 (1926); and that similar arrangements in cases to collect future child support are likewise invalid, Thomas v. Holt , 209 Ga. 133 (1952). The courts in Georgia have not considered the question of whether contingency fees are proper in an action to enforce past due alimony or child support.\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are DR 5-103, EC 5-7 and DR 2-106 and EC 2-20.\nCanon 5, DR 5-103 and EC 5-7 pertain to the ethical propriety of contingency fees in general. These ethical guidelines discourage lawyers from accepting cases on a contingency fee basis to avoid the possibility of an adverse effect on the lawyer's independent professional judgment. While recognizing that a contingency-fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, EC 5-7 states that \"a reasonable contingency fee is permissible in civil cases because it may be the only means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice.\"This Rule, however, cautions a lawyer to enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those instances where the arrangement will be beneficial to the client.\nThe question presented by this inquiry is directly addressed by EC 2-20. In pertinent part, this Ethical Consideration provides that contingent-fee arrangements in domestic relation cases, are rarely justified \"because of the human relationships involved and the unique character of the proceedings.\"\nApplying the above-cited authorities to the question presented, it is the opinion of this Board that a contingent fee arrangement in a divorce case is against public policy and is therefore improper. It should be noted that this opinion is limited to the type of fee arrangements prohibited by the Georgia courts in the cases cited above, and does not address the ethical propriety of a contingency arrangement where the matter is limited solely to the collection of a liquidated amount.","UrlName":"rule479","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ca62537e-c6f2-4350-aade-b31ec2a4b3af","Title":"Advisory Opinion 37","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 37 \nJanuary 20, 1984 \n Attorney's Fees for Collecting PIP Benefits\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented:\nIs it ethically proper for an attorney to take a contingent fee from a client's PIP benefits?\n Opinion:\nThe applicable ethical rules are DR 2-106 and Standard 31(b) of Bar Rule 4-102. Directory Rule 2-106 provides in part:\nDR 2-106--Fees for Legal Services.\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. \n(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; \n(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; \n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; \n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; \n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; \n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; \n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer, or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. \n </div> \n</div>\n Standard 31(b) allow an attorney to \"contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case \"(emphasis added).\nUnder the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-1 through 13) all insurance policies must provide for compensation to injured persons, without regard to fault, for medical expenses, loss of wages, some expenses and burial expenses. This insurance coverage is generally known as PIP coverage. Payments of PIP benefits are required to be made within thirty (30) days after the insurance carrier receives reasonable proof of the fact and the amount of loss. All that is needed to file for PIP benefits is a simple, factual claim form.\nThe basis on which attorneys are allowed to take contingency fees is that the claim on which the attorney represents the client is itself contingent. Blacks Law Dictionary defines contingent as \"possible, but not assured.\"\nExcept in unusual circumstances, the benefits paid under PIP coverage are assured. It is the opinion of this Board that the taking of a contingency fee for the filling out of routine, undisputed PIP claim forms is unreasonable and a violation of DR 2-106(B)(1) and Standard 31(b). An attorney may charge a reasonable fee for the attorney's time spent in processing a PIP claim.\nIn those unusual circumstances when the payment of PIP benefits is not assured, this Board does not wish to prohibit contingency fees in general. However, the attorney should examine the factors set out in DR 2-106(B) to determine whether a contingent fee arrangement would be reasonable.","UrlName":"rule480","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"53c376e7-f51d-4714-aca7-e9d14a5be5ae","Title":"Advisory Opinion 38","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 38 \nJuly 20, 1984 \n Law Clerks Preparing Appellate Briefs\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: May a Law Clerk for a Superior Court Judge prepare appellate briefs on behalf of defendants in criminal cases where the death penalty has been imposed under the following circumstances?\n 1) The cases would be from other judicial circuits; \n3) The work would be performed in the Law Clerk's spare time and he would receive no compensation; \n2) Both the prisoner and judge consent to the Law Clerk's representation after full disclosure; \n4) No county or state materials would be used; \n5) The Law Clerk is paid by the county and serves at the judge's pleasure.\n Opinion: The applicable ethical rules are Canons 5 and 9; ECs 5-14, 5-15, 9-1 and 9-2; DR 5-105; and Standards 35 and 37.\nThe Law Clerk for a Superior Court Judge occupies a unique position. The \"client \"of the Law Clerk is the State of Georgia through the Judge who supervises the Clerk's activities. While a Law Clerk is not specifically subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Clerk is in a close relationship with the Judge who is subject to that code. Lawyers and members of the public view a Law Clerk as an extension of the Judge for whom the Clerk works.\nFor a Law Clerk to take a position against the State representing a prisoner who has been convicted in the State of Georgia, the Clerk will be in a conflict of interest situation. On one hand, the Clerk is representing the person against the State while on the other hand, the Clerk represents the State in the administration of justice through the Superior Court Judge.\nCanon 9 states that:\n\"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of a Professional Impropriety.\"\nIt is the opinion of this Board that a Law Clerk representing criminal defendants would give rise to the appearance of professional impropriety under Canon 9 and ECs 9-1 and 9-2. Additionally, Standard 37 (and DR 5-105) allows a lawyer to represent multiple clients in a conflict of interest situation only if \"it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each \". It is the opinion this Board that a Law Clerk cannot adequately represent the interest of the State of Georgia in death penalty cases and the interest of other prisoners in other death penalty cases.\nThe State Disciplinary Board does not reach the question of whether or not the Law Clerk is subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct as that is a proper question for the Judicial Qualifications Commission.","UrlName":"rule481","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5900d6f6-52be-4831-8e0c-04216eeffa05","Title":"Advisory Opinion 39","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 39 \nJuly 20, 1984 \n Propriety of Defendant's Tender of Lump Sum Settlement Offers to Plaintiffs in Federal Civil Rights Actions Wherein Statutory Attorney Fees are Provided for Successful Plaintiffs\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations of the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Questions Presented : In the U.S. District Court, plaintiff files his claim alleging a violation of first and fourteenth amendments as well as 42 USC §1983, etc. Plaintiff's counsel is typically a corresponding attorney with the American Civil liberties Union. The defendant is typically a private physician, private hospital or drug rehabilitation facility.\nRelated state claims are frequently also raised in such cases, including charges of false imprisonment, battery, medical negligence and violation of state laws regarding involuntary hospitalization, etc. In addition to amounts sought for compensatory and punitive damages, there is also a prayer if not expressly contained in the complaint then, implicitly under the U.S. Code, for statutory attorney's fees under 42 USC §1988.\nIf it is determined during the course of the pre-trial discovery process that an offer to settle the case should be extended to the plaintiffs, such an offer would typically be in the form of a lump sum which would represent the total amount to be paid by the insurance carrier for compensatory and punitive damages as well as any attorney's fees. Neither the defendant nor the insurance carrier would have any interest as to how that lump sum would be divided between the plaintiff and his attorney, the only interest therein being that it represented the maximum extent of their exposure.\nIn a case involving alleged violations of Federal civil rights statutes pending the U.S. District Court in Georgia where the prevailing party would be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as expenses of the litigation, is it unethical or in any way improper for the defendant, in an attempt to settle the case prior to trial, to offer a dollar amount representing the total of compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees which would be received by the plaintiff and his counsel?\nIf the answer to the foregoing is yes, could the ethical violation be cured by entering into an agreement between plaintiff, his attorneys and the defendant, agreeing upon an amount representing compensatory and punitive damages to be received by the plaintiff himself and a separate amount representing compensation for legal services?\n Opinion: It should be first noted that to the extent that the foregoing questions involve interpretations of federal or other law, that the State Disciplinary Board is without authority to consider those aspects of this matter. This opinion will, therefore, address only the ethical aspects of the conduct in question according to the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility. Furthermore, the State Disciplinary Board recognizes that since this inquiry arises in a federal setting, a separate body of federal ethical rules may apply and in responding, the State Disciplinary Board will not undertake to interpret any federal ethical rules.\n The State Disciplinary Board is aware of at least one other Bar Association which has issued a written opinion concerning a similar, if not identical, fact situation. Having read and considered Opinion Nos. 80-94 and 82-80 of the Ethics Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York , which opinions hold that it is unethical for a defendant's counsel to demand a waiver of statutory attorney fees from plaintiff as a condition for settlement in federal civil rights cases involving statutory attorney fees, we decline to adopt the position taken by the majority of that Committee in both of those two opinions. Briefly stated, those opinions held that defendant's demands for waiver of the statutory attorney fees \"had the effect of placing the plaintiff's lawyers in conflict with their clients and undercutting the policies of the civil rights statutes which provided for fees and that accordingly the demands were prejudicial to the administration of justice.\"Opinion No. 82-80 . We are instead, more persuaded by the position taken by the dissent in Opinion No. 82-80 , which cited with approval the following language from the United States Supreme Court in White v. New Hampshire , 455 U.S. 445, 71 L. Ed. 2d 325, 332, n. 15 (1982), a case where the issue of the ethical propriety of simultaneous negotiation of attorney fees in federal civil rights actions was raised, but not actually decided:\n\"In considering whether to enter a negotiated settlement, a defendant may have good reason to demand to know his total liability from both damages and fees. Although such situations may raise difficult ethical issues for a plaintiff's attorney, we are reluctant to hold that no resolution is ever available to ethical counsel.\"\nAlthough no provisions of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility appear to address this issue directly, Standard 45(f) of Bar Rule 4-102 states, in pertinent part, that a lawyer shall not \"settle a legal proceeding or claim without obtaining proper authorization from his client.\"Implicit in this rule is the notion that attorneys must communicate with their clients concerning possible settlement of a cause of action, and offer the benefit of their professional advice and judgment so that the client's decision to make a settlement offer is as informed and intelligent a choice as is reasonably possible.\nClearly, in appropriate cases, the question of a defendant's liability for plaintiff's attorney fees, where so provided by statute, can be a significant factor in reaching a decision as to whether to make an offer of settlement. To force a defendant into proposing a settlement offer wherein plaintiffs statutory attorney fees are not negotiated and incorporated into the final settlement offer leaves a defendant in a position of exposure that is at best, uncertain, and at worst so tenuous that meaningful settlement proposals might never be made. Such a situation undeniably impedes the settlement process and is inimical to the resolution of disputes between parties. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Board that it is not unethical for defendant's counsel to offer to plaintiff, under the facts presented, a lump sum settlement offer prior to trial for a dollar amount representing the total amount of damages and attorney fees for plaintiff's counsel.\nOur resolution of this first question appears to make an answer the second question unnecessary.","UrlName":"rule482","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e6164aab-18be-4105-9bf9-dcd212735ac6","Title":"Advisory Opinion 40","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 40 \nSeptember 21, 1984 \n Misuse of Subpoenas\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Standards of Conduct of the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Whether or not it is a violation of Standard 4 of the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Georgia for an attorney to issue a subpoena for the Production of Documents pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a), directing the witness to appear at a lawyer's office or some other location, when in fact no hearing or trial is taking place and no notice of such subpoena is served upon opposing counsel?\nWhether or not it is a violation of Standard 4 of the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Georgia for an attorney to issue a subpoena pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-45 when no notice of deposition has been filed and served upon all parties and when no deposition has in fact been scheduled?\n Discussion: Disciplinary Standard 4 of the State Bar of Georgia provides as follows:\nA lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation. A violation of this Standard may be punished by disbarment.\n A subpoena is a judicial writ issued in the name of the court by the clerk when attendance is required at court. (See Agnor's Georgia Evidence § 2-3). In the case of White v. Gulf States Paper , 119 Ga. App. 271, 273 (1969), it was stated that our subpoena statutes were limited only to producing documentary evidence at a hearing or trial. In the White decision, the court noted that the old Georgia Code Section 38-8 and 38-9 dealt only with the production of documentary evidence at a hearing or trial and that the new Act (1966 which constitutes our present subpoena law) did not enlarge the provisions of the repealed law to allow use of a Notice to Produce at depositions. This particular case brought about the amendment to Rule 45 of the Civil Practice Act.\nO.C.G.A. § 9-11-45 provides that a subpoena shall issue for persons sought to be deposed and may command the person to produce documents. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-30(b)(1) requires notice to every other party of all depositions. Reading Rule 30 and Rule 45 together, it is obvious that before a subpoena can be issued, notice of the deposition must be given to all parties.\nIn consideration of the above, a subpoena issued pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a) should only be issued for actual hearings and trials and should not be requested when in fact no hearing or trial has been scheduled. Likewise, a subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 45 of the Civil Practice Act should be requested and issued only for depositions which have been actually scheduled by agreement between parties or where a notice of deposition has been filed and served upon all parties, and should not be issued when no deposition has been scheduled.\nThe Board is concerned with the misuse of subpoenas as presented in the two situations discussed because subpoenas are court documents. Non-party witnesses would be misled by such court process into releasing confidential or privileged material without the party having a chance to contest the relevancy, confidentiality or privilege of the material contained in the file because the subpoena is sent without notice to any other party or their counsel. Notice is a concept embraced by the Civil Practice Act. There is no need for notice of a subpoena issue pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a) because all parties receive notice of hearings and trials, so long as they are real hearings and real trials.\n Conclusion: In the opinion of the Board, the use of subpoenas as described herein is a willful misrepresentation to and fraud upon:\n (1) The issuing court; \n(2) The issuing clerk: \n(3) The person or entities to whom the subpoena is directed; and, \n(4) The opposing party and counsel, with the purview of Disciplinary Standard 4.","UrlName":"rule484","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d056c887-3e39-4cb9-97b0-abb52d8d7909","Title":"Advisory Opinion 41","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 41 \nSeptember 24, 1984, \nas amended November 15, 1985 \n \nClient Confidentiality \nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations of the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia starting with Rules and Regulations (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request of such, rendered its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Lawyer X has received cash fees from clients in excess of $10,000 several times in the past three years. All of these fees were for representation in criminal matters. Each time, X has deposited the money in either his operating account or escrow account, when appropriate, and filed a Currency Transaction Report, as required by 31 C.F.R. § 103.22. Subsequently, X received a telephone inquiry from a revenue agent with the Georgia Department of Revenue inquiring into the source of the funds recorded on the currency transaction report. Lawyer X refused to divulge the names of his clients.\nThe State of Georgia then issued a Notice to Produce, requiring production of \"...all books, records, papers and/or documents pertaining to [Lawyer X's personal Corporate Georgia Income Tax] For the periods indicated [1981-1983].\"The Notice to Produce did not name a specific person as a client for an investigation, but Lawyer X was verbally advised by the revenue agent that in fact, the purpose of this Notice to Produce was to discover, at random, the names of the client, and to audit the lawyer.\n(1) Will Lawyer X violate the confidences and secrets provision of the Code of Ethics by complying with the Notice to Produce in revealing the identity of the client in those transactions in excess of $10,000?\n(2) Additionally, will Lawyer X violate the confidences and secrets provision of the Code of Ethics by complying with the Notice to Produce in revealing the identity of all of his clients and the amount of fees paid, whether by case, check, or any amount above or less than $10,000?\n Opinion : The applicable ethical rules are Canon 4; EC's 4-1 through 4-6; and Standard 28.\nIt should be first noted that the questions addressed in this opinion pertain only to a general Notice to Produce seeking information from an attorney's file. The dollar amount involved in the hypothetical is not controlling; rather it is the fact that the Notice to Produce is not addressed to a particular client or clients that is of concern to the Board.\nCanon 4 states: \"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.\"As EC 4-1 explains, the observance of the lawyer's ethical obligation to hold inviolate confidences and secrets of his client encourages laymen to seek legal assistance and facilitates full development of the facts essential to proper representation of the client. EC 4-5 directs that a lawyer should not use secrets acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client. This obligation continues even after the termination of the lawyer's employment. (EC 4-6)\nThese principles are incorporated in the Director Rules and Disciplinary Standards. DR 4-101 and Standard 28 prohibit a lawyer from revealing the confidences and secrets of a client. A violation of this Standard is punishable by disbarment. A lawyer may reveal confidences and secrets of a client only (1) if the clients consents after full disclosure; (2) where the confidences or secrets are permitted to be disclosed under the Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order; (3) where the client intends to commit a crime and information is necessary to prevent the crime; or (4) where it is necessary for the lawyer to establish and collect his fee, or defend himself against the accusation of wrongful conduct.\n The ethical and disciplinary rules distinguish between \"confidences \"and \"secrets.\"The former is information protected by the attorney/client privilege as determined by applicable law, and is more limited than the ethical obligation of the lawyer to guard the secrets of his client. A secret, on the other hand, refers to \"other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which could be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client .\"(emphasis supplied) [DR 4-101(a) and Standard 28(c)].\nIt is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that in responding to a general Notice to Produce Lawyer X must not voluntarily reveal the name/identity of his clients to the Georgia Department of Revenue unless he obtains the consent of the client or clients affected after a full disclosure. [Standard 28(b)(1)] Further, Lawyer X must resist disclosure until a court orders disclosure [Standard 28(b)(2)] and thereafter he may pursue all reasonable avenues of appeal.\nThis decision finds support in the opinions of at least four other Bar Associations which have issued opinions concerning a similar, if not identical, factual situation. Briefly stated, these opinions hold that an attorney must resist disclosure of the name/identity of his client. The District of Columbia, Philadelphia and Birmingham Opinions go further and require an attorney to utilize all appellate avenues before making disclosure.\n Opinion No. 124 of the Committee on Legal Ethics the District of Columbia Bar Association (March 22, 1983); Opinion No. 81-95 of the Professional Guidance Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association (undated); Opinion of Professional Ethics of the Birmingham Bar Association (unnumbered) (January 9, 1981); and Informal Opinion No. 81-3 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Connecticut Bar Association (October 9, 1980).","UrlName":"rule485","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f82c57c-2110-4fac-bd3d-bac1613e6045","Title":"Advisory Opinion 42","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 42 \nNovember 16, 1984 \n Attorney's Disclosure of Client's Possible Intent to Commit Suicide\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. as amended) the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Attorney (A) represents client (C), who is facing a multiple felony indictment and substantial possibility of conviction thereon. C has sought advice from A concerning matters one would normally expect to be consulted about by a terminally ill person trying to put his affairs in order prior to death. Although C has never directly so stated to A, by his actions and conduct, C has led A to believe that C intends to commit suicide prior to his criminal trial.\nA has inquired whether Informal Opinion No. 83-1500 of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (June 24, 1983), which authorized a lawyer to disclose to other persons the definite threat of his client to take his own life would apply to a situation where the client has not definitely expressed such an intention, but, by his actions, has given his attorney reason to believe that he intends to take his own life.\n Opinion: For the same reasons set forth in ABA Informal Opinion No. 83-1500 (A copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference), the Board is of the opinion that when an attorney reasonably believes his client is contemplating suicide, he should be permitted to disclose such information as a last resort in a life-or-death situation when the lawyer's efforts to counsel the client have apparently failed.\n Standing Committee on Ethics \nand Professional Responsibility\n<div align=\"left\"> \n <table width=\"75%\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td valign=\"top\"> Informal Op. 83-1500  \n         Disclosure of Client's Intent \n         to Commit Suicide </td> \n <td valign=\"top\">June 24, 1983</td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n </table> \n</div>\nThis inquiry involves the situation in which a client who has retained a lawyer to draft her will confides to the lawyer that she intends to take her own life. The client also disclosed that she has been hospitalized for mental exhaustion on at least one occasion after a previous suicide attempt. Neither suicide nor attempted suicide is a crime in the jurisdiction. The lawyer asks whether the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits the lawyer from disclosing to a third person the intention of his client to take her own life.\nDR 4-101(B) of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from revealing a confidence or secret of his client. An exception is provided in DR 4-101(C)(3), which permits a lawyer to reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. A literal reading of \"crime \"in this provision renders the exception inapplicable in the inquiring lawyer's jurisdiction. The same conclusion would be reached under proposed Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), which provides that a lawyer may reveal information relating to representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act the lawyer believes likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.\n Ethics committees in two states have dealt with his problem. In Opinion 486 (1978), the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar Association concluded that while suicide had been decriminalized in New York and DR4-101(C)(3) did not literally apply, the overriding social concern for the preservation of human life permitted the lawyer to disclose the information. The New York committee pointed out that the decriminalization of suicide in the state was not intended to effect any basic change in underlying common law and statutory provisions reflecting deep concern for the preservation of human life and the prevention of suicide. Accordingly, the committee analyzed an announced intention to commit suicide in the same manner as proposed criminal conduct under DR 4-101(C)(3). Addressing the same issue in Opinion 79-61 (1979),the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar Association determined that although neither suicide nor attempted suicide is in itself punishable under the criminal law of Massachusetts, both have in other respects been deemed to be malum in se and treated as unlawful and criminal.\nThat committee cited the New York State Bar Association Opinion 486 and reached the same conclusion.\nWe believe that in light of the following language of EC7-12 relating to proper conduct in dealing with the client with a disability, these Committees reached the proper conclusion:\n<blockquote> \nAny mental or physical condition of a client that renders  him incapable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf, casts additional  responsibilities on his lawyer... If the disability of a client, in the lack of a legal  representative compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should  consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance  the interest of his client.... \n</blockquote>\nThis concept is also recognized in the ABA proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct:\n<blockquote> \nA lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take  other protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably  believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest. \n</blockquote>\nThe inquirer may justifiably conclude that his client is unable to make a considered judgment on this ultimate life or death question and should be permitted to disclose the information as a last resort when the lawyer's efforts to counsel the client have apparently failed. This interpretation is limited to the circumstance of this particular opinion request and should not be relied upon to permit the disclosure of any other information in any other situation.","UrlName":"rule486","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"183aad70-d7cd-4ada-9b59-ecb93c8bc202","Title":"Advisory Opinion 45","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 45 \nMarch 15, 1985, \nas amended November 15, 1985 \n Charging Interest on Clients' Overdue Bills\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Questions Presented:\n<div>1. A client is billed for service rendered and fails to pay after thirty (30) days have elapsed. Is it permissible to notify the client, by letter, that unless his account is paid in full, interest will be charged on the next bill on the unpaid balance?</div>\n2. A client signs a fee contract with an attorney providing for the charging of interest on any unpaid balance. Is it permissible for the attorney to charge interest?\n 3. An attorney notifies his or her client by letter that interest will be charged unless their accounts are paid in full. If the conduct described in question 1 is impermissible, can the attorney rectify the situation by rebilling the clients with any interest charged deducted, or if interest was paid returned? \n \n Opinion: The State Disciplinary Board is of the opinion that an attorney may ethically unilaterally charge interest on client's overdue bills. A lawyer may ethically do so provided that he or she complies with all applicable law, specifically O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts contained in Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act as amended (15 USC 1601 et seq.) and EC 2-19, which states: As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed, it is desirable that he reach a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made. Such a course will not only prevent later misunderstanding but will also work for good relations between the lawyer and the client. It is usually beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent. A lawyer should be mindful that many persons who desire to employ him may have had little or no experience with fee charges of lawyers, and for this reason he should explain fully to such persons the reasons for the particular fee arrangement he proposes. The Board is of the opinion that an attorney can comply with EC 2-19 and unilaterally charge interest without a prior specific agreement with a client if notice is given to the client in advance that interest will be charged on fee bills which become delinquent after a stated period of time, but not less than 30 days. The Board recommends that notice be provided on the bill at the time it is sent and that the notice be conspicuous and printed in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the bill. The notice must specify the amount of interest to be charged and the period of time after which it will be imposed.\n Attorneys should be aware that additional notice and disclosure requirements may be imposed by law, including the specific requirements of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 and the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts, supra . This opinion relates only to those instances where a charge of interest is imposed on a client's overdue bill and has no applicability to the extension of credit or the obtaining of security by an attorney.\nTherefore, the questions presented are answered as follows:\n<div> 1. Yes. An attorney may charge his clients interest provided the attorney complies with EC 2-19 and all applicable law, specifically O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 and the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts, supra .</div>\n2. See the answer to question 1.\n3. Due to the Board's answer to question 1, this question need not be addressed.","UrlName":"rule487","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a84f55f1-df09-45e3-afdf-f116e9ecc1f4","Title":"Advisory Opinion 46","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 46 \nMarch 15, 1985 \n Third Party Advancing or Reimbursing an Insured (Policyholder) for the Latter's Purchase of Optional PIP Coverage\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Factual Background: Attorney (A) represents Client (C) whose spouse was struck and killed by a van as he crossed the street. The deceased spouse had no automobile insurance, while the van driver was insured and his policy provided only basic PIP benefits. These basic benefits extended to the deceased's family and were paid out by the driver's insurance.\nEventually, a settlement of the liability claim was reached. A approached the attorney (X) who represented the driver (Y) and inquired as to whether or not his client would be willing to apply for and tender the premium for optional PIP coverage available under former O.C.g.A. § 33-34-5(B) (Ga. Code Ann. § 56-34046). X consulted with Y and advised that Y would be willing to do so but only on condition that C advance Y the amount for the additional premium and pay Y for his time in making the application for the optional coverage.\n According to a recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Bailey v. Georgia Mutual Ins. Co. , 168 Ga. App. 706, 309 S.E. 2d 870 (1983), \"a demand for increased coverage by the policyholder is necessary before those who would be incidental or third-party beneficiaries as 'other insureds' can seek optional benefits.\"Thus, C and the child of the deceased pedestrian, who was not a direct policyholder, would not have legal standing to apply for and obtain those optional benefits according to the Court of Appeals' ruling.\n Questions Presented:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n 1. May C or A advance to Y the premium amount for the optional PIP coverage? \n2. May A or C compensate Y for his time in applying for and obtaining this coverage? \n3. If the insurer refuses to pay the benefits and litigation results, would C be barred from compensating Y for his time and effort in pursuing the claim in court, in addition to witness and mileage fees allowed by statute? Opinion: The ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are EC 5-8, EC 7-28, DR 5-103(B), DR 7-109(C), and Standards 32 and 58. \n</div>\nThe State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia answers the questions presented as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n1. C or A may ethically advance to Y the premium amount of optional PIP coverage as long as A's conduct is otherwise in accordance with the requirements of Standard 32. Standard 32 provides: \n</div>\nWhile presenting a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examinations, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses. A violation of this standard may be punished by a public reprimand.\n2. A or C may ethically compensate Y for his time in applying for and obtaining the optional PIP coverage, as long as A's conduct is otherwise in accordance with the requirements of Standard 32 cited above.\n3. If the insurer refuses to pay the benefits and litigation results, C is not ethically barred from compensating Y for his time and effort in pursuing the claim in court, provided that the requirements of Standard 58 are observed. Standard 58 provides:\nA lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n(a) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying;\n(b) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or testifying;\n(c) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.\nA violation of this standard may be punished by disbarment.","UrlName":"rule488","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"33a5434e-7c81-4023-8874-318faac1e449","Title":"Advisory Opinion 47","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 47 \nJuly 26, 1985 \n Contingency Fees to Collect Past Due Alimony and/or Child Support\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Is it ethical to charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony and/or child support payments?\n Opinion: The ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are EC 2-23, EC 2-20, DR 2-106, EC 5-7, DR 5-103 and Disciplinary Standard 31.\nThe question presented for resolution by this Board is the question specifically left unanswered in Formal Advisory Opinion 36, which held that contingent fee arrangements in divorce cases and in cases to collect future child support are against public policy and are therefore improper.\n It is the opinion of the Board that it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony or child support for the following reasons: Collection of these amounts occurs after the divorce, i.e. it is a post-judgment proceeding; a suit for execution of a judgment on such arrearages is neither a \"domestic relations \"nor a \"divorce \"case; the human relationships involved and the unique character of domestic relations proceedings which generally prohibit contingent fees are not present and do not apply in these cases; and, most importantly, in many circumstances, a contingent fee arrangement may be the only means by which these vital legal rights can be enforced. Canon 2, EC 2-20 and EC 5-7.\nAlthough it is ethically proper to charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony or child support, the lawyer should strive to meet the following criteria:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n1. A contingent fee arrangement must be the only practical means by which one having a claim for past due alimony or child support can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute the claim (EC's 2-20 and 5-7); \n2. The contingent fee must be reasonable. Guidelines for determining the reasonableness of a fee are set forth in DR 2-106. \n</div>\n DR 2-106 - Fees for Legal Services.\n(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.\n(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;\n(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;\n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;\n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;\n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;\n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;\n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer, or lawyers performing the services;\n(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.\n(C) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.\n3. Any court-awarded fees must be credited against the contingent fee. EC 2-23. These criteria should be carefully followed, particularly in cases seeking to collect past due child support.\n This decision finds support in the opinions of at least eleven other Bar Associations. Opinion 1982-4 , Legal Ethics Committee of the Dallas Bar Association (11/22/82); Opinion 80-34 , Committee on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. (undated); Opinion CI-828 and CI-1050U , Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Michigan (9/2/82) (10/30/84); Opinion 88 , Ethics Committee of the Mississippi State Bar (9/23/83); Opinion 405 , approved by the Virginia State Bar Council (9/8/83); Opinion 82-1 , Legal Ethics Committee of the West Virginia State Bar (6/18/82); Opinion 660 , New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics (5/4/84); Formal Ethics Opinion No. 82-F-26 , Ethics Committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee (2/22/82); Opinion 1983-4/2 , New Hampshire Bar Association Ethics Committee (9/20/83); Opinion 67 , Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee (undated).","UrlName":"rule489","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0044f666-ad1a-473b-ab90-6d63b2df6094","Title":"Advisory Opinion 48","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 48 \nJuly 26, 1985 \n Expert Witness Consulting Services\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873,as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Facts: A client asks an attorney to investigate a possible medical malpractice claim. An appropriate expert is located and the attorney advises the client that the expert requires an hourly fee of X dollars per hour to review the records and that the first hour must be paid in advance.\nThe client tells the attorney that the client cannot pay the expert's fee and asks whether there are any possible alternatives. The attorney is aware of one alternative whereby the client contracts with an expert witness consulting service to locate the services of an appropriate medical expert to review the records to determine whether a cause of action exists. If the expert determines that no cause of action exists, then the client would be so advised and no fee would be owed. If, on the other hand, there appears to be a cause of action, the client would agree to compensate the consulting service on a contingent fee basis from any recovery generated.\nThe consulting service would contract directly with the client, rather than the attorney, and would agree to pay the expert on an hourly basis for time spent by the expert in case preparation, including research, depositions and trial.The expert is not an employee of this organization, however, and would work directly with the attorney on the client's behalf.\nUpon successful completion of the case, the consulting service would receive approximately 7% of the recovery plus reimbursement for any fees paid to the expert by the service according to the rate specified in the contract. The attorney would also sign the contract to guarantee payment of the consulting service on behalf of the client from the proceeds in the attorney's possession. If no recovery is obtained, the the client would only be required by the contract to reimburse the service for any hourly fees paid to the expert.\n Question: Does the proposed use of such an expert witness consulting service violate Bar Rules?\n Opinion: The Board first recognizes the existence of several such services and that for some clients, an arrangement similar to that proposed may be the only means available to retain the services of an expert to pursue a cause of action. Since there is substantial uncertainty about the existence of a cause of action until an appropriate expert offers a favorable opinion, a lawyer may be unwilling or unable to assume the risk of personally advancing the necessary expenses to the client, particularly where it appears likely that the client will not reimburse the attorney if the expert's investigation reveals that there is no cause of action.\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n Standard 58 of Bar Rule 4-102 states as follows:  \n \"A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce  in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony  or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the  payment of:  \n (a) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in  attending or testifying; \n(b) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or  testifying; \n(c) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.  \nA violation of this standard may be punished by  disbarment.\" \n</div>\n Under the proposed arrangement, the lawyer would acquiesce in the payment of a contingent fee to the organization that locates the expert witness, but only in the payment of a fixed fee to the expert. Provided the fee paid to the expert by the consulting service is reasonable, Standard 58 does not appear to be violated. It is very important, however, that the attorney determine that the expert has absolutely no connection with the consulting service, since the reason for the prohibition on contingency compensation to witnesses is to promote truthful testimony uncolored by an financial interest of the witness in the proceedings. See Person v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York , 554 F. 2d 534 (2nd Cir.), cert. den. , 434U.S. 924 (1977). Such impermissible interests could range from significant evidence of interest by the particular expert in future repeated referrals by the consulting service in exchange for a demonstrated willingness to provide favorable opinions, to some type of financial interest of the expert in the service as a director, officer, shareholder or some other form of profit-sharing. The lawyer also cannot permit the consulting service or its employees to provide any testimony or evidence either directly or indirectly through substantial technical assistance to the expert which might somehow fundamentally affect the expert's opinion and transform him into a mere \"mouthpiece \"for the service.In summary, the expert and his opinion must be completely neutral, detached and independent from the consulting service.\nStandard 26 prohibits an attorney from aiding a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. In this regard, the lawyer should insure that the contract with the consulting service does not impair the lawyer's strategic and tactical responsibility to decide which witnesses to call and what evidence and testimony to present on behalf of the client. So long as the participation of the consulting service in the case is confined to locating an appropriate expert and assuming a portion of the risk of prosecuting the cause of action, it would not appear that the lawyer has aided the consulting service in the unauthorized practice of law.\nFinally, the contract in question provides for the payment of a portion of any proceeds recovered by the lawyer to the consulting service which raises the issue of fee splitting with a lay organization. With certain inapplicable exceptions, Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. In this case, however, the contract does not split attorney fees with the organization since it is the client that contracts with the organization to pay a specific share of the client's recovery to the organization in exchange for its services. The attorney is obligated only to guarantee the client's reimbursement of expenses advanced by the organization and, where appropriate, the payment of the consulting service's share of any recovery. Fees charged by the attorney, however, should be computed and paid without reduction by the fee paid to the consulting service. Otherwise, the contract becomes a mere subterfuge for fee splitting between the attorney and a lay organization. Provided the attorney insures the client is fully advised of these consequences of the contract and the client freely agrees to be so bound, there appears to be no fee splitting involved in the proposed arrangement.\nThis opinion finds support in similar opinions issued by the following organizations:\n Informal Opinion 1375 of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (1976);\n Opinion Nos. 55 and 56 of the Committee on Legal Ethics of the District of Columbia Bar (1978);\n Formal Opinion 1984-79 of the California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct (1984).","UrlName":"rule490","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cd62708d-7e7a-477f-b187-c8e01ee2faa4","Title":"Advisory Opinion 49","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 49 \nJuly 26, 1985 \n Lawyer's Use of a Lay Collection Agency to Collect Overdue Accounts for Legal Services\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Facts: Lawyer L has represented a number of clients whose cases have been completed. The fees in these cases have not been fully paid. Lawyer L has on a monthly basis submitted bills to the clients requesting payment. After thirty (30) days, Lawyer L has sent a letter demanding that immediate payment be made or that arrangements for weekly payments be made. There is no effort to pay in full or to make payments by Client C.\nWhen the account is sixty (60) days old, Lawyer L desires to turn the unpaid bill of Client C over to a commercial collection agency for collection of the account on a contingency fee basis. The commercial collection agency will be calling the client and demanding payment and failing voluntary payment, will employ Georgia counsel at their expenses to file a lawsuit to collect the account. The fee is 45% for accounts less than or equal to 120 days delinquent and 50% for accounts over 120 days delinquent.\n Question Presented: May Lawyer L ethically retain the collection agency on the terms stated?\n Opinion: The aspirational guidance of EC 2-23 suggest that \"[a] lawyer should be zealous in his efforts to avoid controversies over fees with clients and should attempt to resolve amicably any differences on the subject.\"Referral to a collection agency, however, much like filing suit against one's client, is a measure of last resort and should be undertaken only after the lawyer is sure that all reasonable alternatives have been pursued, including an offer by the lawyer to voluntarily submit the matter to the Fee Arbitration Program sponsored by the State Bar. See Part IV--Arbitration of Fee Disputes--Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia . Unfortunately, the good faith efforts of an attorney are not always successful, and, this Board recognizes that on occasion, a client will absolutely refuse to pay an attorney's bill despite all reasonable attempts at compromise. Under such circumstances, its would appear to be unfair to deprive an attorney of a lawful means available to other professions and businesses through which compensation properly earned can be collected. While the Board is of the opinion that the proposed arrangement is ethically permissible, discussion of certain additional considerations is required.\nSince a client's non-payment often stems from a belief that the lawyer's bill is excessive, a lawyer should first, before referral, satisfy himself that the unpaid bill is reasonable. In this regard, the guidelines of DR 2-106 are most instructive and should be carefully considered by the lawyer. It should also be pointed out that although it appears from these facts that Lawyer L has made a reasonable attempt to collect these overdue fees through his personal efforts before referral, an arbitrary deadline of 60 days past due may not, in all cases be appropriate. In reaching a decision of whether or not referral is appropriate, a lawyer should individually consider each case and not apply an arbitrary deadline for the sake of administrative efficiency. Where it is clear, however, the the client's refusal is due to willful indifference and not to an inability to pay or to circumstances beyond the client's control, and the lawyer is satisfied that the non-payment constitutes, in essence, a fraud or gross imposition by the client, then referral to a reputable collection agency is proper.\nWhile Standard 28(b)(4) of Bar Rule 4-102 permits a lawyer to reveal \"confidences and secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee \", a lawyer should exercise this option with considerable caution. Specifically, Lawyer L should reveal to the collection agency only such minimal background information about the client as is absolutely necessary for the agency to properly perform its job. Additionally, just as with any of his employees, the lawyer needs to exercise reasonable care to insure that the agency employees disclose only such client confidences or secrets as are permitted under Standard 28 since a failure in this regard subjects the lawyer to potential disbarment under Standard 29 of Bar Rule 4-102.\nFinally, brief clarification of a possible problem with fee splitting is necessary. With certain inapplicable exceptions, Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. While the fees sought to be collected on behalf of Lawyer L by the collection agency represent legal fees earned by the lawyer, the fees have already been completely earned when referred and the collection agency has not participated in the actual earning of the fees in violation of the prohibition against a lawyer aiding the unauthorized practice of law. See Standard 24. Accordingly, the Board is of the opinion that under the given facts, the fees referred to the collection agency are more in the nature of accounts receivable, the splitting of which Standard 26 is not intended to prevent.\nThe Board finds support for its conclusion that provided the foregoing considerations are satisfied, the conduct in question is ethically proper in similar opinions issued by the following jurisdictions:\n Opinion 82-24 of the Committee on Ethics of the Maryland Bar Association (1982);\n Opinion 82-2 of the Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Arizona (1982);\n Opinion 81-3 of the Ethics Committee of the Florida Bar (1981);\n Opinion No. 225 of the Oregon State Bar (1972);\n Opinion No. 20 of the Colorado Bar Association (1961).\n<hr align=\"left\" width=\"50%\">\n 1 Ga. L. 1946, p. 171 (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-306 through 9-411). 2 Ga. Code Ann § 26-1704 recodified as O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20.","UrlName":"rule491","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f11f9977-b716-4737-964c-231658b7d25c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On August 23, 1989 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2 The adoption of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct does not require a change in this opinion, which is based on the Code of Judicial Conduct and Georgia law.  However, the Code of Judicial Conduct and Georgia law may have been revised since this opinion was issued. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. QUESTION PRESENTED: Ethical propriety of a part-time judge also serving as a criminal defense counsel. OPINION: The Supreme Court of Georgia approves, as amended, Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2 requesting an Advisory Opinion as to the ethical propriety of a part-time judge serving in a judicial capacity while also serving as a criminal defense counsel. Georgia law authorizes part-time Judges to practice law, subject to certain restrictions. OCGA § 15-7-21 provides that part-time State Court Judges may engage in the private practice of law in other courts, but prohibits practice in the Judge's own court or appearances in any matter as to which the Judge has exercised any jurisdiction. OCGA § 15-10-22 (b) provides that Magistrates who are attorneys may practice in other courts, but not in their own courts, nor may they appear in any matter as to which their court has exercised any jurisdiction. In addition, the Compliance section of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:A. Part-time Judges. A part-time judge is a judge who serves on a continuing or periodic basis, but who is permitted by law to devote time to some other profession or occupation and whose compensation for that reason is less than that of a full-time judge. Part-time judges: . . . . . (2) should not practice law in the court on which they serve or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the courts on which they serve, or act as lawyers in proceedings in which they have served as judges or in any other proceeding related thereto. From this, it is clear that both the statutes and the Canons authorize the practice of law by part-time Judges and spell out the restrictions on such practice. For that reason, representation of a defendant in a criminal case by a part-time judge cannot be said to be per se inappropriate or unethical. At the same time, Canon 2 admonishes that:Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. For that reason, although such representation is not in and of itself inappropriate, the regular or exclusive representation of such defendants by a Judge whose responsibilities include the issuance of criminal warrants or the trial of criminal cases might destroy the appearance of impartiality and integrity essential to the administration of justice and, therefore, be inappropriate. In reaching this conclusion, we have been aware of the holding in Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, et al. , 249 Ga. 543 (291 SE2d 524) (1982); however, in Hudson v. State , 250 Ga. 479 (299 SE2d 531) (1983), this Court declined to adopt a rule which would require disqualification of any part-time Judge serving as an attorney in a criminal defense action. As Judge Gregory stated at Page 482 of the Hudson opinion:Further, we decline to adopt the broad rule proposed by defendant which would require automatic disqualification of every attorney in a criminal defense action where the attorney is simultaneously employed as either a state court solicitor or probate judge. We therefore concluded that part-time Judges are not prohibited from representing defendants in criminal cases, subject to the reservations spelled out in the statutes and the Canons as above set forth.","UrlName":"rule502","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ada8ae14-da3a-4fec-800d-cfc72f209e71","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On December 17, 1987 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-3 For references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . For references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rules 1.7(a)</a> , and <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">2.2(a)</a> . For references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of County Attorneys Representing Criminal Defendants. There is no basis for a per se ethical disqualification of county attorneys from the representation of criminal defendants, unless the defendant is charged with a violation of a county ordinance. Any conflict of interest raised by a county attorney's representation of clients other than the county should be analyzed in the same fashion as any other conflict arising from the representation of differing or potentially differing interests. County attorneys must be especially sensitive to the possibility of conflict created by their role, if any, as prosecutor. Correspondent requests guidance as to whether county attorneys or their partners or associates may represent criminal defendants. The primary issue is potential conflict of interest. The position of county attorney obviously creates a lawyer-client relationship between the attorney and the county governmental unit. The county attorney is not called upon by election or oath of office to enforce the laws of the State. The county attorney is, however, authorized to prosecute violations of county ordinances on behalf of the county. When he or she is acting in such a capacity the duty to the county is similar to that of a solicitor to the state. Based on the reasoning of Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2, it would be ethically improper for a county attorney to represent a criminal defendant charged with a violation of a county ordinance. More generally, the county attorney's obligation is zealous representation of the best interests of his or her client. Any conflict of interest created by a county attorney's representation of clients other than the county should be analyzed like any other conflict arising from the representation of differing or potentially differing interests. There is, therefore, no basis for a per se ethical disqualification of a county attorney or partners or associates from the representation of criminal defendants. In those specific situations in which such representation would violate Standards No. 35 or 36, the representation is obviously prohibited. When representation is prohibited by Standard No. 35 or Standard No. 36, Standard No. 38, as amended, would impute the disqualification of the attorney to all members of the firm. While no per se disqualification bars county attorneys unless the defendant is charged with a violation of a county ordinance, a given county attorney may nevertheless be ethically disqualified from the representation of criminal defendants in the county. Legal representation of county prosecution or law enforcement agencies may affect adversely the attorney's independent professional judgment. All county attorneys need to be sensitive to the possibility of such potential conflict. This advisory opinion is necessarily limited to the ethical propriety of the conduct in question. We offer no opinion on either the constitutional issues of ineffective assistance of counsel or statutory issues of disqualification. ","UrlName":"rule504","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2e4e03ed-ea51-4ef9-8868-7e2a20277106","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-4","Content":"State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On December 17, 1987 Formal Advisory Opinion No 86-4 This opinion relies on both Directory Rules and Standards of Conduct that bear upon matters addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">Rule 4.2</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of the Plaintiff's Attorney in a Personal Injury Case Writing a Letter to the Insured Defendant Which May Contain Legal Advice. It is ethically improper for the plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which contains legal advice. The plaintiff's lawyer can properly write a letter to the attorney for the insured and the insurer making an offer of settlement. The letter may properly request the lawyer to provide this information to the insured as well as the insurer. If the plaintiff's lawyer needs information as to the name of the insured's insurer, he or she may properly write the insured requesting this information. But the contents of the letter shall be limited to a request for the necessary information. The plaintiff's attorney may not render legal advice to the insured. It is ethically improper for the plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice. The problem is raised by letter to insureds notifying them of the potential liability of their insurers for failure to settle within policy limits. It is important first to state the applicable rules of law. An insurer is normally liable only for any judgment within the policy limits. The insured is normally liable for any judgment in excess of the policy limits. An insurer has a good faith duty to the insured, however, to settle a claim within the policy limits under the \"equal consideration \"rule. National Emblem Insurance Co. v. Pritchard, 140 Ga. App. 350, 231 S.E. 2d 126 (1976); United States Fidelity &Guaranty Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E. 2d 809, aff'd, 223 Ga. 789, 158 S.E. 2d 243(1967). The failure of the insurer to fulfill this good faith duty may cause the insurer to be liable for any excess judgment. State Farm Insurance Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d331 (5th Cir. 1967). These legal rules make apparent the reason a plaintiff's attorney may wish to write the insured directly. The letter will lay the basis for seeking recovery against the insurer for the portion of a judgment rendered in excess of the policy limits. Attorneys for plaintiffs may also perceive an advantage in having the insurer know that the insured is fully aware of his or her rights. That is, the communication with the insured is a helpful pressure tactic. Such a letter is impermissible, regardless of whether it is sent before or after the insured is represented by counsel. A lawyer is precluded from contacting a person represented by a lawyer as to matters relevant to the representation without the written consent of that person's lawyer. Ga. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104(A)(1), Standard 47. Georgia Advisory Opinion No. 10 (July 18,1969), held that such contact with an insured defendant is not improper if undertaken before the defendant is represented by a lawyer and before an action is filed. Opinion 10, however, was written prior to the adoption of our current Code of Professional Responsibility and Standards of Conduct and was based upon former Bar Rule 3-109 which is very similar to our current DR 7-104(A)(1) and Standard 47. Apparently there was no counterpart to DR 7-104(A)(2) and Standard 49, which now prohibit a lawyer from giving legal advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, whenever the interests of the recipient are or may be in conflict with the interests of the lawyer's client. Advisory Opinion No. 10 was implicitly overruled upon the adoption of DR 7-104(A)(2) and Standard 48, and is now expressly overruled to the extent it conflicts with that Standard. Under Standard 48, a plaintiff's attorney may communicate with the unrepresented potential defendant, but is precluded from rendering legal advice. This is consistent with ABA Informal Opinion 1034 (May 30, 1968); which held that advising the insured of the effect of the insurer's refusal to settle within policy limits constitutes \"legal advice.\"The ABA then quotes an earlier opinion, which involved a complaint about two collection letters, but the language is nonetheless relevant and applicable.       The adroit wording of the questioned paragraphs avoids any direct statement or advice as to what the final results of seeking the threatened remedies will be, and no lawyer would be likely to be misled by it. In each case, however, the overall effect upon lay recipients of such letters probably will be, and probably was intended by the writer to be, that they had better \"pay up or else.\"Rather than state simply that if payment is not made as demanded, his clients will pursue all legal remedies available to them to enforce payment, the writer chooses to describe in legal terms the collection suits that will be filed and then to threaten, in addition, the proceedings [which will be pursued]. The only purpose of threatening such additional proceedings, which would have no direct connection with actions to collect debts, appears to have been to coerce and frighten the alleged debtors. ABA Informal Opinion 1034 at 219 citing ABA Informal Opinion 734. Under Standard 48, a lawyer may communicate by letter with an adverse unrepresented person informing him of a demand on his insurance carrier and that suit will be filed if the demand is not met by a certain date, and that he should seek counsel, but no more. Under Standard 47, no communication with a represented adverse party is written consent without permission of adverse counsel. It is obvious that the letter to the insured is meant for the insurer. It is equally obvious that the insured has a right to information not only as to his own legal rights, but also the legal duties of the insurer to him. It is not, however, obvious that the plaintiff's attorney is the proper person to inform the insured of these rights and duties. The appropriate attorney for this purpose is the insured's attorney. The problem here, of course, is that the attorney for the insured is also the attorney for the insurer. And given the context of the representation, it seems clear that the insurer would prefer that the insured not be made aware of its duty to settle theclaim in good faith. The lawyer representing the insured and the insurer thus faces an apparent dilemma. But the dilemma is only apparent. He or she represents the insured as a client and has a duty to keep the insured fully informed by virtue of the rules of ethics. See Proposed Georgia Rules and Disciplinary Standards of Conduct, Rule 1.4; Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund &Belom, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 40 Ill. Dec. 816, 407 N.E. 2d 47 (1980). The lawyer for the insurer has a duty to inform the insured not only of any offer of settlement; See Proposed Georgia Rules and Disciplinary Standards of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2(c), but also of the potential liability of the insurer for a bad faith refusal to accept any reasonable offer within the policy limits. Id. Rule 1.4(b). To recognize that the plaintiff's lawyer has a right to communicate directly with the insured as to his or her rights would create new problems. Apart from the rules of ethics, to recognize that the plaintiff's lawyer has a right so to advise the insured may well create a duty on the part of the lawyer to do so. For if the lawyer can advise the adversary client for the purpose of laying a predicate for the insurer's liability for an excess judgment, but fails to do so, he or she may be liable to the client for malpractice. The plaintiff's lawyer can properly write a letter to the attorney for the insured and the insurer making the offer of settlement. The letter may properly request the lawyer to provide this information to the insured as well as the insurer. The failure of the insured's lawyer to do so would be breach of the lawyer's duty to keep the client informed and may well subject the lawyer to liability. If the plaintiff's lawyer needs information as to the name of the insured's insurer, he or she may properly write the insured requesting this information. But the contents of the letter shall be limited to no more than a demand, a request for the necessary information and a suggestion to seek counsel. The plaintiff's attorney may not render legal advice to the insured. Ga. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104(A)(2) and Standard 48.","UrlName":"rule463","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"92f36050-992d-4193-a891-fe7da3894f6f","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On May 12, 1989 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a>. For references to Rule 3-103 (Canon III) please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a>. For references to EC 3-1, please see Comment 2 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a>. For references to EC 3-2, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a> and Comment 5 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a>. For references to EC 3-6, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3(b)</a> and Comment 1 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a>. For references to DR 3-101(A), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a>. For references to DR 3-102(A), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a>. For references to DR 3-103, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(b)</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of Lawyer's Delegating to Nonlawyers the Closing of Real Estate Transactions.The closing of real estate transaction constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A § 15-19-50. Accordingly, it would be ethically improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. Certain tasks can be delegated to nonlawyers, subject to the type of supervision and control outlined in State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21. The lawyer cannot, however, delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to \"close \"the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.Correspondent asks whether it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to delegate to a nonlawyer the closing of real estate transactions. This question involves, among other things, an interpretation of Standard 24, Rule 3-103 (Canon III), EC 3-1, EC 3-2, EC 3-6, DR 3-101 (A), DR 3-102 (A), and DR 3-103. With the exception of Standard 24, all of the foregoing Ethical Considerations and Directory Rules are cited and quoted in State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21 (attached hereto).Standard 24 provides as follows: A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. A violation of this Standard may be punished by a public reprimand.As the role of nonlawyers (particularly paralegals and legal secretaries) in the closing of real estate transactions has expanded in recent years, questions have arisen as to the scope of duties which can be delegated to nonlawyers. A general discussion of duties which may ethically be delegated to nonlawyers can be found in State Bar Advisory Opinion Nos. 19 and 21. In short, those Advisory Opinions stress thatAvoidance of charges that the paralegal is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law may be achieved only by strict observance of the direction found in EC 3-6, quoted above, indicating that delegation of activities which ordinarily comprise the practice of law is proper only if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with the client involved, supervises and directs the work delegated to the paralegal and assumes complete ultimate professional responsibility for the work product produced by the paralegal. Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law. State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21 .The question to be addressed in this opinion is whether the closing of a real estate transaction constitutes \"the practice of law.\" This in turn depends upon what it means to \"close \"a real estate transaction. If the \"closing\" is defined as the entire series of events through which title to the land is conveyed from one party to another party, it would be ethically improper for a nonlawyer to \"close \"a real estate transaction. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50 states that the \"practice of law \"includes \"conveyancing,\" \"the giving of any legal advice,\" and \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.\" In Georgia Bar Association v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 222 Ga. 657 (1966), the Georgia Supreme Court characterizes the \"closing of real estate transactions between applicants for title insurance and third persons \"as the rendering of legal services and advice. Moreover, to the extent that any legal advice is given during any part of the closing, this would constitute \"the practice of law \"by definition and could not be ethically delegated to nonlawyers. In light of all of the foregoing, it appears that the closing of real estate transactions constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A. 15-19-50. Accordingly, pursuant to Standard 24, Canon III, and the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules cited above, it would be ethically improper for a lawyer to aid nonlawyers to \"close \"real estate transactions. This does not mean that certain tasks cannot be delegated to nonlawyers, subject to the type of supervision and control outlined in State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21. The lawyer cannot, however, delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to \"close \"the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.","UrlName":"rule505","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"75986703-9764-4c87-ae04-faba35fed32e","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-7","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On December 17, 1987 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-7 For references to Standard of Conduct 31, please see Rules <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">1.5(a)</a> and <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(j)</a>. For references to Standard of Conduct 30, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a>. For references to Standard of Conduct 33, please see Rule <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(a)</a>. This opinion also relies on the Canons of Ethics, specifically Ethical Consideration 5.7 that bears upon matters addressed by Comment 10 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of a Lawyer's Acquisition of a Security Interest in Marital Property to Secure Attorney's Fees in a Domestic Relations Case. An attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property to secure reasonable attorney's fees in a domestic relations case if the security agreement is fully disclosed and consented to by the client in writing, and does not violate any court order. The security interest may serve no other purpose. Correspondent asks whether it is ethically proper for a lawyer to take a security interest in marital property<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\">1 </a> to secure his or her fee in a domestic relations case. The question presented involves an interpretation of Standard No. 31. A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he may: (a) acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses. Standard No. 31's roots are in the common law crime of champerty. It is designed to prevent attorneys from acquiring financial interests in the outcome of litigation other than an attorney's interests in reasonable attorneys fees.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\">2 </a> Standard No. 31 excepts \"acquir/ing/ a lien granted by law to secure . . . fee/s/ or expenses. Standard No. 31 is taken from Directory Rule 5-103. Interpretative guidance for Directory Rule 5-103 is found in the aspirational statement of Ethical Consideration 5-7.The possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment by a lawyer on behalf of his client during litigation generally makes it undesirable for the lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of his client or otherwise to become financially interested in the outcome of the litigation. However, it is not improper for a lawyer to protect his right to collect a fee for his services by the assertion of legally permissible liens, even though by doing so he may acquire an interest in the outcome of litigation.The guidance of Ethical Consideration 5-7 is that \"liens granted by law\" should be read broadly as the equivalent of \"legally permissible liens rather than narrowly as statutory charging liens and retaining liens for the benefit of attorneys.\" Such an interpretation is consistent with the champerty concerns underlying Standard No. 31, in that legally permissible liens used to secure attorneys fees do not create any financial motive for the attorney beyond that of collecting reasonable attorneys fees. A security interest in marital property used to secure attorneys fees in a domestic relations case is therefore permitted by Standard No. 31. It would be improper to use such an arrangement to secure fees if it created an impermissible financial conflict in violation of Standard No. 30. Standard No. 30 would be violated if the attorney's security interest in the marital property would, or reasonably could, affect the exercise of the attorney's independent professional judgment on behalf of the client. An exception is provided under Standard No. 30 when the client gives written consent after full disclosure of the conflict's potential for affecting the attorney's independent professional judgment. Accordingly, an attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property to secure his or her fee in a domestic relations case if the client consents in writing after full disclosure, so long as the lawyer does not violate a court order.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\">3 </a> Consistent with the requirements of this opinion, the interest acquired by the attorney must be a security interest to secure reasonable attorneys fees. Any interest acquired in the subject matter of litigation beyond that necessary to secure fees would be in violation of Standard No. 31 and could violate Standard No. 33 as well. The Bar is cautioned that there are ethical opinions in other jurisdictions finding violation of DR 5-103 in situations in which the interest acquired by the attorney in the subject matter of litigation was not a security interest.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\">4 </a><hr> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"1\"> 1</a>Marital property is defined in Georgia as \"that property acquired as a direct result of the labor and investment of the /parties/during the marriage. . . .\"Courtney v. Courtney , 256 Ga. 97, 98 (1986), citing White v. White , 253 Ga. 267, 269 (1984). See also Moore v. Moore , 249 Ga. 27 (l982). The legal issues raised by using marital property as security for attorney fees in a domestic relations case are not addressed in this advisory opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"2\"> 2</a>Proprietary interests are prohibited under Standard No. 31. It is possible to interpret the term \"proprietary\" to exclude interests which serve only as security for fees. See, for example, Oklahoma Bar Association Advisory Opinion No. 297, May 16, 1980. It is, however, not necessary to attempt a definition of \"proprietary\" here. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"3\"> 3</a>In accord, Greater Cleveland Bar Association, Advisory Opinion No. 151 (May 11, 1983). See, also, Giles v. Russell , 222 Kan. 629, 567 P.2d 845 (1977). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"4\"> 4</a>See, for example, ABA Informal Opinion No. 1397.","UrlName":"rule506","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2e662b0d-a5f1-44d6-b050-3afc2312eade","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On January 11, 1989 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-1 For references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> and Comments 1 and 3 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4</a> For references to Standard of Conduct 44, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3</a> and Comments 1, 2 and 3 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3</a>. For references to DR 7-102(a)(2), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1(b)</a>. For references to EC 7-4, please see Comment 2 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1</a>. For references to EC 7-5, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule50\">Rule 1.2(d)</a> and Comment 6 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule50\">Rule 1.2</a> , Comment 3 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of Filing a Lawsuit in Order to be Within the Statute of Limitations, But Before Sufficient Information is Acquired to Determine if a Legitimate Cause of Action Exists. It is not ethically improper for an attorney to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the attorney determines that a reasonable attorney would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the attorney is not required by rules of procedure, or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the attorney will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. QUESTION PRESENTED: Are there ethical prohibitions against filing suit when the lawyer does not know whether facts exist which would constitute a cause of action, and the information needed to make that determination cannot be acquired prior to the expiration of the pertinent statute of limitations? OPINION: It cannot be determined from these facts whether filing of the suit would constitute a violation of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, or of the requirements of Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92 (1986); nor is such determination within the scope of an ethical opinion. This opinion considers only whether the applicable ethical regulations proscribe filing suit in the situation described by correspondent. There is no Standard of Conduct directly applicable. Specifically, no Standard of Conduct speaks to the situation in which the facts presented by a client suggest a cause of action, but additional facts are necessary for the attorney to make a clear assessment of the claim. Accordingly, the filing of the claim alone cannot be the basis for discipline in Georgia under the present Standards of Conduct. If, however, the attorney is required, by rules of procedure or otherwise, to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis, the attorney cannot make that representation in the situation in question. To make such a representation in this situation would constitute a violation of Standard 4 and would subject the attorney to discipline. If such a representation is required, the effect of the proscription may be to postpone the filing of the suit to beyond the date of the applicable statute of limitations. That is a matter for ethical regulation only if the delay in the investigation prior to the filing was caused by the attorney's \"willful neglect\" (constituting a violation of Standard 44 for which discipline is sanctioned). The absence of Standards of Conduct does not, however, leave the lawyer without a source of guidance. The canons, ethical considerations, and directory rules are helpful in dealing with the question presented. This guidance is found in the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility:     DR 7-102 -- Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.         (A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:             (2) knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law DR 7-102(A)(2) creates a subjective test by use of the term \"knowingly.\" It is violated when the attorney knows that the proposed claim is unwarranted. Such knowledge is not present in the situation in question. EC 7-4 and EC 7-5 advise the attorney to avoid \"frivolous\" claims. Claims may be frivolous because the legal arguments for a cause of action are frivolous, or because factual support is clearly lacking for any cause of action. Only the second form of frivolousness is in question here. Consistent with the overall structure of the Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-4 creates an objective standard for the attorney which is more demanding than the subjective standard of DR 7-102(A)(2). A claim is frivolous under EC 7-4 when there is no reasonable possibility of the existence of the factual basis for the cause of action. EC 7-4 does not require complete factual support for the cause of action prior to the filing, but does require that a reasonable attorney would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the claim can be established after the claim is filed. EC 7-4 permits, for example, the use of discovery to determine if the factual basis of a claim exists if there is a reasonable possibility that is does. This use is consistent with part of the purpose of discovery, i.e., to reveal facts which require dismissal of a claim. In the situation in question, the attorney is acting consistent with ethical guidance if he or she determines that a reasonable attorney would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim.","UrlName":"rule507","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"02a13dc9-48f2-4e53-8bdc-1960fd653f00","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On September 26, 1988 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5 For references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Assertion of Attorneys' Retaining Liens. An attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. QUESTION PRESENTED: What are the ethical duties of a lawyer under Standard 22(b) with respect to the return of a client's papers and property when the lawyer has not been paid in view of the statutory retaining lien authorized by O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(a) (Conflict between Standard 22(b) and Attorneys' Holding Lien)? SUMMARY ANSWER: An attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute.  Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. OPINION: Section 15-19-14(a) of the Georgia Code gives attorneys a lien for services rendered on their clients' papers and moneys in their possession. Specifically, that statute provides as follows: Attorneys at law shall have a lien on all papers and money of their clients in their possession for services rendered to them. They may retain the papers until the claims are satisfied and may apply the money to the satisfaction of the claims. [T]he lien attaches to the fruits of the labor and skill of the attorney, whether realized by judgment or decree, or by virtue of an award, or in any other way, so long as they are the results of his exertions. Brotherton v. Stone,197 Ga. 74, 74-75(3) (1943) quoting Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324(1-b),329 (1927). This definition suggests that anything the attorney prepared or attains for the client can be subject to the statutory lien if the client fails to pay the attorney's fee. By way of illustration and not limitation, the following items are examples of client papers to which a lien may attach: Anything which the client gives to the attorney to use or consider in the representation; Evidence, including demonstrative evidence, photographs, statements of witnesses, affidavits, deposition and hearing transcripts, exhibits and physical evidence; Expert evidence, including tests, opinions and reports; Agreements, contracts, instruments, notes and other documents used or to be used in transactions of any kind; Corporate records, minute books and records of organizations; Wills, trusts and other estate planning documents; and Legal memoranda and analyses. The power to exercise this statutory right is not without limitation, however, in view of Standard 22(b) of the Standards of Conduct of the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia which mandates as follows:A lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including . . . delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled and complying with applicable laws and rules.Due to the facial conflict between the grant of power in the lien statute and the limitation that Standard 22(b) imposes on that power, this opinion will address whether and when an attorney ethically may exercise his or her statutory lien rights upon withdrawal of representation. As a general rule, an attorney cannot exercise statutory lien rights to the foreseeable prejudice of the client. Such ethical considerations maintain preeminence over legislative grants of power to attorneys. For example, First Bank &Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E. 2d 676 (1983), held inapplicable in cases of attorney malpractice the liability shield legislatively afforded by the professional corporate statute. The Supreme Court \"has the authority and in fact the duty to regulate the law practice. . . .\"Id. at 845, 302 S.E. 2d at 675. Although recognizing the right of the legislature to enact technical rules governing corporations, Zagoria cautioned that the legislature \"cannot constitutionally cross the gulf separating the branches of government by imposing regulations upon the practice of law.\" Id. at 845-46, 302 S.E. 2d at 675. Despite the existence of the lien statute, and because \"[a] lawyer's relationship to his client is a very special one,\" id. at 846, 302 S.E. 2d at 675, the power of attorneys to exercise their rights under the lien statute must give way to their ethical obligation not to cause their clients prejudice. The majority of jurisdictions that have considered this question are in accord. Standard 22(b) prohibits attorneys from holding their clients' papers if such an action foreseeably will cause them prejudice. The right to claim a lien in such papers under the statute will not protect the attorney in the case of prejudice to the client. Because it would be only in the rarest of circumstances that a client could be deprived of his or her files without eventually suffering some prejudice, the better practice is for attorneys to forgo retention of client papers in all but the clearest cases. This practice would avoid the necessity of speculating whether an attorney's action might cause some future harm. In accord with certain other jurisdictions, however, we limit the duty to turn over client files and papers to those for which the client has been or will be charged, that is, all work products created during \"billable time.\"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\">1 </a> For matters that are handled under arrangements other than hourly charges, any work product intended for use in the case would be included in those documents that should be returned to the client.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\">2 </a> For example, because attorneys do not bill clients for the creation of time records and they would not be used in the case (absent a claim for fees), these records would probably be retained. Despite the obligation to return original documents to their clients, attorneys are entitled to keep copies of their clients' files.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\">3 </a> Absent a prior agreement that the client will be responsible for copying charges, however, the attorney bears the cost of copying.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\">4 </a> Notably, even if such an agreement exists, in the event that the client refuses to pay, the attorney must advance the cost and then add the charge to the client's outstanding bill.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\">5 </a> We do not endorse the practice of some jurisdictions of allowing the attorney to require the client to post comparable security before releasing the papers.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#6\">6 </a> To allow an attorney to require security in a bona fide fee dispute would be unfair to the client because it may require him or her to encumber property without justification. However, if the client offers to post security for the attorneys' fees and expenses pending resolution of a dispute, the attorney must release the papers. Similarly, we do not unequivocably approve the practice of some jurisdictions of holding summary hearings because this is likely to result in duplicative proceedings.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#7\">7 </a> Therefore, we conclude that an attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.<hr> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"1\"> 1</a>See, e.g., San Francisco Comm. Opin. No. 1984-1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"2\"> 2</a>See also Michigan Opin. No. CI-926. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"3\"> 3</a>See id. See also New Jersey Sup. Ct. Advis. Comm. Opin. No. 554 (May 23, 1985). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"4\"> 4</a>See San Francisco Comm. Opin. No. 1984-1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"5\"> 5</a>See id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"6\"> 6</a>See Foor v. Huntington National Bank, No. 85AP-167, slip op. (Feb. 11, 1986); Michigan Op. No. CI-930 (May 4, 1983). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"7\"> 7</a>See Foor v. Huntington National Bank, No. 85AP-167, slip op. (Feb. 11, 1986).","UrlName":"rule508","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d61a86be-a78b-4975-92a6-005c5e62635e","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 88-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn November 10, 1988 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 88-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 26, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical Propriety of an Attorney-Employee Sharing Attorney's Fees With a Lay Organization-Employer.\n \nIt is ethically permissible for an attorney-employee to collect attorney's fees on a note or loan which fees accrue to the benefit of the attorney's employer, where the attorney's fees are regarded as stipulated liquidated damages under Georgia law.\n \nCorrespondent asks if it is ethically permissible for an attorney to collect attorney's fees which would accrue to the benefit of the attorney's employer, a lay organization, in the following situation: A bank employs a full time, licensed, attorney to handle collections, foreclosures and bankruptcies. Contracts signed by the bank's customers provide for 15 percent of the unpaid balance as attorney's fees if the loan goes into default and has to be collected by or through an attorney. \n \nStandard No. 26 provides, in part, that \"a lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer. . . .\" \n \nThe policy behind this prohibition against fee sharing between a lawyer and a layman is the preservation of a lawyer's independent professional judgment. It is feared that laymen, or lay organizations, sharing a financial interest in the representation and not being under professional obligations, may influence the attorney's judgment against the client's welfare. \n \nThe conduct in question here is not in violation of this policy. The lay organization, with whom the fees are shared, is the client. No influence on independent professional judgment contrary to the interests of the client is present. This situation is clearly distinguishable from the numerous advisory opinions and cases prohibiting fee sharing with a nonlawyer other than the client. Curran v. Department of the Treasury , 805 F.2d 1406 (1986); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States , 656 F.2d 848 (1981). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> \n \nThe Committee concludes that fee sharing with the employer bank is not prohibited under Standard No. 26. The Committee also notes that the conduct described by correspondent is not fee sharing in the sense of that term in Standard No. 26. In correspondent's situation, statutory attorney's fees are regarded as stipulated liquidated damages for collection costs, belonging to the client. The attorney is then free to contract with the client for the agreed upon fee or any other fee. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a> Rylee v. Bank of Statham , 7 Ga. App. 489 (1918). \n \nThe requirements of O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11, that collection efforts must be made \"by and through an attorney \"in order to enforce this statutory attorney's fees provision, have been met. See, United States v. Allen , 699 F.2d 1117 (1983); In re East Side Investors , 694 F.2d 242 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Village Apartment Associates , 9 B.R. 211 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ga. 1981).\n<hr>\n\n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> See, also, MASSACHUSETTS BAR OPINION 84-1 (1984). \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> See, also ABA FORMAL OPINION NO 157.","UrlName":"rule513","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"63344d77-a55d-4911-9c94-1b8cdaa01551","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 88-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn November 29, 1988 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 88-3 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 48, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule298\">Rule 4.3(a)</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule298\">4.3(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 47, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\">Rule 4.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical Propriety of Sending Notice Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 to an Unrepresented Party. \n \nIt is ethically permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 to an unrepresented party. An attorney sending the required notice, however, must do so in such a manner as to inform the unrepresented opposing party that the notice is sent merely to establish a claim for interest, that it is not to be construed as legal advice, and that the attorney sending the notice represents the opposing interests in the dispute.\n \nCorrespondent asks if it is a violation of Standard 48 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia for correspondent to comply with the notice requirement of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 by sending a demand notice to an unrepresented party. That statute requires that written notice of the demand for unliquidated damages be sent to the person \"against whom the claim is made \"in order to entitle the claimant to receive twelve (12) percent interest on judgments in excess of unliquidated damages. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> \n \nStandard 48 provides:\n \nDuring the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.\n \nIn interpreting Standard 48, Formal Opinion No. 86-4 (86-R7), concluded that it was ethically improper for a plaintiff's attorney to send a letter directly to an insured defendant which would notify the defendant about the potential liability of his or her insurer for failure to settle within policy limits. The letter would be considered \"legal advice \"in that plaintiff's attorney impliedly would be advising settlement within policy limits. Accord, ABA Informal Opinion 734 (June 16, 1964). The Opinion correctly focused upon the policy behind Standard 48 which is to avoid creating in an unrepresented party a false impression that the attorney is advising inaccordance with the unrepresented party's interests or is neutral in the dispute. The present situation is distinguishable. Where an attorney sends a formal notice which is required by law, there is much less concern that a false impression will be created. \n \nIt is ethically permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, stating specifically that it is a notice rather than advice. An attorney sending the required notice, however, must do so in such a manner as to inform the unrepresented opposing party that the notice is sent merely to establish a claim for interest, that it is not to be construed as legal advice, that the recipient may seek his independent legal advice and that the attorney sending the notice represents the opposing interests in the dispute. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> The full text of O.C.G.A.§ 51-12-14 is as follows:\n \"Procedure for demand of unliquidated damages in tort actions; when interest may be recovered. \n          (a)    Where a claimant has given written notice by registered or certified mail to a person against whom claim is made for unliquidated damages in a tort action and the person against whom such claim is made fails to pay such amount within 30 days from the mailing of the notice, the claimant shall be  entitled to receive interest on the claimed sum if, upon trial of the case in which the claim is made, the judgment is for an amount not less than the sum claimed. \n          (b)    The written notice referred to in subsection (a) of this Code section may be given on only one occasion and shall specify that it is being given pursuant to this Code section. \n          (c)    The interest provided for by this Code section  shall be at the rate of 12 percent per annum and shall begin to run from the thirtieth day following the date of the mailing of the written notice until the date of judgment. \n          (d)    Evidence or discussion of interest on liquidated damages, as well as evidence of the offer, shall not be submitted to the jury. Interest shall be made a part of the judgment upon presentation of evidence to the satisfaction of the court that this Code section has been complied with and that the verdict of the jury or the award by the judge trying the case without a jury is equal to or exceeds the amount claimed in the notice. \n          (e)    This Code section shall be known and may be cited as the \"Unliquidated Damages Interest Act.\"(Ga. L. 1968, p. 1156, § 1,  Ga. L. 1975, p. 395, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 681, § 1.)\"\n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> If the adverse party isrepresented, the statutory notice need not contain the disclaimers here described, but must be sent to the adverse party's attorney rather than the party. Standard 47.","UrlName":"rule515","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2103ee5e-58dc-4434-b3df-550b3c594488","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 89-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn February 9, 1989 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 89-2 \n \nThis opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including both Directory Rules and Ethical Considerations that bear upon matters directly addressed by Comment 2 of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule78\">Rule 3.5</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical propriety of an attorney/city council member's representing private clients before city council-appointed Judges of the Recorder's Court if the attorney abstains from voting on the appointment.\n \nAn attorney, who is also a member of the city council, should avoid representing private clients before the Recorder's Court when the city council appoints the judges of the Recorders Court, and should not abstain from voting on judicial appointments.\n \nCorrespondent asks if it is ethically proper for an attorney, who is also a member of the city council, to represent private clients before the Recorder's Court, when the city council appoints the Judges of the Recorder's Court, if the attorney abstains from voting on judicial appointments. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> Correspondent also asks if other members of his or her law firm would be prohibited from such representation by imputed disqualification. \n \nA full response to this inquiry would go beyond the ethical regulations and requires interpretation of Young v. Champion , 142 Ga. App. 687 (1977), in which the Court upheld the disqualification of a Commissioner from representation before a Recorder's Court judge who was appointed by the Commission. The Advisory Opinion Board, however, is without authority to interpret court opinions. \n \nThere are no Georgia Standards of Conduct applicable to this particular situation. An advisory opinion is not, however, limited to disciplinary issues in its interpretations of the ethical regulations of the State Bar of Georgia. This Advisory Opinion therefore offers ethical advice based on the applicable ethical regulations.\n \nDirectory Rule 8-101(a)(2) provides:\n\"A lawyer who holds public office shall not use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or a client.\"The city council is, in the situation in question, in the position of employer of the Judge of the Recorder's Court. There is inherent influence in such a position. An attorney/council member who appears before that Judge exercises that influence however unintentional the \"use \"of it may be and however determined both the Judge and the attorney may be to avoid its effect. Even the effort to avoid the effect changes the nature of the relationship between the Judge and the attorney. As a matter of ethical advice, we believe that the attorney/council member should avoid representation before the Judge of the Recorder's Court.\n \nCorrespondent's question seeks to avoid the inherent influence of his or her position by abstaining from all voting on the appointment of the Judges of the Recorder's Court. We cannot advise abstention as a remedy. The attorney, as noted in Ethical Consideration 8-6, is uniquely qualified to evaluate the qualifications of those seeking appointment to the bench. Lawyers have a \"special responsibility to aid in the selection of only those who are qualified.\"EC 8-6. The attorney/council member should not avoid that public responsibility for private gain. To do so would be counter to the ethical advice of Ethical Consideration 8-8, \"A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties.\" \n \nIf correspondent follows the advice of this Opinion he will disqualify himself from representation before the Judges of the Recorder's Court. That disqualification is personal and is not imputed to the other members of the firm. In this case there are no concerns of conflicts of interest of confidentiality requiring imputed disqualification. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> This opinion would not apply where city council members do not participate in appointing city judges. \n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> The Board notes that its opinion in this case, and the holding of Young v. Champion, appear to be contrary to the following Advisory Opinions from other jurisdictions:  Adv. Opin. #5 (New Hampshire, 10/23/81);  Adv. Opin. #84-18 (South Carolina, undated);  Adv. Opin. CI #990 (Michigan 12/13/83).","UrlName":"rule518","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e03a86bc-50c0-4e1f-95c8-5dd8674a2920","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 90-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule525","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a2f3d2c0-230e-4d16-9110-f62c3ff3ad17","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 90-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule526","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"95073992-e622-4976-ab26-2e53c62ea65c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 13, 1991 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 91-1 \n \nThis opinion relies on Standard of Conduct 30 and Ethical Consideration 5-6 that bear upon matters directly addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> . <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. \n \nThe Form Notification and Consent Letter , which is an addendum to this opinion, continues to be useful and valid. \n \nEthical propriety of drafter of will serving as executor. \nIt is not ethically improper for a lawyer to be named executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared when the lawyer does not consciously influence the client in the decision to name him or her executor or trustee, so long as he or she obtains the client's written consent in some form or gives the client written notice in some form after a full disclosure of all the possible conflicts of interest. In addition, the total combined attorney's fee and executor or trustee fee or commission must be reasonable and procedures used in obtaining this fee should be in accord with Georgia law.\n \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n Is it ethically proper for a lawyer to be named executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared? \n \nOPINION: \n \nDisciplinary Standard of Conduct No. 30 provides:\n \nExcept with the written consent or written notice to his client after full disclosure a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interests.\n \nThe financial interests of an executor or trustee reasonably may affect an attorney's independent professional judgment on behalf of the client. The conduct in question falls clearly within the coverage of Standard No. 30. Standard No. 30, however, provides exceptions for this type of conflict. These exceptions to a conflict of interest are the client's written consent or written notice to the client after full disclosure. These exceptions are in question here. \n \nThere is no limitation on client consent in Standard No. 30 unless the \"appearance of impropriety \"prohibition of Canon 9 of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility creates an implied limitation. It is our opinion that the conduct in question does not necessarily create an \"appearance of impropriety,\"and we note that the \"appearance of impropriety \"prohibition is not included in the Standards of Conduct. \n \nThis opinion finds support in the interpretive guidance of the aspirational statement in Ethical Consideration 5-6.\n \nEC 5-6 - A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.\n \nThe implication of Ethical Consideration 5-6 is that the naming of an attorney as executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared does not per se create an appearance of impropriety, but that such an arrangement creates a risk of appearing to be improper, which must be guarded against by the attorney. \n \nA testator's or settlor's freedom to select an executor or trustee is an important freedom, and it should not be restricted absent strong justification. For a variety of reasons, the attorney may be the most appropriate choice of fiduciary for the client. The risk that some lawyers may take advantage of a lawyer-client relationship to benefit themselves in a manner not in the client's best interest should not outweigh that freedom. \n \nThis risk of self-dealing instead creates the need for restrictions that offer assurance that the naming of the lawyer as executor or trustee is the informed decision of the testator or settlor. An attorney's full disclosure is essential to the client's informed decision and consent. Disclosure requires notification of the attorney's potential interest in the arrangement; i.e., the ability to collect an executor's or trustee's fee and possibly attorneys fees. Unlike a real estate transaction where an attorney has a personal interest in the property, being named as executor or trustee does not give the attorney any personal interest in the estate or trust assets other than the fee charged. Waiver of State law fiduciary requirements in the document is permissible as long as waiver is ordinary and customary in similar documents for similar clients that do not name the attorney as fiduciary. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a>\nIn the light of the above, full disclosure in this context should include an explanation of the following:\n \n1. All potential choices of executor or trustee, their relative abilities, competence, safety and integrity, and their fee structure; \n2. The nature of the representation and service that will result if  the client wishes to name the attorney as executor or trustee (i.e., what the exact role of the lawyer as fiduciary will be, what the lawyer's fee structure will be as a lawyer/fiduciary, etc.); \n3. The potential for the attorney executor or trustee hiring him or herself or his or her firm to represent the estate or trust, and the fee arrangement anticipated; and \n4. An explanation of the potential advantages to the client of seeking independent legal advice.\n \nThese disclosures may be made orally or in writing, but the client's consent or the attorney's notice to the client should be in writing. \n \nThe client's consent could be obtained by having the client sign a consent form that outlines the information described above. \n \nConsistent with other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue and the Standards and Rules of the Georgia Bar, it our opinion that it is ethically permissible for testator or settlor to name as executor in a will or trustee of a trust the lawyer who has prepared the instrument when the lawyer: (a) does not promote himself or herself or consciously influence the client in the decision; (b) fully discloses the conflict as described above, and (c) either obtains client consent in some form of writing or notifies the client in writing. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a> \n \nAny executor or trustee is allowed by Georgia law to hire legal counsel, according to the needs of the estate or trust he represents, and pay reasonable fees for their services. O.C.G.A. §53-7-10. An attorney who has ethically named himself or herself as executor or trustee in an instrument he or she has prepared may act as an attorney for the estate or hire a member of his or her firm as attorney. The fiduciary and the attorney, however, must exercise caution to avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest in this circumstance. \n \nWhen a lawyer has ethically named himself or herself as executor or trustee in an instrument he or she has prepared, the lawyer can receive fees for performing both services. If, however, any costs of preparation or execution overlap, the attorney must see that these costs are charged only once. He or she may not charge both the client and the estate or trust for a single task. \n \nAs a lawyer prepares a will or trust instrument, he or she is performing services for the client-testator/settlor as a lawyer. It is the lawyer's task at this time to make sure the client's wishes for the later disposition and distribution of the client's property are integrated into a plan acceptable to the client. \n \nThe lawyer acting in his or her capacity as an executor or trustee is performing a different function altogether. It is the lawyer's task as executor or trustee to effectively implement the integrated plan for disposition and distribution of the testator's or settlor's property. Not only is the lawyer's function different, the tasks are different. The lawyer should still be appropriately and reasonably compensated whether the compensation is provided in the instrument or by statute, but an attorney acting as a fiduciary should not double dip fees charged to the client or estate. \n \nGeorgia law provides that an attorney serving as an administrator cannot double dip in fees. See McDow v. Corley 154 Ga. App. 575 (1980); and Davidson v. Story , 106 Ga. 799, 32 S.E. 867 (1899). It is recognized that if the attorney is serving as both executor or trustee and as legal counsel, it maybe difficult to sort out each task performed as one performed clearly in one capacity or the other. Any fees above Georgia's statutory provisions for compensating executors that an attorney may incur in a dual role as lawyer and fiduciary must be collected by filing an application for extra compensation with the Probate Court under O.C.G.A. §53-6-150. McDow , 154 Ga. App. at 576; and Davidson , 106 Ga. at 801. In keeping with both Georgia law and ethical considerations, the total fees charged by an attorney in such a dual role should be reasonable. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a>\n \n Addendum to Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-R1 \nForm Notification and Consent Letter \n \n[MR. OR MS. FULL NAME] \n[ADDRESS] \n[CITY, STATE ZIP] \n \nDear [MR. OR MS. LAST NAME]: \n \n     Because you have asked me to serve as Executor and Trustee under your will, I must explain certain ethical considerations to you and obtain your written consent to the potential conflicts of interests that could develop. The purpose of this letter is to summarize our discussions about your naming me as fiduciary in your will. \n \n     A lawyer cannot prepare a will or trust in which the client names that lawyer as fiduciary unless that decision originates with the client. The lawyer should never suggest that he/she be named or promote himself/herself to serve in that capacity. \n \n     Others who might serve as your fiduciaries include your spouse, one or more of your children, a relative, a personal friend, a business associate, a bank with trust powers, your accountant, or an investment advisor. \n \n     I can serve as executor and trustee if that is your desire. The potential conflict arises primarily from the probability that I will hire this firm to serve as attorneys for the estate and trust. An attorney is entitled to compensation for legal services performed on behalf of the estate and trust, and the executor and trustee are also entitled to compensation for services in that capacity. When a lawyer has been named as executor and trustee pursuant to the ethical requirements of the State Bar, he/she can receive fees for performing services both as executor and trustee and as attorney as long as he/she charges only once for any single service. Further, the total compensation for serving as both fiduciary and attorney must be reasonable. If you name me as executor and trustee in your will, I and the other lawyers in my firm will charge at our normal hourly rates for all services performed. [NOTE: Modify the preceding sentence as appropriate.] \n \n     I must also point out to you that a lawyer's independence is compromised when he/she acts as both fiduciary and as lawyer for the fiduciary. Some of the potential conflicts in this regard are:\n\n1.  The question whether a particular task is \"legal \"or \"fiduciary \"in nature;\n2.  The question whether services being performed are really necessary in the  circumstances;\n3.  The propriety of giving the fiduciary broad disrectionary powers and exemption from bond;\n4.  The lack of independent review of the document by an attorney other than the one who drafted it; and\n5.  There may be other potential conflicts that have not occurred to me.\n \n     In accordance with the ethical requirements of the State Bar of Georgia, it is necessary for me to obtain your statement that the potential conflicts of interests have been explained to you. In that regard, please review the statement of consent below. If it is satisfactory to you, please sign and return the enclosed copy to me. If you want to discuss any point further, please call. If you decide not to execute the consent, please advise me whom you would like to serve as executor and trustee instead of me. \n \n     If you have any doubt concerning the information contained in this letter or the effect of signing the consent, you should discuss it with another lawyer of your choice. \n \n                                                                Sincerely, \n        \n \n                                                                ________________________ \n                                                                Attorney\n \nCONSENT \n \n     I, ______________________ (Client) _______________, have voluntarily named as executor and trustee in my will and trust, ______________________(Attorney) _________________, who prepared the instrument in his/her capacity as my attorney. Mr./Ms. ________________ (Attorney) ______________ did not promote himself/herself or consciously influence me in the decision to name him/her as executorand trustee. In addition, Mr./Ms. _____________ (Attorney) ______________ has disclosed the potential conflicts which he/she thinks might arise as a result of his/her serving as both executor and trustee and as attorney for the estate and trust. An explanation of the different roles as fiduciary and attorney, an explanation of the risks and disadvantages of this dual representation, an explanation of the manner in which his/her compensation will be determined, and an opportunity to seek independent legal advice were provided to me prior to my signing this consent. \n \nDate__________________                    _________________________________\n(Signature)\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> For example, granting broad powers to a fiduciary or relieving the fiduciary of return or bond requirements is a common practice, can substantially reduce the expense of administration of an estate or trust, and does not relieve the fiduciary of the duty to administer the estate properly in or reduce substantially the rights of the beneficiaries to enforce that duty. On the other hand, a provision that attempted to relieve the fiduciary of negligence would probably not be ordinary and customary and would be improper. \n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2  </a> In Pennsylvania, an attorney ethically may act as co-executor in a will that he or she prepares as long as the attorney advises the client (in a way never specified) of the potential problem that the attorney may be required to testify regarding the will if it is challenged. Professional Guidance Opinion 80-2 of the Philadelphia Bar Association. The attorney also may not take advantage of his position as draftsman to promote himself or herself or \"sell \"the ideas to the client. See also Professional Guidance Opinion 8-17 of the Philadelphia Bar Association (concerning an attorney naming himself successor-trustee in a will he drafted). \n \n <a name=\"3\"> 3 </a> In accord . Okl. Opin. No. 298 (Feb. 28, 1991) (attorney serving as executor of estate and as attorney for the estate may charge reasonable fees for each so long as charges do not overlap.); Ala. Opin. No. 81-503 (undated) (attorney may serve as administrator of estate and as attorney for the estate and may charge reasonable fees for each); Wis. Opin. No. E-80-14 (Dec. 1980) (a lawyer, appointed as guardian, may serve as attorney for the guardian, and may charge reasonable fees for performing in both capacities).","UrlName":"rule520","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ef91d436-d7b1-4547-9817-70a6d7e729ca","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 20, 1991 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 91-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 31, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(a)</a> . \n \nThis opinion also relies on the Canons of Ethics, specifically Ethical Considerations EC 2-19 and 2-23, that bear upon matters directly addressed by Comments 2 and 9 of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5</a> .\n ADVANCE FEE PAYMENTS \n \nA lawyer need not place any fees into a trust account absent special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of the client. Such circumstances may be the agreement of the parties, the size and amount of the fee, and the length of time contemplated for the undertaking.\n \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nWhether a lawyer may deposit into a general operating account a retainer that represents payment of fees yet to be earned. \n \n OPINION: \n \nThe question posed by correspondent is not clear. \"Fees yet to be earned \"are prepaid fees. \"Prepaid fees \"also include \"fixed \"or \"flat fees,\"which are not earned until the task is completed. The terms \"retainer \"and \"prepaid fees \"have different meanings. For purposes of clarity, the terms are defined as here used. \n \nA retainer is \"...the fee which the client pays when he retains the attorney to act for him, and thereby prevents him from acting for his adversary.\"Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Thus, retainer fees are earned by the attorney by agreeing to be \"on call \"for the client and by not accepting employment from the client's adversaries. McNulty, George &Hall v. Pruden , 62 Ga. 135, 141 (1878). \n \nA \"flat \"or \"fixed \"fee is one charged by an attorney to perform a task to completion, for example, to draw a contract, prepare a will, or represent the client in court, as in an uncontested divorce or a criminal case. Such a fee may be paid before or after the task is completed. \n \nA \"prepaid fee \"is a fee paid by the client with the understanding that the attorney will earn the fee as he or she performs the task agreed upon. \n \nUnder these various definitions, one can reasonably take the position that \"retainers \"and \"flat fees \"may be placed in the general operating account when paid. Prepaid fees may be placed in a trust account until earned. \n \nTerminology as to the various types of fee arrangements does not alter the fact that the lawyer is a fiduciary. Therefore, the lawyer's duties as to fees should be uniform and governed by the same rules regardless of the particular fee arrangement. Those duties are as follows:\n 1.  To have a clear understanding with the client as to the details of the fee arrangement prior to undertaking the representation, preferably in writing. \n2.  To return to the client any unearned portion of a fee. \n3.  To accept the client's dismissal of him or her (with or without cause) without imposing any penalty on the client for the dismissal. \n4.  Comply with the provisions of Standard 31 as to reasonableness of the fee.\n \nThe law is well settled that a client can dismiss a lawyer for any reason or for no reason, and the lawyer has a duty to return any unearned portion of the fee. In the Matter of Collins , 246 Ga. 325, 271 S.E.2d 473 (1980).\nThe exercise of the right to discharge an attorney with or without cause does not constitute a breach of contract because it is a basic term of the contract, implied by law into it by reason of the nature of the attorney-client relationship, that the client may terminate that contract at any time.\n Henry, Walden &Davis v. Goodman , 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W. 2d 233 (1987). \n \nThe client, of course, may not be penalized for exercising the right to dismiss the lawyer. Id . In view of these duties, a lawyer need not place any fees into a trust account absent special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of the client. Such circumstances may be the agreement of the parties, the size and amount of the fee, and the length of time contemplated for the undertaking. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a>\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> A fee paid for retainer of the attorney, as narrowly defined in this opinion, illustrates the importance of an agreement or understanding in writing outlining, among other things: geographic area involved, duration, scope of proposed legal services, fees and expenses for legal services rendered, and due date of future retainer fees covered by the retainer agreement. The agreement should also contain specific terms as to refunds of any portion of the fee should the agreement be terminated prior to its expiration date. See Ethical Considerations 2-19 and 2-23.","UrlName":"rule521","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"30cda581-2c94-4c74-9631-35c49e6e1705","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-3","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule527","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bc8cdcc5-d2a7-4fa3-b010-ec92ba3f0b94","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 92-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule528","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2f1e7d3d-e2e0-4017-92f4-5641db555d63","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 92-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule529","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bdfa90bd-93a1-49af-9f47-e6bca8ffd4d0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule530","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cd42c0f8-57d8-48cf-b273-d4d851d38f12","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule531","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"44debefd-6424-4f86-9611-83a86779ae21","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court \nOn September 17, 1993 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 93-3 \n \nThis opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including both Directory Rules and Ethical Considerations, that bear upon matters addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule83\">Rules 3.8(b)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">1.7(a)</a> (see especially Comments 6 and 10), <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">1.1</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">1.5(a)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(d)</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(f)(2)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">5.4(c)</a> and<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule207\">9.5</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee. \n \nThe question presented is whether it is unethical for a prosecutor to condition a plea agreement on an appointed or pro bono counsel's waiver of any claims for attorneys' fees. \n \nIn order to answer this inquiry, we must consider the unique nature of the American adversarial system, especially in criminal litigation. Lawyers typically occupy the three key roles in our system, as prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge. Each participant has a distinct role to play, and it is the carefully crafted balance of the public, ethical and professional responsibilities of the players that makes the system operate in accordance with Constitutional guarantees and the rightful expectations of the populace. As the Preamble to our Code of Professional Responsibility states:\n \n[I] It is peculiarly essential that the system for  establishing and dispensing justice be so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration... It cannot be so  maintained unless the conduct and motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit approval of all just men.\n \nThe first participant, the prosecutor, is an advocate like all lawyers, but he or she also has a unique responsibility as lawyer for the sovereign. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> \"The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a> While operating within the adversarial system, the prosecutor's obligation is to protect the innocent as well as convict the guilty, and to guard the rights of the accused as well as enforce the rights of the public. Thus, the prosecutor acts almost as a \"minister of justice,\"occupying a quasi-judicial position. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a> \n \nThe EC's seek to balance a prosecutor's duty to act in the best interests of the client (the state) with the duty to avoid an unjust result. For instance, the prosecutor:\n \nshould make timely disclosure to the defense of available evidence... that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid  pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\"> 4 </a>\n \nBecause of the prosecutor's unique position and responsibilities, conduct that is tolerable on the part of a private person may be intolerable when done by the prosecutor on behalf of the state. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\"> 5 </a> \n \nThe second participant in the system, the defense attorney, plays another role with markedly different responsibilities. The defense attorney's primary allegiance is to the client, the overriding goal being the achievement of that which is in the client's best interests, as the client perceives them. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#6\"> 6 </a> The principal duty the defense attorney owes to the administration of justice is \"to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate with courage, devotion, and to the utmost of his or her learning and ability and according to the law.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#7\"> 7 </a> \n \nThese duties devolve upon the defense attorney both as a member of the legal profession and as a party with a contractual relationship with the defendant. Even more importantly, however, these responsibilities are an outgrowth of the defendant's right to \"effective assistance of counsel \"guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 8 the Fourteenth Amendment to the Georgia Constitution 9 and court rule. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#10\"> 10 </a> \n \nThe third participant in the adversarial system is the judge. As stated in the Code of Judicial Conduct:\n \nOur legal system is based on the principle that an  independent, fair and competent judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and  the rule of law . . . The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of  disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under the rule of law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#11\"> 11 </a>\n \nAs arbiter, the judge must of course remain neutral and impartial. At the same time, however, judges are also responsible for guaranteeing that defendants receive fair trials and effective representation. \n \nThe prosecutor who conditions a plea agreement in a criminal case on waiver of attorneys' fees upsets the delicate balance of the adversarial system by interfering with both the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and the people's right to maintain a fair system of justice, and by sullying the judicial system's reputation for fair and ethical treatment of all persons. It does this in several important ways. \n \nFirst, such a condition creates a conflict of interest for the defense attorney, who is torn between the need to receive compensation for his or her work and the duty to protect the freedom, sometimes even the life, of the client. This conflict substantially interferes with the right, guaranteed by Constitutional mandate and court rules, to be assisted by competent, conflict-free counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#12\"> 12 </a>\n Standard 30 provides: \n \nExcept with the written consent of his client after full  disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his  professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#13\"> 13 </a>\n \nA prosecutor's condition such as the one discussed here creates such a conflict. \"[A]dequate compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity of the profession.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#14\"> 14 </a> \"When members of the Bar are induced to render legal services for inadequate compensation, as a consequence the quality of the service rendered may be lowered, the welfare of the profession injured and the administration of justice made less efficient.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#15\"> 15 </a> The defense attorney in the situation posited here would not receive adequate, or even any, compensation when the prosecutor confronts him with a plea agreement based on the waiver of his fees. \n \nThe risk of inadequate representation exists not only in cases where individual lawyers are unpaid or are unsure about the prospects of payment. The potential risk will pervade every criminal prosecution unless a clear signal is sent that this sort of bargain is unacceptable in any circumstance. Thus, the prosecutor puts the defense attorney, and through him the defendant, in an impossible position. Certainty regarding payment in representation of the defendant is needed so that defense counsel can properly balance his workload. With uncertainty in the process, defense counsel may do that which is only human - devote less time and energy to that which is less likely to result in adequate remuneration. \n \nStandard 30 does permit an attorney to accept or continue representation in the face of personal conflict with written consent or notice to the client after full disclosure. Despite the literal language of the Standard, a client's written consent cannot waive this kind of personal conflict. This is true for at least two reasons. First, conflicts should be resolved before representation begins. This avoids harmful uncertainty, and prevents a late withdrawal of counsel that would be detrimental to both the client and the cause of justice. Second, as long as this tool remains an option, it is never clear when the prosecutor may use it. The fear that a prosecutor will use it may cause defense attorneys to stop taking the cases altogether <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#16\"> 16 </a> or to jealously guard their time while representing a defendant in the fear that they will ultimately have to yield their fees. \n \nIt should be noted that blanket proscriptions aimed at preventing conflicts in criminal cases are nothing new. Standard 34, which is sandwiched between other Standards dealing with impermissible conflicts, states:\n \nPrior to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in publication  rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed employment. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#17\"> 17 </a>\n \nThe reasoning behind this Standard, for which there is no consent exception, is obvious actions which are appropriate or necessary in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of a description of the representation. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#18\"> 18 </a> Thus, there is precedent for adoption of prophylactic rules limiting both the lawyer's and client's options, in order to protect the client's interest in competent and zealous representation. \n \nThe second reason why the prosecutor's condition is improper is that it jeopardizes the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant. The Constitution demands that \"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#19\"> 19 </a> This amendment guarantees effective and conflict free representation. The Courts have already held that some conflicts may not be waived under any circumstances, especially in death penalty cases. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#20\"> 20 </a> Creating conflicts of interest and interfering with effective assistance of counsel is inconsistent with the prosecutor's duty as a \"minister of justice \" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://21/"> 21 </a> to seek justice, and not merely convict. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#22\"> 22 </a> \n \nThird, the prosecutor's condition imperils the interest of the people in maintaining a system that operates fairly and in the state's best interests. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#23\"> 23 </a> Justice is imperiled in several ways: first, the mere possibility that counsel will not be paid will decrease the likelihood that competent counsel will come forward to represent the defendant; second, counsel who does come forward cannot safely devote his undivided loyalty to the best interests of the defendant, for fear that uncompensated work will divert attention from paying work; third, the conflict created by the prosecutor's actual or possible conditioning of the reduced sentence on the waiver of fees will increase the likelihood that defendants will later seek to set aside convictions or guilty pleas on the ground that they were not represented by conflict-free counsel; and fourth, if the crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted really should carry a particular sentence under state law, it is inappropriate for that interest to be ignored solely for the purpose of saving money. \n \nFinally, the actions of the prosecutor conflict with his obligation to \"avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#24\"> 24 </a> As the EC's in Canon 9 provide:\n \nContinuation of the American concept that we are to be  governed by rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be  obtained through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our  system and in the legal profession . . . Public confidence in law and lawyers may be  eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer . . . . When explicit ethical  guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner  that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and  the legal profession. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#25\"> 25 </a>\n \nAll of this is especially true, of course, of a prosecutor. Public confidence in the legal system is certainly not promoted by actions which have the effect of discouraging competent counsel from representing criminal defendants,interfering with rights guaranteed by the state and Federal constitutions, and sacrificing the best interests of the state for purely monetary reasons. \n \nFor these reasons, we conclude that it is unethical for a prosecutor to condition a plea agreement in a criminal case on appointed or pro bono counsel's waiver of any claims for attorneys' fees.\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> The prosecutor is bound by the Standards of Conduct (hereinafter \"Standards \") and the aspirational Directory Rules (hereinafter \"DR \") and Ethical Considerations (hereinafter \"EC \"). See Standard 70(a). \n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> EC 7-13. \n \n <a name=\"3\"> 3 </a> See DR 7-103 and EC's 7-13 and 7-14; Model Rule 3.8; and ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (hereinafter \"Justice Standards \") 3-1.1. \n \n <a name=\"4\"> 4 </a> EC 7-13. \n \n <a name=\"5\"> 5 </a> Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 214 (1990). \n \n <a name=\"6\"> 6 </a> See The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Rule 3.1 (1982). \n \n <a name=\"7\"> 7 </a> Criminal Justice Standard 4-1.1(b); See EC 7-19, stating that \"The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.\"See also DR7-101; Model Rule 1.3 (Diligence), comment. Also see The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Rule 3.1, which states, \"A lawyer shall use all legal means that are consistent with the retainer agreement, and reasonable available, to advance a client's interests as the client perceives them.\" \n \n <a name=\"8\"> 8 </a> See United States Constitution, amend. VI, which provides, \"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.\"Also see Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984). \n \n <a name=\"9\"> 9 </a> See Georgia Constitution, Art. 1, § 1, ~ 14 of the Georgia Constitution, stating \"Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel . . . . \"Also see Austin v. Carter, 248 Ga. 774 (1982). \n \n <a name=\"10\"> 10 </a> See Uniform Superior Court Rule 29.8(C), which provides that \"More difficult cases shall be assigned to attorneys with sufficient levels of experience and competence to afford adequate representation.\"Also see Rules 29.8(D), providing that \"Less experienced attorneys should be assigned cases which are within their capabilities. ..\"and 29.8(E) providing, \"Cases in which the death penalty is sought shall be assigned only to attorneys of sufficient experience, skill, and competence to render effective assistance of counsel to defendants. . . .\" \n \n <a name=\"11\"> 11 </a> ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble (1990). \n \n <a name=\"12\"> 12 </a> See Cuylerv. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) and Wilson v. State, 257 Ga. 352 (1987). \n \n <a name=\"13\"> 13 </a> (emphasis supplied). DR 5-101 states essentially the same rule, but in aspirational form. The DR, however, does not require that the consent of a client be written. \n \n <a name=\"14\"> 14 </a> EC 2-17. \n \n <a name=\"15\"> 15 </a> ABA Opinion 302(1961). \n \n <a name=\"16\"> 16 </a> The EC's encourage lawyers to do pro bono work (See EC 2-25, stating \"[E]very lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged . . . \"\"When a lawyer is appointed by a court or requested by a bar association to undertake representation of a person unable to obtain counsel, . . .he should not seek to be excused from undertaking the representation except for compelling reasons.\"EC 2-29. \n          At the same time, lawyers are not expected to unselfishly offer unlimited time for inadequate pay. In Opinion 87-3, the Nebraska State Bar Committee on Ethics found that a \"compelling reason \"to decline appointment to represent an indigent in a criminal defense matter is that \"[a]cceptance would impose unreasonable financial hardship on the lawyer.\" \n \n <a name=\"17\"> 17 </a> DR 5-104(B) states the same rule, but in aspirational form. \n \n <a name=\"18\"> 18 </a> See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981), in which the Court noted that the publication agreement affected counsel's tactical choices. To enhance the sensationalism of the trial, he failed to adequately investigate, seek a continuance, or request a change of venue; he also put defendant on the stand. \n \n <a name=\"19\"> 19 </a> U.S. Const. amend.VI. \n \n <a name=\"20\"> 20 </a> Fleming v. State,246 Ga. 90 (1980) (death penalty appeal invoking the State Supreme Court's \"supervisory role of the bar \"). \n \n <a name=\"21\"> 21 </a> Criminal Justice Standards, supra. \n \n <a name=\"22\"> 22 </a> See EC 7-13. \n \n <a name=\"23\"> 23 </a> EC 7-13 states,\"[H]is duty is to seek justice . . . during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all . . . .\"In criminal litigation, it is the prosecutor who stands in the shoes of the people, and it is his responsibility to make sure that both fairness and justice are pursued. \n \n <a name=\"24\"> 24 </a> Canon 9 provides, \"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.\" \n <a name=\"25\"> \n25 </a> EC 9-1, 9-2.","UrlName":"rule524","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9dbbe297-9392-4abb-950b-e9f9ff39dc02","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-4","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn November 10, 1993 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 93-4 \n For references to Standard of Conduct 21, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(a)</a> .\n For references to Standards of Conduct 22, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.\nStandard 22(b) requires a criminal defense attorney to provide copies of transcripts to indigent clients, without cost to the clients, whenever that is necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the clients upon termination of the representation of the clients by the defense attorney.\nCorrespondent asks if public defenders are ethically obligated to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies. Apparently, the public defender office does not provide representation on collateral post-conviction remedies yet wishes to retain the paupered transcript in its file for its own purposes. Making additional copies of transcripts for indigent clients will impose a financial burden upon the public defender.\nStandard 22(b) requires the public defender or any criminal defense attorney to provide copies of transcripts to indigent clients, without cost to the clients, whenever that is necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client upon termination of the representation of the client by the public defender. Standard 22(b), in its pertinent part, provides:\n A lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including . . . delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled. While, by its own terms, Standard 22(b) applies only upon withdrawal, the purpose of Standard 22(b) is invoked whenever there is a termination of a lawyer-client relationship. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a>\n A paupered transcript is a \"paper . . . to which the client is entitled.\"That phrase must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the Standard which is to avoid prejudice to a client's rights. There can be no doubt that the lack of a transcript can prejudice the assertion of rights by the client in a collateral post-conviction relief matter. In addition, the attorney obtained the paupered transcript under a claim of right which belongs to the client -- not to the attorney. Standard 22(b) obligates attorneys to deliver transcripts and any other court documents which would be useful in the client's pursuit of rights. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\nThe obligation created by Standard 22 is limited to those situations in which the client would be prejudiced by the failure to deliver the transcript. If an additional copy of a paupered transcript is available to the client from the court for use in collateral post-conviction proceedings, the client may not be prejudiced by a refusal to deliver the transcript. Whether additional copies of paupered transcripts are or should be available from the court is not a matter for this opinion.\n As we stated in Advisory Opinion 87-5, attorneys are entitled to keep copies of papers in their client files, but, absent a prior agreement as to costs, a situation inapplicable here, the attorney bears the cost of copying. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a> It would be completely inconsistent with the nature of the relationship between the public defender or other defense counsel and the indigent criminal defendant to condition release of documents essential to further appeals upon the payment of costs of copying.\nIn cases where the criminal defense lawyer does not have the transcript available through no fault of his own, he has no obligation to provide it.\n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> Standard 21 makes the withdrawal rules applicable to cases of discharge by the client as well: \n \"A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment and a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if he is discharged by his client.\"\n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> In accord, ABA Informal Opinion 1376.\n <a name=\"3\"> 3 </a> In accord, Michigan Opin. No. CI-926.","UrlName":"rule493","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bbfafeeb-e7ee-496f-a711-95698670b72b","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 94-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 9, 1994 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 94-1 \n \nOn June 9, 2004, the Supreme Court of Georgia amended Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3. As a result, this formal advisory opinion no longer provides an accurate interpretation of the ethical rules. Please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule149\">Rule 7.3 (c)(2)</a> which adequately addresses the issue discussed in this opinion. \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical Propriety of Lawyer Referral Service Collecting a Percentage of Fees in Certain Cases Referred to Participating Attorneys by the Service\nAny division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a nonlawyer in violation of Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102.\n Correspondent represents a local bar association that operates a non-profit lawyer referral service. The inquiry concerns the ethical propriety of the lawyer referral service collecting a percentage of fees in certain cases referred to participating attorneys by the service. \n \nStandard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102 provides in pertinent part that a lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer. \n \nWhile the membership of the local bar association is composed of lawyers who are licensed to practice law in the state, the local bar association, in and of itself, has no authority to engage in the practice of law.  Therefore, any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service would constitute the sharing of fees with a nonlawyer in violation of Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102. \n \nMoreover, \"[a] lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization...as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his [or her] employment by a client.\"The lawyer may pay only \"the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bona fide lawyer referral service operated by an organization authorized by law....\"Standard 13(b). \n ","UrlName":"rule494","Order":46,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"310bbc9a-b051-4601-ad7b-9bcc928207e9","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 95-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn October 4, 1995 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 95-1 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 23, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 26, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 28, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule57\">Rules 1.6</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 30, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http:// /Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 31(a), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 40, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(f)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program which purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client? To participate in the program, the lawyer must enroll and pay a fee; and agree to assign the client's fees bills and share information about the client and the client's case with the program. \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nBecause the lawyer's participation will result in a violation of one or more disciplinary Standards, members of the State Bar of Georgia cannot ethically participate in the program. \n \nOPINION: \n \nI. Introduction and Background \n \nA fee collection program purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client. To participate in the program, the lawyer must enroll and pay a fee; and agree to assign the client's fees bills and share information about the client and the client's case with the program. \n \nIf the client is credit worthy, the program will pay the client's bill and then proceed to collect the fees from the client on an installment basis, charging interest according to the credit worthiness of the client; if the client is not credit worthy, the program will proceed to collect the fees for the lawyer, but without any advance payment, remitting only 80% of the amount of the fees collected. \n \nThe lawyer is required by the program's Participation Agreement to grade clients according to their legal needs and ability to pay. The Participation Agreement contains the following provisions: \n \nThe lawyer must \"disclose events or circumstances materially affecting...credit worthiness \"of the client. The lawyer is required to warrant and covenant, among other terms, the following: that the application, credit agreement and voucher \"have been signed by either the Client, a person authorized to sign on the Client's behalf, or the person who will be responsible for repaying the credit extended under the Program, and such Client or person has been identified by a valid driver's license or state identification card;\"\"the Voucher accurately describes and evidences the type of service which has been provided to the Client;\"\"the Client is not in default with respect to any agreement between Client and Participant (lawyer), other than regarding accounts receivable;\"and \"Participant has no knowledge of any facts which may result in the uncollectability and/or unenforceability of the Credit Agreement.\" \n \nThus to participate in the program, the lawyer must provide information about the client that may well violate the client's right of confidentiality. Moreover, the client must sign the lawyer's voucher warranting the satisfactory nature of the lawyer's services, acknowledging that the fees are reasonable, and agreeing to pay finance charges in addition to the reasonable fee. \n \nII. The Ethical and Legal Considerations in the Program\nPreliminarily, it should be noted that a client's use of a program voucher is not analogous to a client's use of all-purpose credit cards to pay for services of a lawyer. Rather, the program is essentially a finance company designed to provide a service exclusively for lawyers and clients.\n In Georgia, lawyers are officers of the Court, Platen v. Byck , 50 Ga. 245, 248 (1873); Bibb County v. Hancock , 211 Ga. 429, 438 (1955); Sams v. Olah , 225 Ga. 497, 504 (1969), and, as members of the State Bar, are members of the administrative arm of the Georgia Supreme Court engaged in the administration of justice.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \nThe office of attorney is indispensable to the administration of justice and is intimate and peculiar in its relation to, and vital to the well-being of, the court. \n</blockquote>\n Sams v. Olah , supra, at 504. Thus, the lawyer is \"an officer of the state, with an obligation to the courts and to the public no less significant than his obligation to his client,\"id., and the legal profession \"[d]emands adherence to the public interest as the foremost obligation of the practitioner.\"First Bank &Trust Co. v. Zagoria , 250 Ga. 844, 845 (1983).\n The basic vice of the program is that it violates both the spirit and the letter of these precepts by requiring the lawyer to dilute his or her role as fiduciary. For example, the lawyer requires the client to sign a warranty as to the services rendered, which purports to contract away the client's legal right to complain or to dismiss the lawyer. A fundamental rule applicable to the lawyer as fiduciary is that \"a client has the absolute right to discharge the attorney and terminate the relation at any time, even without cause.\"White v. Aiken , 197 Ga. 29 (1943). (See also Standard 26).\n The dilution of the lawyer's fiduciary role is further indicated by the fact that a lawyer's participation in the program entails the possible violation of at least six standards of the State Bar of Georgia: Standards 23, 26, 28, 30, 31(a), and 40.\nStandard 23 requires a lawyer who withdraws from employment to refund any unearned fees. Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. Standard 28 prohibits a lawyer from revealing the confidences or secrets of a client. Standard 30 prohibits representation where the lawyer's exercise of professional judgment on behalf of a client may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interest. Standard 31(a) prohibits the lawyer from charging a clearly excessive fee. And Standard 40 prohibits a lawyer from accepting compensation from one other than the client for representation of the client without the consent of the client.\nBecause the lawyer's participation will result in a violation of one or more of these Standards, members of the State Bar of Georgia cannot ethically participate in the program.\n","UrlName":"rule497","Order":47,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e6be1456-c2e5-4c7e-8a30-90b9f1b623ec","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 96-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn January 25, 1996 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 96-1 \n \nThis opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including both Directory Rules and Ethical Considerations, that bear upon matters directly addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> . The conduct, which is the subject of this Formal Advisory Opinion, is now specifically and clearly prohibited by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nThe question presented is whether an attorney may require a client, who desires to discharge the lawyer, to enter into an agreement releasing the lawyer for all claims by the client against the lawyer, including any disciplinary complaint with the State Bar, in order to obtain the client's files from the lawyer and a waiver of any claim of lien by the lawyer against such files. \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nA lawyer should represent a client competently and should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client by putting the interests of a client ahead of the lawyer's own personal interests. Therefore, a lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar disciplinary complaints by the client against the lawyer. \n \nOPINION:\nIt has been brought to the attention of the State Bar's Disciplinary Board that lawyers are following a practice of requiring a client, who desires to discharge the lawyer, to execute an agreement releasing the lawyer from any liability for claims relating to the lawyer's representation of the client in order for the client to obtain the papers and documents that constitute the client's file. One such agreement includes the following provision:\n \n...it is hereby agreed that [the client] hereby releases and forever discharges [the lawyers]...from all...claims,...including any disciplinary complaint with the State Bar of Georgia...which [the client] ever had or may have [against the lawyers] including but not limited to [the lawyers] representation of [the client] in the above stated matter. ...\n[The lawyers]...waive any claim of lien that they have in said matter.\nIt is apparent from reviewing this provision that the lawyer being discharged is attempting to condition the release of the client's files upon the waiver of any claims, including claims for malpractice and State Bar disciplinary complaints, by the client against the lawyer. This attempt by the lawyer to limit his or her liability for malpractice constitutes a failure to comply with Canon 6 of the Canon of Ethics, which provides that a lawyer should represent a client competently. As clearly explained in Ethical Consideration 6-6:\n \nA lawyer should not seek, by contract or other means, to limit his individual liability to his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of his client properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly should not [be] permitted to do so.\nThe provisions of this Ethical Consideration are emphasized by Directory Rule 6-102:\n \n(A) A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his personal malpractice.\nClearly, the practice of requiring a client, who desires to discharge the lawyer, to execute an agreement as described herein before releasing the client's files is an attempt to exonerate the lawyer from individual liability to his or her client. As such, this practice constitutes a violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Ethics.\nFurthermore, Canon 5 of the Canons of Ethics provides that a \"a lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client.\"As explained in Ethical Consideration 5-1:\n \nThe professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of uncompromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.\nBy attempting to limit his or her liability for malpractice as a condition of releasing the client's files, the lawyer puts himself or herself into an adversarial relationship with the client. By purposefully withholding papers, documents, and evidence in the client's file until the client agrees to execute an agreement releasing the lawyer from any liability for claims or malpractice, the lawyer's personal interests are placed ahead of the interests of the client. This conduct amounts to a failure to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client in violation of Canon 5 of the State Bar of Georgia's Canons of Ethics.\nIn addition, by conditioning the return of a client's files and the waiver of any lien that the lawyer might have against such files upon the execution of a release of claims for malpractice and complaints to the State Disciplinary Board, the lawyer has potentially caused prejudice to the client in violation of Standard 22(b) of the Standards of Conduct for the State Bar of Georgia which provides as follows:\n \nA lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled and complying with applicable laws and rules.\nBy such conduct, the lawyer has also potentially caused prejudice to the client in violation of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5 which provides as follows:\n \nAn attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.\nIn summary, the practice of requiring a client, that desires to discharge a lawyer, to execute an agreement, such as described herein, is an attempt by the lawyer to either exonerate himself or herself from claims for malpractice or limit his or her liability to the client for acts of malpractice, and such conduct is improper.\n","UrlName":"rule499","Order":48,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"63202f2d-83ee-40bd-800d-bdca8d755ce9","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 96-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule501","Order":49,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71867a07-e1b4-41ac-98ca-7d95ebce8c0d","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule503","Order":50,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"290106da-aa32-4732-a959-855c97f91929","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn February 13, 1997 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 97-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(c), please see Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> Comments. \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (trade names), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (lawyers practicing together under firm name), please see Comments [1] and [6] of<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor reference to Standard of Conduct 9(b) (use of name of lawyer-pubic official in firm name), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(c)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 35-38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rules 1.7</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(c)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">1.9</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">2.2</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay an attorney practice in more than one law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nAn attorney may practice simultaneously in more than one firm so long as those firms represent different ownership, the public and individual clients are clearly informed, and each firm adheres to all requirements of the Standards governing conflicts of interest and client confidences and secrets. \n \nOPINION: \n \nCorrespondent asks whether an attorney may practice in more than one law firm. Correspondent suggests several possible variations, including firms with overlapping partners, firms with different associates, and firms formed for different clients or different purposes. Each potential structure raises different problems under the Georgia Standards of Conduct. In addition to the structural concerns raised by Correspondent, overlapping firms create special problems of conflict of interest and client confidentiality. \n \nStandard 9(c) speaks to multiple structures: \"A law firm shall not simultaneously practice law under more than one name.\"Thus firms composed of the same principals may not form parallel firms for the practice of law, whether by using different associates, or for different practice areas or different clients. Standard 9(c) prohibits only multiple practices by the same \"law firm,\"however. Thus it does not forbid a member of one firm from joining with different principals simultaneously in a different practice or practices. Other Standards recognize and accept nontraditional practice forms. Standard 10 recognizes that \"[a] partnership for the practice of law may be composed of one or more individual professional corporations.\"Standard 11 deals with interstate law firms in which personnel and admissions to practice are distinct from state to state. \n \nThe principal problem created by distinct but overlapping practice firms is actual or potential client confusion. The Georgia Standards uniformly protect against any firm structure or designation which creates that possibility. Standard 8 (firm names, printing and publications) and Standard 9(a) (trade names) forbid any \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"usage. Standard 9(a) ties these concerns to client understandings \"as to the lawyer or lawyers practicing under that name or to the type of practice in which the lawyer or lawyers are engaged.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general). Standard 10 adds that \"[a] lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are ... partners.\"See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (\"special counsel \"relationship \"must be ... identified correctly so that clients and potential clients are fully aware \"). In addition, Standard 9(b) prohibits using the name of a lawyer-public official \"not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general); Advisory Opinion No. 23 (disclosure requirements for office of multistate firm). \n \nIn short, a lawyer's engaging in multiple practices with distinct ownership is not prohibited by the Standards, so long as neither the general public nor any individual client is or may be misled thereby. \n \nThe precise steps which each firm must take to avoid being \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"are beyond the scope of this opinion. If a lawyer practices in more than one active firm, he or she may be required to identify those firms in all communications to the general public, together with appropriate distinctions between or among them; and may need to explain to each client or potential client at the outset how that client will or would be served. The client needs to understand who is offering to perform or will perform services, and to whom the client should look for answers or redress in case of any problem. \n \nParticipation in simultaneous practices also raises concerns for conflict of interest and client confidences or secrets, arising from the overlapping lawyer's or lawyers' work in another firm or firms. The relevant Standards apply with full force to interrelated practices. Confidences and secrets must be protected regardless of where they were obtained. Individual lawyers are disqualified equally wherever they go. Standard 38 vicariously disqualifies each firm in case of any individual disqualification under Standards 35-37, regardless of which firm's work gives rise to individual disqualification. See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (vicarious disqualification in the similar context of \"special counsel \").","UrlName":"rule510","Order":51,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[{"Id":"5fcb0eb2-9077-4634-a325-aae0d50cfaae","ParentId":"290106da-aa32-4732-a959-855c97f91929","Title":"Version 2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn February 13, 1997 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 97-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(c), please see Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> Comments. \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (trade names), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (lawyers practicing together under firm name), please see Comments [1] and [6] of<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(e)</a> . \n \nFor reference to Standard of Conduct 9(b) (use of name of lawyer-pubic official in firm name), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(c)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 35-38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rules 1.7</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(c)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">1.9</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">2.2</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay an attorney practice in more than one law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nAn attorney may practice simultaneously in more than one firm so long as those firms represent different ownership, the public and individual clients are clearly informed, and each firm adheres to all requirements of the Standards governing conflicts of interest and client confidences and secrets. \n \nOPINION: \n \nCorrespondent asks whether an attorney may practice in more than one law firm. Correspondent suggests several possible variations, including firms with overlapping partners, firms with different associates, and firms formed for different clients or different purposes. Each potential structure raises different problems under the Georgia Standards of Conduct. In addition to the structural concerns raised by Correspondent, overlapping firms create special problems of conflict of interest and client confidentiality. \n \nStandard 9(c) speaks to multiple structures: \"A law firm shall not simultaneously practice law under more than one name.\"Thus firms composed of the same principals may not form parallel firms for the practice of law, whether by using different associates, or for different practice areas or different clients. Standard 9(c) prohibits only multiple practices by the same \"law firm,\"however. Thus it does not forbid a member of one firm from joining with different principals simultaneously in a different practice or practices. Other Standards recognize and accept nontraditional practice forms. Standard 10 recognizes that \"[a] partnership for the practice of law may be composed of one or more individual professional corporations.\"Standard 11 deals with interstate law firms in which personnel and admissions to practice are distinct from state to state. \n \nThe principal problem created by distinct but overlapping practice firms is actual or potential client confusion. The Georgia Standards uniformly protect against any firm structure or designation which creates that possibility. Standard 8 (firm names, printing and publications) and Standard 9(a) (trade names) forbid any \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"usage. Standard 9(a) ties these concerns to client understandings \"as to the lawyer or lawyers practicing under that name or to the type of practice in which the lawyer or lawyers are engaged.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general). Standard 10 adds that \"[a] lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are ... partners.\"See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (\"special counsel \"relationship \"must be ... identified correctly so that clients and potential clients are fully aware \"). In addition, Standard 9(b) prohibits using the name of a lawyer-public official \"not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general); Advisory Opinion No. 23 (disclosure requirements for office of multistate firm). \n \nIn short, a lawyer's engaging in multiple practices with distinct ownership is not prohibited by the Standards, so long as neither the general public nor any individual client is or may be misled thereby. \n \nThe precise steps which each firm must take to avoid being \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"are beyond the scope of this opinion. If a lawyer practices in more than one active firm, he or she may be required to identify those firms in all communications to the general public, together with appropriate distinctions between or among them; and may need to explain to each client or potential client at the outset how that client will or would be served. The client needs to understand who is offering to perform or will perform services, and to whom the client should look for answers or redress in case of any problem. \n \nParticipation in simultaneous practices also raises concerns for conflict of interest and client confidences or secrets, arising from the overlapping lawyer's or lawyers' work in another firm or firms. The relevant Standards apply with full force to interrelated practices. Confidences and secrets must be protected regardless of where they were obtained. Individual lawyers are disqualified equally wherever they go. Standard 38 vicariously disqualifies each firm in case of any individual disqualification under Standards 35-37, regardless of which firm's work gives rise to individual disqualification. See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (vicarious disqualification in the similar context of \"special counsel \").","UrlName":"revision329"}],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2cec141b-260d-471a-8871-f253d226bc46","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 4, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 97-3 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 6, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule149\">Rule 7.3(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 22, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 44, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 45(b), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1(a)(1)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nWhether it is ethically permissible for a departing attorney to send a communication to clients of the former law firm? \n \nOPINION: \n \nNo Standard prohibits a departing attorney from contacting those clients with whom the attorney personally worked while at the law firm. A client is not the property of a certain attorney. The main consideration underlying our Canons of Ethics is the best interest and protection of the client. \n \nAn attorney has a duty to keep a client informed. This duty flows in part from Standard 22 which provides that a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until that lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client including giving due notice to the client of the lawyer's withdrawal, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules. Furthermore, Standard 44 prohibits an attorney's willful abandonment or disregard of a legal matter to the client's detriment. Therefore, to the extent that a lawyer's departure from the firm affects the client's legal matters, this client should be informed of the attorney's departure. The fact or circumstances of an attorney's departure from a law firm should not be misrepresented to the firm's clients. See Standard 4 (which prohibits an attorney from engaging in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation); and Standard 45(b) (which prohibits an attorney from knowingly making a false statement of law or fact in his representation of a client). \n \nIf the departing attorney either had significant contact with or actively represented a client on the client's legal matters, the attorney may communicate with the client, in either written or oral form, to advise the client of the attorney's departure from the firm. An appropriate communication may advise the client of the fact of the attorney's departure, the attorney's new location, the attorney's willingness to provide legal services to the client, and the client's right to select who handles the client's future legal representation. \n \nAssuming the departing attorney either had significant contact with or actively represented the client, the written communication to the client does not need to comply with the provisions governing advertisements contained in Standard 6, because it would not constitute \"a written communication to a prospective client for the purposes of obtaining professional employment \"as contemplated by Standard 6 (i.e. the written communication is not required to be labeled an \"advertisement \"). Of course, any written communication regarding a lawyer's services must also comply with Standard 5, which prohibits any false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading communications; and with any other applicable standards of conduct. \n \nA similar analysis should also apply to an oral communication by the departing attorney to a client with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation on legal matters while at the firm. If the departing attorney contacts such a client orally, that attorney should only provide information that is deemed appropriate in a written communication as set forth above. \n \nWith respect to the timing of the disclosure of the attorney's departure to the client, the ultimate consideration is the client's best interest. To the extent practical, a joint notification by the law firm and the departing attorney to the affected clients of the change is the preferred course of action for safeguarding the client's best interests. However, the appropriate timing of a notification to the client is determined on a case by case basis. Depending on the nature of the departing attorney's work for the client, the client may need advance notification of the departure to make a determination as to future representation. \n \nThe departing attorney may also owe certain duties to the firm which may require that the departing attorney should advise the firm of the attorney's intention to leave the firm and the attorney's intention to notify clients of his or her impending departure, prior to informing the clients of the situation. Specifically, the departing attorney should not engage in professional conduct which involves \"dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation \"with respect to the attorney's dealings with the firm as set forth in Standard 4. \n \nIn conclusion, as long as the departing attorney complies with the Standards governing advertisements, solicitation, and general professional conduct, the attorney may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, so as to advise the clients of the attorney's departure as well as the client's right to select his or her legal counsel. Legal issues which may arise from a particular set of facts involving a departing attorney including, but not limited to, contract or tortious interference with contract, are beyond the scope of this formal advisory opinion.","UrlName":"rule511","Order":52,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"761858ac-f617-4774-af9c-1a3463724b8a","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule462","Order":53,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"25cb30ff-9539-4f82-a2f3-ebfd4fd3216d","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn June 1, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-2 \n \nThis opinion relies on Standards of Conduct 61, 62, 63, and 65 that bear upon matters directly addressed by Rule <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule42\">1.15(I)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nWhen a lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity is unable to locate the rightful recipient of such funds after exhausting all reasonable efforts, may that lawyer remove the unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nA lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity may remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act only if the lawyer, prior to delivery, has exhausted all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient. \n \nOPINION: \n \nMany members of the Bar have contacted the State Bar of Georgia for guidance on how to manage client funds and/or other funds held in a fiduciary capacity in the lawyer's escrow trust account when the lawyer is unable to locate the rightful recipient of the funds and the rightful recipient fails to claim the funds. More specifically, the lawyers have asked whether they could ethically remove the unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and disburse the funds in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq., the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. \n \nIn those cases where a lawyer is holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity, the lawyer must do so in compliance with Standards 61, 62, 63 and 65. When the funds become payable or distributable, Standard 61 speaks to the lawyer's duty to deliver funds: \"A lawyer shall promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities or other properties and shall promptly deliver such funds, securities or other properties to the client.\"Implicit both in this Standard, and the lawyer's responsibility to zealously represent the client, is the lawyer's duty to exhaust all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient in order to ensure delivery. \n \nWhen a lawyer holding funds attempts to deliver those funds in compliance with Standard 61 but is unable to locate the rightful recipient, the lawyer has a duty to exhaust all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient. After exhausting all reasonable efforts and the expiration of the five year period discussed in the Act, if the lawyer is still unable to locate the rightful recipient and the rightful recipient fails to claim the funds, the funds are no longer considered client funds or funds held in a fiduciary capacity, but rather, the funds are presumed to be abandoned as a matter of law, except as otherwise provided by the Act, and the lawyer may then deliver the unclaimed funds to the State of Georgia in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq., the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. A lawyer who disburses the unclaimed funds as discussed above shall not be in violation of the Standards.","UrlName":"rule512","Order":54,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4da258c4-e1db-411a-8ab9-783ceb32a90c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn June 1, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-3 \n For reference to Standard of Conduct 47, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\">Rule 4.2(b)(1)</a> .\n For reference to Standard of Conduct 48, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> .\n For reference to DR 7-103, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule83\">Rule 3.8(a)</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nMay a staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of non-clients?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \nA staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group may contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of non-clients and clients alike because such communication is authorized by law and because the State is not an adverse party in that situation.\n OPINION: \nI. Factual Scenario:\nA staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group (hereinafter \"lawyer \") receives information that a state prison inmate is denied a constitutionally protected right by the housing institution. The lawyer contacts the Warden of the institution in writing, notifying the Warden of the situation from the perspective of the inmate. In addition, the writing cites legal authority and argues that the institution has denied the inmate's constitutionally protected rights. In conclusion, the letter asks the Warden to conform to the inmate's demands in light of the legal authority cited in the letter.\nThe lawyer knows that the Warden is a state official with managerial responsibilities. The lawyer also knows that the State is represented by the Attorney General of the State. The lawyer does not seek approval from the Attorney General's office prior to his correspondence.\nII. Ethical and Legal Considerations\n The factual scenario raises questions about the application of Standard 47. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> More particularly, the questions at issue are whether the government is a \"party \"as contemplated by Standard 47 and whether the communication described falls within the \"authorized by law \"exception to Standard 47.\n Standard 47 \nDuring the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior written consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so. A violation of this standard may be punished by a public reprimand.\n The factual scenario describes a lawyer's communication with a government agency he knows to be represented by a lawyer, without the prior written consent of the lawyer representing the government agency. While the question presented refers to a \"non-client,\"the factual scenario describes a situation where the lawyer is offering legal assistance on behalf of a person who presumably requested the assistance. See Huddleston v. State , 259 Ga. 45 (1989) and Legacy Homes v. Cole , 205 Ga. App. 34 (1992) for a description of the formation of the attorney-client relationship. Thus, the communication is the subject of the lawyer's representation of a client.\n Because the government is not an adverse party in this situation and because the communication described is authorized by law, Standard 47 does not apply to the factual scenario presented. The communication prohibited by Standard 47 protects an adverse party from overreaching by opposing counsel, protects the attorney-client relationship, and reduces the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged information that could harm their interests. See , ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 95-396 for a description of the history and purpose of similar rules prohibiting such communication.\n Standard 47 contemplates a situation where a party might take advantage of another with an adverse interest , through unauthorized communication. However, the factual scenario described above is not such a situation. The purpose of the government is to protect its people, including those it has taken into custody. This fundamental concept is well represented in our laws, including our Bar Rules.\nThe petition clause of the First Amendment is directly on point in this regard: Congress shall make no law...abridging...the right of the people...to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The government has a duty to make itself available to those who have legitimate grievances.\nThe government has a duty to make itself available to those who have legitimate grievances. If a person, even a lawyer representing a person incarcerated by the State, has reason to believe that the State is acting in an oppressive manner, that person has a right to communicate this grievance directly to the government agency involved. To do so is a Constitutionally protected right and thus falls within the \"authorized by law \"exception to Standard 47.\nEven where State officials initiate a clearly adversarial proceeding, lawyers for the State are obligated to protect the interests of the accused. This concept is reflected in Directory Rule DR 7-103:\n(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.\nWhile the First Amendment and DR 7-103 contemplate different situations, they both incorporate the notion that the government has an interest in protecting its citizens that is a paramount to any interests it has in being protected from them. In the factual scenario provided, the government agency has an interest in addressing the concerns raised by the lawyer. While the government may have competing interests, that alone does not make the government an adverse party.\n In summary, a staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group may contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of clients because such communication is authorized by law and because the State is not an adverse party in that situation. Regardless of the adversarial nature of the situation, a lawyer should always strive to maintain the integrity of the profession (Canon 1 ) while representing the best interest of his client, and should consider providing copies of the communication to the State lawyer.\n <a name=\"1\">1</a> This opinion does not address Standard 48 which prohibits a lawyers advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer where the interests of the person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client. In the factual scenario described in this opinion, the lawyer knows that the state institution is represented by the Attorney General for the State.","UrlName":"rule514","Order":55,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"98088e98-4d7c-4bbb-b291-7a762393dfa0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn October 29, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> ; (incorporating <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ). \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 37, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> (incorporating <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ) and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-13, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(B), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(C), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(b)</a> , which includes additional procedural requirements.\n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(D), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nIs it ethically proper for a lawyer to represent a criminal defendant when a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution is represented by a second attorney who is listed on letterhead as \"of counsel \"to the same law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nBecause an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, regular, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the standards of conduct applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel \"attorneys. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. \n \nOPINION: \n \nI. Use of the Term \"Of Counsel \"on Materials Intended for Public Distribution. \n \nThe use of the term \"of counsel \"to denote relationships between attorneys and law firms has increased in recent years. Traditionally the term was used to designate semi-retired lawyers who desired to maintain a regular association with a law firm for which they were previously a full-time attorney. Today, the term \"of counsel \"is used to describe a wide range of associations and relationships including lateral hires or attorneys who are in-between associate and partnership classifications. While the primary purpose of this opinion is not to limit or define the terms of such relationships, the Board does believe that some clarification is necessary to protect members of the public who may rely upon the \"of counsel \"designation in selecting legal representation. \n \nAlthough the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility does not define the term \"of counsel \", the American Bar Association has issued a formal opinion which describes the core characteristics of the term as follows:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n ... A close, regular, personal relationship ; but a relationship which is neither that of a partner (or its equivalent, a principal of a professional corporation), with the shared liability and/or managerial responsibility implied by that term; nor, on the other hand, the status ordinarily conveyed by the term 'associate', which is to say a junior non-partner lawyer, regularly employed by the firm. \n</blockquote>\n (Emphasis added). ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 90-357 (1990). The ABA also continues to adhere to aspects of its earlier opinion which prohibited the use of the term \"of counsel \"to designate the following relationships: (1) a relationship involving only a single case, (2) a relationship of forwarder or receiver of legal business, (3) a relationship involving only occasional collaborative efforts, and (4) relationship of an outside consultant. See ABA Formal Opinion 90-357 (1990) (reaffirming in part ABA Formal Opinion 330 (1972)). Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have adhered to the ABA's description of the \"of counsel \"relationships. See Florida Professional Ethics Committee Opinion Nos. 94-7 (1995); State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Opinion No. 1993-129 and the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 262 (1972). \n \nThe Board is of the opinion that the use of the term \"of counsel \"on letterhead, placards, advertisements and other materials intended for public distribution should denote more than casual contact such as mere office-sharing arrangements and that requiring a close, regular, personal relationship between the \"of counsel \"attorney and the principal firm is in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the consuming public. Requiring attorneys who are held out to the public as \"of counsel \"to have a close, regular, personal relationship with the principal firm is also in keeping with well-established standards of conduct requiring lawyers to be scrupulous in the representation of their professional status and prohibiting attorneys from practicing under trade names which are false, fraudulent, deceptive or that would tend to mislead laypersons as to the identity of lawyers actually practicing in the firm. See Standards of Conduct 8 and 9 and EC 2-11 and EC 2-13. \n \nII. Conflicts Analysis for \"Of Counsel \"Relationships. \n \nThe issue as to whether or not a member of a law firm may represent a defendant who potentially has an adverse interest to a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution and who is simultaneously being represented by an \"of counsel \"attorney to the same firm must be analyzed in light of the requirement that such an \"of counsel \"relationship be \"close, regular and personal.\"The Board believes that the prudent and ethical course is for the attorneys involved to apply the same standards in analyzing this potential for conflict of representation as would be applied in more traditional relationships existing between associates and partners with other attorneys in their law firms. \n \nUnder these long-standing rules, an attorney is prohibited from continuing multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be, or is likely to be, adversely affected by his representation of another client. See Standards of Conduct 35 and 36 and DR 5-105(B). If the lawyer is required to decline or withdraw from employment due to the reasons stated in Standards 35 and 36, then no partner or associate of his firm may accept or continue such employment. See Standard of Conduct 38 and DR 5-105(D). The standards do provide for an exception if it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent the interest of each of the clients and each client consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of each client. See Standard of Conduct 37 and DR 5-105(C). \n \nIn addition to associates and partners of law firms, the Board believes that these are sound principles for \"of counsel \"attorneys to follow as well. This is especially true, given the requirement that attorneys listed as \"of counsel \"on letterhead and other materials distributed to the public have a close, regular, personal, relationship with the principal firm. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then, under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. This opinion is consistent with those reached by other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue. See State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 1993-129; Florida Professional Ethics Committee, Opinion 94-7 (1995); and Opinion 72-41 (1973)","UrlName":"rule516","Order":56,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[{"Id":"662c582a-4db3-4868-8e82-12d27bd91e69","ParentId":"98088e98-4d7c-4bbb-b291-7a762393dfa0","Title":"Version 2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn October 29, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> ; (incorporating <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ). \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)(1)</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)(2)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 37, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> (incorporating<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ), <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(e)(1)</a> and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-13, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(B), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(C), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(b)</a> , which includes additional procedural requirements.\n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(D), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nIs it ethically proper for a lawyer to represent a criminal defendant when a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution is represented by a second attorney who is listed on letterhead as \"of counsel \"to the same law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nBecause an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, regular, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the standards of conduct applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel \"attorneys. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. \n \nOPINION: \n \nI. Use of the Term \"Of Counsel \"on Materials Intended for Public Distribution. \n \nThe use of the term \"of counsel \"to denote relationships between attorneys and law firms has increased in recent years. Traditionally the term was used to designate semi-retired lawyers who desired to maintain a regular association with a law firm for which they were previously a full-time attorney. Today, the term \"of counsel \"is used to describe a wide range of associations and relationships including lateral hires or attorneys who are in-between associate and partnership classifications. While the primary purpose of this opinion is not to limit or define the terms of such relationships, the Board does believe that some clarification is necessary to protect members of the public who may rely upon the \"of counsel \"designation in selecting legal representation. \n \nAlthough the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility does not define the term \"of counsel \", the American Bar Association has issued a formal opinion which describes the core characteristics of the term as follows:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n ... A close, regular, personal relationship ; but a relationship which is neither that of a partner (or its equivalent, a principal of a professional corporation), with the shared liability and/or managerial responsibility implied by that term; nor, on the other hand, the status ordinarily conveyed by the term 'associate', which is to say a junior non-partner lawyer, regularly employed by the firm. \n</blockquote>\n (Emphasis added). ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 90-357 (1990). The ABA also continues to adhere to aspects of its earlier opinion which prohibited the use of the term \"of counsel \"to designate the following relationships: (1) a relationship involving only a single case, (2) a relationship of forwarder or receiver of legal business, (3) a relationship involving only occasional collaborative efforts, and (4) relationship of an outside consultant. See ABA Formal Opinion 90-357 (1990) (reaffirming in part ABA Formal Opinion 330 (1972)). Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have adhered to the ABA's description of the \"of counsel \"relationships. See Florida Professional Ethics Committee Opinion Nos. 94-7 (1995); State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Opinion No. 1993-129 and the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 262 (1972). \n \nThe Board is of the opinion that the use of the term \"of counsel \"on letterhead, placards, advertisements and other materials intended for public distribution should denote more than casual contact such as mere office-sharing arrangements and that requiring a close, regular, personal relationship between the \"of counsel \"attorney and the principal firm is in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the consuming public. Requiring attorneys who are held out to the public as \"of counsel \"to have a close, regular, personal relationship with the principal firm is also in keeping with well-established standards of conduct requiring lawyers to be scrupulous in the representation of their professional status and prohibiting attorneys from practicing under trade names which are false, fraudulent, deceptive or that would tend to mislead laypersons as to the identity of lawyers actually practicing in the firm. See Standards of Conduct 8 and 9 and EC 2-11 and EC 2-13. \n \nII. Conflicts Analysis for \"Of Counsel \"Relationships. \n \nThe issue as to whether or not a member of a law firm may represent a defendant who potentially has an adverse interest to a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution and who is simultaneously being represented by an \"of counsel \"attorney to the same firm must be analyzed in light of the requirement that such an \"of counsel \"relationship be \"close, regular and personal.\"The Board believes that the prudent and ethical course is for the attorneys involved to apply the same standards in analyzing this potential for conflict of representation as would be applied in more traditional relationships existing between associates and partners with other attorneys in their law firms. \n \nUnder these long-standing rules, an attorney is prohibited from continuing multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be, or is likely to be, adversely affected by his representation of another client. See Standards of Conduct 35 and 36 and DR 5-105(B). If the lawyer is required to decline or withdraw from employment due to the reasons stated in Standards 35 and 36, then no partner or associate of his firm may accept or continue such employment. See Standard of Conduct 38 and DR 5-105(D). The standards do provide for an exception if it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent the interest of each of the clients and each client consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of each client. See Standard of Conduct 37 and DR 5-105(C). \n \nIn addition to associates and partners of law firms, the Board believes that these are sound principles for \"of counsel \"attorneys to follow as well. This is especially true, given the requirement that attorneys listed as \"of counsel \"on letterhead and other materials distributed to the public have a close, regular, personal, relationship with the principal firm. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then, under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. This opinion is consistent with those reached by other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue. See State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 1993-129; Florida Professional Ethics Committee, Opinion 94-7 (1995); and Opinion 72-41 (1973)","UrlName":"revision331"}],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"08e11fad-a1e2-4fb1-9414-08306ff815b0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 99-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule517","Order":57,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"55a23b3f-e03d-4462-b7c8-b177bf7efd80","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 99-2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON OCTOBER 18, 1999 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 99-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Canon 3, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 3-1, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 3-8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">5.4(b)</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">5.4(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 3-101, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Canon 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 5-14, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 5-20, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2.</a> \n \nFor references to DR 5-105, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nIn a transaction involving a real estate lending institution and its customer, may the in-house counsel for the institution provide legal services to the customer relative to the transaction? May the real estate lending institution charge the customer a fee for any legal services rendered relative to the transaction? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nThe answer to both questions is \"no.\"An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer. Such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest under Standards 35 and 36. This prohibition does not, however, prevent in-house counsel from attending closings as attorney for the institution and preparing the documents necessary to effectuate the closing including those documents that must be signed by the customer and that may benefit both the institution and the customer. Nor does the prohibition prevent the institution from seeking reimbursement for the legal expenses incurred in the transaction by including them in the cost of doing business when determining its charge to its customer. The charge, however, may not be denominated as a legal or attorney fee but must be included in the charge being made by the institution. There is inherent risk of confusion on the part of the customer regarding the role of in-house counsel. Prudent lawyers will act on the assumption that courts will honor the customer's reasonable expectation of in-house counsel's duties created by the closing attorney's conduct at the closing. \n \nOPINION: \n \nStandard 24, proscribing assistance in the unauthorized practice of law, prohibits in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution from providing legal services to its customers. See also, Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 3; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Considerations 3-1 &3-8; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Directory Rule 3-101, and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 5.4(d). Standards 35 and 36 prohibit such conduct if the ability to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of one client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the obligation to another client. See also, Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 5-14 - 5-20; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Directory Rule 5-105, and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 1.7. Specifically, in-house counsel may not provide legal services at a closing or elsewhere to a customer borrowing from the lending institution and arising out of the existing relationship between the customer and the institution. This is true whether or not the customer is charged for these services. The role of employee renders the actions of in-house counsel the action of the employer. The employer, not being a lawyer, is thus being assisted in and is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The in-house counsel by virtue of the existing employer/employee relationship and its accompanying obligation of loyalty to the employer cannot exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the customer. \n \nThis prohibition does not, however, prevent in-house counsel from attending the closing as the institution's legal representative and preparing those documents necessary to effectuate the closing. This includes those documents that must be signed by the customer. In such a situation, in-house counsel is providing legal services directly to the institution even though others, including the customer, may benefit from them. \n \nThe prohibition on assisting in the unauthorized practice of law does not prevent the lending institution from including the expense of in-house counsel in the cost of doing business when determining the fee to charge its customer. The lending institution may, in other words, recoup the expenses of the transaction including the cost of legal services. This conduct does not in and of itself, create a duty to the customer on the part of the in-house counsel nor does it constitute a violation of the prohibition against the sharing of legal fees with a non-lawyer. On the other hand, charging the cost of legal services to the customer (1) is likely to create an unintended expectation in the mind of the customer, (2) constitutes a non-lawyer receiving the fee for legal services rather than an attorney, (3) constitutes a lawyer splitting a fee with a non-lawyer, or (4) directly invites the unauthorized practice of law. It is accordingly prohibited even if limited to actual costs. The customer cannot be made a part of the attorney/client, employer/employee relationship. \n \nThe situation in which in-house counsel attends closings as attorney for the lending institution and prepares the documents necessary to effectuate the closing is fraught with both legal and ethical risks beyond assistance in the unauthorized practice of law and conflict of interests. Even though the above analysis (1) requires that in-house counsel's lawyer-client relationship be restricted to the lending institution, and (2) prohibits the direct billing for legal services by the institution, the fact remains that the customer may benefit from the actions of in-house counsel. Thus the risk of confusion about the role of in-house counsel at the closing will be high. Prudent in-house counsel should anticipate that courts may treat the reasonable customer expectations regarding these legal services as creating duties even in the absence of a lawyer-client relationship. The Restatement (Second) of Torts reports that an attorney who represents only the lender may still be held liable in negligence to a borrower. See, e.g., Seigle v. Jasper, 867 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). A similar result may obtain under traditional contract or agency principles regarding third party beneficiaries. This position is supported by the Restatement of the Law of Lawyering. While declaring the current state of Georgia law on this issue would be inappropriate and beyond the scope of this Formal Advisory Opinion, it is clear that prudent in-house counsel will not ignore these risks both in advising the lending institution and in his or her conduct toward the customer as a matter of good lawyering.","UrlName":"rule519","Order":58,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7bc27240-327a-4d4c-9816-05a91687ed94","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule464","Order":59,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a1dae58c-d3c7-4e94-aa69-a190cd06e723","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 00-2 \n For references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1(a) and (c)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a> and Comments [1] and [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> .\n For references to EC 3-2, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule62\">Rule 2.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-6, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nIs a lawyer aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n Yes, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. Generally, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer effectively substitutes the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, a lawyer should never place a nonlawyer in situations in which he or she is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nothing in this limitation precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\nIn order to enforce this limitation in the public interest, it is necessary to find a violation of the provisions prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own in the representation of the lawyer's client.\nAs applied to the specific questions presented, a lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to give legal advice to the lawyer's client based on the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer rather than the lawyer, would be in clear violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because doing so creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\n OPINION:\n This request for a Formal Advisory Opinion was submitted by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board along with examples of numerous grievances regarding this issue recently considered by the Panel. Essentially, the request prompts the Formal Advisory Opinion Board to return to previously issued advisory opinions on the subject of the use of nonlawyers to see if the guidance of those previous opinions remains valid for current practice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a>\nThe primary disciplinary standard involved in answering the question presented is: Standard 24, (\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\") As will become clear in this Opinion, however, Standard 4 (\"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation.\") and Standard 5 (\"A lawyer shall not make any false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.\") are also involved.\nIn interpreting these disciplinary standards as applied to the question presented, we are guided by Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law,\"and, more specifically, the following Ethical Considerations: Ethical Consideration 3-2, Ethical Consideration 3-5, and Ethical Consideration 3-6.\n In Advisory Opinion No. 19, an Opinion issued before the creation of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and the issuance of advisory opinions by the Supreme Court, the State Disciplinary Board addressed the propriety of Georgia lawyers permitting nonlawyer employees to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm's letterhead under the nonlawyer's signature. The Board said that in determining the propriety of this conduct it must first define the practice of law in Georgia. In doing so, it relied upon the very broad language of a then recent Georgia Supreme Court opinion, Huber v. State , 234 Ga. 458 (1975), which included within the definition of the practice \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law,\"to conclude that the conduct in question, regardless of whether a law suit was pending, constituted the practice of law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\"> 4 </a> Any lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to engage in this conduct would be assisting in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, the Board said. The Board specifically limited this prohibition, however, to letters addressed to adverse or potentially adverse parties that, in essence, threatened or implied a threat of litigation. Furthermore, the Board noted that there was a broad range of activities, including investigating, taking statements from clients and other witnesses, conducting legal research, preparing legal documents (under \"direct supervision of the member \"), and performing administrative, secretarial, or clerical duties that were appropriate for nonlawyers. In the course of performing these activities, nonlawyers could correspond on the firm's letterhead under their own signature. This was permitted as long as the nonlawyer clearly identified his or her status as a nonlawyer in a manner that would avoid misleading the recipient into thinking that the nonlawyer was authorized to practice law.\nWhatever the merits of the answer to the particular question presented, this Opinion's general approach to the issue, i.e., does the conduct of the nonlawyer, considered outside of the context of supervision by a licensed lawyer, appear to fit the broad legal definition of the practice of law, would have severely limited the role of lawyer-supervised nonlawyers to what might be described as in-house and investigatory functions. This Opinion was followed two years later, however, by Advisory Opinion No. 21, an Opinion in which the State Disciplinary Board adopted a different approach.\nThe specific question presented in Advisory Opinion No. 21 was: \"What are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legal assistants or paraprofessionals and permit them to deal with other lawyers, clients, and the public?\"After noting the very broad legal definition of the practice of law in Georgia, the Board said that the issue was instead one of \"strict adherence to a program of supervision and direction of a nonlawyer.\"\nThis insight, an insight we reaffirm in this Opinion, was that the legal issue of what constitutes the practice of law should be separated from the issue of when does the practice of law by an attorney become the practice of law by a nonlawyer because of a lack of involvement by the lawyer in the representation. Under this analysis, it is clear that while most activities conducted by nonlawyers for lawyers are within the legal definition of the practice of law, in that these activities are \"action[s] taken for others in . . . matter[s] connected with the law,\"lawyers are assisting in the unauthorized practice of law only when they inappropriately delegate tasks to a nonlawyer or inadequately supervise appropriately delegated tasks.\nImplicitly suggesting that whether or not a particular task should be delegated to a nonlawyer was too contextual a matter both for effective discipline and for guidance, the Disciplinary Board provided a list of specific tasks that could be safely delegated to nonlawyers \"provided that proper and effective supervision and control by the attorney exists.\"The Board also provided a list of tasks that should not be delegated, apparently without regard to the potential for supervision and control that existed.\nWere we to determine that the lists of delegable and non-delegable tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 fully governed the question presented here, it would be clear that a lawyer would be aiding the unauthorized practice if the lawyer permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to clients providing legal advice (because it would be \"contact with clients . . . requiring the rendering of legal advice) or permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons threatening legal action (because it would be \"contacting an opposite party or his counsel in a situation in which legal rights of the firm's clients will be asserted or negotiated \"). It is our opinion, however, that applying the lists of tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 in a categorical manner runs risks of both over regulation and under regulation of the use of nonlawyers and, thereby, risks both the loss of the efficiency nonlawyers can provide and the loss of adequate protection of the public from unauthorized practice. Rather than being applied categorically, these lists should instead be considered good general guidance for the more particular determination of whether the representation of the client has been turned over, effectively, to the nonlawyer by the lawyer permitting a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own. If such substitution has occurred then the lawyer is aiding the nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whether or not the conduct is proscribed by any list.\nThe question of whether the lawyer has permitted a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own is adequate, we believe, for guidance to attorneys in determining what can and cannot be delegated to nonlawyers. Our task, here, however, is broader than just giving guidance. We must also be concerned in issuing this opinion with the protection of the public interest in avoiding unauthorized practice, and we must be aware of the use of this opinions by various bar organizations, such as the State Disciplinary Board, for determining when there has been a violation of a Standard of Conduct.\nFor the purposes of enforcement, as opposed to guidance, it is not adequate to say that substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own constitutes a violation of the applicable Standards. The information for determining what supervision was given to the nonlawyer, that is, what was and was not a substitution of legal knowledge and judgment, will always be within the control of the attorney alleged to have violated the applicable Standards. To render this guidance enforceable, therefore, it is necessary to find a violation of the Standards prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own.\n Thus, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer creates a reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, lawyers should never place nonlawyers in situations in which the nonlawyer is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nor should a nonlawyer be placed in situations in which decisions must be made for the lawyer's client or advice given to the lawyer's client based on the nonlawyer's legal knowledge, rather than that of the lawyer. Finally, nonlawyers should not be placed in situations in which the nonlawyer, rather than the lawyer, is called upon to argue the client's position. Nothing in these limitations precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\"> 5 </a>\nIn addition to assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by creating the reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer was substituting a nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for his or her own, a lawyer permitting this would also be misrepresenting the nature of the services provided and the nature of the representation in violation of Standards of Conduct 4 and 5. In those circumstances where nonlawyer representation is specifically authorized by regulation, statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, it must be made clear to the client that they will be receiving nonlawyer representation and not representation by a lawyer.\nApplying this analysis to the question presented, if by \"prepare and sign \"it is meant that the legal advice to be given to the client is advice based upon the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer, it is clear that the representation would effectively be representation by a nonlawyer rather than by the retained lawyer. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to do this would be in violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would also be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because by doing so he or she creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\nFor public policy reasons it is important that the legal profession restrict its use of nonlawyers to those uses that would improve the quality, including the efficiency and cost-efficiency, of legal representation rather than using nonlawyers as substitutes for legal representation. Lawyers, as professionals, are ultimately responsible for maintaining the quality of the legal conversation in both the prevention and the resolution of disputes. This professional responsibility cannot be delegated to others without jeopardizing the good work that lawyers have done throughout history in meeting this responsibility.\n Footnotes \n<a name=\"1\">1.</a> The term \"nonlawyer \"includes paralegals. \n<a name=\"2\">2.</a> See footnote 5 infra. \n<a name=\"3\">3.</a> In addition to those opinions discussed in this opinion, there are two other Advisory Opinions concerning the prohibition on assisting the unauthorized practice of law. In Advisory Opinion No. 23, the State Disciplinary Board was asked if an out-of-state law firm could open and maintain an office in the State of Georgia under the direction of a full-time associate of that firm who was a member of the State Bar of Georgia. In determining that it could, the Board warned about the possibility that the local attorney would be assisting the nonlicensed lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. In Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5, an Opinion issued by the Supreme Court, the Board was asked if it would be improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. The Board determined that it would be if the responsibility for \"closing \"was delegated to the nonlawyer without participation by the attorney. We view the holding of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 as consistent with the Opinion issued here. \n<a name=\"4\">4.</a> The language relied upon from Huber v. State was later codified in O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. \n<a name=\"5\">5.</a> For example, it is perfectly permissible for a nonlawyer, employed as a paralegal by a law firm or by a non-profit corporation, such as the Georgia Legal Service Program, doing business as a law firm, to represent his or her own clients whenever paralegal representation is permitted by law, as it would be if the representation were on a food stamp problem at an administrative hearing, or before the Social Security Administration, or in other circumstances where a statute or the authorized rules of the adjudicatory body specifically allow for and regulate representation or counsel by persons other than a lawyer. It must be made clear to the clients, of course, that what they will be receiving is paralegal representation and not representation by a lawyer. Nothing in this opinion is intended to conflict with regulation, by statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, of use of nonlawyers in such authorized roles.","UrlName":"rule466","Order":60,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[{"Id":"eaaaecc8-1e76-4e5a-9526-a3cbadc0ad19","ParentId":"a1dae58c-d3c7-4e94-aa69-a190cd06e723","Title":"Version 2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 00-2 \n For references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1(a) and (c)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a> and Comments [1] and [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> .\n For references to EC 3-2, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule62\">Rule 2.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-6, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nIs a lawyer aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n Yes, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. Generally, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer effectively substitutes the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, a lawyer should never place a nonlawyer in situations in which he or she is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nothing in this limitation precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\nIn order to enforce this limitation in the public interest, it is necessary to find a violation of the provisions prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own in the representation of the lawyer's client.\nAs applied to the specific questions presented, a lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to give legal advice to the lawyer's client based on the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer rather than the lawyer, would be in clear violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because doing so creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\n OPINION:\n This request for a Formal Advisory Opinion was submitted by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board along with examples of numerous grievances regarding this issue recently considered by the Panel. Essentially, the request prompts the Formal Advisory Opinion Board to return to previously issued advisory opinions on the subject of the use of nonlawyers to see if the guidance of those previous opinions remains valid for current practice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a>\nThe primary disciplinary standard involved in answering the question presented is: Standard 24, (\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\") As will become clear in this Opinion, however, Standard 4 (\"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation.\") and Standard 5 (\"A lawyer shall not make any false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.\") are also involved.\nIn interpreting these disciplinary standards as applied to the question presented, we are guided by Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law,\"and, more specifically, the following Ethical Considerations: Ethical Consideration 3-2, Ethical Consideration 3-5, and Ethical Consideration 3-6.\n In Advisory Opinion No. 19, an Opinion issued before the creation of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and the issuance of advisory opinions by the Supreme Court, the State Disciplinary Board addressed the propriety of Georgia lawyers permitting nonlawyer employees to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm's letterhead under the nonlawyer's signature. The Board said that in determining the propriety of this conduct it must first define the practice of law in Georgia. In doing so, it relied upon the very broad language of a then recent Georgia Supreme Court opinion, Huber v. State , 234 Ga. 458 (1975), which included within the definition of the practice \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law,\"to conclude that the conduct in question, regardless of whether a law suit was pending, constituted the practice of law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\"> 4 </a> Any lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to engage in this conduct would be assisting in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, the Board said. The Board specifically limited this prohibition, however, to letters addressed to adverse or potentially adverse parties that, in essence, threatened or implied a threat of litigation. Furthermore, the Board noted that there was a broad range of activities, including investigating, taking statements from clients and other witnesses, conducting legal research, preparing legal documents (under \"direct supervision of the member \"), and performing administrative, secretarial, or clerical duties that were appropriate for nonlawyers. In the course of performing these activities, nonlawyers could correspond on the firm's letterhead under their own signature. This was permitted as long as the nonlawyer clearly identified his or her status as a nonlawyer in a manner that would avoid misleading the recipient into thinking that the nonlawyer was authorized to practice law.\nWhatever the merits of the answer to the particular question presented, this Opinion's general approach to the issue, i.e., does the conduct of the nonlawyer, considered outside of the context of supervision by a licensed lawyer, appear to fit the broad legal definition of the practice of law, would have severely limited the role of lawyer-supervised nonlawyers to what might be described as in-house and investigatory functions. This Opinion was followed two years later, however, by Advisory Opinion No. 21, an Opinion in which the State Disciplinary Board adopted a different approach.\nThe specific question presented in Advisory Opinion No. 21 was: \"What are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legal assistants or paraprofessionals and permit them to deal with other lawyers, clients, and the public?\"After noting the very broad legal definition of the practice of law in Georgia, the Board said that the issue was instead one of \"strict adherence to a program of supervision and direction of a nonlawyer.\"\nThis insight, an insight we reaffirm in this Opinion, was that the legal issue of what constitutes the practice of law should be separated from the issue of when does the practice of law by an attorney become the practice of law by a nonlawyer because of a lack of involvement by the lawyer in the representation. Under this analysis, it is clear that while most activities conducted by nonlawyers for lawyers are within the legal definition of the practice of law, in that these activities are \"action[s] taken for others in . . . matter[s] connected with the law,\"lawyers are assisting in the unauthorized practice of law only when they inappropriately delegate tasks to a nonlawyer or inadequately supervise appropriately delegated tasks.\nImplicitly suggesting that whether or not a particular task should be delegated to a nonlawyer was too contextual a matter both for effective discipline and for guidance, the Disciplinary Board provided a list of specific tasks that could be safely delegated to nonlawyers \"provided that proper and effective supervision and control by the attorney exists.\"The Board also provided a list of tasks that should not be delegated, apparently without regard to the potential for supervision and control that existed.\nWere we to determine that the lists of delegable and non-delegable tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 fully governed the question presented here, it would be clear that a lawyer would be aiding the unauthorized practice if the lawyer permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to clients providing legal advice (because it would be \"contact with clients . . . requiring the rendering of legal advice) or permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons threatening legal action (because it would be \"contacting an opposite party or his counsel in a situation in which legal rights of the firm's clients will be asserted or negotiated \"). It is our opinion, however, that applying the lists of tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 in a categorical manner runs risks of both over regulation and under regulation of the use of nonlawyers and, thereby, risks both the loss of the efficiency nonlawyers can provide and the loss of adequate protection of the public from unauthorized practice. Rather than being applied categorically, these lists should instead be considered good general guidance for the more particular determination of whether the representation of the client has been turned over, effectively, to the nonlawyer by the lawyer permitting a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own. If such substitution has occurred then the lawyer is aiding the nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whether or not the conduct is proscribed by any list.\nThe question of whether the lawyer has permitted a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own is adequate, we believe, for guidance to attorneys in determining what can and cannot be delegated to nonlawyers. Our task, here, however, is broader than just giving guidance. We must also be concerned in issuing this opinion with the protection of the public interest in avoiding unauthorized practice, and we must be aware of the use of this opinions by various bar organizations, such as the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board, for determining when there has been a violation of a Standard of Conduct.\nFor the purposes of enforcement, as opposed to guidance, it is not adequate to say that substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own constitutes a violation of the applicable Standards. The information for determining what supervision was given to the nonlawyer, that is, what was and was not a substitution of legal knowledge and judgment, will always be within the control of the attorney alleged to have violated the applicable Standards. To render this guidance enforceable, therefore, it is necessary to find a violation of the Standards prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own.\n Thus, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer creates a reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, lawyers should never place nonlawyers in situations in which the nonlawyer is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nor should a nonlawyer be placed in situations in which decisions must be made for the lawyer's client or advice given to the lawyer's client based on the nonlawyer's legal knowledge, rather than that of the lawyer. Finally, nonlawyers should not be placed in situations in which the nonlawyer, rather than the lawyer, is called upon to argue the client's position. Nothing in these limitations precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\"> 5 </a>\nIn addition to assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by creating the reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer was substituting a nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for his or her own, a lawyer permitting this would also be misrepresenting the nature of the services provided and the nature of the representation in violation of Standards of Conduct 4 and 5. In those circumstances where nonlawyer representation is specifically authorized by regulation, statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, it must be made clear to the client that they will be receiving nonlawyer representation and not representation by a lawyer.\nApplying this analysis to the question presented, if by \"prepare and sign \"it is meant that the legal advice to be given to the client is advice based upon the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer, it is clear that the representation would effectively be representation by a nonlawyer rather than by the retained lawyer. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to do this would be in violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would also be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because by doing so he or she creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\nFor public policy reasons it is important that the legal profession restrict its use of nonlawyers to those uses that would improve the quality, including the efficiency and cost-efficiency, of legal representation rather than using nonlawyers as substitutes for legal representation. Lawyers, as professionals, are ultimately responsible for maintaining the quality of the legal conversation in both the prevention and the resolution of disputes. This professional responsibility cannot be delegated to others without jeopardizing the good work that lawyers have done throughout history in meeting this responsibility.\n Footnotes \n<a name=\"1\">1.</a> The term \"nonlawyer \"includes paralegals. \n<a name=\"2\">2.</a> See footnote 5 infra. \n<a name=\"3\">3.</a> In addition to those opinions discussed in this opinion, there are two other Advisory Opinions concerning the prohibition on assisting the unauthorized practice of law. In Advisory Opinion No. 23, the State Disciplinary Board was asked if an out-of-state law firm could open and maintain an office in the State of Georgia under the direction of a full-time associate of that firm who was a member of the State Bar of Georgia. In determining that it could, the Board warned about the possibility that the local attorney would be assisting the nonlicensed lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. In Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5, an Opinion issued by the Supreme Court, the Board was asked if it would be improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. The Board determined that it would be if the responsibility for \"closing \"was delegated to the nonlawyer without participation by the attorney. We view the holding of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 as consistent with the Opinion issued here. \n<a name=\"4\">4.</a> The language relied upon from Huber v. State was later codified in O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. \n<a name=\"5\">5.</a> For example, it is perfectly permissible for a nonlawyer, employed as a paralegal by a law firm or by a non-profit corporation, such as the Georgia Legal Service Program, doing business as a law firm, to represent his or her own clients whenever paralegal representation is permitted by law, as it would be if the representation were on a food stamp problem at an administrative hearing, or before the Social Security Administration, or in other circumstances where a statute or the authorized rules of the adjudicatory body specifically allow for and regulate representation or counsel by persons other than a lawyer. It must be made clear to the clients, of course, that what they will be receiving is paralegal representation and not representation by a lawyer. Nothing in this opinion is intended to conflict with regulation, by statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, of use of nonlawyers in such authorized roles.","UrlName":"revision304"}],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c57a6dbd-832f-47f2-bf00-9921847be770","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-3","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 00-3 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nEthical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites. \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 explains that a lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to \"close \"the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 also provides that \"Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.\"The lawyer's physical presence at a closing will assure that there is supervision of the work of the paralegal which is direct and constant. \n \nOPINION: \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 (86-R9) issued by the Supreme Court states that the closing of real estate transactions constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. Therefore, it is ethically improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. Correspondent inquires whether it is ethically permissible to allow a paralegal to be physically present at a remote site for the purpose of witnessing signatures and assuring that documents are signed properly. The paralegal announces to the borrower that they are there to assist the attorney in the closing process. The lawyer is contacted by telephone by the paralegal during the closing to discuss the legal aspects of the closing. \n \nThe critical issue in this inquiry is what constitutes the participation of the attorney in the closing transaction. The lawyer must be in control of the closing process from beginning to end. The supervision of the paralegal must be direct and constant. \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 states that \"If the 'closing' is defined as the entire series of events through which title to the land is conveyed from one party to another party, it would be ethically improper for a nonlawyer to 'close' a real estate transaction.\"Under the circumstances described by the correspondent, the participation of the lawyer is less than meaningful. The lawyer is not in control of the actual closing processing from beginning to end. The lawyer is brought into the closing process after it has already begun. Even though the paralegal may state that they are not a lawyer and is not there for the purpose of giving legal advice, circumstances may arise where one involved in this process as a purchaser, seller or lender would look to the paralegal for advice and/or explanations normally provided by a lawyer. This is not permissible. \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 provides that \"Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.\"By allowing a paralegal to appear at closings at remote sites at which lawyers are present only by telephone conference will obviously increase the likelihood that the paralegal may be placed in circumstances where the paralegal is actually providing legal advice or explanations, or exercising independent judgement as to whether legal advice or explanation is required. \n \nStandard 24 is not met by the lawyer being called on the telephone during the course of the closing process for the purpose of responding to questions or reviewing documents. The lawyer's physical presence at a closing will assure that there is supervision of the work of the paralegal which is direct and constant.","UrlName":"rule447","Order":61,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ac45d0cc-215b-4970-b298-1548b9c16986","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 01-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA ON MAY 3, 2001 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 01-1 \n \n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(b)</a> is recited in this opinion; however, on November 3, 2011, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(b)</a> was amended by the Supreme Court of Georgia and now reads as follows:\n“The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.”\nThe amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion.\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \n    Is it ethically permissible for an attorney, with or without notice to a client, to charge for a standard time unit without regard to how much time is actually expended? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \n    A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee. \n \n OPINION: \n \n    Given the proper resources, equipment and effort, time can be measured with infinitesimal precision. As a practical matter, however, clients routinely require only sufficient precision in attorney billings to determine reasonableness and fairness, and this would not normally necessitate a level of precision in recording the time expended by an attorney that would require hair-splitting accuracy. It is the practice of many attorneys to bill on a time-expended basis, and to bill for time expended by rounding to standard units of from 6 to 15 minutes. This gives rise to the possibility that a lawyer could spend one minute on a client matter, and bill the client for 15 minutes. While \"rounding up \"is permissible, see, e.g., ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 (December 6, 1993), repeatedly rounding up from one minute to fifteen minutes is questionable at best and would raise substantial issues as to whether the fee was reasonable under Rule 1.5(a), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See also Rule 1.5(a) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer could avoid a challenge to rounded up fees as excessive by using a smaller minimum unit (a six minute unit is preferable), and only rounding up if more than half that time was actually expended. See Ross, The Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time-Based Billing by Attorneys (Carolina Academic Press: 1996), p. 169. \n \n    It must be noted that even this practice, billing in six minute units but only billing a unit if more than three minutes was expended, results in the attorney billing for time not actually expended on the client matter. Rule 1.5(b), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, provides:\nWhen the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.\n In order to comply with Rule 1.5(b), the lawyer must take care to clarify to the client the basis for the billing. To simply inform a client that the lawyer would bill on a time expended basis, without explaining any standard unit billing practice, would not be a clear communication of the basis for the fee. \n \n    In addition, we note that Rule 7.1(a)(1), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, governs \"Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services \", and provides: \n \n    [A] communication is false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading it if:\n(1) ...omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.\n Comment 1 to Rule 7.1 provides that Rule 7.1 to applies to \"all communications about a lawyer's services....\" \n \n    To simply inform a client that the lawyer would bill on a time expended basis, without explaining any standard unit billing practice, would omit a fact necessary to make the statement as a whole not materially misleading, and would violate Rule 7.1 (a). \n \n    To insure a clear understanding between the attorney and the client, the attorney should provide the client with an explanation in writing of the basis for the fee. Rule 1.5(b), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See also Rule 1.5(b) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In order to comply with Rule 1.5(b), the attorney must communicate the basis for the fee to the client, and in order to comply with Rule 7.1(a), the communication must include an explanation of any standard unit billing practice.","UrlName":"rule467","Order":62,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2e2e3b18-70d9-4bec-8e51-fbb7027d87a4","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 03-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \n PURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2003 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 03-1 \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nMay a Georgia attorney contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \nA Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as:  1) the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) to refund \"any advance payment of fee that has not been earned \"upon termination of the representation by the attorney or by the client; and 2) the contracted for fee, as well as any resulting fee upon termination, does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness.\n OPINION: \nThis issue is governed primarily by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(d) which provides:  \"Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests such as . . . refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.\"\n A special retainer is a contract for representation obligating a client to pay fees in advance for specified services to be provided by an attorney.  This definition applies regardless of the manner of determining the amount of the fee or the terminology used to designate the fee, e.g., hourly fee, percentage fee, flat fee, fixed fees, or minimum fees.  Generally, fees paid in advance under a special retainer are earned as the specified services are provided.  Some services, for example, the services of the attorney's commitment to the client's case and acceptance of potential disqualification from other representations, are provided as soon as the contract is signed <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> .  The portion of the fee reasonably allocated to these services is, therefore, earned immediately.  These fees, and any other fees that have been earned by providing specified services to the client, need not be refunded to the client.  In this sense, a special retainer can be made non-refundable.\nIn Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2 (FAO 91-2), we said:\n\"Terminology as to the various types of fee arrangements does not alter the fact that the lawyer is a fiduciary.  Therefore, the lawyer's duties as to fees should be uniform and governed by the same rules regardless of the particular fee arrangement.  Those duties are . . . :  1) To have a clear understanding with the client as to the details of the fee arrangement prior to undertaking the representation, preferably in writing.  2) To return to the client any unearned portion of a fee.  3) To accept the client's dismissal of him or her (with or without cause) without imposing any penalty on the client for the dismissal.  4) To comply with the provisions of Standard 31 as to reasonableness of the fee.\"\nThe same Formal Advisory Opinion citing In the Matter of Collins, 246 Ga. 325 (1980), states:\n \"The law is well settled that a client can dismiss a lawyer for any reason or for no reason, and the lawyer has a duty to return any unearned portion of the fee.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a>\nContracts to violate the ethical requirements upon which FAO 91-2 was based are not permitted, because those requirements are now expressed in Rule 1.16(d) and Rule 1.5(a).  Moreover, attorneys should take care to avoid misrepresentation concerning their obligation to return unearned fees upon termination.\nThe ethical obligation to refund unearned fees, however, does not prohibit an attorney from designating by contract points in a representation at which specific advance fees payments under a special retainer will have been earned, so long as this is done in good faith and not as an attempt to penalize a client for termination of the representation by refusing to refund unearned fees or otherwise avoid the requirements of Rule 1.16(d), and the resulting fee is reasonable.  Nor does this obligation call in to question the use of flat fees, minimum fees, or any other form of advance fee payment so long as such fees when unearned are refunded to the client upon termination of the representation by the client or by the attorney.  It also does not require that fees be determined on an hourly basis.  Nor need an attorney place any fees into a trust account absent special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of the client.  See Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2.  Additionally, this obligation does not restrict the non-refundability of fees for any reason other than whether they have been earned upon termination.  Finally, there is nothing in this obligation that prohibits an attorney from contracting for large fees for excellent work done quickly.  When the contracted for work is done, however quickly it may have been done, the fees have been earned and there is no issue as to their non-refundability.  Of course, such fees, like all fee agreements, are subject to Rule 1.5, which provides that the reasonableness of a fee shall be determined by the following factors:\n(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;\n(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;\n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;\n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;\n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;\n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.\n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and\n(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.\n The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2003 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on August 7, 2003.  The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August 21, 2003.  No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion.  In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. \n <a name=\"ftn1\"> [1] </a> The \"likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer \"is a factor the attorney must consider in determining the reasonableness of a fee under Rule 1.5.  This preclusion, therefore, should be considered part of the service the attorney is providing to the client by agreeing to enter into the representation.\n <a name=\"ftn2\"> [2] </a> Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2.         \n","UrlName":"rule532","Order":63,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"584715c9-9860-4b38-a411-02ff8b2244d6","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 03-3","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON JANUARY 6, 2004 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 03-3 \n \n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. The amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion.\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \n    Is it ethically permissible for an attorney to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \n    While it may be possible to structure a solicitation agreement to comply with ethical requirements, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to attempt to do so.  In addition to numerous other ethical concerns, Rule 1.7 Conflicts of Interest: General Rule, would require at a minimum that a \"solicitation agreement \"providing referral fees to the attorney be disclosed to the client in writing in a manner sufficient to permit the client to give informed consent to the personal interest conflict created by the agreement after having the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.  Comment 6 to Rule 1.7 provides: \"A lawyer may not allow related business interest to affect representation by, for example, referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed business interest.\"Additionally, the terms of the \"solicitation agreement \"must be such that the lawyer will exercise his or her independent professional judgment in deciding whether or not to refer a particular client to the financial investment adviser.  Prudentially, this would require the lawyer to document each referral in such a way as to be able to demonstrate that the referral choice was not dictated by the lawyer's financial interests but by the merits of the institution to whom the client was referred.  The agreement must not obligate the attorney to reveal confidential information to the adviser absent the consent of the client; the fees paid to the attorney under the agreement must not be structured in such a way as to create a financial interest adverse to the client or otherwise adversely affect the client, and the agreement must itself be in compliance with other laws the violation of which would be a violation of Rule 8.4 Misconduct, especially those laws concerning the regulation of securities enforceable by criminal sanctions.  This is not an exhaustive list of ethical requirements in that the terms of particular agreements may generate other ethical concerns. \n \nOPINION: \n \n    \"Anytime a lawyer's financial or property interests could be affected by advice the lawyer gives a client, the lawyer had better watch out.\"ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct 51:405.  In the circumstances described in the Question Presented, a lawyer, obligated to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client in deciding if a referral is appropriate and deciding to whom to make the referral, would be in a situation in which his or her financial interests would be affected by the advice given.  This conflict between the obligation of independent professional judgment and the lawyer's financial interest is governed by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 which provides, in relevant part, that:\n (A) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests . . . will materially or adversely affect the representation of the client . . . . \n \n    The Committee is guided in its interpretation of this provision in these circumstances by Comment 6 to Rule 1.7: \n \nA lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.\n \n    Under Rule 1.7, client consent to such a personal interest conflict is permissible after: \"(1) consultation with the lawyer, (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the materials risks of the representation, and (3) having been given an opportunity to consult with independent counsel.\"Thus, at a minimum, a \"solicitation agreement \"providing referral fees to the attorney would have to be disclosed to the client in writing in a manner sufficient to permit the client to give informed consent to the personal interest conflict created by the agreement after having the opportunity to consult with independent counsel. \n \n     In addition to this minimum requirement, there are numerous other ethical obligations that would dictate the permitted terms of such an agreement.  The following obligations are offered as a non-exhaustive list of examples for the terms of particular agreements may generate other ethical concerns. \n \n    1)  The agreement must not bind the attorney to make referrals or to make referrals only to the adviser for such an obligation would be inconsistent with the attorney's obligation to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client in determining whether a referral is appropriate and to whom the client should be referred.  Both determinations must always be  made only in consideration of the client's best interests.  Prudentially, this would require the lawyer to document each referral in such a way as to be able to demonstrate that the referral choice was not dictated by the lawyer's financial interests but by the merits of the institution to whom the client was referred.  In order to be able to do this well the lawyer would need to stay abreast of the quality and cost of services provided by other similar financial institutions. \n \n    2)  The agreement cannot restrict the information the attorney can provide the client concerning a referral by requiring, for example, the attorney to use only materials prepared or approved by the adviser.  Such a restriction is not only inconsistent with the attorney's obligations to exercise independent professional judgment but also with the attorney's obligations under Rule 1.4 Communications concerning the attorney's obligation to provide information to clients sufficient for informed decision making. \n \n    3)  The agreement cannot obligate the attorney to provide confidential information, as defined in Rule 1.6 Confidentiality, to the adviser absent client consent. \n \n    4)  The fees paid to the attorney for the referral cannot be structured in such a way as to create a financial interest or other interest adverse to the client.  Rule 1.8 Conflicts of Interest: Prohibited Transactions provides \". . . nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client . . .\" \n \n    5)  Finally, any such agreement would have to be in compliance with other laws the violations of which could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4 Misconduct.  For example, the agreement may not violate any of the legal or administrative regulations governing trading in securities enforceable by criminal sanctions. \n \n    Thus, while it may be possible to structure a solicitation agreement to comply with ethical requirements, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to attempt to do so. \n \n \n    The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2003 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on August 7, 2003. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August 21, 2003. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. ","UrlName":"rule534","Order":64,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"45c117b6-5506-46bb-964e-9d539032442c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1","Content":"FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 04-1 Approved And Issued On February 13, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia With Comments <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-041.pdf?sfvrsn=c065786b_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S05U1720</a> COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAWe grant a petition for discretionary review brought by the State Bar of Georgia to consider the proposed opinion of the Formal Advisory Board1 (hereinafter \"Board \") that, if an attorney supervises the closing of a real estate transaction conducted by a non-lawyer entity, the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and the closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with the trust account and IOLTA provisions of Rule 1.15(II) of Bar Rule 4-102(d) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.  Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1 (August 6, 2004).  See State Bar Rule 4-403(d) (authorizing this Court to grant a petition for discretionary review).2 For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Board that a lawyer directing the closing of a real estate transaction holds money which belongs to another (either a client or a third-party) as an incident to that practice, and must keep that money in an IOLTA account.  We further add that if the proceeds are not subject to the rules of IOLTA subsection (c)(2), then the funds must be deposited in an interest-bearing account for the client's benefit.  Rule 1.15(II)(c)(1).  Under no circumstances may the closing proceeds be commingled with funds belonging to the lawyer, the law office, or any entity other than as explicitly provided in the Rule.The matter came before the Board pursuant to a request for an advisory opinion on the following question:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">May a lawyer participate in a non-lawyer entity created by the lawyer for the purpose of conducting residential real estate closings where the closing proceeds received by the entity are deposited in a non-IOLTA interest bearing bank trust account rather than an IOLTA account?</div>The opinion first appeared in the June 2004 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal.  In response, the Board received comments both in support of and in opposition to the opinion.  The modified opinion appeared in the October 2004 Georgia Bar Journal, and the State Bar thereafter sought discretionary review.The closing of a real estate transaction in this State constitutes the practice of law, and, if performed by someone other than a duly-licensed Georgia attorney, results in the prohibited unlicensed practice of law.  In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 277 Ga. 472 (588 SE2d 741) (2003).  The attorney participating in the closing is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds, which must be handled in accordance with the trust account and IOLTA provisions in Rule 1.15(II).3 Specifically, when a lawyer holds client funds in trust, the lawyer must make an initial determination whether the funds are eligible for the IOLTA program.  Closing proceeds from a real estate transaction which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time (i.e., funds that cannot otherwise generate net earnings for the client) must be deposited into an Interest on Lawyer's Trust Account (IOLTA Account).  Funds that are not nominal in amount or funds, no matter what amount, that are not to be held for a short period of time, are ineligible for placement in an IOLTA account and must be placed in an interest-bearing account, with the net interest generated paid to the client.  Rule 1.15(II)(c).  See also Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (155 LE2d 376, 123 SC 1406) (2003).  Under either circumstance, Rule 1.15(II) instructs that a lawyer involved in a closing has a strict fiduciary duty to deposit a client's real estate closing proceeds in a separate IOLTA or non-IOLTA interest bearing trust account.The Board's recognition that, under all circumstances, the interest generated on the client's closing funds is governed by Rule 1.15(II), ensures full compliance where real estate closings are involved.  Accordingly, we adopt Formal Advisory Opinion 04-1 to the extent it is in accord with the rule that attorneys must place client closing proceeds that are nominal or held for a short period of time in an IOLTA account.  We clarify that closing proceeds that are more than nominal in amount or that will be deposited for more than a short period of time must be placed in a non-IOLTA interest bearing account with interest payable to the client.  Rule 1.15(II)(c)(1).Formal Advisory Opinion approved, as modified.  All the Justices concur.<hr align=\"left\" width=\"33%\" size=\"1\">1. State Bar Rule 4-403(a) authorizes the Formal Advisory Opinion Board to draft proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning the proper interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.2. Formal Advisory Opinion Board opinions, which are approved or modified by this Court, are \"binding on all members of the State Bar.\"State Bar Rule 4-403(e).3. The sole issue addressed in the proposed opinion is whether an attorney may participate in a non-lawyer entity which the attorney created for the purpose of conducting residential real estate closings without depositing the closing proceeds in an IOLTA account.FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 04-1Question Presented: May a lawyer participate in a non-lawyer entity created by the lawyer for the purpose of conducting residential real estate closings where the closing proceeds received by the entity are deposited in a non-IOLTA interest bearing bank trust account rather than an IOLTA account?Summary Answer: The closing of a real estate transaction constitutes the practice of law.  If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15 (II).  If the attorney does not supervise the closings, then, under the facts set forth above, the lawyer is assisting a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.Opinion: The closing of a real estate transaction in the state of Georgia constitutes the practice of law.  See, In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. 472, 588 S.E. 2d 741 (Nov. 10, 2003), O.C.G.A. §15-19-50 and Formal Advisory Opinions Nos. 86-5 and 00-3.  Thus, to the extent that a non-lawyer entity is conducting residential real estate closings not under the supervision of a lawyer, the non-lawyer entity is engaged in the practice of law.  If an attorney supervises the residential closing <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\"> [1] </a> , then that attorney is a fiduciary with respects to the closing proceeds.  If the attorney participates in but does not supervise the closings, then the non-lawyer entity is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  In such event, the attorney assisting the non-lawyer entity would be doing so in violation of Rule 5.5 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\"> [2] </a>When a lawyer is supervising a real estate closing, the lawyer is professionally responsible for such closings.  Any closing funds received by the lawyer or by persons or entities supervised by the lawyer are held by the lawyer as a fiduciary.  The lawyer's responsibility with regard to such funds is addressed by Rule 1.15 (II) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct which states in relevant part:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - GENERAL <div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(a) Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available a trust account as required by these Rules.  All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from such account.* * * * *(c) All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(1) With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15(III)(c)(1), with the interest to be paid to the client.  No earnings from such an account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.(2) With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) in compliance with the following provisions:* * * * *</div></div></div>As set out in Subsection (c)(2) above, this Rule applies to all client funds which are nominal or are to be held for a short period of time.  As closing proceeds are not nominal in amount, but are to be held for only a short period of time, they are subject to the IOLTA provisions.  Therefore, the funds received in connection with the real estate closing conducted by the lawyer or the non-lawyer entity in the circumstances described above must be deposited into an IOLTA compliant account.<hr align=\"left\" width=\"33%\" size=\"1\"><a name=\"_ftn1\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">1.</a> Adequate supervision would require the lawyer to be present at the closing.  See FAO . . . .etc.<a name=\"_ftn2\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">2.</a> Rule 5.5 states in relevant part that:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW  A lawyer shall not: * * * * * *(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.</div> ","UrlName":"rule448","Order":65,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"17c4efaa-3729-4d7d-8769-425ee4dc9b18","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-2","Content":"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-2 Approved And Issued On April 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule525\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">FAO No. 90-1</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-052.pdf?sfvrsn=bbd66b45_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0791</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     \"Hold Harmless \"Agreements Between Employers and Their In-House Counsel.     Whether an attorney employed in-house by a corporation may enter into an agreement by which his or her employer shall hold the attorney harmless for malpractice committed in the course of his employment. SUMMARY ANSWER:     \"Hold harmless \"agreements between employers and attorneys employed in-house are ethical if the employer is exercising an informed business judgment in utilizing the \"hold harmless \"agreement in lieu of malpractice insurance on the advice of counsel and the agreement is permitted by law. OPINION:\n     Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h) offers the following direction:     \"A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement . . . .\"\nThis rule seeks to prevent attorneys from taking advantage of clients and avoiding the removal of negative consequences for malpractice. See, Opinion 193 (D.C. 1989). Neither of these policies would be well served by prohibiting the use of \"hold harmless \"agreements between employers and attorneys employed in house if the employer is exercising an informed business judgment in utilizing the \"hold harmless \"agreement in lieu of malpractice insurance and doing so on the advise of any counsel other than the counsel being employed.  Consultation with in-house counsel satisfies the requirement of the rule.  First, the position of the client as employer, and the sophistication of those who employ in house counsel, eliminates almost all overreaching concerns. Secondly, the lawyer as employee does not avoid the negative consequences of malpractice because he or she is subject to being discharged by the employer. Apparently, discharge is preferred by employers of in house counsel to malpractice suits as a remedy for negligent performance. See, Opinion 193 (D.C. 1989).     Accordingly, we conclude that \"hold harmless \"agreements are ethical when an employer of in house counsel makes an informed business judgment that such an agreement is preferable to employee malpractice insurance, is done on the advice of counsel, and is permitted by law.  The determination of whether such agreements are permitted by law is not within the scope of  this Opinion.  Finally, we note that the proposed \"hold harmless \"agreement does not limit liability to third parties affected by in house counsel representation.  Instead, the agreement shifts the responsibility for employee conduct from an insurance carrier to the organization as a self insurer.\n","UrlName":"rule453","Order":66,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f2f84f41-0470-4657-aa2e-22cd66687968","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-3","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-3 Approved And Issued On April 26, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule526\">FAO No. 90-2</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-053.pdf?sfvrsn=9f662036_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0795</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk appearing as an attorney before his or her present employer-judge. SUMMARY ANSWER:     The representation of clients by a law clerk before a present employer-judge is a violation of Rule 1.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. OPINION:     This question involves an application of Rule 1.7 governing personal interest conflicts.  Rule 1.7 provides:(a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b). (b) If client consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected or former client consents, preferably in writing, to the representation after: (1) consultation with the lawyer, (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation, and (3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel. (c) Client consent is not permissible if the representation: (1) is prohibited by law or these rules;  . . . (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.     There are two threats to professional judgment posed when  a law clerk undertakes to represent a client before the judge by whom the law clerk is also currently employed.  The first is that the lawyer will be unduly restrained in client representation before the employer-judge.  Comment [6] to Rule 1.7 states that \"the lawyer's personal or economic interest should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.\"And Comment [4] explains that: \"loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interest.  The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.\"     Because of this risk, the representation of clients by a law clerk before an employer-judge is a violation of  Rule 1.7.  Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that for a full-time law clerk concurrently to serve as appointed co-counsel for a criminal defendant before one of the judges by whom the law clerk is employed constitutes an actual conflict of interest depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right of counsel. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a>     Rule 1.7 permits client waiver of personal interest conflicts through client consultation with the lawyer, providing reasonable and adequate written information about the material risks of the representation to the client, and giving the client the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.  This waiver provision must be read consistently with other guidance from the profession.  Because of a second threat to professional judgment, client waiver is impermissible in this situation.  Client waiver is inconsistent with the guidance of Rule 3.5(a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits a lawyer from seeking to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law.  (There is an implication of improper influence in the very fact of the employment of the attorney for one of the parties as the judge's current law clerk. It is also inconsistent with the guidance of Rule 3.5(a) Comment [2] which states,\"If we are to maintain integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law.  The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process.  Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided.  The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety.Accordingly, a part-time law clerk should not seek client waiver of the conflict of interest created by representation of clients before the employer-judge. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\"> [2] </a>A related rule is found in Rule 1.12(b), which states:A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator.  A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator.  In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.Rule 1.12(b) allows a law clerk for a judge to accept employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially with the approval of the judge and prompt written notice to all counsel of record in matters in which the prospective employer of the law clerk is involved.  Rule 1.12 (b) addresses future employment by a judge's law clerk and should not be read to allow a law clerk to represent a party before the judge whom he is currently employed.  Rule 3.5 (a) and Comment [2] to that Rule would prohibit the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality that the close employment relationship between judge and current law clerk would inevitably raise.     This opinion addresses the propriety of the lawyer's conduct under the Georgia Rules of Professional Responsibility.  It does not address the ethical propriety of the same conduct in his or her capacity as part-time clerk.  We do note, however, that many courts have prevented the conduct in question here as a matter of court rules in accord with this opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn3\"> [3] </a> We also note that judicial clerks are often treated as \"other judicial officers \"for the purpose of determining disqualifications and other ethical concerns. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn4\"> [4] </a> Under that treatment, the conduct in question here would be analogous to a request by a part-time judge to practice before his or her own court in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and statutory provisions. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn5\"> [5] </a> See O.C.G.A. § 15-7-21. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn6\">[6]</a> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> 269 Ga. 446, 499 S.E. 2d 897 (1998). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn2\">2.</a> In accord, Advisory Opinion CI-951 (Michigan) (1983).  (Part-time law clerk may not work in any capacity as private counsel on any case pending in employer-judge's circuit and must give notice to clients of his inability to appear in the circuit.) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn3\">3.</a> Sup. Ct. R. 7.  (An employee of the Supreme Court shall not practice as an attorney in any court while employed by the Court.) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn4\">4.</a> See, eg., ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 91:4503 and cases cited therein; see, also, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12 (1984); and Opinion 38 (Georgia 1984) (\"Lawyers and members of the public view a Law Clerk as an extension of the Judge for whom the Clerk works \"). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn5\">5.</a> Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct.  (Part-time judges: (2) should not practice law in the court on which they serve, or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court on which they serve, or act as lawyers in proceedings in which they have served as judges or in any other proceeding related thereto.) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn6\">6.</a> O.C.G.A. § 15-7-21(b).  A part-time judge of the state court may engage in the private practice of law in other courts but may not practice in his own court or appear in any matter as to which that judge has exercised any jurisdiction.","UrlName":"rule455","Order":67,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5a8729aa-cd15-4ad1-982a-0d67bed33fce","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-4","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-4 Approved And Issued On March 19, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia With Comments Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule527\">FAO No. 91-3</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-054.pdf?sfvrsn=a3362275_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0797</a> COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA     We granted a petition for discretionary review brought by the State Bar of Georgia asking the Court to adopt an opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (\"Board \").  At issue is Formal Advisory Opinion (\"FAO \") 05-4, which is a redrafted version of FAO 91-3.  Although both FAO 91-3 and FAO 05-4 address the ethical propriety of a lawyer paying nonlawyer employees a monthly bonus from the gross proceeds of the lawyer's firm, the board reached contrary conclusions in these opinions based on ethical rules in place at the time.  For the reasons which follow, we agree with the board that under current Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4, the payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his or her law office in addition to the nonlawyer employees' regular monthly salary is permissible; and that it is ethically proper to compensate nonlawyer employees pursuant to a plan that is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.     In 1990 this Court issued FAO 91-3 addressing the same issue under former Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102 (and identical Directory Rule 3-102), which, in pertinent part, prohibited a lawyer from sharing fees with a nonlawyer except that \"a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing agreement.\"Former Standard 26 (c).  In 2000 the Court issued the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 2001, to replace the former Standards of Conduct.  Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 supercedes Standard 26 (c) and enlarges the circumstances under which a lawyer or law firm may share legal fees with a nonlawyer. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a> In pertinent part, Rule 5.4 (a) (3) provides:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that . . . . <div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit- sharing arrangement.</div></div> The Board reviewed FAO 91-3 to determine what impact, if any, application of the Rules of Professional Conduct would have on the opinion and concluded that the substance and conclusions reached in FAO 91-3 are no longer in compliance with current ethical considerations. As a result, the board drafted FAO 05-4.  That opinion was published in the April and October 2005 issues of the Georgia Bar Journal; no comments were received in response to the publications, see Rule of Professional Conduct 4-403 (c); and the State Bar sought and was granted discretionary review by this Court.  Rule of Professional Conduct 4-403 (d). The distinction between Rule 5.4 (a) (3) and Standard 26 (c) is that the former permits a nonlawyer employee to participate in both a compensation and retirement plan, whereas the latter permitted nonlawyer compensation only in the context of a retirement plan.  We agree with the board that the support for FAO 91-3 has changed due to the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct and that FA0 91-3 no longer provides an accurate interpretation of the applicable rules of ethics.  In contrast, FAO 05-4 is consistent with current Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 (a) (3) in that it allows compensation to a nonlawyer employee in the form of a monthly bonus paid from the gross receipts of the law firm under the rule that a nonlawyer employee may participate in a compensation plan, even though based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.  Accordingly, we adopt proposed FAO 05-4 and retract FAO 91-3.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\"> [2] </a>Formal Advisory Opinion 05-4 approved. All the Justices concur. <div style=\"text-align: center\">FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-4</div> Question Presented: Ethical propriety of a lawyer paying his nonlawyer employees a monthly bonus from the gross receipts of his law office. Summary Answer: The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his law office in addition to their regular monthly salary is permissible under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.  It is ethically proper for a lawyer to compensate his nonlawyer employees based upon a plan that is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement. Opinion: Correspondent asks whether a lawyer may pay nonlawyer employees a monthly bonus which is a percentage of gross receipts of the law office.Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 necessitates the modification of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-3, which was based largely on Standard No. 26 of Georgia Bar Rule 4-102.  Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 replaces the former standard and provides as follows:<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\">(a)    A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:</div><div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"></div><div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after his death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</div> <div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(2) a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;</div> <div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and</div> <div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(4) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.</div>     Georgia's Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 is analogous to its counterpart in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. In 1980, the ABA amended DR 3-102(A) to add an additional exception regarding the sharing of fees with nonlawyer employees: \"A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit sharing arrangement.\"(emphasis added). ABA DR 3-102(A)(3).  The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are consistent with the ABA's principles of fee sharing with non-attorneys.As the Comment to the Model Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, the policy underlying the limitation on the sharing of fees between lawyer and layperson seeks to protect the lawyer's independent professional judgment. The Comment cautions that if a layperson, not guided by professional obligations, shares an interest in the outcome of the representation of a client, the possibility exists that he or she may influence the attorney's judgment.In light of all of the foregoing, we conclude that the payment of a monthly bonus payable to nonlawyer employees based upon a plan that is in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement does not constitute a sharing of legal fees in violation of Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.<hr> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> Rule 5.4 is now analogous to its counterpart in the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA DR 3-102 (A) (3). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn2\">2.</a> By our approval of FA0 05-4, it becomes \"binding on all members of the State Bar [of Georgia].\"Rules of Professional Conduct 4-403 (e). ","UrlName":"rule456","Order":68,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"165c44b4-73cc-445c-972f-2aa61b908729","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-5","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-5 Approved And Issued On February 13, 2007 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule528\"> FAO No. 92-1 </a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-055.pdf?sfvrsn=6659a864_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0798</a>  QUESTION PRESENTED: 1) Ethical propriety of a law firm obtaining a loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses;2) Ethical considerations applicable to payment of interest charged on loan obtained by law firm to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses. OPINION: Correspondent law firm asks if it is ethically permissible to employ the following system for payment of certain costs and expenses in contingent fee cases. The law firm would set up a draw account with a bank, with the account secured by a note from the firm's individual lawyers. When it becomes necessary to pay court costs, deposition expenses, expert witness fees, or other out-of-pocket litigation expenses, the law firm would obtain an advance under the note. The firm would pay the interest charged by the bank as it is incurred on a monthly or quarterly basis. When a client makes a payment toward expenses incurred in his or her case, the amount of that payment would be paid to the bank to pay down the balance owed on his or her share of expenses advanced under the note. When a case is settled or verdict paid, the firm would pay off the client's share of the money advanced on the loan. If no verdict or settlement is obtained, the firm would pay the balance owed to the bank and bill the client. Some portion of the interest costs incurred in this arrangement would be charged to the client. The contingent fee contract would specify the client's obligations to pay reasonable expenses and interest fees incurred in this arrangement.The first issue is whether it is ethically permissible for lawyers to borrow funds for the purpose of advancing reasonable expenses on their clients' behalf. If so, we must then determine the propriety of charging clients interest to defray part of the expense of the loan.In addressing the first issue, lawyers are generally discouraged from providing financial assistance to their clients. Rule 1.8(e) states:A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or(2) a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</div>Despite that general admonition, contingent fee arrangements are permitted by Rule 1.5(c), which states:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.(2) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(i) the outcome of the matter; and,(ii) if there is a recovery, showing the:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(A) remittance to the client; (B) the method of its determination; (C) the amount of the attorney fee; and (D) if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined. </div></div></div>The correspondent's proposed arrangement covers only those expenses which are permitted under Rule 1.8(e). Paragraph (e) of Rule 1.8 eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer and further limits permitted assistance to cover costs and expenses directly related to litigation. See Comment (4) to Rule 1.8.The arrangement also provides that when any recovery is made on the client's behalf, the recovery would first be debited by the advances made under the note, with payment for those advances being made by the firm directly to the bank. The client thus receives only that recovery which remains after expenses have been paid. The client is informed of this in correspondent's contingent fee contract, which states that \"all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the representation of said claims shall be deducted after division as herein provided to compensate attorney for his fee.\"In the case where recovery is not obtained, however, the lawyers themselves are contractually obligated to pay the amount owed directly to the bank. Correspondent's proposed contract as outlined in the request for this opinion does not inform the client as to possible responsibility for such expenses where there is no recovery. It is the opinion of this Board that Rules 1.5(c) and 1.8(e), taken together, require that the contingent fee contract inform the client whether he is or is not responsible for these expenses, even if there is no recovery.Although the client may remain \"responsible for all or a portion of these expenses,\"decisions regarding the appropriate actions to be taken to deal with such liability are entirely within the discretion of the lawyers. Since this discretion has always existed, the fact that the lawyers have originally borrowed the money instead of advancing it out-of-pocket would seem to be irrelevant, and the arrangement is thus not impermissible.The bank's involvement would be relevant, however, were it allowed to affect the attorney-client relationship, such as if the bank were made privy to clients' confidences or secrets (including client identity) or permitted to affect the lawyer's judgment in representing his or her client. See generally, Rule 1.6. Thus, the lawyer must be careful to make sure that the bank understands that its contractual arrangement can in no way affect or compromise the lawyer's obligations to his or her individual clients.The remaining issue is whether it is ethically permissible for lawyers to charge clients interest on the expenses and costs advanced via this arrangement with the bank. As in the first issue, the fact that the expenses originated with a bank instead of the law firm itself is irrelevant, unless the relationship between lawyer and bank interferes with the relationship between lawyer and client. Assuming it does not, the question is whether lawyers should be permitted to charge their clients interest on advances.In Advisory Opinion No. 45 (March 15, 1985, as amended November 15, 1985), the State Disciplinary Board held that a lawyer may ethically charge interest on clients' overdue bills \"without a prior specific agreement with a client if notice is given to the client in advance that interest will be charged on fee bills which become delinquent after a stated period of time, but not less than 30 days.\"Thus, the Board found no general impropriety in charging interest on overdue bills. There is no apparent reason why advanced expenses for which a client may be responsible under a contingent fee agreement (whether they are billed to the client or deducted from a recovery) should be treated any differently. Thus, we find no ethical impropriety in charging lawful interest on such amounts advanced on the client's behalf. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a>In approving the practice of charging interest on overdue bills, the Board held that a lawyer must comply with \"all applicable law <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a> . . . and ethical considerations.\"The obvious intent of Rule 1.5(c) is to ensure that clients are adequately informed of all relevant aspects of contingent fee arrangements, including all factors taken into account in determining the amount of their ultimate recovery. Since any interest charged on advances could affect the ultimate recovery as much as other factors mentioned in Rule 1.5(c), it would be inconsistent to permit lawyers to charge interest on these advances without revealing the intent to do so in the fee contract. Thus, we conclude that it is permissible to charge interest on such advances only if (i) the client is notified in the contingent fee contract of the maximum rate of interest the lawyer will or may charge on such advances; and (ii) the written statement given to the client upon conclusion of the matter reflects the interest charged on the expenses advanced in the matter.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> The opinion makes specific mention of O.C.G.A. 7-4-16, the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts in Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act as amended (15 USC 1601 et seq.). We state no opinion as to the applicability of these acts or others to the matter at hand.","UrlName":"rule457","Order":69,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d3aa0fac-a8e9-447d-b4ff-50a72bfd7734","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-6","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-6 Approved and Issued On May 3, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule529\"> FAO No. 92-2 </a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-056.pdf?sfvrsn=5bf532e5_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0799</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement. SUMMARY ANSWER:     It is ethically improper for a lawyer to advertise for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement and without complying with the disciplinary standards of conduct applicable to lawyer referral services. OPINION:     Correspondent seeks ethical advice for a practicing attorney who advertises legal services but whose ads do not disclose that a majority of the responding callers will be referred to other lawyers.  The issue is whether the failure to include information about the lawyers referral practices in the ad is misleading in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 7.1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct governing the dissemination of legal services permits a lawyer to \"advertise through all forms of public media...so long as the communication is not a false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.\"A communication is false or misleading if it \"[c]ontains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading,\"Rule 7.1(a)(1).The advertisement of legal services is protected commercial speech under the First Amendment.  Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).  Commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature and prices of products and services.  In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decision-making.  Id. at 364.  Thus, the Court has held that truthful ads including areas of practice which did not conform to the bar's approved list were informative and not misleading and could not be restricted by the state bar.  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).Although actually or inherently misleading advertisements may be prohibited, potentially misleading ads cannot be prohibited if the information in the ad can be presented in a way that is not deceiving.  Gary E. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 2287-2289 (1990). Requiring additional information so as to clarify a potentially misleading communication does not infringe on the attorney's First Amendment.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct balance the lawyer's First Amendment rights with the consumer's interest in accurate information.  In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal.A true statement which omits relevant information is as misleading as a false statement. So, for example, when contingency fees are mentioned in the communication, the fees must be explained.  Rule 7.1(a)(5).  The Rules prohibit communications which are likely to create an unjustified explanation about results the lawyer can achieve or comparison of service unless the comparison can be substantiated.  Rule 7.1(a)(2), (3).The Rules evidence a policy of full disclosure enabling the client to investigate the attorney(s) and the services offered.  Any advertisement must be clearly marked as an ad, unless it is otherwise apparent from the context that it is such a communication and at least one responsible attorney's name must be included.  Rule 7.1(a)(4), (6)(b).  Law firms practicing under a trade name must include names of practicing attorneys.  The firm's trade name cannot imply connections to an organization with which it has no connection.  Rule 7.5(a)(2).  An attorney is prohibited from implying associations with other attorneys when an association does not exist and may state or imply practice in a partnership or other organizations only when that is the fact.  Rule 7.5(d).  These disclosure requirements assure that the public receives accurate information on which to base decisions.Similarly, other jurisdictions have required disclosure of attorney names and professional associations in the advertisement of either legal services or referral services.  A group of attorneys and law firms in the Washington, D.C. area planned to create a private lawyer referral service.  The referral service's advertising campaign was to be handled by a corporation entitled \"The Litigation Group.\"Ads would state that lawyers in the group were willing to represent clients in personal injury matters.  The person answering the telephone calls generated by the ad would refer the caller to one of the member law firms or lawyers.The Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics found the name misleading because it implied the entity was a law firm rather than simply a referral service.  The Committee required the ad include a disclaimer explaining that \"The Litigation Group \"was not a law firm.  Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on legal Ethics, Opinion 1029, 2/1/88.The Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics was presented with facts identical to those presented in Virginia.  The Maryland Committee also required additional information in the ad to indicate the group was not a law firm or single entity providing legal services.  Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics, Opinion 88-65, 2/24/88.Similarly, an opinion by the New York Bar Association prohibited an attorney from using an advertising service which published ads for generic legal services.  Ads for legal services were required to include the names and addresses of participating lawyers and disclose the relationship between the lawyers.  New York Bar Association, Opinion 597, 1/23/89.The situations presented to the Virginia, Maryland and New York committees are analogous to the facts presented here.  The advertiser in all these cases refers a majority of the business generated by the ad, without disclosure.  The ad here does not disclose any association with other attorneys.The advertisement at issue conveys only the offer of legal services by the advertising attorney and no other service or attorney.  The ad does not accurately reflect the attorney's business.  The ad conveys incomplete information regarding referrals, and the omitted information is important to those clients selecting an attorney rather than an attorney referral service.Furthermore, the attorney making the referrals may be circumventing the regulations governing lawyer referral services.  Attorneys may subscribe to and accept referrals from a \"a bona fide lawyer referral service operated by an organization authorized and qualified to do business in this state; provided, however, such organization has filed with the State Disciplinary Board, at least annually a report showing its terms, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating, and the names and addresses of lawyers participating in the service.\"Rule 7.3(c)(1).  These regulations help clients select competent counsel.  If the attorney is not operating a bona fide lawyer referral in accordance with the Rules, the client is deprived of all of this information.  The attorneys accepting the referrals also violate Rule 7.3(c) by participating in the illicit service and paying for the referrals.Assuming that the advertisements at issue offers only the advertising attorneys services and that the attorney accepts cases from the callers, the ad is not false or inherently misleading. However, where a majority of the responding callers are referred out, this becomes a lawyer referral service.  The Rules require disclosure of the referral as well as compliance with the Rules applicable to referral services.","UrlName":"rule458","Order":70,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b2d78f9a-f1d9-40e7-bb3c-4469eafbf541","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-7","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-7 Approved And Issued On November 26, 2007 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule531\"> FAO No. 93-2 </a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-057.pdf?sfvrsn=260f7e4_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S08U0023</a> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=58\%22>Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, Rule 1.7 was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. The amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion. QUESTION PRESENTED: Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured. SUMMARY ANSWER: A lawyer representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim should not undertake the simultaneous representation of the insured on related claims, unless it is reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to both clients, and only if both the insurance company and the insured have consented to the representation after consultation with the lawyer, have received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation, and have been given the opportunity to consult with the independent counsel.  Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule. OPINION: This inquiry addresses several questions as to ethical propriety and possible conflicts between the representation of the client, the insurance company, and its insured.Hypothetical Fact SituationThe insurance company makes a payment to its insured under a provision of an insurance policy which provides that such payment is contingent upon the transfer and assignment of subrogation of the insured's rights to a third party for recovery with respect to such payment.Question 1: May the attorney institute suit against the tortfeasor in the insured's name without getting the insured's permission?Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.2(a), a lawyer may not institute a legal proceeding without obtaining proper authorization from his client.  The ordinary provision in an insurance policy giving the insurance company the right of subrogation does not give the lawyer the right to institute a lawsuit in the name of the insured without specific authority from the insured.  The normal subrogation agreements, trust agreements or loan receipts which are executed at the time of the payment by the insurer usually give the insurance company the right to pursue the claim in the insured's name and depending upon the language may grant proper authorization from the insured to proceed in such fashion.  Appropriate authorization to bring the suit in the insured's name should be obtained and the insured should be kept advised with respect to developments in the case.Question 2: Does the attorney represent both the insured and the insurance company, and, if so, would he then have a duty to inform the insured of his potential causes of action such as for diminution of value and personal injury?The insurance policy does not create an attorney/client relationship between the lawyer and the insured.  If the lawyer undertakes to represent the insured, the lawyer has duties to the insured, which must be respected with respect to advising the insured as to other potential causes of action such as diminution of value and personal injury.  Rule 1.7(b); see also, Comment 10 (assuring independence of counsel) and Comment 12 (common representations permissible even with some differences in interests).Question 3: Is there a conflict of interest in representing the insured as to other potential causes of action?In most instances no problem would be presented with representing the insured as to his deductible, diminution of value, etc.  Generally an insurance company retains the right to compromise the claim, which would reasonably result in a pro-rata payment to the insurance carrier and the insured.  The attorney representing the insured must be cautious to avoid taking any action, which would preclude the insured from any recovery to which the insured might otherwise be entitled.  Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule, (b); see also, Comment 10 (assuring independence of counsel) and Comment 12 (common representations permissible even with some differences in interest.) to Rule 1.7.A much more difficult problem is presented in the event an attorney attempts to represent both an insurance company's subrogation interest in property damage and an insured's personal injury claim.  In most cases the possibility of settlement must be considered.  Any aggregate settlement would necessarily have to be allocated between the liquidated damages of the subrogated property loss and the unliquidated damages of the personal injury claim.  Any aggregate settlement would require each client's consent after consultation, and this requirement cannot be met by blanket consent prior to settlement negotiations.  Rule 1.8(g); see also Comment 6 to Rule 1.8.  Only the most sophisticated of insureds could intelligently waive such a conflict, and therefore in almost all cases an attorney would be precluded from representing both the insurer and the insured in such cases.In conclusion, a lawyer representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim should not undertake the simultaneous representation of the insured on related claims, unless it is reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to both clients, and only if both the insurance company and the insured have consented to the representation after consultation with the lawyer, have received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation, and have been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.  Rule 1.7(a) and (b).","UrlName":"rule459","Order":71,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0ae1e8f5-517c-4259-8e2c-723c20267185","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-8","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD NO. 05-8 Approved And Issued On April 4, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule501\">FAO No. 96-2</a> (Modified to Correct Error Pursuant to Supreme Court Order on April 11, 2008) <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-058.pdf?sfvrsn=5a0cb79a_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0800</a> Please note that in the reference to <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> in this opinion, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> is only quoted in pertinent part. QUESTION PRESENTED: The question presented is whether an attorney may stamp client correspondence with a notice stating that the client has a particular period of time to notify the lawyer if he/she is dissatisfied with the lawyer and that if the client did not notify the lawyer of his/her dissatisfaction within that period of time, the client would waive any claim for malpractice. SUMMARY ANSWER: A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement.  Therefore, in the absence of independent representation of the client, the lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice and should not attempt to cause the waiver of any claim for malpractice by the inclusion of language amounting to such a waiver in correspondence with a client. OPINION: A member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board has brought to the attention of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board a practice by lawyers of adding the following language (by rubber stamp) to correspondence with clients:Important Message If you disagree with anything set forth in this communication or the way I have represented you to date, please notify me by certified mail at the address set forth herein immediately. If I do not hear from you, it shall be an acknowledgment by you per our agreement that you are satisfied with my representation of you to date and you agree with my statements in this communication.The intended effect of this \"message \"is to create a short period of time within which the client must decide whether he or she is satisfied with the representation, and if not satisfied, the client must notify the lawyer \"immediately.\"If such notification is not provided \"immediately,\"the client will have acknowledged an \"agreement \"that the client is satisfied with the representation.It is apparent from reviewing this \"message \"that the lawyer is attempting to exonerate himself or herself from any claim of malpractice or to cause a waiver of any claim for malpractice by the client against the lawyer.  By attempting to limit his or her liability for malpractice or to cause a waiver of any claim for malpractice, the lawyer is putting himself or herself into an adversarial relationship with the client.  While providing advice to the client on the one hand, the lawyer is attempting to limit or excuse his or her liability for claims of malpractice resulting from the provision of such advice on the other hand.  Such conduct places the lawyer's personal interests ahead of the interests of the client.  This conduct is expressly forbidden by Rule 1.8(h), which provides that \"A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement.\"In summary, the use of a message or notice, such as described herein, is a violation of Rule 1.8(h), and subjects an attorney to discipline, for which the maximum penalty is a public reprimand.","UrlName":"rule460","Order":72,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"410020ea-d24b-4223-b6c4-3c43b3cf6cb6","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-9","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-9 Approved And Issued On April 13, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule503\"> FAO No. 97-1 </a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-059.pdf?sfvrsn=2a5783e9_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06R0802</a> See Comments [4] through [9] to <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">Rule 1.9</a> for additional ethical guidance applicable to lawyers moving between firms. QUESTION PRESENTED: Is it ethically proper to work on a temporary basis for other attorneys?  Is it ethically proper for a lawyer, law firm, or corporate law department to hire other attorneys on a temporary basis? SUMMARY ANSWER: Yes.  While a temporary lawyer and the employing firm or corporate law department must be sensitive to the unique problems of conflicts of interest, confidentiality, imputed disqualification, client participation, use of placement agencies and fee division produced by the use of temporary lawyers, there is nothing in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that prohibits the use of temporary lawyers. OPINION: I.  Conflicts of InterestAn attorney is ethically obligated to avoid conflicts of interest with respect to that attorney's client.  A temporary lawyer represents the client of a firm when that lawyer works on a matter for a client.  Thus, a temporary lawyer employed to represent clients or assist in representation of clients enters into an attorney/client relationship with those particular clients as an associate of the firm.  Accordingly, the general rules pertaining to all attorneys regarding conflicts of interest are applicable to the temporary lawyer.  Specifically, the temporary lawyer and the employing law firm or corporate law department must comply with Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10 governing personal interests, simultaneous representation, and subsequent representation conflicts of interest, and imputed disqualification.  Generally, a temporary lawyer should not represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation without obtaining the consent of the affected clients in accordance with the consent requirement of Rule 1.7.The opportunity for conflicts of interest is heightened in the context of the employment of temporary lawyers.  The very nature of a temporary lawyer invokes conflict of interest issues.  Obviously, a temporary lawyer is likely to be employed by many different firms or legal departments during the course of his or her practice.  Therefore, the potential for conflicts of interest is great.  As a practical matter, this potential for conflict imposes upon temporary lawyers and employing law firms or corporate law departments an obligation of great care in both record keeping and screening for conflicts.  In fact, the potential for conflict is so high that law firms or corporate law departments that employ temporary lawyers would be acting unethically if they did not carefully evaluate each proposed employment for actual conflicting interests and potentially conflicting interests.  Additionally, the temporary lawyer should maintain a record of clients and matters worked on in order to evaluate possible conflicts of interest should they arise.  All firms employing temporary lawyers should also maintain a complete and accurate record of all matters on which each temporary lawyer works.One of the most difficult issues involving conflict of interest in the employment of temporary lawyers is imputed disqualification issues.  In other words, when would the firm or legal department be vicariously disqualified due to conflict of interest with respect to the temporary lawyer? Since a temporary attorney is considered to be an associate of the particular firm or corporate law department for which he or she is temporarily working, the normal rules governing imputed disqualification apply.  Specifically, Rule 1.10(a) provides that if any attorney is individually precluded from undertaking representation by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2, then a firm with whom the attorney is associated is also precluded from undertaking that representation.  Also, and most importantly in the temporary lawyer context, Rule 1.9(b) says that a lawyer \"shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previous represented a client: (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and (2) about whom the lawyer had acquired [confidential] information . . . , unless the client consents after consultation.\"The effect of these rules working in conjunction is that a firm employing a temporary lawyer would be disqualified by imputed disqualification from any unconsented to representation materially adverse to a former client of the former firms of the temporary lawyer in the same or a substantially related matter if the temporary lawyer had acquired confidential information about the former representation.II. ConfidentialityIn addition to avoiding conflicts of interest, an attorney also is obligated to protect the client's confidences.  As noted above, a temporary lawyer who is involved in the representation of clients or who provides assistance in the representation of clients enters into an attorney/client relationship with those clients.  Therefore, the temporary attorney is obligated not to disclose client confidences.  A temporary attorney is required to keep all information gained in the professional relationship with a client confidential in accordance with Rule 1.6.<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">Furthermore, Rule 5.1 requires:(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable effort to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</div>This Rule obligates the employing firm or corporate law department to impose upon temporary lawyers obligations of confidentiality identical to those requirements imposed on an associate or any other employee.  This obligation of confidentiality includes all information regarding the representation of all clients of the firm or departments when the temporary lawyer acquires that information during his or her engagement.To protect confidentiality and to avoid excessive risks of imputed disqualification it is a prudent practice for all law firms and corporate law departments, to the extent practicable, to screen each temporary lawyer from access to any information relating to clients that is not related to the temporary lawyer's assignment.  Moreover, a temporary lawyer working for several firms shall make every effort to avoid exposure within those firms to any information relating to clients on matters not assigned to the temporary attorney.III.  Use of Placement Agency for Temporary AttorneysPlacement agencies participate in a business that furnishes law firms and corporate departments with the services of lawyers desiring to obtain part-time or temporary employment.  Firms and corporate legal departments look to these agencies to find temporary attorneys.  In accordance with ABA Formal Opinion 88-356 (1988), a firm does not violate ethical regulations by utilizing a placement agency.  However, there are certain guidelines that should be followed to ensure that no ethical violations occur.  First of all, the firm or corporate legal department must prevent any third party from exerting any control as to the client representation.  Such control would be a violation of Rule 5.4(c).  For example, an agency may have an interest in an attorney's taking additional time on a project so that it will result in higher fees.  The solution is to prevent any control by the agency of the attorney's time.Furthermore, there is an increased risk of disclosure of confidential information even though there must be compliance with the Rules relating to confidential information and conflicts of interest.  This risk of disclosure may be lessened by the screening of temporary attorneys by the firm that, as discussed above, insures the temporary lawyers do not obtain unnecessary information.  Moreover, a client is entitled to be informed that a temporary attorney is being used.  A client reasonably assumes that only attorneys within the firm are doing work on that client's case, and thus, a client should be informed that the firm is using a temporary attorney to do the firm's work.  Because there is some risk of third party interference with the representation, the client should be advised of that risk.  Compliance with Rule 5.4(c), which prohibits third party control of the client representation requires full disclosure to the client of the arrangement.IV.  Fee ArrangementsThe last consideration that needs to be addressed is the appropriate manner in which to handle the fee arrangement.  In accordance with the rationale contained in ABA Formal Opinion 88-356, a fee division with a temporary attorney is allowed.  If a temporary attorney is directly supervised by an attorney in a law firm, that arrangement is analogous to fee splitting with an associate in a law firm, which is allowed by Rule 1.5(e). Thus, in that situation there is no requirement of consent by the client regarding the fee.  Nevertheless, the ethically proper and prudent course is to seek consent of a client under all circumstances in which the temporary lawyer's assistance will be a material component of the representation.  The fee division with a temporary attorney is also allowed even if there is no direct supervision if three criteria are met: (1) the fee is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer; (2) the client is advised of the fee splitting situation and consents; and (3) the total fee is reasonable.   Rule 1.5(e).In that the agency providing the temporary lawyer is not authorized to practice law, any sharing of fees with such an agency would be in violation of Rule 5.4(a).  Therefore, while it is perfectly permissible to compensate an agency for providing a temporary lawyer, such compensation must not be based on a portion of client fees collected by the firm or the temporary lawyer.In summary, employment as a temporary lawyer and use of temporary lawyers are proper when adequate measures, consistent with the guidance offered in this opinion, are employed by the temporary lawyer and the employing firm or corporate law department.  These measures respond to the unique problems created by the use of temporary lawyers, including conflicts of interest, imputed disqualification, confidentiality, fee arrangements, use of placement agencies, and client participation.  Generally, firms employing temporary lawyers should: (1) carefully evaluate each proposed employment for conflicting interests and potentially conflicting interests; (2) if conflicting or potentially conflicting interests exist, then determine if imputed disqualification rules will impute the conflict to the firm; (3) screen each temporary lawyer from all information relating to clients for which a temporary lawyer does not work, to the extent practicable; (4) make sure the client is fully informed as to all matters relating to the temporary lawyer's representation; and (5) maintain complete records on all matters upon which each temporary lawyer works.","UrlName":"rule461","Order":73,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"920b6f2f-60e1-43db-8db3-867ad4c24b5f","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-10","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-10 Approved And Issued On April 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule462\">FAO No. 98-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0510.pdf?sfvrsn=97d84043_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0803</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     Can a Georgia attorney, who has agreed to serve as local counsel, be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia? SUMMARY ANSWER:     A Georgia attorney, serving as local counsel, can be disciplined under Rule 5.1(c) for discovery abuses committed by an out-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel when the local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct.  Knowledge in this situation includes \"willful blindness \"by the local counsel.  Local counsel can also be disciplined for discovery abuse committed by an out-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel when the local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel also in accordance with Rule 5.1(c).  Finally, the role of local counsel, as defined by the parties and understood by the court, may carry with it affirmative ethical obligations. OPINION:     A client has asked in-house or other out-of-state counsel, who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, to represent him as lead counsel in a case venued in Georgia.  Lead counsel associates local counsel, who is a member of the State Bar of Georgia, to assist in the handling of the case.  Local counsel moves the admission of lead counsel pro hac vice, and the motion is granted.  During discovery, lead counsel engages in some form of discovery abuse.     Discipline of local counsel for the discovery abuse of lead counsel would, in all cases, be limited to discovery abuse that is in violation of a particular Rule of Professional Conduct.  If the discovery abuse is a violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct, for example, the destruction of documents subject to a motion to produce, Rules 5.1(c) and 3.4(a) defines local counsel's responsibility for the abuse.  Because Rule 5.1(c) is entitled \"Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \"it may not be obvious to all attorneys that the language of this statute applies to the questions regarding ethical responsibilities between lead and local counsel.  Nevertheless, the language of the Rule clearly applies and is in accord with common principles of accessory culpability:     A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:  (1) The . . . supervisory lawyer orders, or with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; . . . .     Under this Rule the extent of local counsel's accessory culpability for lead counsel's discovery abuse is determined by the answers to two questions:  (1) What constitutes knowledge of the abuse by local counsel?  (2) What constitutes ratification of the violative conduct by local counsel?     Actual knowledge, of course, would always be sufficient to meet the knowledge requirement of this Rule.  Consistent with the doctrine of \"willful blindness \"applied in other legal contexts, however, sufficient knowledge could be imputed to local counsel if he or she, suspicious that lead counsel was engaging in or was about to engage in a violation of ethical requirements, sought to avoid acquiring actual knowledge of the conduct.  The doctrine of \"willful blindness \"applies in these circumstances because local counsel's conduct in avoiding actual knowledge displays the same level of culpability as actual knowledge.     Thus, if local counsel was suspicious that lead counsel was \"engag[ing] in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation \"in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4), local counsel would meet the knowledge requirement of accessory culpability if he or she purposely avoided further inquiry.  What would be sufficient suspicion, of course, is difficult to determine in the abstract.  To avoid the risk of the effect of the doctrine of willful blindness, a prudent attorney should treat any reasonable suspicion as sufficient to prompt inquiry of the in-house or other out-of-state counsel.     What constitutes ratification is also difficult to determine in the abstract.  Consistent with the definition of accessory culpability in other legal contexts, however, an attorney should avoid any conduct that does not actively oppose the violation.  The specific conduct required may include withdrawal from the representation or, in some cases, disclosure of the violation to the court.  Which measures are appropriate will depend upon the particular circumstances and consideration of other ethical requirements.  In all circumstances, however, we would expect local counsel to remonstrate with lead counsel and to warn lead counsel of local counsel's ethical obligations under Rule 5.1(c).     Other than accessory culpability, and depending upon how the parties and the court have defined it in the particular representation, the role of local counsel itself may include an affirmative duty to inquire into the conduct of lead counsel and other affirmative ethical obligations.  This is true, for example, if the court understands the role of local counsel as carrying with it any direct supervisory authority over out-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel.  In such circumstances, Rule 5.1(c) provides:     A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of Rules of Professional Conduct if:  (2) the lawyer . . . has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.     Furthermore, at times lead and local counsel may have defined the relationship so that it is indistinguishable from that of co-counsel.  In such cases the usual principles of ethical responsibility apply.  Even short of this co-counsel role, however, typical acts required of local counsel such as moving of admission pro hac vice or the signing of pleadings, always carry with them affirmative ethical obligations.  For example, in this, as in all circumstances, the signing of pleadings by an attorney constitutes a good faith representation regarding the pleadings and the conduct of the discovery procedure of which the pleadings are a part.  There is nothing in the role of local counsel that changes this basic ethical responsibility.  Local counsel, if he or she signs the pleadings, must be familiar with them and investigate them to the extent required by this good faith requirement.     Finally, there is nothing in the role of local counsel that excuses an attorney from the usual ethical requirements applicable to his or her own conduct in the representation, either individually or in conjunction with lead counsel.  If local counsel engages in any unethical conduct, it is no defense to a violation that the conduct was suggested, initiated, or required by lead counsel.     Generally, Rules 1.2(a) and (d); 1.6; 3.3(a)(1) and (4); 3.3(c); 3.4(a), (b) and (f); 3.5(b); 4.1(a); 4.2(a); 4.3(a) and (b); 5.1(c); 5.3; 5.4(c); 8.4(a)(1) and (4) may apply to the conduct of local counsel depending upon the degree of local counsel's involvement in the discovery process.  While all these Rules might not be applicable in a given case, taken together they cover the range of conduct that may be involved.","UrlName":"rule449","Order":74,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de27d0c5-6cfb-402d-a735-cb573cdcf915","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-11","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-11 Approved and Issued On September 22, 2008 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule517\">FAO No. 99-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0511.pdf?sfvrsn=5fdb84f6_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U1854</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=58\%22> </a> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. The amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion. COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA PER CURIAM.     We granted a petition for discretionary review brought by the State Bar of Georgia asking this Court to adopt an opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (\"Board \") and retract an earlier version of the Formal Advisory Opinion (\"FAO \"). At issue is Proposed Opinion 05-11, which is a re-drafted version of FAO 99-1.1 Both opinions address the ethical propriety of an attorney defending a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client. Having examined FAO 99-1 in light of the issuance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, we agree that the new Rules require a different result than that reached in FAO 99-1 and that Proposed Opinion 05-11 should be adopted and FAO 99-1 retracted.     In FAO 99-1, issued on May 27, 1999, the Board applied Standards 30, 35 and 36 and Ethical Considerations 5-14 and 5-15 to the question presented and concludedan attorney may not simultaneously represent clients that have directly adverse interests in litigation that is the subject matter of either one of the representations. Whether or not this is the case ... depends upon the nature of the representation of the insurance company.     If it is, in fact, the insurance company that is the true client in the unrelated matter, then the interests of the simultaneously represented clients in the litigation against the insured client are directly adverse even though the insurance company is not a party to the litigation and the representations are unrelated. The consent by the clients provided for in Standard 37 is not available in these circumstances because it is not obvious that the attorney can adequately represent the interests of each client. This is true because adequate representation includes a requirement of an appearance of trustworthiness that is inconsistent with the conflict of interest between these simultaneously represented clients.     If, however, as is far more typically the case, it is not the insurance company that is the true client in the unrelated matter, but an insured of the insurance company, then there is no simultaneous representation of directly adverse interests in litigation and these Standards do not apply. Instead, the attorney may have a personal interest conflict under Standard 30 in that the attorney has a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the insurance company. This personal interest conflict may be consented to by the insured client after full disclosure of the potential conflict and careful consideration. The Standard 37 limitation on consent to conflicts does not apply to Standard 30 conflicts. Such consent, however, should not be sought by an attorney when the attorney believes that the representation of the insured will be adversely affected by his or her personal interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the insurance company for to do so would be to violate the attorney's general obligation of zealous representation to the insured client.In its 2006 re-examination of the question presented in FAO 99-1, the Board applied Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Comment 8 thereto and concluded that the attorney's representation of the insured would be an impermissible conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a) if the insurance company is the client in the unrelated matter, and that consent of both clients would not be available to cure the impermissible conflict because the conflict necessarily \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\"Rule 1.7(c)(3). This was the same result as was reached when Standards 35 and 36 were applied in FAO 99-1, though Proposed Opinion 05-11 clarifies that the attorney's successful representation of the insured client would reduce or eliminate the potential subrogation claim of the insurance company client, making advocacy on behalf of one client in these circumstances advocacy against a simultaneously represented client.     In addressing the far more typical case of the client in the unrelated matter being an insured of the insurance company rather than the insurance company itself, the Board in Proposed Opinion 05-11 again echoed FAO 99-1 in its finding that there would be no impermissible advocacy against a simultaneous representation client, but the attorney might have a conflict with the attorney's own interests under Rule 1.7(a), since the attorney would have a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the non-client insurance company. In a departure from FAO 99-1, the Board in Proposed Opinion 05-11 opines that \"the likelihood that the representation [of the insured] will be harmed by this financial interest makes this a risky situation for the attorney,\"noting that while Rule 1.7(b) permits the personal conflict to be cured by consent of all affected clients under some circumstances, consent is not available to cure the conflict if the conflict triggers Rule 1.7(c)(3), i.e., the conflict \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer [would] be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\"Thus, Proposed Opinion 05-11 corrects an error in FAO 99-1, which had required only the consent of the insured client to the personal interest conflict, and replaces the \"warning \"contained in FAO 99-1 (\"No attorney, however, should seek such consent [to an attorney's personal interest conflict] if he or she believes that his or her business interest will, in fact, adversely affect the quality of the representation with the insured client \") with the ethical requirement of Rule 1.7(c).     Inasmuch as FAO 99-1 no longer provides the most current ethical guidance to the members of the State Bar of Georgia since it is not based on the current ethical rules, and Proposed Opinion 05-11 interprets the current ethical rules, clarifies a point made in FAO 99-1, corrects an error in FAO 99-1, and recognizes the conversion of the warning contained in FAO 99-1 into an ethical requirement, we conclude that it is appropriate to adopt Proposed Opinion 05-11 and retract FAO 99-1.2 Formal Advisory Opinion 05-11 approved. All the Justices concur. 1-With the issuance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the Standards of Conduct were replaced and the Canons of Ethics, including Ethical Considerations and Directory Rules, were deleted. At the request of the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, the Board undertook a review of the FAOs issued by this Court that were based on the Standards of Conduct and Canons of Ethics to determine the impact, if any, of the issuance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. 2-Our approval of FAO 05-11 makes it \"binding on all members of the State Bar [of Georgia].\"Rule 4-403(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.   FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-11 QUESTION PRESENTED:     May an attorney ethically defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents, in an unrelated matter, the insurance company with a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client? SUMMARY ANSWER:     In this hypothetical, the attorney's successful representation of the insured would reduce or eliminate the potential subrogation claim of the insurance company that is a client of the same attorney in an unrelated matter. Thus, essentially, advocacy on behalf of one client in these circumstances constitutes advocacy against a simultaneously represented client. \"Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as an advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated.\"See, Rule 1.7, Comment 8. This is true because adequate representation of any client includes a requirement of an appearance of trustworthiness that is inconsistent with advocacy against that client.     Thus, if the insurance company, as opposed to an insured of that company, is in fact the client of the attorney in the unrelated matter, then this representation would be an impermissible conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a) and consent of both clients, as sometimes permitted under Rule 1.7 to cure an impermissible conflict, would not be available. See, Rule 1.7(c)(3).     If, however, as is far more typically the case, it is not the insurance company that is the client in the unrelated matter, but an insured of the insurance company, then there is no advocacy against a simultaneous representation client and the representation is not prohibited for that reason. Instead, in such circumstances, the attorney may have a conflict with the attorney's own interests under Rule 1.7 (a) in that the attorney has a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the non-client insurance company. The likelihood that the representation will be harmed by this financial interest makes this a risky situation for the attorney. Nevertheless, under some circumstances the rules permit this personal interest conflict to be cured by consent of all affected clients after compliance with the requirements for consent found in Rule 1.7(b). Consent would not be available to cure the conflict, however, if the conflict \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer [would] be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affect clients.\"See, Rule 1.7(c). The question this asks is not the subjective one of whether or not the attorney thinks he or she will be able to provide adequate representation despite the conflict, but whether others would reasonably view the situation as such. The attorney makes this determination at his or her own peril. OPINION:     Correspondent asks whether an attorney may ethically defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents, in an unrelated matter, the insurance company with a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client. In this hypothetical, the attorney's successful representation of the insured would reduce or eliminate the potential subrogation claim of the insurance company that is a client of the same attorney in an unrelated matter.     This situation is governed by Rule 1.7, which provides:     (a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).     (b) If client consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected or former client consents, preferably in writing, to the representation after:         (1) consultation with the lawyer;         (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation; and         (3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.     (c) Client consent is not permissible if the representation:         (1) is prohibited by law or these rules;         (2) includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or         (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.     If the representation of the insurance company in the unrelated matter is, in fact, representation of the insurance company, and not representation of an insured of the company, then we get additional assistance in interpreting Rule 1.7 from Comment 8 which states that: \"Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as an advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated.\"This is true because adequate representation of any client includes a requirement of an appearance of trustworthiness that is inconsistent with advocacy against that client. This prohibition is not because Georgia lawyers are not sufficiently trustworthy to act professionally in these circumstances by providing independent professional judgment for each client unfettered by the interests of the other client. It is, instead, a reflection of the reality that reasonable client concerns with the appearance created by such conflicts could, by themselves, adversely affect the quality of the representation.     Thus, in this situation there is an impermissible conflict of interest between simultaneously represented clients under Rule 1.7(a) and consent to cure this conflict is not available under Rule 1.7(c) because it necessarily \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\"See, generally, ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 51:104-105 and cases and advisory opinions cited therein. See, also, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495 (1982) (lawyer may not accept employment adverse to existing client even in unrelated matter; prohibition applies even when present client employs most lawyers in immediate geographical area, thereby making it difficult for adversary to retain equivalent counsel).     If, however, as is far more typically the case, it is not the insurance company that is the client in the unrelated matter, but an insured of the insurance company, then there is no advocacy against a simultaneous representation client and the representation is not prohibited for that reason. Instead, in such circumstances, the attorney may have a conflict with the attorney's own interests under Rule 1.7 (a) in that the attorney has a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the non-client insurance company. The likelihood that the representation will be harmed by this financial interest makes this a risky situation for the attorney. Nevertheless, under some circumstances the rules permit this personal interest conflict to be cured by consent of all affected clients after compliance with the requirements for consent found in Rule 1.7(b). Consent would not be available to cure the conflict, however, if the conflict \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer [would] be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affect clients.\"See, Rule 1.7(c). The question this asks is not the subjective one of whether or not the attorney thinks he or she will be able to provide adequate representation despite the conflict, but whether others would reasonably view the situation as such. The attorney makes this determination at his or her own peril.  ","UrlName":"rule450","Order":75,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71f6c658-da8f-4a6f-9144-290755e07eb8","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-12","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-12 Approved And Issued On July 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule464\">FAO No. 00-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0512.pdf?sfvrsn=41d1bdd3_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U1489</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     When the City Council controls the salary and benefits of the members of the Police Department, may a councilperson, who is an attorney, represent criminal defendants in matters where the police exercise discretion in determining the charges? SUMMARY ANSWER:     Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law.  In any circumstance where the representation may create an appearance of impropriety it should be avoided. OPINION:     This opinion addresses itself to a situation where the City Council member votes on salary and benefits for the police.  Particularly in small municipalities, this situation could give rise to a perception that a police officer's judgment might be affected.  For example, a police officer might be reluctant to oppose a request that he recommend lesser charges or the dismissal of charges when the request comes from a council member representing the accused.  Situations like the one at hand give rise to inherent influence which is present even if the attorney who is also a City Council member attempts to avoid using that position to influence the proceedings.     Rule 3.5 provides that \"A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter:  (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law....\"As a general matter, a police officer is a public official. See White v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 233 Ga. 919 (1975); Sauls v. State, 220 Ga. App. 115 (1996).  But see O.C.G.A. §45-5-6.  Where a police officer exercises discretion as to the prosecution of criminal charges, the police officer is a public official within the meaning of Rule 3.5(a).  By its express terms, Rule 3.5(a) applies only when an attorney seeks to influence, that is where an attorney has the intent to influence, an official by means prohibited by law.  If an attorney were to indicate to an officer that as a result of the attorney's position as a member of the City Council a favorable recommendation as to one of the attorney's clients would result in benefits flowing to the officer, or that an unfavorable recommendation would result in harm, the attorney would have committed the offense of bribery, OCGA §16-10-2 (a)(1), or extortion, OCGA §16-8-16(a)(4).  The attorney would also have violated Rule 3.5(a).     The mere fact of representation of a criminal defendant by an attorney who is a member of the City Council, when the City Council controls the salary and benefits of the members of the Police Department, and when the police exercise discretion in determining the charges does not, by itself, establish a violation of Rule 3.5(a).  To establish a violation, there must be a showing that the attorney sought to exercise influence in a manner prohibited by law.  We note, however, that Comment 2 to Rule 3.5 provides that \"The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety.\"Pursuant to Rule 3.5, therefore, an attorney should not represent a criminal defendant where an inference of improper influence can reasonably be drawn.","UrlName":"rule451","Order":76,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3465bd6d-ed00-45d1-b591-ca67726e53d2","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-13","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-13 Approved And Issued On June 21, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule530\">FAO No. 93-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0513.pdf?sfvrsn=46b5264d_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S07U1159</a>             QUESTION PRESENTED:     (1) Whether the designation \"Special Counsel \"may be used to describe an attorney and/or law firm affiliated with another law firm for the specific purpose of providing consultation and advice to the other firm in specialized legal areas:  (2) and whether the ethical rules governing conflict of interest apply as if the firm, the affiliated attorney and the affiliated firm constitute a single firm. SUMMARY ANSWER:     It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship.  The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm. OPINION:     This opinion deals with the following questions:<ol><li>May a law firm which associates a lawyer for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters identify that lawyer as being, for example, \"Special Counsel for Trust and Estate and Industrial Tax Matters \"?</li><li>May a law firm which associates another law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters identify that law firm as being, for example, \"Special Counsel for Tax and ERISA Matters \"?</li><li>Should Rule 1.10, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\">[1]</a> the vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer, apply to outside associated lawyers and law firms? </li></ol>     The problem should be viewed from the standpoint of clients.  Can the law firm render better service to its clients if it establishes such relationships?  If the answer is yes, there is no reason such relationships cannot be created and publicized.     There is no Rule which would prohibit a law firm from associating either an individual lawyer or law firm as special counsel and such association may be required by Rule 1.1.; <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\">[2]</a> While the American Bar Association has concluded that one firm may not serve as counsel for another (Formal Opinion No. 330, August 1972) this court declines to follow that precedent.  Moreover, a subsequent ABA opinion recognized that one firm may be associated or affiliated with another without being designated \"of counsel.\"(Formal Opinion No. 84-351, October 20, 1984).  In the view of this court, it is not improper to establish the type of relationship proposed.  If established, it must be identified and identified correctly so that clients and potential clients are fully aware of the nature of the relationship.     Finally, the relationship between the law firm and special counsel (whether an individual lawyer or a law firm) must be a bona fide relationship that entails the use of special counsel's expertise.  The relationship cannot be established merely to serve as a referral source.  Any fees charged between special counsel and the law firm, of course, must be divided in accordance with the requirements of Rule 1.5. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn3\">[3]</a>     The first two questions are answered in the affirmative.     The third question presents a more complex issue.     The Georgia vicarious disqualification rule is founded on the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client.  This duty is expressed in the obligations to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client, and to decline representation or withdraw if the ability to do so is adversely affected by the representation of another client.  Recognizing that the client is the client of the firm and that the duty of loyalty extends to all firm members, it follows that the duty to decline or withdraw extends to all firm members.  Rule 1.10.     Identifying an associated firm or lawyer is calculated to raise the expectation in the mind of the client that the relationship is something more than casual.  Indeed it is calculated to convey to the client that the client's matter is being handled by a unit made up of the associating and associated firm or lawyer, so that the expertise of all can be brought to bear on the problem.  Accordingly, in the situation presupposed in the hypothetical, the clients of the associating firm become, for the purposes of Rule 1.10, the clients of the associated firm or lawyer and vice versa.  The unit as a whole has a duty of loyalty to the client and must exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client as an entirety.     Reference should be made to Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10, imputed disqualification; General Rule.  Rule 1.10 discusses when an imputed disqualification can bar all attorneys at a firm or office from representing a particular client.     Rule 1.10 and Comment 1 of the Rule make affiliations among lawyers or law firms less complex.  Rule 1.10 applies to entities other than associated lawyers and law firms to include in addition to lawyers in a private firm, lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in legal services organizations.     As set forth in Comment 1, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn4\">[4]</a> two practitioners who share office space and who occasionally assist each other in representation of clients, may not regard themselves as a law firm.  However, if they present themselves to the public suggesting that they are indeed a firm, they may be regarded as a firm for purposes of these Rules.  Factors such as formal agreements between associated lawyers, as well as maintenance of mutual access to information concerning clients, may be relevant in determining whether practitioners who are sharing space may be considered a firm under the Rule.     The third question is answered in the affirmative.  In light of the adoption of Rule 1.1, ethical rules governing conflict of interest apply to entities and affiliations of lawyers in a broader sense than what has traditionally been considered a \"law firm.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> Rule 1.10     (a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.     (b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:     (1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and     (2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.     (c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn2\">2.</a> Rule 1.1     A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer's level of competence without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in question. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn3\">3.</a> Rule 1.5     (a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:     (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;     (2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;     (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;     (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;     (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;     (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;     (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and     (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.     (b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.     (c) (1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. (2) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:     (i) the outcome of the matter; and,     (ii) if there is a recovery, showing the:         (A) remittance to the client;         (B) the method of its determination;         (C) the amount of the attorney fee; and         (D) if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.     (d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:     (1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or     (2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.     (e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:     (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;     (2) the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and     (3) the total fee is reasonable. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn4\">4.</a> Comment 1 of Rule 1.10     [1] For purposes of these Rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other.","UrlName":"rule452","Order":77,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"020d144f-0976-45a8-9c93-e61d8d9bbcc7","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 07-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON SEPTEMBER 5, 2007 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 07-1 \n             \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? \n \n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nA lawyer may ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between himself and his client in direct efforts to collect a fee, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency.  Otherwise, a lawyer may not report the failure of a client to pay the lawyer's bill to third parties, including major credit reporting services, in an effort to collect a fee. \n \n OPINION: \n \n    This issue is governed primarily by Rule 1.6 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.6 provides, in pertinent part:\n \n    (a) A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the Court. \n \n    Comment 5 to Rule 1.6 provides further guidance: \n \n    Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.  A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.\n \n    Former Standard 28 limited confidentiality to \"confidences and secrets of a client.\"However, Rule 1.6 expands the obligations by requiring a lawyer to \"maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship \"including the client's secrets and confidences. \n \n    An attorney's ethical duty to maintain confidentiality of client information is distinguishable from the attorney-client evidentiary privilege of O.C.G.A. §§24-9-21, 24-9-24 and 24-9-25.  Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Louisiana Forum Corp., 273 Ga. 206, 209-10 (2000).  Thus, Rule 1.6 applies not only to matters governed by the attorney-client privilege, but also to non-privileged information arising from the course of representation.  Information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and client, including the amount of fees that the lawyer contends the client owes, may not be disclosed, except as permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, other law, order of the court or if the client consents.\n \n    Rule 1.6 authorizes disclosure in the following circumstances: \n \n    (b)(1) A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: \n    . . . \n    (iii) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil action against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.\n \n    The comments to Rule 1.6 clarify that such disclosures should be made only in limited circumstances.  While Comment 17 to Rule 1.6 provides that a lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted to prove the services rendered in an action to collect that fee, it cautions that a lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information related to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure.  Further caution is found in Comment 12, which provides that \"[i]n any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than a lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose.\" \n \n    In Georgia, it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to retain a collection agency as a measure of last resort in order to collect a fee that has been properly earned.  Advisory Opinion No. 49 issued by the State Disciplinary Board.  Advisory Opinion 49, however, only applies to a referral to a \"reputable collection agency \".  Advisory Opinion 49 further states that a lawyer should exercise the option of revealing confidences and secrets necessary to establish or collect a fee with considerable caution.  Thus, while use of a reputable collection agency to collect a fee is ethically proper, disclosures to other third parties may not be ethically permissible. Formal Advisory Opinion 95-1 provides that limitations exist on a lawyer's efforts to collect a fee from his client even through a fee collection program. \n \n    Other jurisdictions that have considered similar issues  have distinguished between direct efforts to collect an unpaid fee, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency, from indirect methods in which information is disclosed to third parties in an effort to collect unpaid fees.  In these cases, the direct methods have generally been found to be ethical, while more indirect methods, such as reporting non-paying clients to credit bureaus, have been found to be unethical.  South Carolina Bar Advisory Opinion 94-11 concluded that a lawyer may ethically use a collection agency to collect past due accounts for legal services rendered but cannot report past due accounts to a credit bureau.  The Opinion advises against reporting non-paying clients to credit bureaus because (1) it is not necessary for establishing the lawyer's claim for compensation, (2) it risks disclosure of confidential information, and (3) it smacks of punishment in trying to lower the client's credit rating.  S.C. Ethics Op. 94-11 (1994).  See also South Dakota Ethics Op. 95-3 (1995) and Mass. Ethics Op. 00-3 (2000) \n \n    The Alaska Bar Association reached a similar conclusion when it determined that \"an attorney who lists a client with a credit agency has revealed confidential information about the client for a purpose not permitted by ARPC 1.6 (b) (2) since such a referral is at most an indirect attempt to pressure the client to pay the fee.\"Alaska Ethics Op. No. 2000-3 (2000).  The Alaska Bar Ethics Opinion is based on the notion that listing an unpaid fee with a credit bureau is likely to create pressure on the client to pay the unpaid fee more from an in terrorem effect of a bad credit rating than from any merit to the claim. \n \n    The State Bar of Montana Ethics Committee concluded that an attorney may not report and disclose unpaid fees to a credit bureau because such reporting \"is not necessary to collect a fee because a delinquent fee can be collected without it.\"Mont. Ethics Op. 001027 (2000).  The Montana Opinion further concluded, \"The effect of a negative report is primarily punitive [and] it risks disclosure of confidential information about the former client which the lawyer is not permitted to reveal under Rule 1.6.\"See also New York State Ethics Opinion 684 (1996)  (reporting client's delinquent account to credit bureau does not qualify as an action \"to establish or collect the lawyer's fee \"within the meaning of the exception to the prohibition on disclosure of client information).  But see Florida Ethics Opinion 90-2 (1991) (it is ethically permissible for an attorney to report a delinquent former client to a credit reporting service, provided that confidential information unrelated to the collection of the debt was not disclosed and the debt was not in dispute). \n \n    While recognizing that in collecting a fee a lawyer may use collection agencies or retain counsel, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers concludes that a lawyer may not disclose or threaten to disclose information to non-clients not involved in the suit in order to coerce the client into settling and may not use or threaten tactics, such as personal harassment or asserting frivolous claims, in an effort to collect fees.  Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 41, comment d (2000).  The Restatement has determined that collection methods must preserve the client's right to contest the lawyer's position on the merits.  Id.  The direct methods that have been found to be ethical in other jurisdictions, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency, allow the client to contest the lawyer's position on the merits.  Indirect efforts, such as reporting a client to a credit bureau or disclosing client financial information to other creditors of a client or to individuals or entities with whom the client may do business, are in the nature of personal harassment and are not ethically permissible.  Accordingly, a lawyer may not disclose information concerning the financial relationship between himself and his client to third parties, other than through direct efforts to collect a fee, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency.\n The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2007 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about August 7, 2007.  The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August15, 2007.  No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion.  In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.","UrlName":"rule535","Order":78,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b190b9c0-1a52-4f28-910d-d3949f312ad5","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 10-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 10-1 Approved and Issued On July 11, 2013 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court of Georgia With Comments <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-101.pdf?sfvrsn=ca230921_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S10U1679</a> COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA Responding to a letter from the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council (GPDSC), the State Bar Formal Advisory Opinion Board (Board) issued Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1 (FAO 10-1), in which the Board concluded that the standard for the imputation of conflicts of interest under Rule 1.10 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct applies to the office of a circuit public defender as it would to a private law firm. FAO 10-1 was published in the June 2010 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal and was filed in this Court on June 15, 2010. On July 5, 2010, the GPDSC filed a petition for discretionary review which this Court granted on January 18, 2011. The Court heard oral argument on January 10, 2012. For reasons set forth below, we conclude, as did the Board, that Rule 1.10 (a) applies to a circuit public defender office as it would to a private law firm, and pursuant to State Bar Rule 4.403 (d), we hereby approve FAO 10-1 to the extent it so holds.1 1. At the heart of FAO 10-1 is the constitutional right to conflict-free counsel and the construction of Rule 1.10 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. “Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.” Wood v. Georgia , 450 U.S. 261, 271 ( 101 SC 1097, 67 LE2d 220) (2008). Indeed, this Court has stated in no uncertain terms that, “Effective counsel is counsel free from conflicts of interest.” Garland v. State , 283 Ga. 201 (657 SE2d 842) (2008). In keeping with this unequivocal right to conflict-free representation, Rule 1.10 (a) provides as follows:While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary .(Emphasis in original.) Comment [1] concerning Rule 1.10 defines “firm” to include “lawyers . . . in a legal services organization.” Comment [3] further provides “Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, . . . .”Under a plain reading of Rule 1.10 (a) and the comments thereto, circuit public defenders working in the circuit public defender office of the same judicial circuit are akin to lawyers working in the same unit of a legal services organization and each judicial circuit’s public defender’s office2 is a “firm” as the term is used in the rule. This construction is in keeping with our past jurisprudence. Cf. Hung v. State , 282 Ga. 684 (2) (653 SE2d 48) (2007) (attorney who filed motion for new trial was not considered to be “new” counsel for the purpose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where he and trial counsel were from the same public defender’s office); Kennebrew v. State , 267 Ga. 400 (480 SE2d 1) (1996) (appellate counsel who was from the same public defender office as appellant’s trial lawyer could not represent appellant on appeal where appellant had an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Ryan v. Thomas , 261 Ga. 661 (409 SE2d 507) (1991) (for the purpose of raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “attorneys in a public defender’s office are to be treated as members of a law firm...”); Love v. State , 293 Ga. App. 499, 501 at fn. 1 (667 SE2d 656) (2008). See also Reynolds v. Chapman , 253 F3d 1337, 1343-1344 (11th Cir. 2001) (“While public defenders’ offices have certain characteristics that distinguish them from typical law firms, our cases have not drawn a distinction between the two.”). Accordingly, FAO 10-1 is correct inasmuch is it concludes that public defenders working in the same judicial circuit are “firms” subject to the prohibition set forth in Rule 1.10 (a) when a conflict exists pursuant to the conflict of interest rules listed therein, including in particular Rule 1.7.3 That is, if it is determined that a single public defender in the circuit public defender’s office of a particular judicial circuit has an impermissible conflict of interest concerning the representation of co-defendants, then that conflict of interest is imputed to all of the public defenders working in the circuit public defender office of that particular judicial circuit. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §123 (d)(iv) (“The rules on imputed conflicts ...apply to a public-defender organization as they do to a law firm in private practice...”).2. Despite the unambiguous application of Rule 1.10 (a) to circuit public defenders, GPDSC complains that FAO 10-1 creates a per se or automatic rule of disqualification of a circuit public defender office. We disagree. This Court has stated that “[g]iven that multiple representation alone does not amount to a conflict of interest when one attorney is involved, it follows that counsel from the same [public defender office] are not automatically disqualified from representing multiple defendants charged with offenses arising from the same conduct.” Burns v. State , 281 Ga. 338, 340 (638 SE2d 299) (2006) (emphasis in the original). Here, Rule 1.10 does not become relevant or applicable until after an impermissible conflict of interest has been found to exist. It is only when it is decided that a public defender has an impermissible conflict in representing multiple defendants that the conflict is imputed to the other attorneys in that public defender’s office. Even then, multiple representations still may be permissible in some circumstances. See, e.g., Rule 1.10 (c) (“A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.) Thus, FAO 10-1 does not create a per se rule of disqualification of a circuit public defender’s office prior to the determination that an impermissible conflict of interest exists and cannot be waived or otherwise overcome.Although a lawyer (and by imputation his law firm, including his circuit public defender office) may not always have an impermissible conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case, this should not be read as suggesting that such multiple representation can routinely occur. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct explain that multiple representation of criminal defendants is ethically permissible only in the unusual case. See Rule 1.7, Comment [7] (“The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-defendant.”). We realize that the professional responsibility of lawyers to avoid even imputed conflicts of interest in criminal cases pursuant to Rule 1.10 (a) imposes real costs on Georgia’s indigent defense system, which continually struggles to obtain the resources needed to provide effective representation of poor defendants as the Constitution requires. See Gideon v. Wainwright , 373 U.S. 335 (83 SC 792, 9 LE2d 799) (1963). But the problem of adequately funding indigent defense cannot be solved by compromising the promise of Gideon . See Garland v. State , 283 Ga. 201, 204 (657 SE2d 842) (2008).Since FAO 10-1 accurately interprets Rule 1.10 (a) as it is to be applied to public defenders working in circuit public defender offices in the various judicial circuits of this State, it is approved.4Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1 approved. All the Justices concur.<hr width=\"33%\" size=\"1\" align=\"left\"> 1. In FAO 10-1, the Board purported to answer a broader question–whether “different lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit [may] represent codefendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so” – and we asked the parties to address a similar question in their briefs to this Court. That statement of the question, however, is too broad. The real issue addressed by the Board – and addressed in this opinion – is solely a question of conflict imputation, that is, whether Rule 1.10 (a) applies equally to circuit public defender offices and to private law firms. No doubt, the question of conflict imputation under Rule 1.10 (a) is part of the broader question that the Board purported to answer and that we posed to the parties. But whether multiple representations are absolutely prohibited upon imputation of a conflict – even with, for instance, the informed consent of the client or the employment of “screening” measures within an office or firm – is a question that goes beyond Rule 1.10 (a), and it is one that we do not attempt to answer in this opinion. To the extent that FAO 10-1 speaks to the broader question, we offer no opinion about its correctness.2.  There are 43 circuit public defender offices in Georgia.3.  Rule 1.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct provides:(a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).(b) If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing to the representation after: (1) consultation with the lawyer pursuant to Rule 1.0(c); (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation; and (3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.(c) Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation: (1) is prohibited by law or these Rules; (2) includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or a substantially related proceeding; or (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.4.  Our opinion cites several precedents that concern the constitutional guarantee of the assistance of counsel, and it is only fitting that we think about the constitutional values that Rule 1.10 promotes as we consider the meaning of Rule 1.10. We do not hold that the imputation of conflicts required by Rule 1.10 is compelled by the Constitution, nor do we express any opinion about the constitutionality of any other standard for imputation. Rule 1.10 is a useful aid in the fulfillment of the constitutional guarantee of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, but we do not hold today that it is essential to fulfill the constitutional guarantee. We do not endorse any particular alternative to Rule 1.10 (a), but we also do not foreclose the possibility that Rule 1.10 (a) could be amended so as to adequately safeguard high professional standards and the constitutional rights of an accused – by ensuring, among other things, the independent judgment of his counsel and the preservation of his confidences – and, at the same time, permit circuit public defender offices more flexibility in the representations of co-defendants. As of now, Rule 1.10 is the rule that we have adopted in Georgia, FAO 10-1 correctly interprets it, and we decide nothing more.FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 10-1 QUESTION PRESENTED: May different lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so? SUMMARY ANSWER: Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. OPINIONS: In Georgia, a substantial majority of criminal defendants are indigent.  Many of these defendants receive representation through the offices of the circuit public defenders.  More than 40 judicial circuit public defender offices operate across the State.Issues concerning conflicts of interest often arise in the area of criminal defense.  For example, a single lawyer may be asked to represent co-defendants who have antagonistic or otherwise conflicting interests.  The lawyer’s obligation to one such client would materially and adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent the other co-defendant, and therefore there would be a conflict of interest under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a).  See also Comment [7] to Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 (“…The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant”).  Each such client would also be entitled to the protection of Rule 1.6, which requires a lawyer to maintain the confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship with the client.  One lawyer representing co-defendants with conflicting interests certainly could not effectively represent both while keeping one client’s information confidential from the other.  See Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation…”).Some conflicts of interest are imputed from one lawyer to another within an organization.  Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a), “[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so….”  Therefore, the answer to the question presented depends in part upon whether a circuit public defender office constitutes a “firm” within the meaning of Rule 1.10.Neither the text nor the comments of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly answers the question.  The terminology section of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct defines “firm” as a “lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services organization.  See Comment, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification.”  Comment [1] to Rule 1.10 states that the term “firm” includes lawyers “in a legal services organization,” without defining a legal services organization.  Comment [3], however, provides that:Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid.  Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units.  As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation.That is the extent of the guidance in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and the comments thereto.  In the terms used in this Comment, the answer to the question presented is determined by whether lawyers in a circuit public defender’s office are in the same “unit” of a legal services organization.The Supreme Court of Georgia has not answered the question presented.  The closest it has come to doing so was in the case of Burns v. State , 281 Ga. 338 (2006).  In that case, two lawyers from the same circuit public defender’s office represented separate defendants who were tried together for burglary and other crimes.  The Court held that such representation was permissible because there was no conflict between the two defendants.  Presumably, therefore, the same assistant public defender could have represented both defendants.  The Court recognized that its conclusion left open “the issue whether public defenders should be automatically disqualified or be treated differently from private law firm lawyers when actual or possible conflicts arise in multiple defendant representation cases.”  Id. at 341.Other states, in case law and ethics opinions, have decided the question presented in disparate ways.  Some impute conflicts within particular local defender offices. See Commonwealth v. Westbrook , 400 A2d 160, 162 (Pa. 1979); Turner v. State , 340 So.2d 132, 133 (Fla. App. 2nd Dist. 1976); Tex. Ethics Op . 579 (November 2007);Va. Legal Ethics Op . No. 1776 (May 2003); Ct. Informal Op . 92-23 (July 1992);S.C. Bar Advisory Op . 92-21 (July 1992).  Some courts and committees have allowed for the possibility that there can be sufficient separation of lawyers even within the same office that imputation should not be automatic.  Graves v. State , 619 A.2d 123, 133-134 (Md. Ct. of Special Appeals 1993); Cal. Formal Op . No. 2002-158 (Sept. 2002); Montana Ethics Op . 960924.  Others have decided more generally against a per se rule of imputation of conflicts.  See Bolin v. State , 137 P.3d 136, 145 (Wyo.  2006); State v. Bell , 447 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1982); People v. Robinson , 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (Ill. 1979); State v. Cook , 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (Idaho App. 2007).The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals looked at an imputed conflict situation in a Georgia public defender office.  The Court noted that “[t]he current disciplinary rules of the State Bar in Georgia preclude an attorney from representing a client if one of his or her law partners cannot represent that client due to a conflict of interest.”  Reynolds v. Chapman , 253 F.3d 1337, 1344 (2001).  The Court further stated that “[w]hile public defender’s offices have certain characteristics that distinguish them from typical law firms, our cases have not drawn a distinction between the two.”  Reynolds , supra, p. 1343.The general rule on imputing conflicts within a law firm reflects two concerns.  One is the common economic interest among lawyers in a firm.  All lawyers in a firm might benefit if one lawyer sacrifices the interests of one client to serve the interests of a different, more lucrative client.  The firm, as a unified economic entity, might be tempted to serve this common interest, just as a single lawyer representing both clients would be tempted.  Second, it is routine for lawyers in a firm to have access to confidential information of clients.  A lawyer could access the confidential information of one of the firm’s clients to benefit a different client.  For at least these two reasons, a conflict of one lawyer in a private firm is routinely imputed to all the lawyers in the firm.  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Third, Sec. 123, Comment b.The first of these concerns is not relevant to a circuit public defender office.  “The salaried government employee does not have the financial interest in the success of departmental representation that is inherent in private practice.”  Frazier v. State , 257 Ga. 690, 695 (1987) citing ABA Formal Opinion 342.The concerns about confidentiality, however, are another matter.  The chance that a lawyer for one defendant might learn the confidential information of another defendant, even inadvertently, is too great to overlook.Other concerns include the independence of the assistant public defender and the allocation of office resources.  If one supervisor oversees the representation by two assistants of two clients whose interests conflict, the potential exists for an assistant to feel pressured to represent his or her client in a particular way, one that might not be in the client’s best interest.  Furthermore, conflicts could arise within the office over the allocation of investigatory or other resources between clients with conflicting interests.The ethical rules of the State Bar of Georgia should not be relaxed because clients in criminal cases are indigent.  Lawyers must maintain the same level of ethical responsibilities whether their clients are poor or rich.Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office are members of the same “unit” of a legal services organization and therefore constitute a “firm” within the meaning of Rule 1.10.  Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  Conversely, lawyers employed in circuit public defender offices in different judicial circuits are not considered members of the same “unit” or “firm” within the meaning of Rule 1.10.","UrlName":"rule557","Order":79,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"660638f2-b1d4-4ba1-adfc-8a9a2b9b48d0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 11-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON APRIL 14, 2011 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 11-1 \n \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nEthical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. \n \nOPINION: \n \n    Contracts to render legal services for a fixed fee are implicitly allowed by Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct (Ga. R.P.C.) 1.5 (a)(8) so long as the fee is reasonable. It is commonplace that criminal defense lawyers may provide legal services in return for a fixed fee. Lawyers engaged in civil practice also use fixed-fee contracts. A lawyer might, for example, properly charge a fixed fee to draft a will, handle a divorce, or bring a civil action. In these instances the client engaging the lawyer's services is known and the scope of the particular engagement overall can be foreseen and taken into account when the fee for services is mutually agreed. The principal ethical considerations guiding the agreement are that the lawyer must be competent to handle the matter (Ga. R.P.C. 1.1) and the fee charged must be reasonable and not excessive. See Ga. R.P.C. 1.5(a). \n \n    Analysis suggests that the ethical considerations that bear on the decision of a lawyer to enter into a fixed fee contract to provide legal services can grow more complex and nuanced as the specific context changes. What if, for example, the amount of legal services to be provided is indeterminate and cannot be forecast with certainty at the outset? Or that someone else is compensating the lawyer for the services to be provided to the lawyer's client? It is useful to consider such variations along a spectrum starting from the relatively simple case of a fixed fee paid by the client who will receive the legal representation for a contemplated, particular piece of legal work (e.g., drafting a will; defending a criminal prosecution) to appreciate the growing ethical complexity as the circumstances change. \n \n1. A sophisticated user of legal services offers to retain a lawyer or law firm to provide it with an indeterminate amount of legal services of a particular type for an agreed upon fixed fee. \n \n    In today's economic climate experienced users of legal services are increasingly looking for ways to curb the costs of their legal services and to reduce the uncertainty of these costs. Fixed fee contracts for legal services that promise both certainty and the reduction of costs can be an attractive alternative to an hourly-rate fee arrangement. A lawyer contemplating entering into a contract to furnish an unknown and indeterminate amount of legal services to such a client for a fixed fee should bear in mind that the fee set must be reasonable (Ga. R.P.C. 1.5(a)) and that the lawyer will be obligated to provide competent, diligent representation even if the amount of legal services required ultimately makes the arrangement less profitable than initially contemplated. The lawyer must accept and factor in that possibility when negotiating the fixed fee. \n \n    This situation differs from the standard case of a fixed-fee for an identified piece of legal work only because the amount of legal work that will be required is indeterminate and thus it is harder to predict the time and effort that may be required. Even though the difficulty or amount of work that may be required under such an arrangement will likely be harder to forecast at the outset, such arrangements can benefit both the client and the lawyer. The client, by agreeing to give, for example, all of its work of a particular type to a particular lawyer or law firm will presumably be able to get a discount and reduce its costs for legal services; the lawyer or law firm accepting the engagement can be assured of a steady and predictable stream of revenue during the term of the engagement. \n \n    There are, moreover, structural features in this arrangement that tend to harmonize the interests of the client and the lawyer. A lawyer or law firm contemplating such a fixed fee agreement will presumably be able to consult historical data of the client and its own experiences in handling similar matters in the past to arrive at an appropriate fee to charge. And the client who is paying for the legal services has a direct financial interest in their quality. The client will be the one harmed if the quality of legal services provided are inadequate. The client in these circumstances normally is in position to monitor the quality of the legal services it is receiving. It has every incentive not to reduce its expenditures for legal services below the level necessary to receive satisfactory representation in return. Accordingly, such fixed-fee contracts for an indeterminate amount of legal services to be rendered to the client compensating the lawyer for such services are allowable so long as the fee set complies with Ga. R.P.C. 1.5(a) and the lawyer fulfills his or her obligation to provide competent representation (Ga. R.P.C. 1.1) in a diligent manner (Ga. R.P.C. 1.3), even if the work becomes less profitable than anticipated. \n \n2. A third-party offers to retain a lawyer/law firm to handle an indeterminate amount of legal work of a particular type for a fixed fee for those whom the third-party is contractually obligated to defend and indemnify who will be the client of the lawyer/law firm. \n \n    This situation differs from the last because the third-party paying for the legal services is doing so for another who is the client of the lawyer. An example of this situation is where a liability insurer offers a lawyer or law firm a flat fee to defend all of its insureds in motor vehicle accident cases in a certain geographic area. Like the last situation, there is the problem of the indeterminacy of the amount of legal work that may be required for the fixed fee; and, in addition, there is the new factor that the lawyer will be accepting compensation for representing the client from one other than the client. \n \n    Several state bar association ethics committees have addressed the issue of whether a lawyer or law firm may enter into a contract with a liability insurer in which the lawyer or law firm agrees to handle all or some portion of the insurer's defense work for a fixed flat fee. With the exception of one state, Kentucky, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> all the other state bar associations' ethics opinions have determined that such arrangements are not per se prohibited by their ethics rules and have allowed lawyers to enter into such arrangements, with certain caveats. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2]  </a> It should be noted that all of the arrangements approved involved a flat fee per case, rather than a set fee regardless of the number of cases. \n \n    Although the significance of this fact was not directly discussed in the opinions, it does tend to reduce the risks arising from uncertainty and indeterminacy. Even though some cases may be more complex and time-consuming than the norm, others will be less so. While the lawyer will be obligated under the contract to handle each matter for the same fixed fee, the risk of a far greater volume of cases than projected is significantly reduced by a fixed fee per case arrangement. The lawyer or law firm can afford to increase staff to handle the work load, and under the law of large numbers, a larger pool of cases will tend to even out the average cost per case. \n \n    In analyzing the ethical concerns implicated by lawyers entering into fixed-fee contracts with liability insurers to represent their insureds, several state bar association ethics opinions have warned of the danger presented if the fixed fee does not provide adequate compensation. An arrangement that seriously under-compensates the lawyer could threaten to compromise the lawyer's ability to meet his or her professional obligations as a competent and zealous advocate and adversely affect the lawyer's independent professional judgment on behalf of each client. \n \n    As Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners Opinion 97-7 (December 5, 1997) explains it:\n \n    If a liability insurer pays an attorney or law firm a fixed flat fee which is insufficient in regards to the time and effort spent on the defense work, there is a risk that the attorney's interest in the matter and his or her professional judgment on behalf of the insured may be compromised by the insufficient compensation paid by the insurer. An attorney or law firm cannot enter into such an agreement.\n \n    The same point was echoed in Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 98-2 (June 18, 1998) in which the Florida board determined that such flat fixed-fee contracts are not prohibited under the Florida Rules but cautioned that the lawyer \"may not enter into a set fee agreement in which the set fee is so low as to impair her independent professional judgment or cause her to limit the representation of the insured.\" \n \n    In addition to the Georgia Rules referenced above, a Georgia lawyer considering entering into such an agreement should bear in mind Ga. R.P.C. 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) as well as Ga. R.P.C. 1.7(a) and its Comment [6]. \n \n    Rule 1.8(f) cautious that \"A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless. . . (2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship. . . <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a>\n \n    Ga. R.P.C. 1.7(a) provides that: \n \n    A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interest or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as provided in (b) [which allows client consent to cure conflicts in certain circumstances].\n \n    Ga. R.P.C. 1.7(c) makes it clear, however, that client consent to cure a conflict of interest is \"not permissible if the representation . . . (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\" \n \n    When a lawyer agrees to handle an unknown and indeterminable amount of work for a fixed fee, inadequate compensation and work overload may result. In turn, such effects could not only short-change competent and diligent representation of clients but generate a conflict between the lawyer's own personal and economic interests in earning a livelihood and maintaining the practice and effectively and competently representing the assigned clients. See Comment [6] to Rule 1.7: \"The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.\" \n \n    As other state bar ethics opinions have concluded, this situation does not lend itself to hard and fast categorical answers. Nothing in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct would forbid such a fee agreement per se. But \"it is clear that a lawyer may not accept a fixed fee arrangement if that will induce the lawyer to curtail providing competent and diligent representation of proper scope and exercising independent professional judgment.\"Michigan Bar Ethics Opinion RI-343 (January 25, 2008). Whether the acceptance of a fixed fee for an indeterminate amount of legal work poses an unacceptable risk that it will cause a violation of the lawyer's obligation to his or her clients cannot be answered in the abstract. It requires a judgment of the lawyer in the particular situation. \n \n    A structural factor tends to militate against an outsized risk of compromising the ability of the lawyer to provide an acceptable quality of legal representation in these circumstances just as it did in the last. The indemnity obligation means the insurer must bear the judgment-related financial risk up to the policy limits. Hence, \"the duty to indemnify encourages insurers to defend prudently.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> A liability insurer helps itself - not just its insured - by spending wisely on the defense of cases if it is liable for the judgment on a covered claim. Coupled with the lawyer's own professional obligation to provide competent representation in each case, this factor lessens the danger that the fixed fee will be set at so low a rate as to compromise appropriate representation of insureds by lawyers retained for this purpose by the insurer. \n \n3. A third-party offers to retain a lawyer or law firm to provide an indeterminate amount of legal work for an indeterminate number of clients where the third-party paying for the legal service has an obligation to furnish the assistance of counsel to those who will be clients of the lawyer but does not have a direct stake in the outcome of any representation. \n \n    A situation where a third party that will not be harmed directly itself by the result of the lawyer's representation is compensating the lawyer with a fixed fee to provide an indeterminate amount of legal services to the clients of the lawyer may present an unacceptable risk that the workload and compensation will compromise the competent and diligent representation of those clients. Examples might be a legal aid society that contracts with an outside lawyer to handle all civil cases of a particular type for a set fee for low-income or indigent clients or a governmental or private entity that contracts with independent contractor lawyers to provide legal representation to certain indigent criminal defendants. \n \n    In contrast to the earlier sets of circumstances, several structural factors that might ameliorate the danger of the arrangement resulting in an unmanageable work load and inadequate compensation that could compromise the legal representation are absent in this situation. First, and most obviously, there is a disconnection between the adequacy of the legal service rendered and an impact on the one paying for the legal representation. The one paying for the legal services is neither the client itself nor one obligated to indemnify the client and who therefore bears a judgment-related risk. While the third-party payor is in a position to monitor the adequacy of the legal representation it provides through the lawyers it engages and has an interest in assuring effective representation, it does not bear the same risk of inadequate representation as the client itself in situation No. 1 or the liability insurer in situation No. 2. \n \n    Second, and perhaps less obviously, this last situation is fraught with even greater risk from indeterminacy if there is no ceiling set on the number of cases that can be assigned and there is no provision for adjusting the agreed-upon compensation if the volume of cases or the demands of certain cases turns out to far exceed what was contemplated. Sheer workload can compromise the quality of legal services whatever the arrangement for compensation. But, where the payment is set at a fixed annual fee rather than on a fixed fee per case basis, the ability of the lawyer to staff up to handle a greater-than-expected volume with increased revenue is removed. \n \n    Accordingly, as compared to the other examples, the risk that inadequate compensation and case overload may eventually compromise the adequacy of the legal representation is heightened in these circumstances. A lawyer entering into such a contract must assess carefully the likelihood that such an arrangement in actual operation, if not on its face, will pose significant risks of non-compliance with Ga. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.8(f) or 1.7. \n \n    In this regard, a fee arrangement that is so seriously inadequate that it systematically threatens to undermine the ability of the lawyer to deliver competent legal services is not a reasonable fee. Ga. R.P.C. 1.5 Comment [3] warns that:\n \n    An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required. . . .\n \n   And Comment [1] to Ga. R.P.C. 1.3 reminds that \"A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that each matter can be handled adequately.\" \n \n   A failure to assess realistically at the outset the volume of cases and the adequacy of the compensation and to make an informed judgment about the lawyer's ability to render competent and diligent representation to the clients under the agreement could also result in prohibited conflicts of interest under Ga. R. P.C. 1.7(a). If an un-capped caseload or under-compensation forces a lawyer to underserve some clients by limiting preparation <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\"> [5] </a> and advocacy in order to handle adequately the representation of other clients or the fixed fee systematically confronts the lawyer with choosing between the lawyer's own economic interests and the adequate representation of clients a conflict of interest is present. Ga. R. P. C. 1.7 (c) makes it clear that a conflict that renders it \"reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the effected clients \"cannot be under-taken or continued, even with client consent. \n \n   It is not possible in the abstract to say categorically whether any particular agreement by a lawyer to provide legal services in this third situation violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. However, arrangements that obligate lawyers to handle an unknown and indeterminate number of cases without any ceiling on case volume or any off-setting increase in compensation due to the case volume carry very significant risks that competent and diligent representation of clients may be compromised and that the lawyer's own interests or duties to another client will adversely affect the representation. Lawyers contemplating entering into such arrangements need to give utmost attention to these concerns and exercise a most considered judgment about the likelihood that the contractual obligations that they will be accepting can be satisfied in a manner fully consistent with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer faced with a representation that will result in the violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct must decline or terminate it, Ga. R. P. C. 1.16(a)(1) <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\"> [6] </a> , unless ordered by a court to continue. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\"> [7] </a> \n \n <a name=\"ftn1\"> 1. </a> Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion KBA E - 368 (July 1994). This opinion prohibiting per se lawyers from entering into set flat fee contracts to do all of a liability insurer's defense work was adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in American Insurance Association v. Kentucky Bar Association , 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996). The result and rationale are strongly criticized by Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle Over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 Conn. Ins. L. J. 205 (1997-98). \n \n <a name=\"ftn2\"> 2. </a> Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 98-2 (June 18, 1998) (An attorney may accept a set fee per case from an insurance company to defend all of the insurer's third party insurance defense work unless the attorney concludes that her independent professional judgment will be affected by the agreement); Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct Ethics Opinion 86-13 (February 11, 1987) (agreement to provide specific professional services for a fixed fee is not improper where service is inherently capable of being stated and circumscribed and any additional professional services that become necessary will be compensated at attorney's regular hourly rate.); Michigan Bar Ethics Opinion RI-343 (January 25, 2008) (Not a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to contract with an insurance company to represent its insureds on a fixed fee basis, so long as the arrangement does not adversely affect the lawyer's independent professional judgment and the lawyer represents the insured with competence and diligence.); New Hampshire Bar Association  Formal Ethics Opinion 1990-91|5 (Fixed fee for insurance defense work is not per se prohibited; but attorney, no matter what the fee arrangement, is duty bound to act with diligence.); Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Opinion 97-7 (December 5, 1997) (Fixed fee agreement to do all of liability insurer's defense work must provide reasonable and adequate compensation. The set fee must not be so inadequate that it compromises the attorney's professional obligations as a competent and zealous advocate); Oregon State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion No. 2005-98 (Lawyer may enter flat fee per case contract to represent insureds but this does not limit, in any way lawyer's obligations to each client to render competent and diligent representation. \"Lawyer owes same duty to 'flat fee' clients that lawyer would own to any other client.\"\"Lawyers may not accept a fee so low as to compel the conclusion that insurer was seeking to shirk its duties to insureds and to enlist lawyer's assistance in doing so.\"); Wisconsin State Bar Ethics Opinion E-83-15 (Fixed fee for each case of insurance defense is permissible; attorney reminded of duty to represent a client both competently and zealously.) \n \n <a name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> . Rule 5.4(c) similarly commands that:  \"A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.\" \n \n <a name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> . Silver, note 1 at 236. \n \n <a name=\"ftn5\"> 5 </a> . Ga. R. P. C. 1.1 requires that a lawyer \"provide competent representation to a client.\"Comment [5] spells out the thoroughness and preparation that a lawyer must put forth, noting that \"[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation . (emphasis added). \n \n <a name=\"ftn6\"> 6 </a> . See ABA Formal Opinion 06-441 (May 2006) titled \"Ethical Obligations of Lawyers Who Represent Indigent Criminal Defendants When Excessive Caseloads Interfere With Competent and Diligent Representation,\"suggesting that if a caseload becomes too burdensome for a lawyer to handle competently and ethically the lawyer \"must decline to accept new cases rather than withdraw from existing cases if the acceptance of a new case will result in her workload becoming excessive.\" \n \n <a name=\"ftn7\"> 7 </a> . \". . . When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.\"Ga. R. P. C. 1.16(c). \n \n    The second publication of this opinion appeared in the June 2011 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about June 6, 2011. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on June 23, 2011. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. \n ","UrlName":"rule536","Order":80,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d0f6cc2e-d9eb-4fa2-823c-4b4489dcb26e","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 13-1","Content":"FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 13-1 Approved And Issued On September 22, 2014 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order of The Supreme Court Of Georgia <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-131.pdf?sfvrsn=1ef116f6_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S14U0705</a>                                                     QUESTIONS PRESENTED : 1.    Does a Lawyer <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct when he/she conducts a “witness only” real estate closing? 2.    Can a Lawyer who is closing a real estate transaction meet his/her obligations under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by reviewing, revising as necessary, and adopting documents sent from a lender or from other sources? 3.    Must all funds received by a Lawyer in a real estate closing be deposited into and disbursed from the Lawyer’s trust account? SUMMARY ANSWER : 1.    A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a “witness only” closing. Unless parties to a transaction are handling it pursuant to Georgia’s pro se exemption, Georgia law requires that a Lawyer handle a real estate closing (see O.C.G.A § 15-19-50, UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> . When handling a real estate closing in Georgia a Lawyer does not absolve himself/herself from violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by claiming that he/she has acted only as a witness and not as an attorney. (See UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1). 2.    The closing Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction, resolve any errors in the paperwork, detect and resolve ambiguities in title or title defects, and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer conducting a real estate closing may use documents prepared by others after ensuring their accuracy, making necessary revisions, and adopting the work. 3.    A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disburse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer. (See Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(II) and Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1). OPINION:     A “witness only” closing occurs when an individual presides over the execution of deeds of conveyance and other closing documents but purports to do so merely as a witness and notary, not as someone who is practicing law. (UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2). In order to protect the public from those not properly trained or qualified to render these services, Lawyers are required to “be in control of the closing process from beginning to end.” (Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-3). A Lawyer who purports to handle a closing in the limited role of a witness violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.     In recent years many out-of-state lenders, including some of the largest banking institutions in the country, have changed the way they manage the real estate transactions they fund. The following practices of these lenders have been reported. These national lenders hire attorneys who agree to serve the limited role of presiding over the execution of the documents (i.e., “witness only” closings). In advance of a “witness only” closing an attorney typically receives “signing instructions” and a packet of documents prepared by the lender or at the lender’s direction. The instructions specifically warn the attorney NOT to review the documents or give legal advice to any of the parties to the transaction. The “witness only” attorney obtains the appropriate signatures on the documents, notarizes them, and returns them by mail to the lender or to a third party entity.     The Lawyer’s failure to review closing documents can facilitate foreclosure fraud, problems with title, and other errors that may not be detected until years later when the owner of a property attempts to refinance, sell or convey it.     A Lawyer must provide competent representation and must exercise independent professional judgment in rendering advice. (Rules 1.1 and 2.1, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct). When a Lawyer agrees to serve as a mere figurehead, so that it appears there is a Lawyer “handling” a closing, the Lawyer violates his/her obligations under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 8.4). The Lawyer’s acceptance of the closing documents or signature on the closing statement is the imprimatur of a successful transaction. Because UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and the Supreme Court Order adopting it require (subject to the pro se exception) that only a Lawyer can close a real estate transaction, the Lawyer signing the closing statement or accepting the closing documents would be found to be doing so in his or her capacity as a Lawyer. Therefore, when a closing Lawyer purports to act merely as a witness, this is a misrepresentation of the Lawyer’s role in the transaction. Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(4) provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in “conduct involving . . . misrepresentation.”     The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct allow Lawyers to outsource both legal and nonlegal work. (See ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 08-451.) A Lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by receiving documents from the client or elsewhere for use in a closing transaction, even though the Lawyer has not supervised the preparation of the documents. However, the Lawyer is responsible for utilizing these documents in compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, and must review and adopt work used in a closing. Georgia law allows a title insurance company or other persons to examine records of title to real property, prepare abstracts of title, and issue related insurance. (O.C.G.A. § 15-19-53). Other persons may provide attorneys with paralegal and clerical services, so long as “at all times the attorney receiving the information or services shall maintain full professional and direct responsibility to his clients for the information and services received.” (O.C.G.A. § 15-19-54; also see UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and Rules 5.3 and 5.5, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct).     The obligation to review, revise, approve and adopt documents used in a real estate closing applies to the entire series of events that comprise a closing. (Formal Advisory Opinions No. 86-5 and 00-3, and UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2). While the Supreme Court has not explicitly enumerated what all of those events are, they may include, but not be limited to: (i) rendering an opinion as to title and the resolution of any defects in marketable title; (ii) preparation of deeds of conveyance, including warranty deeds, quitclaim deeds, deeds to secure debt, and mortgage deeds; (iii) overseeing and participating in the execution of instruments conveying title; (iv) supervising the recordation of documents conveying title; and (v) in those situations where the Lawyer receives funds, depositing and disbursing those funds in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). Even if some of these steps are performed elsewhere, the Lawyer maintains full professional and direct responsibility for the entire transaction and for the services rendered to the client.     Finally, as in any transaction in which a Lawyer receives client funds, a Lawyer must comply with Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(II) when handling a real estate closing. If the Lawyer receives funds on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity he/she must deposit the funds into, and administer them from, a trust account in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). (Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1). It should be noted that Georgia law also allows the lender to disburse funds. (O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13(a)(10)). A Lawyer violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct when he/she delivers closing proceeds to a title company or to a third party settlement company for disbursement instead of depositing them into and disbursing them from an attorney escrow account. __________________________________________________ <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1. </a> Bar Rule 1.0(j) provides that “Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its Rules to practice law in the State of Georgia, including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2. </a> The result is to exclude Nonlawyers as defined by Bar Rule 1.0(k), Domestic Lawyers as defined by Bar Rule 1.0(d), and Foreign Lawyers as defined by Bar Rule 1.0(f), from the real estate closing process.","UrlName":"rule572","Order":81,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0607ab69-dce9-40fe-943c-d25edbc1a458","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 13-2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON OCTOBER 23, 2013 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 13-2 \n<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=33056\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S14U0706</a> \n QUESTIONS PRESENTED: \n<ol> \n <li>May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?</li> \n <li>May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?</li> \n</ol>\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n<ol> \n <li>A lawyer may not ethically agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such agreements violate Rule 1.8(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from providing financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation.</li> \n <li>Further, a lawyer may not seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such conduct violates Rule 8.4(a)(1) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from knowingly inducing another lawyer to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n</ol>\n OPINION: \nLawyers often represent clients in civil actions, such as personal injury or medical malpractice, who have incurred substantial medical bills as a result of their injuries. These lawyers are required to work diligently to obtain a fair settlement for these clients. Obtaining a settlement or judgment can sometimes take years.\nThe proper disbursement of settlement proceeds is a tremendous responsibility for a lawyer who receives such proceeds. Clients are often in need of funds from the settlement. Lawyers need payment for their services. And third persons such as medical providers, insurance carriers, or Medicare and Medicaid seek reimbursement of their expenses from the settlement.\n Increasingly, lawyers who represent plaintiffs are being asked to personally indemnify the opposing party and counsel from claims by third persons to the settlement proceeds. Lawyers are concerned not only about whether it is ethical to enter into such an agreement but also whether it is ethical to seek to require other lawyers to enter into such an agreement. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> \n 1. A lawyer may not ethically agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. \nThe first issue is governed by Rule 1.8(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as follows:\n“A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n1. a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or\n2. a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.”\nComment 4 provides further guidance:\n“Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above.”\n Financial assistance can take many forms. Such assistance includes gifts, loans and loan guarantees. Any type of guarantee to cover a client’s debts constitutes financial assistance. Rule 1.8(e) provides narrow exceptions to the prohibition on a lawyer providing financial assistance to a client in connection with litigation. Those exceptions do not apply when a lawyer enters into a personal indemnification agreement. Because a lawyer, under Rule 1.8(e), may not provide financial assistance to a client by, for example, paying or advancing the client’s medical expenses in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, it follows that a lawyer may not agree, either voluntarily or at the insistence of the client or parties being released, to guarantee or accept ultimate responsibility for such expenses. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> \n Moreover, any insistence by a client that the lawyer accept a settlement offer containing an indemnification agreement on the part of the lawyer might require the lawyer to withdraw from the representation. The lawyer may otherwise be in violation of Rule 1.16(a)(1), which provides that “a lawyer shall … withdraw from the representation of a client if … the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> \n 2. A lawyer may not seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. \n The second issue is governed by Rule 8.4(a)(1), which provides that “It shall be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to … violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.” (emphasis added). Comment 1 to Rule 8.4 also provides direction:\n“The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevent a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer cannot.”\n<blockquote style=\"margin-left: 80px\"></blockquote>\n In light of the conclusion that plaintiff’s counsel may not agree to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third parties, it is also improper for a lawyer representing a defendant to seek to require that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third parties to the settlement funds. Nor can the lawyer representing the defendant avoid such a violation by instructing his client or the insurance company to propose or demand the indemnification. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> \n_______________________________________________\n <a name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> .This opinion is intended to address the ethical concerns associated with a lawyer’s agreement to indemnify. This opinion does not address the legal or ethical issues involved in the disbursement of settlement funds.\n\n <a name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> . This opinion is consistent with advisory opinions from other states holding that an agreement by a client’s lawyer to guarantee a client’s obligations to third parties amounts to guaranteeing financial assistance to the client, in violation of Rule 1.8(e) or its equivalent. See, e.g. , Alabama State Bar Ethics Opinion RO 2011-01; Arizona State Bar Ethics Opinion 03-05; Delaware State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 2011-1; Florida Bar Staff Opinion 30310 (2011); Illinois State Bar Association Advisory Opinion 06-01 (violation of Illinois Rule 1.8(d), which is similar to Rule 1.8(e)); Indiana State Bar Association Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1 of 2005 (non-Medicare and Medicaid settlement agreement that requires counsel to indemnify opposing party from subrogation liens and third-party claims violates Indiana rules); Maine Ethics Opinion 204 (2011); Missouri Formal Advisory Opinion 125 (2008); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics Formal Opinion 2010-3; Supreme Court of Ohio Opinion 2011-1; Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee Opinion 2011-6 (2012); South Carolina Ethics Advisory Opinion 08-07; Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion 11-01; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1858 (2011); Washington State Bar Association Advisory Opinion 1736 (1997); Wisconsin Formal Opinion E-87-11 (1998).\n\nMany of these jurisdictions also hold that an agreement to guarantee a client’s obligations to third parties also violates Rule 1.7(a) or its equivalent regarding conflicts of interest. In reaching its decision, the Board does not consider it necessary to address that issue here.\n <a name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> .The mere suggestion by the client that the lawyer guarantee or indemnify against claims would not require withdrawal by the lawyer, only the client’s demand that the lawyer do so would require withdrawal. See Rule 1.16(a)(1) (“A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.”).\n\n <a name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> .This opinion is consistent with advisory opinions from other states holding that a lawyer’s demand that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third parties to the settlement funds violates Rule 8.4(a)(1) or its equivalent. See, e.g. , Alabama State Bar Ethics Opinion RO 2011-01; Florida Bar Staff Opinion 30310 (2011); Missouri Formal Advisory Opinion 125 (2008); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics Formal Opinion 2010-3; Supreme Court of Ohio Opinion 2011-1; Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion 11-01; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1858 (2011)). \n \n\n The second publication of this opinion appeared in the December 2013 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about December 19, 2013. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on January 21, 2014. No review was requested within the 20-day review period. On March 28, 2014, the Supreme Court of Georgiai issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.","UrlName":"rule569","Order":82,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d9515c0b-e7cb-489c-937b-a0a3195f0368","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD PURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON JULY 25, 2016 FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16-1 (Redrafted Version of FAO No. 03-2) <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-161.pdf?sfvrsn=e4dc72e3_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S16U1765</a>                                                     QUESTION PRESENTED: Does the obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, apply as between two jointly represented clients? SUMMARY ANSWER: The obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, applies as between two jointly represented clients. An attorney must honor one client’s request that information be kept confidential from the other jointly represented client. Honoring the client’s request will, in almost all circumstances, require the attorney to withdraw from the joint representation. OPINION: Unlike the attorney-client privilege, jointly represented clients do not lose the protection of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, as to each other by entering into the joint representation. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, Opinion No. 296 (2000) and Committee on Professional Ethics, New York State Bar Association, Opinion No. 555 (1984). Nor do jointly represented clients impliedly consent to a sharing of confidences with each other.When one client in a joint representation requests that some information relevant to the representation be kept confidential from the other client, the attorney must honor the request and then determine if continuing with the representation while honoring the request will: a) be inconsistent with the lawyer’s obligations to keep the other client informed under Rule 1.4, Communication; b) materially and adversely affect the representation of the other client under Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule; or c) both.The lawyer has discretion to continue with the joint representation while not revealing the confidential information to the other client only to the extent that he or she can do so consistent with these rules. If maintaining the confidence will constitute a violation of Rule 1.4 or Rule 1.7, as it almost certainly will, the lawyer should maintain the confidence and discontinue the joint representation. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> Consent to conflicting representations, of course, is permitted under Rule 1.7. Consent to continued joint representation in these circumstances, however, ordinarily would not be available either because it would be impossible to obtain the required informed consent without disclosing the confidential information in question <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> or because consent is not permitted under Rule 1.7 in that the continued joint representation would “involve circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.” Rule 1.7 (c) (3).The potential problems that confidentiality can create between jointly represented clients make it especially important that clients understand the requirements of a joint representation prior to entering into one. When an attorney is considering a joint representation, informed consent of the clients, confirmed in writing, is required prior to the representation “if there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s . . . duties to [either of the jointly represented clients] . . . will materially and adversely affect the representation of [the other] client.” Rule 1.7. Whether or not informed consent is required, however, a prudent attorney will always discuss with clients wishing to be jointly represented the need for sharing confidences between them, obtain their consent to such sharing, and inform them of the consequences of either client’s nevertheless insisting on confidentiality as to the other client and, in effect, revoking the consent. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> If it appears to the attorney that either client is uncomfortable with the required sharing of confidential information that joint representation requires, the attorney should reconsider whether joint representation is appropriate in the circumstances. If a putative jointly represented client indicates a need for confidentiality from another putative jointly represented client, then it is very likely that joint representation is inappropriate and the putative clients need individual representation by separate attorneys.The above guidelines, derived from the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and consistent with the primary advisory opinions from other jurisdictions, are general in nature. There is no doubt that their application in some specific contexts will create additional specific concerns seemingly unaddressed in the general ethical requirements. We are, however, without authority to depart from the Rules of Professional Conduct that are intended to be generally applicable to the profession. For example, there is no doubt that the application of these requirements to the joint representation of spouses in estate planning will sometimes place attorneys in the awkward position of having to withdraw from a joint representation of spouses because of a request by one spouse to keep relevant information confidential from the other and, by withdrawing, not only ending trusted lawyer-client relationships but also essentially notifying the other client that an issue of confidentiality has arisen. See, e.g., Florida State Bar Opinion 95-4 (1997) (“The attorney may not reveal confidential information to the wife when the husband tells the attorney that he wishes to provide for a beneficiary that is unknown to the wife. The attorney must withdraw from the representation of both husband and wife because of the conflict presented when the attorney must maintain the husband’s separate confidences regarding the joint representation.”) A large number of highly varied recommendations have been made about how to deal with these specific concerns in this specific practice setting. See, e.g., Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses , 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1253 (1994); and, Collett, And The Two Shall Become As One . . . Until The Lawyers Are Done , 7 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics &Public Policy 101 (1993) for discussion of these recommendations. Which recommendations are followed, we believe, is best left to the practical wisdom of the good lawyers practicing in this field so long as the general ethical requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct as described in this Opinion are met.___________________________________________<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7, cmt. 31 (“As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation.”)<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> See GEORGIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.0(h) (defining “informed consent” as “the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct”); see also id ., cmt. 6 (“The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client’s or other person’s options and alternatives.”)<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7, cmt. 31 (advising that “[a] lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other). The second publication of this opinion appeared in the June 2016 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about June 7. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on July 1, 2016. No review was requested within the 20-day review period. On July 25, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.  ","UrlName":"rule590","Order":83,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9b253c5e-3f55-491e-8e49-20b048a5a176","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION 16-2 Approved And Issued On April 16, 2018 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-162.pdf?sfvrsn=4ea19b8c_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S17U0553</a> QUESTION PRESENTED: May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? SUMMARY ANSWER: When it becomes clear that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the child's wishes and the attorney's considered opinion of the child's best interests, the attorney must withdraw from his or her role as the child's guardian ad litem. OPINION: Relevant Rules This question squarely implicates several of Georgia's Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly, Rule 1.14.  Rule 1.14, dealing with an attorney's ethical duties towards a child or other client with diminished capacity, provides that \"the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.\"Comment 1 to Rule 1.14 goes on to note that \"children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> This question also involves Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation, and Rule 1.7, governing conflicts of interest. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> Comment 2 to Rule 1.7 indicates that \"[l]oyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests.  The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> This situation also implicates Rule 3.7, the lawyer as a witness, to the extent that the guardian ad litem must testify and may need to advise the court of the conflict between the child's expressed wishes and what he deems the best interests of the child.  Finally, Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, may also be violated if the attorney presents the disagreement to the Court.Statutory Background Georgia law requires the appointment of an attorney for a child as the child's counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> The statute also provides that the court shall additionally appoint a guardian ad litem for the child, and that the child's counsel is eligible to serve as the guardian ad litem unless there is a conflict of interest between the lawyer’s duty as an attorney for the child and the lawyer’s “considered opinion” of the child’s best interest as the guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\"> [5] </a> In addition to the child's statutory right to counsel, a child in a termination of parental rights proceedings also has a federal constitutional right to counsel. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\"> [6] </a> In Georgia, a guardian ad litem's role is \"to protect the interests of the child and to investigate and present evidence to the court on the child's behalf.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\"> [7] </a> The best interests of the child standard is paramount in considering changes or termination of parental custody.  See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 276 Ga. 372, 377 (2003) (\"[t]he paramount concern in any change of custody must be the best interests and welfare of the minor child \").  The Georgia Court of Appeals held in In re A.P. based on the facts of that case that the attorney-guardian ad litem dual representation provided for under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(a) (the predecessor to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d)) does not result in an inherent conflict of interest, given that \"the fundamental duty of both a guardian ad litem and an attorney is to act in the best interests of the [child]. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn8\"> [8] </a> This advisory opinion is necessarily limited to the ethical obligations of an attorney once a conflict of interest in the representation has already arisen.  Therefore, we need not address whether or not the dual representation provided for under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d) results in an inherent conflict of interest. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn9\"> [9] </a> Discussion The child's attorney's first responsibility is to his or her client. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn10\"> [10] </a> Rule 1.2 makes clear that an attorney in a normal attorney-client relationship is bound to defer to a client's wishes regarding the ultimate objectives of the representation. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn11\"> [11] </a> Rule 1.14 requires the attorney to maintain, \"as far as reasonably possible . . . a normal client-lawyer relationship with the [child]. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn12\"> [12] </a> An attorney who \"reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest \"may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn13\"> [13] </a> Importantly, the Rule does not simply direct the attorney to act in the client's best interests, as determined solely by the attorney.  At the point that the attorney concludes that the child's wishes and best interests are in conflict, the attorney must petition the court for removal as the child's guardian ad litem.  The attorney must consider Rule 1.6 before disclosing any confidential client information other than that there is a conflict which requires such removal.  If the conflict between the attorney's view of the child's best interests and the child's view of his or her own interests is severe, the attorney may seek to withdraw entirely under Rule 1.16(b)(3). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn14\"> 14 </a> The attorney may not withdraw as the child's counsel and then seek appointment as the child's guardian ad litem, as the child would then be a former client to whom the former attorney/guardian ad litem would owe a continuing duty of confidentiality. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn15\"> 15 </a> This conclusion is in accord with many other states. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn16\"> 16 </a> For instance, Ohio permits an attorney to be appointed both as a child's counsel and as the child's guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn17\"> 17 </a> Ohio ethics rules prohibit continued service in the dual roles when there is a conflict between the attorney's determination of best interests and the child's express wishes. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn18\"> 18 </a> Court rules and applicable statutes require the court to appoint another person as guardian ad litem for the child. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn19\"> 19 </a> An attorney who perceives a conflict between his role as counsel and as guardian ad litem is expressly instructed to notify the court of the conflict and seek withdrawal as guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn20\"> 20 </a> This solution (withdrawal from the guardian ad litem role once it conflicts with the role as counsel) is in accord with an attorney's duty to the client. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn21\"> 21 </a> Connecticut's Bar Association provided similar advice to its attorneys, and Connecticut's legislature subsequently codified that position into law. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn22\"> 22 </a> Similarly, in Massachusetts, an attorney representing a child must represent the child's expressed preferences, assuming that the child is reasonably able to make \"an adequately considered decision . . . even if the attorney believes the child's position to be unwise or not in the child's best interest. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn23\"> 23 </a> Even if a child is unable to make an adequately considered decision, the attorney still has the duty to represent the child's expressed preferences unless doing so would \"place the child at risk of substantial harm. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn24\"> 24 </a> In New Jersey, a court-appointed attorney needs to be \"a zealous advocate for the wishes of the client . . . unless the decisions are patently absurd or pose an undue risk of harm. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn25\"> 25 </a> New Jersey's Supreme Court was skeptical that an attorney's duty of advocacy could be successfully reconciled with concern for the client's best interests. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn26\"> 26 </a> In contrast, other states have developed a \"hybrid \"model for attorneys in child custody cases serving simultaneously as counsel for the child and as their guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn27\"> 27 </a> This \"hybrid \"approach \"necessitates a modified application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn28\"> 28 </a> That is, the states following the hybrid model, acknowledge the \"'hybrid' nature of the role of attorney/guardian ad litem which necessitates a modified application of the Rules of Professional Conduct,\"excusing strict adherence to those rules. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn29\"> 29 </a> The attorney under this approach is bound by the client's best interests, not the client's expressed interests. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn30\"> 30 </a> The attorney must present the child's wishes and the reasons the attorney disagrees to the court. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn31\"> 31 </a> Although acknowledging that this approach has practical benefits, we conclude that strict adherence to the Rules of Professional Conduct is the sounder approach.Conclusion At the point that the attorney concludes that the child's wishes and best interests are in conflict, the attorney must petition the court for removal as the child's guardian ad litem and must consider Rule 1.6 before disclosing any confidential client information other than that there is a conflict which requires such removal.  If the conflict between the attorney's view of the child's best interests and the child's view of his or her own interests is severe, the attorney may seek to withdraw entirely following Rule 1.16(b)(3).________________________________________<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14, Comment 1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.2, 1.7. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, Comment 4. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(b) (“The court shall appoint an attorney for a child in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The appointment shall be made as soon as practicable to ensure adequate representation of such child and, in any event, before the first court hearing that may substantially affect the interests of such child”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn5\"> 5 </a> O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d) (“The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child in a termination proceeding; provided, however, that such guardian ad litem may be the same person as the child's attorney unless or until there is a conflict of interest between the attorney's duty to such child as such child's attorney and the attorney's considered opinion of such child's best interests as guardian ad litem”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn6\"> 6 </a> Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359-61 (N.D. Ga. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 2010 WL 1558980 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2010). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn7\"> 7 </a> See Padilla v. Melendez, 228 Ga. App. 460, 462 (1997). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ft87\"> 8 </a> In re A.P., 291 Ga. App. 690, 691 (2008). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn9\"> 9 </a> See, e.g., Wis. Ethics Op. E-89-13 (finding no inherent conflict of interest with the dual representation of an attorney and guardian but concluding that if a conflict does arise based on specific facts, the attorney's ethical responsibility is to resign as the guardian). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn10\"> 10 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn11\"> 11 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2, Comment 1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn12\"> 12 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn13\"> 13 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn14\"> 14 </a> Rule 1.16 (b)(3) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a lawyer may seek to withdraw if “the client insists upon pusuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn15\"> 15 </a> See Rule 1.6(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn16\"> 16 </a> See, e.g., Wis. Ethics Op. E-89-13, Conflicts of Interests; Guardians (1989) (providing that dual representation as counsel and guardian ad litem is permitted until conflict between the roles occurs, and then the attorney must petition the court for a new guardian ad litem); Ariz. Ethics Op. 86-13, Juvenile Proceedings; Guardians (1986) (providing that a \"lawyer may serve as counsel and guardian ad litem for a minor child in a dependency proceeding so long as there is no conflict between the child's wishes and the best interests of the child \"). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn17\"> 17 </a> Ohio Board of Comm'rs. on Griev. and Discipline, Op. 2006-5, 2006 WL 2000108, at*1 (2006). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn18\"> 18 </a> Id. at *2. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn19\"> 19 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn20\"> 20 </a> Id., quoting In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St. 3d 229, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985) (superseded by statute on other grounds). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn21\"> 21 </a> Id. See also Baxter, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 232 (\"[w]hen an attorney is appointed to represent a person and is also appointed guardian ad litem for that person, his first and highest duty is to zealously represent his client within the bounds of the law and to champion his client's cause \"). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn22\"> 22 </a> See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, CT Eth. Op. 94-29, 1994 WL 780846, at *3 (1994); In re Tayquon, 821 A.2d 796, 803-04 (Conn. App. 2003) (discussing revisions to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-129a). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn23\"> 23 </a> See Mass Comm. For Public Counsel Servs., Performance Standards, Standard 1.6(b), at 8-10, available at http://www.publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_manual/private_counsel_manual_pdf/chapters/chapter_4_sections/civil/trial_panel_standards.pdf; See also In re Georgette, 785 N.E.2d 356, 368 (Mass. 2003). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn24\"> 24 </a> Mass Comm. For Public Counsel Servs., Performance Standards, Standard 1.6(d) at 11. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn25\"> 25 </a> In re Mason, 701 A.2d 979, 982 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (internal citations omitted). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn26\"> 26 </a> See In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1285 (N.J. 1994). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn27\"> 27 </a> See Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 153-54 (Wyo. 1998); In re Marriage of Rolfe, 216 Mont. 39, 51-53, 699 P.2d 79, 86-87 (Mont. 1985); In re Christina W., 639 S.E.2d at 777 (requiring the guardian to give the child's opinions consideration \"where the child has demonstrated an adequate level of competency [but] there is no requirement that the child's wishes govern.\"); see also Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 390 (Alaska 1977) (\"[I]t is equally plain that the guardian is not required to advocate whatever placement might seem preferable to a client of tender years.\") (superseded by statute on other grounds); Alaska Bar Assn Ethics Committee Op. 85-4 (November 8, 1985)(concluding that duty of confidentiality is modified in order to effectuate the child's best interests); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee Op. No. 07-02 (June 7, 2007) (noting that Utah statute requires a guardian ad litem to notify the Court if the minor's wishes differ from the attorney's determination of best interests). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn28\"> 28 </a> Clark, 953 P.2d at 153. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn29\"> 29 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn30\"> 30 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn31\"> 31 </a> Id. at 153-54; Rolfe, 699 P.2d at 87. <div></div> </div>","UrlName":"rule600","Order":84,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"53dcc89b-edd1-496d-a18f-a08bc17059cc","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-3","Content":"STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD PURSUANT TO BAR RULE 4-403 ON JUNE 14, 2016 FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16-3 (Proposed FAO No. 15-R1) <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-163.pdf?sfvrsn=f384af46_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S17U0554</a>QUESTION PRESENTED: May a sole practitioner <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[1] </a>use a firm name that includes “group,” “firm,” “& Associates”?SUMMARY ANSWER: A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “& Associates” because both terms would incorrectly imply that the sole practitioner practices with other lawyers. However, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.”OPINION: The question presented is governed by Rules 7.1 and 7.5 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 7.5(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.” Rule 7.1(a), in turn, provides that advertisements about a lawyer’s services may not be “false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading.” A firm name is a form of advertising about a lawyer’s services, and so a firm name may not be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading either. Rule 7.5 Comment [1]. In addition, Rule 7.5(d) provides that a firm name may state or imply that a lawyer “practice[s] in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.”In applying these rules to the question presented, the Board is mindful that lawyer advertising is commercial speech that is entitled to some protection by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. , 433 U.S. 350 (1977); In re Robbins , 266 Ga. 681 (1996) (per curiam). Commercial speech is not entitled to absolute protection, and false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech may be freely regulated or even prohibited entirely. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. , 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio , 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985); In re Robbins , 266 Ga. at 683. Thus, there is no constitutional impediment to prohibiting names of law firms that are false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading.The question, of course, is whether a particular firm name is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. The requestor has asked only about whether the use of “group” in a sole practitioner’s firm name, such as Doe Law Group, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[2] </a>is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. Because the use of “firm” and “& Associates” in a sole practitioner’s firm name, such as Doe Law Firm and Doe & Associates, is so similar to the use of “group,” this opinion considers all three. Indeed, the Office of the General Counsel regularly receives requests for ethical guidance regarding the use of all of these terms in firm names, not just the use of “group” as the requestor has asked, and so it is appropriate to expand the scope of the requestor’s request.In determining whether it is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading for a sole practitioner to use “group” in his firm name, this opinion first considers the common dictionary definitions of this term. According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, a “group” in the business context is “a number of people who work together or share certain beliefs.” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 768 (3d ed. 2010). Merriam-Webster similarly defines “group” as “a number of individuals assembled together or having some unifying relationship.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 552 (11th ed. 2011). These common dictionary definitions of “group,” as well as the absence of a specialized definition of “group” in the context of the legal profession, lead to the conclusion that a sole practitioner may not use “group” in his firm name because this term would incorrectly imply that the firm consists of multiple lawyers. This conclusion is consistent with ethics opinions in other jurisdictions, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[3] </a>and it is also consistent with the position taken by the Office of the General Counsel when it has been presented with informal inquiries regarding the use of “group” in a sole practitioner’s firm name.A different result is required with respect to the use of “firm” in a sole practitioner’s firm name. Although there is some similarity between the meanings of “firm” and “group” in denoting the name of a business, a different result is required because the Rules define a “firm” as “a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law.” Rule 1.0(e). “This specific definition is, at least implicitly, a recognition that firms may consist of many lawyers or only a single practitioner.” D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 332 (2005).Nevertheless, it should be noted that the common dictionary definitions of “firm” are not as clear as the common dictionary definitions of “group.” The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “firm” as “a business concern, esp. one involving a partnership of two or more people; a law firm .” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY at 651. Although this definition assumes that most firms will be comprised of more than one person, it allows for the possibility that a firm will have only one person. Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines “firm” as “a partnership of two or more persons that is not recognized as a legal person distinct from the members composing it,” but it also defines “firm” as “the name or title under which a company transacts business.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 472. Even Black’s Law Dictionary is ambiguous about whether “firm” signifies more than one person. It defines “firm” both as “[t]he title under which one or more persons conduct business jointly” and as “[t]he association by which persons are united for business purposes.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (10th ed. 2014). Thus, unlike “group,” “firm” is not necessarily pluralistic.The definition of “firm” in the Rules means that it is not false or untruthful for a sole practitioner to use a firm name that includes “firm.” But because an accurate firm name still may be deceptive or misleading, this opinion must consider whether a firm name such as Doe Law Firm is deceptive or misleading when Doe is a sole practitioner. This name is not inherently deceptive or misleading because it would not cause a reasonable member of the public to believe that Doe necessarily practices with other lawyers. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[4] </a>However, the use of “firm” in a sole practitioner’s firm name could be deceptive or misleading in certain contexts, and so a sole practitioner who uses “firm” in his firm name must be mindful of his obligations under Rules 7.1 and 7.5.The use of “& Associates” in a sole practitioner’s firm name, such as Doe & Associates, is a much more common issue. Whether this is proper depends on the meaning of “associate.” Generally, an associate is “a partner or colleague in business or at work” or “a person with limited or subordinate membership in an organization.” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY at 97; see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 75 (defining “associate” as “an entry-level member (as of a learned society, professional organization, or profession)”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 147 (defining “associate” as “[a] colleague or companion”). But “associate” has acquired a specific meaning in the context of the legal profession:An associate is a … lawyer-employee who is not a partner of the firm. All other non-lawyer employees are to be considered simply employees and not associates. This category of employees includes paralegals, secretaries, non-lawyer clerks, officer [sic] managers and the like. When the word associates is employed on firm letterhead or in commercial advertisement such term refers to lawyers working in the firm who are employees of the firm and not partners.Florida Bar v. Fetterman , 439 So. 2d 835, 838-39 (1983) (per curiam); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 147 (defining “associate” as “[a] junior member of an organization or profession; esp., a lawyer in a law firm, usu. with fewer than a certain number of years in practice, who may, upon achieving the requisite seniority, receive an offer to become a partner or shareholder”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[5]</a>This opinion adopts this definition. This means that a sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “& Associates” because, by definition, a sole practitioner does not have any associates. A sole practitioner also may not use “& Associates” in his firm name to refer to partners or non-lawyer employees, such as paralegals, investigators, nurse consultants, etc., because they are not associates. For the same reason, a sole practitioner also may not use “& Associates” in his firm name to refer to lawyers with whom he has an office-sharing arrangement. Thus, for a firm name that includes “& Associates” to be proper, there must be at least one lawyer who employs two or more associates. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[6] </a>For example, a firm name such as Doe & Associates is proper only if Doe is the only partner in the firm and the firm employs at least two associates. Otherwise, the name would be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading because it would incorrectly identify the number of lawyers in the firm and misrepresent the status of the firm’s lawyers and employees.This conclusion raises additional questions, and although it is not possible to foresee all questions that may arise, a couple of the more obvious ones are addressed here. First, is it proper to use “& Associates” in a firm name to refer to part-time associates, lawyers designated as “of counsel,” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[7] </a>and lawyers hired on a contract basis? The answer depends on the degree to which the lawyer practices with the firm. For example, a part-time associate who works one day every month might not qualify, but a part-time associate who works twenty-five hours every week probably would qualify. The key is not the lawyer’s title but rather whether the lawyer actively and regularly practices with the firm. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn8\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[8] </a>If the lawyer does so, he falls within the definition of “associate” quoted above, even though he may not work full-time hours and may actually be a contractor rather than an employee.Second, must a lawyer whose firm name includes “& Associates” change the name of the firm when the number of associates employed by the firm falls below two? At that time, the name of the firm has become inaccurate, but this opinion recognizes the practical difficulties associated with changing a firm’s name. When confronted with this issue, other jurisdictions have taken a flexible approach. In Minnesota, the continued use of “& Associates” in a firm name will not subject the lawyer to discipline if the requisite number of associates are hired within a reasonable amount of time or if the lawyer reasonably and objectively anticipates hiring the requisite number of associates within a reasonable amount of time. Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Resp. Bd., Op. 20 (2009). In Alabama, a disciplinary decision may depend on how long the firm has been without the requisite number of associates and what efforts have been made to hire more associates. Ala. State Bar, Off. of Gen. Couns., Formal Op. 1993-11 (1993). Similarly, in the District of Columbia, the factors considered include the frequency and duration of the firm’s time without the requisite number of associates and the extent of the efforts made to hire more associates. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 189 (1988). Ultimately, though, a law firm will have to change its name if it no longer employs at least two associates. This opinion agrees with the flexibility used in Minnesota, Alabama, and the District of Columbia, but determining whether a firm name violates Rules 7.1 or 7.5 because of hiring and firing decisions will have to be made on a case-by-case basis.Although this opinion does not consider all of the possible terminology that could be used in the name of a sole practitioner’s firm, it does establish the principle that any name implying that a firm is larger than it truly is will be considered false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading and, therefore, a violation of Rules 7.1 and 7.5.__________________1 For purposes of this opinion, a sole practitioner is a lawyer who does not have any partners and does not employ any other lawyers.2 This opinion uses Doe Law Group, Doe Law Firm, and Doe & Associates as examples of firm names implicated by the question presented. These sample names are fictitious and are not intended to refer to actual law firms or lawyers.3 It appears that there are opinions on this issue from only four other jurisdictions, and all four concluded that a firm name may include “group” only if there are two or more lawyers practicing together. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 2163 (2007); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 2121 (2006); Sup. Ct. of Ohio, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances &Discipline, Op. 2006-2 (2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 732 (2000); Mo. Bar, Informal Advisory Op. 20000142 (2000).4 Again, it appears that there are very few opinions on this issue from other jurisdictions. All of them agree that a sole practitioner may use the term “firm” in his firm name. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 869 (2011); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 332 (2005); Ala. State Bar, Off. of Gen. Couns., Formal Op. 1993-11 (1993); Iowa Sup. Ct., Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &Conduct, Op. 79-68 (1979).5 In the analogous context of interpreting a statute, “the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter.” O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(b). This principle warrants reliance on the specific definition that “associate” has acquired in the context of the legal profession rather than on its general definition.6 Almost all other state bar associations that have considered this issue, as well as the American Bar Association, agree with this conclusion. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 931 (2012); Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Resp. Bd., Op. 20 (2009); State Bar of N.M., Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Ethics Advisory Op. 2006-1 (2006); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 05-19 (2005); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 332 (2005); Sup. Ct. of Ohio, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances &Discipline, Op. 95-1 (1995); Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 138 (1994); Va. State Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 1532 (1993); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 189 (1988); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 1086 (1987); Fla. Bar, Ethics Op. 86-1 (1986); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 919 (1985); Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 93 (1984); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 178 (1984); Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-246 (1981); Okla. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 288 (1975); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 286 (1973); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 50 (1972); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 318 (1967); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 310 (1963). Two states, Alabama and Arizona, appear to allow the use of “& Associates” when there is only one associate employed by the firm. Ala. State Bar, Off. of Gen. Couns., Formal Op. 1993-11 (1993); State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 90-01 (1990). This opinion rejects this view because “& Associates,” as a plural term, obviously refers to more than one associate. Thus, the use of “& Associates” in a firm name to refer to only one associate is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. However, the use of “&Associate” would present a different question.7 See State Bar of Ga., Formal Advisory Op. 98-4 (1998) (defining what constitutes an “of counsel” relationship between a lawyer and a law firm).8 In Utah, a lawyer qualifies as an “associate” only if he “regularly spends a majority of [his] time working on legal matters for the firm.” Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 04-03 (2004). This standard is too stringent, especially in light of the fact that a lawyer in Georgia is permitted to practice in multiple law firms. State Bar of Ga., Formal Advisory Op. 97-2 (1997).The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2016 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal and was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on November 10, 2016. No petition for discretionary review was filed within the 20-day review period, and on December 8, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 4-403(d), Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-3 is an opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and is binding on the requestor and the State Bar of Georgia, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.","UrlName":"rule591","Order":85,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ef8d23f5-10fe-4c92-85da-bc1d7a5ec09a","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 20-1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 20-1 Approved On May 3, 2022 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 94-3 <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://efile.gasupreme.us/viewFiling?filingId=d3c8f438-8ff4-4397-b003-0a56b73fa577\%22 target=\"_blank\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">Supreme Court Docket No. S21U0879</a> QUESTION PRESENTED : Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. SUMMARY ANSWER : Generally, a lawyer may communicate with a former employee of an organization that is represented by counsel without obtaining that counsel’s consent, provided that the lawyer fully discloses to the former employee, before initiating the communication, the following information: (1) the identity of the lawyer’s client and the nature of that client’s interest in relation to the organization (i.e., the former employer); and (2) the reason for the communication and the essence of the information sought. After making these disclosures, the lawyer must also obtain the former employee’s consent to the communication. Furthermore, in communicating with the former employee, the lawyer must not utilize methods of obtaining information that would violate the legal rights of the former employee or the represented organization, such as inquiring into information that may be protected by the attorney-client privilege or other evidentiary privilege.Finally, if the lawyer knows or at any point determines that the former employee is individually represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer may not communicate with the former employee, unless authorized by law or court order to do so, without obtaining the former employee’s counsel’s consent. OPINION : The question presented relates to the propriety of a lawyer seeking to obtain information from a former employee of an organization that is represented by counsel. Counsel for an organizational client undoubtedly would prefer that an adverse lawyer not be permitted to communicate with former employees of the organization for the purpose of obtaining information that could be used against the organization. However, prohibiting such communications by a lawyer, without the consent of the organization's counsel, would give that counsel a right of information control that is not supported by any rule of professional conduct. Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2, commonly known as the anti-contact rule, only addresses a lawyer’s ability to communicate about the subject matter of a representation with a person who is represented by counsel in the matter. Specifically, Rule 4.2(a) provides:A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.Rule 4.2 prohibits communication with some but not all of the constituents of the organization. Comment 4A to Rule 4.2 explains which constituents fall within the rule’s anti-contact protections—In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.The Comment does not anywhere suggest that a former employee comes within Rule 4.2’s protections. The only reasonable conclusion to draw from this omission is that Rule 4.2 does not apply to former employees.That, however, does not fully address a lawyer’s ethical obligations in this context. While a lawyer may communicate with a former employee <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> of an organization without first obtaining the consent of that organization’s counsel, the lawyer must comply with Rule 4.3 and make it clear that he or she is not disinterested and explain the nature of and reasons for the communication with the former employee. In particular, the lawyer must fully disclose to the former employee, before initiating the communication, the following information: (1) the identity of the lawyer’s client and the nature of that client’s interest in relation to the organization (i.e., the former employer); and (2) the reason for the communication and the essence of the information sought. After the required disclosures are made, the lawyer must secure the former employee’s consent to the communication. If the former employee refuses to consent, the lawyer must proceed through the formal discovery process in order to obtain the desired information. The lawyer must also exercise caution in communicating with the former employee and avoid utilizing methods of obtaining information that would violate the legal rights of the former employee or the represented organization. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> In particular, the lawyer must refrain from inquiring into information that may be protected by the attorney-client privilege or some other evidentiary privilege. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> Along the same lines, before initiating the communication, the lawyer should ensure that the former employee is not personally represented by counsel in the matter.  If the lawyer knows or determines that the former employee is individually represented by counsel, the lawyer must comply with Rule 4.2 and obtain the consent of the former employee’s counsel, unless the lawyer is otherwise authorized by law or court order to make the communication.  Finally, while this opinion focuses on a lawyer communicating with a former employee of an organization that is represented by counsel, the guidance it provides is also instructive for navigating the same situation when the organization is not represented by counsel. A former employee under such circumstances likewise has a right to know the identity of the lawyer’s client and the nature of and reasons for the lawyer’s communication. Therefore, even when the organization is not represented by counsel, a lawyer should make full disclosure to the former employee as set forth in this opinion and obtain the former employee’s consent before engaging in any other communication._________________________________________<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> Rule 4.3 addresses a lawyer’s duties in dealing with an unrepresented person: In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: a. state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter,    the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and b. give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client GEORGIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 4.3 (2020) [hereinafter “GEORGIA RULES”].<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> See GEORGIA RULES, R. 4.4(a). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> See GEORGIA RULES, R. 4.4(a), cmt. [1] (“Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, butthey include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships .”) (emphasis added).  </div>","UrlName":"rule610","Order":86,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c7276add-2da8-45be-963a-23e26b88e132","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 22-1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 22-1 (Proposed FAO No. 21-R1) Approved on June 11, 2024 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://efile.gasupreme.us/viewFiling?filingId=a54f05c4-2ba1-46ff-a036-bb55ab7c3e55\%22 target=\"_blank\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">Supreme Court Docket No. S24U0609</a> (Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 21-R1) QUESTION PRESENTED: Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location? SUMMARY ANSWER: Yes, under certain conditions. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer residing and working in Georgia may provide legal services by remote means that have no relationship to Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location if: (a) the lawyer does not hold out or otherwise represent that they are licensed in Georgia; (b) the lawyer takes reasonable steps to ensure that the lawyer’s Georgia location is not generally known; and (c) the lawyer takes reasonable steps to correct any misunderstanding about the lawyer’s licensure. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> OPINION: Under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer who is licensed elsewhere but not in Georgia is defined as either a “Domestic Lawyer” or a “Foreign Lawyer.” A “Domestic Lawyer” is “a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> A “Foreign Lawyer” is “a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> The Formal Advisory Opinion Board (“FAOB”) has been asked to provide guidance about a hypothetical Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who has taken up residence in Georgia. Using telephone, email, cloud file storage, videoconferencing, and other technologies, the lawyer practices law from Georgia while residing in Georgia but provides no legal services that have any connection to Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location. The narrow question for the FAOB is whether Rule 5.5 is violated under these specific circumstances. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 sets forth the limited circumstances under which a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may provide legal services “in Georgia.” It permits Domestic Lawyers to provide in Georgia certain services on an ongoing basis for the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal or Georgia law. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\"> [5] </a> Foreign Lawyers may provide in Georgia some ongoing services for the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\"> [6] </a> Rule 5.5 also permits both Domestic and Foreign Lawyers to provide some legal services in Georgia if the services are performed on a temporary basis. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\"> [7] </a> The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not define what it means to provide legal services “in Georgia.” This Opinion concerns only hypothetical activities that have no connection to Georgia other than the physical location of the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer rendering the service. The hypothetical services do not relate to any Georgia client, lawsuit, or alternative dispute resolution proceeding. They do not involve Georgia law or any property located in Georgia. They do not involve any organization or its affiliates with offices in Georgia. The FAOB concludes that providing such legal services from Georgia is not the provision of legal services “in Georgia” within the meaning of Rule 5.5. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn8\"> [8] </a> The limitations of Rule 5.5 on the circumstances under which Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may provide legal services in Georgia are thus inapplicable to the hypothetical activities addressed in this Opinion. Even if a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not providing legal services “in Georgia,” Rule 5.5 prohibits certain other activities. Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may not, except as authorized by other rules or other law, “establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law” or “hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the [Domestic Lawyer or Foreign Lawyer] is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn9\"> [9] </a> The purpose of these prohibitions is to prevent the public from being misled about the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer’s licensure. Obviously, an affirmative misrepresentation creates a risk that the public will be misled. So does the establishment of a physical office or other systematic and continuous presence for the practice of law in a state where the lawyer is not licensed. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn10\"> [10] </a> The question for the FAOB therefore is whether a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who resides in Georgia and renders legal services by remote means from Georgia can take steps to ensure that the public will not be misled about the lawyer’s licensure. The answer is yes. The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer must not affirmatively misrepresent themselves as licensed in Georgia. The lawyer must practice only remotely and take all other reasonable steps to ensure that the lawyer’s provision of legal services from Georgia is not generally known to the public. For example, the lawyer must not reveal their Georgia location in advertisements, letterhead, business cards, or on the internet. If the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a member of the public believes that the lawyer is licensed in Georgia, the lawyer must give an appropriate disclaimer. By providing legal services from Georgia under these conditions, even on a continuous basis, the lawyer negates the risk that the public will be confused about the lawyer’s licensure. The hypothetical Domestic or Foreign Lawyer has not therefore established an office or other continuous and systematic presence for the practice of law in Georgia in violation of Rule 5.5.Other authorities agree. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn11\"> [11] </a> For example, the Supreme Court of Florida approved an advisory opinion that it would be permissible for a lawyer not licensed in Florida to practice federal intellectual property law from his Florida home through his internet connection to his New Jersey law firm, where the lawyer “would have no public presence or profile as an attorney in Florida” and “neither he nor his firm will advertise or otherwise inform the public of his remote work presence in Florida.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn12\"> [12] </a> That opinion concluded that, under Florida’s version of Rule 5.5, the lawyer “will not be establishing a regular presence in Florida for the practice of law; he will merely be living here.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn13\"> [13] </a> Since then, the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct have been amended to add a comment to its version of Rule 5.5 that is consistent with the Florida advisory opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn14\"> [14] </a> Similarly, the Utah Ethics Advisory Committee posed and answered this question about Utah’s version of Rule 5.5: “what interest does the Utah State Bar have in regulating an out-of-state lawyer’s practice for out-of-state clients simply because he has a private home in Utah? And the answer is ... none.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn15\"> [15] </a> In New Jersey, a lawyer licensed elsewhere does not establish a continuous and systematic presence for the practice of law if the lawyer only practices out-of-state law and has no “outward manifestation of physical presence, as a lawyer, in New Jersey.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn16\"> [16] </a> It is important to highlight the limits of this opinion. We conclude that a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer does not violate Rule 5.5 by providing legal services by remote means from Georgia (but not “in Georgia”) while residing in Georgia, under specific conditions. The lawyer must not misrepresent the lawyer’s lack of Georgia law license. The lawyer also must take reasonable steps to ensure that the Georgia location of the lawyer is not generally known and to correct any misunderstanding of the lawyer’s licensure. For Domestic and Foreign Lawyers who wish to practice from Georgia, this Opinion provides a safe harbor from the limits of Rule 5.5. This Opinion does not purport, however, to provide guidance beyond that. Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide services “in Georgia” or whose presence in Georgia becomes generally known must consult Rule 5.5 and other applicable law to determine the propriety of such activities.<div>_________________________________________</div><div><a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> Apart from the question addressed in this opinion, Domestic and Foreign Lawyers must consider whether practicing while physically residing in Georgia violates Georgia law. Part 14 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the State Bar of Georgia sets forth the rules governing the investigation and prosecution of the unlicensed practice of law. Rule 14-1.1 notes that the Supreme Court of Georgia has the inherent authority to regulate the practice of law, including the unlicensed practice of law. Rule 14-2.1 (a) defines the unlicensed practice of law to “mean the practice of law, as prohibited by statute, court rule, and case law of the State of Georgia.” Under OCGA § 15-19-51, it is a crime for “any person other than a duly licensed attorney” to practice law in Georgia. Whether the activities of a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is physically residing in Georgia violate Georgia law is a question of law on which the FAOB may not render an opinion, as its authority is limited to interpreting the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-403 (a) (2023). </div><a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (f) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (h) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> A corollary question concerns the circumstances under which lawyers admitted to practice in Georgia may practice law by remote means while physically residing outside of Georgia. Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5 (a), a lawyer licensed in Georgia is subject to the disciplinary authority of Georgia no matter where the lawyer’s activities occur. Georgia Rule 5.5 (a) provides: “A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.” Georgia lawyers who are practicing law remotely from other jurisdictions must ensure that their activities do not violate the law or the rules of those jurisdictions. This is potentially a complex question for which Georgia lawyers may need to consult authorities from other jurisdictions, such as those cited in this Opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn5\"> 5 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (d) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn6\"> 6 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (f) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn7\"> 7 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (c) (2023) (Domestic Lawyers) and 5.5 (e) (Foreign Lawyers). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn8\"> 8 </a> See Hazard, Hodes, Jarvis &Thompson, LAW OF LAWYERING FOURTH ED. § 49.05 (2022-1 Supp. At 49-23) (“As a matter of public policy, the legitimate interest of the state of residence of the lawyer's home office in enforcing its own UPL rules in such instances will be either small or nonexistent. Practicing law ‘from’ a state in the absence of other connections between that practice and the state is not the same as practicing law ‘in’ a state.”) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn9\"> 9 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (b) (Domestic Lawyers) and 5.5 (e) (Foreign Lawyers) (2022). This Opinion assumes that the hypothetical Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not authorized by any rule or other law to establish an office or other continuous and systematic presence in Georgia for the practice of law. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn10\"> 10 </a> See Hazard, Hodes, Jarvis &Thompson, LAW OF LAWYERING FOURTH ED. § 49.05 (2022-1 Supp. at 49-24) (“a prohibition against maintaining a physical office for lawyers not licensed in the state is sensible, precisely because members of the public will not even think to ask about licensure when they are sitting across an office table from a flesh and blood lawyer….) and 49-26 (“In addition to the ban on out-of-state lawyers opening in-state offices, Rule 5.5 (b) (1) also prohibits the establishment of any ‘other systematic and continuous presence’ in the jurisdiction for the practice of law (emphasis added). Although this second dividing line is not as sharp as the first one, the idea animating the two prohibitions is the same.”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn11\"> 11 </a> Other states differ somewhat in how they articulate the conclusion, but only the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has taken a more restrictive view. It concluded that a lawyer not licensed in the District of Columbia could provide services from D.C. only if the lawyer was practicing from home due to the COVID-19 pandemic and other conditions were met. See Opinion 24-20: Teleworking from Home and the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn12\"> 12 </a> The Florida Bar: Re Advisory Opinion – Out-of-State Attorney Working Remotely from Florida Home, 318 So. 3d 538, 540 (2021). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn13\"> 13 </a> Id. at 541. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn14\"> 14 </a> In Re Amendments to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-5.5, 334 So.3d 1272 (2022). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn15\"> 15 </a> Utah Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 19-03 (2019) at 7. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn16\"> 16 </a> Joint Opinion of the New Jersey Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (Opinion 59) and the New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (Opinion 742) at 2 – 3 (2021). See also Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1896 (2022); Wisconsin Formal Ethics Opinion EF-21-02 (2021); ABA Formal Op. 495 (2020). Arizona, New York, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Carolina have addressed the issue in their rules rather than by ethics opinions. AZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.5(d); N.Y. CT. APP. RULES FOR THE TEMPORARY PRACTICE OF LAW IN NEW YORK § 523.5; MN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.5(d); N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)(3); N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.5(d)(2). </div>","UrlName":"rule648","Order":87,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Rule 4-402. The Formal Advisory Opinion Board","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the State Disciplinary Review Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the State Disciplinary Board and State Disciplinary Review Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"rule243","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"d2387df8-46e6-47b7-b689-b77c9f82b987","ParentId":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the Investigative Panel and Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"revision296"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"30447727-9b59-4979-909e-06676d7b0368","Title":"Rule 4-302","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule219","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e7e149e7-e023-4ce6-ae8d-3e0cce1b9ceb","Title":"Rule 4-201.1. State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The power to review for error final reports and recommendations of Special Masters in public proceedings arising under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct is hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Review Board shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia; the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President; seven members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia and one at large appointed as described below; and two nonlawyer members appointed as described below. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Review Board. No State Disciplinary Review Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia and the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia (or member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President) shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires in an even-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia for a term of three years; and when the term of appointment of a member expires in an odd-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Review Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Review Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Review Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work reviewing cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule602","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Title":"CHAPTER 2 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter14","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Rule 4-201. State Disciplinary Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The powers to investigate and discipline lawyers for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors; two nonlawyer members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; and two nonlawyer members appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors. The Court and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Board. No State Disciplinary Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors, whichever appointed the member whose term has expired.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant. </li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work investigating cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule63","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"07f753ca-7fed-4fb2-a326-4be45d9389ca","ParentId":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The powers to investigate and discipline members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct set forth in Bar Rule 4-102 are hereby vested in a State Disciplinary Board and a Consumer Assistance Program. The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of two panels. The first panel shall be the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Investigative Panel). The second panel shall be the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Review Panel). The Consumer Assistance Program shall operate as described in Part XII of these Rules. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Investigative Panel shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the President with the approval of the Board of Governors, and six public members appointed by the Supreme Court to serve as public members of the Panel.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> All members shall be appointed for three-year terms subject to the following exceptions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed;</li> \n <li>ex-officio members shall serve during the term of their office; and shall not increase the quorum requirement; and</li> \n <li>certain initial members as set forth in paragraph (2) below.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>It shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third (1/3) of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually.</li> \n <li>A member may be removed from the Panel pursuant to procedures set by the Panel for failure to attend regular meetings of the Panel. The vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the current President of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel shall annually elect a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, or a vice-chairperson for any subcommittee for which the chairperson is not a member to serve as chairperson for that subcommittee, and such other officers as it may deem proper. The Panel shall meet in its entirety in July of each year to elect a chairperson. At any time the Panel may decide to divide itself into subcommittees or to consolidate after having divided. A majority shall constitute a quorum and a majority of a quorum shall be authorized to act. However, in any matter in which one or more Investigative Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the matter.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel is authorized to organize itself into as many subcommittees as the Panel deems necessary to conduct the expeditious investigation of disciplinary matters referred to it by the Office of General Counsel. However, no subcommittee shall consist of fewer than seven (7) members of the Panel and each such subcommittee shall include at least one (1) of the public members.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The Review Panel shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President, nine (9) members of the State Bar, three (3) from each of the three (3) federal judicial districts of the State appointed as described below, and four (4) public members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The nine (9) members of the Bar from the federal judicial districts shall be appointed for three (3) year terms so that the term of one Panel member from each district will expire each year. The three (3) vacant positions will be filled in odd years by appointment by the President, with the approval of the Board of Governors, and in even years by appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Panel members serving at the time this Rule goes into effect shall continue to serve until their respective terms expire. New Panel members shall be appointed as set forth above.</li> \n <li>Any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed.</li> \n <li>Ex-officio members shall serve during the term or terms of their offices and shall not increase the quorum requirement.</li> \n <li>The Review Panel shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper in July of each year. The presence of six (6) members of the Panel shall constitute a quorum. Four (4) members of the Panel shall be authorized to act except that a recommendation of the Review Panel to suspend or disbar shall require the affirmative vote of at least six (6) members of the Review Panel, with not more than four (4) negative votes. However, in any case in which one or more Review Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum and the number of members necessary to vote affirmatively for disbarment or suspension, shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the case. No recommendation of disbarment or suspension may be made by fewer than four (4) affirmative votes. For the purposes of this Rule the recusal of a member shall have the same effect as disqualification.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision102"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e7e149e7-e023-4ce6-ae8d-3e0cce1b9ceb","Title":"Rule 4-201.1. State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The power to review for error final reports and recommendations of Special Masters in public proceedings arising under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct is hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Review Board shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia; the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President; seven members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia and one at large appointed as described below; and two nonlawyer members appointed as described below. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Review Board. No State Disciplinary Review Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia and the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia (or member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President) shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires in an even-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia for a term of three years; and when the term of appointment of a member expires in an odd-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Review Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Review Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Review Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work reviewing cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule602","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Rule 4-202. Receipt of Grievances; Initial Review by Bar Counsel","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of a Memorandum of Grievance, an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program, or credible information from any source. If the investigation is based upon receipt of credible information, the Office of the General Counsel must first notify the respondent lawyer and provide a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may also deliver the information from any source to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any matter under investigation. The screening process may include forwarding information received to the respondent so that the respondent may respond.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring the respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided in Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a matter, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those matters that do not present sufficient merit to proceed.</li> \n <li>Those matters that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule106","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"4d838131-f92a-4eb5-9a08-5517ba7ed783","ParentId":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Grievances shall be filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. In lieu of a Memorandum of Grievance the Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program. All grievances must include the name of the complainant and must be signed by the complainant.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may investigate conduct upon receipt of credible information from any source after notifying the respondent lawyer and providing a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation. The Office of the General Counsel may deliver the information it obtains to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any grievance. The screening process may include forwarding a copy of the grievance to the respondent in order that the respondent may respond to the grievance.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring a respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided at Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a grievance, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those grievances that do not present sufficient merit to proceed. Rejection of such grievances by the Office of the General Counsel shall not deprive the complaining party of any right of action he might otherwise have at law or in equity against the respondent.</li> \n <li>Those grievances that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision397"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0d18e960-68e3-48cb-bc1b-bb426f81e3a7","Title":"Rule 4-203. Powers and Duties","Content":"In accordance with these Rules, the State Disciplinary Board shall have the following powers and duties:\n(1) to receive and evaluate any and all written grievances against lawyers and to frame such charges and grievances as shall conform to the requirements of these Rules. A copy of the information serving as the basis for investigation or proceedings before the State Disciplinary Board shall be furnished to the respondent by the procedures set forth in Rule 4-203.1;\n(2) to initiate grievances on its own motion, to require additional information from a complainant, where appropriate, and to dismiss and reject matters that seem unjustified, frivolous, or patently unfounded;\n(3) to issue letters of instruction when dismissing a matter;\n(4) to delegate the duties of the State Disciplinary Board enumerated in paragraphs (1), (2), (8), (9), (10), and (11) hereof to the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or such other members as the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair may designate subject to review and approval by the full State Disciplinary Board;\n(5) to conduct Probable Cause investigations, to collect evidence and information concerning matters under investigation, and to certify matters to the Supreme Court of Georgia for hearings by Special Masters as hereinafter provided;\n(6) to prescribe its own Rules of conduct and procedure;\n(7) to receive, investigate, and collect evidence and information, and review and accept or reject Petitions for Voluntary Discipline pursuant to Rule 4-227 (b) (1);\n(8) to sign and enforce, as hereinafter described, subpoenas for the appearance of persons and the production of documents, things and records at investigations both during the screening process and the State Disciplinary Board’s investigation;\n(9) to issue a subpoena as provided in this Rule whenever a subpoena is sought in this State pursuant to the law of another jurisdiction for use in lawyer discipline or disability proceedings, where the issuance of the subpoena has been duly approved under the law of the other jurisdiction. Upon petition for good cause the State Disciplinary Board may compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents in the county where the witness resides or is employed or elsewhere as agreed by the witness. Service of the subpoena shall be as provided in the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Enforcement or challenges to the subpoena shall be as provided at Rule 4-221 (c);\n(10) to extend the time within which a formal complaint may be filed;\n(11) to issue Formal Letters of Admonition and Confidential Reprimands as hereinafter provided;\n(12) to issue a Notice of Discipline providing that unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice, the respondent shall be sanctioned as ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia;\n(13) to refer a lawyer who appears to be impaired for an evaluation by an appropriate medical or mental health professional; and\n(14) to use the staff of the Office of the General Counsel in performing its duties.\n<div></div>\n<div></div>\n","UrlName":"rule108","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7fe7960c-10b9-469c-9f35-a2a95244a2d2","Title":"Rule 4-203.1. Uniform Service Rule","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Lawyers shall inform the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, in writing, of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address on file with the Membership Department in all efforts to contact, communicate with, and perfect service upon a lawyer. The choice of a lawyer to provide only a post office box or commercial equivalent address to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall constitute an election to waive personal service. Notification of a change of address given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the Membership Department shall not satisfy the requirement herein.</li> \n <li> In all matters requiring personal service under Part IV of the Bar Rules, service may be perfected in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Acknowledgment of Service: An acknowledgment of service from the respondent shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li>Written Response from Respondent: A written response from the respondent or respondent’s counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li> In the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent’s counsel, and subject to the provisions of subparagraph (b) (4) below, the respondent shall be served in the following manner: \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>Personal Service: Service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or any other person authorized to serve a summons under the provisions of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, as approved by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or the Chair’s designee. Receipt of a Return of Service Non Est Inventus shall constitute conclusive proof that service cannot be perfected by personal service.</li> \n <li>Service by Publication: If personal service cannot be perfected, or when the respondent has only provided a post office box or commercial equivalent address to the Membership Department and the respondent has not acknowledged service within 10 days of a mailing to respondent’s post office box or commercial equivalent address, service may be accomplished by publication once a week for two weeks in the legal organ of the county of respondent’s address, as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and, contemporaneously with the publication, mailing a copy of the service documents by first class mail to respondent’s address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When it appears from an affidavit made by the Office of the General Counsel that the respondent has departed from the State, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the State, or seeks to avoid the service, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, or the Chair’s designee, may authorize service by publication without the necessity of first attempting personal service. The affidavit made by the Office of the General Counsel must demonstrate recent unsuccessful attempts at personal service upon the respondent regarding other or related disciplinary matters and that such personal service was attempted at respondent’s address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Whenever service of pleadings or other documents subsequent to the original complaint is required or permitted to be made upon a respondent represented by a lawyer, the service shall be made upon the respondent’s lawyer. Service upon the respondent’s lawyer or upon an unrepresented respondent shall be made by hand-delivery or by delivering a copy or mailing a copy to the respondent’s lawyer or to the respondent’s official address on file with the Membership Department, unless the respondent’s lawyer specifies a different address for the lawyer in a filed pleading. As used in this Rule, the term “delivering a copy” means handing it to the respondent’s lawyer or to the respondent, or leaving it at the lawyer’s or respondent’s office with a person of suitable age or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion. Service by mail is complete upon mailing and includes transmission by U.S. Mail, or by a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within three business days, shown by the official postmark or by the commercial carrier’s transmittal form. Proof of service may be made by certificate of a lawyer or of his employee, written admission, affidavit, or other satisfactory proof. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service.\t </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule109","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b41a4675-2b95-426d-9d60-acf01d16b66f","ParentId":"7fe7960c-10b9-469c-9f35-a2a95244a2d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Attorneys authorized to practice law in Georgia shall inform the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, in writing, of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address on file with the Membership Department in all efforts to contact, communicate with, and perfect service upon an attorney. The choice of an attorney to provide only a post office box or equivalent commercial address to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall constitute an election to waive personal service. Notification of a change of address given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the Membership Department shall not satisfy the requirement herein.</li> \n <li> In all matters requiring personal service under Part IV of the Bar Rules, service may be perfected in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Acknowledgment of Service: An acknowledgment of service from the Respondent shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li>Written Response from Respondent: A written response from the Respondent or Respondent's counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li> In the absence of an acknowledgment of service, or a written response from the Respondent or Respondent's counsel, and subject to the provisions of paragraph (4) below, the Respondent shall be served in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>Personal service: Service may be accomplished by the Sheriff, or a Court approved agent for service of process, or any person approved by the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or the Chair's designee. Receipt of a Return of Service Non Est Inventus from the Sheriff or any other person approved for service of the service documents, shall constitute conclusive proof that service cannot be perfected by personal service.</li> \n <li>Service by publication: In the event that personal service cannot be perfected, or when the Respondent has only provided a post office box to the Membership Department and Respondent has not acknowledged service within twenty (20) days of a mailing to Respondent's post office box, service may be accomplished by publication once a week for two weeks in the legal organ of the county of Respondent's address, as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and, contemporaneously with the publication, mailing a copy of the service documents by first class mail to Respondent's address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When it appears from an affidavit made by the Office of General Counsel that the Respondent has departed from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or seeks to avoid the service, the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel, or the chair's designee, may authorize service by publication without the necessity of first attempting personal service. The affidavit made by the Office of General Counsel must demonstrate recent unsuccessful attempts at personal service upon the Respondent regarding other or related disciplinary matters and that such personal service was attempted at Respondent's address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Whenever service of pleadings or other documents subsequent to the original complaint is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is otherwise required by these Rules. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his last known address. As used in this Rule, the term \"delivery of a copy \"means handing it to the attorney or to the party, or leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. Proof of service may be made by certificate of an attorney or of his employee, by written admission, by affidavit, or by other proof satisfactory to the court. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision105"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5e552308-5c15-4eb4-9150-ccc522670691","Title":"Rule 4-204. Investigation and Disposition by State Disciplinary Board-Generally","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> Each matter that presents sufficient merit to proceed may be referred with a Notice of Investigation to the State Disciplinary Board for investigation and disposition in accordance with its Rules. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign a lawyer member of the State Disciplinary Board to be responsible for the investigation. The Office of the General Counsel shall simultaneously assign a staff investigator to assist the State Disciplinary Board member with the investigation. If the investigation of the State Disciplinary Board establishes Probable Cause to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, it shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>issue a Formal Letter of Admonition;</li> \n <li>issue a Confidential Reprimand;</li> \n <li>issue a Notice of Discipline; </li> \n <li>refer the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia for hearing before a Special Master and file a formal complaint with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all as hereinafter provided; or</li> \n <li>refer a respondent for evaluation by an appropriate medical or mental health professional pursuant to Rule 4-104 upon the State Disciplinary Board’s determination that there is cause to believe the lawyer is impaired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n All other cases may be either dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board or referred to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.\n <li>The primary investigation shall be conducted by the member of the State Disciplinary Board responsible for the investigation, assisted by the staff of the Office of the General Counsel, upon request of the State Disciplinary Board member. The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia shall fund the Office of the General Counsel so that the Office of the General Counsel will be able to adequately investigate and prosecute all cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule110","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Rule 4-204.1. Notice of Investigation","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a) is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a);</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the grievance and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule76","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"c017b578-1033-45d1-a54e-20293af130ec","ParentId":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (b) is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (b);</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision399"},{"Id":"1ca382d2-6b2c-4dc8-983d-934b03e898b2","ParentId":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance;</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the grievance and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision325"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"32f62174-44c4-4bf1-8d41-2bcb39bf0f76","Title":"Rule 4-204.2.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule112","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ddd647f-da37-479d-ab5f-9e0d2850e21a","ParentId":"32f62174-44c4-4bf1-8d41-2bcb39bf0f76","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1.","UrlName":"revision166"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ebbb95c7-c350-4c76-8f3f-285d058bc3ac","Title":"Rule 4-204.3. Answer to Notice of Investigation Required","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The respondent shall deliver to the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter a written response under oath to the Notice of Investigation within 30 days of service.</li> \n <li>The written response must address specifically all of the issues set forth in the Notice of Investigation.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter may, in the State Disciplinary Board member’s discretion, grant extensions of time for the respondent’s answer. Any request for extension of time must be made in writing, and the grant of an extension of time must also be in writing. Extensions of time shall not exceed 30 days and should not be routinely granted.</li> \n <li> In cases where the maximum sanction is disbarment or suspension and the respondent fails to properly respond within the time required by these Rules, the Office of the General Counsel may seek authorization from the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to file a motion for interim suspension of the respondent.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>When an investigating member of the State Disciplinary Board notifies the Office of the General Counsel that the respondent has failed to respond and that the respondent should be suspended, the Office of the General Counsel shall, with the approval of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, file a Motion for Interim Suspension of the respondent. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an appropriate order.</li> \n <li>When the State Disciplinary Board member and the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board determine that a respondent who has been suspended for failure to respond has filed an appropriate response and should be reinstated, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a Motion to Lift Interim Suspension. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an appropriate order. The determination that an adequate response has been filed is within the discretion of the investigating State Disciplinary Board member and the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule113","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"45b9c5b6-dd60-41ec-9214-e8964ebb7919","Title":"Rule 4-204.4. Finding of Probable Cause; Referral to Special Master","Content":"In the event the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause of the respondent’s violation of one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, it may refer the matter to the Supreme Court of Georgia by directing the Office of the General Counsel to file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia either:\n(a) A formal complaint, as herein provided, along with a petition for the appointment of a Special Master and a notice of its finding of Probable Cause, within 30 days of the finding of Probable Cause unless the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair grants an extension of time for the filing; or\n(b) A Notice of Discipline pursuant to Rules 4-208.1, 4-208.2 and 4-208.3.","UrlName":"rule114","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d96d2620-410a-4333-950f-3c3cd562c88e","ParentId":"45b9c5b6-dd60-41ec-9214-e8964ebb7919","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In the event the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, finds Probable Cause of the Respondent's violation of one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 or these rules it may refer the matter to the Supreme Court by directing the Office of the General Counsel to file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia either: \n \n    (1) a formal complaint, as herein provided; \n \n    (2) a petition for the appointment of a Special Master; and \n \n    (3) a notice of its finding of Probable Cause.\n The documents specified above shall be filed in duplicate within thirty (30) days of the finding of Probable Cause unless the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, or its Chairperson grants an extension of time for the filing. \n \n(b) A Notice of Discipline in the matter shall thereafter proceed pursuant to Bar Rule 4-208.1, 4-208.2 and 4-208.3.","UrlName":"revision168"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"572c5f31-1365-45f8-a60d-d38d78516aba","Title":"Rule 4-204.5. Letters of Instruction","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> In addition to dismissing a complaint, the State Disciplinary Board may issue a letter of instruction to the respondent upon the following conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to a quorum of the State Disciplinary Board assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; and</li> \n <li> the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent either: \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>has not engaged in conduct that is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules; or</li> \n <li>has engaged in conduct that although technically in violation of such Rules is not reprehensible, and has resulted in no harm or injury to any third person, and is not in violation of the spirit of such Rules; or</li> \n <li>has engaged in conduct in violation of any recognized voluntary creed of professionalism.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A letter of instruction shall not constitute a finding of any disciplinary infraction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule116","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"41c7d017-7599-40ef-b753-1f43ce4c34bd","ParentId":"572c5f31-1365-45f8-a60d-d38d78516aba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In addition to dismissing a complaint, the Investigative Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, may issue a letter of instruction in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n \n    (1) the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to the entire Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; and \n \n    (2) the Investigative Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent either: \n \n        (i) has not engaged in conduct which is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules; or \n \n        (ii) has engaged in conduct that although technically in violation of such rules is not reprehensible, and has resulted in no harm or injury to any third person, and is not in violation of the spirit of such rules; or \n \n        (iii) has engaged in conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of Part III of these rules or any recognized voluntary creed of professionalism; \n \n(b) Letters of instruction shall contain a statement of the conduct of the respondent which may have violated Part III of these rules or the voluntary creed of professionalism. \n \n(c) A letter of instruction shall not constitute a finding of any disciplinary infraction.","UrlName":"revision170"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"77052b66-6315-44fa-adad-251f283e8018","Title":"Rule 4-205. Confidential Discipline; In General","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Disciplinary Board may issue a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to a quorum of the State Disciplinary Board assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting;</li> \n <li>the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent has engaged in conduct that is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules; and</li> \n <li> the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the conduct referred to in paragraph (b) hereof was engaged in:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>inadvertently; or</li> \n <li>purposefully, but in ignorance of the applicable disciplinary rule or rules; or</li> \n <li>under such circumstances that it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that the protection of the public and rehabilitation of the respondent would be best achieved by the issuance of a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand rather than by any other form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule118","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b2ad539d-868b-476a-94ef-263b3350a018","ParentId":"77052b66-6315-44fa-adad-251f283e8018","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In lieu of the imposition of any other discipline, the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Investigative Panel may issue letters of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n \n(a) the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to the entire Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; \n \n(b) the Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent has engaged in conduct which is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules; \n \n(c) the Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the conduct referred to in subpart (b) hereof was engaged in: \n \n    (1) inadvertently; or \n \n    (2) purposefully, but in ignorance of the applicable disciplinary rule or rules; or \n \n    (3) under such circumstances that it is the opinion of the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Investigative Panel that the protection of the public and rehabilitation of the respondent would be best achieved by the issuance of a letter of admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand rather than by any other form of discipline.","UrlName":"revision172"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9c775694-8d7c-4937-8be2-d161f55e3dbd","Title":"Rule 4-206. Confidential Discipline; Contents","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Formal Letters of Admonition and Confidential Reprimands shall contain a statement of the specific conduct of the respondent that violates Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, shall state the name of the complainant, if any, and shall state the reasons for issuance of such confidential discipline.</li> \n <li> A Formal Letter of Admonition shall also contain the following information:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the right of the respondent to reject the Formal Letter of Admonition under Rule 4-207;</li> \n <li>the procedure for rejecting the Formal Letter of Admonition under Rule 4-207; and</li> \n <li>the effect of an accepted Formal Letter of Admonition in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A Confidential Reprimand shall also contain information concerning the effect of the acceptance of such reprimand in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule119","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0b364013-3666-4c0a-907d-bd5bf6941a32","ParentId":"9c775694-8d7c-4937-8be2-d161f55e3dbd","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Letters of formal admonition and Investigative Panel Reprimands shall contain a statement of the specific conduct of the respondent which violates Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules, shall state the name of the complainant and shall state the reasons for issuance of such confidential discipline. \n \n(b) A letter of formal admonition shall also contain the following information: \n \n    (1) the right of the respondent to reject the letter of formal admonition under Rule 4-207; \n \n    (2) the procedure for rejecting the letter of formal admonition under Rule 4-207; and \n \n    (3) the effect of an accepted letter of formal admonition in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline. \n \n(c) An Investigative Panel Reprimand shall also contain information concerning the effect of the acceptance of such reprimand in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline.","UrlName":"revision174"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"973c39ff-b307-4891-bf21-eab08c74c0e4","Title":"Rule 4-207. Letters of Formal Admonition and Confidential Reprimands; Notification and Right of Rejection","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In any case where the State Disciplinary Board votes to impose discipline in the form of a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand, such vote shall constitute the State Disciplinary Board’s finding of Probable Cause. The respondent shall have the right to reject, in writing, the imposition of such discipline.  \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Notification to respondent shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>in the case of a Formal Letter of Admonition, the letter of admonition;</li> \n <li> in the case of a Confidential Reprimand, the letter notifying the respondent to appear for the administration of the reprimand; \n sent to the respondent at his or her address as reflected in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia, via certified mail, return receipt requested. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Rejection by respondent shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>in writing, within 30 days of notification; and</li> \n <li>sent to the State Disciplinary Board via any of the methods authorized under Rule 4-203.1 (c) and directed to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the current headquarters address of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>If the respondent rejects the imposition of a Formal Letter of Admonition or Confidential Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel may file a formal complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia unless the State Disciplinary Board reconsiders its decision.</li> \n <li>Confidential Reprimands shall be administered before the State Disciplinary Board by the Chair or his designee.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule121","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"37680a37-9dc5-4ca1-8e81-0a57628591e8","ParentId":"973c39ff-b307-4891-bf21-eab08c74c0e4","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In any case where the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, votes to impose discipline in the form of a letter of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand, such vote shall constitute the Panel's finding of probable cause. The respondent shall have the right to reject, in writing, the imposition of such discipline. A written rejection shall be deemed an election by the respondent to continue disciplinary proceedings under these rules and shall cause the Investigative Panel to proceed under Rule 4-204.4 \n \n(a) Notification to respondent shall be as follows: \n \n    (1) in the case of letters of formal admonition, the letter of admonition; \n \n    (2) in the case of an Investigative Panel Reprimand, the letter notifying the respondent to appear for the administration of the reprimand; \n \n    (3) sent to the respondent at his address as reflected in State Bar records, via certified mail, return receipt requested. \n \n(b) Rejection by respondent shall be as follows: \n \n    (1) in writing, within thirty days of notification; \n \n    (2) sent to the Investigative Panel via certified mail, return receipt requested, directed to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the current headquarters address of the State Bar. \n \n(c) If the respondent rejects the imposition of a formal admonition or Investigative Panel Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a formal complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within thirty days of receipt of the rejection unless the Investigative Panel or its Chairperson grants an extension of time for the filing of the formal complaint. \n \n(d) Investigative Panel Reprimands shall be administered before the Panel by the Chairperson or his or her designee.","UrlName":"revision176"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1e4711b7-d594-4651-b32d-a487d5feb8aa","Title":"Rule 4-208. Confidential Discipline; Effect in Event of Subsequent Discipline","Content":"In the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of confidential discipline shall be waived and the Office of the General Counsel may use such information as aggravation of discipline.","UrlName":"rule122","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"62bd0945-172f-4d4e-a682-44e53509227b","ParentId":"1e4711b7-d594-4651-b32d-a487d5feb8aa","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An accepted letter of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand shall be considered as a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Bar Rule 4-103. In the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of confidential discipline shall be waived and the Office of the General Counsel may use such information as aggravation of discipline.","UrlName":"revision178"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ca6b3d1-3b2e-45ec-95eb-b055d8b26364","Title":"Rule 4-208.1. Notice of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>In any case where the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause, the State Disciplinary Board may issue a Notice of Discipline requesting that the Supreme Court of Georgia impose any level of public discipline authorized by these Rules.</li> \n <li>Unless the Notice of Discipline is rejected by the respondent as provided in Rule 4-208.3, (1) the respondent shall be in default; (2) the respondent shall have no right to any evidentiary hearing; and (3) the respondent shall be subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia is not bound by the State Disciplinary Board’s recommendation and may impose any level of discipline it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule124","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"79a6bd3c-89d6-4107-9dca-37aa06ce8477","ParentId":"2ca6b3d1-3b2e-45ec-95eb-b055d8b26364","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In any case where the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel finds Probable Cause, the Panel may issue a Notice of Discipline imposing any level of public discipline authorized by these rules. \n \n(b) Unless the Notice of Discipline is rejected by the Respondent as provided in Rule 4-208.3, (1) the Respondent shall be in default; (2) the Respondent shall have no right to any evidentiary hearing; and (3) the Respondent shall be subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by the Supreme Court.","UrlName":"revision180"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Rule 4-208.2. Notice of Discipline; Contents; Service","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Notice of Discipline shall include: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the Rules that the State Disciplinary Board found the respondent violated;</li> \n <li>the allegations of facts that, if unrebutted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated;</li> \n <li>the level of public discipline recommended to be imposed;</li> \n <li>the reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the State Disciplinary Board to be relevant to such recommendation;</li> \n <li>the entire provisions of Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of a Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing the same in the notice;</li> \n <li>a copy of the Memorandum of Grievance or written description pursuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a); and</li> \n <li>a statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the respondent, including confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file documents evidencing service with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the State Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia in subsequent proceedings in the same matter.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule125","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"508b411a-242e-45c5-b595-74262b4b03b4","ParentId":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Notice of Discipline shall include: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the Rules that the State Disciplinary Board found the respondent violated;</li> \n <li>the allegations of facts that, if unrebutted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated;</li> \n <li>the level of public discipline recommended to be imposed;</li> \n <li>the reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the State Disciplinary Board to be relevant to such recommendation;</li> \n <li>the entire provisions of Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of a Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing the same in the notice;</li> \n <li>a copy of the Memorandum of Grievance; and</li> \n <li>a statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the respondent, including confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file documents evidencing service with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the State Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia in subsequent proceedings in the same matter.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision401"},{"Id":"88f1164f-fca6-433a-8c71-f7b662e6027b","ParentId":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Notice of Discipline shall state the following: \n \n    (1) The Rules which the Investigative Panel found that the Respondent violated; \n \n    (2) The facts which, if unrefuted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated; \n \n    (3) The level of public discipline recommended to be imposed; \n \n    (4) The reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the Investigative Panel to be relevant to such recommendation; \n \n    (5) The entire provisions of Bar Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing same in the Notice; \n \n    (6) A copy of the Memorandum of Grievance; and \n \n    (7) A statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the Respondent, including confidential discipline under Bar Rules 4-205 to 4-208. \n \n(b) The original Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(c) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(d) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(e) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(f) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(g) The Office of the General Counsel shall file the documents by which service was accomplished with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(h) The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the Respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"revision182"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"eb93af9b-e8a9-4570-aaf1-d72804590d12","Title":"Rule 4-208.3. Rejection of Notice of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In order to reject the Notice of Discipline, the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel must file a Notice of Rejection of the Notice of Discipline with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within 30 days following service of the Notice of Discipline.</li> \n <li>Any Notice of Rejection by the respondent shall be served upon the opposing party. In accordance with Rule 4-204.3 if the respondent has not previously filed a sworn response to the Notice of Investigation the rejection must include a sworn response in order to be considered valid. The respondent must also file a copy of such written response with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time of filing the Notice of Rejection.</li> \n <li>The timely filing of a Notice of Rejection shall constitute an election for the matter to proceed pursuant to Rule 4-208.4 et seq.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule126","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d6a72f5e-f34f-48ef-a481-3ab6dedd8bc3","ParentId":"eb93af9b-e8a9-4570-aaf1-d72804590d12","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In order to reject the Notice of Discipline the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel must file a Notice of Rejection of the Notice of Discipline with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within 30 days following service of the Notice of Discipline.  \n  \n(b) Any Notice of Rejection by the respondent shall be served by the respondent upon the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Any Notice of Rejection by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia shall be served by the General Counsel upon the respondent. No rejection by the respondent shall be considered valid unless the respondent files a written response as required by Rule 4-204.3 at or before the filing of the rejection. The respondent must also file a copy of such written response with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time of filing the Notice of Rejection. \n \n(c) The timely filing of a Notice of Rejection shall constitute an election for the Coordinating Special Master to appoint a Special Master and the matter shall thereafter proceed pursuant to Rules 4-209 through 4-225.","UrlName":"revision184"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"19154403-0c33-4593-b66b-2a3d173c2038","Title":"Rule 4-208.4. Formal Complaint Following Notice of Rejection of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia a formal complaint and a Petition for Appointment of Special Master within 30 days following the filing of a Notice of Rejection. The Notice of Discipline shall operate as the notice of finding of Probable Cause by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may obtain extensions of time for the filing of the formal complaint from the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or his designee.</li> \n <li>After the rejection of a Notice of Discipline and prior to the time of the filing of the formal complaint, the State Disciplinary Board may reconsider the matter and take appropriate action.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule128","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b5738bbf-cfd8-4488-b84d-1259e2ab4d9a","ParentId":"19154403-0c33-4593-b66b-2a3d173c2038","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Office of the General Counsel shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia a formal complaint and a Petition for Appointment of Special Master within thirty (30) days following the filing of a Notice of Rejection. The Notice of Discipline shall operate as the notice of finding of Probable Cause by the Investigative Panel. \n \n(b) The Office of the General Counsel may obtain extensions of time for the filing of the formal complaint from the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or his or her designee. \n \n(c) After the rejection of a Notice of Discipline and prior to the time of the filing of the formal complaint, the Investigative Panel may consider any new evidence regarding the grievance and take appropriate action.","UrlName":"revision186"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"48246a5f-fb57-45e0-8fdf-4699503baeee","Title":"Rule 4-209. Docketing by Supreme Court; Appointment of Special Master; Challenges to Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon receipt of a notice of finding of Probable Cause, a petition for appointment of a Special Master and a formal complaint, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, give the matter a Supreme Court of Georgia docket number, and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate. In those proceedings where a Notice of Discipline has been filed, the notice of finding of Probable Cause need not be filed.</li> \n <li>Within a reasonable time after receipt of a petition for appointment of a Special Master or notification that a Special Master previously appointed has been disqualified, withdrawn, or is otherwise unable to serve, the Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings in such complaint. The Coordinating Special Master shall select a Special Master from the list approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve the signed Order Appointing Special Master on the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon notification of the appointment of a Special Master, the State Bar of Georgia shall immediately serve the respondent with the order of appointment of a Special Master and with its formal complaint as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li>Within 10 days of service of the notice of appointment of a Special Master, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file any and all objections or challenges either of them may have to the competency, qualifications or impartiality of the Special Master with the Coordinating Special Master. The party filing such objections or challenges must also serve a copy of the objections or challenges upon the opposing party and the Special Master, who may respond to such objections or challenges. Within a reasonable time, the Coordinating Special Master shall consider the challenges and the responses of respondent, the State Bar of Georgia, and the Special Master, if any, determine whether the Special Master is disqualified and notify the parties, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Special Master of the decision. Exceptions to the Coordinating Special Master’s denial of disqualification are subject to review by the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time the record in the matter is filed with the Court pursuant to Rule 4-216 (e). If a Special Master is disqualified, appointment of a successor Special Master shall proceed as provided in this Rule.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule130","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d9980b44-4051-4feb-b4e9-81742f936147","ParentId":"48246a5f-fb57-45e0-8fdf-4699503baeee","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon receipt of a finding of Probable Cause, a petition for appointment of a Special Master and a formal complaint from the Investigative Panel, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate. In those proceedings where a Notice of Discipline has been filed, the finding of Probable Cause need not be filed. \n \n(b) Within a reasonable time after receipt of a petition/motion for appointment of a Special Master or notification that a Special Master previously appointed has been disqualified, the Coordinating Special Master will appoint a Special Master to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings in such complaint. The Coordinating Special Master shall select as Special Masters experienced members of the State Bar of Georgia who possess a reputation in the Bar for ethical practice; \nprovided, that a Special Master may not be appointed to hear a complaint against a Respondent who resides in the same circuit as that in which the Special Master resides.\n (c) Upon being advised of appointment of a Special Master by the Coordinating Special Master, the Clerk of the Court shall return the original Notice of Discipline, rejection of Notice of Discipline, if applicable, formal complaint, Probable Cause finding, petition for appointment of Special Master and the signed order thereon to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon notification of the appointment of a Special Master, the Office of the General Counsel shall immediately serve the Respondent with the order of appointment of a Special Master and with its formal complaint as hereinafter provided. \n \n(d) Within ten days of service of the notice of appointment of a Special Master, the Respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall lodge any and all objections or challenges they may have to the competency, qualifications or impartiality of the Special Master with the chairperson of the Review Panel. The party filing such objections or challenges must also serve a copy of the objections or challenges upon the opposing counsel, the Coordinating Special Master and the \nSpecial Master, who may respond to such objections or challenges. Within a reasonable time the chairperson of the Review Panel shall consider the challenges, the responses of Respondent, the State Bar of Georgia, the Coordinating Special Master and the Special Master, if any, determine whether the Special Master is disqualified and notify the parties, the Coordinating Special Master and the Special Master of the chairperson’s decision. Exceptions to the chairperson’s \ndenial of disqualification are subject to review by the entire Review Panel and, thereafter, by the Supreme Court of Georgia when exceptions arising during the evidentiary hearing and exceptions to the report of the Special Master and the Review Panel are properly before the Court. In the event of disqualification of a Special Master by the chairperson of the Review Panel, said chairperson shall notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Coordinating Special \nMaster, the Special Master, the State Bar of Georgia and the Respondent of the disqualification and appointment of a successor Special Master shall proceed as provided in this rule.","UrlName":"revision188"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"dc2ddd92-ce46-4035-ba0d-7f2c51a8b20a","Title":"Rule 4-209.1. Coordinating Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia shall appoint a lawyer to serve as the Coordinating Special Master for disciplinary cases.</li> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia annually shall appoint up to 20 lawyers to serve as Special Masters in disciplinary cases. The Court may reappoint lawyers appointed in prior years, although it generally is preferable for a lawyer to serve as a Special Master for no more than five consecutive years. When a case is assigned to a lawyer appointed as Special Master, such lawyer shall continue to serve as Special Master in that case until final disposition, unless the Coordinating Special Master or the Court directs otherwise, irrespective of whether such lawyer is reappointed to serve as Special Master for another year.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master and Special Masters shall serve at the pleasure of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>No member of the State Disciplinary Board, State Disciplinary Review Board, Special Master Compensation Commission, or Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia shall be appointed to serve as Coordinating Special Master or as a Special Master.</li> \n <li>A list of the lawyers appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia as Special Masters shall be published on the website of the State Bar of Georgia and annually in a regular publication of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Training for Special Masters is expected, and the Coordinating Special Master shall be responsible for the planning and conduct of training sessions, which the State Bar of Georgia shall make available without cost to Special Masters. At a minimum, a lawyer appointed for the first time as a Special Master should attend a training session within six months of his appointment. The failure of a Special Master to complete the minimum required training session shall not be a basis for a motion to disqualify a Special Master. </li> \n <li>A Special Master (including the Coordinating Special Master) shall be disqualified to serve in a disciplinary case when circumstances exist, which, if the Special Master were a judge, would require the recusal of the Special Master under the Code of Judicial Conduct. In the event that the Coordinating Special Master is disqualified in any case, the Supreme Court of Georgia shall assign the case to a Special Master, and the Court shall designate another Special Master to act as Coordinating Special Master for purposes of that case only.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule131","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"accca273-ede6-4400-a09c-a04bdad8ddcb","ParentId":"dc2ddd92-ce46-4035-ba0d-7f2c51a8b20a","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The appointment of and the determination of the compensation of the Coordinating Special Master shall be the duty of the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. The Commission shall be comprised of the second, third and fourth immediate past presidents of the State Bar of Georgia. If any of the above named ex officio individuals should be unable to serve, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(b) The Coordinating Special Master shall be selected by the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission, with the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Coordinating Special Master shall serve as an independent contractor at the pleasure of the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. \n \n(c) The Coordinating Special Master shall be compensated by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds of the State Bar of Georgia in an amount specified by the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. The Coordinating Special Master’s compensation shall be approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia. On or before the first day of each calendar year, the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission shall submit to the Supreme Court of Georgia for approval the hourly rate to be paid to the Coordinating Special Master during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year, which rate shall continue until the conclusion of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(d) The Coordinating Special Master shall have such office space, furniture and equipment and may incur such operating expenses in such amounts as may be specified by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Such amounts shall be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds. On or before the first day of each calendar year, the Supreme Court of Georgia will set the amount to be paid for the above items during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year.\n(e) If the Coordinating Special Master position is vacant or the Coordinating Special Master has recused or been disqualified from a particular matter, the Supreme Court of Georgia may appoint a temporary Acting Coordinating Special Master to act until the position can be filled or to act in any particular matter.","UrlName":"revision190"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4f566031-7216-473f-aa71-81ad232243b7","Title":"Rule 4-209.2. Special Masters","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master and the Special Masters shall be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating fund at rates to be set by the Supreme Court of Georgia, which the Court may adjust from time to time.</li> \n <li>To advise the Supreme Court of Georgia with respect to the compensation of the Coordinating Special Master and Special Masters, the Court shall appoint a Special Master Compensation Commission, which shall consist of the current Treasurer of the State Bar of Georgia; the second, third, and fourth immediate past presidents of the State Bar of Georgia, unless any such past president should decline to serve; and such other persons as the Court may designate. The Commission shall make annual recommendations to the Court about the rate to be paid to the Coordinating Special Master and the rate to be paid to the Special Masters, and the Commission shall report such recommendations to the Court no later than January 1 of each year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule133","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"1ee12620-f5ee-4b93-beee-f813133bd44c","ParentId":"4f566031-7216-473f-aa71-81ad232243b7","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The Coordinating Special Master, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia, shall select and maintain a limited pool of qualified lawyers to serve as Special Masters for the State Disciplinary Board and Hearing Officers for the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants pursuant to Part A, Section 8 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia. The names of those so selected shall be placed on a list maintained by the Coordinating Special Master. Said list shall be published annually in a regular State Bar of Georgia publication. Although not mandatory, it is preferable that a lawyer so selected shall only remain on such list for five years, so that the term may generally be considered to be five years. Any lawyer whose name is removed from such list shall be eligible to be selected and placed on the list at any subsequent time.\n (b) Training for Special Masters and Hearing Officers is expected, subject to the terms of this Rule, and shall consist of one training session within twelve months after selection. The Special Master and Hearing Officer training shall be planned and conducted by the Coordinating Special Master. Special Masters and Hearing Officers who fail to attend such a minimum training session shall periodically be removed from consideration for appointment in future cases. Failure to attend such a training session shall not be the basis for a disqualification of any Special Master or Hearing Officer; as such qualifications shall remain in the sole discretion of the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(c) The Special Masters may be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds on a per case rate to be set by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Hearing Officers may be paid pursuant to Part A, Section 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia.\n(d) On or before the first day of March of each calendar year, the Supreme Court of Georgia may set the amount to be paid to the Special Masters during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year, which rate shall continue until the conclusion of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"revision192"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3ee26eaa-e752-484a-bf5e-9e65269cc3eb","Title":"Rule 4-209.3 Powers and Duties of the Coordinating Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Coordinating Special Master shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to establish requirements for, conduct, and supervise Special Master training;</li> \n <li>to assign cases to Special Masters from the list provided in Rule 4-209 (b);</li> \n <li>to exercise all of the powers and duties provided in Rule 4-210 when acting as a Special Master under paragraph (h) below;</li> \n <li>to monitor and evaluate the performance of Special Masters and to submit a report to the Supreme Court of Georgia regarding such performance annually;</li> \n <li>to remove Special Masters for such cause as may be deemed proper by the Coordinating Special Master;</li> \n <li>to fill all vacancies occasioned by incapacity, disqualification, recusal, or removal;</li> \n <li>to administer Special Master compensation, as provided in Rule 4-209.2 (b);</li> \n <li>to hear pretrial motions when no Special Master is serving; </li> \n <li>to perform all other administrative duties necessary for an efficient and effective hearing system;</li> \n <li>to allow a late filing of the respondent’s answer where there has been no final selection of a Special Master within 30 days of service of the formal complaint upon the respondent;</li> \n <li>to receive and pass upon challenges and objections to the appointment of Special Masters; and</li> \n <li>to extend the time for a Special Master to file a report, in accordance with Rule 4-214 (a).</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule552","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"eefc4188-d502-482d-91a8-d54da3e49a16","ParentId":"3ee26eaa-e752-484a-bf5e-9e65269cc3eb","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Coordinating Special Master shall have the following powers and duties:\n (1) to establish requirements for and supervise Special Master and Hearing Officer training; \n \n (2) to assign cases to Special Masters and Hearing Officers from the pool provided in Bar Rule 4-209 (b); \n \n (3) to exercise all of the powers and duties provided in Bar Rule 4-210 when acting as a Special Master under subparagraph (8) below; \n \n (4) to monitor and evaluate the performance of Special Masters and Hearing Officers; \n \n (5) to remove Special Masters and Hearing Officers for such cause as may be deemed proper by the Coordinating Special Master; \n \n (6) to fill all vacancies occasioned by incapacity, disqualification, recusal or removal; \n \n (7) to administer Special Master and Hearing Officer compensation, if authorized as provided in Bar Rule 4-209.2 or Part A, Section 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia; \n \n (8) to hear pretrial motions when no Special Master has been assigned; and \n \n(9) to perform all other administrative duties necessary for an efficient and effective hearing system.","UrlName":"revision194"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cf41204d-18f9-4302-801c-b3cfeb38cd2d","Title":"Rule 4-210. Powers and Duties of Special Masters","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In accordance with these Rules a duly appointed Special Master shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to exercise general supervision over assigned disciplinary proceedings, including emergency suspension cases as provided in Rule 4-108, and to perform all duties specifically enumerated in these Rules;</li> \n <li>to rule on all questions concerning the sufficiency of the formal complaint;</li> \n <li>to encourage negotiations between the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent, whether at a pretrial meeting set by the Special Master or at any other time;</li> \n <li>to receive and evaluate any Petition for Voluntary Discipline filed after the filing of a formal complaint;</li> \n <li>to grant continuances and to extend any time limit provided for herein as to any pending matter subject to Rule 4-214 (a);</li> \n <li>to apply to the Coordinating Special Master for leave to withdraw and for the appointment of a successor in the event that he becomes incapacitated or otherwise unable to perform his duties;</li> \n <li>to hear, determine and consolidate action on the complaints, where there are multiple complaints against a respondent growing out of different transactions, whether they involve one or more complainants, and to make recommendations on each complaint as constituting a separate offense;</li> \n <li>to sign subpoenas and to exercise the powers described in Rule 4-221 (c);</li> \n <li>to preside over evidentiary hearings and to decide questions of law and fact raised during such hearings;</li> \n <li>to make findings of fact and conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline as hereinafter provided and to submit his findings for consideration by the Supreme Court of Georgia in accordance with Rule 4-214;</li> \n <li>to exercise general supervision over discovery by parties to disciplinary proceedings and to conduct such hearings and sign all appropriate pleadings and orders pertaining to such discovery as are provided for by the law of Georgia applicable to discovery in civil cases; and</li> \n <li>in disciplinary cases, to make a recommendation of discipline, and in emergency suspension cases a recommendation as to whether the respondent should be suspended pending further disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule134","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"63d9ed19-1843-48c9-8df6-230c3b31f099","ParentId":"cf41204d-18f9-4302-801c-b3cfeb38cd2d","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In accordance with these Rules a duly appointed Special Master or Hearing Officer shall have the following powers and duties: \n \n(1) to exercise general supervision over assigned disciplinary proceedings and to perform all duties specifically enumerated in these Rules; \n \n(2) to rule on all questions concerning the sufficiency of the formal complaint;\n(3) to conduct the negotiations between the State Bar of Georgia and the Respondent, whether at a pretrial meeting set by the Special Master or at any other time;\n (4) to receive and evaluate any Petition for Voluntary Discipline; \n \n(5) to grant continuances and to extend any time limit provided for herein as to any pending matter; \n \n(6) to apply to the Coordinating Special Master for leave to withdraw and for the appointment of a successor in the event that he or she becomes incapacitated to perform his or her duties or in the event that he or she learns that he or she and the Respondent reside in the same circuit; \n \n(7) to hear, determine and consolidate action on the complaints, where there are multiple complaints against a Respondent growing out of different transactions, whether they involve one or more complainants, and may proceed to make recommendations on each complaint as constituting a separate offense;\n(8) to sign subpoenas and exercise the powers described in Bar Rule 4-221(b);\n (9) to preside over evidentiary hearings and to decide questions of law and fact raised during such hearings; \n \n(10) to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter provided and to submit his or her findings for consideration by the Review Panel; \n \n(11) to exercise general supervision over discovery by parties to disciplinary proceedings and to conduct such hearings and sign all appropriate pleadings and orders pertaining to such discovery as are provided for by the law of Georgia applicable to discovery in civil cases;\n(12) in disciplinary cases, to make a recommendation of discipline, and in emergency suspension cases a recommendation as to whether the Respondent should be suspended pending further disciplinary proceedings; and\n(13) to conduct and exercise general supervision over hearings for the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants and to make written findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to Part A, Section 8 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia.","UrlName":"revision196"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ee826a71-c151-48fe-8edb-41abef22de27","Title":"Rule 4-211. Formal Complaint; Service","Content":"<ol> \n <li>Within 30 days after a finding of Probable Cause, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a formal complaint that specifies with reasonable particularity the acts complained of and the grounds for disciplinary action. A copy of the formal complaint shall be served upon the respondent after appointment of a Special Master. In those cases where a Notice of Discipline has been filed and rejected, the filing of the formal complaint shall be governed by the time period set forth in Rule 4-208.4. The formal complaint shall be served pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>At all stages of the proceeding, both the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may be represented by counsel. Counsel representing the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to prepare and sign notices, pleadings, motions, complaints, and certificates for and in behalf of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"rule136","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0d430cfa-e7d7-4ab5-a7e2-f1ec9bc56986","ParentId":"ee826a71-c151-48fe-8edb-41abef22de27","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Within thirty days after a finding of Probable Cause, a formal complaint shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel which shall specify with reasonable particularity the acts complained of and the grounds for disciplinary action. A formal complaint shall include the names and addresses of witnesses so far as then known. A copy of the formal complaint shall be served upon the Respondent after appointment of a Special Master by the Coordinating Special \nMaster. In those cases where a Notice of Discipline has been filed and rejected, the filing of the formal complaint shall be governed by the time period set forth in Bar Rule 4-208.4. The formal complaint shall be served pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(b) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(c) At all stages of the proceeding, both the Respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may be represented by counsel. Counsel representing the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to prepare and sign notices, pleadings, motions, complaints, and certificates for and in behalf of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Disciplinary Board.","UrlName":"revision198"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"86e94ba5-a26d-40bd-9bdd-9920d0e0e1a3","Title":"Rule 4-211.1 Dismissal after Formal Complaint","Content":"At any time after the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause, the Office of the General Counsel may dismiss the proceeding with the consent of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or with the consent of any three members of the State Disciplinary Board.","UrlName":"rule138","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"36e51b06-b1bc-48ca-a8b7-8e019fc1c829","ParentId":"86e94ba5-a26d-40bd-9bdd-9920d0e0e1a3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"At any time after the Investigative Panel finds probable cause, the Office of General Counsel may dismiss the proceeding with the consent of the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or with the consent of any three members of the Investigative Panel.","UrlName":"revision200"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d3caa485-b0cd-4823-9271-428068980047","Title":"Rule 4-212. Answer of Respondent; Discovery","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The respondent shall file and serve his answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-221 (b) within 30 days after service of the formal complaint. If the respondent fails to answer or to obtain an extension of time for his answer, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint shall be deemed admitted. In the event the respondent’s answer fails to address specifically the issues raised in the formal complaint, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint and not specifically addressed in the answer shall be deemed admitted. A respondent may obtain an extension of time not to exceed 15 days to file the answer from the Special Master. Extensions of time for the filing of an answer shall not be routinely granted.</li> \n <li>The pendency of objections or challenges to one or more Special Masters shall provide no justification for a respondent’s failure to file his answer or for failure of the State Bar of Georgia or the respondent to engage in discovery.</li> \n <li>Both parties to the disciplinary proceeding may engage in discovery under the rules of practice and procedure then applicable to civil cases in the State of Georgia.</li> \n <li>In lieu of filing an answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar of Georgia, the respondent may submit to the Special Master a Petition for Voluntary Discipline as provided in Rule 4-227 (c). Each such petition shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. As provided in Rule 4-227 (c) (1), the Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule117","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"415ec974-0089-4913-a142-be55ce96b55a","ParentId":"d3caa485-b0cd-4823-9271-428068980047","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The respondent shall serve his or her answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar within thirty days after service of the formal complaint. In the event that respondent fails to answer or to obtain an extension of time for his answer, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint shall be deemed admitted. In the event the respondent's answer fails to address specifically the issues raised in the formal complaint, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint and not specifically addressed in the answer shall be deemed admitted. A respondent may obtain an extension of time not to exceed fifteen days to file the answer from the special master, or, when a challenge to the special master is pending, from the chairperson of the Review Panel. Extensions of time for the filing of an answer shall not be routinely granted. \n \n(b) The pendency of objections or challenges to one or more special masters shall provide no justification for a respondent's failure to file his answer or for failure of the State Bar or the respondent to engage in discovery. \n \n(c) Both parties to the disciplinary proceeding may engage in discovery under the rules of practice and procedure then applicable to civil cases in the State of Georgia. \n \n(d) In lieu of filing an answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar, the respondent may submit to the special master a Petition for Voluntary Discipline; provided, however, that each such petition shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. As provided in Rule 4-210(d), the special master may solicit a response to such petition from Bar counsel.","UrlName":"revision202"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"8127673b-ac9f-4f79-8fcb-17a808c4feba","Title":"Rule 4-213. Evidentiary Hearing","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Within 90 days after the filing of respondent’s answer to the formal complaint or the expiration of the time for filing of the answer, whichever is later, the Special Master shall proceed to hear the case. The evidentiary hearing shall be reported and transcribed at the expense of the State Bar of Georgia. When the hearing is complete, the Special Master shall proceed to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline and file a report with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards as hereinafter provided. Alleged errors in the hearing may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia when the findings and recommendations of discipline are filed with the Court. There shall be no interlocutory appeal of alleged errors in the hearing.</li> \n <li>Upon respondent’s showing of necessity and financial inability to pay for a copy of the transcript, the Special Master shall order the State Bar of Georgia to purchase a copy of the transcript for respondent.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule127","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"e7e60296-f99b-46a6-86f6-e4f2818f7cb5","ParentId":"8127673b-ac9f-4f79-8fcb-17a808c4feba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Within 90 days after the filing of respondent's answer to the formal complaint or the time for filing of the answer, whichever is later, the Special Master shall proceed to hear the case. The evidentiary hearing shall be reported and transcribed at the expense of the State Bar of Georiga. When the hearing is complete, the Special Master shall proceed to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline and file a report with the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia as hereinafter provided. Alleged errors in the trial may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia when the findings and recommendations of discipline of the Review Panel are filed with the Court. There shall be no direct appeal from such proceedings of the Special Master. \n \n(b) Upon respondent's showing of necessity and financial inability to pay for a copy of the transcript, the Special Master shall order the State Bar of Georgia to purchase a copy of the transcript for respondent.","UrlName":"revision204"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9622baf4-fd64-4aec-bb7f-b587c58b1dbd","Title":"Rule 4-214. Report of the Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Unless the Coordinating Special Master extends the deadline for good cause, the Special Master shall prepare a report within 45 days from receipt of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing. Failure of the Special Master to issue the report within 45 days shall not be grounds for dismissal. The report shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>findings of fact on the issues raised by the formal complaint;</li> \n <li>conclusions of law on the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties; and</li> \n <li>a recommendation of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Special Master shall file his or her original report and recommendation with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards and shall serve a copy on the respondent and counsel for the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall file the original record in the case directly with the Supreme Court of Georgia, unless any party files with the Clerk a request for review by the State Disciplinary Review Board and exceptions to the report within 30 days of the date the report is filed as provided in Rule 4-216 et seq. The Clerk shall inform the State Disciplinary Review Board when a request for review and exceptions are filed.</li> \n <li>In the event any party requests review, the responding party shall file a response to the exceptions within 30 days of the filing. Within 10 days after the receipt of a response or the expiration of the time for responding, the Clerk shall transmit the record in the case to the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule53","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"1c0dc62c-cf9e-4ece-9e50-bbc3f2e76594","ParentId":"9622baf4-fd64-4aec-bb7f-b587c58b1dbd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Rule 4-214. This rule is reserved. ","UrlName":"revision206"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"943ffb9b-7630-4dd3-a8fe-4b6b6c0d12da","Title":"Rule 4-215. Powers and Duties of the State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In accordance with these Rules, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to review reports of Special Masters, and to recommend to the Supreme Court of Georgia the imposition of punishment and discipline or dismissal of the complaint;</li> \n <li>to adopt forms for notices and any other written instruments necessary or desirable under these Rules;</li> \n <li>to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure; </li> \n <li>to receive Notice of Reciprocal Discipline and to recommend to the Supreme Court of Georgia the imposition of punishment and discipline pursuant to Bar Rule 9.4 (b) (3); and</li> \n <li>to administer State Disciplinary Review Board reprimands.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule137","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b62dff75-584a-4a6e-969c-ffe4dd865ff7","ParentId":"943ffb9b-7630-4dd3-a8fe-4b6b6c0d12da","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision208"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"137e355a-d385-4b45-ae79-6a737d44c0c1","Title":"Rule 4-216. Proceedings Before the State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon receipt of the record and exceptions to the report of the Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-214, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall consider the record, review findings of fact and conclusions of law, and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court of Georgia and the nature of such recommended discipline. The findings of fact made by a Special Master may be reversed if the State Disciplinary Review Board finds them to be clearly erroneous or manifestly in error. Conclusions of law and determinations of appropriate sanctions shall be reviewed de novo.</li> \n <li>The respondent shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Review Board considering the case under a procedure as provided for in the Rules of the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li>There shall be no de novo hearing before the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board may consider exceptions to the report of the Special Master and may in its discretion grant oral argument if requested by any party within 15 days of transmission of the record and exceptions to the State Disciplinary Review Board. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards, in accordance with Rule 4-214. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.</li> \n <li>Within 90 days after receipt of the record including any exceptions to the report of the Special Master and responses thereto the State Disciplinary Review Board shall file its report with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. The 90-day deadline may be extended by agreement of the parties or with the consent of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board for good cause shown. A copy of the State Disciplinary Review Board’s report shall be served upon the respondent, and the Clerk shall file the record in the case with the Supreme Court of Georgia within 10 days after the report is filed. If no report is filed by the State Disciplinary Review Board within 90 days of receipt by it of the record and no extension is granted, the Clerk shall file the original record in the case with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the case shall be considered by the Court on the record.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule143","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"75367abc-39d4-4199-b939-3f62e23582eb","ParentId":"137e355a-d385-4b45-ae79-6a737d44c0c1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision210"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"662bb234-462b-4dfa-8aa7-6a1370a125b9","Title":"Rule 4-217.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule146","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"e1472412-4b90-4b6b-bec0-aea3970475d9","ParentId":"662bb234-462b-4dfa-8aa7-6a1370a125b9","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Within 30 days from receipt of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing, the Special Master shall prepare a report which shall contain the following:\n(1) findings of fact on the issues raised by the formal complaint, and\n(2) conclusions of law on the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties; and\n(3) a recommendation of discipline.\n (b) The Special Master shall file his or her original report and recommendation with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board and shall serve a copy on the respondent and counsel for the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(c) Thirty days after the Special Master's report and recommendation is filed, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board  shall file the original record in the case directly with the Supreme Court of Georgia unless either party requests review by the Review Panel as provided in paragraph (d) of this Rule. In the event neither party requests review by the Review Panel and the matter goes directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, both parties shall be deemed to have waived any right they may have under the Rules to file exceptions with or make request for oral argument to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Any review undertaken by the Supreme Court of Georgia shall be solely on the original record. \n \n(d) Upon receipt of the Special Master’s report and recommendation, either party may request review by the Review Panel as provided in Rule 4-218. Such party shall file the request and exceptions with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with Rule 4-221 (f) and serve them on the opposing party within 30 days after the Special Master's report is filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. Upon receipt of a timely written request and exceptions, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall prepare and file the record and report with the Review Panel. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.","UrlName":"revision212"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a0d831a8-8c52-4efe-9000-b94fc429538b","Title":"Rule 4-218. Judgments","Content":"After the Special Master's report and any report of the State Disciplinary Review Board are filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file with the Court any written exceptions, supported by written argument, either may have to the reports. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Court within 30 days of the date that the record is filed with the Court and a copy served upon the opposing party. The responding party shall have an additional 30 days to file a response with the Court. The Court may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by a party to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court will promptly consider the report of the Special Master, any report of the State Disciplinary Review Board, any exceptions, and any responses filed by any party to such exceptions, and enter judgment upon the formal complaint. A copy of the Court’s judgment shall be transmitted to the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent by the Court.","UrlName":"rule148","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"89aa92fa-6cc4-46c8-b9ae-8d02469a53d1","ParentId":"a0d831a8-8c52-4efe-9000-b94fc429538b","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon receipt of the report from a Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-217(d), the Review Panel shall consider the record, make findings of fact and conclusions of law and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court and the nature of such recommended discipline. The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a Special Master shall not be binding on the Panel and may be reversed by it on the basis of the record submitted to the Panel by the Special Master. \n \n(b) The Respondent shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any member of the Review Panel considering the case against him under a procedure as provided for in the rules of the Panel. \n \n(c) There shall be no de novo hearing before the Review Panel except by unanimous consent of the Panel. \n \n(d) The Review Panel may grant rehearings, or new trials, for such reasons, in such manner, on such issues and within such times as the ends of justice may require. \n \n(e) The Review Panel may consider exceptions to the report of the special master and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with Bar Rules 4-217(d) and 4-221(f). The responding party shall have ten (10) days after service of the exceptions within which to respond. \n \n(f) The Review Panel shall file its report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. A copy of the Panel's report shall be served upon the Respondent.","UrlName":"revision214"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"34cf176e-9770-4ae2-8545-e40c320883fc","Title":"Rule 4-219. Publication and Protective Orders","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>In cases in which a lawyer is publicly reprimanded, suspended, disbarred, or voluntarily surrenders his license, the Office of the General Counsel shall publish notice of the discipline in a local newspaper or newspapers. The Office of the General Counsel shall publish notice of all public discipline on the official State Bar of Georgia website, including the respondent’s full name and business address, the nature of the discipline imposed and the effective dates.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall immediately cease the practice of law in Georgia and shall, within 30 days, notify all clients of his inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients. Within 45 days after a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, the respondent shall certify to the Court that he has satisfied the requirements of this Rule. Should the respondent fail to comply with the requirements of this Rule, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its own motion or upon motion of the Office of the General Counsel, and after 10 days’ notice to the respondent and proof of his failure to notify or protect his clients, may hold the respondent in contempt and, pursuant to Rule 4-228, order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of the respondent and proceed to notify all clients and to take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Motions for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by either the respondent or by the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension under Part IV of these Rules the respondent shall take such action necessary to cause the removal of any indicia of the respondent as a lawyer, legal assistant, legal clerk or person with similar status. In the event the respondent should maintain a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted, the respondent shall not represent himself as a lawyer or person with similar status and shall not provide any legal advice to clients of the law office.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule150","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"765c0956-e960-4f80-be7b-207b5f653097","ParentId":"34cf176e-9770-4ae2-8545-e40c320883fc","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) After either the Review Panel's report or the Special Master's report is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file with the Court any written exceptions, supported by written argument, each may have to the report subject to the provisions of Rule 4-217 (c). All such exceptions shall be filed with the Court within 30 days of the date that the report is filed with the Court and a copy served upon the opposing party. The responding party shall have an additional 30 days to file its response with the Court. The Court may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by a party to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court will promptly consider the report of the Review Panel or the Special Master, any exceptions, and any responses filed by any party to such exceptions, and enter judgment upon the formal complaint. A copy of the Court's judgment shall be transmitted to the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent by the Court. \n \n(b) In cases in which the Supreme Court of Georgia orders disbarment, voluntary surrender of license or suspension, or the respondent is disbarred or suspended on a Notice of Discipline, the Review Panel shall publish in a local newspaper or newspapers and on the official State Bar of Georgia website, notice of the discipline, including the respondent's full name and business address, the nature of the discipline imposed and the effective dates. \n \n(c) (1) After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall immediately cease the practice of law in Georgia and shall, within 30 days, notify all clients of his inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients. Within 45 days after a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, the respondent shall certify to the Court that he has satisfied the requirements of this Rule. Should the respondent fail to comply with the requirements of this Rule, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its own motion or upon motion of the Office of the General Counsel, and after ten days notice to the respondent and proof of his failure to notify or protect his clients, may hold the respondent in contempt and, pursuant to Rule 4-228, order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of the respondent and proceed to notify all clients and to take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Motions for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by either the respondent or by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(2) After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension under Part IV of these Rules, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall take such action necessary to cause the removal of any indicia of the respondent as a lawyer, legal assistant, legal clerk or person with similar status. In the event the respondent should maintain a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted, the respondent shall not:\n (i) have any contact with the clients of the office either in person, by telephone or in writing; or \n \n(ii) have any contact with persons who have legal dealings with the office either in person, by telephone or in writing.","UrlName":"revision216"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Rule 4-220. Notice of Punishment or Acquittal; Administration of Reprimands","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia for the prescribed period.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record. State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be issued by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board, or his designee, at a regular meeting of the Board.</li> \n <li>Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record in the case. They shall be read in open court in the presence of the respondent by the judge of a Superior Court in the county of the respondent's address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Notice of issuance of the reprimand shall be published in advance in the legal organ of the county of the respondent’s address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia, and provided to the complainant in the underlying case.</li> \n <li>After a Public Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. </li> \n <li>In the event of a final judgment in favor of the respondent, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule152","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4f50c5b-d625-418d-8049-012836748219","ParentId":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Secretary of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia either permanently, in case of disbarment, or for the prescribed period in case of suspension. \n \n(b) Review Panel Reprimands shall be administered before the Panel by the chairperson or his or her designee. \n \n(c) Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Review Panel, the Chairperson of the Review Panel or his or her designee, and shall be read in open court, in the presence of the respondent, by the judge of the superior court in the county in which the respondent resides or in the county in which the disciplinary infraction occurred, with the location to be specified by the Review Panel, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. \n \n(d) After a Public or Review Panel Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. \n \n(e) In the event of a final judgment of acquittal, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the respondent resides. The respondent may give reasonable public notice of the judgment or acquittal.","UrlName":"revision218"},{"Id":"36663b15-9666-4b27-b56c-48e43efb1c12","ParentId":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia for the prescribed period.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record. State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be issued by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board, or his designee, at a regular meeting of the Board.</li> \n <li>Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record in the case. They shall be read in open court in the presence of the respondent by the judge of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides or the county in which the disciplinary infraction occurred, with the location to be specified by the Special Master subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Notice of issuance of the reprimand shall be published in advance in the legal organ of the county of the respondent’s address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia, and provided to the complainant in the underlying case.</li> \n <li>After a Public Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. </li> \n <li>In the event of a final judgment in favor of the respondent, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision270"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"97c32cdd-b655-4893-b2ed-0f800248552f","Title":"Rule 4-221. Hearing Procedures","Content":"(a) Oaths. Before entering upon his duties as herein provided, each member of the State Disciplinary Board, each member of the State Disciplinary Review Board, and each Special Master shall swear or affirm to the following oath by signing a copy and returning it to the Clerk of the Boards or to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, as appropriate.\n “I do solemnly swear or affirm that I will faithfully and impartially \t discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as a member of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia/member of the State Disciplinary Review Board of the State Bar of Georgia/Special Master according to the best of my ability and \t understanding and agreeable to the laws and Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States.”\nThe Clerk of the Boards shall maintain the completed Oaths of Board members, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the completed Oaths of Special Masters.\n(b) Pleadings and Copies. Original pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia, and the parties shall serve copies upon the Special Master and the opposing party pursuant to the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Depositions and other original discovery shall be retained by counsel and shall not be filed except as permitted under the Uniform Superior Court Rules.\n(c) Witnesses and Evidence; Contempt.\n(1) The respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall have the right to require the issuance of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses to testify or to produce books and papers. The Special Master shall have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents relevant to the matter under investigation, by subpoena, and as further provided by law in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n(2) The following shall subject a person to rule for contempt of the Special Master or State Disciplinary Board:\n(i) disregard, in any manner whatsoever, of a subpoena issued pursuant to Rules 4-203 (9), 4-210 (h) or 4-221 (c) (1);\n(ii) refusal to answer any pertinent or proper question of a Special Master; or\n(iii) willful or flagrant violation of a lawful directive of a Special Master.\nIt shall be the duty of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or Special Master to report the facts supporting contempt to the Chief Judge of the Superior Court in and for the county in which the investigation, trial or hearing is being held. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of the matter and shall follow the procedures for contempt as are applicable in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil case before the Superior Court under the laws in Georgia.\n (3) Any Special Master shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue any subpoena herein provided for. \n \n(4) Depositions may be taken by the respondent or the State Bar of Georgia in the same manner and under the same provisions as may be done in civil cases under the laws of Georgia, and such depositions may be used upon the trial or an investigation or hearing in the same manner as such depositions may be used in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n(5) All witnesses attending any hearing provided for under these Rules shall be entitled to the same fees as now are allowed by law to witnesses attending trials in civil cases in the Superior Courts of this State under subpoena.\n(d) Venue of Hearings.\n (1) The hearings on all complaints and charges against a resident respondent shall be held in the county of the respondent’s main office or the county of residence of the respondent unless he otherwise agrees. \n \n(2) Where the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the complaint arose in the State of Georgia, the hearing shall be held in the county where the complaint arose. \n \n(3) When the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the offense occurs outside the State, the hearing may be held in the county of the State Bar of Georgia headquarters.\n","UrlName":"rule156","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"5c9f9944-ca22-4108-8823-d32bea898b29","ParentId":"97c32cdd-b655-4893-b2ed-0f800248552f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Oaths. Before entering upon his duties as herein provided, each member of the State Disciplinary Board and each Special Master shall subscribe to an oath to be administered by any person authorized to administer oaths under the laws of this State, such oath to be in writing and filed with the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia. The form of such oath shall be:\n\"I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as a member of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia/Special Master according to the best of my ability and understanding and agreeable to the laws and Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States so help me God.\"\n(b) Witnesses and Evidence; Contempt.\n(1) The respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall have the right to require the issuance of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses to testify or to produce books and papers. The State Disciplinary Board or a special master shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents, relevant to the matter under investigation, by subpoena, and as further provided by law in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n \n(2) The following shall subject a person to rule for contempt of the Special Master or Panel:\n \n(i) disregard, in any manner whatever, of a subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 4-221 (b) (1),\n \n(ii) refusal to answer any pertinent or proper question of a Special Master or Board member, or\n \n(iii) wilful or flagrant violation of a lawful directive of a Special Master or Board member.\n \nIt shall be the duty of the chairperson of the affected Panel or Special Master to report the fact to the Chief Judge of the superior court in and for the county in which said investigation, trial or hearing is being held. The superior court shall have jurisdiction of the matter and shall follow the procedures for contempt as are applicable in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil case before the superior court under the laws in Georgia.\n \n(3) Any member of the State Disciplinary Board and any Special Master shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue any subpoena herein provided for. \n \n(4) Depositions may be taken by the respondent or the State Bar of Georgia in the same manner and under the same provisions as may be done in civil cases under the laws of Georgia, and such depositions may be used upon the trial or an investigation or hearing in the same manner as such depositions are admissible in evidence in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n \n(5) All witnesses attending any hearing provided for under these Rules shall be entitled to the same fees as now are allowed by law to witnesses attending trials in civil cases in the superior courts of this State under subpoena, and said fees shall be assessed against the parties to the proceedings under the rule of law applicable to civil suits in the superior courts of this State. \n \n(6) Whenever the deposition of any person is to be taken in this State pursuant to the laws of another state, territory, province or commonwealth, or of the United States or of another country for use in attorney discipline, fitness or disability proceedings there, the chairperson of the Investigative Panel, or his or her designee upon petition, may issue a summons or subpoena as provided in this Rule to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents at such deposition.\n \n(c) Venue of Hearings.\n \n(1) The hearings on all complaints and charges against resident respondents shall be held in the county of residence of the respondent unless he otherwise agrees. \n \n(2) Where the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the complaint arose in the State of Georgia, the hearing shall be held in the county where the complaint arose. \n \n(3) When the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the offense occurs outside the State, the hearing may be held in the county of the State Bar of Georgia headquarters.\n \n(d) Confidentiality of Investigations and Proceedings.\n \n(1) The State Bar of Georgia shall maintain as confidential all disciplinary investigations and proceedings pending at the screening or investigative stage, unless otherwise provided by these Rules. \n \n(2) After a proceeding under these Rules is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all evidentiary and motions hearings shall be open to the public and all reports rendered shall be public documents. \n \n(3) Nothing in these Rules shall prohibit the complainant, respondent or third party from disclosing information regarding a disciplinary proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia or a Special Master in proceedings under these Rules. \n \n(4) The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia or the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board may reveal or authorize disclosure of information which would otherwise be confidential under this Rule under the following circumstances:\n \n(i) In the event of a charge of wrongful conduct against any member of the State Disciplinary Board or any person who is otherwise connected with the disciplinary proceeding in any way, either Panel of the Board or its Chairperson or his or her designee, may authorize the use of information concerning disciplinary investigations or proceedings to aid in the defense against such charge. \n \n(ii) In the event the Office of the General Counsel receives information that suggests criminal activity, such information may be revealed to the appropriate criminal prosecutor. \n \n(iii) In the event of subsequent disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, the Office of the General Counsel may, in aggravation of discipline in the pending disciplinary case, reveal the imposition of confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208 and facts underlying the imposition of discipline. \n \n(iv) A complainant or lawyer representing the complainant may be notified of the status or disposition of the complaint. \n \n(v) When public statements that are false or misleading are made about any otherwise confidential disciplinary case, the Office of the General Counsel may disclose all information necessary to correct such false or misleading statements.\n \n(5) The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information to the following persons if it appears that the information may assist them in the discharge of their duties:\n \n(i) The Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(ii) The Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(iii) The Judicial Nominating Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(iv) The Lawyer Assistance Program or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(v) The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(vi) The Judicial Qualifications Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(vii) The Executive Committee with the specific approval of the following representatives of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board: the chairperson, the vice-chairperson and a third representative designated by the chairperson; \n \n(viii) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board; \n \n(ix) The Consumer Assistance Program; \n \n(x) The General Counsel Overview Committee; \n  \n(xi) An office or committee charged with discipline appointed by the United States Circuit or District Court or the highest court of any state, District of Columbia, commonwealth or possession of the United States; and \n \n(xii) The Unlicensed Practice of Law Department.\n \n(6) Any information used by the Office of the General Counsel in a proceeding under Rule 4-108 or in a proceeding to obtain a Receiver to administer the files of a member of the State Bar of Georgia, shall not be confidential under this Rule. \n \n(7) The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information when required by law or court order. \n \n(8) The authority or discretion to reveal confidential information under this Rule shall not constitute a waiver of any evidentiary, statutory or other privilege which may be asserted by the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board under Bar Rules or applicable law. \n \n(9) Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit the Office of the General Counsel or the Investigative Panel from interviewing potential witnesses or placing the Notice of Investigation out for service by sheriff or other authorized person. \n \n(10) Members of the Office of the General Counsel and State Disciplinary Board may respond to specific inquiries concerning matters that have been made public by the complainant, respondent or third parties but are otherwise confidential under these Rules by acknowledging the existence and status of the proceeding. \n \n(11) The State Bar of Georgia shall not disclose information concerning discipline imposed on a lawyer under prior Supreme Court Rules that was confidential when imposed, unless authorized to do so by said prior Rules.\n \n(e) Burden of Proof; Evidence.\n \n(1) In all proceedings under this Chapter the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Georgia, except for proceedings under Rule 4-106. \n \n(2) In all proceedings under this chapter occurring after a finding of probable cause as described in Rule 4-204.4, the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of proof required of the State Bar of Georgia shall be clear and convincing evidence.\n \n(f) Pleadings and Copies. Original pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. Depositions and other original discovery shall be retained by counsel and shall not be filed except as permitted under the Uniform Superior Court Rules. \n \n(g) Pleadings and Communications Privileged. Pleadings and oral and written statements of members of the State Disciplinary Board, members and designees of the Lawyer Assistance Program, Special Masters, Bar counsel and investigators, complainants, witnesses, and respondents and their counsel made to one another or filed in the record during any investigation, intervention, hearing or other disciplinary proceeding under this Part IV, and pertinent to the disciplinary proceeding, are made in performance of a legal and public duty, are absolutely privileged, and under no circumstances form the basis for a right of action.","UrlName":"revision220"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"62b2a0db-ca20-4090-a530-abeb09736218","Title":"Rule 4-221.1 Confidentiality of Investigations and Proceedings","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall maintain as confidential all disciplinary investigations and proceedings pending at the screening or investigative stage, unless otherwise provided by these Rules.</li> \n <li>After a proceeding under these Rules is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all evidentiary and motions hearings shall be open to the public and all documents and pleadings filed of record shall be public documents, unless the Special Master or the Supreme Court of Georgia orders otherwise.</li> \n <li>Nothing in these Rules shall prohibit the complainant, respondent, or a third party from disclosing information regarding a disciplinary proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia or a Special Master in proceedings under these Rules.</li> \n <li> The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board may reveal or authorize disclosure of information that would otherwise be confidential under this Rule under the following circumstances: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>In the event of a charge of wrongful conduct against any member of the State Disciplinary Board, the State Disciplinary Review Board, or any person who is otherwise connected with the disciplinary proceeding in any way, the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair or his designee, may authorize the use of information concerning disciplinary investigations or proceedings to aid in the defense against such charge.</li> \n <li>In the event the Office of the General Counsel receives information that suggests criminal activity, such information may be revealed to the appropriate criminal prosecutor.</li> \n <li>In the event of subsequent disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, the Office of the General Counsel may, in aggravation of discipline in the pending disciplinary case, reveal the imposition of confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208 and facts underlying the imposition of discipline.</li> \n <li>A complainant and/or lawyer representing the complainant shall be notified of the status or disposition of the complaint.</li> \n <li>When public statements that are false or misleading are made about any otherwise confidential disciplinary case, the Office of the General Counsel may disclose all information necessary to correct such false or misleading statements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information to the following persons if it appears that the information may assist them in the discharge of their duties:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Judicial Nominating Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Lawyer Assistance Program or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Judicial Qualifications Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee with the specific approval of the following representatives of the State Disciplinary Board: the Chair, the Vice-Chair, and a third representative designated by the Chair;</li> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board;</li> \n <li>The Client Assistance Program;</li> \n <li>The General Counsel Overview Committee; </li> \n <li>An office or committee charged with discipline appointed by the United States Circuit or District Court or the highest court of any state, District of Columbia, commonwealth or possession of the United States; and</li> \n <li>The Unlicensed Practice of Law Department.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Any information used by the Office of the General Counsel in a proceeding under Rule 4-108 or in a proceeding to obtain a receiver to administer the files of a lawyer, shall not be confidential under this Rule.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information when required by law or court order.</li> \n <li>The authority or discretion to reveal confidential information under this Rule shall not constitute a waiver of any evidentiary, statutory or other privilege which may be asserted by the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board under Bar Rules or applicable law.</li> \n <li>Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit the Office of the General Counsel or the State Disciplinary Board from interviewing potential witnesses or placing the Notice of Investigation out for service by the sheriff or other authorized person.</li> \n <li>Members of the Office of the General Counsel and State Disciplinary Board may respond to specific inquiries concerning matters that have been made public by the complainant, respondent, or third parties but are otherwise confidential under these Rules by acknowledging the existence and status of the proceeding.</li> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall not disclose information concerning discipline imposed on a lawyer under prior Supreme Court of Georgia Rules that was confidential when imposed, unless authorized to do so by said prior Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule603","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"af4ea35a-2419-4a09-b5c3-0756c324d60c","Title":"Rule 4-221.2. Burden of Proof; Evidence","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In all proceedings under this Chapter, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Georgia, except for proceedings under Rule 4-106.</li> \n <li>In all proceedings under this Chapter occurring after a finding of Probable Cause as described in Rule 4-204.4, the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of proof required of the State Bar shall be clear and convincing evidence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule604","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"49a36f5e-540c-43ec-a804-da706530090f","Title":"Rule 4-221.3. Pleadings and Communications Privileged","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Pleadings and oral and written statements of members of the Boards, members and designees of the Lawyer Assistance Program, Special Masters, Bar counsel and investigators, complainants, witnesses, and respondents and their counsel made to one another or filed in the record during any investigation, intervention, hearing, or other disciplinary proceeding under this Part IV, and pertinent to the disciplinary proceeding, are made in performance of a legal and public duty, are absolutely privileged, and under no circumstances form the basis for a right of action.</div>","UrlName":"rule605","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Rule 4-222. Limitation","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance, a written description pursuant to Rule 4-202 (a), or a Client Assistance Program referral form has been received at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted pursuant to these Rules within four years after the commission of the act; provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender’s whereabouts are unknown, or the offender’s name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State.</li> \n <li>Referral of a matter to the State Disciplinary Board shall occur within 12 months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance by the Office of the General Counsel or notification to the respondant of the written description pursuant to Rule 4-202 (a).</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule158","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"14564682-9ff9-4467-9a33-a3b548b47980","ParentId":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance or a Client Assistance Program referral form has been received at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted pursuant to these Rules within four years after the commission of the act; provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender’s whereabouts are unknown, or the offender’s name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State.</li> \n <li>Referral of a matter to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel shall occur within 12 months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or institution of an investigation.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision403"},{"Id":"3e73be77-4c87-40d4-bbdd-dc450b57681e","ParentId":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance has been received at State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted by the Investigative Panel within four years after the commission of the act. Provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender's whereabouts are unknown, or the offender's name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State. \n \n(b) Referral of a matter to the Investigative Panel by the Office of the General Counsel shall occur within twelve months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance at State Bar of Georgia headquarters or institution of a Memorandum of Grievance by the Investigative Panel.","UrlName":"revision222"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1df80583-9d16-4d87-a330-42a90e455f89","Title":"Rule 4-223. Advisory Opinions","Content":"<div>(a) Any Formal Advisory Opinion issued pursuant to Rule 4-403 which is not thereafter disapproved by the Supreme Court of Georgia shall be binding on the State Bar of Georgia, the State Disciplinary Board, and the person who requested the opinion, in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding involving that person. Formal Advisory Opinions which have been approved or modified by the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 4-403 shall also be binding in subsequent disciplinary proceedings which do not involve the person who requested the opinion.</div><div> </div><div>(b) It shall be considered as mitigation to any matter being investigated under these Rules that the respondent has acted in accordance with and in reasonable reliance upon a written Informal Advisory Opinion requested by the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-401 or a Formal Advisory Opinion issued pursuant to Rule 4-403, but not reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule161","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Rule 4-224. Expungement of Records","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The record of any matter against a respondent under these Rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the Office of the General Counsel in accordance with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>those matters closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202 (e) shall be expunged after one year;</li> \n <li>those matters dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board after a Probable Cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and</li> \n <li>those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court of Georgia after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Definition. The term “expunge” shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed.</li> \n <li>Effect of Expungement. After a file has been expunged, any response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record of such matter has been expunged and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the matter or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged.</li> \n <li>Retention of Records. Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel, for good cause shown, with notice to the respondent and an opportunity to be heard, records which would otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this Rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm that the record was expunged and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked the lawyer has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary Rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been referred to the Client Assistance Program, dismissed, or dismissed with a letter of instruction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule165","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"82fb7844-7595-48b9-83be-4471f2052c22","ParentId":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The record of any grievance against a respondent under these Rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the Office of the General Counsel in accordance with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>those grievances closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202 (e) shall be expunged after one year;</li> \n <li>those grievances dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board after a Probable Cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and</li> \n <li>those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court of Georgia after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Definition. The term “expunge” shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed.</li> \n <li>Effect of Expungement. After a file has been expunged, any response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record of such matter has been expunged and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the grievance or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged.</li> \n <li>Retention of Records. Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel, for good cause shown, with notice to the respondent and an opportunity to be heard, records that would otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this Rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm that the record was expunged and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if he has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been referred to the Consumer Assistance Program, dismissed, or dismissed with a letter of instruction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision405"},{"Id":"b7f7fce2-13bc-4974-bfe2-74b8996b5020","ParentId":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The record of any grievance against a respondent under these rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with the following:\n \n(1) those grievances closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202(c) shall be expunged after one year; \n \n(2) those grievances dismissed by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board after a probable cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and \n \n(3) those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.\n \n(b) Definition . The terms \"expunge \"and \"expunction \"shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed. \n \n(c) Effect of Expungement . After a file has been expunged, any agency response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record the agency may have had of such matter has been expunged pursuant to court rule and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the grievance or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged pursuant to court rule. \n \n(d) Retention of Records . Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by bar counsel, for good cause shown and with notice to the respondent and opportunity to be heard, records which should otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the State Disciplinary Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder. \n \n(e) A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm the expunction of the record and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged. \n \n(f) A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if he has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been dismissed or dismissed with a letter of instruction. \n ","UrlName":"revision224"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24ba975c-fd01-47a2-90c6-a115ce801d66","Title":"Rule 4-225. Jurisdiction","Content":"The State Disciplinary Board and any person who is connected with disciplinary proceedings in any way shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of any court other than the Supreme Court with respect thereto, except as provided in Rules 4-214, 4-215 and 4-216.","UrlName":"rule175","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"803a6c4e-72bb-403c-8840-d5138b9a5ba8","Title":"Rule 4-226. Immunity","Content":"The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the disciplinary proceedings of the State Bar of Georgia to be judicial and quasi-judicial in nature and within the Court’s regulatory function, and in connection with such disciplinary proceedings, members of the State Disciplinary Boards, the Coordinating Special Master, Special Masters, Bar counsel, special prosecutors, investigators, and staff are entitled to those immunities customarily afforded to persons so participating in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings or engaged in such regulatory activities.","UrlName":"rule184","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"25ef804c-3d2b-4ce9-a5ee-0a54d7c00520","ParentId":"803a6c4e-72bb-403c-8840-d5138b9a5ba8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The regulatory proceedings of the State Bar are judicial in nature. Therefore, members of the State Disciplinary Board, members and designees of the Committee on Lawyer Impairment, special masters, Bar counsel, special prosecutors, investigators and staff are entitled to judicial immunity when engaged in regulatory activities.","UrlName":"revision226"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4c187325-b7ad-49a5-b4db-ae05a2dda250","Title":"Rule 4-227. Petitions for Voluntary Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A Petition for Voluntary Discipline shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline.</li> \n <li> Prior to the issuance of a formal complaint, a respondent may submit a Petition for Voluntary Discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Those petitions seeking confidential discipline shall be served on the Office of the General Counsel and assigned to a member of the State Disciplinary Board. The State Disciplinary Board shall conduct an investigation and determine whether to accept or reject the petition as outlined at Rule 4-203 (7). </li> \n <li>Those petitions seeking public discipline shall be filed directly with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Office of the General Counsel shall have 30 days within which to file a response. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> After the issuance of a formal complaint a respondent may submit a Petition for Voluntary Discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond. The Office of the General Counsel may assent to the petition or may file a response, stating objections and giving the reasons therefor. The Office of the General Counsel shall serve a copy of its response upon the respondent.</li> \n <li>The Special Master shall consider the petition, the State Bar of Georgia’s response, and the record as it then exists and may accept or reject the Petition for Voluntary Discipline.</li> \n <li> The Special Master may reject a petition for such cause or causes as seem appropriate to the Special Master. Such causes may include but are not limited to a finding that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the petition fails to contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline;</li> \n <li>the petition fails to request appropriate discipline;</li> \n <li>the petition fails to contain sufficient information concerning the admissions of fact and the admissions of conduct;</li> \n <li>the record in the proceeding does not contain sufficient information upon which to base a decision to accept or reject.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Special Master’s decision to reject a Petition for Voluntary Discipline does not preclude the filing of a subsequent petition and is not subject to review by the Supreme Court of Georgia. If the Special Master rejects a Petition for Voluntary Discipline, the disciplinary case shall proceed as provided by these Rules.</li> \n <li>The Special Master may accept the Petition for Voluntary Discipline by entering a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law and delivering same to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall file the report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. A copy of the Special Master’s report shall be served upon the respondent. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.</li> \n <li>Pursuant to Rule 4-210 (e), the Special Master may, in his discretion, extend any of the time limits in these Rules in order to adequately consider a Petition for Voluntary Discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule195","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"66b0daa0-6bd1-49f0-99c4-b6c277f7a4ea","ParentId":"4c187325-b7ad-49a5-b4db-ae05a2dda250","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) A petition for voluntary discipline shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. \n \n(b) Prior to the issuance of a formal complaint, a respondent may submit a petition for voluntary discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n \n(1) Those petitions seeking private discipline shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel and assigned to a member of the Investigative Panel. The Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board shall conduct an investigation and determine whether to accept or reject the petition as outlined at Rule 4-203 (a) (9). \n \n(2) Those petitions seeking public discipline shall be filed directly with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The Office of the General Counsel shall have 30 days within which to file a response. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.\n \n(c) After the issuance of a formal complaint a respondent may submit a petition for voluntary discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n \n(1) The petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond. The Office of the General Counsel may assent to the petition or may file a response, stating objections and giving the reasons therefor. The Office of the General Counsel shall serve a copy of its response upon the respondent. \n \n(2) The Special Master shall consider the petition, the State Bar of Georgia's response, and the record as it then exists and may accept or reject the petition for voluntary discipline. \n \n(3) The Special Master may reject a petition for such cause or causes as seem appropriate to the Special Master. Such causes may include but are not limited to a finding that:\n \n(i) the petition fails to contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline; \n \n(ii) the petition fails to request appropriate discipline; \n \n(iii) the petition fails to contain sufficient information concerning the admissions of fact and the admissions of conduct; \n \n(iv) the record in the proceeding does not contain sufficient information upon which to base a decision to accept or reject.\n \n(4) The Special Master's decision to reject a petition for voluntary discipline does not preclude the filing of a subsequent petition and is not subject to review by either the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia. If the Special Master rejects a petition for voluntary discipline, the disciplinary case shall proceed as provided by these Rules. \n \n(5) If the Special Master accepts the petition for voluntary discipline, s/he shall enter a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law and deliver same to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall file the report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. A copy of the Special Master's report shall be served upon the respondent. The Court shall issue an appropriate order. \n \n(6) Pursuant to Rule 4-210 (5), the Special Master may, in his or her discretion, extend any of the time limits in these Rules in order to adequately consider a petition for voluntary discipline. \n ","UrlName":"revision228"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5b65d67a-c560-4dc6-afb7-72db029c7be1","Title":"Rule 4-228. Receiverships","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Definitions.  \n Absent Lawyer: A member of the State Bar of Georgia (or a Domestic or Foreign lawyer authorized to practice law in Georgia) who has disappeared, died, been disbarred, disciplined or incarcerated, become so impaired as to be unable to properly represent clients, or who poses such a substantial threat of harm to clients or the public that it is necessary for the Supreme Court of Georgia to appoint a receiver. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Receiver.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Upon a final determination by the Supreme Court of Georgia, on a petition filed by the State Bar of Georgia, that a lawyer has become an absent lawyer, and that no partner, associate, or other appropriate representative is available to notify his clients of this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia may order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia be appointed as receiver to take charge of the absent lawyer’s files and records. Such receiver shall review the files, notify the absent lawyer’s clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect the interests of the clients and the public. A motion for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by the respondent, his partners, associates, or legal representatives or by the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>If the receiver should encounter, or anticipate, situations or issues not covered by the order of appointment, including but not limited to, those concerning proper procedure and scope of authority, the receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for such further order or orders as may be necessary or appropriate to address the situation or issue so encountered or anticipated.</li> \n <li>The receiver shall be entitled to release to each client the papers, money, or other property to which the client is entitled. Before releasing the property, the receiver may require a receipt from the client for the property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Applicability of Lawyer-Client Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Confidentiality. The receiver shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or, upon application, by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Lawyer-Client Relationship; Privilege. The receiver relationship standing alone does not create a lawyer-client relationship between the receiver and the clients of the absent lawyer. However, the lawyer-client privilege shall apply to communications by or between the receiver and the clients of the absent lawyer to the same extent as it would have applied to communications by or to the absent lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Trust Account.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>If after appointment the receiver should determine that the absent lawyer maintained one or more trust accounts and that there are no provisions extant that would allow the clients, or other appropriate entities, to receive from the accounts the funds to which they are entitled, the receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for an order extending the scope of the receivership to include the management of the said trust account or accounts. In the event the scope of the receivership is extended to include the management of the trust account or accounts, the receiver shall file quarterly with the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee a report showing the activity in and status of said accounts.</li> \n <li>Service on a bank or financial institution of a copy of the order extending the scope of the receivership to include management of the trust account or accounts shall operate as a modification of any agreement of deposit among such bank or financial institution, the absent lawyer and any other party to the account so as to make the receiver a necessary signatory on any trust account maintained by the absent lawyer with such bank or financial institution. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee, on application by the receiver, may order that the receiver shall be sole signatory on any such account to the extent necessary for the purposes of these Rules and may direct the disposition and distribution of client and other funds.</li> \n <li>In determining ownership of funds in the trust accounts, including by subrogation or indemnification, the receiver should act as a reasonably prudent lawyer maintaining a client trust account. The receiver may (i) rely on a certification of ownership issued by an auditor employed by the receiver; or (ii) interplead any funds of questionable ownership into the appropriate Superior Court; or (iii) proceed under the terms of the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (OCGA § 44-12-190 et seq.). If the absent lawyer’s trust account does not contain sufficient funds to meet known client balances, the receiver may disburse funds on a pro rata basis.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Payment of Expenses of Receiver. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The receiver shall be entitled to reimbursement for actual and reasonable costs incurred by the receiver for expenses, including, but not limited to, (i) the actual and reasonable costs associated with the employment of accountants, auditors, and bookkeepers as necessary to determine the source and ownership of funds held in the absent lawyer’s trust account, and (ii) reasonable costs of secretarial, postage, bond premiums, and moving and storage expenses associated with carrying out the receiver’s duties. Application for allowance of costs and expenses shall be made by affidavit to the Supreme Court of Georgia, or its designee, who may determine the amount of the reimbursement. The application shall be accompanied by an accounting in a form and substance acceptable to the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be paid to the receiver by the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia may seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a judgment against the absent lawyer or his or her estate in an amount equal to the amount paid by the State Bar of Georgia to the receiver. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the amount, and the burden of proof shall shift to the absent lawyer or his estate to prove otherwise.</li> \n <li>The provision of paragraph (e) (1) above shall apply to all receivers serving on the effective date of this Rule and thereafter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Receiver-Client Relationship. With full disclosure and the informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), of any client of the absent lawyer, the receiver may, but need not, accept employment to complete any legal matter. Any written consent by the client shall include an acknowledgment that the client is not obligated to use the receiver.</li> \n <li> Unclaimed Files.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>If upon completion of the receivership there are files belonging to the clients of the absent lawyer that have not been claimed, the receiver shall deliver them to the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia shall store the files for six years, after which time the State Bar of Georgia may exercise its discretion in maintaining or destroying the files.</li> \n <li>If the receiver determines that an unclaimed file contains a Last Will and Testament, the receiver may, but shall not be required to do so, file said Last Will and Testament in the office of the Probate Court in such county as to the receiver may seem appropriate.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Professional Liability Insurance. Only lawyers who maintain errors and omissions insurance, or other appropriate insurance, may be appointed to the position of receiver.</li> \n <li>Requirement of Bond. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee may require the receiver to post bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duties.</li> \n <li> Immunity.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the actions of the State Bar of Georgia and the appointed receiver to be within the Court’s regulatory function, and being regulatory in nature, the State Bar of Georgia and the receiver are entitled to that immunity customarily afforded to court-appointed receivers.</li> \n <li>The immunity granted in paragraph (j) (1) above shall not apply if the receiver is employed by a client of the absent lawyer to continue the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Service. Service under this Rule may be perfected under Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule570","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ae1002e-8cc7-40fe-8558-fd5dd286fbee","ParentId":"5b65d67a-c560-4dc6-afb7-72db029c7be1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a)  Definitions \nAbsent Attorney – a member of the State Bar of Georgia (or a foreign or domestic lawyer authorized to practice law in Georgia) who shall have disappeared, died, become disbarred, disciplined or incarcerated, or become so impaired as to be unable to properly represent his or her clients or as to pose a substantial threat of harm to his or her clients or the public as to justify appointment of a Receiver hereunder by the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(b)  Appointment of Receiver\n(1) Upon a final determination by the Supreme Court of Georgia, on a petition filed by the State Bar of Georgia, that an attorney has become an Absent Attorney, and that no partner, associate or other appropriate representative is available to notify his or her clients of this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia may order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia be appointed as Receiver to take charge of the Absent Attorney's files and records. Such Receiver shall review the files, notify the Absent Attorney's clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect the interests of the clients, and the public. A motion for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by the respondent, his or her partners, associates or legal representatives or by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(2) If the Receiver should encounter, or anticipate, situations or issues not covered by the Order of appointment, including but not limited to, those concerning proper procedure and scope of authority, the Receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for such further order or orders as may be necessary or appropriate to address the situation or issue so encountered or anticipated.\n(3) The receiver shall be entitled to release to each client the papers, money or other property to which the client is entitled. Before releasing the property, the Receiver may require a receipt from the client for the property.\n(c) Applicability of Attorney-Client Rules\n(1) Confidentiality – The Receiver shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or, upon application, by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(2) Attorney-Client Relationship; Privilege – The Receiver relationship standing alone does not create an attorney-client relationship between the Receiver and the clients of the Absent Attorney. However, the attorney-client privilege shall apply to communications by or between the Receiver and the clients of the Absent Attorney to the same extent as it would have applied to communications by or to the Absent Attorney.\n(d)  Trust Account\n(1) If after appointment the Receiver should determine that the Absent Attorney maintained one or more trust accounts and that there are no provisions extant that would allow the clients, or other appropriate entities, to receive from the accounts the funds to which they are entitled, the Receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for an order extending the scope of the Receivership to include the management of the said trust account or accounts. In the event the scope of the Receivership is extended to include the management of the trust account or accounts, the Receiver shall file quarterly with the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee a report showing the activity in and status of said accounts.\n(2) Service on a bank or financial institution of a copy of the order extending the scope of the Receivership to include management of the trust account or accounts shall operate as a modification of any agreement of deposit among such bank or financial institution, the Absent Attorney and any other party to the account so as to make the Receiver a necessary signatory on any trust account maintained by the Absent Attorney with such bank or financial institution. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee, on application by the Receiver, may order that the Receiver shall be sole signatory on any such account to the extent necessary for the purposes of these Rules and may direct the disposition and distribution of client and other funds. \n(3) In determining ownership of funds in the trust accounts, including by subrogation or indemnification, the Receiver should act as a reasonably prudent lawyer maintaining a client trust account. The Receiver may (1) rely on a certification of ownership issued by an auditor employed by the Receiver; or (2) interplead any funds of questionable ownership into the appropriate Superior Court; or (3) proceed under the terms of the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (O.G.C.A. §44-12-190 et seq.).  If the Absent Attorney’s trust account does not contain sufficient funds to meet known client balances, the Receiver may disburse funds on a pro rata basis.\n(e)  Payment of Expenses of Receiver\n(1) The Receiver shall be entitled to reimbursement for actual and reasonable costs incurred by the Receiver for expenses, including, but not limited to, (i) the actual and reasonable costs associated with the employment of accountants, auditors and bookkeepers as necessary to determine the source and ownership of funds held in the Absent Attorney’s trust account, and (ii) reasonable costs of secretarial, postage, bond premiums, and moving and storage expenses associated with carrying out the Receiver’s duties. Application for allowance of costs and expenses shall be made by affidavit to the Supreme Court of Georgia, or its designee, who may determine the amount of the reimbursement. The application shall be accompanied by an accounting in a form and substance acceptable to the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be paid to the Receiver by the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia may seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a judgment against the Absent Attorney or his or her estate in an amount equal to the amount paid by the State Bar of Georgia to the Receiver. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the amount, and the burden of proof shall shift to the Absent Attorney or his or her estate to prove otherwise. \n(2) The provision of paragraph (1) above shall apply to all Receivers serving on the effective date of this Rule and thereafter.\n(f)  Receiver-Client Relationship\nWith full disclosure and the informed consent, as defined in Bar Rule 1.0 (h), of any client of the Absent Attorney, the Receiver may, but need not, accept employment to complete any legal matter. Any written consent by the client shall include an acknowledgment that the client is not obligated to use the Receiver.\n(g) Unclaimed Files\n(1) If upon completion of the Receivership there are files belonging to the clients of the Absent Attorney that have not been claimed, the Receiver shall deliver them to the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia shall store the files for six years, after which time the State Bar of Georgia may exercise its discretion in maintaining or destroying the files.\n(2) If the Receiver determines that an unclaimed file contains a Last Will and Testament, the Receiver may, but shall not be required to do so, file said Last Will and Testament in the office of the Probate Court in such county as to the Receiver may seem appropriate.\n(h)  Professional Liability Insurance\nOnly attorneys who maintain errors and omissions insurance that  includes coverage for conduct as a Receiver may be appointed to the position of Receiver.\n(i) Requirement of Bond\nThe Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee may require the Receiver to post bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his or her duties. \n(j) Immunity\n(1) The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the actions of the State Bar of Georgia and the appointed Receiver to be within the court's judicial and regulatory functions, and being regulatory and judicial in nature, the State Bar of Georgia and Receiver are entitled to judicial immunity. Any person serving as a Receiver under these rules shall be immune from suit for any conduct undertaken in good faith in the course of his or her official duties.\n(2) The immunity granted in paragraph (1) above shall not apply if the Receiver is employed by a client of the Absent Attorney to continue the representation.\n(k) Service\n Service under this Rule may be perfected under Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n ","UrlName":"revision230"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Rule 4-102. Disciplinary Action; Levels of Discipline; Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Public Reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Public Reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand but less than suspension. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Review Board at a meeting of the State Disciplinary Review Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Confidential Reprimand but less than a Public Reprimand. This level of discipline includes publication on the official State Bar of Georgia website as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Confidential Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Confidential Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Board at a meeting of the Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Formal Letter of Admonition but less than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Letter of Admonition: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Formal Letter of Admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Bar Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Board pursuant to the provisions of Bar Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Definitions and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n1.18                                  Duties to Prospective Client \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"rule89","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"fcbf296b-3b7c-44ee-beae-70f2bc53cab4","ParentId":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline removing the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline which removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a public reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A public reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a review panel reprimand but less than suspension.</li> \n <li>Review Panel Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Review Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Review Panel at a meeting of the Review Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than an investigative panel reprimand but less than a public reprimand.</li> \n <li>Investigative Panel Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. An Investigative Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Investigative Panel at a meeting of the Investigative Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a formal admonition but less than a review panel reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Admonition: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A formal admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the Court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Investigative Panel pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"revision46"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Title":"Part IV - Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (also includes Disciplinary Proceedings and Advisory Opinion rules)","Content":"","UrlName":"part4","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Title":"CHAPTER 1 GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND ENFORCEMENT THEREOF","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter13","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"c083cea2-60f5-4f66-8277-3ce6f50cff7e","Title":"Rule 4-101. Enforcement of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia is hereby authorized to maintain and enforce, as set forth in rules hereinafter stated, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in the state of Georgia and to institute disciplinary action in the event of the violation thereof.","UrlName":"rule87","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Rule 4-102. Disciplinary Action; Levels of Discipline; Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Public Reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Public Reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand but less than suspension. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Review Board at a meeting of the State Disciplinary Review Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Confidential Reprimand but less than a Public Reprimand. This level of discipline includes publication on the official State Bar of Georgia website as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Confidential Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Confidential Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Board at a meeting of the Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Formal Letter of Admonition but less than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Letter of Admonition: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Formal Letter of Admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Bar Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Board pursuant to the provisions of Bar Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Definitions and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n1.18                                  Duties to Prospective Client \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"rule89","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"fcbf296b-3b7c-44ee-beae-70f2bc53cab4","ParentId":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline removing the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline which removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a public reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A public reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a review panel reprimand but less than suspension.</li> \n <li>Review Panel Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Review Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Review Panel at a meeting of the Review Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than an investigative panel reprimand but less than a public reprimand.</li> \n <li>Investigative Panel Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. An Investigative Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Investigative Panel at a meeting of the Investigative Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a formal admonition but less than a review panel reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Admonition: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A formal admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the Court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Investigative Panel pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"revision46"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7daabdf1-451a-49d1-9f0f-ad03812aabe1","Title":"Contents","Content":" Rules: Client-Lawyer Relationship \n \n1.0 Terminology and Definitions \n1.1 Competence \n1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3 Diligence \n1.4 Communication \n1.5 Fees \n1.6 Confidentiality of Information \n1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12 Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13 Organization as Client \n1.14 Client under a Disability \n1.15(I) Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II) Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III) Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17 Sale of Law Practice \n1.18 Duties to Prospective Client \n \nCounselor \n \n2.1 Advisor \n2.2 (This rule is reserved.) \n2.3 Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n \nAdvocate \n \n3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions \n3.2 Expediting Litigation \n3.3 Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6 Trial Publicity \n3.7 Lawyer as Witness \n3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9 Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \nTransactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n \n4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \nLaw Firms and Associations \n \n5.1 Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyers \n5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5 Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6 Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7 Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \nPublic Service \n \n6.1 Voluntary Pro Bono Public Service \n6.2 Accepting Appointments \n6.3 Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4 Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n6.5 Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs\n Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services \n7.2 Advertising \n7.3 Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads \n \nMaintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2 Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4 Misconduct \n8.5 Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \nMiscellaneous \n \n9.1 Reporting Requirements \n9.2 Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3 Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4 Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5 Lawyer as a Public Official","UrlName":"rule70","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3254fea5-c24d-461b-8a15-5530a31eed26","Title":"PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES","Content":" [1] A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. \n \n[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. \n \n[3] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the these rules or other law. \n \n[4] A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the law, the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. \n \n[5] As a citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest. \n \n[6] A lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as by substantive and procedural law. A lawyer also is guided by conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service. \n \n[7] Reserved. \n \n[8] In the nature of law practice conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict among a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these rules, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules. \n \n[9] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested in the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n[10] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice. \n \n[11] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves. \n \n[12] The fulfillment of a lawyer's professional responsibility role requires an understanding by them of their relationship to our legal system. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.","UrlName":"rule74","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9afa4c06-904a-4b16-94e0-40aa21e2a658","Title":"SCOPE","Content":" [13] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the rules are imperatives, cast in the terms \"shall \"or \"shall not.\"These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the terms \"may \"or \"should,\"are permissive or aspirational and define areas under the rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. Disciplinary action shall not be taken when the lawyer's conduct falls within the bounds of such discretion. The rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly aspirational and descriptive. Together they define a lawyer's professional role. Comments do not add obligations to or expand the rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the rules. \n \n[14] The rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. Compliance with the rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. \n \n[15] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Bar Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, that may attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship will be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose depends on the circumstances and may be a question of fact. \n \n[16] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government entity may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized by law to represent several government entities in intergovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. They also may have authority to represent the \"public interest \"in circumstances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to do so. These rules do not abrogate any such authority. \n \n[17] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations. \n \n[18] The purpose of these rules is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. These rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the rule. Accordingly, nothing in the rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty. \n \n[19] Moreover, these rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege. In reliance on the attorney-client privilege, clients are entitled to expect that communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected against compelled disclosure. The attorney-client privilege is that of the client and not of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in accordance with recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and work product privileges. \n \n[20]Reserved. \n \n[21] The comment accompanying each rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the rule. The preamble and this note on scope provide general orientation. The comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative.","UrlName":"rule220","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"RULE 1.0. TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li>“Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct against a lawyer filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel and containing the name and signature of the complainant or initiated pursuant to Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law. \n(bb) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(cc) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(dd) “Willfull blindness” denotes awareness of a high probability that a fact exists and deliberate action to avoid learning of the fact. \n(ee) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"rule223","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0915bda9-a785-4194-b214-12b0666b9fa8","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n <li>“Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.</li> \n <li>“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.</li> \n <li>“Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.</li> \n </ol> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision294"},{"Id":"06d293c8-0303-4a5f-bb02-1426dc98b877","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 5","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li>“Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct against a lawyer filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel and containing the name and signature of the complainant or initiated pursuant to Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law. \n(bb) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(cc) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(dd) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision409"},{"Id":"bc1a4859-b8c4-4f17-8fff-17f572ee7964","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 4","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(bb) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(cc) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision389"},{"Id":"5286835f-4415-448b-ac8d-6169d3cf48a3","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer. </li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n <li>“Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.</li> \n <li>“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.</li> \n <li>“Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and e-mail. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.</li> \n </ol> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision282"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f20144b-7054-4d80-84ac-f1211b551489","Title":"RULE 1.1 COMPETENCE","Content":" A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer's level of competence without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in question. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLegal Knowledge and Skill \n \n[1A] The purpose of these rules is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. These rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. \n \n[1B] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances. \n \n[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. \n \n[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest. \n \n[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person subject to Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. \n \nThoroughness and Preparation \n \n[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more elaborate treatment than matters of lesser consequence. \n \nMaintaining Competence \n \n[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should engage in continuing study and education.","UrlName":"rule79","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4d1f67c8-77b9-4b06-a0b8-59b68ffa64f7","Title":"RULE 1.2 SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION AND ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.</li> \n <li>A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not either knowingly or with willful blindness counsel a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct, nor knowingly or with willful blindness assist a client in such conduct. However, a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nAllocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4 (a) (1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4 (a) (2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. \n \n[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16 (b) (4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16 (a) (3). \n \n[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time. \n \n[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering from diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14. \n \nIndependence from Client's Views or Activities \n \n[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities. \n \nAgreements Limiting Scope of Representation \n \n[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. \n \n[7] Although this rule affords the lawyer and the client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1. \n \n[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6. \n \nCriminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions \n \n[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. \n \n[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16 (a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1. \n \n[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary. \n \n[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities. \n \n[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4 (a) (5). </div>","UrlName":"rule50","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9d080d94-78a4-498b-8c17-e968e402cca0","ParentId":"4d1f67c8-77b9-4b06-a0b8-59b68ffa64f7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.</li> \n <li>A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, nor knowingly assist a client in such conduct, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.</li> \n</ol>\n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nAllocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. \n \n[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3). \n \n[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time. \n \n[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering from diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14. \n \nIndependence from Client's Views or Activities \n \n[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities. \n \nAgreements Limiting Scope of Representation \n \n[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. \n \n[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and the client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1. \n \n[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6. \n \nCriminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions \n \n[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. \n \n[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1. \n \n[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary. \n \n[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent voidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities. \n \n[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4(a)(5).","UrlName":"revision48"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0358fab6-2af3-4ea0-b55a-18edc0e83daa","Title":"RULE 1.3 DILIGENCE","Content":"A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.\n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyers duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect. \n  \n[2] A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently. \n \n[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable competence, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client. \n \n[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will serve on a continuing basis. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client but has not been specifically instructed concerning pursuit of an appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter.","UrlName":"rule52","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"39dbb7f3-4d74-4e12-aff1-04eb83ad420b","Title":"RULE 1.4. COMMUNICATION.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), is required by these rules;</li> \n <li>reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;</li> \n <li>keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;</li> \n <li>promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and</li> \n <li>consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation. \n \nCommunicating with Client \n \n[2] If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a) (1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's informed consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2 (a). \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a) (3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation. \n \n[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) (4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. A lawyer should promptly respond to or acknowledge client communications. The timeliness of a lawyer's communication must be judged by all the controlling factors. \"Prompt \"communication with the client does not equate to \"instant \"communication with the client and is sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n \nExplaining Matters \n \n[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, where there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h). \n \n[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. \n \nWithholding Information \n \n[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. </div>","UrlName":"rule54","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"4e5b8c7d-ef0e-41cb-93de-002aca41399f","ParentId":"39dbb7f3-4d74-4e12-aff1-04eb83ad420b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h), is required by these rules;</li> \n <li>reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;</li> \n <li>keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;</li> \n <li>promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and</li> \n <li>consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation. \n \nCommunicating with Client \n \n[2] If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a) (1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's informed consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2 (a). \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a) (3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation. \n \n[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) (4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. Client telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged. The timeliness of a lawyer's communication must be judged by all the controlling factors. \"Prompt \"communication with the client does not equate to \"instant \"communication with the client and is sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n \nExplaining Matters \n \n[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, where there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h). \n \n[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. \n \nWithholding Information \n \n[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. </div>","UrlName":"revision280"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d966e74f-47a5-4d8a-aeb5-236af01deab4","Title":"RULE 1.5 FEES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;</li> \n <li>the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;</li> \n <li>the amount involved and the results obtained;</li> \n <li>the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;</li> \n <li>the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;</li> \n <li>the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and</li> \n <li>whether the fee is fixed or contingent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client. \n To the extent that agreements to arbitrate disputes over fees or expenses are enforceable, a lawyer may enter into such an agreement with a client or prospective client if the client or prospective client gives informed consent in writing signed by the client or prospective client. The agreement to arbitrate and the attorney's disclosures regarding arbitration must be set out in a separate paragraph, written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract, and separately initialed by the client and the lawyer. </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.</li> \n <li> Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the outcome of the matter; and,</li> \n <li> if there is a recovery showing:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>the remittance to the client;</li> \n <li>the method of its determination;</li> \n <li>the amount of the attorney fee; and</li> \n <li>if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or</li> \n <li>a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;</li> \n <li>the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and</li> \n <li>the total fee is reasonable.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n  \n Comment \n \nReasonableness of Fee and Expenses \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer. \n \n[1A] A fee can also be unreasonable if it is illegal. Examples of illegal fees are those taken without required court approval, those that exceed the amount allowed by court order or statute, or those where acceptance of the fee would be unlawful, e.g., accepting controlled substances or sexual favors as payment. \n \nBasis or Rate of Fee \n \n[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth. \n \n[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. \n \nTerms of Payment \n \n[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16 (d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8 (j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8 (a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client. \n \n[5] An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. \n [5A] Paragraph (b) requires informed consent to an agreement to arbitrate disputes over fees and expenses. See Rule 1.0 (l). In obtaining such informed consent, the lawyer should reveal to the client or prospective client the following: (1) in an arbitration, the client or prospective client waives the right to a jury trial because the dispute will be resolved by an individual arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators; (2) generally, there is no right to an appeal from an arbitration decision; (3) arbitration may not permit the broad discovery that would be available in civil litigation; (4) how the costs of arbitration compared to the costs of litigation in a public court, including the requirement that the arbitrator or arbitrators be compensated; and (5) who will bear the cost of arbitration. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client regarding the existence and operation of the State Bar of Georgia's Fee Arbitration Program, regardless of whether the attorney seeks agreement to submit any future fee disputes to that program. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute over fees and expenses is not a waiver of the right to make a disciplinary complaint regarding the lawyer. \n \nProhibited Contingent Fees \n \n[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns. See Formal Advisory Opinions 36 and 47. \n \nDivision of Fee \n \n[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation. \n \n[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. \n \nDisputes over Fees \n \n[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the State Bar of Georgia, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure. </div>","UrlName":"rule55","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2129b43c-aa41-4262-a297-c2073d93a652","ParentId":"d966e74f-47a5-4d8a-aeb5-236af01deab4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;</li> \n <li>the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;</li> \n <li>the amount involved and the results obtained;</li> \n <li>the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;</li> \n <li>the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;</li> \n <li>the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and</li> \n <li>whether the fee is fixed or contingent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.</li> \n <li> Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the outcome of the matter; and,</li> \n <li> if there is a recovery showing:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>the remittance to the client;</li> \n <li>the method of its determination;</li> \n <li>the amount of the attorney fee; and</li> \n <li>if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or</li> \n <li>a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;</li> \n <li>the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and</li> \n <li>the total fee is reasonable.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n  \n \n Comment \n \nReasonableness of Fee and Expenses \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer. \n \n[1A] A fee can also be unreasonable if it is illegal. Examples of illegal fees are those taken without required court approval, those that exceed the amount allowed by court order or statute, or those where acceptance of the fee would be unlawful, e.g., accepting controlled substances or sexual favors as payment. \n \nBasis or Rate of Fee \n \n[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth. \n \n[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. \n \nTerms of Payment \n \n[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client. \n \n[5] An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. \n \nProhibited Contingent Fees \n \n[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns. See Formal Advisory Opinions 36 and 47. \n \nDivision of Fee \n \n[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation. \n \n[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. \n \nDisputes over Fees \n \n[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure. </div>","UrlName":"revision50"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bb7b9ba2-53ef-45ae-a307-e637e4a49b9b","Title":"RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;</li> \n <li>to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by subparagraph (i) above;</li> \n <li>to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules.</li> \n <li>to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer's change of employment or changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In a situation described in paragraph (b) (1), if the client has acted at the time the lawyer learns of the threat of harm or loss to a victim, use or disclosure is permissible only if the harm or loss has not yet occurred.</li> \n <li>Before using or disclosing information pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (i) or (ii), if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duty of confidentiality shall continue after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. See Rule 1.18. \n \n[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance. \n \n[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. \n \n[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. \n \n[4A] RESERVED \n \n[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. Rule 1.6 applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information gained in the professional relationship, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope. The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the client's policy goals. \n \nAuthorized Disclosure \n \n[6] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. \n \n[7] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. \n \n[7A] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized paragraph (b) (1) (iv) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n \nDisclosure Adverse to Client \n \n[8] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. \n \n[9] Several situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3 (a) (4) not to use false evidence. \n \n[10] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2 (d), because to \"knowingly assist \"criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. \n \n[11] Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal and likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b) (1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent death or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes will occur. It is very difficult for a lawyer to \"know \"when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. \n \n[12] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b) (1) does not violate this rule. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[13] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a) (1). \n \n[14] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8 (b) nor Rule 1.16 (d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. \n \n[15] Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b). \n \nDispute Concerning a Lawyer's Conduct \n \n[16] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b) (1) (iii) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n \n[17] If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b) (1) (iii) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure. \nDetection of Conflicts of Interest \n[18] Paragraph (b) (1) (v) recognizes that lawyers in different firms may need to disclose limited information to each other to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, such as when a lawyer is considering an association with another firm, two or more firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering the purchase of a law practice. See Rule 1.17, Comment [6]. Under these circumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to disclose limited information, but only once substantive discussions regarding the new relationship have occurred. Any such disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the persons and entities involved in a matter, a brief summary of the general issues involved, and information about whether the matter has terminated. Even this limited information, however, should be disclosed only to the extent reasonably necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interests that might arise from the possible new relationship. Moreover, the disclosure of any information is prohibited if it would compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client (e.g., the fact that a corporate client is seeking advice on a corporate takeover that has not been publicly announced; that a person has consulted a lawyer about the possibility of divorce before the person’s intentions are known to the person’s spouse; or that a person has consulted a lawyer about a criminal investigation that has not led to a public charge). Under those circumstances, paragraph (a) prohibits disclosure unless the client or former client gives informed consent. A lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the lawyer’s firm may also govern a lawyer’s conduct when exploring an association with another firm and is beyond the scope of these rules. \n[19] Any information disclosed pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (v) may be used or further disclosed only to the extent necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest. Paragraph (b) (1) (v) does not restrict the use of information acquired by means independent of any disclosure pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (v). Paragraph (b) (1) (v) also does not affect the disclosure of information within a law firm when the disclosure is otherwise authorized, see Comment [7], such as when a lawyer in a firm discloses information to another lawyer in the same firm to detect and resolve conflicts of interest that could arise in connection with undertaking a new representation. \nDisclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized \n [20] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client. \n \n[21] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession. \n[22] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n[23] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client’s representation to accomplish the purposes specified. In exercising the discretion conferred by this rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer’s own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer’s decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other rules. Some rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2 (d), 4.1 (b), and 8.1. Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this rule. See Rule 3.3 (b). \nActing Competently to Preserve Confidentiality \n[24] A lawyer should make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information covered by this Rule.  A lawyer should make reasonable efforts to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use). Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of these rules. \n[25] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer should take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to comply with other laws, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these rules.</div>","UrlName":"rule57","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"963c68dc-cfa0-459e-8cc3-b2b5f08dc416","ParentId":"bb7b9ba2-53ef-45ae-a307-e637e4a49b9b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;</li> \n <li>to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by subparagraph (i) above;</li> \n <li>to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In a situation described in paragraph (b) (1), if the client has acted at the time the lawyer learns of the threat of harm or loss to a victim, use or disclosure is permissible only if the harm or loss has not yet occurred.</li> \n <li>Before using or disclosing information pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (i) or (ii), if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The lawyer may, where the law does not otherwise require, reveal information to which the duty of confidentiality does not apply under paragraph (b) without being subjected to disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>The lawyer shall reveal information under paragraph (b) as the applicable law requires.</li> \n <li>The duty of confidentiality shall continue after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. \n \n[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance. \n \n[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. \n \n[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. \n \n[4A] Information gained in the professional relationship includes information gained from a person (prospective client) who discusses the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, the restrictions and exceptions of these rules as to use or revelation of the information apply, e.g. Rules 1.9 and 1.10. \n \n[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. Rule 1.6 applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information gained in the professional relationship, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope. The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the client's policy goals. \n \nAuthorized Disclosure \n \n[6] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. \n \n[7] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. \n \n[7A] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized paragraph (b) (1) (iv) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n \nDisclosure Adverse to Client \n \n[8] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. \n \n[9] Several situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3 (a) (4) not to use false evidence. \n \n[10] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2 (d), because to \"knowingly assist \"criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. \n \n[11] Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal and likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b) (1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent death or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes will occur. It is very difficult for a lawyer to \"know \"when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. \n \n[12] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b) (1) does not violate this rule. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[13] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a) (1). \n \n[14] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8 (b) nor Rule 1.16 (d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. \n \n[15] Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b). \n \nDispute Concerning a Lawyer's Conduct \n \n[16] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b) (1) (iii) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n \n[17] If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b) (1) (iii) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure. \n \nDisclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized \n \n[18] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client. \n \n[19] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession. </div>","UrlName":"revision321"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"179833f9-065d-4c1f-80c1-792594c90dac","Title":"RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).</li> \n <li> If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation after:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0 (c);</li> \n <li>having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation, and</li> \n <li>having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>is prohibited by law or these rules;</li> \n <li>includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or</li> \n <li>involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Though otherwise subject to the provisions of this rule, a part-time prosecutor who engages in the private practice of law may represent a private client adverse to the state or other political subdivision that the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, except with regard to matters for which the part-time prosecutor had or has prosecutorial authority or responsibility.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLoyalty to a Client \n \n[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. If an impermissible conflict of interest exists before representation is undertaken the representation should be declined. The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest. \n \n[2] Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (a) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. \n  \n[3] If an impermissible conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment 4 to Rule 1.3 and Scope. \n \n[4] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. Paragraph (d) states an exception to that general rule. A part-time prosecutor does not automatically have a conflict of interest in representing a private client who is adverse to the state or other political subdivision (such as a city or county) that the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, although it is possible that in a particular case, the part-time prosecutor could have a conflict of interest under paragraph (a). \n \nSimultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require informed consent of the respective clients. \n \nConsultation and Informed Consent \n \n[5] A client may give informed consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's informed consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain informed consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to give informed consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to give informed consent. If informed consent is withdrawn, the lawyer should consult Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.16. \n \n[5A] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0 (b). See also Rule 1.0 (s) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0 (b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. \n \nLawyer's Interests \n \n[6] The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the propriety of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client objective advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. \n \nConflicts in Litigation \n \n[7] Paragraph (c) (2) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same or a similar proceeding including simultaneous representation of parties whose interests may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal, the requirements of paragraph (b) are met, and consent is not prohibited by paragraph (c). \n  \n[8] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients give informed consent as required by paragraph (b). By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government entity is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. \n \n[9] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases while they are pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so should one or more of the cases reach the appellate court. \n \nInterest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service \n \n[10] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and gives informed consent and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8 (f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the clients give informed consent and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. \n \nNon-litigation Conflicts \n \n[11] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for material and adverse effect include the duration and extent of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. \n \n[12] In a negotiation common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest among them. \n \n[13] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved. \n \n[14] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director. \n \nConflict Charged by an Opposing Party \n \n[15] Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope. \n [16] For the purposes of 1.7 (d), part-time prosecutors include but are not limited to part-time solicitors-general, part-time assistant solicitors-general, part-time probate court prosecutors, part-time magistrate court prosecutors, part-time municipal court prosecutors, special assistant attorneys general, part-time juvenile court prosecutors and prosecutors pro tem. \n \n[17] Pragmatic considerations require that the rules treat a lawyer serving as a part-time prosecutor differently. See Thompson v. State, 254 Ga. 393, 396-397 (1985). \n \nSpecial Considerations in Common Representation \n \n[18] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients. \n \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule58","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3c263cdc-75e0-462c-ad1f-5e5a5627313a","ParentId":"179833f9-065d-4c1f-80c1-792594c90dac","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).</li> \n <li> If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation after:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0(c);</li> \n <li>having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation, and</li> \n <li>having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>is prohibited by law or these Rules;</li> \n <li>includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or</li> \n <li>involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLoyalty to a Client \n \n[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. If an impermissible conflict of interest exists before representation is undertaken the representation should be declined. The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest. \n \n[2] Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (a) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. \n  \n[3] If an impermissible conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment 4 to Rule 1.3 and Scope. \n \n[4] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Paragraphs (b) and (c) express that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require informed consent of the respective clients. \n \nConsultation and Informed Consent \n \n[5] A client may give informed consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's informed consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain informed consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to give informed consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to give informed consent. If informed consent is withdrawn, the lawyer should consult Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.16. \n \n[5A] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(s) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. \n \nLawyer's Interests \n \n[6] The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the propriety of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client objective advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. \n \nConflicts in Litigation \n \n[7] Paragraph (c)(2) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same or a similar proceeding including simultaneous representation of parties whose interests may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal, the requirements of paragraph (b) are met, and consent is not prohibited by paragraph (c). \n  \n[8] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients give informed consent as required by paragraph (b). By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government entity is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. \n \n[9] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases while they are pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so should one or more of the cases reach the appellate court. \n \nInterest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service \n \n[10] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and gives informed consent and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the clients give informed consent and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. \n \nNon-litigation Conflicts \n \n[11] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for material and adverse effect include the duration and extent of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. \n \n[12] In a negotiation common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest among them. \n \n[13] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved. \n \n[14] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director. \n \nConflict Charged by an Opposing Party \n \n[15] Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope. \n ","UrlName":"revision4"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"6c1fcca2-0b79-4c3c-94a0-b42a00e94a27","Title":"RULE 1.8 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall neither enter into a business transaction with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer's professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;</li> \n <li>the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use information gained in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these rules.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.</li> \n <li>Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n <ol> \n <li>a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or</li> \n <li>a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:\n <ol> \n <li>the client gives informed consent;</li> \n <li>there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and</li> \n <li>information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for or against the clients, nor in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyers disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law, and the client is independently represented by a lawyer in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith. To the extent that agreements to arbitrate disputes over a lawyer's liability for malpractice are enforceable, a lawyer may enter into such an agreement with a client or a prospective client if the client or prospective client gives informed consent in writing signed by the client or prospective client. The agreement to arbitrate and the attorney's disclosures regarding arbitration must be set out in a separate paragraph, written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract, and separately initialed by the client and the lawyer. </li> \n <li>A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer has actual knowledge is represented by the other lawyer unless his or her client gives informed consent regarding the relationship. The disqualification stated in this paragraph is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:\n <ol> \n <li>acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses as long as the exercise of the lien is not prejudicial to the client with respect to the subject of the representation; and</li> \n <li>contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, except as prohibited by Rule 1.5.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8 (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8 (a) and 1.8 (c)-(j) is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nTransactions Between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1A] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. The client should be fully informed of the true nature of the lawyer's interest or lack of interest in all aspects of the transaction. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's informed consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable. \n  \nUse of Information to the Disadvantage of the Client \n  \n[1B] It is a general rule that an attorney will not be permitted to make use of knowledge, or information, acquired by the attorney through the professional relationship with the client, or in the conduct of the client's business, to the disadvantage of the client. Paragraph (b) follows this general rule and provides that the client may waive this prohibition. However, if the waiver is conditional, the duty is on the attorney to comply with the condition. \n \nGifts from Clients \n \n[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the objective advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial. \n \nLiterary Rights \n \n[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the subject of the representation creates a conflict between the interest of the client and the personal interest of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j) of this rule. \n \nFinancial Assistance to Clients \n \n[4] Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above. \n \nPayment for a Lawyer's Services from One Other Than The Client \n  \n[5] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4 (c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another). \n \nSettlement of Aggregated Claims \n \n[6] Paragraph (g) requires informed consent. This requirement is not met by a blanket consent prior to settlement that the majority decision will rule. \n \nAgreements to Limit Liability \n \n[7] A lawyer may not condition an agreement to withdraw or the return of a client's documents on the client's release of claims. However, this paragraph is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in opinions and memoranda. \n \n[8] A lawyer should not seek prospectively, by contract or other means, to limit the lawyer's individual liability to a client for the lawyer's malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of a client properly has no need to attempt to limit liability for the lawyer's professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of clients properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer may, however, practice law as a partner, member, or shareholder of a limited liability partnership, professional association, limited liability company, or professional corporation. \nArbitration \n [8A] Paragraph (h) requires informed consent to an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims. See Rule 1.0 (l). In obtaining such informed consent, the laywer should reveal to the client or prospective client the following: (1) in an arbitration, the client of prospective client waives the right to a jury because the dispute will be resolved by an individual arbitrator or a panel or arbitrators; (2) generally, there is no right to an appeal from an arbitration decision; (3) arbitration may not permit the broad discovery that would be available in civil litigation; (4) how the costs of arbitration compare to the costs of litigation in a public court, including the requirement that the arbitrator or arbitrators be compensated; and (5) who will bear the costs of arbitration. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client that an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims over fees and expenses is not a waiver of the right to make a disciplinary complaint regarding the lawyer. \n \nFamily Relationships Between Lawyers \n \n[9] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. \n \nAcquisition of Interest in Litigation \n \n[10] Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in the common law prohibition of champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for lawyer's fees and for certain advances of costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e). </div>","UrlName":"rule60","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1547bf53-9f72-45e5-8253-a31aa5d7ae8d","ParentId":"6c1fcca2-0b79-4c3c-94a0-b42a00e94a27","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall neither enter into a business transaction with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer's professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;</li> \n <li>the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use information gained in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.</li> \n <li>Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n <ol> \n <li>a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or</li> \n <li>a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:\n <ol> \n <li>the client gives informed consent;</li> \n <li>there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and</li> \n <li>information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for or against the clients, nor in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyers disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.</li> \n <li>A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer has actual knowledge is represented by the other lawyer unless his or her client gives informed consent regarding the relationship. The disqualification stated in this paragraph is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:\n <ol> \n <li>acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses as long as the exercise of the lien is not prejudicial to the client with respect to the subject of the representation; and</li> \n <li>contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, except as prohibited by Rule 1.5.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(a) and 1.8(c)-(j) is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nTransactions Between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1A] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. The client should be fully informed of the true nature of the lawyer's interest or lack of interest in all aspects of the transaction. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's informed consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable. \n  \nUse of Information to the Disadvantage of the Client \n  \n[1B] It is a general rule that an attorney will not be permitted to make use of knowledge, or information, acquired by the attorney through the professional relationship with the client, or in the conduct of the client's business, to the disadvantage of the client. Paragraph (b) follows this general rule and provides that the client may waive this prohibition. However, if the waiver is conditional, the duty is on the attorney to comply with the condition. \n \nGifts from Clients \n \n[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the objective advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial. \n \nLiterary Rights \n \n[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the subject of the representation creates a conflict between the interest of the client and the personal interest of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j) of this Rule. \n \nFinancial Assistance to Clients \n \n[4] Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above. \n \nPayment for a Lawyer's Services from One Other Than The Client \n  \n[5] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another). \n \nSettlement of Aggregated Claims \n \n[6] Paragraph (g) requires informed consent. This requirement is not met by a blanket consent prior to settlement that the majority decision will rule. \n \nAgreements to Limit Liability \n \n[7] A lawyer may not condition an agreement to withdraw or the return of a client's documents on the client's release of claims. However, this paragraph is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in opinions and memoranda. \n \n[8] A lawyer should not seek prospectively, by contract or other means, to limit the lawyer's individual liability to a client for the lawyer's malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of a client properly has no need to attempt to limit liability for the lawyer's professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of clients properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer may, however, practice law as a partner, member, or shareholder of a limited liability partnership, professional association, limited liability company, or professional corporation. \n \nFamily Relationships Between Lawyers \n \n[9] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. \n \nAcquisition of Interest in Litigation \n \n[10] Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in the common law prohibition of champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for lawyer's fees and for certain advances of costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e). </div>","UrlName":"revision51"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d1647878-baba-429a-8b11-8c4f60290964","Title":"RULE 1.9 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: FORMER CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and</li> \n <li>about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c), that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or</li> \n <li>reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this rule. Under this rule for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11. \n \n[2] The scope of a \"matter \"for purposes of this rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. \n \n[3] Matters are \"substantially related \"for purposes of this rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services. \n \nLawyers Moving Between Firms \n  \n[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. \n \n[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10 (b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm. \n \n[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. \n \n[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c). \n \n[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. \n \n[9] The provisions of this rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0 (b) and (h). With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10. </div>","UrlName":"rule61","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ae93d6f-b0aa-45e5-8088-bf2d4c1fc7e7","ParentId":"d1647878-baba-429a-8b11-8c4f60290964","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and</li> \n <li>about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or</li> \n <li>reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under this Rule for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11. \n \n[2] The scope of a \"matter \"for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. \n \n[3] Matters are \"substantially related \"for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services. \n \nLawyers Moving Between Firms \n  \n[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. \n \n[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm. \n \n[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. \n \n[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). \n \n[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. \n \n[9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(b) and (h). With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10. </div>","UrlName":"revision52"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3d8ef04b-23ce-4883-b52f-67ca784694d4","Title":"RULE 1.10 IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8 (c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.</li> \n <li> When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and</li> \n <li>any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9 (c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \nDefinition of \"Firm \" \n[1] For purposes of these rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. \n[2] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation. \n[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (a) and (b): Successive Government and Private Employment; where a lawyer represents the government after having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (c) (1): Successive Government and Private Employment. The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule and 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. \n[5] Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. However, if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and, thus, has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. \nPrinciples of Imputed Disqualification \n[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9 (b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.10 (b): Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. \n[7] Rule 1.10 (b): Imputed Disqualification operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9 (c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.</div>","UrlName":"rule86","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"39b7e9f5-9ade-497b-8c70-1a8d0a95e14c","ParentId":"3d8ef04b-23ce-4883-b52f-67ca784694d4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.</li> \n <li> When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and</li> \n <li>any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \nDefinition of \"Firm \" \n[1] For purposes of these Rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. \n[2] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation. \n[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b): Successive Government and Private Employment; where a lawyer represents the government after having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(c)(1): Successive Government and Private Employment. The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule and 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. \n[5] Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. However, if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and, thus, has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. \nPrinciples of Imputed Disqualification \n[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. \n[7] Rule 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.</div>","UrlName":"revision53"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0acc2933-f3df-436b-b82d-ad55711fcb4f","Title":"RULE 1.11 SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government entity gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is duly given to the client and to the appropriate government entity to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.</li> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or</li> \n <li>negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12 (b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12 (b).</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> As used in this rule, the term \"matter \"includes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and</li> \n <li>any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government entity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>As used in this rule, the term \"confidential government information \"means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. It is a counterpart of Rule 1.10 (b), which applies to lawyers moving from one firm to another. \n[2] A lawyer representing a government entity, whether employed or specially retained by the government, is subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In addition, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government entity may give consent under this rule. \n[3] Where the successive clients are a public entity and a private client, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government entity should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. \n[4] When the client is an agency of one government, that agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. \n[5] Paragraphs (a) (1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. \n[6] Paragraph (a) (2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the government entity at a time when premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order that the government entity will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer is not complying. \n[7] Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer. \n[8] Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government entity when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law. \n[9] Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the entity with which the lawyer in question has become associated.</div>","UrlName":"rule90","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9819c8a5-48a8-4555-ada1-fd19b5986ad3","ParentId":"0acc2933-f3df-436b-b82d-ad55711fcb4f","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government entity gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is duly given to the client and to the appropriate government entity to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.</li> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or</li> \n <li>negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> As used in this Rule, the term \"matter \"includes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and</li> \n <li>any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government entity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>As used in this Rule, the term \"confidential government information \"means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This Rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. It is a counterpart of Rule 1.10(b), which applies to lawyers moving from one firm to another. \n[2] A lawyer representing a government entity, whether employed or specially retained by the government, is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In addition, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government entity may give consent under this Rule. \n[3] Where the successive clients are a public entity and a private client, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government entity should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. \n[4] When the client is an agency of one government, that agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this Rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. \n[5] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. \n[6] Paragraph (a)(2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the government entity at a time when premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order that the government entity will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer is not complying. \n[7] Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer. \n[8] Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government entity when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law. \n[9] Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the entity with which the lawyer in question has become associated.</div>","UrlName":"revision54"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e39b427e-f692-412a-b382-185913c92ba3","Title":"RULE 1.12 FORMER JUDGE OR ARBITRATOR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.</li> \n <li> If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThis rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term \"personally and substantially \"signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. The term \"adjudicative officer \"includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not \"act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.\"Although phrased differently from this rule, those rules correspond in meaning.</div>","UrlName":"rule93","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"6ebe642e-55da-4665-adee-8bb95321e16f","ParentId":"e39b427e-f692-412a-b382-185913c92ba3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.</li> \n <li> If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThis Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term \"personally and substantially \"signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. The term \"adjudicative officer \"includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not \"act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.\"Although phrased differently from this Rule, those rules correspond in meaning.</div>","UrlName":"revision55"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3f4b6e1c-3da9-448f-b9bc-4c1f8b196f87","Title":"RULE 1.13 ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.</li> \n <li>If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.</li> \n <li> Except as provided in paragraph (d), if\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and</li> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c ), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.</li> \n <li>In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.</li> \n <li>A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThe Organization as the Client \n[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. \"Other constituents \"as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations. \n[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. \n[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0 (i), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. \n[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant consideration. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. \n[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation. \nRelation to Other Rules \n[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other rules. In particular, this rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this rule supplements Rule 1.6 (b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6 (b) (1). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyers' representation of the organization. In such circumstances Rule 1.2 (d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16 (a) (1) may be required. \n[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim. \n[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. \nGovernmental Organization \n[9] The duty defined in this rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these rules. See Scope [16]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business in involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This rule does not limit that authority. See Scope [16]. \nClarifying the Lawyer's Role \n[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged. \n[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case. \nDual Representation \n[12] Paragraph (g) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder. \nDerivative Actions \n[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization. \n[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.</div>","UrlName":"rule97","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"29994363-3ff9-42e9-a318-129638717b79","ParentId":"3f4b6e1c-3da9-448f-b9bc-4c1f8b196f87","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.</li> \n <li>If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.</li> \n <li> Except as provided in paragraph (d), if\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and</li> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c ), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.</li> \n <li>In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.</li> \n <li>A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThe Organization as the Client \n[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. \"Other constituents \"as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations. \n[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. \n[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0(i), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. \n[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant consideration. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. \n[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation. \nRelation to Other Rules \n[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyers' representation of the organization. In such circumstances Rule 1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16(a)(1) may be required. \n[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim. \n[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. \nGovernmental Organization \n[9] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Scope [16]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business in involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This Rule does not limit that authority. See Scope [16]. \nClarifying the Lawyer's Role \n[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged. \n[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case. \nDual Representation \n[12] Paragraph (e) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder. \nDerivative Actions \n[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization. \n[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.</div>","UrlName":"revision56"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b4525c0d-731a-4122-a984-e0f1db856652","Title":"RULE 1.14 CLIENT WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.</li> \n <li>When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.</li> \n <li>Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6 (a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished mental capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions. \n \n[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication. \n \n[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the lawyer should consider such participation in terms of its effect on the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf. \n \n[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2 (d). \n \nTaking Protective Action \n \n[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-making tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections. \n \n[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. \n \n[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client. \n \nDisclosure of the Client's Condition \n \n[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. \n \nEmergency Legal Assistance \n \n[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client. \n \n[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken. \n \n[11] This rule is not violated if a lawyer acts in good faith to comply with the rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule107","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"de6f6d4d-713d-4367-97e2-a05c3318f02b","ParentId":"b4525c0d-731a-4122-a984-e0f1db856652","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.</li> \n <li>When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.</li> \n <li>Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severly incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished mental capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions. \n \n[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication. \n \n[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the lawyer should consider such participation in terms of its effect on the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf. \n \n[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d). \n \nTaking Protective Action \n \n[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections. \n \n[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. \n \n[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client. \n \nDisclosure of the Client's Condition \n \n[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. \n \nEmergency Legal Assistance \n \n[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client. \n \n[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken. \n \n[11] This Rule is not violated if a lawyer acts in good faith to comply with the Rule. </div>","UrlName":"revision57"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fab74617-b734-48a1-ab5a-beca89919b7d","Title":"RULE 1.15(I) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - GENERAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.</li> \n <li> For the purposes of this rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person's interest in funds or other property in the lawyer's possession if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the interest is known to the lawyer, and</li> \n <li> the interest is based upon one of the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A statutory lien;</li> \n <li>A final judgment addressing disposition of those funds or property; or</li> \n <li>A written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The lawyer may disregard the third person's claimed interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement. </li> \n <li>Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.</li> \n <li>When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. \n[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration or interpleader. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed. \n[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party. The obligations of a lawyer under this rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction. \n[3A] In those cases where it is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds or property. \n[4] A \"clients' security fund \"provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.</div>","UrlName":"rule42","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2910a926-e4e3-470b-aaee-83e6228535a2","ParentId":"fab74617-b734-48a1-ab5a-beca89919b7d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.</li> \n <li> For the purposes of this Rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person's interest in funds or other property in the lawyer's possession if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the interest is known to the lawyer, and</li> \n <li> the interest is based upon one of the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A statutory lien;</li> \n <li>A final judgment addressing disposition of those funds or property; or</li> \n <li>A written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The lawyer may disregard the third person's claimed interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement. </li> \n <li>Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.</li> \n <li>When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. \n[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration or interpleader. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed. \n[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party. The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction. \n[3A] In those cases where it is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds or property. \n[4] A \"clients' security fund \"provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.</div>","UrlName":"revision58"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"RULE 1.15(II) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - TRUST ACCOUNT AND IOLTA","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Bar Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined in Bar Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule45","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4c2e1d2-2c8d-48e3-b9a7-78d1a5670861","ParentId":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined  in Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this Rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this Rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision111"},{"Id":"2473e9df-693d-4c42-8d30-abe6f3a5c393","ParentId":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined  in Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this Rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this Rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision113"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b8b582e1-b6cc-49d2-9bfc-653e18985481","Title":"RULE 1.15(III) RECORD KEEPING; TRUST ACCOUNT OVERDRAFT NOTIFICATION; EXAMINATION OF RECORDS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Required Bank Accounts: Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia and who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall maintain, in an approved financial institution as defined by this rule, a trust account or accounts, separate from any business and personal accounts. Funds received by the lawyer on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited into this account. The financial institution shall be in Georgia or in the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third person.</li> \n <li> Description of Accounts:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether general or specific, as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as an \"Attorney Trust Account,\"\"Attorney Escrow Account \"\"IOLTA Account \"or \"Attorney Fiduciary Account.\"The name of the attorney or law firm responsible for the account shall also appear on all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all business accounts, as well as all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, as a \"Business Account,\"a \"Professional Account,\"an \"Office Account,\"a \"General Account,\"a \"Payroll Account,\"\"Operating Account \"or a \"Regular Account.\"</li> \n <li>Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from using any additional description or designation for a specific business or trust account including fiduciary accounts maintained by the lawyer as executor, guardian, trustee, receiver, agent or in any other fiduciary capacity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Procedure:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Approved Institutions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall maintain his or her trust account only in a financial institution approved by the State Bar of Georgia, which shall annually publish a list of approved institutions.\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>Such institutions shall be located within the state of Georgia, within the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third-person. The institution shall be authorized by federal or state law to do business in the jurisdiction where located and shall be federally insured. A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer trust accounts if it abides by an agreement to report to the Office of the General Counsel whenever any properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds, and the instrument is not honored. The agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and shall not be canceled except upon 30-days notice in writing to the Office of the General Counsel. The agreement shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel on a form approved by the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall provide that all reports made by the financial institution shall be in writing and shall include the same information customarily forwarded to the depositor when an instrument is presented against insufficient funds. If the financial institution is located outside of the state of Georgia, it shall also agree in writing to honor any properly issued State Bar of Georgia subpoena.</li> \n <li>In addition to the requirements above, the financial institution must also be approved by the Georgia Bar Foundation and agree to offer IOLTA Accounts in compliance with the additional requirements set out in Part XV of the rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Georgia Bar Foundation may waive the provisions of this rule in whole or in part for good cause shown. A lawyer or law firm may appeal the decision of the Georgia Bar Foundation by application to the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Timing of Reports:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The financial institution shall file a report with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia in every instance where a properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds.</li> \n <li>The report shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel within 15 days of the date of the presentation of the instrument, even if the instrument is subsequently honored.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Nothing shall preclude a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this rule.</li> \n <li>Every lawyer and law firm maintaining a trust account as provided by these rules is hereby and shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements mandated by this rule and shall indemnify and hold harmless each financial institution for its compliance with the aforesaid reporting and production requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Effect on Financial Institution of Compliance: The agreement by a financial institution to offer accounts pursuant to this rule shall be a procedure to advise the State Disciplinary Board of conduct by lawyers and shall not be deemed to create a duty to exercise a standard of care or a contract with third parties that may sustain a loss as a result of lawyers overdrawing lawyer trust accounts.</li> \n <li>Availability of Records: A lawyer shall not fail to produce any of the records required to be maintained by these rules at the request of theState Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia. This obligation shall be in addition to and not in lieu of the procedures contained in Part IV of these rules for the production of documents and evidence.</li> \n <li>Audit for Cause: A lawyer shall not fail to submit to an audit for cause conducted by the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-111.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Each financial institution wishing to be approved as a depository of client trust funds must file an overdraft notification agreement with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia will publish a list of approved institutions at least annually. \n \n[2] The overdraft agreement requires that all overdrafts be reported to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia whether or not the instrument is honored. It is improper for a lawyer to accept \"overdraft privileges \"or any other arrangement for a personal loan on a client trust account, particularly in exchange for the institution's promise to delay or not to report an overdraft. The institution must notify the Office of the General Counsel of all overdrafts even where the institution is certain that its own error caused the overdraft or that the matter could have been resolved between the institution and the lawyer within a reasonable period of time. \n \n[3] The overdraft notification provision is not intended to result in the discipline of every lawyer who overdraws a trust account. The lawyer or institution may explain occasional errors. The provision merely intends that the Office of the General Counsel receive an early warning of improprieties so that corrective action, including audits for cause, may be taken. \n \nWaiver \n \n[4] A lawyer may seek to have the provisions of this rule waived if the lawyer or law firm has its principal office in a county where no bank, credit union, or savings and loan association will agree or has agreed to comply with the provisions of this rule. Other grounds for requesting a waiver may include significant financial or business harm to the lawyer or law firm, such as where the unapproved bank is a client of the lawyer or law firm or where the lawyer serves on the board of the unapproved bank. \n \n[5] The request for a waiver should be in writing, sent to the Georgia Bar Foundation, and should include sufficient information to establish good cause for the requested waiver. \n \n[6] The Georgia Bar Foundation may request additional information from the lawyer or law firm if necessary to determine good cause. \nAudits \n[7] Every lawyer's financial records and trust account records are required records and therefore are properly subject to audit for cause. The audit provisions are intended to uncover errors and omissions before the public is harmed, to deter those lawyers who may be tempted to misuse client's funds and to educate and instruct lawyers as to proper trust accounting methods. Although the auditors will be employed by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, it is intended that disciplinary proceedings will be brought only when the auditors have reasonable cause to believe discrepancies or irregularities exist. Otherwise, the auditors should only educate the lawyer and the lawyer's staff as to proper trust accounting methods. \n[8] An audit for cause may be conducted at any time and without advance notice if the Office of the General Counsel receives sufficient evidence that a lawyer poses a threat of harm to clients or the public. The Office of the General Counsel must have the written approval of the Chairman of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia to conduct an audit for cause. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule47","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"fe56572d-3099-4684-a166-9711aeb97df5","ParentId":"b8b582e1-b6cc-49d2-9bfc-653e18985481","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Required Bank Accounts: Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia and who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall maintain, in an approved financial institution as defined by this rule, a trust account or accounts, separate from any business and personal accounts. Funds received by the lawyer on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited into this account. The financial institution shall be in Georgia or in the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third person.</li> \n <li> Description of Accounts:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether general or specific, as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as an \"Attorney Trust Account,\"\"Attorney Escrow Account \"\"IOLTA Account \"or \"Attorney Fiduciary Account.\"The name of the attorney or law firm responsible for the account shall also appear on all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all business accounts, as well as all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, as a \"Business Account,\"a \"Professional Account,\"an \"Office Account,\"a \"General Account,\"a \"Payroll Account,\"\"Operating Account \"or a \"Regular Account.\"</li> \n <li>Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from using any additional description or designation for a specific business or trust account including fiduciary accounts maintained by the lawyer as executor, guardian, trustee, receiver, agent or in any other fiduciary capacity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Procedure:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Approved Institutions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall maintain his or her trust account only in a financial institution approved by the State Bar of Georgia, which shall annually publish a list of approved institutions.\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>Such institutions shall be located within the state of Georgia, within the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third-person. The institution shall be authorized by federal or state law to do business in the jurisdiction where located and shall be federally insured. A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer trust accounts if it abides by an agreement to report to the Office of the General Counsel whenever any properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds, and the instrument is not honored. The agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and shall not be canceled except upon 30-days notice in writing to the Office of the General Counsel. The agreement shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel on a form approved by the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall provide that all reports made by the financial institution shall be in writing and shall include the same information customarily forwarded to the depositor when an instrument is presented against insufficient funds. If the financial institution is located outside of the state of Georgia, it shall also agree in writing to honor any properly issued State Bar of Georgia subpoena.</li> \n <li>In addition to the requirements above, the financial institution must also be approved by the Georgia Bar Foundation and agree to offer IOLTA Accounts in compliance with the additional requirements set out in Part XV of the rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Georgia Bar Foundation may waive the provisions of this rule in whole or in part for good cause shown. A lawyer or law firm may appeal the decision of the Georgia Bar Foundation by application to the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Timing of Reports:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The financial institution shall file a report with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia in every instance where a properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds and said instrument is not honored within three business days of presentation.</li> \n <li>The report shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel within fifteen days of the date of the presentation of the instrument, even if the instrument is subsequently honored after the three business days provided in (2) (i) above.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Nothing shall preclude a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this rule.</li> \n <li>Every lawyer and law firm maintaining a trust account as provided by these rules is hereby and shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements mandated by this rule and shall indemnify and hold harmless each financial institution for its compliance with the aforesaid reporting and production requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Effect on Financial Institution of Compliance: The agreement by a financial institution to offer accounts pursuant to this rule shall be a procedure to advise the State Disciplinary Board of conduct by lawyers and shall not be deemed to create a duty to exercise a standard of care or a contract with third parties that may sustain a loss as a result of lawyers overdrawing lawyer trust accounts.</li> \n <li>Availability of Records: A lawyer shall not fail to produce any of the records required to be maintained by these rules at the request of theState Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia. This obligation shall be in addition to and not in lieu of the procedures contained in Part IV of these rules for the production of documents and evidence.</li> \n <li>Audit for Cause: A lawyer shall not fail to submit to an audit for cause conducted by the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-111.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Each financial institution wishing to be approved as a depository of client trust funds must file an overdraft notification agreement with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia will publish a list of approved institutions at least annually. \n \n[2] The overdraft agreement requires that all overdrafts be reported to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia whether or not the instrument is honored. It is improper for a lawyer to accept \"overdraft privileges \"or any other arrangement for a personal loan on a client trust account, particularly in exchange for the institution's promise to delay or not to report an overdraft. The institution must notify the Office of the General Counsel of all overdrafts even where the institution is certain that its own error caused the overdraft or that the matter could have been resolved between the institution and the lawyer within a reasonable period of time. \n \n[3] The overdraft notification provision is not intended to result in the discipline of every lawyer who overdraws a trust account. The lawyer or institution may explain occasional errors. The provision merely intends that the Office of the General Counsel receive an early warning of improprieties so that corrective action, including audits for cause, may be taken. \n \nWaiver \n \n[4] A lawyer may seek to have the provisions of this rule waived if the lawyer or law firm has its principal office in a county where no bank, credit union, or savings and loan association will agree or has agreed to comply with the provisions of this rule. Other grounds for requesting a waiver may include significant financial or business harm to the lawyer or law firm, such as where the unapproved bank is a client of the lawyer or law firm or where the lawyer serves on the board of the unapproved bank. \n \n[5] The request for a waiver should be in writing, sent to the Georgia Bar Foundation, and should include sufficient information to establish good cause for the requested waiver. \n \n[6] The Georgia Bar Foundation may request additional information from the lawyer or law firm if necessary to determine good cause. \nAudits \n[7] Every lawyer's financial records and trust account records are required records and therefore are properly subject to audit for cause. The audit provisions are intended to uncover errors and omissions before the public is harmed, to deter those lawyers who may be tempted to misuse client's funds and to educate and instruct lawyers as to proper trust accounting methods. Although the auditors will be employed by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, it is intended that disciplinary proceedings will be brought only when the auditors have reasonable cause to believe discrepancies or irregularities exist. Otherwise, the auditors should only educate the lawyer and the lawyer's staff as to proper trust accounting methods. \n[8] An audit for cause may be conducted at any time and without advance notice if the Office of the General Counsel receives sufficient evidence that a lawyer poses a threat of harm to clients or the public. The Office of the General Counsel must have the written approval of the Chairman of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia to conduct an audit for cause. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision323"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f019eba7-101e-4a2a-8834-5291c6c38c6b","Title":"RULE 1.16 DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is discharged.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;</li> \n <li>the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;</li> \n <li>the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;</li> \n <li>the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;</li> \n <li>the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or</li> \n <li>other good cause for withdrawal exists.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.</li> \n <li>Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. But see Rule 1.2 (c): Scope of Representation. \n \nMandatory Withdrawal \n \n[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation. \n \n[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \nDischarge \n \n[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances. \n \n[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. To the extent possible, the lawyer should give the client an explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to be self-represented. \n \n[6] If the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and, in an extreme case, may initiate proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.14: Client under a Disability. \n \nOptional Withdrawal \n \n[7] The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on a repugnant or imprudent objective. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \n[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. \n \nAssisting the Client upon Withdrawal \n \n[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. \n \n[10] Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may under certain unusual circumstances have a legal obligation to the organization after withdrawing or being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these rules. </div>","UrlName":"rule48","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ab4d791-6703-456d-aae3-c2f9d42df37a","ParentId":"f019eba7-101e-4a2a-8834-5291c6c38c6b","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is discharged.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;</li> \n <li>the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;</li> \n <li>the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;</li> \n <li>the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;</li> \n <li>the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or</li> \n <li>other good cause for withdrawal exists.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.</li> \n <li>Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. But see Rule 1.2(c): Scope of Representation. \n \nMandatory Withdrawal \n \n[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation. \n \n[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \nDischarge \n \n[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances. \n \n[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. To the extent possible, the lawyer should give the client an explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to be self-represented. \n \n[6] If the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and, in an extreme case, may initiate proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.14: Client under a Disability. \n \nOptional Withdrawal \n \n[7] The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on a repugnant or imprudent objective. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \n[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. \n \nAssisting the Client upon Withdrawal \n \n[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. \n \n[10] Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may under certain unusual circumstances have a legal obligation to the organization after withdrawing or being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these Rules. </div>","UrlName":"revision61"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"91ad0a2f-e4fe-449f-a182-e4259678a5ff","Title":"RULE 1.17. SALE OF LAW PRACTICE.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>The practice is sold as an entirety to another lawyer or law firm;</li> \n <li> Actual written notice is given to each of the seller's clients regarding:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the proposed sale;</li> \n <li>the terms of any proposed change in the fee arrangement authorized by paragraph (d);</li> \n <li>the client's right to retain other counsel, or to take possession of the file; and</li> \n <li>the fact that the client's consent to the sale will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of receipt of the notice.</li> \n </ol> \n If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file. </li> \n <li>The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this rule, when another lawyer or firm takes over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer and 5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice. \n \nTermination of Practice by the Seller \n \n[2] The requirement that all of the private practice be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice available for sale to the purchaser. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchaser but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Neither does a return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \nSingle Purchaser \n \n[5] The rule requires a single purchaser. The prohibition against piecemeal sale of a practice protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchaser is required to undertake all client matters in the practice, subject to client consent. If, however, the purchaser is unable to undertake all client matters because of a conflict of interest in a specific matter respecting which the purchaser is not permitted by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest or another rule to represent the client, the requirement that there be a single purchaser is nevertheless satisfied. \n \nClient Confidences, Consent and Notice \n \n[6] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to detailed information relating to the representation, such as the client's file, however, requires client consent. The rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser and any proposed change in the terms of future representation, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed. \n \n[7] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. \n \n[8] All the elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice. \n \nFee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser \n \n[9] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing agreements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser, unless the client consents. The purchaser may, however, advise the client that the purchaser will not undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the higher fees the purchaser usually charges. To prevent client financing of the sale, the higher fee the purchaser may charge must not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for substantially similar services rendered prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations. \n \n[10] The purchaser may not intentionally fragment the practice which is the subject of the sale by charging significantly different fees in substantially similar matters. Doing so would make it possible for the purchaser to avoid the obligation to take over the entire practice by charging arbitrarily higher fees for less lucrative matters, thereby increasing the likelihood that those clients would not consent to the new representation. \n \nOther Applicable Ethical Standards \n \n[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1: Competence); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure client consent after consultation for those conflicts which can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9). \n \n[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation). \n \nApplicability of the Rule \n \n[13] This rule applies to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met. \n \n[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule. \n \n[15] This rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice. </div>","UrlName":"rule49","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f0276f4f-5259-4981-8840-1bbff9517bff","ParentId":"91ad0a2f-e4fe-449f-a182-e4259678a5ff","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>The practice is sold as an entirety to another lawyer or law firm;</li> \n <li> Actual written notice is given to each of the seller's clients regarding:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the proposed sale;</li> \n <li>the terms of any proposed change in the fee arrangement authorized by paragraph (d);</li> \n <li>the client's right to retain other counsel, or to take possession of the file; and</li> \n <li>the fact that the client's consent to the sale will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of receipt of the notice.</li> \n </ol> \n If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file. </li> \n <li>The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this rule, when another lawyer or firm takes over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer and 5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice. \n \nTermination of Practice by the Seller \n \n[2] The requirement that all of the private practice be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice available for sale to the purchaser. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchaser but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Neither does a return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \nSingle Purchaser \n \n[5] The rule requires a single purchaser. The prohibition against piecemeal sale of a practice protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchaser is required to undertake all client matters in the practice, subject to client consent. If, however, the purchaser is unable to undertake all client matters because of a conflict of interest in a specific matter respecting which the purchaser is not permitted by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest or another rule to represent the client, the requirement that there be a single purchaser is nevertheless satisfied. \n \nClient Confidences, Consent and Notice \n \n[6] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to client-specific information relating to the representation and to the file, however, requires client consent. The rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser and any proposed change in the terms of future representation, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed. \n \n[7] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. \n \n[8] All the elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice. \n \nFee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser \n \n[9] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing agreements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser, unless the client consents. The purchaser may, however, advise the client that the purchaser will not undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the higher fees the purchaser usually charges. To prevent client financing of the sale, the higher fee the purchaser may charge must not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for substantially similar services rendered prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations. \n \n[10] The purchaser may not intentionally fragment the practice which is the subject of the sale by charging significantly different fees in substantially similar matters. Doing so would make it possible for the purchaser to avoid the obligation to take over the entire practice by charging arbitrarily higher fees for less lucrative matters, thereby increasing the likelihood that those clients would not consent to the new representation. \n \nOther Applicable Ethical Standards \n \n[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1: Competence); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure client consent after consultation for those conflicts which can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9). \n \n[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation). \n \nApplicability of the Rule \n \n[13] This rule applies to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met. \n \n[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule. \n \n[15] This rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice. </div>","UrlName":"revision278"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"79cd5db1-e60a-4dfe-93c5-bc2570ebc80b","Title":"RULE 1.18. DUTIES TO PROSPECTIVE CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client. \n(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client. \n(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). \n(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's consultations with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients. \n[2] A person becomes a prospective client by consulting with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Whether communications, including written, oral, or electronic communications, constitute a consultation depends on the circumstances. For example, a consultation is likely to have occurred if a lawyer, either in person or through the lawyer’s advertising in any medium, specifically requests or invites the submission of information about a potential representation without clear and reasonably understandable warnings and cautionary statements that limit the lawyer’s obligations, and a person provides information in response. See also Comment [4]. In contrast, a consultation does not occur if a person provides information to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer’s education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal information of general interest. Such a person communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is thus not a \"prospective client.\"Moreover, a person who communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying the lawyer is not a “prospective client.” \n[3] It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by Rule 1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be. \n[4] In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial consultation to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under Rule 1.7, then consent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation. \n[5] A lawyer may condition a consultation with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0 (l) for the definition of informed consent. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer's subsequent use of information received from the prospective client. \n[6] Even in the absence of an agreement, under paragraph (c), the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter. \n[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.10, but, under paragraph (d), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. \n[8] For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer's duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer's care, see Rule 1.15.</div>","UrlName":"rule608","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de4aae0a-e7b5-495d-b898-36b23dbb6bac","Title":"RULE 2.1 ADVISOR","Content":" In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. A lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nScope of Advice \n \n[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. \n \n[2] In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation. Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. \n \n[3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations. \n \n[4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts. \n \nOffering Advice \n \n[5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, duty to the client under Rule 1.4: Communication may require that the lawyer act if the client's course of action is related to the representation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.","UrlName":"rule62","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bf5aa118-f96c-45f6-8cf4-001a331ae3d3","Title":"RULE 2.2 INTERMEDIARY","Content":"Reserved.","UrlName":"rule65","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b9148e26-9da2-467d-81a0-6bb903261fa0","Title":"RULE 2.3 EVALUATION FOR USE BY THIRD PERSONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nDefinition \n \n[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government entity; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business. \n \n[2] Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government entity action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether the opinion is to be made public. \n \n[3] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available. \n \nDuty to Third Person \n \n[4] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings. \n \nAccess to and Disclosure of Information \n \n[5] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. \n \nFinancial Auditors' Requests for Information \n \n[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975. </div>","UrlName":"rule66","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9d14a347-799f-4861-9a49-11305775393e","ParentId":"b9148e26-9da2-467d-81a0-6bb903261fa0","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nDefinition \n \n[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government entity; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business. \n \n[2] Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government entity action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether the opinion is to be made public. \n \n[3] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available. \n \nDuty to Third Person \n \n[4] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings. \n \nAccess to and Disclosure of Information \n \n[5] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. \n \nFinancial Auditors' Requests for Information \n \n[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975. </div>","UrlName":"revision63"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ee3f3057-e1fb-4ad5-9b27-9629d9d9ade2","Title":"RULE 2.4 LAWYER SERVING AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.</li> \n <li>A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.</li> \n <li>When one or more of the parties in a mediation is a current or former client of the neutral lawyer or the neutral's law firm, a lawyer may serve as a neutral only if the matter in which the lawyer serves as a neutral is not the same matter in which the lawyer or law firm represents or represented the party and all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court. \n \n[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. \n \n[3] Unlike non-lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected. \n \n[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12. \n \n[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0 (r)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1. </div>","UrlName":"rule68","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"dc4cd20c-1668-4ee3-9bd8-5fc54c639dbf","ParentId":"ee3f3057-e1fb-4ad5-9b27-9629d9d9ade2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.</li> \n <li>A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.</li> \n <li>When one or more of the parties in a mediation is a current or former client of the neutral lawyer or the neutral's law firm, a lawyer may serve as a neutral only if the matter in which the lawyer serves as a neutral is not the same matter in which the lawyer or law firm represents or represented the party and all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court. \n \n[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. \n \n[3] Unlike non-lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected. \n \n[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12. \n \n[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(r)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1. </div>","UrlName":"revision64"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9487575d-c5ad-4680-9ee1-cf089c18ce38","Title":"RULE 3.1 MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;</li> \n <li>knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. \n \n[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. \n \n[3] It is not ethically improper for a lawyer to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the lawyer determines that a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the lawyer is not required by rules of procedure. or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the lawyer will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. \n \n[4] The decision of a court that a claim is not meritorious is not necessarily conclusive of a violation of this rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule69","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"99f9ad1a-aa70-4081-a8ae-b561636a3ae0","ParentId":"9487575d-c5ad-4680-9ee1-cf089c18ce38","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;</li> \n <li>knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. \n \n[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. \n \n[3] It is not ethically improper for a lawyer to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the lawyer determines that a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the lawyer is not required by rules of procedure. or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the lawyer will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. \n \n[4] The decision of a court that a claim is not meritorious is not necessarily conclusive of a violation of this Rule. </div>","UrlName":"revision65"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"787cc9d4-fe4d-484d-a6d4-e1a3006e108b","Title":"RULE 3.2 EXPEDITING LITIGATION","Content":" A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. \n \n[2] The reasonableness of a lawyer's effort to expedite litigation must be judged by all of the controlling factors. \"Reasonable efforts \"do not equate to \"instant efforts \"and are sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n ","UrlName":"rule71","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a195a719-bb14-4dec-9f7d-5d5e4d9c9dd0","Title":"RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or</li> \n <li>offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.</li> \n <li>In an ex parte proceeding, other than grand jury proceedings, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0 (aa) for the definition of tribunal. It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a) (4) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false. \n \n[2] This rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. \n \nRepresentations by a Lawyer \n \n[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2 (d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2 (d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4 (b). \n \nLegal Argument \n \n[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a) (3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. \n \nOffering Evidence \n \n[5] Paragraph (c) allows that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity. \n \n[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer may refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit from the witness the testimony that the lawyer knows is false. \n \n[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9]. \n \n[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0 (i). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. \n \n[9] Although paragraph (a) (4) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7]. \n \nRemedial Measures \n \n[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done - making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps nothing. \n \n[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2 (d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. \n \nPreserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process \n \n[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. \n \nDuration of Obligation \n \n[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. \n \nEx Parte Proceedings \n \n[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16 (a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16 (b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. </div>","UrlName":"rule72","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"ea43d08b-5a41-4e59-be18-be435a0cce18","ParentId":"a195a719-bb14-4dec-9f7d-5d5e4d9c9dd0","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or</li> \n <li>offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.</li> \n <li>In an ex parte proceeding, other than grand jury proceedings, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(r) for the definition of tribunal. It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(4) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false. \n \n[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. \n \nRepresentations by a Lawyer \n \n[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b). \n \nLegal Argument \n \n[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. \n \nOffering Evidence \n \n[5] Paragraph (c) allows that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity. \n \n[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer may refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit from the witness the testimony that the lawyer knows is false. \n \n[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9]. \n \n[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(i). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. \n \n[9] Although paragraph (a)(4) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7]. \n \nRemedial Measures \n \n[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done - making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps nothing. \n \n[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. \n \nPreserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process \n \n[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. \n \nDuration of Obligation \n \n[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. \n \nEx Parte Proceedings \n \n[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. </div>","UrlName":"revision66"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0e595dc4-c128-4d22-a9ee-b54827dc085b","Title":"RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>falsify evidence;</li> \n <li>counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely; or</li> \n <li> pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparation, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in preparing, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li> request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; or the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information; and</li> \n <li>the information is not otherwise subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the opposing party or counsel; or</li> \n <li>present, participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. \n \n[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2. \n \n[5] As to paragraph (g), the responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of the opposing party or counsel. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence. </div>","UrlName":"rule77","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"bcea26ee-c9b9-489a-8d50-bbc8b7262095","ParentId":"0e595dc4-c128-4d22-a9ee-b54827dc085b","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>falsify evidence;</li> \n <li>counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely; or</li> \n <li> pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparation, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in preparing, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li> request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; or the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information; and</li> \n <li>the information is not otherwise subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the opposing party or counsel; or</li> \n <li>present, participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. \n \n[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2. \n \n[5] As to paragraph (g), the responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of the opposing party or counsel. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence. </div>","UrlName":"revision67"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7e15a371-0bf3-40f4-82e0-125f4df371e6","Title":"RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;</li> \n <li>communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law;</li> \n <li> communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the communication is prohibited by law or court order; or</li> \n <li>the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or</li> \n <li>the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c) of this rule is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (b) or paragraph (d) of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Many forms of improper influence upon the tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. All of those are specified in the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct with which an advocate should be familiar. Attention is also directed to Rule 8.4. Misconduct., which governs other instances of improper conduct by a lawyer/candidate. \n \n[2] If we are to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law. The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process. Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided. The activity proscribed by this rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety. \n \n[3A] The rule with respect to ex parte communications limits direct communications except as may be permitted by law. Thus, court rules or case law must be referred to in order to determine whether certain ex parte communications are legitimate. Ex parte communications may be permitted by statutory authorization. \n \n[3B] A lawyer who obtains a judge's signature on a decree in the absence of the opposing lawyer where certain aspects of the decree are still in dispute, may have violated Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., regardless of the lawyer's good intentions or good faith. \n \n[4] A lawyer may communicate as to the merits of the cause with a judge in the course of official proceedings in the case, in writing if the lawyer simultaneously delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer, or orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer. \n \n[5] If the lawyer knowingly instigates or causes another to instigate a communication proscribed by Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., a violation may occur. \n \n[6] Direct or indirect communication with a juror during the trial is clearly prohibited. A lawyer may not avoid the proscription of Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., by using agents to communicate improperly with jurors. A lawyer may be held responsible if the lawyer was aware of the client's desire to establish contact with jurors and assisted the client in doing so. \n \n[7] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication period. \n \n[8] While a lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge, the lawyer's actions should avoid reciprocation. Fairness and impartiality of the trial process is strengthened by the lawyer's protection of the record for subsequent review and this preserves the professional integrity of the legal profession by patient firmness. </div>","UrlName":"rule78","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"40d626a1-e510-44a9-9471-5e2f78bec600","ParentId":"7e15a371-0bf3-40f4-82e0-125f4df371e6","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;</li> \n <li>communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law;</li> \n <li> communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the communication is prohibited by law or court order; or</li> \n <li>the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or</li> \n <li>the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c) of this Rule is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (b) or paragraph (d) of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Many forms of improper influence upon the tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. All of those are specified in the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct with which an advocate should be familiar. Attention is also directed to Rule 8.4. Misconduct., which governs other instances of improper conduct by a lawyer/candidate. \n \n[2] If we are to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law. The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process. Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided. The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety. \n \n[3A] The Rule with respect to ex parte communications limits direct communications except as may be permitted by law. Thus, court rules or case law must be referred to in order to determine whether certain ex parte communications are legitimate. Ex parte communications may be permitted by statutory authorization. \n \n[3B] A lawyer who obtains a judge's signature on a decree in the absence of the opposing lawyer where certain aspects of the decree are still in dispute, may have violated Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., regardless of the lawyer's good intentions or good faith. \n \n[4] A lawyer may communicate as to the merits of the cause with a judge in the course of official proceedings in the case, in writing if the lawyer simultaneously delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer, or orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer. \n \n[5] If the lawyer knowingly instigates or causes another to instigate a communication proscribed by Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., a violation may occur. \n \n[6] Direct or indirect communication with a juror during the trial is clearly prohibited. A lawyer may not avoid the proscription of Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., by using agents to communicate improperly with jurors. A lawyer may be held responsible if the lawyer was aware of the client's desire to establish contact with jurors and assisted the client in doing so. \n \n[7] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication period. \n \n[8] While a lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge, the lawyer's actions should avoid reciprocation. Fairness and impartiality of the trial process is strengthened by the lawyer's protection of the record for subsequent review and this preserves the professional integrity of the legal profession by patient firmness. </div>","UrlName":"revision68"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"8dfb7354-c1a1-43b5-91a9-a3a62430af36","Title":"RULE 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.</li> \n <li>No lawyer associated in a firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy. \n \n[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. \n \n[3] The rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \n[5A] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;</li> \n <li>in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;</li> \n <li>the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;</li> \n <li>any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;</li> \n <li>information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or</li> \n <li>the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.</li> \n </ol> \n[5B] In addition, there are certain subjects which are more likely than not to have no material prejudicial effect on a proceeding. Thus, a lawyer may usually state: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;</li> \n <li>information contained in a public record;</li> \n <li>that an investigation of a matter is in progress;</li> \n <li>the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;</li> \n <li>a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;</li> \n <li>a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and</li> \n <li> in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;</li> \n <li>if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;</li> \n <li>the fact, time and place of arrest; and</li> \n <li>the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n [6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding. \n \n[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others. </div>","UrlName":"rule80","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d4008c7-81dc-4570-a7c5-fadc0e62e763","ParentId":"8dfb7354-c1a1-43b5-91a9-a3a62430af36","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.</li> \n <li>No lawyer associated in a firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy. \n \n[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. \n \n[3] The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \n[5A] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;</li> \n <li>in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;</li> \n <li>the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;</li> \n <li>any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;</li> \n <li>information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or</li> \n <li>the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.</li> \n </ol> \n[5B] In addition, there are certain subjects which are more likely than not to have no material prejudicial effect on a proceeding. Thus, a lawyer may usually state: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;</li> \n <li>information contained in a public record;</li> \n <li>that an investigation of a matter is in progress;</li> \n <li>the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;</li> \n <li>a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;</li> \n <li>a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and</li> \n <li> in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;</li> \n <li>if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;</li> \n <li>the fact, time and place of arrest; and</li> \n <li>the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n [6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding. \n \n[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others. </div>","UrlName":"revision69"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a27d1536-2fbd-415a-abdf-3d15b8f792a3","Title":"RULE 3.7 LAWYER AS WITNESS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;</li> \n <li>the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or</li> \n <li>disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. \n \n[2] The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a) (2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. \n \n[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a) (3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification has no application to this aspect of the problem. \n \n[5] Whether the combination of roles involves an improper conflict of interest with respect to the client is determined by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule or Rule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification disqualifies the firm also. </div>","UrlName":"rule82","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1a8bd156-3327-4459-9fd5-47902e68ac7a","ParentId":"a27d1536-2fbd-415a-abdf-3d15b8f792a3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;</li> \n <li>the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or</li> \n <li>disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. \n \n[2] The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. \n \n[3] Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. \n \n[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification has no application to this aspect of the problem. \n \n[5] Whether the combination of roles involves an improper conflict of interest with respect to the client is determined by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule or Rule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification disqualifies the firm also. </div>","UrlName":"revision70"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c5237a8c-7ec6-4f31-bf97-99f1ba804338","Title":"RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;</li> \n <li>refrain from making any effort to prevent the accused from exercising a reasonable effort to obtain counsel;</li> \n <li>comply with Rule 4.2;</li> \n <li>make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates the offense;</li> \n <li>exercise reasonable care to prevent persons who are under the direct supervision of the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under subsection (g) of this Rule;</li> \n <li> not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;</li> \n <li>the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and</li> \n <li>there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused;</li> \n <li>promptly disclose new, credible, and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted to an appropriate court or authority. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, the prosecutor shall promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay and undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit;</li> \n <li>seek to remedy a conviction obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction when the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant did not commit the offense.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n \n[2] Reserved. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship. \n \n[5] Paragraph (g) supplements Rule 3.6: Trial Publicity, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6 (b) or 3.6 (c): Trial Publicity. \n [6]\t Reserved. \n [7]\t When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (h) requires prompt disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, paragraph (h) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Consistent with the objectives of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented  defendant,  would  ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. \n [8]\t Under paragraph (i), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Necessary steps may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted. \n [9]\t A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of paragraphs (h) and (i), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule83","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0c97837e-b4b3-442f-b480-60afe6bd6990","ParentId":"c5237a8c-7ec6-4f31-bf97-99f1ba804338","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;</li> \n <li>refrain from making any effort to prevent the accused from exercising a reasonable effort to obtain counsel;</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates the offense;</li> \n <li>exercise reasonable care to prevent persons who are under the direct supervision of the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under subsection (g) of this rule;</li> \n <li> not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;</li> \n <li>the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and</li> \n <li>there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n \n[2] Reserved. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship. \n \n[5] Paragraph (g) supplements Rule 3.6: Trial Publicity, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6 (b) or 3.6 (c): Trial Publicity. </div>","UrlName":"revision391"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4a46f7a1-94ac-4d60-b789-6ebe7708541a","Title":"RULE 3.9 ADVOCATE IN NONADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS","Content":" A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or administrative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3 (a) through (c), 3.4 (a) through (c), and 3.5. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule making or policy making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision making body, like a court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body should deal with the tribunal honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedures. \n \n[2] Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. The requirements of this rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts. \n \n[3] This rule does not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental entity; representation in such a transaction is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4. \n ","UrlName":"rule85","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"748d9636-a16e-43d2-b7d9-5bddf553f1ac","Title":"RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nMisrepresentation \n \n[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act. \n \nStatements of Fact \n \n[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Comments which fall under the general category of \"puffing \"do not violate this rule. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. \n \nFraud by Client \n \n[3] Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information. </div>","UrlName":"rule289","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"16314d93-c9ec-450e-8636-98955fce4f5d","ParentId":"748d9636-a16e-43d2-b7d9-5bddf553f1ac","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nMisrepresentation \n \n[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act. \n \nStatements of Fact \n \n[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Comments which fall under the general category of \"puffing \"do not violate this rule. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. \n \nFraud by Client \n \n[3] Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information. </div>","UrlName":"revision72"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"25645231-5602-4631-b95f-e304dee1c781","Title":"RULE 4.2 COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.</li> \n <li>Attorneys for the State and Federal Government shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as other attorneys in this State.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government entity and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government entity to speak with government officials about the matter. \n \n[2] Communications authorized by law also include constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this Rule or has found this Rule inapplicable. However, the Rule imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional provisions. \n \n[3] This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates. \n \n[4A] In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4 (f). Communication with a former employee of a represented organization is discussed in Formal Advisory Opinion 20-1. \n \n[4B] In administering this Rule it should be anticipated that in many instances, prior to the beginning of the interview, the interviewing lawyer will not possess sufficient information to determine whether the relationship of the interviewee to the entity is sufficiently close to place the person in the \"represented \"category. In those situations the good faith of the lawyer in undertaking the interview should be considered. Evidence of good faith includes an immediate and candid statement of the interest of the person on whose behalf the interview is being taken, a full explanation of why that person's position is adverse to the interests of the entity with which the interviewee is associated, the exploration of the relationship issue at the outset of the interview and the cessation of the interview immediately upon determination that the interview is improper. \n \n[5] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies, however, in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See 1.0. Such an inference may arise in circumstances where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom communication is sought is represented in the matter to be discussed. Thus, a lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by ignoring the obvious. \n \n[6] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3. \n \n[6A] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury. \n \n[7] The anti-contact rule serves important public interests which preserve the proper functioning of the judicial system and the administration of justice by a) protecting against misuse of the imbalance of legal skill between a lawyer and layperson; b) safe-guarding the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel; c) ensuring that all valid claims and defenses are raised in response to inquiry from adverse counsel; d) reducing the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that might harm their interests; and e) maintaining the lawyers ability to monitor the case and effectively represent the client. \n \n[8] Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other because this Rule is not intended to affect communications between parties to an action entered into independent of and not at the request or direction of counsel. </div>","UrlName":"rule296","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"628733fe-c98e-4bf7-8bb3-1abfc627d292","ParentId":"25645231-5602-4631-b95f-e304dee1c781","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.</li> \n <li>Attorneys for the State and Federal Government shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as other attorneys in this State.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government entity and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government entity to speak with government officials about the matter. \n \n[2] Communications authorized by law also include constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this Rule or has found this Rule inapplicable. However, the Rule imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional provisions. \n \n[3] This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates. \n \n[4A] In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. See Formal Advisory Opinion 87-6. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). Communication with a former employee of a represented organization is discussed in Formal Advisory Opinion 94-3. \n \n[4B] In administering this Rule it should be anticipated that in many instances, prior to the beginning of the interview, the interviewing lawyer will not possess sufficient information to determine whether the relationship of the interviewee to the entity is sufficiently close to place the person in the \"represented \"category. In those situations the good faith of the lawyer in undertaking the interview should be considered. Evidence of good faith includes an immediate and candid statement of the interest of the person on whose behalf the interview is being taken, a full explanation of why that person's position is adverse to the interests of the entity with which the interviewee is associated, the exploration of the relationship issue at the outset of the interview and the cessation of the interview immediately upon determination that the interview is improper. \n \n[5] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies, however, in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See 1.0. Such an inference may arise in circumstances where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom communication is sought is represented in the matter to be discussed. Thus, a lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by ignoring the obvious. \n \n[6] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3. \n \n[6A] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury. \n \n[7] The anti-contact rule serves important public interests which preserve the proper functioning of the judicial system and the administration of justice by a) protecting against misuse of the imbalance of legal skill between a lawyer and layperson; b) safe-guarding the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel; c) ensuring that all valid claims and defenses are raised in response to inquiry from adverse counsel; d) reducing the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that might harm their interests; and e) maintaining the lawyers ability to monitor the case and effectively represent the client. \n \n[8] Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other because this Rule is not intended to affect communications between parties to an action entered into independent of and not at the request or direction of counsel. </div>","UrlName":"revision73"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4a6e5ea5-62ee-401b-a772-f70dbf79e097","Title":"RULE 4.3 DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSON","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and</li> \n <li>give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client. </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f). \n \n[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented persons interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations. </div>","UrlName":"rule298","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"a9cc4ee3-7fee-410b-afed-7a63073cff2f","ParentId":"4a6e5ea5-62ee-401b-a772-f70dbf79e097","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and</li> \n <li>give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client. </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f). \n \n[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented persons interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations. </div>","UrlName":"revision74"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bfe134c6-2213-4373-8419-b9ba66e4c40f","Title":"RULE 4.4 RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships. \n[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive a document or electronically stored information that was mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. A document or electronically stored information is inadvertently sent when it is accidentally transmitted, such as when an e-mail or letter is misaddressed or a document or electronically stored information is accidentally included with information that was intentionally transmitted. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document or electronically stored information was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the document or electronically stored information, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document or electronically stored information has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been inappropriately obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, ‘‘document or electronically stored information’’ includes, in addition to paper documents, e-mail and other forms of electronically stored information, including embedded data (commonly referred to as “metadata”), that is subject to being read or put into readable form. Metadata in electronic documents creates an obligation under this Rule only if the receiving lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the metadata was inadvertently sent to the receiving lawyer.</div>","UrlName":"rule300","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"def9f1ce-eb75-4497-ba0e-3477cabad38c","ParentId":"bfe134c6-2213-4373-8419-b9ba66e4c40f","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships.","UrlName":"revision6"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"02b56e63-d751-481f-a3c4-1c665e512de9","Title":"RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTNERS, MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORY LAWYERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A law firm partner as defined in Rule 1.0 (q), and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0 (g) . This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised. \n \n[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules. \n \n[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a) . \n \n[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. \n \n[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation. \n \n[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. \n \n[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a) . </div>","UrlName":"rule302","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"44cce370-1bc0-4f35-ae77-be2507b2c119","ParentId":"02b56e63-d751-481f-a3c4-1c665e512de9","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A law firm partner as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(e) . This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised. \n \n[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules. \n \n[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a) . \n \n[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. \n \n[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation. \n \n[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. \n \n[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a) . </div>","UrlName":"revision75"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f4afeac-58ab-40b7-9489-fdf040ce8227","Title":"RULE 5.2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUBORDINATE LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.</li> \n <li>A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character. \n \n[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged. </div>","UrlName":"rule111","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"46f33fc0-8186-4495-8b64-ca0a3a7c9901","ParentId":"1f4afeac-58ab-40b7-9489-fdf040ce8227","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.</li> \n <li>A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character. \n \n[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged. </div>","UrlName":"revision76"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ff99c726-6ca9-4d61-ae4b-56ea9ec61fbc","Title":"RULE 5.3. RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li>a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li> a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status; or</li> \n <li>provide any legal advice to the clients of the lawyer either in person, by telephone or in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline. \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. \n[3] The prohibitions of paragraph (d) are designed to prevent the unauthorized practice of law in a law office by a person who has been suspended or disbarred. A lawyer who allows a suspended or disbarred lawyer to work in a law office must exercise special care to ensure that the former lawyer complies with these rules, and that clients of the firm understand the former lawyer’s role. \n [4] A lawyer may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal services to the client. When using such assistance outside the firm, a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the assistance is provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations. The extent of this obligation will depend upon the circumstances, including the education, experience and reputation of the nonlawyer; the nature of the assistance involved; the terms of any arrangements concerning the protection of client information; and the legal and ethical environments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly with regard to confidentiality. See also Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Allocation of authority), 1.4 (Communication with client), 1.6 (Confidentiality of information), 5.4 (a) (Professional independence of a lawyer), and 5.5 (a) (Unauthorized practice of law). When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm, a lawyer should communicate directions appropriate under the circumstances to give reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. \n \n[5] Where the client directs the selection of a particular nonlawyer service provider outside the firm, the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the client concerning the allocation of responsibility for monitoring as between the client and the lawyer. See Rule 1.2. When making such an allocation in a matter pending before a tribunal, lawyers and parties may have additional obligations that are a matter of law beyond the scope of these rules. </div>","UrlName":"rule115","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3dafd6d4-7066-4cd3-a407-0afd1189fc27","ParentId":"ff99c726-6ca9-4d61-ae4b-56ea9ec61fbc","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li>a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li> a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status; or</li> \n <li>provide any legal advice to the clients of the lawyer either in person, by telephone or in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline. \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. \n[3] The prohibitions of paragraph (d) are designed to prevent the unauthorized practice of law in a law office by a person who has been suspended or disbarred. A lawyer who allows a suspended or disbarred lawyer to work in a law office must exercise special care to ensure that the former lawyer complies with these Rules, and that clients of the firm understand the former lawyer’s role.</div>","UrlName":"revision276"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"68cd6473-79e8-4913-9202-b7d57d4350df","Title":"RULE 5.4. PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement;</li> \n <li>a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter;</li> \n <li>a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated nonprofit lawyer referral service where such fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>provide legal services to clients while working with other lawyers or law firms practicing in, and organized under the rules of, other jurisdictions, whether domestic or foreign, that permit nonlawyers to participate in the management of such firms, have equity ownership in such firms, or share in legal fees generated by such firms; and</li> \n <li>share legal fees arising from such legal services with such other lawyers or law firms to the same extent as the sharing of legal fees is permitted under applicable Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The activities permitted under the preceding portion of this paragraph (e) are subject to the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The association shall not compromise or interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment, the client-lawyer relationship between the client and the lawyer, or the lawyer’s compliance with these rules; and</li> \n <li>Nothing in paragraph (e) is intended to affect the lawyer’s obligation to comply with other applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, or to alter the forms in which a lawyer is permitted to practice, including but not limited to the creation of an alternative business structure in Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The provisions of this rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment. \n[2] The provisions of paragraphs (e) and (f) of this rule are not intended to allow a Georgia lawyer or law firm to create or participate in alternative business structures (ABS) in Georgia. An alternative business structure is a law firm where a nonlawyer is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. A law firm may also be an ABS where another body is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. This rule only allows a Georgia lawyer to work with an ABS outside of the state of Georgia and to share fees for that work.</div>","UrlName":"rule120","Order":46,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"dc8e5cbc-d8e4-40ba-88ce-a3a3fe392f00","ParentId":"68cd6473-79e8-4913-9202-b7d57d4350df","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.</li> \n <li>a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service where such fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3. Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Provide legal services to clients while working with other lawyers or law firms practicing in, and organized under the rules of, other jurisdictions, whether domestic or foreign, that permit non-lawyers to participate in the management of such firms, have equity ownership in such firms, or share in legal fees generated by such firms; and</li> \n <li>Share legal fees arising from such legal services with such other lawyers or law firms to the same extent as the sharing of legal fees is permitted under applicable Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> The activities permitted under the preceding portion of this paragraph (e) are subject to the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The association shall not compromise or interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment, the client-lawyer relationship between the client and the lawyer, or the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; and</li> \n <li>Nothing in this paragraph (e) is intended to affect the lawyer’s obligation to comply with other applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, or to alter the forms in which a lawyer is permitted to practice, including but not limited to the creation of an alternative business structure in Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment. \n[2] The provisions of paragraph (e) of this Rule are not intended to allow a Georgia lawyer or law firm to create or participate in alternative business structures (ABS) in Georgia. An alternative business structure is a law firm where a non-lawyer is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. A law firm may also be an ABS where another body is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. This Rule only allows a Georgia lawyer to work with an ABS outside of the state of Georgia and to share fees for that work.</div>","UrlName":"revision274"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1ac78e46-95b3-425a-8dfa-49896af55719","Title":"RULE 5.5. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.</li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or</li> \n <li>hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the Domestic Lawyer, or a person the Domestic Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or</li> \n <li>are not within paragraphs (c) (2) or (c) (3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are provided to the Domestic Lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or</li> \n <li>are services that the Domestic Lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Foreign Lawyer shall not, except as authorized by this Rule or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law, or hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. Such a Foreign Lawyer does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in this jurisdiction when on a temporary basis the Foreign Lawyer performs services in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal held or to be held in a jurisdiction outside the United States if the Foreign Lawyer, or a person the Foreign Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or by order of the tribunal to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceedings held or to be held in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice;</li> \n <li> are not within paragraphs (e) (2) or (e) (3) and\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>are performed for a client who resides or has an office in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authorization; or</li> \n <li>arise out of or are reasonably related to a matter that has a substantial connection to a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authorization; or</li> \n <li>are governed primarily by international law or the law of a non-United States jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Foreign Lawyer who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction subject to the following conditions:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The services are provided to the Foreign Lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; and</li> \n <li>The Foreign Lawyer is and remains in this country in lawful immigration status and complies with all relevant provisions of United States immigration laws.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of the grants of authority found in subsections (e) and (f) above, the Foreign Lawyer must be a member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction, the members of which are admitted to practice as lawyers or counselors at law or the equivalent and subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XXI, Rule 121, Provision Of Legal Services Following Determination Of Major Disaster, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XV, Rules 91-95, Student Practice Rule, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XVI, Rules 97-103, Law School Graduates, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XX, Rules 114-120, Extended Public Service Program, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li> Any domestic or foreign lawyer who has been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia pro hac vice, pursuant to the Uniform Rules of the various classes of courts in Georgia, shall pay all required fees and costs annually as set forth in those Rules. Failure to pay the annual fee by January 15 of each year of admission pro hac vice will result in a late fee of $100 that must be paid no later than March 1 of that year. Failure to pay the annual fees may result in disciplinary action, and said lawyer may be subject to prosecution under the unauthorized practice of law statutes of this state. \n   </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n Comment \n[1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Paragraph (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer assisting another person. \n[2] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3. \n[3] A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se. \n[4] Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a Domestic Lawyer violates paragraph (b) and a Foreign Lawyer violates paragraph (e) if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not physically present here. Such Domestic or Foreign Lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. See also Rules 7.1(a) and 7.5(b). \n[5] There are occasions in which a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk to the interests of their clients, the public or the courts. Paragraph (c) identifies four such circumstances for the Domestic Lawyer. Paragraph (e) identifies four such circumstances for the Foreign Lawyer. The fact that conduct is not so identified does not imply that the conduct is or is not authorized. With the exception of paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), this Rule does not authorize a Domestic Lawyer to establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here. \n[6] There is no single test to determine whether a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's services are provided on a \"temporary basis \"in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under paragraph (c) or paragraph (e). Services may be \"temporary \"even though the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when the Domestic Lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation. \n[7] Paragraphs (c) and (d) apply to Domestic Lawyers. Paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) apply to Foreign Lawyers. Paragraphs (c) and (e) contemplate that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice in the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted and excludes a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who while technically admitted is not authorized to practice, because, for example, the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is on inactive status. \n[8] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a Domestic Lawyer associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. Paragraph (e)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a Foreign Lawyer associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For these paragraphs to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the client. \n[9] Domestic Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (c)(2), a Domestic Lawyer does not violate this Rule when the Domestic Lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a Domestic Lawyer to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the Domestic Lawyer to obtain that authority. \n[10] Paragraph (c)(2) also provides that a Domestic Lawyer rendering services in this jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this Rule when the Domestic Lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is authorized to practice law or in which the Domestic Lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted pro hac vice. Examples of such conduct include meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents. Similarly, a Domestic Lawyer may engage in conduct temporarily in this jurisdiction in connection with pending litigation in another jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized to appear, including taking depositions in this jurisdiction. \n[11] When a Domestic Lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted to appear before a court or administrative agency, paragraph (c)(2) also permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinate Domestic Lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in support of the Domestic Lawyer responsible for the litigation. \n[12] Paragraph (c)(3) permits a Domestic Lawyer, and paragraph (e)(3) permits a Foreign Lawyer, to perform services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if those services are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice. The Domestic Lawyer, however, must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so requires. \n[13] Paragraph (c)(4) permits a Domestic Lawyer to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted but are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3). These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers. Paragraph (e)(4)(i) permits a Foreign Lawyer to provide certain legal services in this jurisdiction on behalf of a client who resides or has an office in the jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice. Paragraph (e)(4)(ii) permits a Foreign Lawyer to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to a matter that has a substantial connection to the jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice. These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers. \n[14] Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted. Paragraphs (e)(3) and (e)(4)(ii) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice. A variety of factors may evidence such a relationship. These include but are not limited to the following: \na. The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's client may have been previously represented by the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer; or \nb.  The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's client may be resident in, have an office in, or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nc. The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction in which the Domestic of Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nd. Significant aspects of the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's work in a specific matter might be conducted in the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted or another jurisdiction; or \ne. A significant aspect of a matter may involve the law of the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nf. Some aspect of the matter may be governed by international law or the law of a non-United State jurisdiction; or \ng. The Lawyer's work on the specific matter in this jurisdiction is authorized by the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted; or \nh. The client's activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the services of their Domestic or Foreign Lawyer in assessing the relative merits of each; or \ni. The services may draw on the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law. \n[15] Paragraph (d) identifies two circumstances in which a Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary basis. Except as provided in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), a Domestic Lawyer who establishes an office or other systematic or continuous presence in this jurisdiction must become admitted to practice law generally in this jurisdiction. \n[16] Paragraph (d)(1) applies to a Domestic Lawyer who is employed by a client to provide legal services to the client or its organizational affiliates, i.e., entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common control with the employer. This paragraph does not authorize the provision of personal legal services to the employer's officers or employees. The paragraph applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government lawyers and others who are employed to render legal services to the employer. The Domestic Lawyer's ability to represent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is licensed generally serves the interests of the employer and does not create an unreasonable risk to the client and others because the employer is well situated to assess the Domestic Lawyer's qualifications and the quality of the Domestic Lawyer's work. \n[17] If an employed Domestic Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic presence in this jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering legal services to the employer, the Domestic Lawyer may be subject to registration or other requirements, including assessments for client protection funds and mandatory continuing legal education. \n[18] Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that a Domestic Lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent. Paragraph (e)(4)(iii) recognizes that a Foreign Lawyer may provide legal services when the services provided are governed by international law or the law of a foreign jurisdiction. \n[19] A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c), (d), (e) or (f) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. See Rule 8.5(a). \n[20] In some circumstances, a Domestic Lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the Domestic Lawyer is not licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction. For example, that may be required when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction and requires knowledge of the law of this jurisdiction. See Rule 1.4. \n[21] Paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f) do not authorize communications advertising legal services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction by Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions. Whether and how Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may communicate the availability of their services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction is governed by Rules 7.1 to 7.5. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule129","Order":47,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"834d702e-4fc9-4d8f-ab00-f158dd071475","Title":"RULE 5.6 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or</li> \n <li>an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client. \n \n[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule135","Order":48,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1e9c7303-39be-4831-aa4e-5808b02acf0e","ParentId":"834d702e-4fc9-4d8f-ab00-f158dd071475","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or</li> \n <li>an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client. \n \n[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision79"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7e48566c-b071-4d13-a6e0-9eff52fc699f","Title":"RULE 5.7 RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW-RELATED SERVICES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall be subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or</li> \n <li>by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The term \"law-related services \"denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case. \n[2] Rule 5.7: Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services need not adhere to the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7(a)(1): Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services. \n[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. \n[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a): Conflict of Interest. \n[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing. \n[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit. \n[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity which the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. \n[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a),(b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law. \n [11] When the full protections of all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule139","Order":49,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"a08edb38-d812-49fa-a936-10631a9356cb","ParentId":"7e48566c-b071-4d13-a6e0-9eff52fc699f","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall be subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or</li> \n <li>by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The term \"law-related services \"denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case. \n[2] Rule 5.7: Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services need not adhere to the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7(a)(1): Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services. \n[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. \n[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a): Conflict of Interest. \n[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing. \n[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit. \n[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity which the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. \n[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a),(b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law. \n [11] When the full protections of all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision80"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a5312e3c-cf09-46db-8444-a96cb25db4a2","Title":"RULE 6.1 VOLUNTARY PRO BONO PUBLIC SERVICE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> provide a substantial portion of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> provide any additional services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;</li> \n <li>delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nIn addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. \nNo reporting rules or requirements may be imposed without specific permission of the Supreme Court granted through amendments to these Rules. \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \nComment \n[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. \n[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. \n[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but who nevertheless cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term \"governmental organizations \"includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies. \n[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory lawyers' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. \n[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remain unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). \n[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups. \n[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. \n[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph. \n[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities. \n[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible. \n[11] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.</div>","UrlName":"rule140","Order":50,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b82d9e9a-f4e1-4e29-8f3d-fc80af791c64","ParentId":"a5312e3c-cf09-46db-8444-a96cb25db4a2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> provide a substantial portion of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> provide any additional services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;</li> \n <li>delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nIn addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. \nNo reporting rules or requirements may be imposed without specific permission of the Supreme Court granted through amendments to these Rules. \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \nComment \n[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. \n[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. \n[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but who nevertheless cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term \"governmental organizations \"includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies. \n[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory lawyers' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. \n[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remain unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). \n[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups. \n[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. \n[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph. \n[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities. \n[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible. \n[11] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.</div>","UrlName":"revision81"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"38a8cf58-1c95-4ca8-8e59-954cb89fb0ff","Title":"RULE 6.2 ACCEPTING APPOINTMENTS","Content":" For good cause a lawyer may seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person. \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See Rule 6.1: Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service. An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services. \n \nAppointed Counsel \n \n[2] For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1: Competence, or if undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust. \n \n[3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules. \n \n[4] This Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.","UrlName":"rule141","Order":51,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a747020c-0915-4a74-aaba-7f57f5ab7fdc","Title":"RULE 6.3 MEMBERSHIP IN LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or</li> \n <li>where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed. \n \n[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances. </div>","UrlName":"rule142","Order":52,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3d8678de-66de-44ab-838b-1ff82df79b9d","ParentId":"a747020c-0915-4a74-aaba-7f57f5ab7fdc","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or</li> \n <li>where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed. \n \n[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances. </div>","UrlName":"revision82"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"655d321f-cd27-40fb-be1a-3a6d92569f7b","Title":"RULE 6.4 LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT INTERESTS","Content":" A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefited by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client. \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. See also Rule 1.2(b): Scope of Representation. Without this Rule, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially benefited.","UrlName":"rule144","Order":53,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"RULE 6.5. NONPROFIT & COURT-ANNEXED LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS","Content":"<ol><li>A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided:<ol><li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and\n </li><li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.\n </li></ol></li><li>Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule.</li><li>The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10.\n </li></ol>The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.Comment [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter.[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. ","UrlName":"rule559","Order":54,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"e5063554-dfd3-4187-898d-44ef77085851","ParentId":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided: \n <ol> \n <li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and</li> \n <li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n(b) Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule. \n(c) The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n Comment \n [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10. \n[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation. \n[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter. \n[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program. \n[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision84"},{"Id":"7842ec92-aaa2-4c67-89c9-57477696681e","ParentId":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided: \n <ol> \n <li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and</li> \n <li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n(b) Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule. \n(c) The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n Comment \n [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10. \n[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation. \n[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter. \n[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program. \n[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision86"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bfbb7abc-4b04-4066-b0d1-fed9bf0dd159","Title":"RULE 7.1 COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER'S SERVICES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. By way of illustration, but not limitation, a communication is false or misleading if it:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;</li> \n <li>is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;</li> \n <li>fails to include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content; or</li> \n <li> contains any information regarding contingent fees, and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"Contingent attorneys' fees refers only to those fees charged by attorneys for their legal services. Such fees are not permitted in all types of cases. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client.\" </li> \n <li> contains the language \"no fee unless you win or collect \"or any similar phrase and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"No fee unless you win or collect \"[or insert the similar language used in the communication] refers only to fees charged by the attorney. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client. Contingent fees are not permitted in all types of cases. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A public communication for which a lawyer has given value must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the context that it is such a communication.</li> \n <li>A lawyer retains ultimate responsibility to insure that all communications concerning the lawyer or the lawyer's services comply with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule governs the content of all communications about a lawyer's services, including the various types of advertising permitted by Rules 7.3 through 7.5. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful. \n[2] The prohibition in sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services of statements that may create \"unjustified expectations \"would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances. \nAffirmative Disclosure \n[3] In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally-based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal, and is therefore a preferable form of regulation to absolute bans or other similar restrictions. For example, there is no significant interest in failing to include the name of at least one accountable attorney in all communications promoting the services of a lawyer or law firm as required by sub-paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services. Nor is there any substantial burden imposed as a result of the affirmative disclaimer requirement of sub-paragraph (a)(6) upon a lawyer who wishes to make a claim in the nature of \"no fee unless you win.\"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that affirmative disclosure of a client's liability for costs and expenses of litigation may be required to prevent consumer confusion over the technical distinction between the meaning and effect of the use of such terms as \"fees \"and \"costs \"in an advertisement. \n[4] Certain promotional communications of a lawyer may, as a result of content or circumstance, tend to mislead a consumer to mistakenly believe that the communication is something other than a form of promotional communication for which the lawyer has paid. Examples of such a communication might include advertisements for seminars on legal topics directed to the lay public when such seminars are sponsored by the lawyer, or a newsletter or newspaper column which appears to inform or to educate about the law. Paragraph (b) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services would require affirmative disclosure that a lawyer has given value in order to generate these types of public communications if such is in fact the case. \nAccountability \n[5] Paragraph (c) makes explicit an advertising attorney's ultimate responsibility for all the lawyer's promotional communications and would suggest that review by the lawyer prior to dissemination is advisable if any doubts exist concerning conformity of the end product with these Rules. Although prior review by disciplinary authorities is not required by these Rules, lawyers are certainly encouraged to contact disciplinary authorities prior to authorizing a promotional communication if there are any doubts concerning either an interpretation of these Rules or their application to the communication.</div>","UrlName":"rule145","Order":55,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d2ffbcb-3e31-4917-b9c4-0122fdb5154a","ParentId":"bfbb7abc-4b04-4066-b0d1-fed9bf0dd159","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may advertise through all forms of public media and through written communication not involving personal contact so long as the communication is not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading. By way of illustration, but not limitation, a communication is false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading if it:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;</li> \n <li>is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;</li> \n <li>fails to include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content; or</li> \n <li> contains any information regarding contingent fees, and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"Contingent attorneys' fees refers only to those fees charged by attorneys for their legal services. Such fees are not permitted in all types of cases. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client.\" </li> \n <li> contains the language 'no fee unless you win or collect' or any similar phrase and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"No fee unless you win or collect \"[or insert the similar language used in the communication] refers only to fees charged by the attorney. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client. Contingent fees are not permitted in all types of cases. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A public communication for which a lawyer has given value must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the context that it is such a communication.</li> \n <li>A lawyer retains ultimate responsibility to insure that all communications concerning the lawyer or the lawyer's services comply with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule governs the content of all communications about a lawyer's services, including the various types of advertising permitted by Rules 7.3 through 7.5. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful. \n[2] The prohibition in sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services of statements that may create \"unjustified expectations \"would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances. \nAffirmative Disclosure \n[3] In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally-based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal, and is therefore a preferable form of regulation to absolute bans or other similar restrictions. For example, there is no significant interest in failing to include the name of at least one accountable attorney in all communications promoting the services of a lawyer or law firm as required by sub-paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services. Nor is there any substantial burden imposed as a result of the affirmative disclaimer requirement of sub-paragraph (a)(6) upon a lawyer who wishes to make a claim in the nature of \"no fee unless you win.\"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that affirmative disclosure of a client's liability for costs and expenses of litigation may be required to prevent consumer confusion over the technical distinction between the meaning and effect of the use of such terms as \"fees \"and \"costs \"in an advertisement. \n[4] Certain promotional communications of a lawyer may, as a result of content or circumstance, tend to mislead a consumer to mistakenly believe that the communication is something other than a form of promotional communication for which the lawyer has paid. Examples of such a communication might include advertisements for seminars on legal topics directed to the lay public when such seminars are sponsored by the lawyer, or a newsletter or newspaper column which appears to inform or to educate about the law. Paragraph (b) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services would require affirmative disclosure that a lawyer has given value in order to generate these types of public communications if such is in fact the case. \nAccountability \n[5] Paragraph (c) makes explicit an advertising attorney's ultimate responsibility for all the lawyer's promotional communications and would suggest that review by the lawyer prior to dissemination is advisable if any doubts exist concerning conformity of the end product with these Rules. Although prior review by disciplinary authorities is not required by these Rules, lawyers are certainly encouraged to contact disciplinary authorities prior to authorizing a promotional communication if there are any doubts concerning either an interpretation of these Rules or their application to the communication.</div>","UrlName":"revision272"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e0c4c6e2-31c8-4eaf-b4ba-0568213fc817","Title":"RULE 7.2 ADVERTISING","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical;</li> \n <li>outdoor advertising;</li> \n <li>radio or television;</li> \n <li>written, electronic or recorded communication.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.</li> \n <li> Prominent disclosures.  Any advertisement for legal services directed to potential clients in Georgia, or intended to solicit employment for delivery of any legal services in Georgia, must include prominent disclosures, clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, if written, and clearly intelligible by an average person, if spoken aloud, of the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disclosure of identity and physical location of attorney. Any advertisement shall include the name, physical location and telephone number of each lawyer or law firm who paid for the advertisement and who takes full personal responsibility for the advertisement.  In disclosing the physical location, the responsible lawyer shall state the full address of the location of the principal bona fide office of each lawyer who is prominently identified pursuant to this paragraph.  For the purposes of this Rule, a bona fide office is defined as a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm from which the lawyer or law firm furnishes legal services on a regular and continuing basis. In the absence of a bona fide physical office, the lawyer shall prominently disclose the full address listed with the State Bar of Georgia or other Bar to which the lawyer is admitted.  A lawyer who uses a referral service shall ensure that the service discloses the location of the lawyer's bona fide office, or the registered bar address, when a referral is made.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of referral practice.  If the lawyer or law firm will refer the majority of callers to other attorneys, that fact must be disclosed and the lawyer or law firm must comply with the provisions of Rule 7.3(c) regarding referral services.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of spokespersons and portrayals. Any advertisement that includes a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, portrayal of a client by a non-client, or any paid testimonial or endorsement, shall include prominent disclosure of the use of a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, or of a client by a non-client.</li> \n <li>Disclosures regarding fees. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, which statement shall be available to the client at the time of retainer for any such service.</li> \n <li>Appearance of legal notices or pleadings. Any advertisement that includes any representation that resembles a legal pleading, notice, contract or other legal document shall include prominent disclosure that the document is an advertisement rather than a legal document.</li> \n </ol> \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \n Comment \n \n [1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.\n \n [2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance. \n [3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against \"undignified \"advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. \n [4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation. \n Record of Advertising \n [5] Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule147","Order":56,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"00502313-3b79-42a3-a55c-6c7e9b2d5cc5","ParentId":"e0c4c6e2-31c8-4eaf-b4ba-0568213fc817","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical;</li> \n <li>outdoor advertising;</li> \n <li>radio or television;</li> \n <li>written, electronic or recorded communication.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.</li> \n <li> Prominent disclosures.  Any advertisement for legal services directed to potential clients in Georgia, or intended to solicit employment for delivery of any legal services in Georgia, must include prominent disclosures, clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, if written, and clearly intelligible by an average person, if spoken aloud, of the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disclosure of identity and physical location of attorney. Any advertisement shall include the name, physical location and telephone number of each lawyer or law firm who paid for the advertisement and who takes full personal responsibility for the advertisement.  In disclosing the physical location, the responsible lawyer shall state the full address of the location of the principal bona fide office of each lawyer who is prominently identified pursuant to this paragraph.  For the purposes of this Rule, a bona fide office is defined as a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm from which the lawyer or law firm furnishes legal services on a regular and continuing basis. In the absence of a bona fide physical office, the lawyer shall prominently disclose the full address listed with the State Bar of Georgia or other Bar to which the lawyer is admitted.  A lawyer who uses a referral service shall ensure that the service discloses the location of the lawyer's bona fide office, or the registered bar address, when a referral is made.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of referral practice.  If the lawyer or law firm will refer the majority of callers to other attorneys, that fact must be disclosed and the lawyer or law firm must comply with the provisions of Rule 7.3(c) regarding referral services.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of spokespersons and portrayals. Any advertisement that includes a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, portrayal of a client by a non-client, or any paid testimonial or endorsement, shall include prominent disclosure of the use of a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, or of a client by a non-client.</li> \n <li>Disclosures regarding fees. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, which statement shall be available to the client at the time of retainer for any such service.</li> \n <li>Appearance of legal notices or pleadings. Any advertisement that includes any representation that resembles a legal pleading, notice, contract or other legal document shall include prominent disclosure that the document is an advertisement rather than a legal document.</li> \n </ol> \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \n Comment \n \n [1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.\n \n [2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance. \n [3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against \"undignified \"advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. \n [4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation. \n Record of Advertising \n [5] Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision11"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1b5c4bd6-d92a-4e80-a484-2f534a89761c","Title":"RULE 7.3 DIRECT CONTACT WITH PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS","Content":"<ol><li>A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of the lawyer, the lawyer's firm, lawyer's partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:<ol><li>it has been made known to the lawyer that a person does not desire to receive communications from the lawyer;</li><li>the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence;</li><li>the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication; or</li><li>the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.</li></ol></li><li>Written communications to a prospective client, other than a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes is a former client, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment shall be plainly marked \"Advertisement \"on the face of the envelope and on the top of each page of the written communication in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the letter.</li><li>A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer's employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer's employment by a client; except that the lawyer may pay for public communications permitted by Rule 7.1 and except as follows:<ol><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service, if the service:<ol><li>does not engage in conduct that would violate the Rules if engaged in by a lawyer;</li><li>provides an explanation to the prospective client regarding how the lawyers are selected by the service to participate in the service; and</li><li>discloses to the prospective client how many lawyers are participating in the service and that those lawyers have paid the service a fee to participate in the service.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service, including a fee which is calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter, provided such bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service meets the following criteria:<ol><li>the lawyer referral service shall be operated in the public interest for the purpose of referring prospective clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agencies who can provide the assistance the clients need. Such organization shall file annually with the State Disciplinary Board a report showing its rules and regulations, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating and the names and addresses of the lawyers participating in the service;</li><li>the sponsoring bar association for the lawyer referral service must be open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in this state who maintain an office within the geographical area served, and who meet reasonable objectively determinable experience requirements established by the bar association;</li><li>the combined fees charged by a lawyer and the lawyer referral service to a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges which the client would have paid had no service been involved; and</li><li>a lawyer who is a member of the qualified lawyer referral service must maintain in force a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the use of the lawyer's services, the lawyer's partner or associates services so long as the communications of the organization are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading;</li><li>A lawyer may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment as a private practitioner for the lawyer, a partner or associate through direct personal contact or through live telephone contact, with a nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.</li><li>A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person who seeks to employ the lawyer does so as a result of conduct by any person or organization that would violate these Rules if engaged in by a lawyer.</li></ol>The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.CommentDirect Personal Contact[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in solicitation through direct personal contact by a lawyer of prospective clients known to need legal services. It subjects the lay person to the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a direct interpersonal encounter. A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from the lawyer's own interest, which may color the advice and representation offered the vulnerable prospect.[2] The situation is therefore fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation and overreaching. The potential for abuse inherent in solicitation of prospective clients through personal contact justifies its prohibition, particularly since the direct written contact permitted under paragraph (b) of this Rule offers an alternative means of communicating necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Also included in the prohibited types of personal contact are direct, personal contact through an intermediary and live contact by telephone.Direct Written Solicitation[3] Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule, promotional communication by a lawyer through direct written contact is generally permissible. The public's need to receive information concerning their legal rights and the availability of legal services has been consistently recognized as a basis for permitting direct written communication since this type of communication may often be the best and most effective means of informing. So long as this stream of information flows cleanly, it will be permitted to flow freely.[4] Certain narrowly-drawn restrictions on this type of communication are justified by a substantial state interest in facilitating the public's intelligent selection of counsel, including the restrictions of paragraphs (a) (3) and (a) (4) which proscribe direct mailings to persons such as an injured and hospitalized accident victim or the bereaved family of a deceased.[5] In order to make it clear that the communication is commercial in nature, paragraph (b) requires inclusion of an appropriate affirmative \"advertisement \"disclaimer. Again, the traditional exception for contact with close friends, relatives and former clients is recognized and permits elimination of the disclaimer in direct written contact with these persons.[6] This Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer[7] A lawyer is allowed to pay for communications permitted by these Rules, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency, a prepaid legal services plan or prepaid legal insurance organization may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices.","UrlName":"rule149","Order":57,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"de8287f5-531e-4668-8a96-2fe3b21b971a","ParentId":"1b5c4bd6-d92a-4e80-a484-2f534a89761c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of the lawyer, the lawyer's firm, lawyer's partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>it has been made known to the lawyer that a person does not desire to receive communications from the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence;</li> \n <li>the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Written communications to a prospective client, other than a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes is a former client, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment shall be plainly marked \"Advertisement \"on the face of the envelope and on the top of each page of the written communication in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the letter.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer's employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer's employment by a client; except that the lawyer may pay for public communications permitted by Rule 7.1 and except as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service, if the service:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>does not engage in conduct that would violate the Rules if engaged in by a lawyer;</li> \n <li>provides an explanation to the prospective client regarding how the lawyers are selected by the service to participate in the service; and</li> \n <li>discloses to the prospective client how many lawyers are participating in the service and that those lawyers have paid the service a fee to participate in the service.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/referral-service.cfm/"> bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service </a> , including a fee which is calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter, provided such bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service meets the following criteria:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the lawyer referral service shall be operated in the public interest for the purpose of referring prospective clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agencies who can provide the assistance the clients need. Such organization shall file annually with the State Disciplinary Board a report showing its rules and regulations, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating and the names and addresses of the lawyers participating in the service;</li> \n <li>the sponsoring bar association for the lawyer referral service must be open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in this state who maintain an office within the geographical area served, and who meet reasonable objectively determinable experience requirements established by the bar association;</li> \n <li>the combined fees charged by a lawyer and the lawyer referral service to a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges which the client would have paid had no service been involved; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer who is a member of the qualified lawyer referral service must maintain in force a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the use of the lawyer's services, the lawyer's partner or associates services so long as the communications of the organization are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading;</li> \n <li>A lawyer may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment as a private practitioner for the lawyer, a partner or associate through direct personal contact or through live telephone contact, with a nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person who seeks to employ the lawyer does so as a result of conduct by any person or organization that would violate these Rules if engage in by a lawyer.</li> \n</ol>\nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.\n Comment\n Direct Personal Contact\n[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in solicitation through direct personal contact by a lawyer of prospective clients known to need legal services. It subjects the lay person to the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a direct interpersonal encounter. A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from the lawyer's own interest, which may color the advice and representation offered the vulnerable prospect.\n[2] The situation is therefore fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation and overreaching. The potential for abuse inherent in solicitation of prospective clients through personal contact justifies its prohibition, particularly since the direct written contact permitted under paragraph (b) of this Rule offers an alternative means of communicating necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Also included in the prohibited types of personal contact are direct, personal contact through an intermediary and live contact by telephone.\n Direct Written Solicitation\n[3] Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule, promotional communication by a lawyer through direct written contact is generally permissible. The public's need to receive information concerning their legal rights and the availability of legal services has been consistently recognized as a basis for permitting direct written communication since this type of communication may often be the best and most effective means of informing. So long as this stream of information flows cleanly, it will be permitted to flow freely.\n[4] Certain narrowly-drawn restrictions on this type of communication are justified by a substantial state interest in facilitating the public's intelligent selection of counsel, including the restrictions of paragraphs (a) (3) and (a) (4) which proscribe direct mailings to persons such as an injured and hospitalized accident victim or the bereaved family of a deceased.\n[5] In order to make it clear that the communication is commercial in nature, paragraph (b) requires inclusion of an appropriate affirmative \"advertisement \"disclaimer. Again, the traditional exception for contact with close friends, relatives and former clients is recognized and permits elimination of the disclaimer in direct written contact with these persons.\n[6] This Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.\n Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer\n[7] A lawyer is allowed to pay for communications permitted by these Rules, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency, a prepaid legal services plan or prepaid legal insurance organization may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices.","UrlName":"revision88"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a47de23f-1487-46e7-9b5b-7fb860002ed6","Title":"RULE 7.4 COMMUNICATION OF FIELDS OF PRACTICE","Content":" A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer who is a specialist in a particular field of law by experience, specialized training or education, or is certified by a recognized and bona fide professional entity, may communicate such specialty or certification so long as the statement is not false or misleading. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. \n \n[2] A lawyer may truthfully communicate the fact that the lawyer is a specialist or is certified in a particular field of law by experience or as a result of having been certified as a \"specialist \"by successfully completing a particular program of legal specialization. An example of a proper use of the term would be \"Certified as a Civil Trial Specialist by XYZ Institute \"provided such was in fact the case, such statement would not be false or misleading and provided further that the Civil Trial Specialist program of XYZ Institute is a recognized and bona fide professional entity.","UrlName":"rule151","Order":58,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"839d714d-6690-434e-a388-6b7fdebdcc26","ParentId":"a47de23f-1487-46e7-9b5b-7fb860002ed6","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer who is a specialist in a particular field of law by experience, specialized training or education, or is certified by a recognized and bona fide professional entity, may communicate such specialty or certification so long as the statement is not false or misleading. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. \n \n[2] A lawyer may truthfully communicate the fact that the lawyer is a specialist or is certified in a particular field of law by experience or as a result of having been certified as a \"specialist \"by successfully completing a particular program of legal specialization. An example of a proper use of the term would be \"Certified as a Civil Trial Specialist by XYZ Institute \"provided such was in fact the case, such statement would not be false or misleading and provided further that the Civil Trial Specialist program of XYZ Institute is a recognized and bona fide professional entity. </div>","UrlName":"revision10"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ed01a76-f677-4498-8f1f-892cfa61bcb0","Title":"RULE 7.5 FIRM NAMES AND LETTERHEADS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use a firm name, trade name, letterhead, or other professional designation that is false or misleading.</li> \n <li>A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer holding public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.</li> \n <li>Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] Firm names and letterheads are subject to the general requirement of all advertising that the communication must not be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. Therefore, lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for example, \"Smith and Jones,\"for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law. \n[2] Firm names consisting entirely of the names of deceased or retired partners are permitted and have proven a useful means of identification.</div>","UrlName":"rule153","Order":59,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"77822a2f-afaa-4b47-8b0c-f4f084c47b38","ParentId":"2ed01a76-f677-4498-8f1f-892cfa61bcb0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.</li> \n <li>A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer holding public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.</li> \n <li>Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.</li> \n <li> A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the trade name includes the name of at least one of the lawyers practicing under said name. A law firm name consisting solely of the name or names of deceased or retired members of the firm does not have to include the name of an active member of the firm; and</li> \n <li>the trade name does not imply a connection with a government entity, with a public or charitable legal services organization or any other organization, association or institution or entity, unless there is, in fact, a connection.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] Firm names and letterheads are subject to the general requirement of all advertising that the communication must not be false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading. Therefore, lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for example, \"Smith and Jones,\"for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law. \n [2] Trade names may be used so long as the name includes the name of at least one or more of the lawyers actively practicing with the firm. Firm names consisting entirely of the names of deceased or retired partners have traditionally been permitted and have proven a useful means of identification. Sub-paragraph (e)(1) permits their continued use as an exception to the requirement that a firm name include the name of at least one active member. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision292"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"29e3311e-ee9c-48d1-bec2-87e9e90d46d2","Title":"RULE 8.1 BAR ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY MATTERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware. \n \n[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule. \n \n[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship. </div>","UrlName":"rule154","Order":60,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2ed5246a-3d47-4a8a-b200-3eb31db8b84f","ParentId":"29e3311e-ee9c-48d1-bec2-87e9e90d46d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware. \n \n[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule. \n \n[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship. </div>","UrlName":"revision90"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"50e8e9d0-27d2-4d37-9a3f-bed1bafa6807","Title":"RULE 8.2 JUDICIAL AND LEGAL OFFICIALS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. \n \n[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity. \n \n[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized. </div>","UrlName":"rule155","Order":61,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"580d4c72-d73b-4b11-9658-ba32379d5370","ParentId":"50e8e9d0-27d2-4d37-9a3f-bed1bafa6807","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. \n \n[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity. \n \n[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized. </div>","UrlName":"revision91"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e0444a85-d7c3-49ad-9ba0-20caeac6f2c3","Title":"RULE 8.3 REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should inform the appropriate authority.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they know of a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense. </div>","UrlName":"rule157","Order":62,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"12edb664-0ca8-4634-9280-5510e9fdc82e","ParentId":"e0444a85-d7c3-49ad-9ba0-20caeac6f2c3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should inform the appropriate authority.</li> \n</ol>\n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they know of a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.","UrlName":"revision92"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"747cef32-18d7-4ab9-927e-7587a7e03e5b","Title":"RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a felony;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law;</li> \n <li>engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;</li> \n <li>fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the time appointed in the order or judgment;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>state an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>state an ability to achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable Rules of judicial conduct or other law; or</li> \n <li>commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer has admitted in judicio, the commission of such act.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, conviction shall have the meaning set forth in Rule 1.0 (e).</li> \n <li>The record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings under these disciplinary Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to cause any infringement of the existing inherent right of Georgia Superior Courts to suspend and disbar lawyers from practice based upon a conviction of a crime as specified in paragraphs (a) (1), (a) (2) and (a) (3) above.</li> \n <li>Rule 8.4 (a) (1) does not apply to any of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for which there is no disciplinary penalty.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) through (c) is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevents a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer can not. \n[2] This Rule, as its predecessor, is drawn in terms of acts involving \"moral turpitude \"with, however, a recognition that some such offenses concern matters of personal morality and have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Here the concern is limited to those matters which fall under both the rubric of \"moral turpitude \"and involve underlying conduct relating to the fitness of the lawyer to practice law. \n[3] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving \"moral turpitude.\"That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. \n[4] Reserved. \n[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. \n[6] Persons holding public office assume responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.</div>","UrlName":"rule160","Order":63,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"d0124638-c0d6-45f2-b59e-01153016f645","ParentId":"747cef32-18d7-4ab9-927e-7587a7e03e5b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a felony;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law;</li> \n <li>engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;</li> \n <li>fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the time appointed in the order or judgment;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>state an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>state an ability to achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or</li> \n <li>commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer has admitted in judicio, the commission of such act.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> For purposes of this Rule, conviction shall include any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>a guilty plea;</li> \n <li>a plea of nolo contendere;</li> \n <li>a verdict of guilty; or</li> \n <li>a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings under these disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to cause any infringement of the existing inherent right of Georgia Superior Courts to suspend and disbar lawyers from practice based upon a conviction of a crime as specified in paragraphs (a) (1), (a) (2) and (a) (3) above.</li> \n <li>Rule 8.4 (a) (1) does not apply to any of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for which there is no disciplinary penalty.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) through (c) is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevents a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer can not. \n[2] This Rule, as its predecessor, is drawn in terms of acts involving \"moral turpitude \"with, however, a recognition that some such offenses concern matters of personal morality and have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Here the concern is limited to those matters which fall under both the rubric of \"moral turpitude \"and involve underlying conduct relating to the fitness of the lawyer to practice law. \n[3] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving \"moral turpitude.\"That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. \n[4] Reserved. \n[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. \n[6] Persons holding public office assume responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.</div>","UrlName":"revision393"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bcc5b884-9b3f-4809-99a8-69f9a43fa6bd","Title":"RULE 8.5 DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF LAW","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.</li> \n <li> Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and</li> \n <li>for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n Comment\n Disciplinary Authority\n[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rule 9.4: Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters.\n Choice of Law\n[2] A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.\n[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.\n[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction.\n[5] When a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule.\n[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.\n[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise. ","UrlName":"rule163","Order":64,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f63d4542-aaf7-4886-b136-e8b35b084856","ParentId":"bcc5b884-9b3f-4809-99a8-69f9a43fa6bd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.</li> \n <li> Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and</li> \n <li>for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n Comment \n Disciplinary Authority \n[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rule 9.4: Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters. \n Choice of Law \n[2] A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction. \n[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty. \n[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction. \n[5] When a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule. \n[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules. \n[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise. </div>","UrlName":"revision94"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b3d91ad7-b726-4a79-8425-78f03a16fd09","Title":"RULE 9.1 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Members of the State Bar of Georgia shall, within sixty days, notify the State Bar of Georgia of:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>being admitted to the practice of law in another jurisdiction and the dates of admission;</li> \n <li>being convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law; or</li> \n <li>the imposition of discipline by any jurisdiction other than the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"discipline \"shall include any sanction imposed as the result of conduct that would be in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if occurring in Georgia.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"jurisdiction \"shall include state, federal, territorial and non-United States courts and authorities.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n [1] The State Bar of Georgia is the regulatory authority created by the Supreme Court of Georgia to oversee the practice of law in Georgia. In order to provide effective disciplinary programs, the State Bar of Georgia needs information about its members. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule166","Order":65,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"94b9b094-1aa5-4da2-b836-58f676f1412f","ParentId":"b3d91ad7-b726-4a79-8425-78f03a16fd09","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Members of the State Bar of Georgia shall, within sixty days, notify the State Bar of Georgia of:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>being admitted to the practice of law in another jurisdiction and the dates of admission;</li> \n <li>being convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law; or</li> \n <li>the imposition of discipline by any jurisdiction other than the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"discipline \"shall include any sanction imposed as the result of conduct that would be in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if occurring in Georgia.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"jurisdiction \"shall include state, federal, territorial and non-United States courts and authorities.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n [1] The State Bar of Georgia is the regulatory authority created by the Supreme Court of Georgia to oversee the practice of law in Georgia. In order to provide effective disciplinary programs, the State Bar of Georgia needs information about its members. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision95"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24dd6504-aaff-4eed-9dad-210ffda7f23e","Title":"RULE 9.2 RESTRICTIONS ON FILING DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINTS","Content":" A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement containing a condition that prohibits or restricts a person from filing a disciplinary complaint, or that requires the person to request dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The disciplinary system provides protection to the general public from those lawyers who are not morally fit to practice law. One problem in the past has been the lawyer who settles the civil claim/disciplinary complaint with the injured party on the basis that the injured party not bring a disciplinary complaint or request the dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint. The lawyer is then is free to injure other members of the general public. \n \n[2] To prevent such abuses, this Rule prohibits a lawyer from entering into any agreement containing a condition which prevents a person from filing or pursuing a disciplinary complaint.","UrlName":"rule182","Order":66,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"RULE 9.3 COOPERATION WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY","Content":" During the investigation of a matter pursuant to these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the State Disciplinary Board charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"rule196","Order":67,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"432150ec-fffc-4697-8cb3-1770af2b95e9","ParentId":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"Version 3","Content":" During the investigation of a grievance filed under these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the State Disciplinary Board charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"revision395"},{"Id":"a89fe2f0-d6b3-429a-800e-db4fb74e5464","ParentId":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"Version 2","Content":" During the investigation of a grievance filed under these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the Investigative Panel charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"revision300"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cfbdd4c5-e0f2-431a-b8bb-f0f79a4778d2","Title":"RULE 9.4: JURISDICTION AND RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Jurisdiction. Any lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts committed prior to resignation, suspension, disbarment, or removal from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar of Georgia, or with respect to acts subsequent thereto that amount to the practice of law or constitute a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any Rules or Code subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in lieu thereof, and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer specially admitted by a court of this jurisdiction for a particular proceeding and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this jurisdiction, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li> Reciprocal Discipline. Upon being suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia has been suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, the Office of the General Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. Nothing in this Rule shall prevent a lawyer suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction from filing a Petition for Voluntary Discipline under Rule 4-227.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia has been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall issue a notice to the respondent that shall show the date of the disbarment or suspension in the other jurisdiction and shall include a copy of the order therefor.  The notice shall direct the respondent to show cause to the State Disciplinary Review Board within 30 days from service of the notice why the imposition of substantially similar discipline in this jurisdiction would be unwarranted. The notice shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1, and any response thereto shall be served upon the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li> If neither party objects within 30 days, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall recommend imposition of substantially similar discipline and shall file that recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia within 60 days after the time for the filing of objections expires. The Office of the General Counsel or the respondent may object to imposition of substantially similar discipline by demonstrating that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or</li> \n <li>There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or</li> \n <li>The reason for the original disciplinary status no longer exists; or</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The conduct did not occur within the state of Georgia; and,</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed by the foreign jurisdiction exceeds the level of discipline allowed under these Rules; or</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The discipline would if imposed in identical form be unduly severe or would require action not contemplated by these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n If the State Disciplinary Review Board finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated that any of those elements exist, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall make such other recommendation to the Supreme Court of Georgia as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. </li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board may consider exceptions from either the Office of the General Counsel or the respondent on the grounds enumerated at paragraph (b) (3) of this Rule and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the State Disciplinary Review Board within 30 days of service of the Notice of Reciprocal Discipline. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond. The State Disciplinary Review Board shall file its report and recommendation within 60 days of receiving the response to exceptions.</li> \n <li>In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct, or has been removed from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar of Georgia, shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the removal from practice for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this State.</li> \n <li>Discipline imposed by another jurisdiction but of a lesser nature than disbarment or suspension may be considered in aggravation of discipline in any other disciplinary proceeding.</li> \n <li>For good cause, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board in a reciprocal discipline proceeding may make an interim recommendation to the Supreme Court of Georgia that the respondent be immediately suspended pending final disposition.</li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, the word “jurisdiction” means any State, Territory, country, or federal court.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdiction and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit. Any procedure that so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified. The spectacle of a lawyer disbarred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. \n[2] Reserved. \n[3] The imposition of discipline in one jurisdiction does not mean that Georgia and every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted must necessarily impose discipline. The State Disciplinary Review Board has jurisdiction to recommend reciprocal discipline when a lawyer is suspended or disbarred in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed or otherwise admitted. \n[4] A judicial determination of misconduct by the respondent in another jurisdiction is conclusive, and not subject to re-litigation in the forum jurisdiction. The State Disciplinary Review Board should recommend substantially similar discipline unless it determines, after review limited to the record of the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, that one of the grounds specified in paragraph (b) (3) exists. \n[5] For purposes of this Rule, the suspension or placement of a lawyer on inactive status in another jurisdiction because of want of sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairment of competency as a lawyer shall be considered a disciplinary suspension under the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule203","Order":68,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"d109c0e2-935b-4278-abaf-561b3255d262","ParentId":"cfbdd4c5-e0f2-431a-b8bb-f0f79a4778d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Jurisdiction. Any lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts committed prior to resignation, suspension, disbarment, or removal from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, or with respect to acts subsequent thereto which amount to the practice of law or constitute a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any Rules or Code subsequently adopted by the court in lieu thereof, and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer specially admitted by a court of this jurisdiction for a particular proceeding and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this jurisdiction, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li> Reciprocal Discipline. Upon being suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia has been suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, the Office of General Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. Nothing in the Rule shall prevent a lawyer suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction from filing a petition for voluntary discipline under Rule 4-227.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia has been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall docket the matter and forthwith issue a notice directed to the lawyer containing:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A copy of the order from the other jurisdiction; and</li> \n <li>A notice approved by the Review Panel that the lawyer must inform the Office of General Counsel and the Review Panel, within thirty days from service of the notice, of any claim by the lawyer predicated upon the grounds set forth in paragraph (b)(3) below, that the imposition of the substantially similar discipline in this jurisdiction would be unwarranted and the reasons for that claim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In the event the discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction has been stayed there, any reciprocal discipline imposed in this jurisdiction shall be deferred until the stay expires.</li> \n <li> Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1), the Review Panel shall recommend to the Georgia Supreme Court substantially similar discipline, or removal from practice on the grounds provided in Rule 4-104, unless the Office of General Counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or the Review Panel finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or</li> \n <li>There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or</li> \n <li>The reason for the original disciplinary status no longer exists; or</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the conduct did not occur within the state of Georgia; and,</li> \n <li>the discipline imposed by the foreign jurisdiction exceeds the level of discipline allowed under these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>the discipline would if imposed in identical form be unduly severe or would require action not contemplated by these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n If the Review Panel determines that any of those elements exists, the Review Panel shall make such other recommendation to the Georgia Supreme Court as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. </li> \n <li>The Review Panel may consider exceptions from either the Office of General Counsel or the Respondent on the grounds enumerated at Part (b)(3) of this Rule, and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions in briefs shall be filed with the Review Panel within 30 days from notice of the Notice of Reciprocal Discipline. The responding party shall have 10 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.</li> \n <li>In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct, or has been removed from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the removal from practice for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state.</li> \n <li>Discipline imposed by another jurisdiction but of a lesser nature than disbarment or suspension may be considered in aggravation of discipline in any other disciplinary proceeding.</li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, the word \"jurisdiction \"means any state, territory, country or federal court.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdiction and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit. Any procedure which so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified. The spectacle of a lawyer disbarred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. \n[2] Reserved. \n[3] The imposition of discipline in one jurisdiction does not mean that Georgia and every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted must necessarily impose discipline. The Review Panel has jurisdiction to recommend reciprocal discipline on the basis of public discipline imposed by a jurisdiction in which the respondent is licensed. \n[4] A judicial determination of misconduct by the respondent in another jurisdiction is conclusive, and not subject to relitigation in the forum jurisdiction. The Review Panel should recommend substantially similar discipline unless it determines, after review limited to the record of the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, that one of the grounds specified in paragraph (b)(3) exists. This Rule applies whether or not the respondent is admitted to practice in the foreign jurisdiction. See also, Rule 8.5, Comment [1]. \n[5] For purposes of this Rule, the suspension or placement of a lawyer on inactive status in another jurisdiction because of want of sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairment of competency as an attorney shall be considered a disciplinary suspension under the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"revision96"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ac435e7c-373e-4aac-b77c-d9c71b932185","Title":"RULE 9.5 LAWYER AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is a public official and represents the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, is bound by the provisions of these Rules.</li> \n <li>No provision of these Rules shall be construed to prohibit such a lawyer from taking a legal position adverse to the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, when such action is authorized or required by the U. S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution or statutes of the United States or Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule207","Order":69,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"8327f56a-6a36-4e71-a8ee-520d4acce0f2","ParentId":"ac435e7c-373e-4aac-b77c-d9c71b932185","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is a public official and represents the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, is bound by the provisions of these Rules.</li> \n <li>No provision of these Rules shall be construed to prohibit such a lawyer from taking a legal position adverse to the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, when such action is authorized or required by the U. S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution or statutes of the United States or Georgia.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"revision97"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f92c6b0e-b411-472c-a4b2-770688d9c965","Title":"Rule 4-103. Multiple Violations","Content":"A finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these Rules shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment. A Special Master and the State Disciplinary Review Board may exercise this discretionary power when the question is appropriately before them. Any discipline imposed by another jurisdiction as contemplated by Rule 9.4 may be considered a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of this Rule.","UrlName":"rule92","Order":70,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b080bb20-ecaf-4931-b232-ddbc4336b93c","ParentId":"f92c6b0e-b411-472c-a4b2-770688d9c965","Title":"Version 2","Content":"A finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these rules shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment. The Review Panel may exercise this discretionary power when the question is appropriately before that Panel. Any discipline imposed by another jurisdiction as contemplated by Rule 9.4 may be considered a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of this Rule.","UrlName":"revision156"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"34e1b5c6-65de-45b3-9fcb-e36449fd8f19","Title":"Rule 4-104. Mental Incapacity and Substance Abuse","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Mental illness, cognitive impairment, alcohol abuse, or substance abuse, to the extent of impairing competency as a lawyer, shall constitute grounds for removing a lawyer from the practice of law.</li> \n <li>Upon a determination by the State Disciplinary Board that a lawyer may be impaired or incapacitated to practice law as a result of one of the conditions described in paragraph (a) above, the Board may, in its sole discretion, make a confidential referral of the matter to an appropriate medical or mental health professional for the purposes of evaluation and possible referral to treatment and/or peer support groups. The Board may, in its discretion, defer disciplinary findings and proceedings based upon the impairment or incapacity of a lawyer to afford the lawyer an opportunity to be evaluated and, if necessary, to begin recovery. In such situations the medical or mental health professional shall report to the State Disciplinary Board and the Office of the General Counsel concerning the lawyer’s progress toward recovery. A lawyer’s refusal to cooperate with the medical or mental health professional or to participate in the evaluation or recommended treatment may be grounds for further proceedings under these Rules, including emergency suspension proceedings pursuant to Rule 4-108.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule94","Order":71,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"75437d69-f8ca-4720-8c3b-9f80419a12a6","ParentId":"34e1b5c6-65de-45b3-9fcb-e36449fd8f19","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Want of a sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairing competency as an attorney, when found to exist under the procedure outlined in Part IV, Chapter 2 of these Rules, shall constitute grounds for removing the attorney from the practice of law. Notice of final judgment taking such action shall be given by the Review Panel as provided in Rule 4-220 (a).</li> \n <li>Upon a finding by either panel of the State Disciplinary Board that an attorney may be impaired or incapacitated to practice law due to mental incapacity or substance abuse, that panel may, in its sole discretion, make a confidential referral of the matter to the Lawyer Assistance Program for the purposes of confrontation and referral of the attorney to treatment centers and peer support groups. Either panel may, in its discretion, defer disciplinary findings and proceedings based upon the impairment or incapacitation of an attorney pending attempts by the Lawyer Assistance Program to afford the attorney an opportunity to begin recovery. In such situations the Program shall report to the referring panel and Office of the General Counsel concerning the attorney's progress toward recovery.</li> \n <li>In the event of a finding by the Supreme Court of Georgia that a lawyer is impaired or incapacitated, the Court may refer the matter to the Lawyer Assistance Program, before or after its entry of judgment under Rules 4-219 or 4-220 (a), so that rehabilitative aid may be provided to the impaired or incapacitated attorney. In such situations the Program shall be authorized to report to the Court, either panel of the State Disciplinary Board and Office of the General Counsel concerning the attorney's progress toward recovery.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision98"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ff0cda5f-a0dd-45ec-919a-8d146f2cdde8","Title":"Rule 4-105.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule96","Order":72,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"126fec90-e385-4e6e-b41c-8983b2eb52e3","ParentId":"ff0cda5f-a0dd-45ec-919a-8d146f2cdde8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"When it appears to the Investigative Panel that an attorney's death, incapacity, imprisonment or disappearance poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public, the Investigative Panel shall immediately investigate the matter. If the Investigative Panel determines that such threat exists and that no partner, associate or other appropriate representative is available to prevent the harm, it shall file its findings and recommendation of action in the Supreme Court and shall seek judgment as provided in Rule 4-219.","UrlName":"revision158"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"abdf0431-189b-4f11-885a-f3f34d07a9cd","Title":"Rule 4-106. Conviction of a Crime; Suspension and Disbarment","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of information or evidence that a conviction for any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude has been entered against a lawyer, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall immediately assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number. The Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the appointment of a Special Master to conduct a show cause hearing.</li> \n <li>The petition shall show the date of the conviction and the court in which the conviction was entered, and shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master, pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b).</li> \n <li>The show cause hearing should be held within 15 days after service of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master upon the respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later. Within 30 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file a recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia which may order such discipline as deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li> If the Supreme Court of Georgia orders the respondent suspended pending any appeal, upon the termination of the appeal (or expiration of time for appeal if no appeal is filed) the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Special Master to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the circumstances of the termination of the appeal indicate that the suspended respondent should:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>be disbarred under Rule 8.4; or</li> \n <li>be reinstated; or</li> \n <li>remain suspended pending retrial as a protection to the public; or</li> \n <li> be reinstated while the facts giving rise to the conviction are investigated and, if proper, prosecuted under regular disciplinary procedures in these Rules. \n \n Reports of the Special Master shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, which may order such discipline as deemed appropriate. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, a certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of Rule 8.4 of Rule 4-102 and shall be admissible in proceedings under the disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule98","Order":73,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"94845a10-e432-4de9-a971-72e5476ff7f2","ParentId":"abdf0431-189b-4f11-885a-f3f34d07a9cd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of information or evidence that an attorney has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, whether by verdict, plea of guilty, plea of nolo contendere or imposition of first offender probation, the Office of the General Counsel shall immediately assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number and petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the appointment of a Special Master to conduct a show cause hearing. </li> \n <li>The petition shall show the date of the verdict or plea and the court in which the respondent was convicted, and shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master as provided in Rule 4-209.3 will appoint a Special Master, pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b).</li> \n <li>The show cause hearing should be held within 15 days after service of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master upon the respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later. Within 30 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file a recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia which shall be empowered to order such discipline as deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li> If the Supreme Court of Georgia orders the respondent suspended pending the appeal, upon the termination of the appeal the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Special Master to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the circumstances of the termination of the appeal indicate that the suspended respondent should:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>be disbarred under Rule 8.4; or</li> \n <li>be reinstated; or</li> \n <li>remain suspended pending retrial as a protection to the public; or</li> \n <li> be reinstated while the facts giving rise to the conviction are investigated and, if proper, prosecuted under regular disciplinary procedures in these Rules. \n \n Reports of the Special Master shall be filed with the Review Panel as provided hereafter in Rule 4-217. The Review Panel shall make its findings and recommendation as provided hereafter in Rule 4-218. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, a certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction based upon a verdict, plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere or the imposition of first offender treatment shall be prima facie evidence of an infraction of Rule 8.4 of Rule 4-102 and shall be admissible in proceedings under the disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision99"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b74db3ae-e41e-4815-afa9-c022bf54c69d","Title":"Rule 4-107.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule100","Order":74,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"84aec9fd-5147-4b88-a758-69bf5368c206","ParentId":"b74db3ae-e41e-4815-afa9-c022bf54c69d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision160"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c5d3ee01-67be-4aab-9d78-5754f868543c","Title":"Rule 4-108. Conduct Constituting Threat of Harm to Clients or Public; Emergency Suspension","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that a lawyer's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public and at the direction of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the suspension of the lawyer pending disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing such petition.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall state the evidence justifying the emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the petition for emergency suspension, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall assign the matter a Supreme Court docket number, and shall notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b) to conduct a hearing where the State Bar of Georgia shall show cause why the Respondent should be suspended pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Within 15 days after service of the petition for emergency suspension upon the Respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later, the Special Master shall hold a hearing on the petition for emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>Within 20 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file his or her recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court may suspend the Respondent pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing the emergency suspension, or order such other action as it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule101","Order":75,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"97a13f66-d8f5-43c1-9a93-3a4f221824b7","ParentId":"c5d3ee01-67be-4aab-9d78-5754f868543c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that an Attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public and with the approval of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia and the Chairperson of the Review Panel, or at the direction of the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel, the Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the suspension of the Attorney pending disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing such petition.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall state the evidence justifying the emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the petition for emergency suspension, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall assign the matter a Supreme Court docket number, and shall notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master will appoint a Special Master pursuant to Bar Rule 4-209(b) to conduct a hearing where the State Bar of Georgia shall show cause why the Respondent should be suspended pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Within fifteen days after service of the petition for emergency suspension upon the Respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later, the Special Master shall hold a hearing on the petition for emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>Within twenty days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file his or her recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court sitting en banc may suspend the Respondent pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing the emergency suspension, or order such other action as it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision100"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"79c672d2-4c6e-45fb-bf95-e2929de470cd","Title":"Rule 4-109. Refusal or Failure to Appear for Reprimand; Suspension","Content":"If a respondent fails to appear for imposition of a Confidential Reprimand without just cause, the State Disciplinary Board shall reconsider the matter to determine whether the case should proceed with a public filing pursuant to Bar Rule 4-208 et seq. If a respondent fails to appear before the State Disciplinary Review Board or the Superior Court for imposition of a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand or a Public Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel may file in the Supreme Court of Georgia a motion for suspension of the respondent. A copy of the motion shall be served on the respondent as provided in Bar Rule 4-203.1. The Supreme Court of Georgia may in its discretion, ten days after the filing of the motion, suspend the respondent until such time as the reprimand is administered.","UrlName":"rule102","Order":76,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"91e726c3-f6d1-40ec-acd9-c829a85f798b","ParentId":"79c672d2-4c6e-45fb-bf95-e2929de470cd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Either panel of the State Disciplinary Board based on the knowledge or belief that a respondent has refused, or failed without just cause, to appear in accordance with Bar Rule 4-220 before a panel or the superior court for the administration of a reprimand may file in the Supreme Court a motion for suspension of the respondent. A copy of the motion shall be served on the respondent as provided in Rule 4-203.1. The Supreme Court may in its discretion, ten days after the filing of the motion, suspend the respondent until such time as the reprimand is administered.","UrlName":"revision162"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"09c3ede3-4ff0-48a3-85cb-af3cb15c36e7","Title":"Rule 4-110.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Reserved</div>","UrlName":"rule103","Order":77,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"91566ced-d57e-4de2-9eeb-306da2cc9ab3","ParentId":"09c3ede3-4ff0-48a3-85cb-af3cb15c36e7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Respondent: A person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>Confidential Proceedings: Any proceeding under these Rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Public Proceedings: Any proceeding under these Rules which has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance: An allegation of unethical conduct filed against an attorney.</li> \n <li>Probable Cause: A finding by the Investigative Panel that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Bar Rules.</li> \n <li>Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License: A Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this State. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>He, Him or His: Generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>Attorney: A member of the State Bar of Georgia or one authorized by law to practice law in the State of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Notice of Discipline: A Notice by the Investigative Panel that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision101"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e53aa28d-ec52-41d5-ac81-b51369e3e4e8","Title":"Rule 4-111. Audit for Cause","Content":"Upon receipt of sufficient evidence that a lawyer who practices law in this State poses a threat of harm to his clients or the public, the State Disciplinary Board may conduct an Audit for Cause of the lawyer's trust and escrow accounts with the written approval of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia. Before approval can be granted, the lawyer shall be given notice that approval is being sought and be given an opportunity to appear and be heard. The sufficiency of the notice and opportunity to be heard shall be left to the sole discretion of the persons giving the approval. The State Disciplinary Board must inform the person being audited that the audit is an Audit for Cause.","UrlName":"rule105","Order":78,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"e19654e1-3d52-4091-a048-d45e48c79c8c","ParentId":"e53aa28d-ec52-41d5-ac81-b51369e3e4e8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Upon receipt of sufficient evidence that a lawyer who practices law in this State poses a threat of harm to his clients or the public, the State Disciplinary Board may conduct an Audit for Cause with the written approval of the Chairman of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia. Before approval can be granted, the lawyer shall be given notice that approval is being sought and be given an opportunity to appear and be heard. The sufficiency of the notice and opportunity to be heard shall be left to the sole discretion of the persons giving the approval. The State Disciplinary Board must inform the person being audited that the audit is an Audit for Cause.","UrlName":"revision164"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Title":"CHAPTER 2 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter14","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Rule 4-201. State Disciplinary Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The powers to investigate and discipline lawyers for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors; two nonlawyer members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; and two nonlawyer members appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors. The Court and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Board. No State Disciplinary Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors, whichever appointed the member whose term has expired.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant. </li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work investigating cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule63","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"07f753ca-7fed-4fb2-a326-4be45d9389ca","ParentId":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The powers to investigate and discipline members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct set forth in Bar Rule 4-102 are hereby vested in a State Disciplinary Board and a Consumer Assistance Program. The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of two panels. The first panel shall be the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Investigative Panel). The second panel shall be the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Review Panel). The Consumer Assistance Program shall operate as described in Part XII of these Rules. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Investigative Panel shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the President with the approval of the Board of Governors, and six public members appointed by the Supreme Court to serve as public members of the Panel.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> All members shall be appointed for three-year terms subject to the following exceptions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed;</li> \n <li>ex-officio members shall serve during the term of their office; and shall not increase the quorum requirement; and</li> \n <li>certain initial members as set forth in paragraph (2) below.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>It shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third (1/3) of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually.</li> \n <li>A member may be removed from the Panel pursuant to procedures set by the Panel for failure to attend regular meetings of the Panel. The vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the current President of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel shall annually elect a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, or a vice-chairperson for any subcommittee for which the chairperson is not a member to serve as chairperson for that subcommittee, and such other officers as it may deem proper. The Panel shall meet in its entirety in July of each year to elect a chairperson. At any time the Panel may decide to divide itself into subcommittees or to consolidate after having divided. A majority shall constitute a quorum and a majority of a quorum shall be authorized to act. However, in any matter in which one or more Investigative Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the matter.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel is authorized to organize itself into as many subcommittees as the Panel deems necessary to conduct the expeditious investigation of disciplinary matters referred to it by the Office of General Counsel. However, no subcommittee shall consist of fewer than seven (7) members of the Panel and each such subcommittee shall include at least one (1) of the public members.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The Review Panel shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President, nine (9) members of the State Bar, three (3) from each of the three (3) federal judicial districts of the State appointed as described below, and four (4) public members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The nine (9) members of the Bar from the federal judicial districts shall be appointed for three (3) year terms so that the term of one Panel member from each district will expire each year. The three (3) vacant positions will be filled in odd years by appointment by the President, with the approval of the Board of Governors, and in even years by appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Panel members serving at the time this Rule goes into effect shall continue to serve until their respective terms expire. New Panel members shall be appointed as set forth above.</li> \n <li>Any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed.</li> \n <li>Ex-officio members shall serve during the term or terms of their offices and shall not increase the quorum requirement.</li> \n <li>The Review Panel shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper in July of each year. The presence of six (6) members of the Panel shall constitute a quorum. Four (4) members of the Panel shall be authorized to act except that a recommendation of the Review Panel to suspend or disbar shall require the affirmative vote of at least six (6) members of the Review Panel, with not more than four (4) negative votes. However, in any case in which one or more Review Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum and the number of members necessary to vote affirmatively for disbarment or suspension, shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the case. No recommendation of disbarment or suspension may be made by fewer than four (4) affirmative votes. For the purposes of this Rule the recusal of a member shall have the same effect as disqualification.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision102"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e7e149e7-e023-4ce6-ae8d-3e0cce1b9ceb","Title":"Rule 4-201.1. State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The power to review for error final reports and recommendations of Special Masters in public proceedings arising under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct is hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Review Board shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia; the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President; seven members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia and one at large appointed as described below; and two nonlawyer members appointed as described below. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Review Board. No State Disciplinary Review Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia and the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia (or member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President) shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires in an even-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia for a term of three years; and when the term of appointment of a member expires in an odd-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Review Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Review Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Review Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work reviewing cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule602","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Rule 4-202. Receipt of Grievances; Initial Review by Bar Counsel","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of a Memorandum of Grievance, an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program, or credible information from any source. If the investigation is based upon receipt of credible information, the Office of the General Counsel must first notify the respondent lawyer and provide a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may also deliver the information from any source to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any matter under investigation. The screening process may include forwarding information received to the respondent so that the respondent may respond.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring the respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided in Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a matter, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those matters that do not present sufficient merit to proceed.</li> \n <li>Those matters that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule106","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"4d838131-f92a-4eb5-9a08-5517ba7ed783","ParentId":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Grievances shall be filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. In lieu of a Memorandum of Grievance the Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program. All grievances must include the name of the complainant and must be signed by the complainant.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may investigate conduct upon receipt of credible information from any source after notifying the respondent lawyer and providing a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation. The Office of the General Counsel may deliver the information it obtains to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any grievance. The screening process may include forwarding a copy of the grievance to the respondent in order that the respondent may respond to the grievance.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring a respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided at Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a grievance, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those grievances that do not present sufficient merit to proceed. Rejection of such grievances by the Office of the General Counsel shall not deprive the complaining party of any right of action he might otherwise have at law or in equity against the respondent.</li> \n <li>Those grievances that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision397"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0d18e960-68e3-48cb-bc1b-bb426f81e3a7","Title":"Rule 4-203. Powers and Duties","Content":"In accordance with these Rules, the State Disciplinary Board shall have the following powers and duties:\n(1) to receive and evaluate any and all written grievances against lawyers and to frame such charges and grievances as shall conform to the requirements of these Rules. A copy of the information serving as the basis for investigation or proceedings before the State Disciplinary Board shall be furnished to the respondent by the procedures set forth in Rule 4-203.1;\n(2) to initiate grievances on its own motion, to require additional information from a complainant, where appropriate, and to dismiss and reject matters that seem unjustified, frivolous, or patently unfounded;\n(3) to issue letters of instruction when dismissing a matter;\n(4) to delegate the duties of the State Disciplinary Board enumerated in paragraphs (1), (2), (8), (9), (10), and (11) hereof to the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or such other members as the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair may designate subject to review and approval by the full State Disciplinary Board;\n(5) to conduct Probable Cause investigations, to collect evidence and information concerning matters under investigation, and to certify matters to the Supreme Court of Georgia for hearings by Special Masters as hereinafter provided;\n(6) to prescribe its own Rules of conduct and procedure;\n(7) to receive, investigate, and collect evidence and information, and review and accept or reject Petitions for Voluntary Discipline pursuant to Rule 4-227 (b) (1);\n(8) to sign and enforce, as hereinafter described, subpoenas for the appearance of persons and the production of documents, things and records at investigations both during the screening process and the State Disciplinary Board’s investigation;\n(9) to issue a subpoena as provided in this Rule whenever a subpoena is sought in this State pursuant to the law of another jurisdiction for use in lawyer discipline or disability proceedings, where the issuance of the subpoena has been duly approved under the law of the other jurisdiction. Upon petition for good cause the State Disciplinary Board may compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents in the county where the witness resides or is employed or elsewhere as agreed by the witness. Service of the subpoena shall be as provided in the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Enforcement or challenges to the subpoena shall be as provided at Rule 4-221 (c);\n(10) to extend the time within which a formal complaint may be filed;\n(11) to issue Formal Letters of Admonition and Confidential Reprimands as hereinafter provided;\n(12) to issue a Notice of Discipline providing that unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice, the respondent shall be sanctioned as ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia;\n(13) to refer a lawyer who appears to be impaired for an evaluation by an appropriate medical or mental health professional; and\n(14) to use the staff of the Office of the General Counsel in performing its duties.\n<div></div>\n<div></div>\n","UrlName":"rule108","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7fe7960c-10b9-469c-9f35-a2a95244a2d2","Title":"Rule 4-203.1. Uniform Service Rule","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Lawyers shall inform the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, in writing, of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address on file with the Membership Department in all efforts to contact, communicate with, and perfect service upon a lawyer. The choice of a lawyer to provide only a post office box or commercial equivalent address to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall constitute an election to waive personal service. Notification of a change of address given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the Membership Department shall not satisfy the requirement herein.</li> \n <li> In all matters requiring personal service under Part IV of the Bar Rules, service may be perfected in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Acknowledgment of Service: An acknowledgment of service from the respondent shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li>Written Response from Respondent: A written response from the respondent or respondent’s counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li> In the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent’s counsel, and subject to the provisions of subparagraph (b) (4) below, the respondent shall be served in the following manner: \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>Personal Service: Service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or any other person authorized to serve a summons under the provisions of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, as approved by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or the Chair’s designee. Receipt of a Return of Service Non Est Inventus shall constitute conclusive proof that service cannot be perfected by personal service.</li> \n <li>Service by Publication: If personal service cannot be perfected, or when the respondent has only provided a post office box or commercial equivalent address to the Membership Department and the respondent has not acknowledged service within 10 days of a mailing to respondent’s post office box or commercial equivalent address, service may be accomplished by publication once a week for two weeks in the legal organ of the county of respondent’s address, as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and, contemporaneously with the publication, mailing a copy of the service documents by first class mail to respondent’s address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When it appears from an affidavit made by the Office of the General Counsel that the respondent has departed from the State, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the State, or seeks to avoid the service, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, or the Chair’s designee, may authorize service by publication without the necessity of first attempting personal service. The affidavit made by the Office of the General Counsel must demonstrate recent unsuccessful attempts at personal service upon the respondent regarding other or related disciplinary matters and that such personal service was attempted at respondent’s address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Whenever service of pleadings or other documents subsequent to the original complaint is required or permitted to be made upon a respondent represented by a lawyer, the service shall be made upon the respondent’s lawyer. Service upon the respondent’s lawyer or upon an unrepresented respondent shall be made by hand-delivery or by delivering a copy or mailing a copy to the respondent’s lawyer or to the respondent’s official address on file with the Membership Department, unless the respondent’s lawyer specifies a different address for the lawyer in a filed pleading. As used in this Rule, the term “delivering a copy” means handing it to the respondent’s lawyer or to the respondent, or leaving it at the lawyer’s or respondent’s office with a person of suitable age or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion. Service by mail is complete upon mailing and includes transmission by U.S. Mail, or by a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within three business days, shown by the official postmark or by the commercial carrier’s transmittal form. Proof of service may be made by certificate of a lawyer or of his employee, written admission, affidavit, or other satisfactory proof. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service.\t </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule109","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b41a4675-2b95-426d-9d60-acf01d16b66f","ParentId":"7fe7960c-10b9-469c-9f35-a2a95244a2d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Attorneys authorized to practice law in Georgia shall inform the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, in writing, of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address on file with the Membership Department in all efforts to contact, communicate with, and perfect service upon an attorney. The choice of an attorney to provide only a post office box or equivalent commercial address to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall constitute an election to waive personal service. Notification of a change of address given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the Membership Department shall not satisfy the requirement herein.</li> \n <li> In all matters requiring personal service under Part IV of the Bar Rules, service may be perfected in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Acknowledgment of Service: An acknowledgment of service from the Respondent shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li>Written Response from Respondent: A written response from the Respondent or Respondent's counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li> In the absence of an acknowledgment of service, or a written response from the Respondent or Respondent's counsel, and subject to the provisions of paragraph (4) below, the Respondent shall be served in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>Personal service: Service may be accomplished by the Sheriff, or a Court approved agent for service of process, or any person approved by the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or the Chair's designee. Receipt of a Return of Service Non Est Inventus from the Sheriff or any other person approved for service of the service documents, shall constitute conclusive proof that service cannot be perfected by personal service.</li> \n <li>Service by publication: In the event that personal service cannot be perfected, or when the Respondent has only provided a post office box to the Membership Department and Respondent has not acknowledged service within twenty (20) days of a mailing to Respondent's post office box, service may be accomplished by publication once a week for two weeks in the legal organ of the county of Respondent's address, as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and, contemporaneously with the publication, mailing a copy of the service documents by first class mail to Respondent's address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When it appears from an affidavit made by the Office of General Counsel that the Respondent has departed from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or seeks to avoid the service, the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel, or the chair's designee, may authorize service by publication without the necessity of first attempting personal service. The affidavit made by the Office of General Counsel must demonstrate recent unsuccessful attempts at personal service upon the Respondent regarding other or related disciplinary matters and that such personal service was attempted at Respondent's address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Whenever service of pleadings or other documents subsequent to the original complaint is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is otherwise required by these Rules. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his last known address. As used in this Rule, the term \"delivery of a copy \"means handing it to the attorney or to the party, or leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. Proof of service may be made by certificate of an attorney or of his employee, by written admission, by affidavit, or by other proof satisfactory to the court. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision105"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5e552308-5c15-4eb4-9150-ccc522670691","Title":"Rule 4-204. Investigation and Disposition by State Disciplinary Board-Generally","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> Each matter that presents sufficient merit to proceed may be referred with a Notice of Investigation to the State Disciplinary Board for investigation and disposition in accordance with its Rules. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign a lawyer member of the State Disciplinary Board to be responsible for the investigation. The Office of the General Counsel shall simultaneously assign a staff investigator to assist the State Disciplinary Board member with the investigation. If the investigation of the State Disciplinary Board establishes Probable Cause to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, it shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>issue a Formal Letter of Admonition;</li> \n <li>issue a Confidential Reprimand;</li> \n <li>issue a Notice of Discipline; </li> \n <li>refer the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia for hearing before a Special Master and file a formal complaint with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all as hereinafter provided; or</li> \n <li>refer a respondent for evaluation by an appropriate medical or mental health professional pursuant to Rule 4-104 upon the State Disciplinary Board’s determination that there is cause to believe the lawyer is impaired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n All other cases may be either dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board or referred to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.\n <li>The primary investigation shall be conducted by the member of the State Disciplinary Board responsible for the investigation, assisted by the staff of the Office of the General Counsel, upon request of the State Disciplinary Board member. The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia shall fund the Office of the General Counsel so that the Office of the General Counsel will be able to adequately investigate and prosecute all cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule110","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Rule 4-204.1. Notice of Investigation","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a) is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a);</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the grievance and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule76","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"c017b578-1033-45d1-a54e-20293af130ec","ParentId":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (b) is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (b);</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision399"},{"Id":"1ca382d2-6b2c-4dc8-983d-934b03e898b2","ParentId":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance;</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the grievance and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision325"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"32f62174-44c4-4bf1-8d41-2bcb39bf0f76","Title":"Rule 4-204.2.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule112","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ddd647f-da37-479d-ab5f-9e0d2850e21a","ParentId":"32f62174-44c4-4bf1-8d41-2bcb39bf0f76","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1.","UrlName":"revision166"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ebbb95c7-c350-4c76-8f3f-285d058bc3ac","Title":"Rule 4-204.3. Answer to Notice of Investigation Required","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The respondent shall deliver to the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter a written response under oath to the Notice of Investigation within 30 days of service.</li> \n <li>The written response must address specifically all of the issues set forth in the Notice of Investigation.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter may, in the State Disciplinary Board member’s discretion, grant extensions of time for the respondent’s answer. Any request for extension of time must be made in writing, and the grant of an extension of time must also be in writing. Extensions of time shall not exceed 30 days and should not be routinely granted.</li> \n <li> In cases where the maximum sanction is disbarment or suspension and the respondent fails to properly respond within the time required by these Rules, the Office of the General Counsel may seek authorization from the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to file a motion for interim suspension of the respondent.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>When an investigating member of the State Disciplinary Board notifies the Office of the General Counsel that the respondent has failed to respond and that the respondent should be suspended, the Office of the General Counsel shall, with the approval of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, file a Motion for Interim Suspension of the respondent. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an appropriate order.</li> \n <li>When the State Disciplinary Board member and the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board determine that a respondent who has been suspended for failure to respond has filed an appropriate response and should be reinstated, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a Motion to Lift Interim Suspension. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an appropriate order. The determination that an adequate response has been filed is within the discretion of the investigating State Disciplinary Board member and the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule113","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"45b9c5b6-dd60-41ec-9214-e8964ebb7919","Title":"Rule 4-204.4. Finding of Probable Cause; Referral to Special Master","Content":"In the event the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause of the respondent’s violation of one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, it may refer the matter to the Supreme Court of Georgia by directing the Office of the General Counsel to file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia either:\n(a) A formal complaint, as herein provided, along with a petition for the appointment of a Special Master and a notice of its finding of Probable Cause, within 30 days of the finding of Probable Cause unless the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair grants an extension of time for the filing; or\n(b) A Notice of Discipline pursuant to Rules 4-208.1, 4-208.2 and 4-208.3.","UrlName":"rule114","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d96d2620-410a-4333-950f-3c3cd562c88e","ParentId":"45b9c5b6-dd60-41ec-9214-e8964ebb7919","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In the event the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, finds Probable Cause of the Respondent's violation of one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 or these rules it may refer the matter to the Supreme Court by directing the Office of the General Counsel to file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia either: \n \n    (1) a formal complaint, as herein provided; \n \n    (2) a petition for the appointment of a Special Master; and \n \n    (3) a notice of its finding of Probable Cause.\n The documents specified above shall be filed in duplicate within thirty (30) days of the finding of Probable Cause unless the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, or its Chairperson grants an extension of time for the filing. \n \n(b) A Notice of Discipline in the matter shall thereafter proceed pursuant to Bar Rule 4-208.1, 4-208.2 and 4-208.3.","UrlName":"revision168"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"572c5f31-1365-45f8-a60d-d38d78516aba","Title":"Rule 4-204.5. Letters of Instruction","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> In addition to dismissing a complaint, the State Disciplinary Board may issue a letter of instruction to the respondent upon the following conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to a quorum of the State Disciplinary Board assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; and</li> \n <li> the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent either: \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>has not engaged in conduct that is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules; or</li> \n <li>has engaged in conduct that although technically in violation of such Rules is not reprehensible, and has resulted in no harm or injury to any third person, and is not in violation of the spirit of such Rules; or</li> \n <li>has engaged in conduct in violation of any recognized voluntary creed of professionalism.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A letter of instruction shall not constitute a finding of any disciplinary infraction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule116","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"41c7d017-7599-40ef-b753-1f43ce4c34bd","ParentId":"572c5f31-1365-45f8-a60d-d38d78516aba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In addition to dismissing a complaint, the Investigative Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, may issue a letter of instruction in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n \n    (1) the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to the entire Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; and \n \n    (2) the Investigative Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent either: \n \n        (i) has not engaged in conduct which is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules; or \n \n        (ii) has engaged in conduct that although technically in violation of such rules is not reprehensible, and has resulted in no harm or injury to any third person, and is not in violation of the spirit of such rules; or \n \n        (iii) has engaged in conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of Part III of these rules or any recognized voluntary creed of professionalism; \n \n(b) Letters of instruction shall contain a statement of the conduct of the respondent which may have violated Part III of these rules or the voluntary creed of professionalism. \n \n(c) A letter of instruction shall not constitute a finding of any disciplinary infraction.","UrlName":"revision170"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"77052b66-6315-44fa-adad-251f283e8018","Title":"Rule 4-205. Confidential Discipline; In General","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Disciplinary Board may issue a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to a quorum of the State Disciplinary Board assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting;</li> \n <li>the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent has engaged in conduct that is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules; and</li> \n <li> the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the conduct referred to in paragraph (b) hereof was engaged in:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>inadvertently; or</li> \n <li>purposefully, but in ignorance of the applicable disciplinary rule or rules; or</li> \n <li>under such circumstances that it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that the protection of the public and rehabilitation of the respondent would be best achieved by the issuance of a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand rather than by any other form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule118","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b2ad539d-868b-476a-94ef-263b3350a018","ParentId":"77052b66-6315-44fa-adad-251f283e8018","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In lieu of the imposition of any other discipline, the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Investigative Panel may issue letters of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n \n(a) the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to the entire Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; \n \n(b) the Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent has engaged in conduct which is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules; \n \n(c) the Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the conduct referred to in subpart (b) hereof was engaged in: \n \n    (1) inadvertently; or \n \n    (2) purposefully, but in ignorance of the applicable disciplinary rule or rules; or \n \n    (3) under such circumstances that it is the opinion of the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Investigative Panel that the protection of the public and rehabilitation of the respondent would be best achieved by the issuance of a letter of admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand rather than by any other form of discipline.","UrlName":"revision172"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9c775694-8d7c-4937-8be2-d161f55e3dbd","Title":"Rule 4-206. Confidential Discipline; Contents","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Formal Letters of Admonition and Confidential Reprimands shall contain a statement of the specific conduct of the respondent that violates Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, shall state the name of the complainant, if any, and shall state the reasons for issuance of such confidential discipline.</li> \n <li> A Formal Letter of Admonition shall also contain the following information:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the right of the respondent to reject the Formal Letter of Admonition under Rule 4-207;</li> \n <li>the procedure for rejecting the Formal Letter of Admonition under Rule 4-207; and</li> \n <li>the effect of an accepted Formal Letter of Admonition in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A Confidential Reprimand shall also contain information concerning the effect of the acceptance of such reprimand in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule119","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0b364013-3666-4c0a-907d-bd5bf6941a32","ParentId":"9c775694-8d7c-4937-8be2-d161f55e3dbd","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Letters of formal admonition and Investigative Panel Reprimands shall contain a statement of the specific conduct of the respondent which violates Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules, shall state the name of the complainant and shall state the reasons for issuance of such confidential discipline. \n \n(b) A letter of formal admonition shall also contain the following information: \n \n    (1) the right of the respondent to reject the letter of formal admonition under Rule 4-207; \n \n    (2) the procedure for rejecting the letter of formal admonition under Rule 4-207; and \n \n    (3) the effect of an accepted letter of formal admonition in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline. \n \n(c) An Investigative Panel Reprimand shall also contain information concerning the effect of the acceptance of such reprimand in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline.","UrlName":"revision174"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"973c39ff-b307-4891-bf21-eab08c74c0e4","Title":"Rule 4-207. Letters of Formal Admonition and Confidential Reprimands; Notification and Right of Rejection","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In any case where the State Disciplinary Board votes to impose discipline in the form of a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand, such vote shall constitute the State Disciplinary Board’s finding of Probable Cause. The respondent shall have the right to reject, in writing, the imposition of such discipline.  \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Notification to respondent shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>in the case of a Formal Letter of Admonition, the letter of admonition;</li> \n <li> in the case of a Confidential Reprimand, the letter notifying the respondent to appear for the administration of the reprimand; \n sent to the respondent at his or her address as reflected in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia, via certified mail, return receipt requested. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Rejection by respondent shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>in writing, within 30 days of notification; and</li> \n <li>sent to the State Disciplinary Board via any of the methods authorized under Rule 4-203.1 (c) and directed to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the current headquarters address of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>If the respondent rejects the imposition of a Formal Letter of Admonition or Confidential Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel may file a formal complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia unless the State Disciplinary Board reconsiders its decision.</li> \n <li>Confidential Reprimands shall be administered before the State Disciplinary Board by the Chair or his designee.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule121","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"37680a37-9dc5-4ca1-8e81-0a57628591e8","ParentId":"973c39ff-b307-4891-bf21-eab08c74c0e4","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In any case where the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, votes to impose discipline in the form of a letter of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand, such vote shall constitute the Panel's finding of probable cause. The respondent shall have the right to reject, in writing, the imposition of such discipline. A written rejection shall be deemed an election by the respondent to continue disciplinary proceedings under these rules and shall cause the Investigative Panel to proceed under Rule 4-204.4 \n \n(a) Notification to respondent shall be as follows: \n \n    (1) in the case of letters of formal admonition, the letter of admonition; \n \n    (2) in the case of an Investigative Panel Reprimand, the letter notifying the respondent to appear for the administration of the reprimand; \n \n    (3) sent to the respondent at his address as reflected in State Bar records, via certified mail, return receipt requested. \n \n(b) Rejection by respondent shall be as follows: \n \n    (1) in writing, within thirty days of notification; \n \n    (2) sent to the Investigative Panel via certified mail, return receipt requested, directed to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the current headquarters address of the State Bar. \n \n(c) If the respondent rejects the imposition of a formal admonition or Investigative Panel Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a formal complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within thirty days of receipt of the rejection unless the Investigative Panel or its Chairperson grants an extension of time for the filing of the formal complaint. \n \n(d) Investigative Panel Reprimands shall be administered before the Panel by the Chairperson or his or her designee.","UrlName":"revision176"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1e4711b7-d594-4651-b32d-a487d5feb8aa","Title":"Rule 4-208. Confidential Discipline; Effect in Event of Subsequent Discipline","Content":"In the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of confidential discipline shall be waived and the Office of the General Counsel may use such information as aggravation of discipline.","UrlName":"rule122","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"62bd0945-172f-4d4e-a682-44e53509227b","ParentId":"1e4711b7-d594-4651-b32d-a487d5feb8aa","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An accepted letter of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand shall be considered as a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Bar Rule 4-103. In the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of confidential discipline shall be waived and the Office of the General Counsel may use such information as aggravation of discipline.","UrlName":"revision178"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ca6b3d1-3b2e-45ec-95eb-b055d8b26364","Title":"Rule 4-208.1. Notice of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>In any case where the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause, the State Disciplinary Board may issue a Notice of Discipline requesting that the Supreme Court of Georgia impose any level of public discipline authorized by these Rules.</li> \n <li>Unless the Notice of Discipline is rejected by the respondent as provided in Rule 4-208.3, (1) the respondent shall be in default; (2) the respondent shall have no right to any evidentiary hearing; and (3) the respondent shall be subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia is not bound by the State Disciplinary Board’s recommendation and may impose any level of discipline it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule124","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"79a6bd3c-89d6-4107-9dca-37aa06ce8477","ParentId":"2ca6b3d1-3b2e-45ec-95eb-b055d8b26364","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In any case where the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel finds Probable Cause, the Panel may issue a Notice of Discipline imposing any level of public discipline authorized by these rules. \n \n(b) Unless the Notice of Discipline is rejected by the Respondent as provided in Rule 4-208.3, (1) the Respondent shall be in default; (2) the Respondent shall have no right to any evidentiary hearing; and (3) the Respondent shall be subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by the Supreme Court.","UrlName":"revision180"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Rule 4-208.2. Notice of Discipline; Contents; Service","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Notice of Discipline shall include: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the Rules that the State Disciplinary Board found the respondent violated;</li> \n <li>the allegations of facts that, if unrebutted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated;</li> \n <li>the level of public discipline recommended to be imposed;</li> \n <li>the reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the State Disciplinary Board to be relevant to such recommendation;</li> \n <li>the entire provisions of Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of a Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing the same in the notice;</li> \n <li>a copy of the Memorandum of Grievance or written description pursuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a); and</li> \n <li>a statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the respondent, including confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file documents evidencing service with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the State Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia in subsequent proceedings in the same matter.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule125","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"508b411a-242e-45c5-b595-74262b4b03b4","ParentId":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Notice of Discipline shall include: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the Rules that the State Disciplinary Board found the respondent violated;</li> \n <li>the allegations of facts that, if unrebutted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated;</li> \n <li>the level of public discipline recommended to be imposed;</li> \n <li>the reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the State Disciplinary Board to be relevant to such recommendation;</li> \n <li>the entire provisions of Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of a Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing the same in the notice;</li> \n <li>a copy of the Memorandum of Grievance; and</li> \n <li>a statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the respondent, including confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file documents evidencing service with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the State Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia in subsequent proceedings in the same matter.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision401"},{"Id":"88f1164f-fca6-433a-8c71-f7b662e6027b","ParentId":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Notice of Discipline shall state the following: \n \n    (1) The Rules which the Investigative Panel found that the Respondent violated; \n \n    (2) The facts which, if unrefuted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated; \n \n    (3) The level of public discipline recommended to be imposed; \n \n    (4) The reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the Investigative Panel to be relevant to such recommendation; \n \n    (5) The entire provisions of Bar Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing same in the Notice; \n \n    (6) A copy of the Memorandum of Grievance; and \n \n    (7) A statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the Respondent, including confidential discipline under Bar Rules 4-205 to 4-208. \n \n(b) The original Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(c) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(d) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(e) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(f) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(g) The Office of the General Counsel shall file the documents by which service was accomplished with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(h) The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the Respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"revision182"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"eb93af9b-e8a9-4570-aaf1-d72804590d12","Title":"Rule 4-208.3. Rejection of Notice of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In order to reject the Notice of Discipline, the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel must file a Notice of Rejection of the Notice of Discipline with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within 30 days following service of the Notice of Discipline.</li> \n <li>Any Notice of Rejection by the respondent shall be served upon the opposing party. In accordance with Rule 4-204.3 if the respondent has not previously filed a sworn response to the Notice of Investigation the rejection must include a sworn response in order to be considered valid. The respondent must also file a copy of such written response with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time of filing the Notice of Rejection.</li> \n <li>The timely filing of a Notice of Rejection shall constitute an election for the matter to proceed pursuant to Rule 4-208.4 et seq.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule126","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d6a72f5e-f34f-48ef-a481-3ab6dedd8bc3","ParentId":"eb93af9b-e8a9-4570-aaf1-d72804590d12","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In order to reject the Notice of Discipline the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel must file a Notice of Rejection of the Notice of Discipline with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within 30 days following service of the Notice of Discipline.  \n  \n(b) Any Notice of Rejection by the respondent shall be served by the respondent upon the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Any Notice of Rejection by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia shall be served by the General Counsel upon the respondent. No rejection by the respondent shall be considered valid unless the respondent files a written response as required by Rule 4-204.3 at or before the filing of the rejection. The respondent must also file a copy of such written response with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time of filing the Notice of Rejection. \n \n(c) The timely filing of a Notice of Rejection shall constitute an election for the Coordinating Special Master to appoint a Special Master and the matter shall thereafter proceed pursuant to Rules 4-209 through 4-225.","UrlName":"revision184"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"19154403-0c33-4593-b66b-2a3d173c2038","Title":"Rule 4-208.4. Formal Complaint Following Notice of Rejection of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia a formal complaint and a Petition for Appointment of Special Master within 30 days following the filing of a Notice of Rejection. The Notice of Discipline shall operate as the notice of finding of Probable Cause by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may obtain extensions of time for the filing of the formal complaint from the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or his designee.</li> \n <li>After the rejection of a Notice of Discipline and prior to the time of the filing of the formal complaint, the State Disciplinary Board may reconsider the matter and take appropriate action.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule128","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b5738bbf-cfd8-4488-b84d-1259e2ab4d9a","ParentId":"19154403-0c33-4593-b66b-2a3d173c2038","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Office of the General Counsel shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia a formal complaint and a Petition for Appointment of Special Master within thirty (30) days following the filing of a Notice of Rejection. The Notice of Discipline shall operate as the notice of finding of Probable Cause by the Investigative Panel. \n \n(b) The Office of the General Counsel may obtain extensions of time for the filing of the formal complaint from the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or his or her designee. \n \n(c) After the rejection of a Notice of Discipline and prior to the time of the filing of the formal complaint, the Investigative Panel may consider any new evidence regarding the grievance and take appropriate action.","UrlName":"revision186"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"48246a5f-fb57-45e0-8fdf-4699503baeee","Title":"Rule 4-209. Docketing by Supreme Court; Appointment of Special Master; Challenges to Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon receipt of a notice of finding of Probable Cause, a petition for appointment of a Special Master and a formal complaint, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, give the matter a Supreme Court of Georgia docket number, and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate. In those proceedings where a Notice of Discipline has been filed, the notice of finding of Probable Cause need not be filed.</li> \n <li>Within a reasonable time after receipt of a petition for appointment of a Special Master or notification that a Special Master previously appointed has been disqualified, withdrawn, or is otherwise unable to serve, the Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings in such complaint. The Coordinating Special Master shall select a Special Master from the list approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve the signed Order Appointing Special Master on the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon notification of the appointment of a Special Master, the State Bar of Georgia shall immediately serve the respondent with the order of appointment of a Special Master and with its formal complaint as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li>Within 10 days of service of the notice of appointment of a Special Master, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file any and all objections or challenges either of them may have to the competency, qualifications or impartiality of the Special Master with the Coordinating Special Master. The party filing such objections or challenges must also serve a copy of the objections or challenges upon the opposing party and the Special Master, who may respond to such objections or challenges. Within a reasonable time, the Coordinating Special Master shall consider the challenges and the responses of respondent, the State Bar of Georgia, and the Special Master, if any, determine whether the Special Master is disqualified and notify the parties, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Special Master of the decision. Exceptions to the Coordinating Special Master’s denial of disqualification are subject to review by the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time the record in the matter is filed with the Court pursuant to Rule 4-216 (e). If a Special Master is disqualified, appointment of a successor Special Master shall proceed as provided in this Rule.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule130","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d9980b44-4051-4feb-b4e9-81742f936147","ParentId":"48246a5f-fb57-45e0-8fdf-4699503baeee","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon receipt of a finding of Probable Cause, a petition for appointment of a Special Master and a formal complaint from the Investigative Panel, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate. In those proceedings where a Notice of Discipline has been filed, the finding of Probable Cause need not be filed. \n \n(b) Within a reasonable time after receipt of a petition/motion for appointment of a Special Master or notification that a Special Master previously appointed has been disqualified, the Coordinating Special Master will appoint a Special Master to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings in such complaint. The Coordinating Special Master shall select as Special Masters experienced members of the State Bar of Georgia who possess a reputation in the Bar for ethical practice; \nprovided, that a Special Master may not be appointed to hear a complaint against a Respondent who resides in the same circuit as that in which the Special Master resides.\n (c) Upon being advised of appointment of a Special Master by the Coordinating Special Master, the Clerk of the Court shall return the original Notice of Discipline, rejection of Notice of Discipline, if applicable, formal complaint, Probable Cause finding, petition for appointment of Special Master and the signed order thereon to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon notification of the appointment of a Special Master, the Office of the General Counsel shall immediately serve the Respondent with the order of appointment of a Special Master and with its formal complaint as hereinafter provided. \n \n(d) Within ten days of service of the notice of appointment of a Special Master, the Respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall lodge any and all objections or challenges they may have to the competency, qualifications or impartiality of the Special Master with the chairperson of the Review Panel. The party filing such objections or challenges must also serve a copy of the objections or challenges upon the opposing counsel, the Coordinating Special Master and the \nSpecial Master, who may respond to such objections or challenges. Within a reasonable time the chairperson of the Review Panel shall consider the challenges, the responses of Respondent, the State Bar of Georgia, the Coordinating Special Master and the Special Master, if any, determine whether the Special Master is disqualified and notify the parties, the Coordinating Special Master and the Special Master of the chairperson’s decision. Exceptions to the chairperson’s \ndenial of disqualification are subject to review by the entire Review Panel and, thereafter, by the Supreme Court of Georgia when exceptions arising during the evidentiary hearing and exceptions to the report of the Special Master and the Review Panel are properly before the Court. In the event of disqualification of a Special Master by the chairperson of the Review Panel, said chairperson shall notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Coordinating Special \nMaster, the Special Master, the State Bar of Georgia and the Respondent of the disqualification and appointment of a successor Special Master shall proceed as provided in this rule.","UrlName":"revision188"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"dc2ddd92-ce46-4035-ba0d-7f2c51a8b20a","Title":"Rule 4-209.1. Coordinating Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia shall appoint a lawyer to serve as the Coordinating Special Master for disciplinary cases.</li> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia annually shall appoint up to 20 lawyers to serve as Special Masters in disciplinary cases. The Court may reappoint lawyers appointed in prior years, although it generally is preferable for a lawyer to serve as a Special Master for no more than five consecutive years. When a case is assigned to a lawyer appointed as Special Master, such lawyer shall continue to serve as Special Master in that case until final disposition, unless the Coordinating Special Master or the Court directs otherwise, irrespective of whether such lawyer is reappointed to serve as Special Master for another year.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master and Special Masters shall serve at the pleasure of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>No member of the State Disciplinary Board, State Disciplinary Review Board, Special Master Compensation Commission, or Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia shall be appointed to serve as Coordinating Special Master or as a Special Master.</li> \n <li>A list of the lawyers appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia as Special Masters shall be published on the website of the State Bar of Georgia and annually in a regular publication of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Training for Special Masters is expected, and the Coordinating Special Master shall be responsible for the planning and conduct of training sessions, which the State Bar of Georgia shall make available without cost to Special Masters. At a minimum, a lawyer appointed for the first time as a Special Master should attend a training session within six months of his appointment. The failure of a Special Master to complete the minimum required training session shall not be a basis for a motion to disqualify a Special Master. </li> \n <li>A Special Master (including the Coordinating Special Master) shall be disqualified to serve in a disciplinary case when circumstances exist, which, if the Special Master were a judge, would require the recusal of the Special Master under the Code of Judicial Conduct. In the event that the Coordinating Special Master is disqualified in any case, the Supreme Court of Georgia shall assign the case to a Special Master, and the Court shall designate another Special Master to act as Coordinating Special Master for purposes of that case only.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule131","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"accca273-ede6-4400-a09c-a04bdad8ddcb","ParentId":"dc2ddd92-ce46-4035-ba0d-7f2c51a8b20a","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The appointment of and the determination of the compensation of the Coordinating Special Master shall be the duty of the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. The Commission shall be comprised of the second, third and fourth immediate past presidents of the State Bar of Georgia. If any of the above named ex officio individuals should be unable to serve, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(b) The Coordinating Special Master shall be selected by the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission, with the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Coordinating Special Master shall serve as an independent contractor at the pleasure of the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. \n \n(c) The Coordinating Special Master shall be compensated by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds of the State Bar of Georgia in an amount specified by the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. The Coordinating Special Master’s compensation shall be approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia. On or before the first day of each calendar year, the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission shall submit to the Supreme Court of Georgia for approval the hourly rate to be paid to the Coordinating Special Master during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year, which rate shall continue until the conclusion of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(d) The Coordinating Special Master shall have such office space, furniture and equipment and may incur such operating expenses in such amounts as may be specified by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Such amounts shall be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds. On or before the first day of each calendar year, the Supreme Court of Georgia will set the amount to be paid for the above items during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year.\n(e) If the Coordinating Special Master position is vacant or the Coordinating Special Master has recused or been disqualified from a particular matter, the Supreme Court of Georgia may appoint a temporary Acting Coordinating Special Master to act until the position can be filled or to act in any particular matter.","UrlName":"revision190"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4f566031-7216-473f-aa71-81ad232243b7","Title":"Rule 4-209.2. Special Masters","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master and the Special Masters shall be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating fund at rates to be set by the Supreme Court of Georgia, which the Court may adjust from time to time.</li> \n <li>To advise the Supreme Court of Georgia with respect to the compensation of the Coordinating Special Master and Special Masters, the Court shall appoint a Special Master Compensation Commission, which shall consist of the current Treasurer of the State Bar of Georgia; the second, third, and fourth immediate past presidents of the State Bar of Georgia, unless any such past president should decline to serve; and such other persons as the Court may designate. The Commission shall make annual recommendations to the Court about the rate to be paid to the Coordinating Special Master and the rate to be paid to the Special Masters, and the Commission shall report such recommendations to the Court no later than January 1 of each year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule133","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"1ee12620-f5ee-4b93-beee-f813133bd44c","ParentId":"4f566031-7216-473f-aa71-81ad232243b7","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The Coordinating Special Master, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia, shall select and maintain a limited pool of qualified lawyers to serve as Special Masters for the State Disciplinary Board and Hearing Officers for the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants pursuant to Part A, Section 8 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia. The names of those so selected shall be placed on a list maintained by the Coordinating Special Master. Said list shall be published annually in a regular State Bar of Georgia publication. Although not mandatory, it is preferable that a lawyer so selected shall only remain on such list for five years, so that the term may generally be considered to be five years. Any lawyer whose name is removed from such list shall be eligible to be selected and placed on the list at any subsequent time.\n (b) Training for Special Masters and Hearing Officers is expected, subject to the terms of this Rule, and shall consist of one training session within twelve months after selection. The Special Master and Hearing Officer training shall be planned and conducted by the Coordinating Special Master. Special Masters and Hearing Officers who fail to attend such a minimum training session shall periodically be removed from consideration for appointment in future cases. Failure to attend such a training session shall not be the basis for a disqualification of any Special Master or Hearing Officer; as such qualifications shall remain in the sole discretion of the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(c) The Special Masters may be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds on a per case rate to be set by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Hearing Officers may be paid pursuant to Part A, Section 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia.\n(d) On or before the first day of March of each calendar year, the Supreme Court of Georgia may set the amount to be paid to the Special Masters during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year, which rate shall continue until the conclusion of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"revision192"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3ee26eaa-e752-484a-bf5e-9e65269cc3eb","Title":"Rule 4-209.3 Powers and Duties of the Coordinating Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Coordinating Special Master shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to establish requirements for, conduct, and supervise Special Master training;</li> \n <li>to assign cases to Special Masters from the list provided in Rule 4-209 (b);</li> \n <li>to exercise all of the powers and duties provided in Rule 4-210 when acting as a Special Master under paragraph (h) below;</li> \n <li>to monitor and evaluate the performance of Special Masters and to submit a report to the Supreme Court of Georgia regarding such performance annually;</li> \n <li>to remove Special Masters for such cause as may be deemed proper by the Coordinating Special Master;</li> \n <li>to fill all vacancies occasioned by incapacity, disqualification, recusal, or removal;</li> \n <li>to administer Special Master compensation, as provided in Rule 4-209.2 (b);</li> \n <li>to hear pretrial motions when no Special Master is serving; </li> \n <li>to perform all other administrative duties necessary for an efficient and effective hearing system;</li> \n <li>to allow a late filing of the respondent’s answer where there has been no final selection of a Special Master within 30 days of service of the formal complaint upon the respondent;</li> \n <li>to receive and pass upon challenges and objections to the appointment of Special Masters; and</li> \n <li>to extend the time for a Special Master to file a report, in accordance with Rule 4-214 (a).</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule552","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"eefc4188-d502-482d-91a8-d54da3e49a16","ParentId":"3ee26eaa-e752-484a-bf5e-9e65269cc3eb","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Coordinating Special Master shall have the following powers and duties:\n (1) to establish requirements for and supervise Special Master and Hearing Officer training; \n \n (2) to assign cases to Special Masters and Hearing Officers from the pool provided in Bar Rule 4-209 (b); \n \n (3) to exercise all of the powers and duties provided in Bar Rule 4-210 when acting as a Special Master under subparagraph (8) below; \n \n (4) to monitor and evaluate the performance of Special Masters and Hearing Officers; \n \n (5) to remove Special Masters and Hearing Officers for such cause as may be deemed proper by the Coordinating Special Master; \n \n (6) to fill all vacancies occasioned by incapacity, disqualification, recusal or removal; \n \n (7) to administer Special Master and Hearing Officer compensation, if authorized as provided in Bar Rule 4-209.2 or Part A, Section 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia; \n \n (8) to hear pretrial motions when no Special Master has been assigned; and \n \n(9) to perform all other administrative duties necessary for an efficient and effective hearing system.","UrlName":"revision194"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cf41204d-18f9-4302-801c-b3cfeb38cd2d","Title":"Rule 4-210. Powers and Duties of Special Masters","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In accordance with these Rules a duly appointed Special Master shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to exercise general supervision over assigned disciplinary proceedings, including emergency suspension cases as provided in Rule 4-108, and to perform all duties specifically enumerated in these Rules;</li> \n <li>to rule on all questions concerning the sufficiency of the formal complaint;</li> \n <li>to encourage negotiations between the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent, whether at a pretrial meeting set by the Special Master or at any other time;</li> \n <li>to receive and evaluate any Petition for Voluntary Discipline filed after the filing of a formal complaint;</li> \n <li>to grant continuances and to extend any time limit provided for herein as to any pending matter subject to Rule 4-214 (a);</li> \n <li>to apply to the Coordinating Special Master for leave to withdraw and for the appointment of a successor in the event that he becomes incapacitated or otherwise unable to perform his duties;</li> \n <li>to hear, determine and consolidate action on the complaints, where there are multiple complaints against a respondent growing out of different transactions, whether they involve one or more complainants, and to make recommendations on each complaint as constituting a separate offense;</li> \n <li>to sign subpoenas and to exercise the powers described in Rule 4-221 (c);</li> \n <li>to preside over evidentiary hearings and to decide questions of law and fact raised during such hearings;</li> \n <li>to make findings of fact and conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline as hereinafter provided and to submit his findings for consideration by the Supreme Court of Georgia in accordance with Rule 4-214;</li> \n <li>to exercise general supervision over discovery by parties to disciplinary proceedings and to conduct such hearings and sign all appropriate pleadings and orders pertaining to such discovery as are provided for by the law of Georgia applicable to discovery in civil cases; and</li> \n <li>in disciplinary cases, to make a recommendation of discipline, and in emergency suspension cases a recommendation as to whether the respondent should be suspended pending further disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule134","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"63d9ed19-1843-48c9-8df6-230c3b31f099","ParentId":"cf41204d-18f9-4302-801c-b3cfeb38cd2d","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In accordance with these Rules a duly appointed Special Master or Hearing Officer shall have the following powers and duties: \n \n(1) to exercise general supervision over assigned disciplinary proceedings and to perform all duties specifically enumerated in these Rules; \n \n(2) to rule on all questions concerning the sufficiency of the formal complaint;\n(3) to conduct the negotiations between the State Bar of Georgia and the Respondent, whether at a pretrial meeting set by the Special Master or at any other time;\n (4) to receive and evaluate any Petition for Voluntary Discipline; \n \n(5) to grant continuances and to extend any time limit provided for herein as to any pending matter; \n \n(6) to apply to the Coordinating Special Master for leave to withdraw and for the appointment of a successor in the event that he or she becomes incapacitated to perform his or her duties or in the event that he or she learns that he or she and the Respondent reside in the same circuit; \n \n(7) to hear, determine and consolidate action on the complaints, where there are multiple complaints against a Respondent growing out of different transactions, whether they involve one or more complainants, and may proceed to make recommendations on each complaint as constituting a separate offense;\n(8) to sign subpoenas and exercise the powers described in Bar Rule 4-221(b);\n (9) to preside over evidentiary hearings and to decide questions of law and fact raised during such hearings; \n \n(10) to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter provided and to submit his or her findings for consideration by the Review Panel; \n \n(11) to exercise general supervision over discovery by parties to disciplinary proceedings and to conduct such hearings and sign all appropriate pleadings and orders pertaining to such discovery as are provided for by the law of Georgia applicable to discovery in civil cases;\n(12) in disciplinary cases, to make a recommendation of discipline, and in emergency suspension cases a recommendation as to whether the Respondent should be suspended pending further disciplinary proceedings; and\n(13) to conduct and exercise general supervision over hearings for the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants and to make written findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to Part A, Section 8 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia.","UrlName":"revision196"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ee826a71-c151-48fe-8edb-41abef22de27","Title":"Rule 4-211. Formal Complaint; Service","Content":"<ol> \n <li>Within 30 days after a finding of Probable Cause, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a formal complaint that specifies with reasonable particularity the acts complained of and the grounds for disciplinary action. A copy of the formal complaint shall be served upon the respondent after appointment of a Special Master. In those cases where a Notice of Discipline has been filed and rejected, the filing of the formal complaint shall be governed by the time period set forth in Rule 4-208.4. The formal complaint shall be served pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>At all stages of the proceeding, both the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may be represented by counsel. Counsel representing the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to prepare and sign notices, pleadings, motions, complaints, and certificates for and in behalf of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"rule136","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0d430cfa-e7d7-4ab5-a7e2-f1ec9bc56986","ParentId":"ee826a71-c151-48fe-8edb-41abef22de27","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Within thirty days after a finding of Probable Cause, a formal complaint shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel which shall specify with reasonable particularity the acts complained of and the grounds for disciplinary action. A formal complaint shall include the names and addresses of witnesses so far as then known. A copy of the formal complaint shall be served upon the Respondent after appointment of a Special Master by the Coordinating Special \nMaster. In those cases where a Notice of Discipline has been filed and rejected, the filing of the formal complaint shall be governed by the time period set forth in Bar Rule 4-208.4. The formal complaint shall be served pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(b) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(c) At all stages of the proceeding, both the Respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may be represented by counsel. Counsel representing the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to prepare and sign notices, pleadings, motions, complaints, and certificates for and in behalf of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Disciplinary Board.","UrlName":"revision198"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"86e94ba5-a26d-40bd-9bdd-9920d0e0e1a3","Title":"Rule 4-211.1 Dismissal after Formal Complaint","Content":"At any time after the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause, the Office of the General Counsel may dismiss the proceeding with the consent of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or with the consent of any three members of the State Disciplinary Board.","UrlName":"rule138","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"36e51b06-b1bc-48ca-a8b7-8e019fc1c829","ParentId":"86e94ba5-a26d-40bd-9bdd-9920d0e0e1a3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"At any time after the Investigative Panel finds probable cause, the Office of General Counsel may dismiss the proceeding with the consent of the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or with the consent of any three members of the Investigative Panel.","UrlName":"revision200"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d3caa485-b0cd-4823-9271-428068980047","Title":"Rule 4-212. Answer of Respondent; Discovery","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The respondent shall file and serve his answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-221 (b) within 30 days after service of the formal complaint. If the respondent fails to answer or to obtain an extension of time for his answer, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint shall be deemed admitted. In the event the respondent’s answer fails to address specifically the issues raised in the formal complaint, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint and not specifically addressed in the answer shall be deemed admitted. A respondent may obtain an extension of time not to exceed 15 days to file the answer from the Special Master. Extensions of time for the filing of an answer shall not be routinely granted.</li> \n <li>The pendency of objections or challenges to one or more Special Masters shall provide no justification for a respondent’s failure to file his answer or for failure of the State Bar of Georgia or the respondent to engage in discovery.</li> \n <li>Both parties to the disciplinary proceeding may engage in discovery under the rules of practice and procedure then applicable to civil cases in the State of Georgia.</li> \n <li>In lieu of filing an answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar of Georgia, the respondent may submit to the Special Master a Petition for Voluntary Discipline as provided in Rule 4-227 (c). Each such petition shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. As provided in Rule 4-227 (c) (1), the Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule117","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"415ec974-0089-4913-a142-be55ce96b55a","ParentId":"d3caa485-b0cd-4823-9271-428068980047","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The respondent shall serve his or her answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar within thirty days after service of the formal complaint. In the event that respondent fails to answer or to obtain an extension of time for his answer, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint shall be deemed admitted. In the event the respondent's answer fails to address specifically the issues raised in the formal complaint, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint and not specifically addressed in the answer shall be deemed admitted. A respondent may obtain an extension of time not to exceed fifteen days to file the answer from the special master, or, when a challenge to the special master is pending, from the chairperson of the Review Panel. Extensions of time for the filing of an answer shall not be routinely granted. \n \n(b) The pendency of objections or challenges to one or more special masters shall provide no justification for a respondent's failure to file his answer or for failure of the State Bar or the respondent to engage in discovery. \n \n(c) Both parties to the disciplinary proceeding may engage in discovery under the rules of practice and procedure then applicable to civil cases in the State of Georgia. \n \n(d) In lieu of filing an answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar, the respondent may submit to the special master a Petition for Voluntary Discipline; provided, however, that each such petition shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. As provided in Rule 4-210(d), the special master may solicit a response to such petition from Bar counsel.","UrlName":"revision202"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"8127673b-ac9f-4f79-8fcb-17a808c4feba","Title":"Rule 4-213. Evidentiary Hearing","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Within 90 days after the filing of respondent’s answer to the formal complaint or the expiration of the time for filing of the answer, whichever is later, the Special Master shall proceed to hear the case. The evidentiary hearing shall be reported and transcribed at the expense of the State Bar of Georgia. When the hearing is complete, the Special Master shall proceed to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline and file a report with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards as hereinafter provided. Alleged errors in the hearing may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia when the findings and recommendations of discipline are filed with the Court. There shall be no interlocutory appeal of alleged errors in the hearing.</li> \n <li>Upon respondent’s showing of necessity and financial inability to pay for a copy of the transcript, the Special Master shall order the State Bar of Georgia to purchase a copy of the transcript for respondent.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule127","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"e7e60296-f99b-46a6-86f6-e4f2818f7cb5","ParentId":"8127673b-ac9f-4f79-8fcb-17a808c4feba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Within 90 days after the filing of respondent's answer to the formal complaint or the time for filing of the answer, whichever is later, the Special Master shall proceed to hear the case. The evidentiary hearing shall be reported and transcribed at the expense of the State Bar of Georiga. When the hearing is complete, the Special Master shall proceed to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline and file a report with the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia as hereinafter provided. Alleged errors in the trial may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia when the findings and recommendations of discipline of the Review Panel are filed with the Court. There shall be no direct appeal from such proceedings of the Special Master. \n \n(b) Upon respondent's showing of necessity and financial inability to pay for a copy of the transcript, the Special Master shall order the State Bar of Georgia to purchase a copy of the transcript for respondent.","UrlName":"revision204"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9622baf4-fd64-4aec-bb7f-b587c58b1dbd","Title":"Rule 4-214. Report of the Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Unless the Coordinating Special Master extends the deadline for good cause, the Special Master shall prepare a report within 45 days from receipt of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing. Failure of the Special Master to issue the report within 45 days shall not be grounds for dismissal. The report shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>findings of fact on the issues raised by the formal complaint;</li> \n <li>conclusions of law on the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties; and</li> \n <li>a recommendation of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Special Master shall file his or her original report and recommendation with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards and shall serve a copy on the respondent and counsel for the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall file the original record in the case directly with the Supreme Court of Georgia, unless any party files with the Clerk a request for review by the State Disciplinary Review Board and exceptions to the report within 30 days of the date the report is filed as provided in Rule 4-216 et seq. The Clerk shall inform the State Disciplinary Review Board when a request for review and exceptions are filed.</li> \n <li>In the event any party requests review, the responding party shall file a response to the exceptions within 30 days of the filing. Within 10 days after the receipt of a response or the expiration of the time for responding, the Clerk shall transmit the record in the case to the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule53","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"1c0dc62c-cf9e-4ece-9e50-bbc3f2e76594","ParentId":"9622baf4-fd64-4aec-bb7f-b587c58b1dbd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Rule 4-214. This rule is reserved. ","UrlName":"revision206"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"943ffb9b-7630-4dd3-a8fe-4b6b6c0d12da","Title":"Rule 4-215. Powers and Duties of the State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In accordance with these Rules, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to review reports of Special Masters, and to recommend to the Supreme Court of Georgia the imposition of punishment and discipline or dismissal of the complaint;</li> \n <li>to adopt forms for notices and any other written instruments necessary or desirable under these Rules;</li> \n <li>to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure; </li> \n <li>to receive Notice of Reciprocal Discipline and to recommend to the Supreme Court of Georgia the imposition of punishment and discipline pursuant to Bar Rule 9.4 (b) (3); and</li> \n <li>to administer State Disciplinary Review Board reprimands.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule137","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b62dff75-584a-4a6e-969c-ffe4dd865ff7","ParentId":"943ffb9b-7630-4dd3-a8fe-4b6b6c0d12da","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision208"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"137e355a-d385-4b45-ae79-6a737d44c0c1","Title":"Rule 4-216. Proceedings Before the State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon receipt of the record and exceptions to the report of the Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-214, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall consider the record, review findings of fact and conclusions of law, and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court of Georgia and the nature of such recommended discipline. The findings of fact made by a Special Master may be reversed if the State Disciplinary Review Board finds them to be clearly erroneous or manifestly in error. Conclusions of law and determinations of appropriate sanctions shall be reviewed de novo.</li> \n <li>The respondent shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Review Board considering the case under a procedure as provided for in the Rules of the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li>There shall be no de novo hearing before the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board may consider exceptions to the report of the Special Master and may in its discretion grant oral argument if requested by any party within 15 days of transmission of the record and exceptions to the State Disciplinary Review Board. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards, in accordance with Rule 4-214. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.</li> \n <li>Within 90 days after receipt of the record including any exceptions to the report of the Special Master and responses thereto the State Disciplinary Review Board shall file its report with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. The 90-day deadline may be extended by agreement of the parties or with the consent of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board for good cause shown. A copy of the State Disciplinary Review Board’s report shall be served upon the respondent, and the Clerk shall file the record in the case with the Supreme Court of Georgia within 10 days after the report is filed. If no report is filed by the State Disciplinary Review Board within 90 days of receipt by it of the record and no extension is granted, the Clerk shall file the original record in the case with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the case shall be considered by the Court on the record.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule143","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"75367abc-39d4-4199-b939-3f62e23582eb","ParentId":"137e355a-d385-4b45-ae79-6a737d44c0c1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision210"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"662bb234-462b-4dfa-8aa7-6a1370a125b9","Title":"Rule 4-217.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule146","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"e1472412-4b90-4b6b-bec0-aea3970475d9","ParentId":"662bb234-462b-4dfa-8aa7-6a1370a125b9","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Within 30 days from receipt of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing, the Special Master shall prepare a report which shall contain the following:\n(1) findings of fact on the issues raised by the formal complaint, and\n(2) conclusions of law on the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties; and\n(3) a recommendation of discipline.\n (b) The Special Master shall file his or her original report and recommendation with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board and shall serve a copy on the respondent and counsel for the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(c) Thirty days after the Special Master's report and recommendation is filed, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board  shall file the original record in the case directly with the Supreme Court of Georgia unless either party requests review by the Review Panel as provided in paragraph (d) of this Rule. In the event neither party requests review by the Review Panel and the matter goes directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, both parties shall be deemed to have waived any right they may have under the Rules to file exceptions with or make request for oral argument to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Any review undertaken by the Supreme Court of Georgia shall be solely on the original record. \n \n(d) Upon receipt of the Special Master’s report and recommendation, either party may request review by the Review Panel as provided in Rule 4-218. Such party shall file the request and exceptions with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with Rule 4-221 (f) and serve them on the opposing party within 30 days after the Special Master's report is filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. Upon receipt of a timely written request and exceptions, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall prepare and file the record and report with the Review Panel. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.","UrlName":"revision212"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a0d831a8-8c52-4efe-9000-b94fc429538b","Title":"Rule 4-218. Judgments","Content":"After the Special Master's report and any report of the State Disciplinary Review Board are filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file with the Court any written exceptions, supported by written argument, either may have to the reports. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Court within 30 days of the date that the record is filed with the Court and a copy served upon the opposing party. The responding party shall have an additional 30 days to file a response with the Court. The Court may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by a party to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court will promptly consider the report of the Special Master, any report of the State Disciplinary Review Board, any exceptions, and any responses filed by any party to such exceptions, and enter judgment upon the formal complaint. A copy of the Court’s judgment shall be transmitted to the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent by the Court.","UrlName":"rule148","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"89aa92fa-6cc4-46c8-b9ae-8d02469a53d1","ParentId":"a0d831a8-8c52-4efe-9000-b94fc429538b","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon receipt of the report from a Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-217(d), the Review Panel shall consider the record, make findings of fact and conclusions of law and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court and the nature of such recommended discipline. The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a Special Master shall not be binding on the Panel and may be reversed by it on the basis of the record submitted to the Panel by the Special Master. \n \n(b) The Respondent shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any member of the Review Panel considering the case against him under a procedure as provided for in the rules of the Panel. \n \n(c) There shall be no de novo hearing before the Review Panel except by unanimous consent of the Panel. \n \n(d) The Review Panel may grant rehearings, or new trials, for such reasons, in such manner, on such issues and within such times as the ends of justice may require. \n \n(e) The Review Panel may consider exceptions to the report of the special master and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with Bar Rules 4-217(d) and 4-221(f). The responding party shall have ten (10) days after service of the exceptions within which to respond. \n \n(f) The Review Panel shall file its report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. A copy of the Panel's report shall be served upon the Respondent.","UrlName":"revision214"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"34cf176e-9770-4ae2-8545-e40c320883fc","Title":"Rule 4-219. Publication and Protective Orders","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>In cases in which a lawyer is publicly reprimanded, suspended, disbarred, or voluntarily surrenders his license, the Office of the General Counsel shall publish notice of the discipline in a local newspaper or newspapers. The Office of the General Counsel shall publish notice of all public discipline on the official State Bar of Georgia website, including the respondent’s full name and business address, the nature of the discipline imposed and the effective dates.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall immediately cease the practice of law in Georgia and shall, within 30 days, notify all clients of his inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients. Within 45 days after a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, the respondent shall certify to the Court that he has satisfied the requirements of this Rule. Should the respondent fail to comply with the requirements of this Rule, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its own motion or upon motion of the Office of the General Counsel, and after 10 days’ notice to the respondent and proof of his failure to notify or protect his clients, may hold the respondent in contempt and, pursuant to Rule 4-228, order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of the respondent and proceed to notify all clients and to take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Motions for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by either the respondent or by the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension under Part IV of these Rules the respondent shall take such action necessary to cause the removal of any indicia of the respondent as a lawyer, legal assistant, legal clerk or person with similar status. In the event the respondent should maintain a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted, the respondent shall not represent himself as a lawyer or person with similar status and shall not provide any legal advice to clients of the law office.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule150","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"765c0956-e960-4f80-be7b-207b5f653097","ParentId":"34cf176e-9770-4ae2-8545-e40c320883fc","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) After either the Review Panel's report or the Special Master's report is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file with the Court any written exceptions, supported by written argument, each may have to the report subject to the provisions of Rule 4-217 (c). All such exceptions shall be filed with the Court within 30 days of the date that the report is filed with the Court and a copy served upon the opposing party. The responding party shall have an additional 30 days to file its response with the Court. The Court may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by a party to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court will promptly consider the report of the Review Panel or the Special Master, any exceptions, and any responses filed by any party to such exceptions, and enter judgment upon the formal complaint. A copy of the Court's judgment shall be transmitted to the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent by the Court. \n \n(b) In cases in which the Supreme Court of Georgia orders disbarment, voluntary surrender of license or suspension, or the respondent is disbarred or suspended on a Notice of Discipline, the Review Panel shall publish in a local newspaper or newspapers and on the official State Bar of Georgia website, notice of the discipline, including the respondent's full name and business address, the nature of the discipline imposed and the effective dates. \n \n(c) (1) After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall immediately cease the practice of law in Georgia and shall, within 30 days, notify all clients of his inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients. Within 45 days after a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, the respondent shall certify to the Court that he has satisfied the requirements of this Rule. Should the respondent fail to comply with the requirements of this Rule, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its own motion or upon motion of the Office of the General Counsel, and after ten days notice to the respondent and proof of his failure to notify or protect his clients, may hold the respondent in contempt and, pursuant to Rule 4-228, order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of the respondent and proceed to notify all clients and to take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Motions for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by either the respondent or by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(2) After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension under Part IV of these Rules, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall take such action necessary to cause the removal of any indicia of the respondent as a lawyer, legal assistant, legal clerk or person with similar status. In the event the respondent should maintain a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted, the respondent shall not:\n (i) have any contact with the clients of the office either in person, by telephone or in writing; or \n \n(ii) have any contact with persons who have legal dealings with the office either in person, by telephone or in writing.","UrlName":"revision216"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Rule 4-220. Notice of Punishment or Acquittal; Administration of Reprimands","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia for the prescribed period.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record. State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be issued by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board, or his designee, at a regular meeting of the Board.</li> \n <li>Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record in the case. They shall be read in open court in the presence of the respondent by the judge of a Superior Court in the county of the respondent's address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Notice of issuance of the reprimand shall be published in advance in the legal organ of the county of the respondent’s address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia, and provided to the complainant in the underlying case.</li> \n <li>After a Public Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. </li> \n <li>In the event of a final judgment in favor of the respondent, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule152","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4f50c5b-d625-418d-8049-012836748219","ParentId":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Secretary of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia either permanently, in case of disbarment, or for the prescribed period in case of suspension. \n \n(b) Review Panel Reprimands shall be administered before the Panel by the chairperson or his or her designee. \n \n(c) Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Review Panel, the Chairperson of the Review Panel or his or her designee, and shall be read in open court, in the presence of the respondent, by the judge of the superior court in the county in which the respondent resides or in the county in which the disciplinary infraction occurred, with the location to be specified by the Review Panel, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. \n \n(d) After a Public or Review Panel Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. \n \n(e) In the event of a final judgment of acquittal, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the respondent resides. The respondent may give reasonable public notice of the judgment or acquittal.","UrlName":"revision218"},{"Id":"36663b15-9666-4b27-b56c-48e43efb1c12","ParentId":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia for the prescribed period.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record. State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be issued by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board, or his designee, at a regular meeting of the Board.</li> \n <li>Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record in the case. They shall be read in open court in the presence of the respondent by the judge of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides or the county in which the disciplinary infraction occurred, with the location to be specified by the Special Master subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Notice of issuance of the reprimand shall be published in advance in the legal organ of the county of the respondent’s address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia, and provided to the complainant in the underlying case.</li> \n <li>After a Public Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. </li> \n <li>In the event of a final judgment in favor of the respondent, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision270"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"97c32cdd-b655-4893-b2ed-0f800248552f","Title":"Rule 4-221. Hearing Procedures","Content":"(a) Oaths. Before entering upon his duties as herein provided, each member of the State Disciplinary Board, each member of the State Disciplinary Review Board, and each Special Master shall swear or affirm to the following oath by signing a copy and returning it to the Clerk of the Boards or to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, as appropriate.\n “I do solemnly swear or affirm that I will faithfully and impartially \t discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as a member of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia/member of the State Disciplinary Review Board of the State Bar of Georgia/Special Master according to the best of my ability and \t understanding and agreeable to the laws and Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States.”\nThe Clerk of the Boards shall maintain the completed Oaths of Board members, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the completed Oaths of Special Masters.\n(b) Pleadings and Copies. Original pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia, and the parties shall serve copies upon the Special Master and the opposing party pursuant to the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Depositions and other original discovery shall be retained by counsel and shall not be filed except as permitted under the Uniform Superior Court Rules.\n(c) Witnesses and Evidence; Contempt.\n(1) The respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall have the right to require the issuance of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses to testify or to produce books and papers. The Special Master shall have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents relevant to the matter under investigation, by subpoena, and as further provided by law in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n(2) The following shall subject a person to rule for contempt of the Special Master or State Disciplinary Board:\n(i) disregard, in any manner whatsoever, of a subpoena issued pursuant to Rules 4-203 (9), 4-210 (h) or 4-221 (c) (1);\n(ii) refusal to answer any pertinent or proper question of a Special Master; or\n(iii) willful or flagrant violation of a lawful directive of a Special Master.\nIt shall be the duty of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or Special Master to report the facts supporting contempt to the Chief Judge of the Superior Court in and for the county in which the investigation, trial or hearing is being held. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of the matter and shall follow the procedures for contempt as are applicable in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil case before the Superior Court under the laws in Georgia.\n (3) Any Special Master shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue any subpoena herein provided for. \n \n(4) Depositions may be taken by the respondent or the State Bar of Georgia in the same manner and under the same provisions as may be done in civil cases under the laws of Georgia, and such depositions may be used upon the trial or an investigation or hearing in the same manner as such depositions may be used in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n(5) All witnesses attending any hearing provided for under these Rules shall be entitled to the same fees as now are allowed by law to witnesses attending trials in civil cases in the Superior Courts of this State under subpoena.\n(d) Venue of Hearings.\n (1) The hearings on all complaints and charges against a resident respondent shall be held in the county of the respondent’s main office or the county of residence of the respondent unless he otherwise agrees. \n \n(2) Where the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the complaint arose in the State of Georgia, the hearing shall be held in the county where the complaint arose. \n \n(3) When the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the offense occurs outside the State, the hearing may be held in the county of the State Bar of Georgia headquarters.\n","UrlName":"rule156","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"5c9f9944-ca22-4108-8823-d32bea898b29","ParentId":"97c32cdd-b655-4893-b2ed-0f800248552f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Oaths. Before entering upon his duties as herein provided, each member of the State Disciplinary Board and each Special Master shall subscribe to an oath to be administered by any person authorized to administer oaths under the laws of this State, such oath to be in writing and filed with the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia. The form of such oath shall be:\n\"I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as a member of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia/Special Master according to the best of my ability and understanding and agreeable to the laws and Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States so help me God.\"\n(b) Witnesses and Evidence; Contempt.\n(1) The respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall have the right to require the issuance of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses to testify or to produce books and papers. The State Disciplinary Board or a special master shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents, relevant to the matter under investigation, by subpoena, and as further provided by law in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n \n(2) The following shall subject a person to rule for contempt of the Special Master or Panel:\n \n(i) disregard, in any manner whatever, of a subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 4-221 (b) (1),\n \n(ii) refusal to answer any pertinent or proper question of a Special Master or Board member, or\n \n(iii) wilful or flagrant violation of a lawful directive of a Special Master or Board member.\n \nIt shall be the duty of the chairperson of the affected Panel or Special Master to report the fact to the Chief Judge of the superior court in and for the county in which said investigation, trial or hearing is being held. The superior court shall have jurisdiction of the matter and shall follow the procedures for contempt as are applicable in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil case before the superior court under the laws in Georgia.\n \n(3) Any member of the State Disciplinary Board and any Special Master shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue any subpoena herein provided for. \n \n(4) Depositions may be taken by the respondent or the State Bar of Georgia in the same manner and under the same provisions as may be done in civil cases under the laws of Georgia, and such depositions may be used upon the trial or an investigation or hearing in the same manner as such depositions are admissible in evidence in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n \n(5) All witnesses attending any hearing provided for under these Rules shall be entitled to the same fees as now are allowed by law to witnesses attending trials in civil cases in the superior courts of this State under subpoena, and said fees shall be assessed against the parties to the proceedings under the rule of law applicable to civil suits in the superior courts of this State. \n \n(6) Whenever the deposition of any person is to be taken in this State pursuant to the laws of another state, territory, province or commonwealth, or of the United States or of another country for use in attorney discipline, fitness or disability proceedings there, the chairperson of the Investigative Panel, or his or her designee upon petition, may issue a summons or subpoena as provided in this Rule to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents at such deposition.\n \n(c) Venue of Hearings.\n \n(1) The hearings on all complaints and charges against resident respondents shall be held in the county of residence of the respondent unless he otherwise agrees. \n \n(2) Where the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the complaint arose in the State of Georgia, the hearing shall be held in the county where the complaint arose. \n \n(3) When the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the offense occurs outside the State, the hearing may be held in the county of the State Bar of Georgia headquarters.\n \n(d) Confidentiality of Investigations and Proceedings.\n \n(1) The State Bar of Georgia shall maintain as confidential all disciplinary investigations and proceedings pending at the screening or investigative stage, unless otherwise provided by these Rules. \n \n(2) After a proceeding under these Rules is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all evidentiary and motions hearings shall be open to the public and all reports rendered shall be public documents. \n \n(3) Nothing in these Rules shall prohibit the complainant, respondent or third party from disclosing information regarding a disciplinary proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia or a Special Master in proceedings under these Rules. \n \n(4) The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia or the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board may reveal or authorize disclosure of information which would otherwise be confidential under this Rule under the following circumstances:\n \n(i) In the event of a charge of wrongful conduct against any member of the State Disciplinary Board or any person who is otherwise connected with the disciplinary proceeding in any way, either Panel of the Board or its Chairperson or his or her designee, may authorize the use of information concerning disciplinary investigations or proceedings to aid in the defense against such charge. \n \n(ii) In the event the Office of the General Counsel receives information that suggests criminal activity, such information may be revealed to the appropriate criminal prosecutor. \n \n(iii) In the event of subsequent disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, the Office of the General Counsel may, in aggravation of discipline in the pending disciplinary case, reveal the imposition of confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208 and facts underlying the imposition of discipline. \n \n(iv) A complainant or lawyer representing the complainant may be notified of the status or disposition of the complaint. \n \n(v) When public statements that are false or misleading are made about any otherwise confidential disciplinary case, the Office of the General Counsel may disclose all information necessary to correct such false or misleading statements.\n \n(5) The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information to the following persons if it appears that the information may assist them in the discharge of their duties:\n \n(i) The Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(ii) The Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(iii) The Judicial Nominating Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(iv) The Lawyer Assistance Program or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(v) The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(vi) The Judicial Qualifications Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(vii) The Executive Committee with the specific approval of the following representatives of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board: the chairperson, the vice-chairperson and a third representative designated by the chairperson; \n \n(viii) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board; \n \n(ix) The Consumer Assistance Program; \n \n(x) The General Counsel Overview Committee; \n  \n(xi) An office or committee charged with discipline appointed by the United States Circuit or District Court or the highest court of any state, District of Columbia, commonwealth or possession of the United States; and \n \n(xii) The Unlicensed Practice of Law Department.\n \n(6) Any information used by the Office of the General Counsel in a proceeding under Rule 4-108 or in a proceeding to obtain a Receiver to administer the files of a member of the State Bar of Georgia, shall not be confidential under this Rule. \n \n(7) The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information when required by law or court order. \n \n(8) The authority or discretion to reveal confidential information under this Rule shall not constitute a waiver of any evidentiary, statutory or other privilege which may be asserted by the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board under Bar Rules or applicable law. \n \n(9) Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit the Office of the General Counsel or the Investigative Panel from interviewing potential witnesses or placing the Notice of Investigation out for service by sheriff or other authorized person. \n \n(10) Members of the Office of the General Counsel and State Disciplinary Board may respond to specific inquiries concerning matters that have been made public by the complainant, respondent or third parties but are otherwise confidential under these Rules by acknowledging the existence and status of the proceeding. \n \n(11) The State Bar of Georgia shall not disclose information concerning discipline imposed on a lawyer under prior Supreme Court Rules that was confidential when imposed, unless authorized to do so by said prior Rules.\n \n(e) Burden of Proof; Evidence.\n \n(1) In all proceedings under this Chapter the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Georgia, except for proceedings under Rule 4-106. \n \n(2) In all proceedings under this chapter occurring after a finding of probable cause as described in Rule 4-204.4, the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of proof required of the State Bar of Georgia shall be clear and convincing evidence.\n \n(f) Pleadings and Copies. Original pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. Depositions and other original discovery shall be retained by counsel and shall not be filed except as permitted under the Uniform Superior Court Rules. \n \n(g) Pleadings and Communications Privileged. Pleadings and oral and written statements of members of the State Disciplinary Board, members and designees of the Lawyer Assistance Program, Special Masters, Bar counsel and investigators, complainants, witnesses, and respondents and their counsel made to one another or filed in the record during any investigation, intervention, hearing or other disciplinary proceeding under this Part IV, and pertinent to the disciplinary proceeding, are made in performance of a legal and public duty, are absolutely privileged, and under no circumstances form the basis for a right of action.","UrlName":"revision220"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"62b2a0db-ca20-4090-a530-abeb09736218","Title":"Rule 4-221.1 Confidentiality of Investigations and Proceedings","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall maintain as confidential all disciplinary investigations and proceedings pending at the screening or investigative stage, unless otherwise provided by these Rules.</li> \n <li>After a proceeding under these Rules is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all evidentiary and motions hearings shall be open to the public and all documents and pleadings filed of record shall be public documents, unless the Special Master or the Supreme Court of Georgia orders otherwise.</li> \n <li>Nothing in these Rules shall prohibit the complainant, respondent, or a third party from disclosing information regarding a disciplinary proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia or a Special Master in proceedings under these Rules.</li> \n <li> The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board may reveal or authorize disclosure of information that would otherwise be confidential under this Rule under the following circumstances: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>In the event of a charge of wrongful conduct against any member of the State Disciplinary Board, the State Disciplinary Review Board, or any person who is otherwise connected with the disciplinary proceeding in any way, the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair or his designee, may authorize the use of information concerning disciplinary investigations or proceedings to aid in the defense against such charge.</li> \n <li>In the event the Office of the General Counsel receives information that suggests criminal activity, such information may be revealed to the appropriate criminal prosecutor.</li> \n <li>In the event of subsequent disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, the Office of the General Counsel may, in aggravation of discipline in the pending disciplinary case, reveal the imposition of confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208 and facts underlying the imposition of discipline.</li> \n <li>A complainant and/or lawyer representing the complainant shall be notified of the status or disposition of the complaint.</li> \n <li>When public statements that are false or misleading are made about any otherwise confidential disciplinary case, the Office of the General Counsel may disclose all information necessary to correct such false or misleading statements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information to the following persons if it appears that the information may assist them in the discharge of their duties:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Judicial Nominating Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Lawyer Assistance Program or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Judicial Qualifications Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee with the specific approval of the following representatives of the State Disciplinary Board: the Chair, the Vice-Chair, and a third representative designated by the Chair;</li> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board;</li> \n <li>The Client Assistance Program;</li> \n <li>The General Counsel Overview Committee; </li> \n <li>An office or committee charged with discipline appointed by the United States Circuit or District Court or the highest court of any state, District of Columbia, commonwealth or possession of the United States; and</li> \n <li>The Unlicensed Practice of Law Department.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Any information used by the Office of the General Counsel in a proceeding under Rule 4-108 or in a proceeding to obtain a receiver to administer the files of a lawyer, shall not be confidential under this Rule.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information when required by law or court order.</li> \n <li>The authority or discretion to reveal confidential information under this Rule shall not constitute a waiver of any evidentiary, statutory or other privilege which may be asserted by the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board under Bar Rules or applicable law.</li> \n <li>Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit the Office of the General Counsel or the State Disciplinary Board from interviewing potential witnesses or placing the Notice of Investigation out for service by the sheriff or other authorized person.</li> \n <li>Members of the Office of the General Counsel and State Disciplinary Board may respond to specific inquiries concerning matters that have been made public by the complainant, respondent, or third parties but are otherwise confidential under these Rules by acknowledging the existence and status of the proceeding.</li> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall not disclose information concerning discipline imposed on a lawyer under prior Supreme Court of Georgia Rules that was confidential when imposed, unless authorized to do so by said prior Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule603","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"af4ea35a-2419-4a09-b5c3-0756c324d60c","Title":"Rule 4-221.2. Burden of Proof; Evidence","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In all proceedings under this Chapter, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Georgia, except for proceedings under Rule 4-106.</li> \n <li>In all proceedings under this Chapter occurring after a finding of Probable Cause as described in Rule 4-204.4, the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of proof required of the State Bar shall be clear and convincing evidence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule604","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"49a36f5e-540c-43ec-a804-da706530090f","Title":"Rule 4-221.3. Pleadings and Communications Privileged","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Pleadings and oral and written statements of members of the Boards, members and designees of the Lawyer Assistance Program, Special Masters, Bar counsel and investigators, complainants, witnesses, and respondents and their counsel made to one another or filed in the record during any investigation, intervention, hearing, or other disciplinary proceeding under this Part IV, and pertinent to the disciplinary proceeding, are made in performance of a legal and public duty, are absolutely privileged, and under no circumstances form the basis for a right of action.</div>","UrlName":"rule605","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Rule 4-222. Limitation","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance, a written description pursuant to Rule 4-202 (a), or a Client Assistance Program referral form has been received at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted pursuant to these Rules within four years after the commission of the act; provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender’s whereabouts are unknown, or the offender’s name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State.</li> \n <li>Referral of a matter to the State Disciplinary Board shall occur within 12 months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance by the Office of the General Counsel or notification to the respondant of the written description pursuant to Rule 4-202 (a).</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule158","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"14564682-9ff9-4467-9a33-a3b548b47980","ParentId":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance or a Client Assistance Program referral form has been received at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted pursuant to these Rules within four years after the commission of the act; provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender’s whereabouts are unknown, or the offender’s name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State.</li> \n <li>Referral of a matter to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel shall occur within 12 months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or institution of an investigation.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision403"},{"Id":"3e73be77-4c87-40d4-bbdd-dc450b57681e","ParentId":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance has been received at State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted by the Investigative Panel within four years after the commission of the act. Provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender's whereabouts are unknown, or the offender's name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State. \n \n(b) Referral of a matter to the Investigative Panel by the Office of the General Counsel shall occur within twelve months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance at State Bar of Georgia headquarters or institution of a Memorandum of Grievance by the Investigative Panel.","UrlName":"revision222"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1df80583-9d16-4d87-a330-42a90e455f89","Title":"Rule 4-223. Advisory Opinions","Content":"<div>(a) Any Formal Advisory Opinion issued pursuant to Rule 4-403 which is not thereafter disapproved by the Supreme Court of Georgia shall be binding on the State Bar of Georgia, the State Disciplinary Board, and the person who requested the opinion, in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding involving that person. Formal Advisory Opinions which have been approved or modified by the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 4-403 shall also be binding in subsequent disciplinary proceedings which do not involve the person who requested the opinion.</div><div> </div><div>(b) It shall be considered as mitigation to any matter being investigated under these Rules that the respondent has acted in accordance with and in reasonable reliance upon a written Informal Advisory Opinion requested by the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-401 or a Formal Advisory Opinion issued pursuant to Rule 4-403, but not reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule161","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Rule 4-224. Expungement of Records","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The record of any matter against a respondent under these Rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the Office of the General Counsel in accordance with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>those matters closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202 (e) shall be expunged after one year;</li> \n <li>those matters dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board after a Probable Cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and</li> \n <li>those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court of Georgia after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Definition. The term “expunge” shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed.</li> \n <li>Effect of Expungement. After a file has been expunged, any response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record of such matter has been expunged and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the matter or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged.</li> \n <li>Retention of Records. Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel, for good cause shown, with notice to the respondent and an opportunity to be heard, records which would otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this Rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm that the record was expunged and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked the lawyer has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary Rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been referred to the Client Assistance Program, dismissed, or dismissed with a letter of instruction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule165","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"82fb7844-7595-48b9-83be-4471f2052c22","ParentId":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The record of any grievance against a respondent under these Rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the Office of the General Counsel in accordance with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>those grievances closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202 (e) shall be expunged after one year;</li> \n <li>those grievances dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board after a Probable Cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and</li> \n <li>those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court of Georgia after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Definition. The term “expunge” shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed.</li> \n <li>Effect of Expungement. After a file has been expunged, any response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record of such matter has been expunged and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the grievance or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged.</li> \n <li>Retention of Records. Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel, for good cause shown, with notice to the respondent and an opportunity to be heard, records that would otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this Rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm that the record was expunged and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if he has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been referred to the Consumer Assistance Program, dismissed, or dismissed with a letter of instruction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision405"},{"Id":"b7f7fce2-13bc-4974-bfe2-74b8996b5020","ParentId":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The record of any grievance against a respondent under these rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with the following:\n \n(1) those grievances closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202(c) shall be expunged after one year; \n \n(2) those grievances dismissed by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board after a probable cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and \n \n(3) those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.\n \n(b) Definition . The terms \"expunge \"and \"expunction \"shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed. \n \n(c) Effect of Expungement . After a file has been expunged, any agency response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record the agency may have had of such matter has been expunged pursuant to court rule and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the grievance or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged pursuant to court rule. \n \n(d) Retention of Records . Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by bar counsel, for good cause shown and with notice to the respondent and opportunity to be heard, records which should otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the State Disciplinary Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder. \n \n(e) A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm the expunction of the record and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged. \n \n(f) A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if he has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been dismissed or dismissed with a letter of instruction. \n ","UrlName":"revision224"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24ba975c-fd01-47a2-90c6-a115ce801d66","Title":"Rule 4-225. Jurisdiction","Content":"The State Disciplinary Board and any person who is connected with disciplinary proceedings in any way shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of any court other than the Supreme Court with respect thereto, except as provided in Rules 4-214, 4-215 and 4-216.","UrlName":"rule175","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"803a6c4e-72bb-403c-8840-d5138b9a5ba8","Title":"Rule 4-226. Immunity","Content":"The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the disciplinary proceedings of the State Bar of Georgia to be judicial and quasi-judicial in nature and within the Court’s regulatory function, and in connection with such disciplinary proceedings, members of the State Disciplinary Boards, the Coordinating Special Master, Special Masters, Bar counsel, special prosecutors, investigators, and staff are entitled to those immunities customarily afforded to persons so participating in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings or engaged in such regulatory activities.","UrlName":"rule184","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"25ef804c-3d2b-4ce9-a5ee-0a54d7c00520","ParentId":"803a6c4e-72bb-403c-8840-d5138b9a5ba8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The regulatory proceedings of the State Bar are judicial in nature. Therefore, members of the State Disciplinary Board, members and designees of the Committee on Lawyer Impairment, special masters, Bar counsel, special prosecutors, investigators and staff are entitled to judicial immunity when engaged in regulatory activities.","UrlName":"revision226"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4c187325-b7ad-49a5-b4db-ae05a2dda250","Title":"Rule 4-227. Petitions for Voluntary Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A Petition for Voluntary Discipline shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline.</li> \n <li> Prior to the issuance of a formal complaint, a respondent may submit a Petition for Voluntary Discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Those petitions seeking confidential discipline shall be served on the Office of the General Counsel and assigned to a member of the State Disciplinary Board. The State Disciplinary Board shall conduct an investigation and determine whether to accept or reject the petition as outlined at Rule 4-203 (7). </li> \n <li>Those petitions seeking public discipline shall be filed directly with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Office of the General Counsel shall have 30 days within which to file a response. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> After the issuance of a formal complaint a respondent may submit a Petition for Voluntary Discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond. The Office of the General Counsel may assent to the petition or may file a response, stating objections and giving the reasons therefor. The Office of the General Counsel shall serve a copy of its response upon the respondent.</li> \n <li>The Special Master shall consider the petition, the State Bar of Georgia’s response, and the record as it then exists and may accept or reject the Petition for Voluntary Discipline.</li> \n <li> The Special Master may reject a petition for such cause or causes as seem appropriate to the Special Master. Such causes may include but are not limited to a finding that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the petition fails to contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline;</li> \n <li>the petition fails to request appropriate discipline;</li> \n <li>the petition fails to contain sufficient information concerning the admissions of fact and the admissions of conduct;</li> \n <li>the record in the proceeding does not contain sufficient information upon which to base a decision to accept or reject.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Special Master’s decision to reject a Petition for Voluntary Discipline does not preclude the filing of a subsequent petition and is not subject to review by the Supreme Court of Georgia. If the Special Master rejects a Petition for Voluntary Discipline, the disciplinary case shall proceed as provided by these Rules.</li> \n <li>The Special Master may accept the Petition for Voluntary Discipline by entering a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law and delivering same to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall file the report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. A copy of the Special Master’s report shall be served upon the respondent. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.</li> \n <li>Pursuant to Rule 4-210 (e), the Special Master may, in his discretion, extend any of the time limits in these Rules in order to adequately consider a Petition for Voluntary Discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule195","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"66b0daa0-6bd1-49f0-99c4-b6c277f7a4ea","ParentId":"4c187325-b7ad-49a5-b4db-ae05a2dda250","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) A petition for voluntary discipline shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. \n \n(b) Prior to the issuance of a formal complaint, a respondent may submit a petition for voluntary discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n \n(1) Those petitions seeking private discipline shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel and assigned to a member of the Investigative Panel. The Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board shall conduct an investigation and determine whether to accept or reject the petition as outlined at Rule 4-203 (a) (9). \n \n(2) Those petitions seeking public discipline shall be filed directly with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The Office of the General Counsel shall have 30 days within which to file a response. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.\n \n(c) After the issuance of a formal complaint a respondent may submit a petition for voluntary discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n \n(1) The petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond. The Office of the General Counsel may assent to the petition or may file a response, stating objections and giving the reasons therefor. The Office of the General Counsel shall serve a copy of its response upon the respondent. \n \n(2) The Special Master shall consider the petition, the State Bar of Georgia's response, and the record as it then exists and may accept or reject the petition for voluntary discipline. \n \n(3) The Special Master may reject a petition for such cause or causes as seem appropriate to the Special Master. Such causes may include but are not limited to a finding that:\n \n(i) the petition fails to contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline; \n \n(ii) the petition fails to request appropriate discipline; \n \n(iii) the petition fails to contain sufficient information concerning the admissions of fact and the admissions of conduct; \n \n(iv) the record in the proceeding does not contain sufficient information upon which to base a decision to accept or reject.\n \n(4) The Special Master's decision to reject a petition for voluntary discipline does not preclude the filing of a subsequent petition and is not subject to review by either the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia. If the Special Master rejects a petition for voluntary discipline, the disciplinary case shall proceed as provided by these Rules. \n \n(5) If the Special Master accepts the petition for voluntary discipline, s/he shall enter a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law and deliver same to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall file the report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. A copy of the Special Master's report shall be served upon the respondent. The Court shall issue an appropriate order. \n \n(6) Pursuant to Rule 4-210 (5), the Special Master may, in his or her discretion, extend any of the time limits in these Rules in order to adequately consider a petition for voluntary discipline. \n ","UrlName":"revision228"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5b65d67a-c560-4dc6-afb7-72db029c7be1","Title":"Rule 4-228. Receiverships","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Definitions.  \n Absent Lawyer: A member of the State Bar of Georgia (or a Domestic or Foreign lawyer authorized to practice law in Georgia) who has disappeared, died, been disbarred, disciplined or incarcerated, become so impaired as to be unable to properly represent clients, or who poses such a substantial threat of harm to clients or the public that it is necessary for the Supreme Court of Georgia to appoint a receiver. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Receiver.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Upon a final determination by the Supreme Court of Georgia, on a petition filed by the State Bar of Georgia, that a lawyer has become an absent lawyer, and that no partner, associate, or other appropriate representative is available to notify his clients of this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia may order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia be appointed as receiver to take charge of the absent lawyer’s files and records. Such receiver shall review the files, notify the absent lawyer’s clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect the interests of the clients and the public. A motion for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by the respondent, his partners, associates, or legal representatives or by the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>If the receiver should encounter, or anticipate, situations or issues not covered by the order of appointment, including but not limited to, those concerning proper procedure and scope of authority, the receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for such further order or orders as may be necessary or appropriate to address the situation or issue so encountered or anticipated.</li> \n <li>The receiver shall be entitled to release to each client the papers, money, or other property to which the client is entitled. Before releasing the property, the receiver may require a receipt from the client for the property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Applicability of Lawyer-Client Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Confidentiality. The receiver shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or, upon application, by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Lawyer-Client Relationship; Privilege. The receiver relationship standing alone does not create a lawyer-client relationship between the receiver and the clients of the absent lawyer. However, the lawyer-client privilege shall apply to communications by or between the receiver and the clients of the absent lawyer to the same extent as it would have applied to communications by or to the absent lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Trust Account.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>If after appointment the receiver should determine that the absent lawyer maintained one or more trust accounts and that there are no provisions extant that would allow the clients, or other appropriate entities, to receive from the accounts the funds to which they are entitled, the receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for an order extending the scope of the receivership to include the management of the said trust account or accounts. In the event the scope of the receivership is extended to include the management of the trust account or accounts, the receiver shall file quarterly with the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee a report showing the activity in and status of said accounts.</li> \n <li>Service on a bank or financial institution of a copy of the order extending the scope of the receivership to include management of the trust account or accounts shall operate as a modification of any agreement of deposit among such bank or financial institution, the absent lawyer and any other party to the account so as to make the receiver a necessary signatory on any trust account maintained by the absent lawyer with such bank or financial institution. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee, on application by the receiver, may order that the receiver shall be sole signatory on any such account to the extent necessary for the purposes of these Rules and may direct the disposition and distribution of client and other funds.</li> \n <li>In determining ownership of funds in the trust accounts, including by subrogation or indemnification, the receiver should act as a reasonably prudent lawyer maintaining a client trust account. The receiver may (i) rely on a certification of ownership issued by an auditor employed by the receiver; or (ii) interplead any funds of questionable ownership into the appropriate Superior Court; or (iii) proceed under the terms of the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (OCGA § 44-12-190 et seq.). If the absent lawyer’s trust account does not contain sufficient funds to meet known client balances, the receiver may disburse funds on a pro rata basis.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Payment of Expenses of Receiver. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The receiver shall be entitled to reimbursement for actual and reasonable costs incurred by the receiver for expenses, including, but not limited to, (i) the actual and reasonable costs associated with the employment of accountants, auditors, and bookkeepers as necessary to determine the source and ownership of funds held in the absent lawyer’s trust account, and (ii) reasonable costs of secretarial, postage, bond premiums, and moving and storage expenses associated with carrying out the receiver’s duties. Application for allowance of costs and expenses shall be made by affidavit to the Supreme Court of Georgia, or its designee, who may determine the amount of the reimbursement. The application shall be accompanied by an accounting in a form and substance acceptable to the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be paid to the receiver by the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia may seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a judgment against the absent lawyer or his or her estate in an amount equal to the amount paid by the State Bar of Georgia to the receiver. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the amount, and the burden of proof shall shift to the absent lawyer or his estate to prove otherwise.</li> \n <li>The provision of paragraph (e) (1) above shall apply to all receivers serving on the effective date of this Rule and thereafter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Receiver-Client Relationship. With full disclosure and the informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), of any client of the absent lawyer, the receiver may, but need not, accept employment to complete any legal matter. Any written consent by the client shall include an acknowledgment that the client is not obligated to use the receiver.</li> \n <li> Unclaimed Files.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>If upon completion of the receivership there are files belonging to the clients of the absent lawyer that have not been claimed, the receiver shall deliver them to the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia shall store the files for six years, after which time the State Bar of Georgia may exercise its discretion in maintaining or destroying the files.</li> \n <li>If the receiver determines that an unclaimed file contains a Last Will and Testament, the receiver may, but shall not be required to do so, file said Last Will and Testament in the office of the Probate Court in such county as to the receiver may seem appropriate.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Professional Liability Insurance. Only lawyers who maintain errors and omissions insurance, or other appropriate insurance, may be appointed to the position of receiver.</li> \n <li>Requirement of Bond. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee may require the receiver to post bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duties.</li> \n <li> Immunity.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the actions of the State Bar of Georgia and the appointed receiver to be within the Court’s regulatory function, and being regulatory in nature, the State Bar of Georgia and the receiver are entitled to that immunity customarily afforded to court-appointed receivers.</li> \n <li>The immunity granted in paragraph (j) (1) above shall not apply if the receiver is employed by a client of the absent lawyer to continue the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Service. Service under this Rule may be perfected under Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule570","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ae1002e-8cc7-40fe-8558-fd5dd286fbee","ParentId":"5b65d67a-c560-4dc6-afb7-72db029c7be1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a)  Definitions \nAbsent Attorney – a member of the State Bar of Georgia (or a foreign or domestic lawyer authorized to practice law in Georgia) who shall have disappeared, died, become disbarred, disciplined or incarcerated, or become so impaired as to be unable to properly represent his or her clients or as to pose a substantial threat of harm to his or her clients or the public as to justify appointment of a Receiver hereunder by the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(b)  Appointment of Receiver\n(1) Upon a final determination by the Supreme Court of Georgia, on a petition filed by the State Bar of Georgia, that an attorney has become an Absent Attorney, and that no partner, associate or other appropriate representative is available to notify his or her clients of this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia may order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia be appointed as Receiver to take charge of the Absent Attorney's files and records. Such Receiver shall review the files, notify the Absent Attorney's clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect the interests of the clients, and the public. A motion for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by the respondent, his or her partners, associates or legal representatives or by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(2) If the Receiver should encounter, or anticipate, situations or issues not covered by the Order of appointment, including but not limited to, those concerning proper procedure and scope of authority, the Receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for such further order or orders as may be necessary or appropriate to address the situation or issue so encountered or anticipated.\n(3) The receiver shall be entitled to release to each client the papers, money or other property to which the client is entitled. Before releasing the property, the Receiver may require a receipt from the client for the property.\n(c) Applicability of Attorney-Client Rules\n(1) Confidentiality – The Receiver shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or, upon application, by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(2) Attorney-Client Relationship; Privilege – The Receiver relationship standing alone does not create an attorney-client relationship between the Receiver and the clients of the Absent Attorney. However, the attorney-client privilege shall apply to communications by or between the Receiver and the clients of the Absent Attorney to the same extent as it would have applied to communications by or to the Absent Attorney.\n(d)  Trust Account\n(1) If after appointment the Receiver should determine that the Absent Attorney maintained one or more trust accounts and that there are no provisions extant that would allow the clients, or other appropriate entities, to receive from the accounts the funds to which they are entitled, the Receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for an order extending the scope of the Receivership to include the management of the said trust account or accounts. In the event the scope of the Receivership is extended to include the management of the trust account or accounts, the Receiver shall file quarterly with the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee a report showing the activity in and status of said accounts.\n(2) Service on a bank or financial institution of a copy of the order extending the scope of the Receivership to include management of the trust account or accounts shall operate as a modification of any agreement of deposit among such bank or financial institution, the Absent Attorney and any other party to the account so as to make the Receiver a necessary signatory on any trust account maintained by the Absent Attorney with such bank or financial institution. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee, on application by the Receiver, may order that the Receiver shall be sole signatory on any such account to the extent necessary for the purposes of these Rules and may direct the disposition and distribution of client and other funds. \n(3) In determining ownership of funds in the trust accounts, including by subrogation or indemnification, the Receiver should act as a reasonably prudent lawyer maintaining a client trust account. The Receiver may (1) rely on a certification of ownership issued by an auditor employed by the Receiver; or (2) interplead any funds of questionable ownership into the appropriate Superior Court; or (3) proceed under the terms of the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (O.G.C.A. §44-12-190 et seq.).  If the Absent Attorney’s trust account does not contain sufficient funds to meet known client balances, the Receiver may disburse funds on a pro rata basis.\n(e)  Payment of Expenses of Receiver\n(1) The Receiver shall be entitled to reimbursement for actual and reasonable costs incurred by the Receiver for expenses, including, but not limited to, (i) the actual and reasonable costs associated with the employment of accountants, auditors and bookkeepers as necessary to determine the source and ownership of funds held in the Absent Attorney’s trust account, and (ii) reasonable costs of secretarial, postage, bond premiums, and moving and storage expenses associated with carrying out the Receiver’s duties. Application for allowance of costs and expenses shall be made by affidavit to the Supreme Court of Georgia, or its designee, who may determine the amount of the reimbursement. The application shall be accompanied by an accounting in a form and substance acceptable to the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be paid to the Receiver by the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia may seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a judgment against the Absent Attorney or his or her estate in an amount equal to the amount paid by the State Bar of Georgia to the Receiver. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the amount, and the burden of proof shall shift to the Absent Attorney or his or her estate to prove otherwise. \n(2) The provision of paragraph (1) above shall apply to all Receivers serving on the effective date of this Rule and thereafter.\n(f)  Receiver-Client Relationship\nWith full disclosure and the informed consent, as defined in Bar Rule 1.0 (h), of any client of the Absent Attorney, the Receiver may, but need not, accept employment to complete any legal matter. Any written consent by the client shall include an acknowledgment that the client is not obligated to use the Receiver.\n(g) Unclaimed Files\n(1) If upon completion of the Receivership there are files belonging to the clients of the Absent Attorney that have not been claimed, the Receiver shall deliver them to the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia shall store the files for six years, after which time the State Bar of Georgia may exercise its discretion in maintaining or destroying the files.\n(2) If the Receiver determines that an unclaimed file contains a Last Will and Testament, the Receiver may, but shall not be required to do so, file said Last Will and Testament in the office of the Probate Court in such county as to the Receiver may seem appropriate.\n(h)  Professional Liability Insurance\nOnly attorneys who maintain errors and omissions insurance that  includes coverage for conduct as a Receiver may be appointed to the position of Receiver.\n(i) Requirement of Bond\nThe Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee may require the Receiver to post bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his or her duties. \n(j) Immunity\n(1) The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the actions of the State Bar of Georgia and the appointed Receiver to be within the court's judicial and regulatory functions, and being regulatory and judicial in nature, the State Bar of Georgia and Receiver are entitled to judicial immunity. Any person serving as a Receiver under these rules shall be immune from suit for any conduct undertaken in good faith in the course of his or her official duties.\n(2) The immunity granted in paragraph (1) above shall not apply if the Receiver is employed by a client of the Absent Attorney to continue the representation.\n(k) Service\n Service under this Rule may be perfected under Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n ","UrlName":"revision230"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Title":"CHAPTER 3 This Chapter is Reserved","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter27","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"9352c34c-e065-400d-b993-906e86f9970a","Title":"Rule 4-301","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule218","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"30447727-9b59-4979-909e-06676d7b0368","Title":"Rule 4-302","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule219","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bafec039-e06f-478e-9b11-41d0c6c75154","Title":"Rule 4-303","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule221","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e12e2da1-f716-48af-aa0b-7b06c5ad2041","Title":"Rule 4-304","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule225","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"795a5e24-8385-4369-885c-ceeb0b68ae0c","Title":"Rule 4-305","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule228","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"96205185-2293-4cab-b827-3b0d1b523ee4","Title":"Rule 4-306","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule234","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Title":"CHAPTER 4 ADVISORY OPINIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter28","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"6e17c812-cd79-45f4-a404-f95b8e7c29b9","Title":"Rule 4-401. Informal Advisory Opinions","Content":"The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to render Informal Advisory Opinions concerning the Office of the General Counsel's interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Informal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may be issued in oral or written form. An Informal Advisory Opinion is the personal opinion of the issuing attorney of the Office of the General Counsel and is neither a defense to any complaint nor binding on the State Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court of Georgia, or the State Bar of Georgia. If the person requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion desires, the Office of the General Counsel will transmit the Informal Advisory Opinion to the Formal Advisory Opinion Board for discretionary consideration of the drafting of a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.","UrlName":"rule241","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Rule 4-402. The Formal Advisory Opinion Board","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the State Disciplinary Review Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the State Disciplinary Board and State Disciplinary Review Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"rule243","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"d2387df8-46e6-47b7-b689-b77c9f82b987","ParentId":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the Investigative Panel and Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"revision296"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Rule 4-403. Formal Advisory Opinions","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct.</li> \n <li>When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate.</li> \n <li>If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court.</li> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule248","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"174b3a3d-b53f-4ed3-ade3-857d1d6801c6","ParentId":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(b) When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct. \n \n(c) When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(d) After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notificaiton by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate. \n \n(e) If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court. \n \n(f) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions. \n \n(g) The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.","UrlName":"revision110"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"35733557-f94e-4a97-b5d4-2c0e5fa949d4","Title":"Rule 4-404. Immunity","Content":"The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board, as well as staff persons and counsel assisting the Board and its members, including, but not limited to staff counsel, advisors and the State Bar of Georgia, its officers and employees, members of the Executive Committee, and members of the Board of Governors, shall have absolute immunity from civil liability for all acts performed in the course of their official duties. ","UrlName":"rule253","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957","Title":"Ethics & Discipline","Content":"","UrlName":"ha2","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Title":"Current Rules","Content":"","UrlName":"hasa2","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"d2b29f44-6392-487b-8802-3863f6fc0c80","Title":"Part III (After January 1, 2001) - Reserved","Content":"Part III: Reserved","UrlName":"part3","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Title":"Part IV - Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (also includes Disciplinary Proceedings and Advisory Opinion rules)","Content":"","UrlName":"part4","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Title":"CHAPTER 1 GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND ENFORCEMENT THEREOF","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter13","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"c083cea2-60f5-4f66-8277-3ce6f50cff7e","Title":"Rule 4-101. Enforcement of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia is hereby authorized to maintain and enforce, as set forth in rules hereinafter stated, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in the state of Georgia and to institute disciplinary action in the event of the violation thereof.","UrlName":"rule87","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Rule 4-102. Disciplinary Action; Levels of Discipline; Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline that removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Public Reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Public Reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand but less than suspension. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Review Board at a meeting of the State Disciplinary Review Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Confidential Reprimand but less than a Public Reprimand. This level of discipline includes publication on the official State Bar of Georgia website as provided by Bar Rule 4-219 (a).</li> \n <li>Confidential Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Confidential Reprimand shall be administered by the State Disciplinary Board at a meeting of the Board. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a Formal Letter of Admonition but less than a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Letter of Admonition: A form of confidential discipline that declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Formal Letter of Admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Bar Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Board pursuant to the provisions of Bar Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Definitions and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n1.18                                  Duties to Prospective Client \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"rule89","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"fcbf296b-3b7c-44ee-beae-70f2bc53cab4","ParentId":"c100d7a1-1008-4ee4-9a01-f7428e7f31c4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Rules of Professional Conduct to be observed by the members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia are set forth herein and any violation thereof; any assistance or inducement directed toward another for the purpose of producing a violation thereof; or any violation thereof through the acts of another, shall subject the offender to disciplinary action as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li> The levels of discipline are set forth below. The power to administer a more severe level of discipline shall include the power to administer the lesser:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disbarment: A form of public discipline removing the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases of serious misconduct. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Suspension: A form of public discipline which removes the respondent from the practice of law in Georgia for a definite period of time or until satisfaction of certain conditions imposed as a part of the suspension. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a public reprimand but less than disbarment. This level of discipline includes publication as provided by Rule 4-219(b).</li> \n <li>Public Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A public reprimand shall be administered by a judge of a superior court in open court. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a review panel reprimand but less than suspension.</li> \n <li>Review Panel Reprimand: A form of public discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A Review Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Review Panel at a meeting of the Review Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than an investigative panel reprimand but less than a public reprimand.</li> \n <li>Investigative Panel Reprimand: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. An Investigative Panel Reprimand shall be administered by the Investigative Panel at a meeting of the Investigative Panel. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit more than a formal admonition but less than a review panel reprimand.</li> \n <li>Formal Admonition: A form of confidential discipline which declares the respondent's conduct to have been improper but does not limit the right to practice. A formal admonition shall be administered by letter as provided in Rules 4-205 through 4-208. This level of discipline would be appropriate in cases that merit the lowest form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above following formal proceedings against a respondent; however, any case where discipline is imposed by the Court is a matter of public record despite the fact that the level of discipline would have been confidential if imposed by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>As provided in Part IV, Chapter 2 of the State Bar Rules, the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board may impose any of the levels of discipline set forth above provided that a respondent shall have the right to reject the imposition of discipline by the Investigative Panel pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-208.3;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Table of Contents, Preamble, Scope, Terminology and Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:</li> \n </ol> \n Contents \n Preamble, Scope and Terminology \n \nRules:    Client-Lawyer Relationship \n                \n1.0                                    Terminology \n1.1                                    Competence \n1.2                                    Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3                                    Diligence \n1.4                                    Communication \n1.5                                    Fees \n1.6                                    Confidentiality of Information \n1.7                                    Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8                                    Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9                                    Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10                                  Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11                                  Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12                                  Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13                                  Organization as Client    \n1.14                                  Client With Diminished Capacity \n1.15(I)                               Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II)                              Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III)                             Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16                                  Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17                                  Sale of Law Practice \n \n                Counselor \n \n2.1                                    Advisor \n2.2                                    (This Rule is Reserved) \n2.3                                    Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n2.4                                    Lawyer Serving as a Third Party Neutral \n \n                Advocate \n \n3.1                                    Meritorious Claims and Contentions    \n3.2                                    Expediting Litigation \n3.3                                    Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4                                    Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5                                    Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6                                    Trial Publicity \n3.7                                    Lawyer as Witness \n3.8                                    Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9                                    Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \n                Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n  \n4.1                                    Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2                                    Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3                                    Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4                                    Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \n               Law Firms and Associations \n \n5.1                                    Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \n5.2                                    Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3                                    Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4                                    Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5                                    Unauthorized Practice of Law: Multijurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6                                    Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7                                    Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \n                 Public Service \n \n6.1                                    Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service \n6.2                                    Accepting Appointments \n6.3                                    Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4                                    Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n \n                Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1                                    Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services \n7.2                                    Advertising \n7.3                                    Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4                                    Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5                                    Firm Names and Letterheads \n \n                Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1                                    Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2                                    Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3                                    Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4                                    Misconduct \n8.5                                    Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \n                Miscellaneous \n \n9.1                                    Reporting Requirements \n9.2                                    Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3                                    Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4                                    Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5                                    Lawyer as a Public Official </div>","UrlName":"revision46"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7daabdf1-451a-49d1-9f0f-ad03812aabe1","Title":"Contents","Content":" Rules: Client-Lawyer Relationship \n \n1.0 Terminology and Definitions \n1.1 Competence \n1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3 Diligence \n1.4 Communication \n1.5 Fees \n1.6 Confidentiality of Information \n1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12 Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13 Organization as Client \n1.14 Client under a Disability \n1.15(I) Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II) Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III) Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17 Sale of Law Practice \n1.18 Duties to Prospective Client \n \nCounselor \n \n2.1 Advisor \n2.2 (This rule is reserved.) \n2.3 Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n \nAdvocate \n \n3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions \n3.2 Expediting Litigation \n3.3 Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6 Trial Publicity \n3.7 Lawyer as Witness \n3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9 Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \nTransactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n \n4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \nLaw Firms and Associations \n \n5.1 Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyers \n5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5 Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6 Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7 Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \nPublic Service \n \n6.1 Voluntary Pro Bono Public Service \n6.2 Accepting Appointments \n6.3 Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4 Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n6.5 Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs\n Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services \n7.2 Advertising \n7.3 Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads \n \nMaintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2 Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4 Misconduct \n8.5 Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \nMiscellaneous \n \n9.1 Reporting Requirements \n9.2 Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3 Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4 Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5 Lawyer as a Public Official","UrlName":"rule70","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3254fea5-c24d-461b-8a15-5530a31eed26","Title":"PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES","Content":" [1] A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. \n \n[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. \n \n[3] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the these rules or other law. \n \n[4] A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the law, the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. \n \n[5] As a citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest. \n \n[6] A lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as by substantive and procedural law. A lawyer also is guided by conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service. \n \n[7] Reserved. \n \n[8] In the nature of law practice conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict among a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these rules, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules. \n \n[9] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested in the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n[10] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice. \n \n[11] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves. \n \n[12] The fulfillment of a lawyer's professional responsibility role requires an understanding by them of their relationship to our legal system. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.","UrlName":"rule74","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9afa4c06-904a-4b16-94e0-40aa21e2a658","Title":"SCOPE","Content":" [13] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the rules are imperatives, cast in the terms \"shall \"or \"shall not.\"These define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the terms \"may \"or \"should,\"are permissive or aspirational and define areas under the rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. Disciplinary action shall not be taken when the lawyer's conduct falls within the bounds of such discretion. The rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly aspirational and descriptive. Together they define a lawyer's professional role. Comments do not add obligations to or expand the rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the rules. \n \n[14] The rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general. Compliance with the rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. \n \n[15] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer's authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Bar Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, that may attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship will be established. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose depends on the circumstances and may be a question of fact. \n \n[16] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government entity may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized by law to represent several government entities in intergovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. They also may have authority to represent the \"public interest \"in circumstances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to do so. These rules do not abrogate any such authority. \n \n[17] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations. \n \n[18] The purpose of these rules is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. These rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the rule. Accordingly, nothing in the rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty. \n \n[19] Moreover, these rules are not intended to govern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege. In reliance on the attorney-client privilege, clients are entitled to expect that communications within the scope of the privilege will be protected against compelled disclosure. The attorney-client privilege is that of the client and not of the lawyer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer under the rules has a limited discretion to disclose a client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that information relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of such information may be judicially compelled only in accordance with recognized exceptions to the attorney-client and work product privileges. \n \n[20]Reserved. \n \n[21] The comment accompanying each rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the rule. The preamble and this note on scope provide general orientation. The comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative.","UrlName":"rule220","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"RULE 1.0. TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li>“Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct against a lawyer filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel and containing the name and signature of the complainant or initiated pursuant to Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law. \n(bb) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(cc) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(dd) “Willfull blindness” denotes awareness of a high probability that a fact exists and deliberate action to avoid learning of the fact. \n(ee) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"rule223","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0915bda9-a785-4194-b214-12b0666b9fa8","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n <li>“Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.</li> \n <li>“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.</li> \n <li>“Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.</li> \n </ol> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision294"},{"Id":"06d293c8-0303-4a5f-bb02-1426dc98b877","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 5","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li>“Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct against a lawyer filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel and containing the name and signature of the complainant or initiated pursuant to Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law. \n(bb) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(cc) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(dd) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision409"},{"Id":"bc1a4859-b8c4-4f17-8fff-17f572ee7964","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 4","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer.</li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>\"Prospective Client \"denotes a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter.</li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (aa) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance. \n(bb) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. \n(cc) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including but not limited to handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and electronic communications. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing. \n </div> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision389"},{"Id":"5286835f-4415-448b-ac8d-6169d3cf48a3","ParentId":"c936147c-d950-44cb-bab7-f2410666d768","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>“Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually thought the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Confidential Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Confirmed in writing” when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person, or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (l) for the definition of “informed consent.” If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.</li> \n <li>“Consult” or “consultation” denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.</li> \n <li> “Conviction” or “convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t a guilty plea; </li> \n <li> \t a plea of nolo contendere; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty; </li> \n <li> \t a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; or </li> \n <li> \t A plea entered under the Georgia First Offender Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in Georgia or another jurisdiction. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Domestic Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Firm” or “law firm” denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d); or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.</li> \n <li>“Foreign Lawyer” denotes a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive; not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.</li> \n <li>“Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance” denotes an allegation of unethical conduct filed against a lawyer. </li> \n <li>“He,” “Him” or “His” denotes generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.</li> \n <li>“Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.</li> \n <li>“Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice.</li> \n <li> “Nonlawyer” denotes a person not authorized to practice law by either the:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> \t Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules (including pro hac vice admission), or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any other state or territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or </li> \n <li> \t duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation.  </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>“Notice of Discipline” denotes a notice by the State Disciplinary Board that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n <li>“Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized pursuant to Bar Rule 1-203 (d), or a member of an association authorized to practice law. </li> \n <li>“Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License” denotes a Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this state. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>“Probable Cause” denotes a finding by the State Disciplinary Board that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the rules. </li> \n <li>“Public Proceedings” denotes any proceeding under these rules that has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.</li> \n <li>“Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.</li> \n <li>“Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.</li> \n <li>“Respondent” denotes a person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>“Screened” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these rules or other law.</li> \n <li>“Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a material matter of clear and weighty importance.</li> \n <li>“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.</li> \n <li>“Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or video recording and e-mail. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.</li> \n </ol> \n<div>Comment</div> \n[1] Bar Rule 4-110 includes additional definitions for terminology used in the procedural section of these rules. \nConfirmed in Writing \n[1A] If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client's informed consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter. \nFirm \n[2] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (e) can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rules. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. \n[3] With respect to the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[4] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these rules. \nFraud \n[5] When used in these rules, the terms \"fraud \"or \"fraudulent \"refers to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform. \nInformed Consent \n[6] Many of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.2 (c), 1.6 (a) and 1.7 (b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client's or other person's options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed consent. \n [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client's or other person's silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a person's consent be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.7 (b) and 1.9 (a) . For a definition of \"writing \"and \"confirmed in writing,\"see paragraphs (s) and (b). Other Rules require that a client's consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. See, e.g., Rules 1.8 (a) (3) and (g) . For a definition of \"signed,\"see paragraph (s). \nScreened \n[8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 and 1.12. \n[9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that confidential information known by the personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected lawyers of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the screened lawyer to avoid any communication with other firm personnel and any contact with any firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other firm personnel forbidding any communication with the screened lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by the screened lawyer to firm files or other materials relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other firm personnel. \n[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening. \nWriting \n [11] The purpose of this definition is to permit a lawyer to use developing technologies that maintain an objective record of a communication that does not rely upon the memory of the lawyer or any other person. See OCGA § 10-12-2(8). </div>","UrlName":"revision282"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f20144b-7054-4d80-84ac-f1211b551489","Title":"RULE 1.1 COMPETENCE","Content":" A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer's level of competence without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in question. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLegal Knowledge and Skill \n \n[1A] The purpose of these rules is not to give rise to a cause of action nor to create a presumption that a legal duty has been breached. These rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. \n \n[1B] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances. \n \n[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. \n \n[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client's interest. \n \n[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person subject to Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. \n \nThoroughness and Preparation \n \n[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more elaborate treatment than matters of lesser consequence. \n \nMaintaining Competence \n \n[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should engage in continuing study and education.","UrlName":"rule79","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4d1f67c8-77b9-4b06-a0b8-59b68ffa64f7","Title":"RULE 1.2 SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION AND ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.</li> \n <li>A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not either knowingly or with willful blindness counsel a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct, nor knowingly or with willful blindness assist a client in such conduct. However, a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nAllocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4 (a) (1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4 (a) (2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. \n \n[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16 (b) (4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16 (a) (3). \n \n[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time. \n \n[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering from diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14. \n \nIndependence from Client's Views or Activities \n \n[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities. \n \nAgreements Limiting Scope of Representation \n \n[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. \n \n[7] Although this rule affords the lawyer and the client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1. \n \n[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6. \n \nCriminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions \n \n[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. \n \n[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16 (a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1. \n \n[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary. \n \n[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent avoidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities. \n \n[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4 (a) (5). </div>","UrlName":"rule50","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9d080d94-78a4-498b-8c17-e968e402cca0","ParentId":"4d1f67c8-77b9-4b06-a0b8-59b68ffa64f7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.</li> \n <li>A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may limit the scope and objectives of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, nor knowingly assist a client in such conduct, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.</li> \n</ol>\n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nAllocation of Authority between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. \n \n[2] On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(b)(4). Conversely, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer. See Rule 1.16(a)(3). \n \n[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client may, however, revoke such authority at any time. \n \n[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering from diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14. \n \nIndependence from Client's Views or Activities \n \n[5] Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities. \n \nAgreements Limiting Scope of Representation \n \n[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer's services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to matters related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client's objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent. \n \n[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and the client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a client's objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer's services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1. \n \n[8] All agreements concerning a lawyer's representation of a client must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other law. See, e.g., Rules 1.1, 1.8 and 5.6. \n \nCriminal, Fraudulent and Prohibited Transactions \n \n[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity. \n \n[10] When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1. \n \n[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary. \n \n[12] Paragraph (d) applies whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Hence, a lawyer must not participate in a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent voidance of tax liability. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise. The last clause of paragraph (d) recognizes that determining the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation may require a course of action involving disobedience of the statute or regulation or of the interpretation placed upon it by governmental authorities. \n \n[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law or if the lawyer intends to act contrary to the client's instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct. See Rule 1.4(a)(5).","UrlName":"revision48"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0358fab6-2af3-4ea0-b55a-18edc0e83daa","Title":"RULE 1.3 DILIGENCE","Content":"A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.\n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. The lawyers duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect. \n  \n[2] A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently. \n \n[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable competence, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client. \n \n[4] Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will serve on a continuing basis. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client but has not been specifically instructed concerning pursuit of an appeal, the lawyer should advise the client of the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter.","UrlName":"rule52","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"39dbb7f3-4d74-4e12-aff1-04eb83ad420b","Title":"RULE 1.4. COMMUNICATION.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), is required by these rules;</li> \n <li>reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;</li> \n <li>keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;</li> \n <li>promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and</li> \n <li>consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation. \n \nCommunicating with Client \n \n[2] If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a) (1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's informed consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2 (a). \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a) (3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation. \n \n[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) (4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. A lawyer should promptly respond to or acknowledge client communications. The timeliness of a lawyer's communication must be judged by all the controlling factors. \"Prompt \"communication with the client does not equate to \"instant \"communication with the client and is sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n \nExplaining Matters \n \n[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, where there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h). \n \n[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. \n \nWithholding Information \n \n[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. </div>","UrlName":"rule54","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"4e5b8c7d-ef0e-41cb-93de-002aca41399f","ParentId":"39dbb7f3-4d74-4e12-aff1-04eb83ad420b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h), is required by these rules;</li> \n <li>reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;</li> \n <li>keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;</li> \n <li>promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and</li> \n <li>consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation. \n \nCommunicating with Client \n \n[2] If these rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a) (1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's informed consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2 (a). \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations - depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client - this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a) (3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation. \n \n[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) (4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. Client telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged. The timeliness of a lawyer's communication must be judged by all the controlling factors. \"Prompt \"communication with the client does not equate to \"instant \"communication with the client and is sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n \nExplaining Matters \n \n[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, where there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (h). \n \n[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client. \n \nWithholding Information \n \n[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. </div>","UrlName":"revision280"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d966e74f-47a5-4d8a-aeb5-236af01deab4","Title":"RULE 1.5 FEES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;</li> \n <li>the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;</li> \n <li>the amount involved and the results obtained;</li> \n <li>the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;</li> \n <li>the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;</li> \n <li>the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and</li> \n <li>whether the fee is fixed or contingent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client. \n To the extent that agreements to arbitrate disputes over fees or expenses are enforceable, a lawyer may enter into such an agreement with a client or prospective client if the client or prospective client gives informed consent in writing signed by the client or prospective client. The agreement to arbitrate and the attorney's disclosures regarding arbitration must be set out in a separate paragraph, written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract, and separately initialed by the client and the lawyer. </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.</li> \n <li> Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the outcome of the matter; and,</li> \n <li> if there is a recovery showing:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>the remittance to the client;</li> \n <li>the method of its determination;</li> \n <li>the amount of the attorney fee; and</li> \n <li>if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or</li> \n <li>a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;</li> \n <li>the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and</li> \n <li>the total fee is reasonable.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n  \n Comment \n \nReasonableness of Fee and Expenses \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer. \n \n[1A] A fee can also be unreasonable if it is illegal. Examples of illegal fees are those taken without required court approval, those that exceed the amount allowed by court order or statute, or those where acceptance of the fee would be unlawful, e.g., accepting controlled substances or sexual favors as payment. \n \nBasis or Rate of Fee \n \n[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth. \n \n[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. \n \nTerms of Payment \n \n[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16 (d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8 (j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8 (a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client. \n \n[5] An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. \n [5A] Paragraph (b) requires informed consent to an agreement to arbitrate disputes over fees and expenses. See Rule 1.0 (l). In obtaining such informed consent, the lawyer should reveal to the client or prospective client the following: (1) in an arbitration, the client or prospective client waives the right to a jury trial because the dispute will be resolved by an individual arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators; (2) generally, there is no right to an appeal from an arbitration decision; (3) arbitration may not permit the broad discovery that would be available in civil litigation; (4) how the costs of arbitration compared to the costs of litigation in a public court, including the requirement that the arbitrator or arbitrators be compensated; and (5) who will bear the cost of arbitration. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client regarding the existence and operation of the State Bar of Georgia's Fee Arbitration Program, regardless of whether the attorney seeks agreement to submit any future fee disputes to that program. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute over fees and expenses is not a waiver of the right to make a disciplinary complaint regarding the lawyer. \n \nProhibited Contingent Fees \n \n[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns. See Formal Advisory Opinions 36 and 47. \n \nDivision of Fee \n \n[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation. \n \n[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. \n \nDisputes over Fees \n \n[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the State Bar of Georgia, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure. </div>","UrlName":"rule55","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2129b43c-aa41-4262-a297-c2073d93a652","ParentId":"d966e74f-47a5-4d8a-aeb5-236af01deab4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;</li> \n <li>the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;</li> \n <li>the amount involved and the results obtained;</li> \n <li>the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;</li> \n <li>the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;</li> \n <li>the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and</li> \n <li>whether the fee is fixed or contingent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.</li> \n <li> Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the outcome of the matter; and,</li> \n <li> if there is a recovery showing:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>the remittance to the client;</li> \n <li>the method of its determination;</li> \n <li>the amount of the attorney fee; and</li> \n <li>if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or</li> \n <li>a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;</li> \n <li>the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and</li> \n <li>the total fee is reasonable.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n  \n \n Comment \n \nReasonableness of Fee and Expenses \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers charge fees that are reasonable under the circumstances. The factors specified in (1) through (8) are not exclusive. Nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must be reasonable. A lawyer may seek reimbursement for the cost of services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging a reasonable amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reasonably reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer. \n \n[1A] A fee can also be unreasonable if it is illegal. Examples of illegal fees are those taken without required court approval, those that exceed the amount allowed by court order or statute, or those where acceptance of the fee would be unlawful, e.g., accepting controlled substances or sexual favors as payment. \n \nBasis or Rate of Fee \n \n[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those that are directly involved in its computation. It is sufficient, for example, to state that the basic rate is an hourly charge or a fixed amount or an estimated amount, or to identify the factors that may be taken into account in finally fixing the fee. When developments occur during the representation that render an earlier estimate substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided to the client. A written statement concerning the fee reduces the possibility of misunderstanding. Furnishing the client with a simple memorandum or a copy of the lawyer's customary fee schedule is sufficient if the basis or rate of the fee is set forth. \n \n[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule. In determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. \n \nTerms of Payment \n \n[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(d). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(j). However, a fee paid in property instead of money may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client. \n \n[5] An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. However, it is proper to define the extent of services in light of the client's ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. \n \nProhibited Contingent Fees \n \n[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained. This provision does not preclude a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders because such contracts do not implicate the same policy concerns. See Formal Advisory Opinions 36 and 47. \n \nDivision of Fee \n \n[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well. Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation. \n \n[8] Paragraph (e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. \n \nDisputes over Fees \n \n[9] If a procedure has been established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration or mediation procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it. Law may prescribe a procedure for determining a lawyer's fee, for example, in representation of an executor or administrator, a class or a person entitled to a reasonable fee as part of the measure of damages. The lawyer entitled to such a fee and a lawyer representing another party concerned with the fee should comply with the prescribed procedure. </div>","UrlName":"revision50"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bb7b9ba2-53ef-45ae-a307-e637e4a49b9b","Title":"RULE 1.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;</li> \n <li>to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by subparagraph (i) above;</li> \n <li>to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules.</li> \n <li>to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer's change of employment or changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In a situation described in paragraph (b) (1), if the client has acted at the time the lawyer learns of the threat of harm or loss to a victim, use or disclosure is permissible only if the harm or loss has not yet occurred.</li> \n <li>Before using or disclosing information pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (i) or (ii), if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duty of confidentiality shall continue after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. See Rule 1.18. \n \n[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance. \n \n[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. \n \n[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. \n \n[4A] RESERVED \n \n[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. Rule 1.6 applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information gained in the professional relationship, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope. The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the client's policy goals. \n \nAuthorized Disclosure \n \n[6] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. \n \n[7] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. \n \n[7A] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized paragraph (b) (1) (iv) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n \nDisclosure Adverse to Client \n \n[8] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. \n \n[9] Several situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3 (a) (4) not to use false evidence. \n \n[10] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2 (d), because to \"knowingly assist \"criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. \n \n[11] Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal and likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b) (1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent death or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes will occur. It is very difficult for a lawyer to \"know \"when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. \n \n[12] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b) (1) does not violate this rule. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[13] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a) (1). \n \n[14] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8 (b) nor Rule 1.16 (d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. \n \n[15] Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b). \n \nDispute Concerning a Lawyer's Conduct \n \n[16] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b) (1) (iii) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n \n[17] If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b) (1) (iii) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure. \nDetection of Conflicts of Interest \n[18] Paragraph (b) (1) (v) recognizes that lawyers in different firms may need to disclose limited information to each other to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, such as when a lawyer is considering an association with another firm, two or more firms are considering a merger, or a lawyer is considering the purchase of a law practice. See Rule 1.17, Comment [6]. Under these circumstances, lawyers and law firms are permitted to disclose limited information, but only once substantive discussions regarding the new relationship have occurred. Any such disclosure should ordinarily include no more than the identity of the persons and entities involved in a matter, a brief summary of the general issues involved, and information about whether the matter has terminated. Even this limited information, however, should be disclosed only to the extent reasonably necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interests that might arise from the possible new relationship. Moreover, the disclosure of any information is prohibited if it would compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client (e.g., the fact that a corporate client is seeking advice on a corporate takeover that has not been publicly announced; that a person has consulted a lawyer about the possibility of divorce before the person’s intentions are known to the person’s spouse; or that a person has consulted a lawyer about a criminal investigation that has not led to a public charge). Under those circumstances, paragraph (a) prohibits disclosure unless the client or former client gives informed consent. A lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the lawyer’s firm may also govern a lawyer’s conduct when exploring an association with another firm and is beyond the scope of these rules. \n[19] Any information disclosed pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (v) may be used or further disclosed only to the extent necessary to detect and resolve conflicts of interest. Paragraph (b) (1) (v) does not restrict the use of information acquired by means independent of any disclosure pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (v). Paragraph (b) (1) (v) also does not affect the disclosure of information within a law firm when the disclosure is otherwise authorized, see Comment [7], such as when a lawyer in a firm discloses information to another lawyer in the same firm to detect and resolve conflicts of interest that could arise in connection with undertaking a new representation. \nDisclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized \n [20] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client. \n \n[21] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession. \n[22] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified. Where practicable, the lawyer should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n[23] Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client’s representation to accomplish the purposes specified. In exercising the discretion conferred by this rule, the lawyer may consider such factors as the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer’s own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. A lawyer’s decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this rule. Disclosure may be required, however, by other rules. Some rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2 (d), 4.1 (b), and 8.1. Rule 3.3, on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted by this rule. See Rule 3.3 (b). \nActing Competently to Preserve Confidentiality \n[24] A lawyer should make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information covered by this Rule.  A lawyer should make reasonable efforts to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use). Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s information in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond the scope of these rules. \n[25] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer should take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to comply with other laws, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these rules.</div>","UrlName":"rule57","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"963c68dc-cfa0-459e-8cc3-b2b5f08dc416","ParentId":"bb7b9ba2-53ef-45ae-a307-e637e4a49b9b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the court.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;</li> \n <li>to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by subparagraph (i) above;</li> \n <li>to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client;</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In a situation described in paragraph (b) (1), if the client has acted at the time the lawyer learns of the threat of harm or loss to a victim, use or disclosure is permissible only if the harm or loss has not yet occurred.</li> \n <li>Before using or disclosing information pursuant to paragraph (b) (1) (i) or (ii), if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The lawyer may, where the law does not otherwise require, reveal information to which the duty of confidentiality does not apply under paragraph (b) without being subjected to disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>The lawyer shall reveal information under paragraph (b) as the applicable law requires.</li> \n <li>The duty of confidentiality shall continue after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The lawyer is part of a judicial system charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid any violation of the law in the proper exercise of their rights. \n \n[2] The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance. \n \n[3] Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld. \n \n[4] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation. The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. \n \n[4A] Information gained in the professional relationship includes information gained from a person (prospective client) who discusses the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, the restrictions and exceptions of these rules as to use or revelation of the information apply, e.g. Rules 1.9 and 1.10. \n \n[5] The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. Rule 1.6 applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information gained in the professional relationship, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. See also Scope. The requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship applies to government lawyers who may disagree with the client's policy goals. \n \nAuthorized Disclosure \n \n[6] A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client's instructions or special circumstances limit that authority. In litigation, for example, a lawyer may disclose information by admitting a fact that cannot properly be disputed, or in negotiation by making a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion. \n \n[7] Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers. \n \n[7A] A lawyer's confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about the lawyer's personal responsibility to comply with these rules. In most situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized paragraph (b) (1) (iv) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer's compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n \nDisclosure Adverse to Client \n \n[8] The confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. \n \n[9] Several situations must be distinguished. First, the lawyer may not knowingly assist a client in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent. See Rule 1.2 (d). Similarly, a lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3 (a) (4) not to use false evidence. \n \n[10] Second, the lawyer may have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2 (d), because to \"knowingly assist \"criminal or fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character. \n \n[11] Third, the lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective conduct that is criminal and likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm. As stated in paragraph (b) (1), the lawyer has professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent such consequences. The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent death or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes will occur. It is very difficult for a lawyer to \"know \"when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. \n \n[12] The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in question. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b) (1) does not violate this rule. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[13] If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16 (a) (1). \n \n[14] After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8 (b) nor Rule 1.16 (d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like. \n \n[15] Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule 1.13 (b). \n \nDispute Concerning a Lawyer's Conduct \n \n[16] Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges complicity of the lawyer in a client's conduct or other misconduct of the lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. The same is true with respect to a claim involving the conduct or representation of a former client. The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity has been made. Paragraph (b) (1) (iii) does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding that charges such complicity, so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an assertion. The right to defend, of course, applies where a proceeding has been commenced. Where practicable and not prejudicial to the lawyer's ability to establish the defense, the lawyer should advise the client of the third party's assertion and request that the client respond appropriately. In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable. \n \n[17] If the lawyer is charged with wrongdoing in which the client's conduct is implicated, the rule of confidentiality should not prevent the lawyer from defending against the charge. Such a charge can arise in a civil, criminal or professional disciplinary proceeding, and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client, or on a wrong alleged by a third person; for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together. A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b) (1) (iii) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary. As stated above, the lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure. \n \nDisclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized \n \n[18] The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions. If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client, absent waiver by the client, paragraph (a) requires the lawyer to invoke the privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client. \n \n[19] The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a matter of interpretation beyond the scope of these rules, but a presumption should exist against such a supersession. </div>","UrlName":"revision321"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"179833f9-065d-4c1f-80c1-792594c90dac","Title":"RULE 1.7 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: GENERAL RULE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).</li> \n <li> If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation after:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0 (c);</li> \n <li>having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation, and</li> \n <li>having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>is prohibited by law or these rules;</li> \n <li>includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or</li> \n <li>involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Though otherwise subject to the provisions of this rule, a part-time prosecutor who engages in the private practice of law may represent a private client adverse to the state or other political subdivision that the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, except with regard to matters for which the part-time prosecutor had or has prosecutorial authority or responsibility.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLoyalty to a Client \n \n[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. If an impermissible conflict of interest exists before representation is undertaken the representation should be declined. The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest. \n \n[2] Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (a) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. \n  \n[3] If an impermissible conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment 4 to Rule 1.3 and Scope. \n \n[4] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. Paragraph (d) states an exception to that general rule. A part-time prosecutor does not automatically have a conflict of interest in representing a private client who is adverse to the state or other political subdivision (such as a city or county) that the lawyer represents as a part-time prosecutor, although it is possible that in a particular case, the part-time prosecutor could have a conflict of interest under paragraph (a). \n \nSimultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require informed consent of the respective clients. \n \nConsultation and Informed Consent \n \n[5] A client may give informed consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's informed consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain informed consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to give informed consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to give informed consent. If informed consent is withdrawn, the lawyer should consult Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.16. \n \n[5A] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0 (b). See also Rule 1.0 (s) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0 (b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. \n \nLawyer's Interests \n \n[6] The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the propriety of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client objective advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. \n \nConflicts in Litigation \n \n[7] Paragraph (c) (2) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same or a similar proceeding including simultaneous representation of parties whose interests may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal, the requirements of paragraph (b) are met, and consent is not prohibited by paragraph (c). \n  \n[8] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients give informed consent as required by paragraph (b). By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government entity is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. \n \n[9] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases while they are pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so should one or more of the cases reach the appellate court. \n \nInterest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service \n \n[10] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and gives informed consent and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8 (f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the clients give informed consent and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. \n \nNon-litigation Conflicts \n \n[11] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for material and adverse effect include the duration and extent of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. \n \n[12] In a negotiation common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest among them. \n \n[13] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved. \n \n[14] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director. \n \nConflict Charged by an Opposing Party \n \n[15] Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope. \n [16] For the purposes of 1.7 (d), part-time prosecutors include but are not limited to part-time solicitors-general, part-time assistant solicitors-general, part-time probate court prosecutors, part-time magistrate court prosecutors, part-time municipal court prosecutors, special assistant attorneys general, part-time juvenile court prosecutors and prosecutors pro tem. \n \n[17] Pragmatic considerations require that the rules treat a lawyer serving as a part-time prosecutor differently. See Thompson v. State, 254 Ga. 393, 396-397 (1985). \n \nSpecial Considerations in Common Representation \n \n[18] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients. \n \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule58","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3c263cdc-75e0-462c-ad1f-5e5a5627313a","ParentId":"179833f9-065d-4c1f-80c1-792594c90dac","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).</li> \n <li> If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation after:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>consultation with the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.0(c);</li> \n <li>having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation, and</li> \n <li>having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>is prohibited by law or these Rules;</li> \n <li>includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or</li> \n <li>involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nLoyalty to a Client \n \n[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. If an impermissible conflict of interest exists before representation is undertaken the representation should be declined. The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues involved and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest. \n \n[2] Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (a) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. \n  \n[3] If an impermissible conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment 4 to Rule 1.3 and Scope. \n \n[4] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Paragraphs (b) and (c) express that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require informed consent of the respective clients. \n \nConsultation and Informed Consent \n \n[5] A client may give informed consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's informed consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain informed consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to give informed consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to give informed consent. If informed consent is withdrawn, the lawyer should consult Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.16. \n \n[5A] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(s) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. \n \nLawyer's Interests \n \n[6] The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the propriety of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client objective advice. A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest. \n \nConflicts in Litigation \n \n[7] Paragraph (c)(2) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same or a similar proceeding including simultaneous representation of parties whose interests may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal, the requirements of paragraph (b) are met, and consent is not prohibited by paragraph (c). \n  \n[8] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients give informed consent as required by paragraph (b). By the same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in which a government entity is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation. \n \n[9] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases while they are pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so should one or more of the cases reach the appellate court. \n \nInterest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service \n \n[10] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and gives informed consent and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal representation of the directors or employees, if the clients give informed consent and the arrangement ensures the lawyer's professional independence. \n \nNon-litigation Conflicts \n \n[11] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in determining whether there is potential for material and adverse effect include the duration and extent of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. \n \n[12] In a negotiation common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference of interest among them. \n \n[13] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved. \n \n[14] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director. \n \nConflict Charged by an Opposing Party \n \n[15] Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call into question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope. \n ","UrlName":"revision4"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"6c1fcca2-0b79-4c3c-94a0-b42a00e94a27","Title":"RULE 1.8 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall neither enter into a business transaction with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer's professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;</li> \n <li>the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use information gained in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these rules.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.</li> \n <li>Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n <ol> \n <li>a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or</li> \n <li>a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:\n <ol> \n <li>the client gives informed consent;</li> \n <li>there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and</li> \n <li>information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for or against the clients, nor in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyers disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law, and the client is independently represented by a lawyer in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith. To the extent that agreements to arbitrate disputes over a lawyer's liability for malpractice are enforceable, a lawyer may enter into such an agreement with a client or a prospective client if the client or prospective client gives informed consent in writing signed by the client or prospective client. The agreement to arbitrate and the attorney's disclosures regarding arbitration must be set out in a separate paragraph, written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract, and separately initialed by the client and the lawyer. </li> \n <li>A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer has actual knowledge is represented by the other lawyer unless his or her client gives informed consent regarding the relationship. The disqualification stated in this paragraph is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:\n <ol> \n <li>acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses as long as the exercise of the lien is not prejudicial to the client with respect to the subject of the representation; and</li> \n <li>contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, except as prohibited by Rule 1.5.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8 (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8 (a) and 1.8 (c)-(j) is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nTransactions Between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1A] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. The client should be fully informed of the true nature of the lawyer's interest or lack of interest in all aspects of the transaction. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's informed consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable. \n  \nUse of Information to the Disadvantage of the Client \n  \n[1B] It is a general rule that an attorney will not be permitted to make use of knowledge, or information, acquired by the attorney through the professional relationship with the client, or in the conduct of the client's business, to the disadvantage of the client. Paragraph (b) follows this general rule and provides that the client may waive this prohibition. However, if the waiver is conditional, the duty is on the attorney to comply with the condition. \n \nGifts from Clients \n \n[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the objective advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial. \n \nLiterary Rights \n \n[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the subject of the representation creates a conflict between the interest of the client and the personal interest of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j) of this rule. \n \nFinancial Assistance to Clients \n \n[4] Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above. \n \nPayment for a Lawyer's Services from One Other Than The Client \n  \n[5] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4 (c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another). \n \nSettlement of Aggregated Claims \n \n[6] Paragraph (g) requires informed consent. This requirement is not met by a blanket consent prior to settlement that the majority decision will rule. \n \nAgreements to Limit Liability \n \n[7] A lawyer may not condition an agreement to withdraw or the return of a client's documents on the client's release of claims. However, this paragraph is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in opinions and memoranda. \n \n[8] A lawyer should not seek prospectively, by contract or other means, to limit the lawyer's individual liability to a client for the lawyer's malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of a client properly has no need to attempt to limit liability for the lawyer's professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of clients properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer may, however, practice law as a partner, member, or shareholder of a limited liability partnership, professional association, limited liability company, or professional corporation. \nArbitration \n [8A] Paragraph (h) requires informed consent to an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims. See Rule 1.0 (l). In obtaining such informed consent, the laywer should reveal to the client or prospective client the following: (1) in an arbitration, the client of prospective client waives the right to a jury because the dispute will be resolved by an individual arbitrator or a panel or arbitrators; (2) generally, there is no right to an appeal from an arbitration decision; (3) arbitration may not permit the broad discovery that would be available in civil litigation; (4) how the costs of arbitration compare to the costs of litigation in a public court, including the requirement that the arbitrator or arbitrators be compensated; and (5) who will bear the costs of arbitration. The lawyer should also inform the client or prospective client that an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims over fees and expenses is not a waiver of the right to make a disciplinary complaint regarding the lawyer. \n \nFamily Relationships Between Lawyers \n \n[9] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. \n \nAcquisition of Interest in Litigation \n \n[10] Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in the common law prohibition of champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for lawyer's fees and for certain advances of costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e). </div>","UrlName":"rule60","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1547bf53-9f72-45e5-8253-a31aa5d7ae8d","ParentId":"6c1fcca2-0b79-4c3c-94a0-b42a00e94a27","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall neither enter into a business transaction with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer's professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;</li> \n <li>the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use information gained in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.</li> \n <li>Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n <ol> \n <li>a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or</li> \n <li>a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:\n <ol> \n <li>the client gives informed consent;</li> \n <li>there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and</li> \n <li>information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims for or against the clients, nor in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyers disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.</li> \n <li>A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person whom the lawyer has actual knowledge is represented by the other lawyer unless his or her client gives informed consent regarding the relationship. The disqualification stated in this paragraph is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:\n <ol> \n <li>acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses as long as the exercise of the lien is not prejudicial to the client with respect to the subject of the representation; and</li> \n <li>contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, except as prohibited by Rule 1.5.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.8(a) and 1.8(c)-(j) is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nTransactions Between Client and Lawyer \n \n[1A] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. The client should be fully informed of the true nature of the lawyer's interest or lack of interest in all aspects of the transaction. In such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's informed consent, seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable. \n  \nUse of Information to the Disadvantage of the Client \n  \n[1B] It is a general rule that an attorney will not be permitted to make use of knowledge, or information, acquired by the attorney through the professional relationship with the client, or in the conduct of the client's business, to the disadvantage of the client. Paragraph (b) follows this general rule and provides that the client may waive this prohibition. However, if the waiver is conditional, the duty is on the attorney to comply with the condition. \n \nGifts from Clients \n \n[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should have the objective advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial. \n \nLiterary Rights \n \n[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the subject of the representation creates a conflict between the interest of the client and the personal interest of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5 and paragraph (j) of this Rule. \n \nFinancial Assistance to Clients \n \n[4] Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above. \n \nPayment for a Lawyer's Services from One Other Than The Client \n  \n[5] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another). \n \nSettlement of Aggregated Claims \n \n[6] Paragraph (g) requires informed consent. This requirement is not met by a blanket consent prior to settlement that the majority decision will rule. \n \nAgreements to Limit Liability \n \n[7] A lawyer may not condition an agreement to withdraw or the return of a client's documents on the client's release of claims. However, this paragraph is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in opinions and memoranda. \n \n[8] A lawyer should not seek prospectively, by contract or other means, to limit the lawyer's individual liability to a client for the lawyer's malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of a client properly has no need to attempt to limit liability for the lawyer's professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of clients properly should not be permitted to do so. A lawyer may, however, practice law as a partner, member, or shareholder of a limited liability partnership, professional association, limited liability company, or professional corporation. \n \nFamily Relationships Between Lawyers \n \n[9] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. \n \nAcquisition of Interest in Litigation \n \n[10] Paragraph (j) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in the common law prohibition of champerty and maintenance, is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for lawyer's fees and for certain advances of costs of litigation set forth in paragraph (e). </div>","UrlName":"revision51"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d1647878-baba-429a-8b11-8c4f60290964","Title":"RULE 1.9 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: FORMER CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and</li> \n <li>about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c), that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or</li> \n <li>reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this rule. Under this rule for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11. \n \n[2] The scope of a \"matter \"for purposes of this rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. \n \n[3] Matters are \"substantially related \"for purposes of this rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services. \n \nLawyers Moving Between Firms \n  \n[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. \n \n[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10 (b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm. \n \n[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. \n \n[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9 (c). \n \n[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. \n \n[9] The provisions of this rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0 (b) and (h). With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10. </div>","UrlName":"rule61","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ae93d6f-b0aa-45e5-8088-bf2d4c1fc7e7","ParentId":"d1647878-baba-429a-8b11-8c4f60290964","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and</li> \n <li>about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), that is material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or</li> \n <li>reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with this Rule. Under this Rule for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former client. So also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11. \n \n[2] The scope of a \"matter \"for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. \n \n[3] Matters are \"substantially related \"for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if there otherwise is a substantial risk that confidential information as would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client's position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person's spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client's policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation; on the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services. \n \nLawyers Moving Between Firms \n  \n[4] When lawyers have been associated within a firm but then end their association, the question of whether a lawyer should undertake representation is more complicated. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many lawyers to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputation were applied with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. \n \n[5] Paragraph (b) operates to disqualify the lawyer only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge or information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. See Rule 1.10(b) for the restrictions on a firm once a lawyer has terminated association with the firm. \n \n[6] Application of paragraph (b) depends on a situation's particular facts, aided by inferences, deductions or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm's clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussions of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. In such an inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. \n \n[7] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). \n \n[8] Paragraph (c) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. \n \n[9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraphs (a) and (b). See Rule 1.0(b) and (h). With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10. </div>","UrlName":"revision52"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3d8ef04b-23ce-4883-b52f-67ca784694d4","Title":"RULE 1.10 IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8 (c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.</li> \n <li> When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and</li> \n <li>any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9 (c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \nDefinition of \"Firm \" \n[1] For purposes of these rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. \n[2] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation. \n[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (a) and (b): Successive Government and Private Employment; where a lawyer represents the government after having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (c) (1): Successive Government and Private Employment. The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule and 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. \n[5] Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. However, if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and, thus, has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. \nPrinciples of Imputed Disqualification \n[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9 (b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.10 (b): Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. \n[7] Rule 1.10 (b): Imputed Disqualification operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9 (c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.</div>","UrlName":"rule86","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"39b7e9f5-9ade-497b-8c70-1a8d0a95e14c","ParentId":"3d8ef04b-23ce-4883-b52f-67ca784694d4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.</li> \n <li> When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and</li> \n <li>any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \nDefinition of \"Firm \" \n[1] For purposes of these Rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. \n[2] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. \n[3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation. \n[4] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b): Successive Government and Private Employment; where a lawyer represents the government after having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(c)(1): Successive Government and Private Employment. The individual lawyer involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule and 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. \n[5] Different provisions are thus made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. The government is entitled to protection of its client confidences and, therefore, to the protections provided in Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information, 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. However, if the more extensive disqualification in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to former government lawyers, the potential effect on the government would be unduly burdensome. The government deals with all private citizens and organizations and, thus, has a much wider circle of adverse legal interests than does any private law firm. In these circumstances, the government's recruitment of lawyers would be seriously impaired if Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification were applied to the government. On balance, therefore, the government is better served in the long run by the protections stated in Rule 1.11: Successive Government and Private Employment. \nPrinciples of Imputed Disqualification \n[6] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b): Conflict of Interest: Former Client, and 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. \n[7] Rule 1.10(b): Imputed Disqualification operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client.</div>","UrlName":"revision53"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0acc2933-f3df-436b-b82d-ad55711fcb4f","Title":"RULE 1.11 SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government entity gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is duly given to the client and to the appropriate government entity to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.</li> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or</li> \n <li>negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12 (b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12 (b).</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> As used in this rule, the term \"matter \"includes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and</li> \n <li>any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government entity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>As used in this rule, the term \"confidential government information \"means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. It is a counterpart of Rule 1.10 (b), which applies to lawyers moving from one firm to another. \n[2] A lawyer representing a government entity, whether employed or specially retained by the government, is subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In addition, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government entity may give consent under this rule. \n[3] Where the successive clients are a public entity and a private client, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government entity should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. \n[4] When the client is an agency of one government, that agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. \n[5] Paragraphs (a) (1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. \n[6] Paragraph (a) (2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the government entity at a time when premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order that the government entity will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer is not complying. \n[7] Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer. \n[8] Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government entity when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law. \n[9] Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the entity with which the lawyer in question has become associated.</div>","UrlName":"rule90","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9819c8a5-48a8-4555-ada1-fd19b5986ad3","ParentId":"0acc2933-f3df-436b-b82d-ad55711fcb4f","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government entity gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is duly given to the client and to the appropriate government entity to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.</li> \n <li> Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or</li> \n <li>negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b).</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> As used in this Rule, the term \"matter \"includes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and</li> \n <li>any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government entity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>As used in this Rule, the term \"confidential government information \"means information which has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and which is not otherwise available to the public.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This Rule prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. It is a counterpart of Rule 1.10(b), which applies to lawyers moving from one firm to another. \n[2] A lawyer representing a government entity, whether employed or specially retained by the government, is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against representing adverse interests stated in Rule 1.7 and the protections afforded former clients in Rule 1.9. In addition, such a lawyer is subject to Rule 1.11 and to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government entity may give consent under this Rule. \n[3] Where the successive clients are a public entity and a private client, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in public authority might be used for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service. However, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government entity should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public service. \n[4] When the client is an agency of one government, that agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this Rule if the lawyer thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. \n[5] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (b) do not prohibit a lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement. They prohibit directly relating the lawyer's compensation to the fee in the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. \n[6] Paragraph (a)(2) does not require that a lawyer give notice to the government entity at a time when premature disclosure would injure the client; a requirement for premature disclosure might preclude engagement of the lawyer. Such notice is, however, required to be given as soon as practicable in order that the government entity will have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer is not complying. \n[7] Paragraph (b) operates only when the lawyer in question has knowledge of the information, which means actual knowledge; it does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer. \n[8] Paragraphs (a) and (c) do not prohibit a lawyer from jointly representing a private party and a government entity when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law. \n[9] Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the entity with which the lawyer in question has become associated.</div>","UrlName":"revision54"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e39b427e-f692-412a-b382-185913c92ba3","Title":"RULE 1.12 FORMER JUDGE OR ARBITRATOR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.</li> \n <li> If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThis rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term \"personally and substantially \"signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. The term \"adjudicative officer \"includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not \"act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.\"Although phrased differently from this rule, those rules correspond in meaning.</div>","UrlName":"rule93","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"6ebe642e-55da-4665-adee-8bb95321e16f","ParentId":"e39b427e-f692-412a-b382-185913c92ba3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator. In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.</li> \n <li> If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and</li> \n <li>written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThis Rule generally parallels Rule 1.11. The term \"personally and substantially \"signifies that a judge who was a member of a multimember court, and thereafter left judicial office to practice law, is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter pending in the court, but in which the former judge did not participate. So also the fact that a former judge exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. The term \"adjudicative officer \"includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers, and also lawyers who serve as part-time judges. Compliance Canons A(2), B(2) and C of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide that a part-time judge, judge pro tempore or retired judge recalled to active service, may not \"act as a lawyer in any proceeding in which he served as a judge or in any other proceeding related thereto.\"Although phrased differently from this Rule, those rules correspond in meaning.</div>","UrlName":"revision55"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3f4b6e1c-3da9-448f-b9bc-4c1f8b196f87","Title":"RULE 1.13 ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.</li> \n <li>If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.</li> \n <li> Except as provided in paragraph (d), if\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and</li> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c ), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.</li> \n <li>In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.</li> \n <li>A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThe Organization as the Client \n[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. \"Other constituents \"as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations. \n[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. \n[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0 (i), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. \n[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant consideration. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. \n[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation. \nRelation to Other Rules \n[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other rules. In particular, this rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this rule supplements Rule 1.6 (b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6 (b) (1). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyers' representation of the organization. In such circumstances Rule 1.2 (d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16 (a) (1) may be required. \n[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim. \n[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. \nGovernmental Organization \n[9] The duty defined in this rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these rules. See Scope [16]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business in involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This rule does not limit that authority. See Scope [16]. \nClarifying the Lawyer's Role \n[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged. \n[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case. \nDual Representation \n[12] Paragraph (g) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder. \nDerivative Actions \n[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization. \n[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.</div>","UrlName":"rule97","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"29994363-3ff9-42e9-a318-129638717b79","ParentId":"3f4b6e1c-3da9-448f-b9bc-4c1f8b196f87","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.</li> \n <li>If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.</li> \n <li> Except as provided in paragraph (d), if\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and</li> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c ), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal.</li> \n <li>In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.</li> \n <li>A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \nThe Organization as the Client \n[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. \"Other constituents \"as used in this Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations. \n[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. \n[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. As defined in Rule 1.0(i), knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. \n[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant consideration. Ordinarily, referral to a higher authority would be necessary. In some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider the matter; for example, if the circumstances involve a constituent's innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer's advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer's advice, it will be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. \n[5] Paragraph (b) also makes clear that when it is reasonably necessary to enable the organization to address the matter in a timely and appropriate manner, the lawyer must refer the matter to higher authority, including, if warranted by the circumstances, the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization under applicable law. The organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation. \nRelation to Other Rules \n[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rules 1.8, 1.16, 3.3 or 4.1. Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule 1.6(b) by providing an additional basis upon which the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation, but does not modify, restrict, or limit the provisions of Rule 1.6(b)(1). Under paragraph (c) the lawyer may reveal such information only when the organization's highest authority insists upon or fails to address threatened or ongoing action that is clearly a violation of law, and then only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain substantial injury to the organization. It is not necessary that the lawyer's services be used in furtherance of the violation, but it is required that the matter be related to the lawyers' representation of the organization. In such circumstances Rule 1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event, withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16(a)(1) may be required. \n[7] Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation in circumstances described in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim. \n[8] A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b) or (c), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of these paragraphs, must proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. \nGovernmental Organization \n[9] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Scope [16]. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business in involved. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This Rule does not limit that authority. See Scope [16]. \nClarifying the Lawyer's Role \n[10] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged. \n[11] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may turn on the facts of each case. \nDual Representation \n[12] Paragraph (e) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder. \nDerivative Actions \n[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization. \n[14] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.</div>","UrlName":"revision56"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b4525c0d-731a-4122-a984-e0f1db856652","Title":"RULE 1.14 CLIENT WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.</li> \n <li>When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.</li> \n <li>Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6 (a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished mental capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions. \n \n[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication. \n \n[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the lawyer should consider such participation in terms of its effect on the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf. \n \n[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2 (d). \n \nTaking Protective Action \n \n[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-making tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections. \n \n[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. \n \n[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client. \n \nDisclosure of the Client's Condition \n \n[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. \n \nEmergency Legal Assistance \n \n[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client. \n \n[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken. \n \n[11] This rule is not violated if a lawyer acts in good faith to comply with the rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule107","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"de6f6d4d-713d-4367-97e2-a05c3318f02b","ParentId":"b4525c0d-731a-4122-a984-e0f1db856652","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.</li> \n <li>When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.</li> \n <li>Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severly incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished mental capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody. So also, it is recognized that some persons of advanced age can be quite capable of handling routine financial matters while needing special legal protection concerning major transactions. \n \n[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to treat the client with attention and respect. Even if the person does have a legal representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communication. \n \n[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. When necessary to assist in the representation, the lawyer should consider such participation in terms of its effect on the applicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client's interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client's behalf. \n \n[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d). \n \nTaking Protective Action \n \n[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a normal client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take protective measures deemed necessary. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into the client's decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social connections. \n \n[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. \n \n[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client's benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client. \n \nDisclosure of the Client's Condition \n \n[8] Disclosure of the client's diminished capacity could adversely affect the client's interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted with will act adversely to the client's interests before discussing matters related to the client. The lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. \n \nEmergency Legal Assistance \n \n[9] In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such person even though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. The lawyer should take legal action on behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer would with respect to a client. \n \n[10] A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such emergency actions taken. \n \n[11] This Rule is not violated if a lawyer acts in good faith to comply with the Rule. </div>","UrlName":"revision57"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fab74617-b734-48a1-ab5a-beca89919b7d","Title":"RULE 1.15(I) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - GENERAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.</li> \n <li> For the purposes of this rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person's interest in funds or other property in the lawyer's possession if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the interest is known to the lawyer, and</li> \n <li> the interest is based upon one of the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A statutory lien;</li> \n <li>A final judgment addressing disposition of those funds or property; or</li> \n <li>A written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The lawyer may disregard the third person's claimed interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement. </li> \n <li>Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.</li> \n <li>When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. \n[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration or interpleader. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed. \n[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party. The obligations of a lawyer under this rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction. \n[3A] In those cases where it is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds or property. \n[4] A \"clients' security fund \"provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.</div>","UrlName":"rule42","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2910a926-e4e3-470b-aaee-83e6228535a2","ParentId":"fab74617-b734-48a1-ab5a-beca89919b7d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall hold funds or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own funds or other property. Funds shall be kept in one or more separate accounts maintained in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1). Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of six years after termination of the representation.</li> \n <li> For the purposes of this Rule, a lawyer may not disregard a third person's interest in funds or other property in the lawyer's possession if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the interest is known to the lawyer, and</li> \n <li> the interest is based upon one of the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A statutory lien;</li> \n <li>A final judgment addressing disposition of those funds or property; or</li> \n <li>A written agreement by the client or the lawyer on behalf of the client guaranteeing payment out of those funds or property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The lawyer may disregard the third person's claimed interest if the lawyer reasonably concludes that there is a valid defense to such lien, judgment, or agreement. </li> \n <li>Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.</li> \n <li>When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of funds or other property in which both the lawyer and a client or a third person claim interest, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the funds or property as to which the interests are not in dispute.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. \n[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration or interpleader. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed. \n[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party. The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction. \n[3A] In those cases where it is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds or property. \n[4] A \"clients' security fund \"provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer should participate.</div>","UrlName":"revision58"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"RULE 1.15(II) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - TRUST ACCOUNT AND IOLTA","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Bar Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined in Bar Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule45","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4c2e1d2-2c8d-48e3-b9a7-78d1a5670861","ParentId":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined  in Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this Rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this Rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision111"},{"Id":"2473e9df-693d-4c42-8d30-abe6f3a5c393","ParentId":"20a634e7-cff2-4f0f-af11-a0ae4d5425c0","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available one or more trust accounts as required by these Rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from a trust account.</li> \n <li>No personal funds shall ever be deposited in a lawyer's trust account, except that unearned attorney's fees may be so held until the same are earned. Sufficient personal funds of the lawyer may be kept in the trust account to cover maintenance fees such as service charges on the account. Records on such trust accounts shall be so kept and maintained as to reflect at all times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds shall be withdrawn from such trust accounts for the personal use of the lawyer maintaining the account except earned lawyer's fees debited against the account of a specific client and recorded as such.</li> \n <li> All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account at an approved institution with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1), with the interest to be paid to the client.\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an interest-bearing account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in such an interest-bearing account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to  reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, such that there can be no reasonable expectation of a positive net return to the client or third person, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) at an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15 (III) (c) (1) in compliance with the following provisions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>No earnings from such an IOLTA Account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.</li> \n <li>Funds in each IOLTA Account shall be available for withdrawal upon request and without delay, subject only to any notice period which the institution is required to reserve by law or regulation.</li> \n <li>As required by Rule 15-103, the rate of interest payable on any IOLTA Account shall not be less than the rate paid by the depositor institution to regular, non-lawyer depositors. Higher rates offered by the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time periods or quantity minimums, such as those offered in the form of certificates of deposit, may be obtained by a lawyer or law firm on some or all of the deposited funds so long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer principal immediately.</li> \n <li> Lawyers or law firms shall direct the depository institution:\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>to remit to the Georgia Bar Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees as defined  in Rule 15-102 (c), on the average monthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of interest earned on that account for any month, and any charges or fees that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution;</li> \n <li>to transmit with each remittance to the Georgia Bar Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is being applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges of fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance;</li> \n <li>to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No charge of ethical impropriety or other breach of professional conduct shall attend the determination that such funds are nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, or to the decision to invest clients' funds in a pooled interest-bearing account.</li> \n <li>Whether the funds are designated short-term or nominal or not, a lawyer or law firm may, at the request of the client, deposit funds into a separate interest-bearing account and remit all interest earned, or interest earned net of charges, to the client or clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II) (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] The personal money permitted to be kept in the lawyer's trust account by this Rule shall not be used for any purpose other than to cover the bank fees and if used for any other purpose the lawyer shall have violated this Rule. If the lawyer wishes to reduce the amount of personal money in the trust account, the change must be properly noted in the lawyer's financial records and the monies transferred to the lawyer's business account. \n[2] Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit a lawyer from removing from the trust account fees which have been earned on a regular basis which coincides with the lawyer's billing cycles rather than removing the fees earned on an hour-by-hour basis. \n[3] In determining whether funds of a client or other beneficiary can earn income in excess of costs, the lawyer may consider the following factors: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the amount of funds to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the expected duration of the deposit, including the likelihood of delay in the matter with respect to which the funds are held;</li> \n <li>the rates of interest or yield at financial institutions where the funds are to be deposited;</li> \n <li>the cost of establishing and administering a non-IOLTA trust account for the benefit of the client or other beneficiary, including service charges, the costs of the lawyer’s services and the costs of preparing any tax reports that may be required;</li> \n <li>the  capability of financial  institutions, lawyers, or law firms to calculate and pay earnings to individual clients; and</li> \n <li>any other circumstances that affect the ability of the funds to earn a net return for the client or other beneficiary.</li> \n </ol> \n [4] The lawyer or law firm should review the IOLTA Account at reasonable intervals to determine whether changed circumstances require further action with respect to the funds of any client or third party. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision113"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b8b582e1-b6cc-49d2-9bfc-653e18985481","Title":"RULE 1.15(III) RECORD KEEPING; TRUST ACCOUNT OVERDRAFT NOTIFICATION; EXAMINATION OF RECORDS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Required Bank Accounts: Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia and who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall maintain, in an approved financial institution as defined by this rule, a trust account or accounts, separate from any business and personal accounts. Funds received by the lawyer on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited into this account. The financial institution shall be in Georgia or in the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third person.</li> \n <li> Description of Accounts:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether general or specific, as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as an \"Attorney Trust Account,\"\"Attorney Escrow Account \"\"IOLTA Account \"or \"Attorney Fiduciary Account.\"The name of the attorney or law firm responsible for the account shall also appear on all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all business accounts, as well as all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, as a \"Business Account,\"a \"Professional Account,\"an \"Office Account,\"a \"General Account,\"a \"Payroll Account,\"\"Operating Account \"or a \"Regular Account.\"</li> \n <li>Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from using any additional description or designation for a specific business or trust account including fiduciary accounts maintained by the lawyer as executor, guardian, trustee, receiver, agent or in any other fiduciary capacity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Procedure:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Approved Institutions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall maintain his or her trust account only in a financial institution approved by the State Bar of Georgia, which shall annually publish a list of approved institutions.\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>Such institutions shall be located within the state of Georgia, within the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third-person. The institution shall be authorized by federal or state law to do business in the jurisdiction where located and shall be federally insured. A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer trust accounts if it abides by an agreement to report to the Office of the General Counsel whenever any properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds, and the instrument is not honored. The agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and shall not be canceled except upon 30-days notice in writing to the Office of the General Counsel. The agreement shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel on a form approved by the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall provide that all reports made by the financial institution shall be in writing and shall include the same information customarily forwarded to the depositor when an instrument is presented against insufficient funds. If the financial institution is located outside of the state of Georgia, it shall also agree in writing to honor any properly issued State Bar of Georgia subpoena.</li> \n <li>In addition to the requirements above, the financial institution must also be approved by the Georgia Bar Foundation and agree to offer IOLTA Accounts in compliance with the additional requirements set out in Part XV of the rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Georgia Bar Foundation may waive the provisions of this rule in whole or in part for good cause shown. A lawyer or law firm may appeal the decision of the Georgia Bar Foundation by application to the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Timing of Reports:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The financial institution shall file a report with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia in every instance where a properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds.</li> \n <li>The report shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel within 15 days of the date of the presentation of the instrument, even if the instrument is subsequently honored.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Nothing shall preclude a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this rule.</li> \n <li>Every lawyer and law firm maintaining a trust account as provided by these rules is hereby and shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements mandated by this rule and shall indemnify and hold harmless each financial institution for its compliance with the aforesaid reporting and production requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Effect on Financial Institution of Compliance: The agreement by a financial institution to offer accounts pursuant to this rule shall be a procedure to advise the State Disciplinary Board of conduct by lawyers and shall not be deemed to create a duty to exercise a standard of care or a contract with third parties that may sustain a loss as a result of lawyers overdrawing lawyer trust accounts.</li> \n <li>Availability of Records: A lawyer shall not fail to produce any of the records required to be maintained by these rules at the request of theState Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia. This obligation shall be in addition to and not in lieu of the procedures contained in Part IV of these rules for the production of documents and evidence.</li> \n <li>Audit for Cause: A lawyer shall not fail to submit to an audit for cause conducted by the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-111.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Each financial institution wishing to be approved as a depository of client trust funds must file an overdraft notification agreement with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia will publish a list of approved institutions at least annually. \n \n[2] The overdraft agreement requires that all overdrafts be reported to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia whether or not the instrument is honored. It is improper for a lawyer to accept \"overdraft privileges \"or any other arrangement for a personal loan on a client trust account, particularly in exchange for the institution's promise to delay or not to report an overdraft. The institution must notify the Office of the General Counsel of all overdrafts even where the institution is certain that its own error caused the overdraft or that the matter could have been resolved between the institution and the lawyer within a reasonable period of time. \n \n[3] The overdraft notification provision is not intended to result in the discipline of every lawyer who overdraws a trust account. The lawyer or institution may explain occasional errors. The provision merely intends that the Office of the General Counsel receive an early warning of improprieties so that corrective action, including audits for cause, may be taken. \n \nWaiver \n \n[4] A lawyer may seek to have the provisions of this rule waived if the lawyer or law firm has its principal office in a county where no bank, credit union, or savings and loan association will agree or has agreed to comply with the provisions of this rule. Other grounds for requesting a waiver may include significant financial or business harm to the lawyer or law firm, such as where the unapproved bank is a client of the lawyer or law firm or where the lawyer serves on the board of the unapproved bank. \n \n[5] The request for a waiver should be in writing, sent to the Georgia Bar Foundation, and should include sufficient information to establish good cause for the requested waiver. \n \n[6] The Georgia Bar Foundation may request additional information from the lawyer or law firm if necessary to determine good cause. \nAudits \n[7] Every lawyer's financial records and trust account records are required records and therefore are properly subject to audit for cause. The audit provisions are intended to uncover errors and omissions before the public is harmed, to deter those lawyers who may be tempted to misuse client's funds and to educate and instruct lawyers as to proper trust accounting methods. Although the auditors will be employed by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, it is intended that disciplinary proceedings will be brought only when the auditors have reasonable cause to believe discrepancies or irregularities exist. Otherwise, the auditors should only educate the lawyer and the lawyer's staff as to proper trust accounting methods. \n[8] An audit for cause may be conducted at any time and without advance notice if the Office of the General Counsel receives sufficient evidence that a lawyer poses a threat of harm to clients or the public. The Office of the General Counsel must have the written approval of the Chairman of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia to conduct an audit for cause. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule47","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"fe56572d-3099-4684-a166-9711aeb97df5","ParentId":"b8b582e1-b6cc-49d2-9bfc-653e18985481","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Required Bank Accounts: Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia and who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall maintain, in an approved financial institution as defined by this rule, a trust account or accounts, separate from any business and personal accounts. Funds received by the lawyer on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited into this account. The financial institution shall be in Georgia or in the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third person.</li> \n <li> Description of Accounts:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all trust accounts, whether general or specific, as well as all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon, as an \"Attorney Trust Account,\"\"Attorney Escrow Account \"\"IOLTA Account \"or \"Attorney Fiduciary Account.\"The name of the attorney or law firm responsible for the account shall also appear on all deposit slips and checks drawn thereon.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall designate all business accounts, as well as all deposit slips and all checks drawn thereon, as a \"Business Account,\"a \"Professional Account,\"an \"Office Account,\"a \"General Account,\"a \"Payroll Account,\"\"Operating Account \"or a \"Regular Account.\"</li> \n <li>Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a lawyer from using any additional description or designation for a specific business or trust account including fiduciary accounts maintained by the lawyer as executor, guardian, trustee, receiver, agent or in any other fiduciary capacity.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Procedure:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Approved Institutions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall maintain his or her trust account only in a financial institution approved by the State Bar of Georgia, which shall annually publish a list of approved institutions.\n <ol type=\"A\"> \n <li>Such institutions shall be located within the state of Georgia, within the state where the lawyer's office is located, or elsewhere with the written consent and at the written request of the client or third-person. The institution shall be authorized by federal or state law to do business in the jurisdiction where located and shall be federally insured. A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer trust accounts if it abides by an agreement to report to the Office of the General Counsel whenever any properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds, and the instrument is not honored. The agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and shall not be canceled except upon 30-days notice in writing to the Office of the General Counsel. The agreement shall be filed with the Office of General Counsel on a form approved by the State Disciplinary Board. The agreement shall provide that all reports made by the financial institution shall be in writing and shall include the same information customarily forwarded to the depositor when an instrument is presented against insufficient funds. If the financial institution is located outside of the state of Georgia, it shall also agree in writing to honor any properly issued State Bar of Georgia subpoena.</li> \n <li>In addition to the requirements above, the financial institution must also be approved by the Georgia Bar Foundation and agree to offer IOLTA Accounts in compliance with the additional requirements set out in Part XV of the rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Georgia Bar Foundation may waive the provisions of this rule in whole or in part for good cause shown. A lawyer or law firm may appeal the decision of the Georgia Bar Foundation by application to the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Timing of Reports:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The financial institution shall file a report with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia in every instance where a properly payable instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing insufficient funds and said instrument is not honored within three business days of presentation.</li> \n <li>The report shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel within fifteen days of the date of the presentation of the instrument, even if the instrument is subsequently honored after the three business days provided in (2) (i) above.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Nothing shall preclude a financial institution from charging a particular lawyer or law firm for the reasonable cost of producing the reports and records required by this rule.</li> \n <li>Every lawyer and law firm maintaining a trust account as provided by these rules is hereby and shall be conclusively deemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements mandated by this rule and shall indemnify and hold harmless each financial institution for its compliance with the aforesaid reporting and production requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Effect on Financial Institution of Compliance: The agreement by a financial institution to offer accounts pursuant to this rule shall be a procedure to advise the State Disciplinary Board of conduct by lawyers and shall not be deemed to create a duty to exercise a standard of care or a contract with third parties that may sustain a loss as a result of lawyers overdrawing lawyer trust accounts.</li> \n <li>Availability of Records: A lawyer shall not fail to produce any of the records required to be maintained by these rules at the request of theState Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia. This obligation shall be in addition to and not in lieu of the procedures contained in Part IV of these rules for the production of documents and evidence.</li> \n <li>Audit for Cause: A lawyer shall not fail to submit to an audit for cause conducted by the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-111.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Each financial institution wishing to be approved as a depository of client trust funds must file an overdraft notification agreement with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia will publish a list of approved institutions at least annually. \n \n[2] The overdraft agreement requires that all overdrafts be reported to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia whether or not the instrument is honored. It is improper for a lawyer to accept \"overdraft privileges \"or any other arrangement for a personal loan on a client trust account, particularly in exchange for the institution's promise to delay or not to report an overdraft. The institution must notify the Office of the General Counsel of all overdrafts even where the institution is certain that its own error caused the overdraft or that the matter could have been resolved between the institution and the lawyer within a reasonable period of time. \n \n[3] The overdraft notification provision is not intended to result in the discipline of every lawyer who overdraws a trust account. The lawyer or institution may explain occasional errors. The provision merely intends that the Office of the General Counsel receive an early warning of improprieties so that corrective action, including audits for cause, may be taken. \n \nWaiver \n \n[4] A lawyer may seek to have the provisions of this rule waived if the lawyer or law firm has its principal office in a county where no bank, credit union, or savings and loan association will agree or has agreed to comply with the provisions of this rule. Other grounds for requesting a waiver may include significant financial or business harm to the lawyer or law firm, such as where the unapproved bank is a client of the lawyer or law firm or where the lawyer serves on the board of the unapproved bank. \n \n[5] The request for a waiver should be in writing, sent to the Georgia Bar Foundation, and should include sufficient information to establish good cause for the requested waiver. \n \n[6] The Georgia Bar Foundation may request additional information from the lawyer or law firm if necessary to determine good cause. \nAudits \n[7] Every lawyer's financial records and trust account records are required records and therefore are properly subject to audit for cause. The audit provisions are intended to uncover errors and omissions before the public is harmed, to deter those lawyers who may be tempted to misuse client's funds and to educate and instruct lawyers as to proper trust accounting methods. Although the auditors will be employed by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, it is intended that disciplinary proceedings will be brought only when the auditors have reasonable cause to believe discrepancies or irregularities exist. Otherwise, the auditors should only educate the lawyer and the lawyer's staff as to proper trust accounting methods. \n[8] An audit for cause may be conducted at any time and without advance notice if the Office of the General Counsel receives sufficient evidence that a lawyer poses a threat of harm to clients or the public. The Office of the General Counsel must have the written approval of the Chairman of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia to conduct an audit for cause. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision323"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f019eba7-101e-4a2a-8834-5291c6c38c6b","Title":"RULE 1.16 DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is discharged.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;</li> \n <li>the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;</li> \n <li>the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;</li> \n <li>the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;</li> \n <li>the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or</li> \n <li>other good cause for withdrawal exists.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.</li> \n <li>Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. But see Rule 1.2 (c): Scope of Representation. \n \nMandatory Withdrawal \n \n[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation. \n \n[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \nDischarge \n \n[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances. \n \n[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. To the extent possible, the lawyer should give the client an explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to be self-represented. \n \n[6] If the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and, in an extreme case, may initiate proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.14: Client under a Disability. \n \nOptional Withdrawal \n \n[7] The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on a repugnant or imprudent objective. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \n[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. \n \nAssisting the Client upon Withdrawal \n \n[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. \n \n[10] Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may under certain unusual circumstances have a legal obligation to the organization after withdrawing or being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these rules. </div>","UrlName":"rule48","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ab4d791-6703-456d-aae3-c2f9d42df37a","ParentId":"f019eba7-101e-4a2a-8834-5291c6c38c6b","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is discharged.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;</li> \n <li>the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;</li> \n <li>the client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent;</li> \n <li>the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;</li> \n <li>the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or</li> \n <li>other good cause for withdrawal exists.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When a lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable laws and rules. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.</li> \n <li>Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. But see Rule 1.2(c): Scope of Representation. \n \nMandatory Withdrawal \n \n[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation. \n \n[3] When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. See also Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may wish an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \nDischarge \n \n[4] A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer's services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances. \n \n[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. To the extent possible, the lawyer should give the client an explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring the client to be self-represented. \n \n[6] If the client is mentally incompetent, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client's interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and, in an extreme case, may initiate proceedings for a conservatorship or similar protection of the client. See Rule 1.14: Client under a Disability. \n \nOptional Withdrawal \n \n[7] The lawyer has the option to withdraw if it can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer's services were misused in the past even if that would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer also may withdraw where the client insists on a repugnant or imprudent objective. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. \n \n[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. \n \nAssisting the Client upon Withdrawal \n \n[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. \n \n[10] Whether or not a lawyer for an organization may under certain unusual circumstances have a legal obligation to the organization after withdrawing or being discharged by the organization's highest authority is beyond the scope of these Rules. </div>","UrlName":"revision61"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"91ad0a2f-e4fe-449f-a182-e4259678a5ff","Title":"RULE 1.17. SALE OF LAW PRACTICE.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>The practice is sold as an entirety to another lawyer or law firm;</li> \n <li> Actual written notice is given to each of the seller's clients regarding:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the proposed sale;</li> \n <li>the terms of any proposed change in the fee arrangement authorized by paragraph (d);</li> \n <li>the client's right to retain other counsel, or to take possession of the file; and</li> \n <li>the fact that the client's consent to the sale will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of receipt of the notice.</li> \n </ol> \n If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file. </li> \n <li>The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this rule, when another lawyer or firm takes over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer and 5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice. \n \nTermination of Practice by the Seller \n \n[2] The requirement that all of the private practice be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice available for sale to the purchaser. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchaser but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Neither does a return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \nSingle Purchaser \n \n[5] The rule requires a single purchaser. The prohibition against piecemeal sale of a practice protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchaser is required to undertake all client matters in the practice, subject to client consent. If, however, the purchaser is unable to undertake all client matters because of a conflict of interest in a specific matter respecting which the purchaser is not permitted by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest or another rule to represent the client, the requirement that there be a single purchaser is nevertheless satisfied. \n \nClient Confidences, Consent and Notice \n \n[6] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to detailed information relating to the representation, such as the client's file, however, requires client consent. The rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser and any proposed change in the terms of future representation, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed. \n \n[7] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. \n \n[8] All the elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice. \n \nFee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser \n \n[9] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing agreements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser, unless the client consents. The purchaser may, however, advise the client that the purchaser will not undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the higher fees the purchaser usually charges. To prevent client financing of the sale, the higher fee the purchaser may charge must not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for substantially similar services rendered prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations. \n \n[10] The purchaser may not intentionally fragment the practice which is the subject of the sale by charging significantly different fees in substantially similar matters. Doing so would make it possible for the purchaser to avoid the obligation to take over the entire practice by charging arbitrarily higher fees for less lucrative matters, thereby increasing the likelihood that those clients would not consent to the new representation. \n \nOther Applicable Ethical Standards \n \n[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1: Competence); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure client consent after consultation for those conflicts which can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9). \n \n[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation). \n \nApplicability of the Rule \n \n[13] This rule applies to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met. \n \n[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule. \n \n[15] This rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice. </div>","UrlName":"rule49","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f0276f4f-5259-4981-8840-1bbff9517bff","ParentId":"91ad0a2f-e4fe-449f-a182-e4259678a5ff","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer or a law firm may sell or purchase a law practice, including good will, if the following conditions are satisfied: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>The practice is sold as an entirety to another lawyer or law firm;</li> \n <li> Actual written notice is given to each of the seller's clients regarding:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the proposed sale;</li> \n <li>the terms of any proposed change in the fee arrangement authorized by paragraph (d);</li> \n <li>the client's right to retain other counsel, or to take possession of the file; and</li> \n <li>the fact that the client's consent to the sale will be presumed if the client does not take any action or does not otherwise object within 90 days of receipt of the notice.</li> \n </ol> \n If a client cannot be given notice, the representation of that client may be transferred to the purchaser only upon entry of an order so authorizing by a court having jurisdiction. The seller may disclose to the court in camera information relating to the representation only to the extent necessary to obtain an order authorizing the transfer of a file. </li> \n <li>The fees charged clients shall not be increased by reason of the sale. The purchaser may, however, refuse to undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the purchaser fees at a rate not exceeding the fees charged by the purchaser for rendering substantially similar services prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this rule, when another lawyer or firm takes over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice as may withdrawing partners of law firms. See Rules 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer and 5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice. \n \nTermination of Practice by the Seller \n \n[2] The requirement that all of the private practice be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice available for sale to the purchaser. The fact that a number of the seller's clients decide not to be represented by the purchaser but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Neither does a return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \nSingle Purchaser \n \n[5] The rule requires a single purchaser. The prohibition against piecemeal sale of a practice protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The purchaser is required to undertake all client matters in the practice, subject to client consent. If, however, the purchaser is unable to undertake all client matters because of a conflict of interest in a specific matter respecting which the purchaser is not permitted by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest or another rule to represent the client, the requirement that there be a single purchaser is nevertheless satisfied. \n \nClient Confidences, Consent and Notice \n \n[6] Negotiations between seller and prospective purchaser prior to disclosure of information relating to a specific representation of an identifiable client no more violate the confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information than do preliminary discussions concerning the possible association of another lawyer or mergers between firms, with respect to which client consent is not required. Providing the purchaser access to client-specific information relating to the representation and to the file, however, requires client consent. The rule provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the purchaser the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the purchaser and any proposed change in the terms of future representation, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed. \n \n[7] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. Since these clients cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, the rule requires an order from a court having jurisdiction authorizing their transfer or other disposition. The court can be expected to determine whether reasonable efforts to locate the client have been exhausted, and whether the absent client's legitimate interests will be served by authorizing the transfer of the file so that the purchaser may continue the representation. Preservation of client confidences requires that the petition for a court order be considered in camera. \n \n[8] All the elements of client autonomy, including the client's absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice. \n \nFee Arrangements Between Client and Purchaser \n \n[9] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged the clients of the practice. Existing agreements between the seller and the client as to fees and the scope of the work must be honored by the purchaser, unless the client consents. The purchaser may, however, advise the client that the purchaser will not undertake the representation unless the client consents to pay the higher fees the purchaser usually charges. To prevent client financing of the sale, the higher fee the purchaser may charge must not exceed the fees charged by the purchaser for substantially similar services rendered prior to the initiation of the purchase negotiations. \n \n[10] The purchaser may not intentionally fragment the practice which is the subject of the sale by charging significantly different fees in substantially similar matters. Doing so would make it possible for the purchaser to avoid the obligation to take over the entire practice by charging arbitrarily higher fees for less lucrative matters, thereby increasing the likelihood that those clients would not consent to the new representation. \n \nOther Applicable Ethical Standards \n \n[11] Lawyers participating in the sale of a law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. These include, for example, the seller's obligation to exercise competence in identifying a purchaser qualified to assume the practice and the purchaser's obligation to undertake the representation competently (see Rule 1.1: Competence); the obligation to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure client consent after consultation for those conflicts which can be agreed to (see Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest); and the obligation to protect information relating to the representation (see Rules 1.6 and 1.9). \n \n[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale (see Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation). \n \nApplicability of the Rule \n \n[13] This rule applies to the sale of a law practice by representatives of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer. Thus, the seller may be represented by a non-lawyer representative not subject to these rules. Since, however, no lawyer may participate in a sale of a law practice which does not conform to the requirements of this rule, the representatives of the seller as well as the purchasing lawyer can be expected to see to it that they are met. \n \n[14] Admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, retirement plans and similar arrangements, and a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, do not constitute a sale or purchase governed by this rule. \n \n[15] This rule does not apply to the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice. </div>","UrlName":"revision278"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"79cd5db1-e60a-4dfe-93c5-bc2570ebc80b","Title":"RULE 1.18. DUTIES TO PROSPECTIVE CLIENT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client. \n(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client. \n(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). \n(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Prospective clients, like clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer's custody, or rely on the lawyer's advice. A lawyer's consultations with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients. \n[2] A person becomes a prospective client by consulting with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Whether communications, including written, oral, or electronic communications, constitute a consultation depends on the circumstances. For example, a consultation is likely to have occurred if a lawyer, either in person or through the lawyer’s advertising in any medium, specifically requests or invites the submission of information about a potential representation without clear and reasonably understandable warnings and cautionary statements that limit the lawyer’s obligations, and a person provides information in response. See also Comment [4]. In contrast, a consultation does not occur if a person provides information to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer’s education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal information of general interest. Such a person communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is thus not a \"prospective client.\"Moreover, a person who communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying the lawyer is not a “prospective client.” \n[3] It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by Rule 1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be. \n[4] In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not to undertake a new matter should limit the initial consultation to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under Rule 1.7, then consent from all affected present or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation. \n[5] A lawyer may condition a consultation with a prospective client on the person's informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0 (l) for the definition of informed consent. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer's subsequent use of information received from the prospective client. \n[6] Even in the absence of an agreement, under paragraph (c), the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter. \n[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.10, but, under paragraph (d), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. \n[8] For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer's duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer's care, see Rule 1.15.</div>","UrlName":"rule608","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de4aae0a-e7b5-495d-b898-36b23dbb6bac","Title":"RULE 2.1 ADVISOR","Content":" In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. A lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nScope of Advice \n \n[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. \n \n[2] In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation. Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. \n \n[3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations. \n \n[4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts. \n \nOffering Advice \n \n[5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, duty to the client under Rule 1.4: Communication may require that the lawyer act if the client's course of action is related to the representation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's interest.","UrlName":"rule62","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bf5aa118-f96c-45f6-8cf4-001a331ae3d3","Title":"RULE 2.2 INTERMEDIARY","Content":"Reserved.","UrlName":"rule65","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b9148e26-9da2-467d-81a0-6bb903261fa0","Title":"RULE 2.3 EVALUATION FOR USE BY THIRD PERSONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nDefinition \n \n[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government entity; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business. \n \n[2] Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government entity action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether the opinion is to be made public. \n \n[3] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available. \n \nDuty to Third Person \n \n[4] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings. \n \nAccess to and Disclosure of Information \n \n[5] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. \n \nFinancial Auditors' Requests for Information \n \n[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975. </div>","UrlName":"rule66","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9d14a347-799f-4861-9a49-11305775393e","ParentId":"b9148e26-9da2-467d-81a0-6bb903261fa0","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client; and</li> \n <li>the client gives informed consent.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \nDefinition \n \n[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government entity; for example, an opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business. \n \n[2] Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated government entity action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether the opinion is to be made public. \n \n[3] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available. \n \nDuty to Third Person \n \n[4] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings. \n \nAccess to and Disclosure of Information \n \n[5] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances. \n \nFinancial Auditors' Requests for Information \n \n[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975. </div>","UrlName":"revision63"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ee3f3057-e1fb-4ad5-9b27-9629d9d9ade2","Title":"RULE 2.4 LAWYER SERVING AS THIRD PARTY NEUTRAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.</li> \n <li>A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.</li> \n <li>When one or more of the parties in a mediation is a current or former client of the neutral lawyer or the neutral's law firm, a lawyer may serve as a neutral only if the matter in which the lawyer serves as a neutral is not the same matter in which the lawyer or law firm represents or represented the party and all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court. \n \n[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. \n \n[3] Unlike non-lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected. \n \n[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12. \n \n[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0 (r)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1. </div>","UrlName":"rule68","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"dc4cd20c-1668-4ee3-9bd8-5fc54c639dbf","ParentId":"ee3f3057-e1fb-4ad5-9b27-9629d9d9ade2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.</li> \n <li>A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer's role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.</li> \n <li>When one or more of the parties in a mediation is a current or former client of the neutral lawyer or the neutral's law firm, a lawyer may serve as a neutral only if the matter in which the lawyer serves as a neutral is not the same matter in which the lawyer or law firm represents or represented the party and all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. Aside from representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A third-party neutral is a person, such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator, who assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court. \n \n[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers, although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are allowed to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that apply either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. \n \n[3] Unlike non-lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer's service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly parties who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer's role as third-party neutral and a lawyer's role as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected. \n \n[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral subsequently may be asked to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the individual lawyer and the lawyer's law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12. \n \n[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(r)), the lawyer's duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer's duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1. </div>","UrlName":"revision64"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9487575d-c5ad-4680-9ee1-cf089c18ce38","Title":"RULE 3.1 MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;</li> \n <li>knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. \n \n[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. \n \n[3] It is not ethically improper for a lawyer to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the lawyer determines that a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the lawyer is not required by rules of procedure. or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the lawyer will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. \n \n[4] The decision of a court that a claim is not meritorious is not necessarily conclusive of a violation of this rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule69","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"99f9ad1a-aa70-4081-a8ae-b561636a3ae0","ParentId":"9487575d-c5ad-4680-9ee1-cf089c18ce38","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another;</li> \n <li>knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and never is static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law's ambiguities and potential for change. \n \n[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, or, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. \n \n[3] It is not ethically improper for a lawyer to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the lawyer determines that a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the lawyer is not required by rules of procedure. or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the lawyer will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. \n \n[4] The decision of a court that a claim is not meritorious is not necessarily conclusive of a violation of this Rule. </div>","UrlName":"revision65"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"787cc9d4-fe4d-484d-a6d4-e1a3006e108b","Title":"RULE 3.2 EXPEDITING LITIGATION","Content":" A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. \n \n[2] The reasonableness of a lawyer's effort to expedite litigation must be judged by all of the controlling factors. \"Reasonable efforts \"do not equate to \"instant efforts \"and are sufficient if reasonable under the relevant circumstances. \n ","UrlName":"rule71","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a195a719-bb14-4dec-9f7d-5d5e4d9c9dd0","Title":"RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or</li> \n <li>offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.</li> \n <li>In an ex parte proceeding, other than grand jury proceedings, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0 (aa) for the definition of tribunal. It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a) (4) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false. \n \n[2] This rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. \n \nRepresentations by a Lawyer \n \n[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2 (d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2 (d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4 (b). \n \nLegal Argument \n \n[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a) (3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. \n \nOffering Evidence \n \n[5] Paragraph (c) allows that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity. \n \n[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer may refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit from the witness the testimony that the lawyer knows is false. \n \n[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9]. \n \n[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0 (i). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. \n \n[9] Although paragraph (a) (4) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7]. \n \nRemedial Measures \n \n[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done - making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps nothing. \n \n[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2 (d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. \n \nPreserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process \n \n[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. \n \nDuration of Obligation \n \n[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. \n \nEx Parte Proceedings \n \n[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16 (a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16 (b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. </div>","UrlName":"rule72","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"ea43d08b-5a41-4e59-be18-be435a0cce18","ParentId":"a195a719-bb14-4dec-9f7d-5d5e4d9c9dd0","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not knowingly:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;</li> \n <li>fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or</li> \n <li>offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.</li> \n <li>In an ex parte proceeding, other than grand jury proceedings, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(r) for the definition of tribunal. It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(4) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false. \n \n[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. \n \nRepresentations by a Lawyer \n \n[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule 8.4(b). \n \nLegal Argument \n \n[4] Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore, as stated in paragraph (a)(3), an advocate has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. \n \nOffering Evidence \n \n[5] Paragraph (c) allows that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity. \n \n[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer may refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit from the witness the testimony that the lawyer knows is false. \n \n[7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements. See also Comment [9]. \n \n[8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(i). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood. \n \n[9] Although paragraph (a)(4) only prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. Offering such proof may reflect adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of such a client where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the client's decision to testify. See also Comment [7]. \n \nRemedial Measures \n \n[10] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done - making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, or perhaps nothing. \n \n[11] The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court. \n \nPreserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process \n \n[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. \n \nDuration of Obligation \n \n[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. \n \nEx Parte Proceedings \n \n[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision. \n \nWithdrawal \n \n[15] Normally, a lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's disclosure. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6. </div>","UrlName":"revision66"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0e595dc4-c128-4d22-a9ee-b54827dc085b","Title":"RULE 3.4 FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>falsify evidence;</li> \n <li>counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely; or</li> \n <li> pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparation, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in preparing, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li> request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; or the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information; and</li> \n <li>the information is not otherwise subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the opposing party or counsel; or</li> \n <li>present, participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. \n \n[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2. \n \n[5] As to paragraph (g), the responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of the opposing party or counsel. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence. </div>","UrlName":"rule77","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"bcea26ee-c9b9-489a-8d50-bbc8b7262095","ParentId":"0e595dc4-c128-4d22-a9ee-b54827dc085b","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>falsify evidence;</li> \n <li>counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely; or</li> \n <li> pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in preparation, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in preparing, attending or testifying; or</li> \n <li>a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li>Reserved.;</li> \n <li> request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; or the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information; and</li> \n <li>the information is not otherwise subject to the assertion of a privilege by the client; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the opposing party or counsel; or</li> \n <li>present, participate in presenting or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. \n \n[2] Documents and other items of evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal offense. Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to advise employees of a client to refrain from giving information to another party, for the employees may identify their interests with those of the client. See also Rule 4.2. \n \n[5] As to paragraph (g), the responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of the opposing party or counsel. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence. </div>","UrlName":"revision67"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7e15a371-0bf3-40f4-82e0-125f4df371e6","Title":"RULE 3.5 IMPARTIALITY AND DECORUM OF THE TRIBUNAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;</li> \n <li>communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law;</li> \n <li> communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the communication is prohibited by law or court order; or</li> \n <li>the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or</li> \n <li>the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c) of this rule is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (b) or paragraph (d) of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Many forms of improper influence upon the tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. All of those are specified in the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct with which an advocate should be familiar. Attention is also directed to Rule 8.4. Misconduct., which governs other instances of improper conduct by a lawyer/candidate. \n \n[2] If we are to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law. The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process. Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided. The activity proscribed by this rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety. \n \n[3A] The rule with respect to ex parte communications limits direct communications except as may be permitted by law. Thus, court rules or case law must be referred to in order to determine whether certain ex parte communications are legitimate. Ex parte communications may be permitted by statutory authorization. \n \n[3B] A lawyer who obtains a judge's signature on a decree in the absence of the opposing lawyer where certain aspects of the decree are still in dispute, may have violated Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., regardless of the lawyer's good intentions or good faith. \n \n[4] A lawyer may communicate as to the merits of the cause with a judge in the course of official proceedings in the case, in writing if the lawyer simultaneously delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer, or orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer. \n \n[5] If the lawyer knowingly instigates or causes another to instigate a communication proscribed by Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., a violation may occur. \n \n[6] Direct or indirect communication with a juror during the trial is clearly prohibited. A lawyer may not avoid the proscription of Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., by using agents to communicate improperly with jurors. A lawyer may be held responsible if the lawyer was aware of the client's desire to establish contact with jurors and assisted the client in doing so. \n \n[7] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication period. \n \n[8] While a lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge, the lawyer's actions should avoid reciprocation. Fairness and impartiality of the trial process is strengthened by the lawyer's protection of the record for subsequent review and this preserves the professional integrity of the legal profession by patient firmness. </div>","UrlName":"rule78","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"40d626a1-e510-44a9-9471-5e2f78bec600","ParentId":"7e15a371-0bf3-40f4-82e0-125f4df371e6","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law;</li> \n <li>communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by law;</li> \n <li> communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the communication is prohibited by law or court order; or</li> \n <li>the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or</li> \n <li>the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (a) or paragraph (c) of this Rule is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of paragraph (b) or paragraph (d) of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Many forms of improper influence upon the tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. All of those are specified in the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct with which an advocate should be familiar. Attention is also directed to Rule 8.4. Misconduct., which governs other instances of improper conduct by a lawyer/candidate. \n \n[2] If we are to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law. The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process. Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided. The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety. \n \n[3A] The Rule with respect to ex parte communications limits direct communications except as may be permitted by law. Thus, court rules or case law must be referred to in order to determine whether certain ex parte communications are legitimate. Ex parte communications may be permitted by statutory authorization. \n \n[3B] A lawyer who obtains a judge's signature on a decree in the absence of the opposing lawyer where certain aspects of the decree are still in dispute, may have violated Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., regardless of the lawyer's good intentions or good faith. \n \n[4] A lawyer may communicate as to the merits of the cause with a judge in the course of official proceedings in the case, in writing if the lawyer simultaneously delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer, or orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the party is not represented by a lawyer. \n \n[5] If the lawyer knowingly instigates or causes another to instigate a communication proscribed by Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., a violation may occur. \n \n[6] Direct or indirect communication with a juror during the trial is clearly prohibited. A lawyer may not avoid the proscription of Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal., by using agents to communicate improperly with jurors. A lawyer may be held responsible if the lawyer was aware of the client's desire to establish contact with jurors and assisted the client in doing so. \n \n[7] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication period. \n \n[8] While a lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge, the lawyer's actions should avoid reciprocation. Fairness and impartiality of the trial process is strengthened by the lawyer's protection of the record for subsequent review and this preserves the professional integrity of the legal profession by patient firmness. </div>","UrlName":"revision68"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"8dfb7354-c1a1-43b5-91a9-a3a62430af36","Title":"RULE 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.</li> \n <li>No lawyer associated in a firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy. \n \n[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. \n \n[3] The rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \n[5A] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;</li> \n <li>in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;</li> \n <li>the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;</li> \n <li>any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;</li> \n <li>information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or</li> \n <li>the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.</li> \n </ol> \n[5B] In addition, there are certain subjects which are more likely than not to have no material prejudicial effect on a proceeding. Thus, a lawyer may usually state: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;</li> \n <li>information contained in a public record;</li> \n <li>that an investigation of a matter is in progress;</li> \n <li>the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;</li> \n <li>a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;</li> \n <li>a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and</li> \n <li> in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;</li> \n <li>if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;</li> \n <li>the fact, time and place of arrest; and</li> \n <li>the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n [6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding. \n \n[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others. </div>","UrlName":"rule80","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d4008c7-81dc-4570-a7c5-fadc0e62e763","ParentId":"8dfb7354-c1a1-43b5-91a9-a3a62430af36","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a person would reasonably believe to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.</li> \n <li>No lawyer associated in a firm or government entity with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy. \n \n[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of litigation. \n \n[3] The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer's making statements that the lawyer knows or should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the rule applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation of a case, and their associates. \n \n[4] Reserved. \n \n[5A] There are, on the other hand, certain subjects which are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;</li> \n <li>in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement;</li> \n <li>the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;</li> \n <li>any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration;</li> \n <li>information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or</li> \n <li>the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.</li> \n </ol> \n[5B] In addition, there are certain subjects which are more likely than not to have no material prejudicial effect on a proceeding. Thus, a lawyer may usually state: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;</li> \n <li>information contained in a public record;</li> \n <li>that an investigation of a matter is in progress;</li> \n <li>the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;</li> \n <li>a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;</li> \n <li>a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and</li> \n <li> in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;</li> \n <li>if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;</li> \n <li>the fact, time and place of arrest; and</li> \n <li>the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n [6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding. \n \n[7] Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party's lawyer, or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer's client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others. </div>","UrlName":"revision69"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a27d1536-2fbd-415a-abdf-3d15b8f792a3","Title":"RULE 3.7 LAWYER AS WITNESS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;</li> \n <li>the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or</li> \n <li>disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. \n \n[2] The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. \n \n[3] Paragraph (a) (1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a) (2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. \n \n[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a) (3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification has no application to this aspect of the problem. \n \n[5] Whether the combination of roles involves an improper conflict of interest with respect to the client is determined by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule or Rule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification disqualifies the firm also. </div>","UrlName":"rule82","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1a8bd156-3327-4459-9fd5-47902e68ac7a","ParentId":"a27d1536-2fbd-415a-abdf-3d15b8f792a3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;</li> \n <li>the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or</li> \n <li>disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client. \n \n[2] The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. \n \n[3] Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph (a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyers to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony. \n \n[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the client and those of the opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer's client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The principle of imputed disqualification stated in Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification has no application to this aspect of the problem. \n \n[5] Whether the combination of roles involves an improper conflict of interest with respect to the client is determined by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule or Rule 1.9: Conflict of Interest: Former Client. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer or a member of the lawyer's firm, the representation is improper. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether or not such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. See Comment to Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict of interest, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification disqualifies the firm also. </div>","UrlName":"revision70"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c5237a8c-7ec6-4f31-bf97-99f1ba804338","Title":"RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;</li> \n <li>refrain from making any effort to prevent the accused from exercising a reasonable effort to obtain counsel;</li> \n <li>comply with Rule 4.2;</li> \n <li>make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates the offense;</li> \n <li>exercise reasonable care to prevent persons who are under the direct supervision of the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under subsection (g) of this Rule;</li> \n <li> not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;</li> \n <li>the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and</li> \n <li>there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused;</li> \n <li>promptly disclose new, credible, and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted to an appropriate court or authority. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, the prosecutor shall promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay and undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit;</li> \n <li>seek to remedy a conviction obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction when the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant did not commit the offense.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n \n[2] Reserved. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship. \n \n[5] Paragraph (g) supplements Rule 3.6: Trial Publicity, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6 (b) or 3.6 (c): Trial Publicity. \n [6]\t Reserved. \n [7]\t When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (h) requires prompt disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, paragraph (h) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Consistent with the objectives of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented  defendant,  would  ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. \n [8]\t Under paragraph (i), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Necessary steps may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted. \n [9]\t A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of paragraphs (h) and (i), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule. </div>","UrlName":"rule83","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0c97837e-b4b3-442f-b480-60afe6bd6990","ParentId":"c5237a8c-7ec6-4f31-bf97-99f1ba804338","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;</li> \n <li>refrain from making any effort to prevent the accused from exercising a reasonable effort to obtain counsel;</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or that mitigates the offense;</li> \n <li>exercise reasonable care to prevent persons who are under the direct supervision of the prosecutor from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under subsection (g) of this rule;</li> \n <li> not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;</li> \n <li>the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and</li> \n <li>there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions have adopted the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, which in turn are the product of prolonged and careful deliberation by lawyers experienced in both criminal prosecution and defense. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n \n[2] Reserved. \n \n[3] Reserved. \n \n[4] Paragraph (f) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship. \n \n[5] Paragraph (g) supplements Rule 3.6: Trial Publicity, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with Rule 3.6 (b) or 3.6 (c): Trial Publicity. </div>","UrlName":"revision391"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4a46f7a1-94ac-4d60-b789-6ebe7708541a","Title":"RULE 3.9 ADVOCATE IN NONADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS","Content":" A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or administrative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3 (a) through (c), 3.4 (a) through (c), and 3.5. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule making or policy making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argument in the matters under consideration. The decision making body, like a court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it. A lawyer appearing before such a body should deal with the tribunal honestly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedures. \n \n[2] Lawyers have no exclusive right to appear before nonadjudicative bodies, as they do before a court. The requirements of this rule therefore may subject lawyers to regulations inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However, legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts. \n \n[3] This rule does not apply to representation of a client in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental entity; representation in such a transaction is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4. \n ","UrlName":"rule85","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"748d9636-a16e-43d2-b7d9-5bddf553f1ac","Title":"RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nMisrepresentation \n \n[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act. \n \nStatements of Fact \n \n[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Comments which fall under the general category of \"puffing \"do not violate this rule. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. \n \nFraud by Client \n \n[3] Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information. </div>","UrlName":"rule289","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"16314d93-c9ec-450e-8636-98955fce4f5d","ParentId":"748d9636-a16e-43d2-b7d9-5bddf553f1ac","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \nMisrepresentation \n \n[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act. \n \nStatements of Fact \n \n[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Comments which fall under the general category of \"puffing \"do not violate this rule. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. \n \nFraud by Client \n \n[3] Paragraph (b) recognizes that substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose certain information to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. The requirement of disclosure created by this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information. </div>","UrlName":"revision72"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"25645231-5602-4631-b95f-e304dee1c781","Title":"RULE 4.2 COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.</li> \n <li>Attorneys for the State and Federal Government shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as other attorneys in this State.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government entity and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government entity to speak with government officials about the matter. \n \n[2] Communications authorized by law also include constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this Rule or has found this Rule inapplicable. However, the Rule imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional provisions. \n \n[3] This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates. \n \n[4A] In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4 (f). Communication with a former employee of a represented organization is discussed in Formal Advisory Opinion 20-1. \n \n[4B] In administering this Rule it should be anticipated that in many instances, prior to the beginning of the interview, the interviewing lawyer will not possess sufficient information to determine whether the relationship of the interviewee to the entity is sufficiently close to place the person in the \"represented \"category. In those situations the good faith of the lawyer in undertaking the interview should be considered. Evidence of good faith includes an immediate and candid statement of the interest of the person on whose behalf the interview is being taken, a full explanation of why that person's position is adverse to the interests of the entity with which the interviewee is associated, the exploration of the relationship issue at the outset of the interview and the cessation of the interview immediately upon determination that the interview is improper. \n \n[5] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies, however, in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See 1.0. Such an inference may arise in circumstances where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom communication is sought is represented in the matter to be discussed. Thus, a lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by ignoring the obvious. \n \n[6] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3. \n \n[6A] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury. \n \n[7] The anti-contact rule serves important public interests which preserve the proper functioning of the judicial system and the administration of justice by a) protecting against misuse of the imbalance of legal skill between a lawyer and layperson; b) safe-guarding the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel; c) ensuring that all valid claims and defenses are raised in response to inquiry from adverse counsel; d) reducing the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that might harm their interests; and e) maintaining the lawyers ability to monitor the case and effectively represent the client. \n \n[8] Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other because this Rule is not intended to affect communications between parties to an action entered into independent of and not at the request or direction of counsel. </div>","UrlName":"rule296","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"628733fe-c98e-4bf7-8bb3-1abfc627d292","ParentId":"25645231-5602-4631-b95f-e304dee1c781","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.</li> \n <li>Attorneys for the State and Federal Government shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as other attorneys in this State.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government entity and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented person is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example, the right of a party to a controversy with a government entity to speak with government officials about the matter. \n \n[2] Communications authorized by law also include constitutionally permissible investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings, when there is applicable judicial precedent that either has found the activity permissible under this Rule or has found this Rule inapplicable. However, the Rule imposes ethical restrictions that go beyond those imposed by constitutional provisions. \n \n[3] This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates. \n \n[4A] In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. See Formal Advisory Opinion 87-6. If an agent or employee of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). Communication with a former employee of a represented organization is discussed in Formal Advisory Opinion 94-3. \n \n[4B] In administering this Rule it should be anticipated that in many instances, prior to the beginning of the interview, the interviewing lawyer will not possess sufficient information to determine whether the relationship of the interviewee to the entity is sufficiently close to place the person in the \"represented \"category. In those situations the good faith of the lawyer in undertaking the interview should be considered. Evidence of good faith includes an immediate and candid statement of the interest of the person on whose behalf the interview is being taken, a full explanation of why that person's position is adverse to the interests of the entity with which the interviewee is associated, the exploration of the relationship issue at the outset of the interview and the cessation of the interview immediately upon determination that the interview is improper. \n \n[5] The prohibition on communications with a represented person only applies, however, in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See 1.0. Such an inference may arise in circumstances where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom communication is sought is represented in the matter to be discussed. Thus, a lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by ignoring the obvious. \n \n[6] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer's communications are subject to Rule 4.3. \n \n[6A] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury. \n \n[7] The anti-contact rule serves important public interests which preserve the proper functioning of the judicial system and the administration of justice by a) protecting against misuse of the imbalance of legal skill between a lawyer and layperson; b) safe-guarding the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel; c) ensuring that all valid claims and defenses are raised in response to inquiry from adverse counsel; d) reducing the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that might harm their interests; and e) maintaining the lawyers ability to monitor the case and effectively represent the client. \n \n[8] Parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other because this Rule is not intended to affect communications between parties to an action entered into independent of and not at the request or direction of counsel. </div>","UrlName":"revision73"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4a6e5ea5-62ee-401b-a772-f70dbf79e097","Title":"RULE 4.3 DEALING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSON","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and</li> \n <li>give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client. </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f). \n \n[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented persons interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations. </div>","UrlName":"rule298","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"a9cc4ee3-7fee-410b-afed-7a63073cff2f","ParentId":"4a6e5ea5-62ee-401b-a772-f70dbf79e097","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and</li> \n <li>give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client. </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer's client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. For misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(f). \n \n[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer's client and those in which the person's interests are not in conflict with the client's. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented persons interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice, apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented person, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer's client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person's signature and explain the lawyer's own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer's view of the underlying legal obligations. </div>","UrlName":"revision74"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bfe134c6-2213-4373-8419-b9ba66e4c40f","Title":"RULE 4.4 RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships. \n[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive a document or electronically stored information that was mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. A document or electronically stored information is inadvertently sent when it is accidentally transmitted, such as when an e-mail or letter is misaddressed or a document or electronically stored information is accidentally included with information that was intentionally transmitted. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document or electronically stored information was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the document or electronically stored information, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document or electronically stored information has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been inappropriately obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, ‘‘document or electronically stored information’’ includes, in addition to paper documents, e-mail and other forms of electronically stored information, including embedded data (commonly referred to as “metadata”), that is subject to being read or put into readable form. Metadata in electronic documents creates an obligation under this Rule only if the receiving lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the metadata was inadvertently sent to the receiving lawyer.</div>","UrlName":"rule300","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"def9f1ce-eb75-4497-ba0e-3477cabad38c","ParentId":"bfe134c6-2213-4373-8419-b9ba66e4c40f","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships.","UrlName":"revision6"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"02b56e63-d751-481f-a3c4-1c665e512de9","Title":"RULE 5.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTNERS, MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORY LAWYERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A law firm partner as defined in Rule 1.0 (q), and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0 (g) . This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised. \n \n[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules. \n \n[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a) . \n \n[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. \n \n[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation. \n \n[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. \n \n[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a) . </div>","UrlName":"rule302","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"44cce370-1bc0-4f35-ae77-be2507b2c119","ParentId":"02b56e63-d751-481f-a3c4-1c665e512de9","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A law firm partner as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Paragraph (a) applies to lawyers who have managerial authority over the professional work of a firm. See Rule 1.0(e) . This includes members of a partnership, the shareholders in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, and members of other associations authorized to practice law; lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of other lawyers in a firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Such policies and procedures include those designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised. \n \n[3] Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (a) can depend on the firm's structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules. \n \n[4] Paragraph (c) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a) . \n \n[5] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a partner or other lawyer having comparable managerial authority in a law firm, as well as a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over performance of specific legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer's involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension. \n \n[6] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation. \n \n[7] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. \n \n[8] The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 5.2(a) . </div>","UrlName":"revision75"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f4afeac-58ab-40b7-9489-fdf040ce8227","Title":"RULE 5.2 RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUBORDINATE LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.</li> \n <li>A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character. \n \n[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged. </div>","UrlName":"rule111","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"46f33fc0-8186-4495-8b64-ca0a3a7c9901","ParentId":"1f4afeac-58ab-40b7-9489-fdf040ce8227","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer is bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.</li> \n <li>A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of the Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document's frivolous character. \n \n[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest, the supervisor's reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged. </div>","UrlName":"revision76"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ff99c726-6ca9-4d61-ae4b-56ea9ec61fbc","Title":"RULE 5.3. RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li>a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li> a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status; or</li> \n <li>provide any legal advice to the clients of the lawyer either in person, by telephone or in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline. \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. \n[3] The prohibitions of paragraph (d) are designed to prevent the unauthorized practice of law in a law office by a person who has been suspended or disbarred. A lawyer who allows a suspended or disbarred lawyer to work in a law office must exercise special care to ensure that the former lawyer complies with these rules, and that clients of the firm understand the former lawyer’s role. \n [4] A lawyer may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal services to the client. When using such assistance outside the firm, a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the assistance is provided in a manner that is compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations. The extent of this obligation will depend upon the circumstances, including the education, experience and reputation of the nonlawyer; the nature of the assistance involved; the terms of any arrangements concerning the protection of client information; and the legal and ethical environments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly with regard to confidentiality. See also Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Allocation of authority), 1.4 (Communication with client), 1.6 (Confidentiality of information), 5.4 (a) (Professional independence of a lawyer), and 5.5 (a) (Unauthorized practice of law). When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm, a lawyer should communicate directions appropriate under the circumstances to give reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. \n \n[5] Where the client directs the selection of a particular nonlawyer service provider outside the firm, the lawyer ordinarily should agree with the client concerning the allocation of responsibility for monitoring as between the client and the lawyer. See Rule 1.2. When making such an allocation in a matter pending before a tribunal, lawyers and parties may have additional obligations that are a matter of law beyond the scope of these rules. </div>","UrlName":"rule115","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3dafd6d4-7066-4cd3-a407-0afd1189fc27","ParentId":"ff99c726-6ca9-4d61-ae4b-56ea9ec61fbc","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li>a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;</li> \n <li> a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status; or</li> \n <li>provide any legal advice to the clients of the lawyer either in person, by telephone or in writing.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline. \n[2] Paragraph (a) requires lawyers with managerial authority within a law firm to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm will act in a way compatible with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Comment [1] to Rule 5.1. Paragraph (b) applies to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the work of a nonlawyer. Paragraph (c) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer. \n[3] The prohibitions of paragraph (d) are designed to prevent the unauthorized practice of law in a law office by a person who has been suspended or disbarred. A lawyer who allows a suspended or disbarred lawyer to work in a law office must exercise special care to ensure that the former lawyer complies with these Rules, and that clients of the firm understand the former lawyer’s role.</div>","UrlName":"revision276"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"68cd6473-79e8-4913-9202-b7d57d4350df","Title":"RULE 5.4. PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement;</li> \n <li>a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter;</li> \n <li>a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated nonprofit lawyer referral service where such fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>provide legal services to clients while working with other lawyers or law firms practicing in, and organized under the rules of, other jurisdictions, whether domestic or foreign, that permit nonlawyers to participate in the management of such firms, have equity ownership in such firms, or share in legal fees generated by such firms; and</li> \n <li>share legal fees arising from such legal services with such other lawyers or law firms to the same extent as the sharing of legal fees is permitted under applicable Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The activities permitted under the preceding portion of this paragraph (e) are subject to the following:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The association shall not compromise or interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment, the client-lawyer relationship between the client and the lawyer, or the lawyer’s compliance with these rules; and</li> \n <li>Nothing in paragraph (e) is intended to affect the lawyer’s obligation to comply with other applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, or to alter the forms in which a lawyer is permitted to practice, including but not limited to the creation of an alternative business structure in Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The provisions of this rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment. \n[2] The provisions of paragraphs (e) and (f) of this rule are not intended to allow a Georgia lawyer or law firm to create or participate in alternative business structures (ABS) in Georgia. An alternative business structure is a law firm where a nonlawyer is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. A law firm may also be an ABS where another body is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. This rule only allows a Georgia lawyer to work with an ABS outside of the state of Georgia and to share fees for that work.</div>","UrlName":"rule120","Order":46,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"dc8e5cbc-d8e4-40ba-88ce-a3a3fe392f00","ParentId":"68cd6473-79e8-4913-9202-b7d57d4350df","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.</li> \n <li>a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service where such fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3. Direct Contact with Prospective Clients.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or</li> \n <li>a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Provide legal services to clients while working with other lawyers or law firms practicing in, and organized under the rules of, other jurisdictions, whether domestic or foreign, that permit non-lawyers to participate in the management of such firms, have equity ownership in such firms, or share in legal fees generated by such firms; and</li> \n <li>Share legal fees arising from such legal services with such other lawyers or law firms to the same extent as the sharing of legal fees is permitted under applicable Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n <li> The activities permitted under the preceding portion of this paragraph (e) are subject to the following:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The association shall not compromise or interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment, the client-lawyer relationship between the client and the lawyer, or the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; and</li> \n <li>Nothing in this paragraph (e) is intended to affect the lawyer’s obligation to comply with other applicable Rules of Professional Conduct, or to alter the forms in which a lawyer is permitted to practice, including but not limited to the creation of an alternative business structure in Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment. Where someone other than the client pays the lawyer's fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer, that arrangement does not modify the lawyer's obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer's professional judgment. \n[2] The provisions of paragraph (e) of this Rule are not intended to allow a Georgia lawyer or law firm to create or participate in alternative business structures (ABS) in Georgia. An alternative business structure is a law firm where a non-lawyer is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. A law firm may also be an ABS where another body is a manager of the firm, or has an ownership-type interest in the firm. This Rule only allows a Georgia lawyer to work with an ABS outside of the state of Georgia and to share fees for that work.</div>","UrlName":"revision274"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1ac78e46-95b3-425a-8dfa-49896af55719","Title":"RULE 5.5. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.</li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer shall not:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law; or</li> \n <li>hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the Domestic Lawyer, or a person the Domestic Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or</li> \n <li>are not within paragraphs (c) (2) or (c) (3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted to practice.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are provided to the Domestic Lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or</li> \n <li>are services that the Domestic Lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Foreign Lawyer shall not, except as authorized by this Rule or other law, establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law, or hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. Such a Foreign Lawyer does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in this jurisdiction when on a temporary basis the Foreign Lawyer performs services in this jurisdiction that:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal held or to be held in a jurisdiction outside the United States if the Foreign Lawyer, or a person the Foreign Lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or by order of the tribunal to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;</li> \n <li>are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceedings held or to be held in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice;</li> \n <li> are not within paragraphs (e) (2) or (e) (3) and\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>are performed for a client who resides or has an office in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authorization; or</li> \n <li>arise out of or are reasonably related to a matter that has a substantial connection to a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice to the extent of that authorization; or</li> \n <li>are governed primarily by international law or the law of a non-United States jurisdiction.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A Foreign Lawyer who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction subject to the following conditions:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The services are provided to the Foreign Lawyer's employer or its organizational affiliates and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; and</li> \n <li>The Foreign Lawyer is and remains in this country in lawful immigration status and complies with all relevant provisions of United States immigration laws.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of the grants of authority found in subsections (e) and (f) above, the Foreign Lawyer must be a member in good standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign jurisdiction, the members of which are admitted to practice as lawyers or counselors at law or the equivalent and subject to effective regulation and discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XXI, Rule 121, Provision Of Legal Services Following Determination Of Major Disaster, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XV, Rules 91-95, Student Practice Rule, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XVI, Rules 97-103, Law School Graduates, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XX, Rules 114-120, Extended Public Service Program, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li> Any domestic or foreign lawyer who has been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia pro hac vice, pursuant to the Uniform Rules of the various classes of courts in Georgia, shall pay all required fees and costs annually as set forth in those Rules. Failure to pay the annual fee by January 15 of each year of admission pro hac vice will result in a late fee of $100 that must be paid no later than March 1 of that year. Failure to pay the annual fees may result in disciplinary action, and said lawyer may be subject to prosecution under the unauthorized practice of law statutes of this state. \n   </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n Comment \n[1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Paragraph (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action or by the lawyer assisting another person. \n[2] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3. \n[3] A lawyer may provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of the law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se. \n[4] Other than as authorized by law or this Rule, a Domestic Lawyer violates paragraph (b) and a Foreign Lawyer violates paragraph (e) if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law. Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not physically present here. Such Domestic or Foreign Lawyer must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction. See also Rules 7.1(a) and 7.5(b). \n[5] There are occasions in which a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create an unreasonable risk to the interests of their clients, the public or the courts. Paragraph (c) identifies four such circumstances for the Domestic Lawyer. Paragraph (e) identifies four such circumstances for the Foreign Lawyer. The fact that conduct is not so identified does not imply that the conduct is or is not authorized. With the exception of paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), this Rule does not authorize a Domestic Lawyer to establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here. \n[6] There is no single test to determine whether a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's services are provided on a \"temporary basis \"in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under paragraph (c) or paragraph (e). Services may be \"temporary \"even though the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when the Domestic Lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation. \n[7] Paragraphs (c) and (d) apply to Domestic Lawyers. Paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) apply to Foreign Lawyers. Paragraphs (c) and (e) contemplate that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice in the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted and excludes a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who while technically admitted is not authorized to practice, because, for example, the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is on inactive status. \n[8] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a Domestic Lawyer associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. Paragraph (e)(1) recognizes that the interests of clients and the public are protected if a Foreign Lawyer associates with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction. For these paragraphs to apply, however, the lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction must actively participate in and share responsibility for the representation of the client. \n[9] Domestic Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in a jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. This authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (c)(2), a Domestic Lawyer does not violate this Rule when the Domestic Lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency pursuant to such authority. To the extent that a court rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a Domestic Lawyer to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the Domestic Lawyer to obtain that authority. \n[10] Paragraph (c)(2) also provides that a Domestic Lawyer rendering services in this jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate this Rule when the Domestic Lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is authorized to practice law or in which the Domestic Lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted pro hac vice. Examples of such conduct include meetings with the client, interviews of potential witnesses, and the review of documents. Similarly, a Domestic Lawyer may engage in conduct temporarily in this jurisdiction in connection with pending litigation in another jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is or reasonably expects to be authorized to appear, including taking depositions in this jurisdiction. \n[11] When a Domestic Lawyer has been or reasonably expects to be admitted to appear before a court or administrative agency, paragraph (c)(2) also permits conduct by lawyers who are associated with that lawyer in the matter, but who do not expect to appear before the court or administrative agency. For example, subordinate Domestic Lawyers may conduct research, review documents, and attend meetings with witnesses in support of the Domestic Lawyer responsible for the litigation. \n[12] Paragraph (c)(3) permits a Domestic Lawyer, and paragraph (e)(3) permits a Foreign Lawyer, to perform services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction if those services are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice. The Domestic Lawyer, however, must obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so requires. \n[13] Paragraph (c)(4) permits a Domestic Lawyer to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted but are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3). These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers. Paragraph (e)(4)(i) permits a Foreign Lawyer to provide certain legal services in this jurisdiction on behalf of a client who resides or has an office in the jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice. Paragraph (e)(4)(ii) permits a Foreign Lawyer to provide certain legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that arise out of or are reasonably related to a matter that has a substantial connection to the jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is authorized to practice. These services include both legal services and services that nonlawyers may perform but that are considered the practice of law when performed by lawyers. \n[14] Paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the Domestic Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is admitted. Paragraphs (e)(3) and (e)(4)(ii) require that the services arise out of or be reasonably related to the Foreign Lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the Foreign Lawyer is admitted to practice. A variety of factors may evidence such a relationship. These include but are not limited to the following: \na. The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's client may have been previously represented by the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer; or \nb.  The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's client may be resident in, have an office in, or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nc. The matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction in which the Domestic of Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nd. Significant aspects of the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's work in a specific matter might be conducted in the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted or another jurisdiction; or \ne. A significant aspect of a matter may involve the law of the jurisdiction in which the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is admitted; or \nf. Some aspect of the matter may be governed by international law or the law of a non-United State jurisdiction; or \ng. The Lawyer's work on the specific matter in this jurisdiction is authorized by the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted; or \nh. The client's activities or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions, such as when the officers of a multinational corporation survey potential business sites and seek the services of their Domestic or Foreign Lawyer in assessing the relative merits of each; or \ni. The services may draw on the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally-uniform, foreign, or international law. \n[15] Paragraph (d) identifies two circumstances in which a Domestic Lawyer, who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law as well as provide legal services on a temporary basis. Except as provided in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), a Domestic Lawyer who establishes an office or other systematic or continuous presence in this jurisdiction must become admitted to practice law generally in this jurisdiction. \n[16] Paragraph (d)(1) applies to a Domestic Lawyer who is employed by a client to provide legal services to the client or its organizational affiliates, i.e., entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common control with the employer. This paragraph does not authorize the provision of personal legal services to the employer's officers or employees. The paragraph applies to in-house corporate lawyers, government lawyers and others who are employed to render legal services to the employer. The Domestic Lawyer's ability to represent the employer outside the jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is licensed generally serves the interests of the employer and does not create an unreasonable risk to the client and others because the employer is well situated to assess the Domestic Lawyer's qualifications and the quality of the Domestic Lawyer's work. \n[17] If an employed Domestic Lawyer establishes an office or other systematic presence in this jurisdiction for the purpose of rendering legal services to the employer, the Domestic Lawyer may be subject to registration or other requirements, including assessments for client protection funds and mandatory continuing legal education. \n[18] Paragraph (d)(2) recognizes that a Domestic Lawyer may provide legal services in a jurisdiction in which the Domestic Lawyer is not licensed when authorized to do so by federal or other law, which includes statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent. Paragraph (e)(4)(iii) recognizes that a Foreign Lawyer may provide legal services when the services provided are governed by international law or the law of a foreign jurisdiction. \n[19] A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c), (d), (e) or (f) or otherwise is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. See Rule 8.5(a). \n[20] In some circumstances, a Domestic Lawyer who practices law in this jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs (c) or (d) may have to inform the client that the Domestic Lawyer is not licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction. For example, that may be required when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction and requires knowledge of the law of this jurisdiction. See Rule 1.4. \n[21] Paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f) do not authorize communications advertising legal services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction by Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions. Whether and how Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may communicate the availability of their services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction is governed by Rules 7.1 to 7.5. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule129","Order":47,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"834d702e-4fc9-4d8f-ab00-f158dd071475","Title":"RULE 5.6 RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or</li> \n <li>an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client. \n \n[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule135","Order":48,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"1e9c7303-39be-4831-aa4e-5808b02acf0e","ParentId":"834d702e-4fc9-4d8f-ab00-f158dd071475","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or</li> \n <li>an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] An agreement restricting the right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements except for restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm. \n \n[2] Paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing not to represent other persons in connection with settling a claim on behalf of a client. \n \n[3] This Rule does not apply to prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision79"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7e48566c-b071-4d13-a6e0-9eff52fc699f","Title":"RULE 5.7 RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW-RELATED SERVICES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall be subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or</li> \n <li>by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The term \"law-related services \"denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case. \n[2] Rule 5.7: Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services need not adhere to the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7(a)(1): Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services. \n[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. \n[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a): Conflict of Interest. \n[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing. \n[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit. \n[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity which the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. \n[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a),(b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law. \n [11] When the full protections of all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule139","Order":49,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"a08edb38-d812-49fa-a936-10631a9356cb","ParentId":"7e48566c-b071-4d13-a6e0-9eff52fc699f","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall be subject to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or</li> \n <li>by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The term \"law-related services \"denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of law-related services when that may not be the case. \n[2] Rule 5.7: Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services applies to the provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related services are performed. The Rule identifies the circumstances in which all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct apply to the provision of law-related services. Even when those circumstances do not exist, however, the conduct of a lawyer involved in the provision of law-related services is subject to those Rules that apply generally to lawyer conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involves the provision of legal services. See, e.g., Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n[3] When law-related services are provided by a lawyer under circumstances that are distinct from the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients, the lawyer in providing the law-related services need not adhere to the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct as provided in Rule 5.7(a)(1): Restrictions Regarding Law-Related Services. \n[4] Law-related services also may be provided through an entity that is distinct from that through which the lawyer provides legal services. If the lawyer individually or with others has control of such an entity's operations, the Rule requires the lawyer to take reasonable measures to assure that each person using the services of the entity knows that the services provided by the entity are not legal services and that the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that relate to the client-lawyer relationship do not apply. A lawyer's control of an entity extends to the ability to direct its operation. Whether a lawyer has such control will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. \n[5] When a client-lawyer relationship exists with a person who is referred by a lawyer to a separate law-related service entity controlled by the lawyer, individually or with others, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a): Conflict of Interest. \n[6] In taking the reasonable measures referred to in paragraph (a)(2) to assure that a person using law-related services understands the practical effect or significance of the inapplicability of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer should communicate to the person receiving the law-related services, in a manner sufficient to assure that the person understands the significance of the fact, that the relationship of the person to the business entity will not be a client-lawyer relationship. The communication should be made before entering into an agreement for provision of or providing law-related services, and preferably should be in writing. \n[7] The burden is upon the lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the circumstances to communicate the desired understanding. For instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services, such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with a lawsuit. \n[8] Regardless of the sophistication of potential recipients of law-related services, a lawyer should take special care to keep separate the provision of law-related and legal services in order to minimize the risk that the recipient will assume that the law-related services are legal services. The risk of such confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both types of services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances the legal and law-related services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other, and the requirement of disclosure and consultation imposed by paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule cannot be met. In such a case a lawyer will be responsible for assuring that both the lawyer's conduct and, to the extent required by Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, that of nonlawyer employees in the distinct entity which the lawyer controls complies in all respects with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n[9] A broad range of economic and other interests of clients may be served by lawyers' engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting. \n[10] When a lawyer is obliged to accord the recipients of such services the protections of those Rules that apply to the client-lawyer relationship, the lawyer must take special care to heed the proscriptions of the Rules addressing conflict of interest (Rules 1.7 through 1.11, especially Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a),(b) and (f)), and to scrupulously adhere to the requirements of Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information relating to disclosure of confidential information. The promotion of the law-related services must also in all respects comply with Rules 7.1 through 7.3, dealing with advertising and solicitation. In that regard, lawyers should take special care to identify the obligations that may be imposed as a result of a jurisdiction's decisional law. \n [11] When the full protections of all of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the provision of law-related services, principles of law external to the Rules, for example, the law of principal and agent, govern the legal duties owed to those receiving the services. Those other legal principles may establish a different degree of protection for the recipient with respect to confidentiality of information, conflicts of interest and permissible business relationships with clients. See also Rule 8.4: Misconduct. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision80"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a5312e3c-cf09-46db-8444-a96cb25db4a2","Title":"RULE 6.1 VOLUNTARY PRO BONO PUBLIC SERVICE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> provide a substantial portion of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> provide any additional services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;</li> \n <li>delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nIn addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. \nNo reporting rules or requirements may be imposed without specific permission of the Supreme Court granted through amendments to these Rules. \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \nComment \n[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. \n[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. \n[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but who nevertheless cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term \"governmental organizations \"includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies. \n[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory lawyers' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. \n[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remain unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). \n[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups. \n[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. \n[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph. \n[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities. \n[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible. \n[11] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.</div>","UrlName":"rule140","Order":50,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b82d9e9a-f4e1-4e29-8f3d-fc80af791c64","ParentId":"a5312e3c-cf09-46db-8444-a96cb25db4a2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> provide a substantial portion of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> provide any additional services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate;</li> \n <li>delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or</li> \n <li>participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nIn addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. \nNo reporting rules or requirements may be imposed without specific permission of the Supreme Court granted through amendments to these Rules. \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \nComment \n[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The American Bar Association urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. States, however, may decide to choose a higher or lower number of hours of annual service (which may be expressed as a percentage of a lawyer's professional time) depending upon local needs and local conditions. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. \n[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. \n[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but who nevertheless cannot afford counsel. Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term \"governmental organizations \"includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of governmental or public sector agencies. \n[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential for the work performed to fall within the meaning of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory lawyers' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. \n[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service remain unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). \n[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and religious groups. \n[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. \n[8] Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph. \n[9] Because the provision of pro bono services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bono responsibility by providing financial support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should be reasonably equivalent to the value of the hours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's aggregate pro bono activities. \n[10] Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible. \n[11] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.</div>","UrlName":"revision81"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"38a8cf58-1c95-4ca8-8e59-954cb89fb0ff","Title":"RULE 6.2 ACCEPTING APPOINTMENTS","Content":" For good cause a lawyer may seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person. \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono publico service. See Rule 6.1: Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service. An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services. \n \nAppointed Counsel \n \n[2] For good cause a lawyer may seek to decline an appointment to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel or whose cause is unpopular. Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1: Competence, or if undertaking the representation would result in an improper conflict of interest, for example, when the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client. A lawyer may also seek to decline an appointment if acceptance would be unreasonably burdensome, for example, when it would impose a financial sacrifice so great as to be unjust. \n \n[3] An appointed lawyer has the same obligations to the client as retained counsel, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality, and is subject to the same limitations on the client-lawyer relationship, such as the obligation to refrain from assisting the client in violation of the Rules. \n \n[4] This Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process.","UrlName":"rule141","Order":51,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a747020c-0915-4a74-aaba-7f57f5ab7fdc","Title":"RULE 6.3 MEMBERSHIP IN LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or</li> \n <li>where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed. \n \n[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances. </div>","UrlName":"rule142","Order":52,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3d8678de-66de-44ab-838b-1ff82df79b9d","ParentId":"a747020c-0915-4a74-aaba-7f57f5ab7fdc","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests adverse to a client of the lawyer. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer's obligations to a client under Rule 1.7; or</li> \n <li>where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests are adverse to a client of the lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n There is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal service organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer's clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession's involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed. \n \n[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances. </div>","UrlName":"revision82"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"655d321f-cd27-40fb-be1a-3a6d92569f7b","Title":"RULE 6.4 LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT INTERESTS","Content":" A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefited by a decision in which the lawyer participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact but need not identify the client. \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. See also Rule 1.2(b): Scope of Representation. Without this Rule, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. For example, a lawyer specializing in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest. A lawyer is professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially benefited.","UrlName":"rule144","Order":53,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"RULE 6.5. NONPROFIT & COURT-ANNEXED LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS","Content":"<ol><li>A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided:<ol><li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and\n </li><li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.\n </li></ol></li><li>Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule.</li><li>The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10.\n </li></ol>The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.Comment [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10.[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter.[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program.[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. ","UrlName":"rule559","Order":54,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"e5063554-dfd3-4187-898d-44ef77085851","ParentId":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided: \n <ol> \n <li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and</li> \n <li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n(b) Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule. \n(c) The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n Comment \n [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10. \n[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation. \n[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter. \n[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program. \n[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision84"},{"Id":"7842ec92-aaa2-4c67-89c9-57477696681e","ParentId":"57c7983c-20ea-4a74-abcf-22e91626b62c","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> (a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit organization or court, provides short-term limited legal services to a client, normally through a one-time consultation, without expectation by either lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter and without expectation that the lawyer will receive a fee from the client for the services provided: \n <ol> \n <li>is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and</li> \n <li>is subject to Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a) with respect to the matter.</li> \n </ol> \n(b) Except as provided by paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule. \n(c) The recipient of the consultation authorized under paragraph (a) is, for purposes of Rule 1.9, a former client of the lawyer providing the service, but that lawyer's disqualification is not imputed to lawyers associated with the lawyer for purposes of Rule 1.10. \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n Comment \n [1] Legal services organizations, courts and various nonprofit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide short-term limited legal services—such as consultation clinics for advice or help with the completion of legal forms—that will assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer's representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to systematically screen for conflicts of interest as is generally required before undertaking a representation. See, e.g., Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10. \n[2] A lawyer who provides free short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client's informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, the Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation. \n[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a) in the matter. \n[4] Because the limited nature of services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer's firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rule 1.10 is inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 when the lawyer knows that the lawyer's firm is disqualified by Rules 1.7 or 1.9(a). By virtue of paragraph (b), however, a lawyer's participation in a short-term limited legal services program will not preclude the lawyer's firm from undertaking or continuing the representation of a client with interests adverse to a client being represented under the program's auspices. Nor will the personal disqualification of a lawyer participating in the program be imputed to other lawyers participating in the program. \n[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision86"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bfbb7abc-4b04-4066-b0d1-fed9bf0dd159","Title":"RULE 7.1 COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING A LAWYER'S SERVICES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. By way of illustration, but not limitation, a communication is false or misleading if it:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;</li> \n <li>is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;</li> \n <li>fails to include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content; or</li> \n <li> contains any information regarding contingent fees, and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"Contingent attorneys' fees refers only to those fees charged by attorneys for their legal services. Such fees are not permitted in all types of cases. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client.\" </li> \n <li> contains the language \"no fee unless you win or collect \"or any similar phrase and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"No fee unless you win or collect \"[or insert the similar language used in the communication] refers only to fees charged by the attorney. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client. Contingent fees are not permitted in all types of cases. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A public communication for which a lawyer has given value must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the context that it is such a communication.</li> \n <li>A lawyer retains ultimate responsibility to insure that all communications concerning the lawyer or the lawyer's services comply with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule governs the content of all communications about a lawyer's services, including the various types of advertising permitted by Rules 7.3 through 7.5. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful. \n[2] The prohibition in sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services of statements that may create \"unjustified expectations \"would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances. \nAffirmative Disclosure \n[3] In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally-based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal, and is therefore a preferable form of regulation to absolute bans or other similar restrictions. For example, there is no significant interest in failing to include the name of at least one accountable attorney in all communications promoting the services of a lawyer or law firm as required by sub-paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services. Nor is there any substantial burden imposed as a result of the affirmative disclaimer requirement of sub-paragraph (a)(6) upon a lawyer who wishes to make a claim in the nature of \"no fee unless you win.\"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that affirmative disclosure of a client's liability for costs and expenses of litigation may be required to prevent consumer confusion over the technical distinction between the meaning and effect of the use of such terms as \"fees \"and \"costs \"in an advertisement. \n[4] Certain promotional communications of a lawyer may, as a result of content or circumstance, tend to mislead a consumer to mistakenly believe that the communication is something other than a form of promotional communication for which the lawyer has paid. Examples of such a communication might include advertisements for seminars on legal topics directed to the lay public when such seminars are sponsored by the lawyer, or a newsletter or newspaper column which appears to inform or to educate about the law. Paragraph (b) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services would require affirmative disclosure that a lawyer has given value in order to generate these types of public communications if such is in fact the case. \nAccountability \n[5] Paragraph (c) makes explicit an advertising attorney's ultimate responsibility for all the lawyer's promotional communications and would suggest that review by the lawyer prior to dissemination is advisable if any doubts exist concerning conformity of the end product with these Rules. Although prior review by disciplinary authorities is not required by these Rules, lawyers are certainly encouraged to contact disciplinary authorities prior to authorizing a promotional communication if there are any doubts concerning either an interpretation of these Rules or their application to the communication.</div>","UrlName":"rule145","Order":55,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d2ffbcb-3e31-4917-b9c4-0122fdb5154a","ParentId":"bfbb7abc-4b04-4066-b0d1-fed9bf0dd159","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer may advertise through all forms of public media and through written communication not involving personal contact so long as the communication is not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading. By way of illustration, but not limitation, a communication is false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading if it:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;</li> \n <li>is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services unless the comparison can be factually substantiated;</li> \n <li>fails to include the name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content; or</li> \n <li> contains any information regarding contingent fees, and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"Contingent attorneys' fees refers only to those fees charged by attorneys for their legal services. Such fees are not permitted in all types of cases. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client.\" </li> \n <li> contains the language 'no fee unless you win or collect' or any similar phrase and fails to conspicuously present the following disclaimer: \n \n \"No fee unless you win or collect \"[or insert the similar language used in the communication] refers only to fees charged by the attorney. Court costs and other additional expenses of legal action usually must be paid by the client. Contingent fees are not permitted in all types of cases. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A public communication for which a lawyer has given value must be identified as such unless it is apparent from the context that it is such a communication.</li> \n <li>A lawyer retains ultimate responsibility to insure that all communications concerning the lawyer or the lawyer's services comply with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] This rule governs the content of all communications about a lawyer's services, including the various types of advertising permitted by Rules 7.3 through 7.5. Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about them should be truthful. \n[2] The prohibition in sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services of statements that may create \"unjustified expectations \"would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances. \nAffirmative Disclosure \n[3] In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally-based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal, and is therefore a preferable form of regulation to absolute bans or other similar restrictions. For example, there is no significant interest in failing to include the name of at least one accountable attorney in all communications promoting the services of a lawyer or law firm as required by sub-paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services. Nor is there any substantial burden imposed as a result of the affirmative disclaimer requirement of sub-paragraph (a)(6) upon a lawyer who wishes to make a claim in the nature of \"no fee unless you win.\"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that affirmative disclosure of a client's liability for costs and expenses of litigation may be required to prevent consumer confusion over the technical distinction between the meaning and effect of the use of such terms as \"fees \"and \"costs \"in an advertisement. \n[4] Certain promotional communications of a lawyer may, as a result of content or circumstance, tend to mislead a consumer to mistakenly believe that the communication is something other than a form of promotional communication for which the lawyer has paid. Examples of such a communication might include advertisements for seminars on legal topics directed to the lay public when such seminars are sponsored by the lawyer, or a newsletter or newspaper column which appears to inform or to educate about the law. Paragraph (b) of this Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services would require affirmative disclosure that a lawyer has given value in order to generate these types of public communications if such is in fact the case. \nAccountability \n[5] Paragraph (c) makes explicit an advertising attorney's ultimate responsibility for all the lawyer's promotional communications and would suggest that review by the lawyer prior to dissemination is advisable if any doubts exist concerning conformity of the end product with these Rules. Although prior review by disciplinary authorities is not required by these Rules, lawyers are certainly encouraged to contact disciplinary authorities prior to authorizing a promotional communication if there are any doubts concerning either an interpretation of these Rules or their application to the communication.</div>","UrlName":"revision272"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e0c4c6e2-31c8-4eaf-b4ba-0568213fc817","Title":"RULE 7.2 ADVERTISING","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical;</li> \n <li>outdoor advertising;</li> \n <li>radio or television;</li> \n <li>written, electronic or recorded communication.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.</li> \n <li> Prominent disclosures.  Any advertisement for legal services directed to potential clients in Georgia, or intended to solicit employment for delivery of any legal services in Georgia, must include prominent disclosures, clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, if written, and clearly intelligible by an average person, if spoken aloud, of the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disclosure of identity and physical location of attorney. Any advertisement shall include the name, physical location and telephone number of each lawyer or law firm who paid for the advertisement and who takes full personal responsibility for the advertisement.  In disclosing the physical location, the responsible lawyer shall state the full address of the location of the principal bona fide office of each lawyer who is prominently identified pursuant to this paragraph.  For the purposes of this Rule, a bona fide office is defined as a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm from which the lawyer or law firm furnishes legal services on a regular and continuing basis. In the absence of a bona fide physical office, the lawyer shall prominently disclose the full address listed with the State Bar of Georgia or other Bar to which the lawyer is admitted.  A lawyer who uses a referral service shall ensure that the service discloses the location of the lawyer's bona fide office, or the registered bar address, when a referral is made.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of referral practice.  If the lawyer or law firm will refer the majority of callers to other attorneys, that fact must be disclosed and the lawyer or law firm must comply with the provisions of Rule 7.3(c) regarding referral services.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of spokespersons and portrayals. Any advertisement that includes a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, portrayal of a client by a non-client, or any paid testimonial or endorsement, shall include prominent disclosure of the use of a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, or of a client by a non-client.</li> \n <li>Disclosures regarding fees. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, which statement shall be available to the client at the time of retainer for any such service.</li> \n <li>Appearance of legal notices or pleadings. Any advertisement that includes any representation that resembles a legal pleading, notice, contract or other legal document shall include prominent disclosure that the document is an advertisement rather than a legal document.</li> \n </ol> \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \n Comment \n \n [1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.\n \n [2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance. \n [3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against \"undignified \"advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. \n [4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation. \n Record of Advertising \n [5] Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule147","Order":56,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"00502313-3b79-42a3-a55c-6c7e9b2d5cc5","ParentId":"e0c4c6e2-31c8-4eaf-b4ba-0568213fc817","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical;</li> \n <li>outdoor advertising;</li> \n <li>radio or television;</li> \n <li>written, electronic or recorded communication.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A copy or recording of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.</li> \n <li> Prominent disclosures.  Any advertisement for legal services directed to potential clients in Georgia, or intended to solicit employment for delivery of any legal services in Georgia, must include prominent disclosures, clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, if written, and clearly intelligible by an average person, if spoken aloud, of the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Disclosure of identity and physical location of attorney. Any advertisement shall include the name, physical location and telephone number of each lawyer or law firm who paid for the advertisement and who takes full personal responsibility for the advertisement.  In disclosing the physical location, the responsible lawyer shall state the full address of the location of the principal bona fide office of each lawyer who is prominently identified pursuant to this paragraph.  For the purposes of this Rule, a bona fide office is defined as a physical location maintained by the lawyer or law firm from which the lawyer or law firm furnishes legal services on a regular and continuing basis. In the absence of a bona fide physical office, the lawyer shall prominently disclose the full address listed with the State Bar of Georgia or other Bar to which the lawyer is admitted.  A lawyer who uses a referral service shall ensure that the service discloses the location of the lawyer's bona fide office, or the registered bar address, when a referral is made.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of referral practice.  If the lawyer or law firm will refer the majority of callers to other attorneys, that fact must be disclosed and the lawyer or law firm must comply with the provisions of Rule 7.3(c) regarding referral services.</li> \n <li>Disclosure of spokespersons and portrayals. Any advertisement that includes a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, portrayal of a client by a non-client, or any paid testimonial or endorsement, shall include prominent disclosure of the use of a non-attorney spokesperson, portrayal of a lawyer by a non-lawyer, or of a client by a non-client.</li> \n <li>Disclosures regarding fees. A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, which statement shall be available to the client at the time of retainer for any such service.</li> \n <li>Appearance of legal notices or pleadings. Any advertisement that includes any representation that resembles a legal pleading, notice, contract or other legal document shall include prominent disclosure that the document is an advertisement rather than a legal document.</li> \n </ol> \n \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \n Comment \n \n [1] To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele. However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of moderate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are misleading or overreaching.\n \n [2] This Rule permits public dissemination of information concerning a lawyer's name or firm name, address and telephone number; the kinds of services the lawyer will undertake; the basis on which the lawyer's fees are determined, including prices for specific services and payment and credit arrangements; a lawyer's foreign language ability; names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly represented; and other information that might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance. \n [3] Questions of effectiveness and taste in advertising are matters of speculation and subjective judgment. Some jurisdictions have had extensive prohibitions against television advertising, against advertising going beyond specified facts about a lawyer, or against \"undignified \"advertising. Television is now one of the most powerful media for getting information to the public, particularly persons of low and moderate income; prohibiting television advertising, therefore, would impede the flow of information about legal services to many sectors of the public. Limiting the information that may be advertised has a similar effect and assumes that the bar can accurately forecast the kind of information that the public would regard as relevant. \n [4] Neither this Rule nor Rule 7.3: Direct Contact with Prospective Clients prohibits communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation. \n Record of Advertising \n [5] Paragraph (b) requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate enforcement of this Rule. \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision11"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1b5c4bd6-d92a-4e80-a484-2f534a89761c","Title":"RULE 7.3 DIRECT CONTACT WITH PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS","Content":"<ol><li>A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of the lawyer, the lawyer's firm, lawyer's partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:<ol><li>it has been made known to the lawyer that a person does not desire to receive communications from the lawyer;</li><li>the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence;</li><li>the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication; or</li><li>the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.</li></ol></li><li>Written communications to a prospective client, other than a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes is a former client, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment shall be plainly marked \"Advertisement \"on the face of the envelope and on the top of each page of the written communication in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the letter.</li><li>A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer's employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer's employment by a client; except that the lawyer may pay for public communications permitted by Rule 7.1 and except as follows:<ol><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service, if the service:<ol><li>does not engage in conduct that would violate the Rules if engaged in by a lawyer;</li><li>provides an explanation to the prospective client regarding how the lawyers are selected by the service to participate in the service; and</li><li>discloses to the prospective client how many lawyers are participating in the service and that those lawyers have paid the service a fee to participate in the service.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service, including a fee which is calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter, provided such bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service meets the following criteria:<ol><li>the lawyer referral service shall be operated in the public interest for the purpose of referring prospective clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agencies who can provide the assistance the clients need. Such organization shall file annually with the State Disciplinary Board a report showing its rules and regulations, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating and the names and addresses of the lawyers participating in the service;</li><li>the sponsoring bar association for the lawyer referral service must be open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in this state who maintain an office within the geographical area served, and who meet reasonable objectively determinable experience requirements established by the bar association;</li><li>the combined fees charged by a lawyer and the lawyer referral service to a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges which the client would have paid had no service been involved; and</li><li>a lawyer who is a member of the qualified lawyer referral service must maintain in force a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the use of the lawyer's services, the lawyer's partner or associates services so long as the communications of the organization are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading;</li><li>A lawyer may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.</li></ol></li><li>A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment as a private practitioner for the lawyer, a partner or associate through direct personal contact or through live telephone contact, with a nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.</li><li>A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person who seeks to employ the lawyer does so as a result of conduct by any person or organization that would violate these Rules if engaged in by a lawyer.</li></ol>The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.CommentDirect Personal Contact[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in solicitation through direct personal contact by a lawyer of prospective clients known to need legal services. It subjects the lay person to the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a direct interpersonal encounter. A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from the lawyer's own interest, which may color the advice and representation offered the vulnerable prospect.[2] The situation is therefore fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation and overreaching. The potential for abuse inherent in solicitation of prospective clients through personal contact justifies its prohibition, particularly since the direct written contact permitted under paragraph (b) of this Rule offers an alternative means of communicating necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Also included in the prohibited types of personal contact are direct, personal contact through an intermediary and live contact by telephone.Direct Written Solicitation[3] Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule, promotional communication by a lawyer through direct written contact is generally permissible. The public's need to receive information concerning their legal rights and the availability of legal services has been consistently recognized as a basis for permitting direct written communication since this type of communication may often be the best and most effective means of informing. So long as this stream of information flows cleanly, it will be permitted to flow freely.[4] Certain narrowly-drawn restrictions on this type of communication are justified by a substantial state interest in facilitating the public's intelligent selection of counsel, including the restrictions of paragraphs (a) (3) and (a) (4) which proscribe direct mailings to persons such as an injured and hospitalized accident victim or the bereaved family of a deceased.[5] In order to make it clear that the communication is commercial in nature, paragraph (b) requires inclusion of an appropriate affirmative \"advertisement \"disclaimer. Again, the traditional exception for contact with close friends, relatives and former clients is recognized and permits elimination of the disclaimer in direct written contact with these persons.[6] This Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer[7] A lawyer is allowed to pay for communications permitted by these Rules, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency, a prepaid legal services plan or prepaid legal insurance organization may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices.","UrlName":"rule149","Order":57,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"de8287f5-531e-4668-8a96-2fe3b21b971a","ParentId":"1b5c4bd6-d92a-4e80-a484-2f534a89761c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on behalf of the lawyer, the lawyer's firm, lawyer's partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>it has been made known to the lawyer that a person does not desire to receive communications from the lawyer;</li> \n <li>the communication involves coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, harassment, intimidation or undue influence;</li> \n <li>the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication; or</li> \n <li>the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Written communications to a prospective client, other than a close friend, relative, former client or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes is a former client, for the purpose of obtaining professional employment shall be plainly marked \"Advertisement \"on the face of the envelope and on the top of each page of the written communication in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the letter.</li> \n <li> A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer's employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer's employment by a client; except that the lawyer may pay for public communications permitted by Rule 7.1 and except as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service, if the service:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>does not engage in conduct that would violate the Rules if engaged in by a lawyer;</li> \n <li>provides an explanation to the prospective client regarding how the lawyers are selected by the service to participate in the service; and</li> \n <li>discloses to the prospective client how many lawyers are participating in the service and that those lawyers have paid the service a fee to participate in the service.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/referral-service.cfm/"> bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service </a> , including a fee which is calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter, provided such bar-operated non-profit lawyer referral service meets the following criteria:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the lawyer referral service shall be operated in the public interest for the purpose of referring prospective clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agencies who can provide the assistance the clients need. Such organization shall file annually with the State Disciplinary Board a report showing its rules and regulations, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating and the names and addresses of the lawyers participating in the service;</li> \n <li>the sponsoring bar association for the lawyer referral service must be open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in this state who maintain an office within the geographical area served, and who meet reasonable objectively determinable experience requirements established by the bar association;</li> \n <li>the combined fees charged by a lawyer and the lawyer referral service to a client referred by such service shall not exceed the total charges which the client would have paid had no service been involved; and</li> \n <li>a lawyer who is a member of the qualified lawyer referral service must maintain in force a policy of errors and omissions insurance in an amount no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the use of the lawyer's services, the lawyer's partner or associates services so long as the communications of the organization are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading;</li> \n <li>A lawyer may pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment as a private practitioner for the lawyer, a partner or associate through direct personal contact or through live telephone contact, with a nonlawyer who has not sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer.</li> \n <li>A lawyer shall not accept employment when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person who seeks to employ the lawyer does so as a result of conduct by any person or organization that would violate these Rules if engage in by a lawyer.</li> \n</ol>\nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.\n Comment\n Direct Personal Contact\n[1] There is a potential for abuse inherent in solicitation through direct personal contact by a lawyer of prospective clients known to need legal services. It subjects the lay person to the private importuning of a trained advocate, in a direct interpersonal encounter. A prospective client often feels overwhelmed by the situation giving rise to the need for legal services, and may have an impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interest. Furthermore, the lawyer seeking the retainer is faced with a conflict stemming from the lawyer's own interest, which may color the advice and representation offered the vulnerable prospect.\n[2] The situation is therefore fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation and overreaching. The potential for abuse inherent in solicitation of prospective clients through personal contact justifies its prohibition, particularly since the direct written contact permitted under paragraph (b) of this Rule offers an alternative means of communicating necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services. Also included in the prohibited types of personal contact are direct, personal contact through an intermediary and live contact by telephone.\n Direct Written Solicitation\n[3] Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Rule, promotional communication by a lawyer through direct written contact is generally permissible. The public's need to receive information concerning their legal rights and the availability of legal services has been consistently recognized as a basis for permitting direct written communication since this type of communication may often be the best and most effective means of informing. So long as this stream of information flows cleanly, it will be permitted to flow freely.\n[4] Certain narrowly-drawn restrictions on this type of communication are justified by a substantial state interest in facilitating the public's intelligent selection of counsel, including the restrictions of paragraphs (a) (3) and (a) (4) which proscribe direct mailings to persons such as an injured and hospitalized accident victim or the bereaved family of a deceased.\n[5] In order to make it clear that the communication is commercial in nature, paragraph (b) requires inclusion of an appropriate affirmative \"advertisement \"disclaimer. Again, the traditional exception for contact with close friends, relatives and former clients is recognized and permits elimination of the disclaimer in direct written contact with these persons.\n[6] This Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law, such as notice to members of a class in class action litigation.\n Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer\n[7] A lawyer is allowed to pay for communications permitted by these Rules, but otherwise is not permitted to pay another person for channeling professional work. This restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services. Thus, a legal aid agency, a prepaid legal services plan or prepaid legal insurance organization may pay to advertise legal services provided under its auspices.","UrlName":"revision88"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a47de23f-1487-46e7-9b5b-7fb860002ed6","Title":"RULE 7.4 COMMUNICATION OF FIELDS OF PRACTICE","Content":" A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer who is a specialist in a particular field of law by experience, specialized training or education, or is certified by a recognized and bona fide professional entity, may communicate such specialty or certification so long as the statement is not false or misleading. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. \n \n[2] A lawyer may truthfully communicate the fact that the lawyer is a specialist or is certified in a particular field of law by experience or as a result of having been certified as a \"specialist \"by successfully completing a particular program of legal specialization. An example of a proper use of the term would be \"Certified as a Civil Trial Specialist by XYZ Institute \"provided such was in fact the case, such statement would not be false or misleading and provided further that the Civil Trial Specialist program of XYZ Institute is a recognized and bona fide professional entity.","UrlName":"rule151","Order":58,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"839d714d-6690-434e-a388-6b7fdebdcc26","ParentId":"a47de23f-1487-46e7-9b5b-7fb860002ed6","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer who is a specialist in a particular field of law by experience, specialized training or education, or is certified by a recognized and bona fide professional entity, may communicate such specialty or certification so long as the statement is not false or misleading. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept matters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. \n \n[2] A lawyer may truthfully communicate the fact that the lawyer is a specialist or is certified in a particular field of law by experience or as a result of having been certified as a \"specialist \"by successfully completing a particular program of legal specialization. An example of a proper use of the term would be \"Certified as a Civil Trial Specialist by XYZ Institute \"provided such was in fact the case, such statement would not be false or misleading and provided further that the Civil Trial Specialist program of XYZ Institute is a recognized and bona fide professional entity. </div>","UrlName":"revision10"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ed01a76-f677-4498-8f1f-892cfa61bcb0","Title":"RULE 7.5 FIRM NAMES AND LETTERHEADS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use a firm name, trade name, letterhead, or other professional designation that is false or misleading.</li> \n <li>A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer holding public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.</li> \n <li>Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] Firm names and letterheads are subject to the general requirement of all advertising that the communication must not be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. Therefore, lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for example, \"Smith and Jones,\"for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law. \n[2] Firm names consisting entirely of the names of deceased or retired partners are permitted and have proven a useful means of identification.</div>","UrlName":"rule153","Order":59,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"77822a2f-afaa-4b47-8b0c-f4f084c47b38","ParentId":"2ed01a76-f677-4498-8f1f-892cfa61bcb0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.</li> \n <li>A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer holding public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.</li> \n <li>Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.</li> \n <li> A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the trade name includes the name of at least one of the lawyers practicing under said name. A law firm name consisting solely of the name or names of deceased or retired members of the firm does not have to include the name of an active member of the firm; and</li> \n <li>the trade name does not imply a connection with a government entity, with a public or charitable legal services organization or any other organization, association or institution or entity, unless there is, in fact, a connection.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n[1] Firm names and letterheads are subject to the general requirement of all advertising that the communication must not be false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading. Therefore, lawyers sharing office facilities, but who are not in fact partners, may not denominate themselves as, for example, \"Smith and Jones,\"for that title suggests partnership in the practice of law. \n [2] Trade names may be used so long as the name includes the name of at least one or more of the lawyers actively practicing with the firm. Firm names consisting entirely of the names of deceased or retired partners have traditionally been permitted and have proven a useful means of identification. Sub-paragraph (e)(1) permits their continued use as an exception to the requirement that a firm name include the name of at least one active member. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision292"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"29e3311e-ee9c-48d1-bec2-87e9e90d46d2","Title":"RULE 8.1 BAR ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY MATTERS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware. \n \n[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule. \n \n[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship. </div>","UrlName":"rule154","Order":60,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"2ed5246a-3d47-4a8a-b200-3eb31db8b84f","ParentId":"29e3311e-ee9c-48d1-bec2-87e9e90d46d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or</li> \n <li>fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.</li> \n </ol> \n The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The duty imposed by this Rule extends to persons seeking admission to the bar as well as to lawyers. Hence, if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted, and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer's own admission or discipline as well as that of others. Thus, it is a separate professional offense for a lawyer to knowingly make a misrepresentation or omission in connection with a disciplinary investigation of the lawyer's own conduct. This Rule also requires affirmative clarification of any misunderstanding on the part of the admissions or disciplinary authority of which the person involved becomes aware. \n \n[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule. \n \n[3] A lawyer representing an applicant for admission to the bar, or representing a lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary inquiry or proceeding, is governed by the rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship. </div>","UrlName":"revision90"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"50e8e9d0-27d2-4d37-9a3f-bed1bafa6807","Title":"RULE 8.2 JUDICIAL AND LEGAL OFFICIALS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. \n \n[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity. \n \n[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized. </div>","UrlName":"rule155","Order":61,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"580d4c72-d73b-4b11-9658-ba32379d5370","ParentId":"50e8e9d0-27d2-4d37-9a3f-bed1bafa6807","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office and to public legal offices, such as attorney general, prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. \n \n[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer should be bound by applicable limitations on political activity. \n \n[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized. </div>","UrlName":"revision91"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e0444a85-d7c3-49ad-9ba0-20caeac6f2c3","Title":"RULE 8.3 REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should inform the appropriate authority.</li> \n </ol> \n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they know of a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense. </div>","UrlName":"rule157","Order":62,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"12edb664-0ca8-4634-9280-5510e9fdc82e","ParentId":"e0444a85-d7c3-49ad-9ba0-20caeac6f2c3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, should inform the appropriate professional authority.</li> \n <li>A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office should inform the appropriate authority.</li> \n</ol>\n \nThere is no disciplinary penalty for a violation of this Rule. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they know of a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.","UrlName":"revision92"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"747cef32-18d7-4ab9-927e-7587a7e03e5b","Title":"RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a felony;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law;</li> \n <li>engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;</li> \n <li>fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the time appointed in the order or judgment;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>state an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>state an ability to achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable Rules of judicial conduct or other law; or</li> \n <li>commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer has admitted in judicio, the commission of such act.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, conviction shall have the meaning set forth in Rule 1.0 (e).</li> \n <li>The record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings under these disciplinary Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to cause any infringement of the existing inherent right of Georgia Superior Courts to suspend and disbar lawyers from practice based upon a conviction of a crime as specified in paragraphs (a) (1), (a) (2) and (a) (3) above.</li> \n <li>Rule 8.4 (a) (1) does not apply to any of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for which there is no disciplinary penalty.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) through (c) is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevents a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer can not. \n[2] This Rule, as its predecessor, is drawn in terms of acts involving \"moral turpitude \"with, however, a recognition that some such offenses concern matters of personal morality and have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Here the concern is limited to those matters which fall under both the rubric of \"moral turpitude \"and involve underlying conduct relating to the fitness of the lawyer to practice law. \n[3] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving \"moral turpitude.\"That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. \n[4] Reserved. \n[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. \n[6] Persons holding public office assume responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.</div>","UrlName":"rule160","Order":63,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"d0124638-c0d6-45f2-b59e-01153016f645","ParentId":"747cef32-18d7-4ab9-927e-7587a7e03e5b","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a felony;</li> \n <li>be convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law;</li> \n <li>engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;</li> \n <li>fail to pay any final judgment or rule absolute rendered against such lawyer for money collected by him or her as a lawyer within ten days after the time appointed in the order or judgment;</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>state an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>state an ability to achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n <li>achieve results by means that violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or</li> \n <li>commit a criminal act that relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law or reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, where the lawyer has admitted in judicio, the commission of such act.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> For purposes of this Rule, conviction shall include any of the following accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>a guilty plea;</li> \n <li>a plea of nolo contendere;</li> \n <li>a verdict of guilty; or</li> \n <li>a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings under these disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to cause any infringement of the existing inherent right of Georgia Superior Courts to suspend and disbar lawyers from practice based upon a conviction of a crime as specified in paragraphs (a) (1), (a) (2) and (a) (3) above.</li> \n <li>Rule 8.4 (a) (1) does not apply to any of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct for which there is no disciplinary penalty.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) through (c) is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevents a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer can not. \n[2] This Rule, as its predecessor, is drawn in terms of acts involving \"moral turpitude \"with, however, a recognition that some such offenses concern matters of personal morality and have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Here the concern is limited to those matters which fall under both the rubric of \"moral turpitude \"and involve underlying conduct relating to the fitness of the lawyer to practice law. \n[3] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving \"moral turpitude.\"That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation. \n[4] Reserved. \n[5] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law. \n[6] Persons holding public office assume responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.</div>","UrlName":"revision393"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bcc5b884-9b3f-4809-99a8-69f9a43fa6bd","Title":"RULE 8.5 DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF LAW","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.</li> \n <li> Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and</li> \n <li>for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n Comment\n Disciplinary Authority\n[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rule 9.4: Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters.\n Choice of Law\n[2] A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.\n[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty.\n[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction.\n[5] When a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule.\n[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.\n[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise. ","UrlName":"rule163","Order":64,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f63d4542-aaf7-4886-b136-e8b35b084856","ParentId":"bcc5b884-9b3f-4809-99a8-69f9a43fa6bd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.</li> \n <li> Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and</li> \n <li>for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n Comment \n Disciplinary Authority \n[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the citizens of this jurisdiction. Reciprocal enforcement of a jurisdiction's disciplinary findings and sanctions will further advance the purposes of this Rule. See, Rule 9.4: Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction under Rule 8.5(a) appoints an official to be designated by this Court to receive service of process in this jurisdiction. The fact that the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction may be a factor in determining whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the lawyer for civil matters. \n Choice of Law \n[2] A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations. The lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction. \n[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of both clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions, and (iii) providing protection from discipline for lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who act reasonably in the face of uncertainty. \n[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a tribunal, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits unless the rules of the tribunal, including its choice of law rule, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, including conduct in anticipation of a proceeding not yet pending before a tribunal, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in another jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred, where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction. \n[5] When a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one in which the conduct occurred. So long as the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur, the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule. \n[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules. \n[7] The choice of law provision applies to lawyers or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise. </div>","UrlName":"revision94"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b3d91ad7-b726-4a79-8425-78f03a16fd09","Title":"RULE 9.1 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Members of the State Bar of Georgia shall, within sixty days, notify the State Bar of Georgia of:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>being admitted to the practice of law in another jurisdiction and the dates of admission;</li> \n <li>being convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law; or</li> \n <li>the imposition of discipline by any jurisdiction other than the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"discipline \"shall include any sanction imposed as the result of conduct that would be in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if occurring in Georgia.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"jurisdiction \"shall include state, federal, territorial and non-United States courts and authorities.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n [1] The State Bar of Georgia is the regulatory authority created by the Supreme Court of Georgia to oversee the practice of law in Georgia. In order to provide effective disciplinary programs, the State Bar of Georgia needs information about its members. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule166","Order":65,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"94b9b094-1aa5-4da2-b836-58f676f1412f","ParentId":"b3d91ad7-b726-4a79-8425-78f03a16fd09","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Members of the State Bar of Georgia shall, within sixty days, notify the State Bar of Georgia of:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>being admitted to the practice of law in another jurisdiction and the dates of admission;</li> \n <li>being convicted of any felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying conduct relates to the lawyer's fitness to practice law; or</li> \n <li>the imposition of discipline by any jurisdiction other than the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"discipline \"shall include any sanction imposed as the result of conduct that would be in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if occurring in Georgia.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Rule the term \"jurisdiction \"shall include state, federal, territorial and non-United States courts and authorities.</li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \nComment \n [1] The State Bar of Georgia is the regulatory authority created by the Supreme Court of Georgia to oversee the practice of law in Georgia. In order to provide effective disciplinary programs, the State Bar of Georgia needs information about its members. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision95"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24dd6504-aaff-4eed-9dad-210ffda7f23e","Title":"RULE 9.2 RESTRICTIONS ON FILING DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINTS","Content":" A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement containing a condition that prohibits or restricts a person from filing a disciplinary complaint, or that requires the person to request dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \n \nComment \n \n[1] The disciplinary system provides protection to the general public from those lawyers who are not morally fit to practice law. One problem in the past has been the lawyer who settles the civil claim/disciplinary complaint with the injured party on the basis that the injured party not bring a disciplinary complaint or request the dismissal of a pending disciplinary complaint. The lawyer is then is free to injure other members of the general public. \n \n[2] To prevent such abuses, this Rule prohibits a lawyer from entering into any agreement containing a condition which prevents a person from filing or pursuing a disciplinary complaint.","UrlName":"rule182","Order":66,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"RULE 9.3 COOPERATION WITH DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY","Content":" During the investigation of a matter pursuant to these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the State Disciplinary Board charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"rule196","Order":67,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"432150ec-fffc-4697-8cb3-1770af2b95e9","ParentId":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"Version 3","Content":" During the investigation of a grievance filed under these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the State Disciplinary Board charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"revision395"},{"Id":"a89fe2f0-d6b3-429a-800e-db4fb74e5464","ParentId":"80c25df1-f4ae-4709-ab5a-26543d2e5374","Title":"Version 2","Content":" During the investigation of a grievance filed under these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules. \n \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. \n \nComment \n \n[1] Much of the work in the disciplinary process is performed by volunteer lawyers and lay persons. In order to make good use of their valuable time, it is imperative that the lawyer complained against cooperate with the investigation. In particular, the lawyer must file a sworn response with the member of the Investigative Panel charged with the responsibility of investigating the complaint. \n \n[2] Nothing in this Rule prohibits a lawyer from responding by making a Fifth Amendment objection, if appropriate. However, disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature and the use of a Fifth Amendment objection will give rise to a presumption against the lawyer. \n ","UrlName":"revision300"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cfbdd4c5-e0f2-431a-b8bb-f0f79a4778d2","Title":"RULE 9.4: JURISDICTION AND RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Jurisdiction. Any lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts committed prior to resignation, suspension, disbarment, or removal from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar of Georgia, or with respect to acts subsequent thereto that amount to the practice of law or constitute a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any Rules or Code subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in lieu thereof, and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer specially admitted by a court of this jurisdiction for a particular proceeding and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this jurisdiction, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li> Reciprocal Discipline. Upon being suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia has been suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, the Office of the General Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. Nothing in this Rule shall prevent a lawyer suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction from filing a Petition for Voluntary Discipline under Rule 4-227.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia has been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall issue a notice to the respondent that shall show the date of the disbarment or suspension in the other jurisdiction and shall include a copy of the order therefor.  The notice shall direct the respondent to show cause to the State Disciplinary Review Board within 30 days from service of the notice why the imposition of substantially similar discipline in this jurisdiction would be unwarranted. The notice shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1, and any response thereto shall be served upon the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li> If neither party objects within 30 days, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall recommend imposition of substantially similar discipline and shall file that recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia within 60 days after the time for the filing of objections expires. The Office of the General Counsel or the respondent may object to imposition of substantially similar discipline by demonstrating that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or</li> \n <li>There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or</li> \n <li>The reason for the original disciplinary status no longer exists; or</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The conduct did not occur within the state of Georgia; and,</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed by the foreign jurisdiction exceeds the level of discipline allowed under these Rules; or</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The discipline would if imposed in identical form be unduly severe or would require action not contemplated by these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n If the State Disciplinary Review Board finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated that any of those elements exist, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall make such other recommendation to the Supreme Court of Georgia as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. </li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board may consider exceptions from either the Office of the General Counsel or the respondent on the grounds enumerated at paragraph (b) (3) of this Rule and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the State Disciplinary Review Board within 30 days of service of the Notice of Reciprocal Discipline. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond. The State Disciplinary Review Board shall file its report and recommendation within 60 days of receiving the response to exceptions.</li> \n <li>In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct, or has been removed from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar of Georgia, shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the removal from practice for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this State.</li> \n <li>Discipline imposed by another jurisdiction but of a lesser nature than disbarment or suspension may be considered in aggravation of discipline in any other disciplinary proceeding.</li> \n <li>For good cause, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board in a reciprocal discipline proceeding may make an interim recommendation to the Supreme Court of Georgia that the respondent be immediately suspended pending final disposition.</li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, the word “jurisdiction” means any State, Territory, country, or federal court.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdiction and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit. Any procedure that so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified. The spectacle of a lawyer disbarred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. \n[2] Reserved. \n[3] The imposition of discipline in one jurisdiction does not mean that Georgia and every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted must necessarily impose discipline. The State Disciplinary Review Board has jurisdiction to recommend reciprocal discipline when a lawyer is suspended or disbarred in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed or otherwise admitted. \n[4] A judicial determination of misconduct by the respondent in another jurisdiction is conclusive, and not subject to re-litigation in the forum jurisdiction. The State Disciplinary Review Board should recommend substantially similar discipline unless it determines, after review limited to the record of the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, that one of the grounds specified in paragraph (b) (3) exists. \n[5] For purposes of this Rule, the suspension or placement of a lawyer on inactive status in another jurisdiction because of want of sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairment of competency as a lawyer shall be considered a disciplinary suspension under the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule203","Order":68,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"d109c0e2-935b-4278-abaf-561b3255d262","ParentId":"cfbdd4c5-e0f2-431a-b8bb-f0f79a4778d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Jurisdiction. Any lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, including any formerly admitted lawyer with respect to acts committed prior to resignation, suspension, disbarment, or removal from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, or with respect to acts subsequent thereto which amount to the practice of law or constitute a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any Rules or Code subsequently adopted by the court in lieu thereof, and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer specially admitted by a court of this jurisdiction for a particular proceeding and any Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who practices law or renders or offers to render any legal services in this jurisdiction, is subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li> Reciprocal Discipline. Upon being suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline. Upon notification from any source that a lawyer within the jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia has been suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, the Office of General Counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the disciplinary order and file it with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. Nothing in the Rule shall prevent a lawyer suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction from filing a petition for voluntary discipline under Rule 4-227.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order demonstrating that a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia has been disbarred or suspended in another jurisdiction, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall docket the matter and forthwith issue a notice directed to the lawyer containing:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>A copy of the order from the other jurisdiction; and</li> \n <li>A notice approved by the Review Panel that the lawyer must inform the Office of General Counsel and the Review Panel, within thirty days from service of the notice, of any claim by the lawyer predicated upon the grounds set forth in paragraph (b)(3) below, that the imposition of the substantially similar discipline in this jurisdiction would be unwarranted and the reasons for that claim.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In the event the discipline imposed in the other jurisdiction has been stayed there, any reciprocal discipline imposed in this jurisdiction shall be deferred until the stay expires.</li> \n <li> Upon the expiration of thirty days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(1), the Review Panel shall recommend to the Georgia Supreme Court substantially similar discipline, or removal from practice on the grounds provided in Rule 4-104, unless the Office of General Counsel or the lawyer demonstrates, or the Review Panel finds that it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is predicated, that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or</li> \n <li>There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or</li> \n <li>The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the public policy of the jurisdiction; or</li> \n <li>The reason for the original disciplinary status no longer exists; or</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the conduct did not occur within the state of Georgia; and,</li> \n <li>the discipline imposed by the foreign jurisdiction exceeds the level of discipline allowed under these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>the discipline would if imposed in identical form be unduly severe or would require action not contemplated by these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n If the Review Panel determines that any of those elements exists, the Review Panel shall make such other recommendation to the Georgia Supreme Court as it deems appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate. </li> \n <li>The Review Panel may consider exceptions from either the Office of General Counsel or the Respondent on the grounds enumerated at Part (b)(3) of this Rule, and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions in briefs shall be filed with the Review Panel within 30 days from notice of the Notice of Reciprocal Discipline. The responding party shall have 10 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.</li> \n <li>In all other aspects, a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct, or has been removed from practice on any of the grounds provided in Rule 4-104 of the State Bar, shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the removal from practice for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state.</li> \n <li>Discipline imposed by another jurisdiction but of a lesser nature than disbarment or suspension may be considered in aggravation of discipline in any other disciplinary proceeding.</li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, the word \"jurisdiction \"means any state, territory, country or federal court.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \nThe maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. \nComment \n[1] If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdiction and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit. Any procedure which so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified. The spectacle of a lawyer disbarred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. \n[2] Reserved. \n[3] The imposition of discipline in one jurisdiction does not mean that Georgia and every other jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted must necessarily impose discipline. The Review Panel has jurisdiction to recommend reciprocal discipline on the basis of public discipline imposed by a jurisdiction in which the respondent is licensed. \n[4] A judicial determination of misconduct by the respondent in another jurisdiction is conclusive, and not subject to relitigation in the forum jurisdiction. The Review Panel should recommend substantially similar discipline unless it determines, after review limited to the record of the proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction, that one of the grounds specified in paragraph (b)(3) exists. This Rule applies whether or not the respondent is admitted to practice in the foreign jurisdiction. See also, Rule 8.5, Comment [1]. \n[5] For purposes of this Rule, the suspension or placement of a lawyer on inactive status in another jurisdiction because of want of sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairment of competency as an attorney shall be considered a disciplinary suspension under the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"revision96"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ac435e7c-373e-4aac-b77c-d9c71b932185","Title":"RULE 9.5 LAWYER AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is a public official and represents the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, is bound by the provisions of these Rules.</li> \n <li>No provision of these Rules shall be construed to prohibit such a lawyer from taking a legal position adverse to the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, when such action is authorized or required by the U. S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution or statutes of the United States or Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule207","Order":69,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"8327f56a-6a36-4e71-a8ee-520d4acce0f2","ParentId":"ac435e7c-373e-4aac-b77c-d9c71b932185","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A lawyer who is a public official and represents the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, is bound by the provisions of these Rules.</li> \n <li>No provision of these Rules shall be construed to prohibit such a lawyer from taking a legal position adverse to the State, a municipal corporation in the State, the United States government, their agencies or officials, when such action is authorized or required by the U. S. Constitution, the Georgia Constitution or statutes of the United States or Georgia.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"revision97"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f92c6b0e-b411-472c-a4b2-770688d9c965","Title":"Rule 4-103. Multiple Violations","Content":"A finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these Rules shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment. A Special Master and the State Disciplinary Review Board may exercise this discretionary power when the question is appropriately before them. Any discipline imposed by another jurisdiction as contemplated by Rule 9.4 may be considered a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of this Rule.","UrlName":"rule92","Order":70,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"b080bb20-ecaf-4931-b232-ddbc4336b93c","ParentId":"f92c6b0e-b411-472c-a4b2-770688d9c965","Title":"Version 2","Content":"A finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these rules shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment. The Review Panel may exercise this discretionary power when the question is appropriately before that Panel. Any discipline imposed by another jurisdiction as contemplated by Rule 9.4 may be considered a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of this Rule.","UrlName":"revision156"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"34e1b5c6-65de-45b3-9fcb-e36449fd8f19","Title":"Rule 4-104. Mental Incapacity and Substance Abuse","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Mental illness, cognitive impairment, alcohol abuse, or substance abuse, to the extent of impairing competency as a lawyer, shall constitute grounds for removing a lawyer from the practice of law.</li> \n <li>Upon a determination by the State Disciplinary Board that a lawyer may be impaired or incapacitated to practice law as a result of one of the conditions described in paragraph (a) above, the Board may, in its sole discretion, make a confidential referral of the matter to an appropriate medical or mental health professional for the purposes of evaluation and possible referral to treatment and/or peer support groups. The Board may, in its discretion, defer disciplinary findings and proceedings based upon the impairment or incapacity of a lawyer to afford the lawyer an opportunity to be evaluated and, if necessary, to begin recovery. In such situations the medical or mental health professional shall report to the State Disciplinary Board and the Office of the General Counsel concerning the lawyer’s progress toward recovery. A lawyer’s refusal to cooperate with the medical or mental health professional or to participate in the evaluation or recommended treatment may be grounds for further proceedings under these Rules, including emergency suspension proceedings pursuant to Rule 4-108.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule94","Order":71,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"75437d69-f8ca-4720-8c3b-9f80419a12a6","ParentId":"34e1b5c6-65de-45b3-9fcb-e36449fd8f19","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Want of a sound mind, senility, habitual intoxication or drug addiction, to the extent of impairing competency as an attorney, when found to exist under the procedure outlined in Part IV, Chapter 2 of these Rules, shall constitute grounds for removing the attorney from the practice of law. Notice of final judgment taking such action shall be given by the Review Panel as provided in Rule 4-220 (a).</li> \n <li>Upon a finding by either panel of the State Disciplinary Board that an attorney may be impaired or incapacitated to practice law due to mental incapacity or substance abuse, that panel may, in its sole discretion, make a confidential referral of the matter to the Lawyer Assistance Program for the purposes of confrontation and referral of the attorney to treatment centers and peer support groups. Either panel may, in its discretion, defer disciplinary findings and proceedings based upon the impairment or incapacitation of an attorney pending attempts by the Lawyer Assistance Program to afford the attorney an opportunity to begin recovery. In such situations the Program shall report to the referring panel and Office of the General Counsel concerning the attorney's progress toward recovery.</li> \n <li>In the event of a finding by the Supreme Court of Georgia that a lawyer is impaired or incapacitated, the Court may refer the matter to the Lawyer Assistance Program, before or after its entry of judgment under Rules 4-219 or 4-220 (a), so that rehabilitative aid may be provided to the impaired or incapacitated attorney. In such situations the Program shall be authorized to report to the Court, either panel of the State Disciplinary Board and Office of the General Counsel concerning the attorney's progress toward recovery.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision98"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ff0cda5f-a0dd-45ec-919a-8d146f2cdde8","Title":"Rule 4-105.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule96","Order":72,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"126fec90-e385-4e6e-b41c-8983b2eb52e3","ParentId":"ff0cda5f-a0dd-45ec-919a-8d146f2cdde8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"When it appears to the Investigative Panel that an attorney's death, incapacity, imprisonment or disappearance poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public, the Investigative Panel shall immediately investigate the matter. If the Investigative Panel determines that such threat exists and that no partner, associate or other appropriate representative is available to prevent the harm, it shall file its findings and recommendation of action in the Supreme Court and shall seek judgment as provided in Rule 4-219.","UrlName":"revision158"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"abdf0431-189b-4f11-885a-f3f34d07a9cd","Title":"Rule 4-106. Conviction of a Crime; Suspension and Disbarment","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of information or evidence that a conviction for any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude has been entered against a lawyer, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall immediately assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number. The Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the appointment of a Special Master to conduct a show cause hearing.</li> \n <li>The petition shall show the date of the conviction and the court in which the conviction was entered, and shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master, pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b).</li> \n <li>The show cause hearing should be held within 15 days after service of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master upon the respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later. Within 30 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file a recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia which may order such discipline as deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li> If the Supreme Court of Georgia orders the respondent suspended pending any appeal, upon the termination of the appeal (or expiration of time for appeal if no appeal is filed) the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Special Master to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the circumstances of the termination of the appeal indicate that the suspended respondent should:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>be disbarred under Rule 8.4; or</li> \n <li>be reinstated; or</li> \n <li>remain suspended pending retrial as a protection to the public; or</li> \n <li> be reinstated while the facts giving rise to the conviction are investigated and, if proper, prosecuted under regular disciplinary procedures in these Rules. \n \n Reports of the Special Master shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, which may order such discipline as deemed appropriate. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, a certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of Rule 8.4 of Rule 4-102 and shall be admissible in proceedings under the disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule98","Order":73,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"94845a10-e432-4de9-a971-72e5476ff7f2","ParentId":"abdf0431-189b-4f11-885a-f3f34d07a9cd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of information or evidence that an attorney has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, whether by verdict, plea of guilty, plea of nolo contendere or imposition of first offender probation, the Office of the General Counsel shall immediately assign the matter a State Disciplinary Board docket number and petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the appointment of a Special Master to conduct a show cause hearing. </li> \n <li>The petition shall show the date of the verdict or plea and the court in which the respondent was convicted, and shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master as provided in Rule 4-209.3 will appoint a Special Master, pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b).</li> \n <li>The show cause hearing should be held within 15 days after service of the Petition for Appointment of Special Master upon the respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later. Within 30 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file a recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia which shall be empowered to order such discipline as deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li> If the Supreme Court of Georgia orders the respondent suspended pending the appeal, upon the termination of the appeal the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Special Master to conduct a hearing for the purpose of determining whether the circumstances of the termination of the appeal indicate that the suspended respondent should:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>be disbarred under Rule 8.4; or</li> \n <li>be reinstated; or</li> \n <li>remain suspended pending retrial as a protection to the public; or</li> \n <li> be reinstated while the facts giving rise to the conviction are investigated and, if proper, prosecuted under regular disciplinary procedures in these Rules. \n \n Reports of the Special Master shall be filed with the Review Panel as provided hereafter in Rule 4-217. The Review Panel shall make its findings and recommendation as provided hereafter in Rule 4-218. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>For purposes of this Rule, a certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction based upon a verdict, plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere or the imposition of first offender treatment shall be prima facie evidence of an infraction of Rule 8.4 of Rule 4-102 and shall be admissible in proceedings under the disciplinary rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision99"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b74db3ae-e41e-4815-afa9-c022bf54c69d","Title":"Rule 4-107.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule100","Order":74,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"84aec9fd-5147-4b88-a758-69bf5368c206","ParentId":"b74db3ae-e41e-4815-afa9-c022bf54c69d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision160"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c5d3ee01-67be-4aab-9d78-5754f868543c","Title":"Rule 4-108. Conduct Constituting Threat of Harm to Clients or Public; Emergency Suspension","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that a lawyer's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public and at the direction of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the suspension of the lawyer pending disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing such petition.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall state the evidence justifying the emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the petition for emergency suspension, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall assign the matter a Supreme Court docket number, and shall notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-209 (b) to conduct a hearing where the State Bar of Georgia shall show cause why the Respondent should be suspended pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Within 15 days after service of the petition for emergency suspension upon the Respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later, the Special Master shall hold a hearing on the petition for emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>Within 20 days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file his or her recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court may suspend the Respondent pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing the emergency suspension, or order such other action as it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule101","Order":75,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"97a13f66-d8f5-43c1-9a93-3a4f221824b7","ParentId":"c5d3ee01-67be-4aab-9d78-5754f868543c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that an Attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or the public and with the approval of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia and the Chairperson of the Review Panel, or at the direction of the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel, the Office of the General Counsel shall petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for the suspension of the Attorney pending disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing such petition.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall state the evidence justifying the emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>The petition for emergency suspension shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Upon receipt of the petition for emergency suspension, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, shall assign the matter a Supreme Court docket number, and shall notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master will appoint a Special Master pursuant to Bar Rule 4-209(b) to conduct a hearing where the State Bar of Georgia shall show cause why the Respondent should be suspended pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Within fifteen days after service of the petition for emergency suspension upon the Respondent or appointment of a Special Master, whichever is later, the Special Master shall hold a hearing on the petition for emergency suspension.</li> \n <li>Within twenty days of the hearing, the Special Master shall file his or her recommendation with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Court sitting en banc may suspend the Respondent pending final disposition of disciplinary proceedings predicated upon the conduct causing the emergency suspension, or order such other action as it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision100"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"79c672d2-4c6e-45fb-bf95-e2929de470cd","Title":"Rule 4-109. Refusal or Failure to Appear for Reprimand; Suspension","Content":"If a respondent fails to appear for imposition of a Confidential Reprimand without just cause, the State Disciplinary Board shall reconsider the matter to determine whether the case should proceed with a public filing pursuant to Bar Rule 4-208 et seq. If a respondent fails to appear before the State Disciplinary Review Board or the Superior Court for imposition of a State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand or a Public Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel may file in the Supreme Court of Georgia a motion for suspension of the respondent. A copy of the motion shall be served on the respondent as provided in Bar Rule 4-203.1. The Supreme Court of Georgia may in its discretion, ten days after the filing of the motion, suspend the respondent until such time as the reprimand is administered.","UrlName":"rule102","Order":76,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"91e726c3-f6d1-40ec-acd9-c829a85f798b","ParentId":"79c672d2-4c6e-45fb-bf95-e2929de470cd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Either panel of the State Disciplinary Board based on the knowledge or belief that a respondent has refused, or failed without just cause, to appear in accordance with Bar Rule 4-220 before a panel or the superior court for the administration of a reprimand may file in the Supreme Court a motion for suspension of the respondent. A copy of the motion shall be served on the respondent as provided in Rule 4-203.1. The Supreme Court may in its discretion, ten days after the filing of the motion, suspend the respondent until such time as the reprimand is administered.","UrlName":"revision162"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"09c3ede3-4ff0-48a3-85cb-af3cb15c36e7","Title":"Rule 4-110.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Reserved</div>","UrlName":"rule103","Order":77,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"91566ced-d57e-4de2-9eeb-306da2cc9ab3","ParentId":"09c3ede3-4ff0-48a3-85cb-af3cb15c36e7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Respondent: A person whose conduct is the subject of any disciplinary investigation or proceeding.</li> \n <li>Confidential Proceedings: Any proceeding under these Rules which occurs prior to a filing in the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Public Proceedings: Any proceeding under these Rules which has been filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Grievance/Memorandum of Grievance: An allegation of unethical conduct filed against an attorney.</li> \n <li>Probable Cause: A finding by the Investigative Panel that there is sufficient evidence to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Bar Rules.</li> \n <li>Petition for Voluntary Surrender of License: A Petition for Voluntary Discipline in which the respondent voluntarily surrenders his license to practice law in this State. A voluntary surrender of license is tantamount to disbarment.</li> \n <li>He, Him or His: Generic pronouns including both male and female.</li> \n <li>Attorney: A member of the State Bar of Georgia or one authorized by law to practice law in the State of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Notice of Discipline: A Notice by the Investigative Panel that the respondent will be subject to a disciplinary sanction for violation of one or more Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision101"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e53aa28d-ec52-41d5-ac81-b51369e3e4e8","Title":"Rule 4-111. Audit for Cause","Content":"Upon receipt of sufficient evidence that a lawyer who practices law in this State poses a threat of harm to his clients or the public, the State Disciplinary Board may conduct an Audit for Cause of the lawyer's trust and escrow accounts with the written approval of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia. Before approval can be granted, the lawyer shall be given notice that approval is being sought and be given an opportunity to appear and be heard. The sufficiency of the notice and opportunity to be heard shall be left to the sole discretion of the persons giving the approval. The State Disciplinary Board must inform the person being audited that the audit is an Audit for Cause.","UrlName":"rule105","Order":78,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[{"Id":"e19654e1-3d52-4091-a048-d45e48c79c8c","ParentId":"e53aa28d-ec52-41d5-ac81-b51369e3e4e8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Upon receipt of sufficient evidence that a lawyer who practices law in this State poses a threat of harm to his clients or the public, the State Disciplinary Board may conduct an Audit for Cause with the written approval of the Chairman of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia. Before approval can be granted, the lawyer shall be given notice that approval is being sought and be given an opportunity to appear and be heard. The sufficiency of the notice and opportunity to be heard shall be left to the sole discretion of the persons giving the approval. The State Disciplinary Board must inform the person being audited that the audit is an Audit for Cause.","UrlName":"revision164"}],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Title":"CHAPTER 2 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter14","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Rule 4-201. State Disciplinary Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The powers to investigate and discipline lawyers for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; six members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia, appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors; two nonlawyer members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia; and two nonlawyer members appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors. The Court and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Board. No State Disciplinary Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors, whichever appointed the member whose term has expired.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant. </li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work investigating cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule63","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"07f753ca-7fed-4fb2-a326-4be45d9389ca","ParentId":"66411518-34ea-4592-93c8-bbb03b869068","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The powers to investigate and discipline members of the State Bar of Georgia and those authorized to practice law in Georgia for violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct set forth in Bar Rule 4-102 are hereby vested in a State Disciplinary Board and a Consumer Assistance Program. The State Disciplinary Board shall consist of two panels. The first panel shall be the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Investigative Panel). The second panel shall be the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board (Review Panel). The Consumer Assistance Program shall operate as described in Part XII of these Rules. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Investigative Panel shall consist of the President-elect of the State Bar of Georgia and the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one member of the State Bar of Georgia from each judicial district of the State appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the Supreme Court, one at-large member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the President with the approval of the Board of Governors, and six public members appointed by the Supreme Court to serve as public members of the Panel.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> All members shall be appointed for three-year terms subject to the following exceptions:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed;</li> \n <li>ex-officio members shall serve during the term of their office; and shall not increase the quorum requirement; and</li> \n <li>certain initial members as set forth in paragraph (2) below.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>It shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third (1/3) of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually.</li> \n <li>A member may be removed from the Panel pursuant to procedures set by the Panel for failure to attend regular meetings of the Panel. The vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the current President of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel shall annually elect a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, or a vice-chairperson for any subcommittee for which the chairperson is not a member to serve as chairperson for that subcommittee, and such other officers as it may deem proper. The Panel shall meet in its entirety in July of each year to elect a chairperson. At any time the Panel may decide to divide itself into subcommittees or to consolidate after having divided. A majority shall constitute a quorum and a majority of a quorum shall be authorized to act. However, in any matter in which one or more Investigative Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the matter.</li> \n <li>The Investigative Panel is authorized to organize itself into as many subcommittees as the Panel deems necessary to conduct the expeditious investigation of disciplinary matters referred to it by the Office of General Counsel. However, no subcommittee shall consist of fewer than seven (7) members of the Panel and each such subcommittee shall include at least one (1) of the public members.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The Review Panel shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President, nine (9) members of the State Bar, three (3) from each of the three (3) federal judicial districts of the State appointed as described below, and four (4) public members appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The nine (9) members of the Bar from the federal judicial districts shall be appointed for three (3) year terms so that the term of one Panel member from each district will expire each year. The three (3) vacant positions will be filled in odd years by appointment by the President, with the approval of the Board of Governors, and in even years by appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Panel members serving at the time this Rule goes into effect shall continue to serve until their respective terms expire. New Panel members shall be appointed as set forth above.</li> \n <li>Any person appointed to fill a vacancy caused by resignation, death, disqualification or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed.</li> \n <li>Ex-officio members shall serve during the term or terms of their offices and shall not increase the quorum requirement.</li> \n <li>The Review Panel shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper in July of each year. The presence of six (6) members of the Panel shall constitute a quorum. Four (4) members of the Panel shall be authorized to act except that a recommendation of the Review Panel to suspend or disbar shall require the affirmative vote of at least six (6) members of the Review Panel, with not more than four (4) negative votes. However, in any case in which one or more Review Panel members are disqualified, the number of members constituting a quorum and the number of members necessary to vote affirmatively for disbarment or suspension, shall be reduced by the number of members disqualified from voting on the case. No recommendation of disbarment or suspension may be made by fewer than four (4) affirmative votes. For the purposes of this Rule the recusal of a member shall have the same effect as disqualification.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision102"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e7e149e7-e023-4ce6-ae8d-3e0cce1b9ceb","Title":"Rule 4-201.1. State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The power to review for error final reports and recommendations of Special Masters in public proceedings arising under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct is hereby vested in the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li> The State Disciplinary Review Board shall consist of the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia; the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia or a member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President; seven members of the State Bar of Georgia, two from each of the three federal judicial districts of Georgia and one at large appointed as described below; and two nonlawyer members appointed as described below. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the President of the State Bar of Georgia are encouraged to make appointments that will ensure the geographic, gender, racial, and generational diversity of the State Disciplinary Review Board. No State Disciplinary Review Board member may serve for more than two consecutive terms, including a term underway at the time this Rule goes into effect. \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>The Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia and the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia (or member of the Young Lawyers Division designated by its Immediate Past President) shall serve only during the term of their office, shall serve as members ex officio, and shall not increase the quorum requirement. </li> \n <li>All other members shall be appointed for three-year terms, except as provided in paragraph (b) (3) below. When the term of appointment of a member expires in an even-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia for a term of three years; and when the term of appointment of a member expires in an odd-numbered year, the seat shall be filled by the appointment of the President of the State Bar of Georgia with the approval of the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>Whenever the seat of an appointed member becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, the seat shall be filled for the unexpired term by the appointment of the Supreme Court of Georgia or the President of the State Bar of Georgia, whichever appointed the member whose seat has become vacant.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board shall remove a member for failure to attend meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board or for other good cause, and the seat of a member so removed shall be filled as provided in paragraph (b) (3) above.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting following an Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia the State Disciplinary Review Board shall elect a Chair and Vice-Chair. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Upon request, State Disciplinary Review Board members shall be reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending meetings of the State Disciplinary Review Board. The Internal Rules of the State Disciplinary Review Board provide further explanation of the travel and reimbursement policies.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board members may request reimbursement for postage, copying, and other expenses necessary for their work reviewing cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule602","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Rule 4-202. Receipt of Grievances; Initial Review by Bar Counsel","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of a Memorandum of Grievance, an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program, or credible information from any source. If the investigation is based upon receipt of credible information, the Office of the General Counsel must first notify the respondent lawyer and provide a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may also deliver the information from any source to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any matter under investigation. The screening process may include forwarding information received to the respondent so that the respondent may respond.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring the respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided in Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a matter, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those matters that do not present sufficient merit to proceed.</li> \n <li>Those matters that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule106","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"4d838131-f92a-4eb5-9a08-5517ba7ed783","ParentId":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Grievances shall be filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. In lieu of a Memorandum of Grievance the Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program. All grievances must include the name of the complainant and must be signed by the complainant.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may investigate conduct upon receipt of credible information from any source after notifying the respondent lawyer and providing a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation. The Office of the General Counsel may deliver the information it obtains to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any grievance. The screening process may include forwarding a copy of the grievance to the respondent in order that the respondent may respond to the grievance.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring a respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided at Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a grievance, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those grievances that do not present sufficient merit to proceed. Rejection of such grievances by the Office of the General Counsel shall not deprive the complaining party of any right of action he might otherwise have at law or in equity against the respondent.</li> \n <li>Those grievances that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision397"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0d18e960-68e3-48cb-bc1b-bb426f81e3a7","Title":"Rule 4-203. Powers and Duties","Content":"In accordance with these Rules, the State Disciplinary Board shall have the following powers and duties:\n(1) to receive and evaluate any and all written grievances against lawyers and to frame such charges and grievances as shall conform to the requirements of these Rules. A copy of the information serving as the basis for investigation or proceedings before the State Disciplinary Board shall be furnished to the respondent by the procedures set forth in Rule 4-203.1;\n(2) to initiate grievances on its own motion, to require additional information from a complainant, where appropriate, and to dismiss and reject matters that seem unjustified, frivolous, or patently unfounded;\n(3) to issue letters of instruction when dismissing a matter;\n(4) to delegate the duties of the State Disciplinary Board enumerated in paragraphs (1), (2), (8), (9), (10), and (11) hereof to the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or such other members as the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair may designate subject to review and approval by the full State Disciplinary Board;\n(5) to conduct Probable Cause investigations, to collect evidence and information concerning matters under investigation, and to certify matters to the Supreme Court of Georgia for hearings by Special Masters as hereinafter provided;\n(6) to prescribe its own Rules of conduct and procedure;\n(7) to receive, investigate, and collect evidence and information, and review and accept or reject Petitions for Voluntary Discipline pursuant to Rule 4-227 (b) (1);\n(8) to sign and enforce, as hereinafter described, subpoenas for the appearance of persons and the production of documents, things and records at investigations both during the screening process and the State Disciplinary Board’s investigation;\n(9) to issue a subpoena as provided in this Rule whenever a subpoena is sought in this State pursuant to the law of another jurisdiction for use in lawyer discipline or disability proceedings, where the issuance of the subpoena has been duly approved under the law of the other jurisdiction. Upon petition for good cause the State Disciplinary Board may compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents in the county where the witness resides or is employed or elsewhere as agreed by the witness. Service of the subpoena shall be as provided in the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Enforcement or challenges to the subpoena shall be as provided at Rule 4-221 (c);\n(10) to extend the time within which a formal complaint may be filed;\n(11) to issue Formal Letters of Admonition and Confidential Reprimands as hereinafter provided;\n(12) to issue a Notice of Discipline providing that unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice, the respondent shall be sanctioned as ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia;\n(13) to refer a lawyer who appears to be impaired for an evaluation by an appropriate medical or mental health professional; and\n(14) to use the staff of the Office of the General Counsel in performing its duties.\n<div></div>\n<div></div>\n","UrlName":"rule108","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7fe7960c-10b9-469c-9f35-a2a95244a2d2","Title":"Rule 4-203.1. Uniform Service Rule","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Lawyers shall inform the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, in writing, of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address on file with the Membership Department in all efforts to contact, communicate with, and perfect service upon a lawyer. The choice of a lawyer to provide only a post office box or commercial equivalent address to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall constitute an election to waive personal service. Notification of a change of address given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the Membership Department shall not satisfy the requirement herein.</li> \n <li> In all matters requiring personal service under Part IV of the Bar Rules, service may be perfected in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Acknowledgment of Service: An acknowledgment of service from the respondent shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li>Written Response from Respondent: A written response from the respondent or respondent’s counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li> In the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent’s counsel, and subject to the provisions of subparagraph (b) (4) below, the respondent shall be served in the following manner: \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>Personal Service: Service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or any other person authorized to serve a summons under the provisions of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, as approved by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or the Chair’s designee. Receipt of a Return of Service Non Est Inventus shall constitute conclusive proof that service cannot be perfected by personal service.</li> \n <li>Service by Publication: If personal service cannot be perfected, or when the respondent has only provided a post office box or commercial equivalent address to the Membership Department and the respondent has not acknowledged service within 10 days of a mailing to respondent’s post office box or commercial equivalent address, service may be accomplished by publication once a week for two weeks in the legal organ of the county of respondent’s address, as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and, contemporaneously with the publication, mailing a copy of the service documents by first class mail to respondent’s address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When it appears from an affidavit made by the Office of the General Counsel that the respondent has departed from the State, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the State, or seeks to avoid the service, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, or the Chair’s designee, may authorize service by publication without the necessity of first attempting personal service. The affidavit made by the Office of the General Counsel must demonstrate recent unsuccessful attempts at personal service upon the respondent regarding other or related disciplinary matters and that such personal service was attempted at respondent’s address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Whenever service of pleadings or other documents subsequent to the original complaint is required or permitted to be made upon a respondent represented by a lawyer, the service shall be made upon the respondent’s lawyer. Service upon the respondent’s lawyer or upon an unrepresented respondent shall be made by hand-delivery or by delivering a copy or mailing a copy to the respondent’s lawyer or to the respondent’s official address on file with the Membership Department, unless the respondent’s lawyer specifies a different address for the lawyer in a filed pleading. As used in this Rule, the term “delivering a copy” means handing it to the respondent’s lawyer or to the respondent, or leaving it at the lawyer’s or respondent’s office with a person of suitable age or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion. Service by mail is complete upon mailing and includes transmission by U.S. Mail, or by a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within three business days, shown by the official postmark or by the commercial carrier’s transmittal form. Proof of service may be made by certificate of a lawyer or of his employee, written admission, affidavit, or other satisfactory proof. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service.\t </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule109","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b41a4675-2b95-426d-9d60-acf01d16b66f","ParentId":"7fe7960c-10b9-469c-9f35-a2a95244a2d2","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Attorneys authorized to practice law in Georgia shall inform the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, in writing, of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address on file with the Membership Department in all efforts to contact, communicate with, and perfect service upon an attorney. The choice of an attorney to provide only a post office box or equivalent commercial address to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia shall constitute an election to waive personal service. Notification of a change of address given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the Membership Department shall not satisfy the requirement herein.</li> \n <li> In all matters requiring personal service under Part IV of the Bar Rules, service may be perfected in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Acknowledgment of Service: An acknowledgment of service from the Respondent shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li>Written Response from Respondent: A written response from the Respondent or Respondent's counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.</li> \n <li> In the absence of an acknowledgment of service, or a written response from the Respondent or Respondent's counsel, and subject to the provisions of paragraph (4) below, the Respondent shall be served in the following manner:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>Personal service: Service may be accomplished by the Sheriff, or a Court approved agent for service of process, or any person approved by the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or the Chair's designee. Receipt of a Return of Service Non Est Inventus from the Sheriff or any other person approved for service of the service documents, shall constitute conclusive proof that service cannot be perfected by personal service.</li> \n <li>Service by publication: In the event that personal service cannot be perfected, or when the Respondent has only provided a post office box to the Membership Department and Respondent has not acknowledged service within twenty (20) days of a mailing to Respondent's post office box, service may be accomplished by publication once a week for two weeks in the legal organ of the county of Respondent's address, as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and, contemporaneously with the publication, mailing a copy of the service documents by first class mail to Respondent's address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>When it appears from an affidavit made by the Office of General Counsel that the Respondent has departed from the state, or cannot, after due diligence, be found within the state, or seeks to avoid the service, the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel, or the chair's designee, may authorize service by publication without the necessity of first attempting personal service. The affidavit made by the Office of General Counsel must demonstrate recent unsuccessful attempts at personal service upon the Respondent regarding other or related disciplinary matters and that such personal service was attempted at Respondent's address as shown on the records of the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Whenever service of pleadings or other documents subsequent to the original complaint is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is otherwise required by these Rules. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his last known address. As used in this Rule, the term \"delivery of a copy \"means handing it to the attorney or to the party, or leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof or, if the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon mailing. Proof of service may be made by certificate of an attorney or of his employee, by written admission, by affidavit, or by other proof satisfactory to the court. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision105"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5e552308-5c15-4eb4-9150-ccc522670691","Title":"Rule 4-204. Investigation and Disposition by State Disciplinary Board-Generally","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> Each matter that presents sufficient merit to proceed may be referred with a Notice of Investigation to the State Disciplinary Board for investigation and disposition in accordance with its Rules. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign a lawyer member of the State Disciplinary Board to be responsible for the investigation. The Office of the General Counsel shall simultaneously assign a staff investigator to assist the State Disciplinary Board member with the investigation. If the investigation of the State Disciplinary Board establishes Probable Cause to believe that the respondent has violated one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, it shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>issue a Formal Letter of Admonition;</li> \n <li>issue a Confidential Reprimand;</li> \n <li>issue a Notice of Discipline; </li> \n <li>refer the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia for hearing before a Special Master and file a formal complaint with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all as hereinafter provided; or</li> \n <li>refer a respondent for evaluation by an appropriate medical or mental health professional pursuant to Rule 4-104 upon the State Disciplinary Board’s determination that there is cause to believe the lawyer is impaired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n All other cases may be either dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board or referred to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.\n <li>The primary investigation shall be conducted by the member of the State Disciplinary Board responsible for the investigation, assisted by the staff of the Office of the General Counsel, upon request of the State Disciplinary Board member. The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia shall fund the Office of the General Counsel so that the Office of the General Counsel will be able to adequately investigate and prosecute all cases.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule110","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Rule 4-204.1. Notice of Investigation","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a) is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a);</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the grievance and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule76","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"c017b578-1033-45d1-a54e-20293af130ec","ParentId":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (b) is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance or written description persuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (b);</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision399"},{"Id":"1ca382d2-6b2c-4dc8-983d-934b03e898b2","ParentId":"251debf6-a1ac-4b23-9fa2-79f39b8a2d8c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> A Notice of Investigation shall accord the respondent reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in writing. The Notice shall contain: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>a statement that the grievance is being transmitted to the State Disciplinary Board;</li> \n <li>a copy of the grievance;</li> \n <li>a list of the Rules that appear to have been violated;</li> \n <li>the name and address of the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the grievance and a list of the State Disciplinary Board members; and</li> \n <li>a statement of the respondent’s right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any State Disciplinary Board member.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The form for the Notice of Investigation shall be approved by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision325"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"32f62174-44c4-4bf1-8d41-2bcb39bf0f76","Title":"Rule 4-204.2.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule112","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ddd647f-da37-479d-ab5f-9e0d2850e21a","ParentId":"32f62174-44c4-4bf1-8d41-2bcb39bf0f76","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Office of the General Counsel shall cause the Notice of Investigation to be served upon the respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1.","UrlName":"revision166"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ebbb95c7-c350-4c76-8f3f-285d058bc3ac","Title":"Rule 4-204.3. Answer to Notice of Investigation Required","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The respondent shall deliver to the State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter a written response under oath to the Notice of Investigation within 30 days of service.</li> \n <li>The written response must address specifically all of the issues set forth in the Notice of Investigation.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Board member assigned to investigate the matter may, in the State Disciplinary Board member’s discretion, grant extensions of time for the respondent’s answer. Any request for extension of time must be made in writing, and the grant of an extension of time must also be in writing. Extensions of time shall not exceed 30 days and should not be routinely granted.</li> \n <li> In cases where the maximum sanction is disbarment or suspension and the respondent fails to properly respond within the time required by these Rules, the Office of the General Counsel may seek authorization from the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to file a motion for interim suspension of the respondent.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>When an investigating member of the State Disciplinary Board notifies the Office of the General Counsel that the respondent has failed to respond and that the respondent should be suspended, the Office of the General Counsel shall, with the approval of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board, file a Motion for Interim Suspension of the respondent. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an appropriate order.</li> \n <li>When the State Disciplinary Board member and the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board determine that a respondent who has been suspended for failure to respond has filed an appropriate response and should be reinstated, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a Motion to Lift Interim Suspension. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an appropriate order. The determination that an adequate response has been filed is within the discretion of the investigating State Disciplinary Board member and the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule113","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"45b9c5b6-dd60-41ec-9214-e8964ebb7919","Title":"Rule 4-204.4. Finding of Probable Cause; Referral to Special Master","Content":"In the event the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause of the respondent’s violation of one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, it may refer the matter to the Supreme Court of Georgia by directing the Office of the General Counsel to file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia either:\n(a) A formal complaint, as herein provided, along with a petition for the appointment of a Special Master and a notice of its finding of Probable Cause, within 30 days of the finding of Probable Cause unless the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair grants an extension of time for the filing; or\n(b) A Notice of Discipline pursuant to Rules 4-208.1, 4-208.2 and 4-208.3.","UrlName":"rule114","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d96d2620-410a-4333-950f-3c3cd562c88e","ParentId":"45b9c5b6-dd60-41ec-9214-e8964ebb7919","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In the event the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, finds Probable Cause of the Respondent's violation of one or more of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 or these rules it may refer the matter to the Supreme Court by directing the Office of the General Counsel to file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia either: \n \n    (1) a formal complaint, as herein provided; \n \n    (2) a petition for the appointment of a Special Master; and \n \n    (3) a notice of its finding of Probable Cause.\n The documents specified above shall be filed in duplicate within thirty (30) days of the finding of Probable Cause unless the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, or its Chairperson grants an extension of time for the filing. \n \n(b) A Notice of Discipline in the matter shall thereafter proceed pursuant to Bar Rule 4-208.1, 4-208.2 and 4-208.3.","UrlName":"revision168"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"572c5f31-1365-45f8-a60d-d38d78516aba","Title":"Rule 4-204.5. Letters of Instruction","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> In addition to dismissing a complaint, the State Disciplinary Board may issue a letter of instruction to the respondent upon the following conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to a quorum of the State Disciplinary Board assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; and</li> \n <li> the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent either: \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>has not engaged in conduct that is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules; or</li> \n <li>has engaged in conduct that although technically in violation of such Rules is not reprehensible, and has resulted in no harm or injury to any third person, and is not in violation of the spirit of such Rules; or</li> \n <li>has engaged in conduct in violation of any recognized voluntary creed of professionalism.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A letter of instruction shall not constitute a finding of any disciplinary infraction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule116","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"41c7d017-7599-40ef-b753-1f43ce4c34bd","ParentId":"572c5f31-1365-45f8-a60d-d38d78516aba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In addition to dismissing a complaint, the Investigative Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, may issue a letter of instruction in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n \n    (1) the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to the entire Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; and \n \n    (2) the Investigative Panel, or subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent either: \n \n        (i) has not engaged in conduct which is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules; or \n \n        (ii) has engaged in conduct that although technically in violation of such rules is not reprehensible, and has resulted in no harm or injury to any third person, and is not in violation of the spirit of such rules; or \n \n        (iii) has engaged in conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of Part III of these rules or any recognized voluntary creed of professionalism; \n \n(b) Letters of instruction shall contain a statement of the conduct of the respondent which may have violated Part III of these rules or the voluntary creed of professionalism. \n \n(c) A letter of instruction shall not constitute a finding of any disciplinary infraction.","UrlName":"revision170"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"77052b66-6315-44fa-adad-251f283e8018","Title":"Rule 4-205. Confidential Discipline; In General","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Disciplinary Board may issue a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to a quorum of the State Disciplinary Board assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting;</li> \n <li>the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent has engaged in conduct that is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules; and</li> \n <li> the State Disciplinary Board, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the conduct referred to in paragraph (b) hereof was engaged in:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>inadvertently; or</li> \n <li>purposefully, but in ignorance of the applicable disciplinary rule or rules; or</li> \n <li>under such circumstances that it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that the protection of the public and rehabilitation of the respondent would be best achieved by the issuance of a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand rather than by any other form of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule118","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b2ad539d-868b-476a-94ef-263b3350a018","ParentId":"77052b66-6315-44fa-adad-251f283e8018","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In lieu of the imposition of any other discipline, the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Investigative Panel may issue letters of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand in any disciplinary case upon the following conditions: \n \n(a) the case has been thoroughly investigated, the respondent has been notified of and has had an opportunity to answer the charges brought against him, and the case has been reported to the entire Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel assembled at a regularly scheduled meeting; \n \n(b) the Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the respondent has engaged in conduct which is in violation of the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules; \n \n(c) the Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel, as evidenced through the majority vote of its members present and voting, is of the opinion that the conduct referred to in subpart (b) hereof was engaged in: \n \n    (1) inadvertently; or \n \n    (2) purposefully, but in ignorance of the applicable disciplinary rule or rules; or \n \n    (3) under such circumstances that it is the opinion of the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Investigative Panel that the protection of the public and rehabilitation of the respondent would be best achieved by the issuance of a letter of admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand rather than by any other form of discipline.","UrlName":"revision172"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9c775694-8d7c-4937-8be2-d161f55e3dbd","Title":"Rule 4-206. Confidential Discipline; Contents","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Formal Letters of Admonition and Confidential Reprimands shall contain a statement of the specific conduct of the respondent that violates Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules, shall state the name of the complainant, if any, and shall state the reasons for issuance of such confidential discipline.</li> \n <li> A Formal Letter of Admonition shall also contain the following information:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the right of the respondent to reject the Formal Letter of Admonition under Rule 4-207;</li> \n <li>the procedure for rejecting the Formal Letter of Admonition under Rule 4-207; and</li> \n <li>the effect of an accepted Formal Letter of Admonition in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A Confidential Reprimand shall also contain information concerning the effect of the acceptance of such reprimand in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule119","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0b364013-3666-4c0a-907d-bd5bf6941a32","ParentId":"9c775694-8d7c-4937-8be2-d161f55e3dbd","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Letters of formal admonition and Investigative Panel Reprimands shall contain a statement of the specific conduct of the respondent which violates Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules, shall state the name of the complainant and shall state the reasons for issuance of such confidential discipline. \n \n(b) A letter of formal admonition shall also contain the following information: \n \n    (1) the right of the respondent to reject the letter of formal admonition under Rule 4-207; \n \n    (2) the procedure for rejecting the letter of formal admonition under Rule 4-207; and \n \n    (3) the effect of an accepted letter of formal admonition in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline. \n \n(c) An Investigative Panel Reprimand shall also contain information concerning the effect of the acceptance of such reprimand in the event of a third or subsequent imposition of discipline.","UrlName":"revision174"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"973c39ff-b307-4891-bf21-eab08c74c0e4","Title":"Rule 4-207. Letters of Formal Admonition and Confidential Reprimands; Notification and Right of Rejection","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In any case where the State Disciplinary Board votes to impose discipline in the form of a Formal Letter of Admonition or a Confidential Reprimand, such vote shall constitute the State Disciplinary Board’s finding of Probable Cause. The respondent shall have the right to reject, in writing, the imposition of such discipline.  \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Notification to respondent shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>in the case of a Formal Letter of Admonition, the letter of admonition;</li> \n <li> in the case of a Confidential Reprimand, the letter notifying the respondent to appear for the administration of the reprimand; \n sent to the respondent at his or her address as reflected in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia, via certified mail, return receipt requested. </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Rejection by respondent shall be as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>in writing, within 30 days of notification; and</li> \n <li>sent to the State Disciplinary Board via any of the methods authorized under Rule 4-203.1 (c) and directed to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the current headquarters address of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>If the respondent rejects the imposition of a Formal Letter of Admonition or Confidential Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel may file a formal complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia unless the State Disciplinary Board reconsiders its decision.</li> \n <li>Confidential Reprimands shall be administered before the State Disciplinary Board by the Chair or his designee.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule121","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"37680a37-9dc5-4ca1-8e81-0a57628591e8","ParentId":"973c39ff-b307-4891-bf21-eab08c74c0e4","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In any case where the Investigative Panel, or a subcommittee of the Panel, votes to impose discipline in the form of a letter of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand, such vote shall constitute the Panel's finding of probable cause. The respondent shall have the right to reject, in writing, the imposition of such discipline. A written rejection shall be deemed an election by the respondent to continue disciplinary proceedings under these rules and shall cause the Investigative Panel to proceed under Rule 4-204.4 \n \n(a) Notification to respondent shall be as follows: \n \n    (1) in the case of letters of formal admonition, the letter of admonition; \n \n    (2) in the case of an Investigative Panel Reprimand, the letter notifying the respondent to appear for the administration of the reprimand; \n \n    (3) sent to the respondent at his address as reflected in State Bar records, via certified mail, return receipt requested. \n \n(b) Rejection by respondent shall be as follows: \n \n    (1) in writing, within thirty days of notification; \n \n    (2) sent to the Investigative Panel via certified mail, return receipt requested, directed to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the current headquarters address of the State Bar. \n \n(c) If the respondent rejects the imposition of a formal admonition or Investigative Panel Reprimand, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a formal complaint with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within thirty days of receipt of the rejection unless the Investigative Panel or its Chairperson grants an extension of time for the filing of the formal complaint. \n \n(d) Investigative Panel Reprimands shall be administered before the Panel by the Chairperson or his or her designee.","UrlName":"revision176"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1e4711b7-d594-4651-b32d-a487d5feb8aa","Title":"Rule 4-208. Confidential Discipline; Effect in Event of Subsequent Discipline","Content":"In the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of confidential discipline shall be waived and the Office of the General Counsel may use such information as aggravation of discipline.","UrlName":"rule122","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"62bd0945-172f-4d4e-a682-44e53509227b","ParentId":"1e4711b7-d594-4651-b32d-a487d5feb8aa","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An accepted letter of formal admonition or an Investigative Panel Reprimand shall be considered as a disciplinary infraction for the purpose of invoking the provisions of Bar Rule 4-103. In the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of confidential discipline shall be waived and the Office of the General Counsel may use such information as aggravation of discipline.","UrlName":"revision178"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ca6b3d1-3b2e-45ec-95eb-b055d8b26364","Title":"Rule 4-208.1. Notice of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>In any case where the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause, the State Disciplinary Board may issue a Notice of Discipline requesting that the Supreme Court of Georgia impose any level of public discipline authorized by these Rules.</li> \n <li>Unless the Notice of Discipline is rejected by the respondent as provided in Rule 4-208.3, (1) the respondent shall be in default; (2) the respondent shall have no right to any evidentiary hearing; and (3) the respondent shall be subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Supreme Court of Georgia is not bound by the State Disciplinary Board’s recommendation and may impose any level of discipline it deems appropriate.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule124","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"79a6bd3c-89d6-4107-9dca-37aa06ce8477","ParentId":"2ca6b3d1-3b2e-45ec-95eb-b055d8b26364","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In any case where the Investigative Panel or a subcommittee of the Panel finds Probable Cause, the Panel may issue a Notice of Discipline imposing any level of public discipline authorized by these rules. \n \n(b) Unless the Notice of Discipline is rejected by the Respondent as provided in Rule 4-208.3, (1) the Respondent shall be in default; (2) the Respondent shall have no right to any evidentiary hearing; and (3) the Respondent shall be subject to such discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by the Supreme Court.","UrlName":"revision180"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Rule 4-208.2. Notice of Discipline; Contents; Service","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Notice of Discipline shall include: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the Rules that the State Disciplinary Board found the respondent violated;</li> \n <li>the allegations of facts that, if unrebutted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated;</li> \n <li>the level of public discipline recommended to be imposed;</li> \n <li>the reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the State Disciplinary Board to be relevant to such recommendation;</li> \n <li>the entire provisions of Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of a Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing the same in the notice;</li> \n <li>a copy of the Memorandum of Grievance or written description pursuant to Bar Rule 4-202 (a); and</li> \n <li>a statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the respondent, including confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file documents evidencing service with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the State Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia in subsequent proceedings in the same matter.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule125","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"508b411a-242e-45c5-b595-74262b4b03b4","ParentId":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Notice of Discipline shall include: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the Rules that the State Disciplinary Board found the respondent violated;</li> \n <li>the allegations of facts that, if unrebutted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated;</li> \n <li>the level of public discipline recommended to be imposed;</li> \n <li>the reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the State Disciplinary Board to be relevant to such recommendation;</li> \n <li>the entire provisions of Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of a Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing the same in the notice;</li> \n <li>a copy of the Memorandum of Grievance; and</li> \n <li>a statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the respondent, including confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file documents evidencing service with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the State Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia in subsequent proceedings in the same matter.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision401"},{"Id":"88f1164f-fca6-433a-8c71-f7b662e6027b","ParentId":"71240f03-9f27-4866-8e8f-344b680007ad","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Notice of Discipline shall state the following: \n \n    (1) The Rules which the Investigative Panel found that the Respondent violated; \n \n    (2) The facts which, if unrefuted, support the finding that such Rules have been violated; \n \n    (3) The level of public discipline recommended to be imposed; \n \n    (4) The reasons why such level of discipline is recommended, including matters considered in mitigation and matters considered in aggravation, and such other considerations deemed by the Investigative Panel to be relevant to such recommendation; \n \n    (5) The entire provisions of Bar Rule 4-208.3 relating to rejection of Notice of Discipline. This may be satisfied by attaching a copy of the Rule to the Notice of Discipline and referencing same in the Notice; \n \n    (6) A copy of the Memorandum of Grievance; and \n \n    (7) A statement of any prior discipline imposed upon the Respondent, including confidential discipline under Bar Rules 4-205 to 4-208. \n \n(b) The original Notice of Discipline shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and a copy of the Notice of Discipline shall be served upon the Respondent pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(c) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(d) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(e) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(f) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(g) The Office of the General Counsel shall file the documents by which service was accomplished with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(h) The level of disciplinary sanction in any Notice of Discipline rejected by the Respondent or the Office of the General Counsel shall not be binding on the Special Master, the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"revision182"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"eb93af9b-e8a9-4570-aaf1-d72804590d12","Title":"Rule 4-208.3. Rejection of Notice of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In order to reject the Notice of Discipline, the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel must file a Notice of Rejection of the Notice of Discipline with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within 30 days following service of the Notice of Discipline.</li> \n <li>Any Notice of Rejection by the respondent shall be served upon the opposing party. In accordance with Rule 4-204.3 if the respondent has not previously filed a sworn response to the Notice of Investigation the rejection must include a sworn response in order to be considered valid. The respondent must also file a copy of such written response with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time of filing the Notice of Rejection.</li> \n <li>The timely filing of a Notice of Rejection shall constitute an election for the matter to proceed pursuant to Rule 4-208.4 et seq.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule126","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d6a72f5e-f34f-48ef-a481-3ab6dedd8bc3","ParentId":"eb93af9b-e8a9-4570-aaf1-d72804590d12","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) In order to reject the Notice of Discipline the respondent or the Office of the General Counsel must file a Notice of Rejection of the Notice of Discipline with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia within 30 days following service of the Notice of Discipline.  \n  \n(b) Any Notice of Rejection by the respondent shall be served by the respondent upon the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Any Notice of Rejection by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia shall be served by the General Counsel upon the respondent. No rejection by the respondent shall be considered valid unless the respondent files a written response as required by Rule 4-204.3 at or before the filing of the rejection. The respondent must also file a copy of such written response with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time of filing the Notice of Rejection. \n \n(c) The timely filing of a Notice of Rejection shall constitute an election for the Coordinating Special Master to appoint a Special Master and the matter shall thereafter proceed pursuant to Rules 4-209 through 4-225.","UrlName":"revision184"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"19154403-0c33-4593-b66b-2a3d173c2038","Title":"Rule 4-208.4. Formal Complaint Following Notice of Rejection of Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia a formal complaint and a Petition for Appointment of Special Master within 30 days following the filing of a Notice of Rejection. The Notice of Discipline shall operate as the notice of finding of Probable Cause by the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may obtain extensions of time for the filing of the formal complaint from the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or his designee.</li> \n <li>After the rejection of a Notice of Discipline and prior to the time of the filing of the formal complaint, the State Disciplinary Board may reconsider the matter and take appropriate action.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule128","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b5738bbf-cfd8-4488-b84d-1259e2ab4d9a","ParentId":"19154403-0c33-4593-b66b-2a3d173c2038","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Office of the General Counsel shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia a formal complaint and a Petition for Appointment of Special Master within thirty (30) days following the filing of a Notice of Rejection. The Notice of Discipline shall operate as the notice of finding of Probable Cause by the Investigative Panel. \n \n(b) The Office of the General Counsel may obtain extensions of time for the filing of the formal complaint from the Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or his or her designee. \n \n(c) After the rejection of a Notice of Discipline and prior to the time of the filing of the formal complaint, the Investigative Panel may consider any new evidence regarding the grievance and take appropriate action.","UrlName":"revision186"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"48246a5f-fb57-45e0-8fdf-4699503baeee","Title":"Rule 4-209. Docketing by Supreme Court; Appointment of Special Master; Challenges to Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon receipt of a notice of finding of Probable Cause, a petition for appointment of a Special Master and a formal complaint, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, give the matter a Supreme Court of Georgia docket number, and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate. In those proceedings where a Notice of Discipline has been filed, the notice of finding of Probable Cause need not be filed.</li> \n <li>Within a reasonable time after receipt of a petition for appointment of a Special Master or notification that a Special Master previously appointed has been disqualified, withdrawn, or is otherwise unable to serve, the Coordinating Special Master shall appoint a Special Master to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings in such complaint. The Coordinating Special Master shall select a Special Master from the list approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall serve the signed Order Appointing Special Master on the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon notification of the appointment of a Special Master, the State Bar of Georgia shall immediately serve the respondent with the order of appointment of a Special Master and with its formal complaint as hereinafter provided.</li> \n <li>Within 10 days of service of the notice of appointment of a Special Master, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file any and all objections or challenges either of them may have to the competency, qualifications or impartiality of the Special Master with the Coordinating Special Master. The party filing such objections or challenges must also serve a copy of the objections or challenges upon the opposing party and the Special Master, who may respond to such objections or challenges. Within a reasonable time, the Coordinating Special Master shall consider the challenges and the responses of respondent, the State Bar of Georgia, and the Special Master, if any, determine whether the Special Master is disqualified and notify the parties, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Special Master of the decision. Exceptions to the Coordinating Special Master’s denial of disqualification are subject to review by the Supreme Court of Georgia at the time the record in the matter is filed with the Court pursuant to Rule 4-216 (e). If a Special Master is disqualified, appointment of a successor Special Master shall proceed as provided in this Rule.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule130","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"d9980b44-4051-4feb-b4e9-81742f936147","ParentId":"48246a5f-fb57-45e0-8fdf-4699503baeee","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon receipt of a finding of Probable Cause, a petition for appointment of a Special Master and a formal complaint from the Investigative Panel, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the matter in the records of the Court, give the matter a Supreme Court docket number and notify the Coordinating Special Master that appointment of a Special Master is appropriate. In those proceedings where a Notice of Discipline has been filed, the finding of Probable Cause need not be filed. \n \n(b) Within a reasonable time after receipt of a petition/motion for appointment of a Special Master or notification that a Special Master previously appointed has been disqualified, the Coordinating Special Master will appoint a Special Master to conduct formal disciplinary proceedings in such complaint. The Coordinating Special Master shall select as Special Masters experienced members of the State Bar of Georgia who possess a reputation in the Bar for ethical practice; \nprovided, that a Special Master may not be appointed to hear a complaint against a Respondent who resides in the same circuit as that in which the Special Master resides.\n (c) Upon being advised of appointment of a Special Master by the Coordinating Special Master, the Clerk of the Court shall return the original Notice of Discipline, rejection of Notice of Discipline, if applicable, formal complaint, Probable Cause finding, petition for appointment of Special Master and the signed order thereon to the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon notification of the appointment of a Special Master, the Office of the General Counsel shall immediately serve the Respondent with the order of appointment of a Special Master and with its formal complaint as hereinafter provided. \n \n(d) Within ten days of service of the notice of appointment of a Special Master, the Respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall lodge any and all objections or challenges they may have to the competency, qualifications or impartiality of the Special Master with the chairperson of the Review Panel. The party filing such objections or challenges must also serve a copy of the objections or challenges upon the opposing counsel, the Coordinating Special Master and the \nSpecial Master, who may respond to such objections or challenges. Within a reasonable time the chairperson of the Review Panel shall consider the challenges, the responses of Respondent, the State Bar of Georgia, the Coordinating Special Master and the Special Master, if any, determine whether the Special Master is disqualified and notify the parties, the Coordinating Special Master and the Special Master of the chairperson’s decision. Exceptions to the chairperson’s \ndenial of disqualification are subject to review by the entire Review Panel and, thereafter, by the Supreme Court of Georgia when exceptions arising during the evidentiary hearing and exceptions to the report of the Special Master and the Review Panel are properly before the Court. In the event of disqualification of a Special Master by the chairperson of the Review Panel, said chairperson shall notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Coordinating Special \nMaster, the Special Master, the State Bar of Georgia and the Respondent of the disqualification and appointment of a successor Special Master shall proceed as provided in this rule.","UrlName":"revision188"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"dc2ddd92-ce46-4035-ba0d-7f2c51a8b20a","Title":"Rule 4-209.1. Coordinating Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia shall appoint a lawyer to serve as the Coordinating Special Master for disciplinary cases.</li> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia annually shall appoint up to 20 lawyers to serve as Special Masters in disciplinary cases. The Court may reappoint lawyers appointed in prior years, although it generally is preferable for a lawyer to serve as a Special Master for no more than five consecutive years. When a case is assigned to a lawyer appointed as Special Master, such lawyer shall continue to serve as Special Master in that case until final disposition, unless the Coordinating Special Master or the Court directs otherwise, irrespective of whether such lawyer is reappointed to serve as Special Master for another year.</li> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master and Special Masters shall serve at the pleasure of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>No member of the State Disciplinary Board, State Disciplinary Review Board, Special Master Compensation Commission, or Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia shall be appointed to serve as Coordinating Special Master or as a Special Master.</li> \n <li>A list of the lawyers appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia as Special Masters shall be published on the website of the State Bar of Georgia and annually in a regular publication of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Training for Special Masters is expected, and the Coordinating Special Master shall be responsible for the planning and conduct of training sessions, which the State Bar of Georgia shall make available without cost to Special Masters. At a minimum, a lawyer appointed for the first time as a Special Master should attend a training session within six months of his appointment. The failure of a Special Master to complete the minimum required training session shall not be a basis for a motion to disqualify a Special Master. </li> \n <li>A Special Master (including the Coordinating Special Master) shall be disqualified to serve in a disciplinary case when circumstances exist, which, if the Special Master were a judge, would require the recusal of the Special Master under the Code of Judicial Conduct. In the event that the Coordinating Special Master is disqualified in any case, the Supreme Court of Georgia shall assign the case to a Special Master, and the Court shall designate another Special Master to act as Coordinating Special Master for purposes of that case only.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule131","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"accca273-ede6-4400-a09c-a04bdad8ddcb","ParentId":"dc2ddd92-ce46-4035-ba0d-7f2c51a8b20a","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The appointment of and the determination of the compensation of the Coordinating Special Master shall be the duty of the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. The Commission shall be comprised of the second, third and fourth immediate past presidents of the State Bar of Georgia. If any of the above named ex officio individuals should be unable to serve, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(b) The Coordinating Special Master shall be selected by the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission, with the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Coordinating Special Master shall serve as an independent contractor at the pleasure of the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. \n \n(c) The Coordinating Special Master shall be compensated by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds of the State Bar of Georgia in an amount specified by the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission. The Coordinating Special Master’s compensation shall be approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia. On or before the first day of each calendar year, the Coordinating Special Master Selection and Compensation Commission shall submit to the Supreme Court of Georgia for approval the hourly rate to be paid to the Coordinating Special Master during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year, which rate shall continue until the conclusion of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(d) The Coordinating Special Master shall have such office space, furniture and equipment and may incur such operating expenses in such amounts as may be specified by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Such amounts shall be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds. On or before the first day of each calendar year, the Supreme Court of Georgia will set the amount to be paid for the above items during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year.\n(e) If the Coordinating Special Master position is vacant or the Coordinating Special Master has recused or been disqualified from a particular matter, the Supreme Court of Georgia may appoint a temporary Acting Coordinating Special Master to act until the position can be filled or to act in any particular matter.","UrlName":"revision190"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4f566031-7216-473f-aa71-81ad232243b7","Title":"Rule 4-209.2. Special Masters","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Coordinating Special Master and the Special Masters shall be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating fund at rates to be set by the Supreme Court of Georgia, which the Court may adjust from time to time.</li> \n <li>To advise the Supreme Court of Georgia with respect to the compensation of the Coordinating Special Master and Special Masters, the Court shall appoint a Special Master Compensation Commission, which shall consist of the current Treasurer of the State Bar of Georgia; the second, third, and fourth immediate past presidents of the State Bar of Georgia, unless any such past president should decline to serve; and such other persons as the Court may designate. The Commission shall make annual recommendations to the Court about the rate to be paid to the Coordinating Special Master and the rate to be paid to the Special Masters, and the Commission shall report such recommendations to the Court no later than January 1 of each year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule133","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"1ee12620-f5ee-4b93-beee-f813133bd44c","ParentId":"4f566031-7216-473f-aa71-81ad232243b7","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The Coordinating Special Master, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia, shall select and maintain a limited pool of qualified lawyers to serve as Special Masters for the State Disciplinary Board and Hearing Officers for the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants pursuant to Part A, Section 8 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia. The names of those so selected shall be placed on a list maintained by the Coordinating Special Master. Said list shall be published annually in a regular State Bar of Georgia publication. Although not mandatory, it is preferable that a lawyer so selected shall only remain on such list for five years, so that the term may generally be considered to be five years. Any lawyer whose name is removed from such list shall be eligible to be selected and placed on the list at any subsequent time.\n (b) Training for Special Masters and Hearing Officers is expected, subject to the terms of this Rule, and shall consist of one training session within twelve months after selection. The Special Master and Hearing Officer training shall be planned and conducted by the Coordinating Special Master. Special Masters and Hearing Officers who fail to attend such a minimum training session shall periodically be removed from consideration for appointment in future cases. Failure to attend such a training session shall not be the basis for a disqualification of any Special Master or Hearing Officer; as such qualifications shall remain in the sole discretion of the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(c) The Special Masters may be paid by the State Bar of Georgia from the general operating funds on a per case rate to be set by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Hearing Officers may be paid pursuant to Part A, Section 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia.\n(d) On or before the first day of March of each calendar year, the Supreme Court of Georgia may set the amount to be paid to the Special Masters during the fiscal year beginning the first day of July of that year, which rate shall continue until the conclusion of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"revision192"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3ee26eaa-e752-484a-bf5e-9e65269cc3eb","Title":"Rule 4-209.3 Powers and Duties of the Coordinating Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Coordinating Special Master shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to establish requirements for, conduct, and supervise Special Master training;</li> \n <li>to assign cases to Special Masters from the list provided in Rule 4-209 (b);</li> \n <li>to exercise all of the powers and duties provided in Rule 4-210 when acting as a Special Master under paragraph (h) below;</li> \n <li>to monitor and evaluate the performance of Special Masters and to submit a report to the Supreme Court of Georgia regarding such performance annually;</li> \n <li>to remove Special Masters for such cause as may be deemed proper by the Coordinating Special Master;</li> \n <li>to fill all vacancies occasioned by incapacity, disqualification, recusal, or removal;</li> \n <li>to administer Special Master compensation, as provided in Rule 4-209.2 (b);</li> \n <li>to hear pretrial motions when no Special Master is serving; </li> \n <li>to perform all other administrative duties necessary for an efficient and effective hearing system;</li> \n <li>to allow a late filing of the respondent’s answer where there has been no final selection of a Special Master within 30 days of service of the formal complaint upon the respondent;</li> \n <li>to receive and pass upon challenges and objections to the appointment of Special Masters; and</li> \n <li>to extend the time for a Special Master to file a report, in accordance with Rule 4-214 (a).</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule552","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"eefc4188-d502-482d-91a8-d54da3e49a16","ParentId":"3ee26eaa-e752-484a-bf5e-9e65269cc3eb","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Coordinating Special Master shall have the following powers and duties:\n (1) to establish requirements for and supervise Special Master and Hearing Officer training; \n \n (2) to assign cases to Special Masters and Hearing Officers from the pool provided in Bar Rule 4-209 (b); \n \n (3) to exercise all of the powers and duties provided in Bar Rule 4-210 when acting as a Special Master under subparagraph (8) below; \n \n (4) to monitor and evaluate the performance of Special Masters and Hearing Officers; \n \n (5) to remove Special Masters and Hearing Officers for such cause as may be deemed proper by the Coordinating Special Master; \n \n (6) to fill all vacancies occasioned by incapacity, disqualification, recusal or removal; \n \n (7) to administer Special Master and Hearing Officer compensation, if authorized as provided in Bar Rule 4-209.2 or Part A, Section 14 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia; \n \n (8) to hear pretrial motions when no Special Master has been assigned; and \n \n(9) to perform all other administrative duties necessary for an efficient and effective hearing system.","UrlName":"revision194"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cf41204d-18f9-4302-801c-b3cfeb38cd2d","Title":"Rule 4-210. Powers and Duties of Special Masters","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In accordance with these Rules a duly appointed Special Master shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to exercise general supervision over assigned disciplinary proceedings, including emergency suspension cases as provided in Rule 4-108, and to perform all duties specifically enumerated in these Rules;</li> \n <li>to rule on all questions concerning the sufficiency of the formal complaint;</li> \n <li>to encourage negotiations between the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent, whether at a pretrial meeting set by the Special Master or at any other time;</li> \n <li>to receive and evaluate any Petition for Voluntary Discipline filed after the filing of a formal complaint;</li> \n <li>to grant continuances and to extend any time limit provided for herein as to any pending matter subject to Rule 4-214 (a);</li> \n <li>to apply to the Coordinating Special Master for leave to withdraw and for the appointment of a successor in the event that he becomes incapacitated or otherwise unable to perform his duties;</li> \n <li>to hear, determine and consolidate action on the complaints, where there are multiple complaints against a respondent growing out of different transactions, whether they involve one or more complainants, and to make recommendations on each complaint as constituting a separate offense;</li> \n <li>to sign subpoenas and to exercise the powers described in Rule 4-221 (c);</li> \n <li>to preside over evidentiary hearings and to decide questions of law and fact raised during such hearings;</li> \n <li>to make findings of fact and conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline as hereinafter provided and to submit his findings for consideration by the Supreme Court of Georgia in accordance with Rule 4-214;</li> \n <li>to exercise general supervision over discovery by parties to disciplinary proceedings and to conduct such hearings and sign all appropriate pleadings and orders pertaining to such discovery as are provided for by the law of Georgia applicable to discovery in civil cases; and</li> \n <li>in disciplinary cases, to make a recommendation of discipline, and in emergency suspension cases a recommendation as to whether the respondent should be suspended pending further disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule134","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"63d9ed19-1843-48c9-8df6-230c3b31f099","ParentId":"cf41204d-18f9-4302-801c-b3cfeb38cd2d","Title":"Version 2","Content":" In accordance with these Rules a duly appointed Special Master or Hearing Officer shall have the following powers and duties: \n \n(1) to exercise general supervision over assigned disciplinary proceedings and to perform all duties specifically enumerated in these Rules; \n \n(2) to rule on all questions concerning the sufficiency of the formal complaint;\n(3) to conduct the negotiations between the State Bar of Georgia and the Respondent, whether at a pretrial meeting set by the Special Master or at any other time;\n (4) to receive and evaluate any Petition for Voluntary Discipline; \n \n(5) to grant continuances and to extend any time limit provided for herein as to any pending matter; \n \n(6) to apply to the Coordinating Special Master for leave to withdraw and for the appointment of a successor in the event that he or she becomes incapacitated to perform his or her duties or in the event that he or she learns that he or she and the Respondent reside in the same circuit; \n \n(7) to hear, determine and consolidate action on the complaints, where there are multiple complaints against a Respondent growing out of different transactions, whether they involve one or more complainants, and may proceed to make recommendations on each complaint as constituting a separate offense;\n(8) to sign subpoenas and exercise the powers described in Bar Rule 4-221(b);\n (9) to preside over evidentiary hearings and to decide questions of law and fact raised during such hearings; \n \n(10) to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter provided and to submit his or her findings for consideration by the Review Panel; \n \n(11) to exercise general supervision over discovery by parties to disciplinary proceedings and to conduct such hearings and sign all appropriate pleadings and orders pertaining to such discovery as are provided for by the law of Georgia applicable to discovery in civil cases;\n(12) in disciplinary cases, to make a recommendation of discipline, and in emergency suspension cases a recommendation as to whether the Respondent should be suspended pending further disciplinary proceedings; and\n(13) to conduct and exercise general supervision over hearings for the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants and to make written findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to Part A, Section 8 of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia.","UrlName":"revision196"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ee826a71-c151-48fe-8edb-41abef22de27","Title":"Rule 4-211. Formal Complaint; Service","Content":"<ol> \n <li>Within 30 days after a finding of Probable Cause, the Office of the General Counsel shall file a formal complaint that specifies with reasonable particularity the acts complained of and the grounds for disciplinary action. A copy of the formal complaint shall be served upon the respondent after appointment of a Special Master. In those cases where a Notice of Discipline has been filed and rejected, the filing of the formal complaint shall be governed by the time period set forth in Rule 4-208.4. The formal complaint shall be served pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>Reserved.</li> \n <li>At all stages of the proceeding, both the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may be represented by counsel. Counsel representing the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to prepare and sign notices, pleadings, motions, complaints, and certificates for and in behalf of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n</ol>","UrlName":"rule136","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0d430cfa-e7d7-4ab5-a7e2-f1ec9bc56986","ParentId":"ee826a71-c151-48fe-8edb-41abef22de27","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Within thirty days after a finding of Probable Cause, a formal complaint shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel which shall specify with reasonable particularity the acts complained of and the grounds for disciplinary action. A formal complaint shall include the names and addresses of witnesses so far as then known. A copy of the formal complaint shall be served upon the Respondent after appointment of a Special Master by the Coordinating Special \nMaster. In those cases where a Notice of Discipline has been filed and rejected, the filing of the formal complaint shall be governed by the time period set forth in Bar Rule 4-208.4. The formal complaint shall be served pursuant to Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(b) This subparagraph is reserved. \n \n(c) At all stages of the proceeding, both the Respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may be represented by counsel. Counsel representing the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to prepare and sign notices, pleadings, motions, complaints, and certificates for and in behalf of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Disciplinary Board.","UrlName":"revision198"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"86e94ba5-a26d-40bd-9bdd-9920d0e0e1a3","Title":"Rule 4-211.1 Dismissal after Formal Complaint","Content":"At any time after the State Disciplinary Board finds Probable Cause, the Office of the General Counsel may dismiss the proceeding with the consent of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or with the consent of any three members of the State Disciplinary Board.","UrlName":"rule138","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"36e51b06-b1bc-48ca-a8b7-8e019fc1c829","ParentId":"86e94ba5-a26d-40bd-9bdd-9920d0e0e1a3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"At any time after the Investigative Panel finds probable cause, the Office of General Counsel may dismiss the proceeding with the consent of the Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of the Investigative Panel or with the consent of any three members of the Investigative Panel.","UrlName":"revision200"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d3caa485-b0cd-4823-9271-428068980047","Title":"Rule 4-212. Answer of Respondent; Discovery","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The respondent shall file and serve his answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-221 (b) within 30 days after service of the formal complaint. If the respondent fails to answer or to obtain an extension of time for his answer, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint shall be deemed admitted. In the event the respondent’s answer fails to address specifically the issues raised in the formal complaint, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint and not specifically addressed in the answer shall be deemed admitted. A respondent may obtain an extension of time not to exceed 15 days to file the answer from the Special Master. Extensions of time for the filing of an answer shall not be routinely granted.</li> \n <li>The pendency of objections or challenges to one or more Special Masters shall provide no justification for a respondent’s failure to file his answer or for failure of the State Bar of Georgia or the respondent to engage in discovery.</li> \n <li>Both parties to the disciplinary proceeding may engage in discovery under the rules of practice and procedure then applicable to civil cases in the State of Georgia.</li> \n <li>In lieu of filing an answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar of Georgia, the respondent may submit to the Special Master a Petition for Voluntary Discipline as provided in Rule 4-227 (c). Each such petition shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. As provided in Rule 4-227 (c) (1), the Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule117","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"415ec974-0089-4913-a142-be55ce96b55a","ParentId":"d3caa485-b0cd-4823-9271-428068980047","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The respondent shall serve his or her answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar within thirty days after service of the formal complaint. In the event that respondent fails to answer or to obtain an extension of time for his answer, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint shall be deemed admitted. In the event the respondent's answer fails to address specifically the issues raised in the formal complaint, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal complaint and not specifically addressed in the answer shall be deemed admitted. A respondent may obtain an extension of time not to exceed fifteen days to file the answer from the special master, or, when a challenge to the special master is pending, from the chairperson of the Review Panel. Extensions of time for the filing of an answer shall not be routinely granted. \n \n(b) The pendency of objections or challenges to one or more special masters shall provide no justification for a respondent's failure to file his answer or for failure of the State Bar or the respondent to engage in discovery. \n \n(c) Both parties to the disciplinary proceeding may engage in discovery under the rules of practice and procedure then applicable to civil cases in the State of Georgia. \n \n(d) In lieu of filing an answer to the formal complaint of the State Bar, the respondent may submit to the special master a Petition for Voluntary Discipline; provided, however, that each such petition shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. As provided in Rule 4-210(d), the special master may solicit a response to such petition from Bar counsel.","UrlName":"revision202"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"8127673b-ac9f-4f79-8fcb-17a808c4feba","Title":"Rule 4-213. Evidentiary Hearing","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Within 90 days after the filing of respondent’s answer to the formal complaint or the expiration of the time for filing of the answer, whichever is later, the Special Master shall proceed to hear the case. The evidentiary hearing shall be reported and transcribed at the expense of the State Bar of Georgia. When the hearing is complete, the Special Master shall proceed to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline and file a report with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards as hereinafter provided. Alleged errors in the hearing may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia when the findings and recommendations of discipline are filed with the Court. There shall be no interlocutory appeal of alleged errors in the hearing.</li> \n <li>Upon respondent’s showing of necessity and financial inability to pay for a copy of the transcript, the Special Master shall order the State Bar of Georgia to purchase a copy of the transcript for respondent.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule127","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"e7e60296-f99b-46a6-86f6-e4f2818f7cb5","ParentId":"8127673b-ac9f-4f79-8fcb-17a808c4feba","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Within 90 days after the filing of respondent's answer to the formal complaint or the time for filing of the answer, whichever is later, the Special Master shall proceed to hear the case. The evidentiary hearing shall be reported and transcribed at the expense of the State Bar of Georiga. When the hearing is complete, the Special Master shall proceed to make findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation of discipline and file a report with the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia as hereinafter provided. Alleged errors in the trial may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia when the findings and recommendations of discipline of the Review Panel are filed with the Court. There shall be no direct appeal from such proceedings of the Special Master. \n \n(b) Upon respondent's showing of necessity and financial inability to pay for a copy of the transcript, the Special Master shall order the State Bar of Georgia to purchase a copy of the transcript for respondent.","UrlName":"revision204"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9622baf4-fd64-4aec-bb7f-b587c58b1dbd","Title":"Rule 4-214. Report of the Special Master","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Unless the Coordinating Special Master extends the deadline for good cause, the Special Master shall prepare a report within 45 days from receipt of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing. Failure of the Special Master to issue the report within 45 days shall not be grounds for dismissal. The report shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>findings of fact on the issues raised by the formal complaint;</li> \n <li>conclusions of law on the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties; and</li> \n <li>a recommendation of discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Special Master shall file his or her original report and recommendation with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards and shall serve a copy on the respondent and counsel for the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n <li>The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall file the original record in the case directly with the Supreme Court of Georgia, unless any party files with the Clerk a request for review by the State Disciplinary Review Board and exceptions to the report within 30 days of the date the report is filed as provided in Rule 4-216 et seq. The Clerk shall inform the State Disciplinary Review Board when a request for review and exceptions are filed.</li> \n <li>In the event any party requests review, the responding party shall file a response to the exceptions within 30 days of the filing. Within 10 days after the receipt of a response or the expiration of the time for responding, the Clerk shall transmit the record in the case to the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule53","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"1c0dc62c-cf9e-4ece-9e50-bbc3f2e76594","ParentId":"9622baf4-fd64-4aec-bb7f-b587c58b1dbd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Rule 4-214. This rule is reserved. ","UrlName":"revision206"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"943ffb9b-7630-4dd3-a8fe-4b6b6c0d12da","Title":"Rule 4-215. Powers and Duties of the State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In accordance with these Rules, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol> \n <li>to review reports of Special Masters, and to recommend to the Supreme Court of Georgia the imposition of punishment and discipline or dismissal of the complaint;</li> \n <li>to adopt forms for notices and any other written instruments necessary or desirable under these Rules;</li> \n <li>to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure; </li> \n <li>to receive Notice of Reciprocal Discipline and to recommend to the Supreme Court of Georgia the imposition of punishment and discipline pursuant to Bar Rule 9.4 (b) (3); and</li> \n <li>to administer State Disciplinary Review Board reprimands.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule137","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b62dff75-584a-4a6e-969c-ffe4dd865ff7","ParentId":"943ffb9b-7630-4dd3-a8fe-4b6b6c0d12da","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision208"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"137e355a-d385-4b45-ae79-6a737d44c0c1","Title":"Rule 4-216. Proceedings Before the State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon receipt of the record and exceptions to the report of the Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-214, the State Disciplinary Review Board shall consider the record, review findings of fact and conclusions of law, and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court of Georgia and the nature of such recommended discipline. The findings of fact made by a Special Master may be reversed if the State Disciplinary Review Board finds them to be clearly erroneous or manifestly in error. Conclusions of law and determinations of appropriate sanctions shall be reviewed de novo.</li> \n <li>The respondent shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Review Board considering the case under a procedure as provided for in the Rules of the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li>There shall be no de novo hearing before the State Disciplinary Review Board.</li> \n <li>The State Disciplinary Review Board may consider exceptions to the report of the Special Master and may in its discretion grant oral argument if requested by any party within 15 days of transmission of the record and exceptions to the State Disciplinary Review Board. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards, in accordance with Rule 4-214. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.</li> \n <li>Within 90 days after receipt of the record including any exceptions to the report of the Special Master and responses thereto the State Disciplinary Review Board shall file its report with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. The 90-day deadline may be extended by agreement of the parties or with the consent of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board for good cause shown. A copy of the State Disciplinary Review Board’s report shall be served upon the respondent, and the Clerk shall file the record in the case with the Supreme Court of Georgia within 10 days after the report is filed. If no report is filed by the State Disciplinary Review Board within 90 days of receipt by it of the record and no extension is granted, the Clerk shall file the original record in the case with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the case shall be considered by the Court on the record.</li> \n </ol> \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule143","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"75367abc-39d4-4199-b939-3f62e23582eb","ParentId":"137e355a-d385-4b45-ae79-6a737d44c0c1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"revision210"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"662bb234-462b-4dfa-8aa7-6a1370a125b9","Title":"Rule 4-217.","Content":"Reserved","UrlName":"rule146","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"e1472412-4b90-4b6b-bec0-aea3970475d9","ParentId":"662bb234-462b-4dfa-8aa7-6a1370a125b9","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Within 30 days from receipt of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing, the Special Master shall prepare a report which shall contain the following:\n(1) findings of fact on the issues raised by the formal complaint, and\n(2) conclusions of law on the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties; and\n(3) a recommendation of discipline.\n (b) The Special Master shall file his or her original report and recommendation with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board and shall serve a copy on the respondent and counsel for the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-203.1. \n \n(c) Thirty days after the Special Master's report and recommendation is filed, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board  shall file the original record in the case directly with the Supreme Court of Georgia unless either party requests review by the Review Panel as provided in paragraph (d) of this Rule. In the event neither party requests review by the Review Panel and the matter goes directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, both parties shall be deemed to have waived any right they may have under the Rules to file exceptions with or make request for oral argument to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Any review undertaken by the Supreme Court of Georgia shall be solely on the original record. \n \n(d) Upon receipt of the Special Master’s report and recommendation, either party may request review by the Review Panel as provided in Rule 4-218. Such party shall file the request and exceptions with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with Rule 4-221 (f) and serve them on the opposing party within 30 days after the Special Master's report is filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. Upon receipt of a timely written request and exceptions, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall prepare and file the record and report with the Review Panel. The responding party shall have 30 days after service of the exceptions within which to respond.","UrlName":"revision212"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a0d831a8-8c52-4efe-9000-b94fc429538b","Title":"Rule 4-218. Judgments","Content":"After the Special Master's report and any report of the State Disciplinary Review Board are filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file with the Court any written exceptions, supported by written argument, either may have to the reports. All such exceptions shall be filed with the Court within 30 days of the date that the record is filed with the Court and a copy served upon the opposing party. The responding party shall have an additional 30 days to file a response with the Court. The Court may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by a party to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court will promptly consider the report of the Special Master, any report of the State Disciplinary Review Board, any exceptions, and any responses filed by any party to such exceptions, and enter judgment upon the formal complaint. A copy of the Court’s judgment shall be transmitted to the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent by the Court.","UrlName":"rule148","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"89aa92fa-6cc4-46c8-b9ae-8d02469a53d1","ParentId":"a0d831a8-8c52-4efe-9000-b94fc429538b","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon receipt of the report from a Special Master pursuant to Rule 4-217(d), the Review Panel shall consider the record, make findings of fact and conclusions of law and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court and the nature of such recommended discipline. The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a Special Master shall not be binding on the Panel and may be reversed by it on the basis of the record submitted to the Panel by the Special Master. \n \n(b) The Respondent shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any member of the Review Panel considering the case against him under a procedure as provided for in the rules of the Panel. \n \n(c) There shall be no de novo hearing before the Review Panel except by unanimous consent of the Panel. \n \n(d) The Review Panel may grant rehearings, or new trials, for such reasons, in such manner, on such issues and within such times as the ends of justice may require. \n \n(e) The Review Panel may consider exceptions to the report of the special master and may in its discretion grant oral argument. Exceptions and briefs shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with Bar Rules 4-217(d) and 4-221(f). The responding party shall have ten (10) days after service of the exceptions within which to respond. \n \n(f) The Review Panel shall file its report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. A copy of the Panel's report shall be served upon the Respondent.","UrlName":"revision214"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"34cf176e-9770-4ae2-8545-e40c320883fc","Title":"Rule 4-219. Publication and Protective Orders","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>In cases in which a lawyer is publicly reprimanded, suspended, disbarred, or voluntarily surrenders his license, the Office of the General Counsel shall publish notice of the discipline in a local newspaper or newspapers. The Office of the General Counsel shall publish notice of all public discipline on the official State Bar of Georgia website, including the respondent’s full name and business address, the nature of the discipline imposed and the effective dates.</li> \n <li> \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall immediately cease the practice of law in Georgia and shall, within 30 days, notify all clients of his inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients. Within 45 days after a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, the respondent shall certify to the Court that he has satisfied the requirements of this Rule. Should the respondent fail to comply with the requirements of this Rule, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its own motion or upon motion of the Office of the General Counsel, and after 10 days’ notice to the respondent and proof of his failure to notify or protect his clients, may hold the respondent in contempt and, pursuant to Rule 4-228, order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of the respondent and proceed to notify all clients and to take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Motions for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by either the respondent or by the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension under Part IV of these Rules the respondent shall take such action necessary to cause the removal of any indicia of the respondent as a lawyer, legal assistant, legal clerk or person with similar status. In the event the respondent should maintain a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted, the respondent shall not represent himself as a lawyer or person with similar status and shall not provide any legal advice to clients of the law office.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule150","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"765c0956-e960-4f80-be7b-207b5f653097","ParentId":"34cf176e-9770-4ae2-8545-e40c320883fc","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) After either the Review Panel's report or the Special Master's report is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, the respondent and the State Bar of Georgia may file with the Court any written exceptions, supported by written argument, each may have to the report subject to the provisions of Rule 4-217 (c). All such exceptions shall be filed with the Court within 30 days of the date that the report is filed with the Court and a copy served upon the opposing party. The responding party shall have an additional 30 days to file its response with the Court. The Court may grant oral argument on any exception filed with it upon application for such argument by a party to the disciplinary proceedings. The Court will promptly consider the report of the Review Panel or the Special Master, any exceptions, and any responses filed by any party to such exceptions, and enter judgment upon the formal complaint. A copy of the Court's judgment shall be transmitted to the State Bar of Georgia and the respondent by the Court. \n \n(b) In cases in which the Supreme Court of Georgia orders disbarment, voluntary surrender of license or suspension, or the respondent is disbarred or suspended on a Notice of Discipline, the Review Panel shall publish in a local newspaper or newspapers and on the official State Bar of Georgia website, notice of the discipline, including the respondent's full name and business address, the nature of the discipline imposed and the effective dates. \n \n(c) (1) After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall immediately cease the practice of law in Georgia and shall, within 30 days, notify all clients of his inability to represent them and of the necessity for promptly retaining new counsel, and shall take all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients. Within 45 days after a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, the respondent shall certify to the Court that he has satisfied the requirements of this Rule. Should the respondent fail to comply with the requirements of this Rule, the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon its own motion or upon motion of the Office of the General Counsel, and after ten days notice to the respondent and proof of his failure to notify or protect his clients, may hold the respondent in contempt and, pursuant to Rule 4-228, order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia take charge of the files and records of the respondent and proceed to notify all clients and to take such steps as seem indicated to protect their interests. Motions for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by either the respondent or by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(2) After a final judgment of disbarment or suspension under Part IV of these Rules, including a disbarment or suspension on a Notice of Discipline, the respondent shall take such action necessary to cause the removal of any indicia of the respondent as a lawyer, legal assistant, legal clerk or person with similar status. In the event the respondent should maintain a presence in an office where the practice of law is conducted, the respondent shall not:\n (i) have any contact with the clients of the office either in person, by telephone or in writing; or \n \n(ii) have any contact with persons who have legal dealings with the office either in person, by telephone or in writing.","UrlName":"revision216"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Rule 4-220. Notice of Punishment or Acquittal; Administration of Reprimands","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia for the prescribed period.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record. State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be issued by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board, or his designee, at a regular meeting of the Board.</li> \n <li>Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record in the case. They shall be read in open court in the presence of the respondent by the judge of a Superior Court in the county of the respondent's address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Notice of issuance of the reprimand shall be published in advance in the legal organ of the county of the respondent’s address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia, and provided to the complainant in the underlying case.</li> \n <li>After a Public Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. </li> \n <li>In the event of a final judgment in favor of the respondent, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule152","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"b4f50c5b-d625-418d-8049-012836748219","ParentId":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Secretary of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia either permanently, in case of disbarment, or for the prescribed period in case of suspension. \n \n(b) Review Panel Reprimands shall be administered before the Panel by the chairperson or his or her designee. \n \n(c) Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Review Panel, the Chairperson of the Review Panel or his or her designee, and shall be read in open court, in the presence of the respondent, by the judge of the superior court in the county in which the respondent resides or in the county in which the disciplinary infraction occurred, with the location to be specified by the Review Panel, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. \n \n(d) After a Public or Review Panel Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. \n \n(e) In the event of a final judgment of acquittal, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the respondent resides. The respondent may give reasonable public notice of the judgment or acquittal.","UrlName":"revision218"},{"Id":"36663b15-9666-4b27-b56c-48e43efb1c12","ParentId":"86cbb9b3-89a8-47b7-9451-1dbe93ba8577","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Upon a final judgment of disbarment or suspension, notice of the action taken shall be given by the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia to the clerks of all courts of record in this State and to the Membership Department of the State Bar of Georgia, and the name of the respondent in question shall be stricken from the rolls of said courts and from the rolls of the State Bar of Georgia for the prescribed period.</li> \n <li>State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record. State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimands shall be issued by the Chair of the State Disciplinary Review Board, or his designee, at a regular meeting of the Board.</li> \n <li>Public Reprimands shall be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel based upon the record in the case. They shall be read in open court in the presence of the respondent by the judge of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides or the county in which the disciplinary infraction occurred, with the location to be specified by the Special Master subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Notice of issuance of the reprimand shall be published in advance in the legal organ of the county of the respondent’s address as shown on the Membership Records of the State Bar of Georgia, and provided to the complainant in the underlying case.</li> \n <li>After a Public Reprimand has been administered, a certificate reciting the fact of the administration of the reprimand and the date of its administration shall be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia. There shall be attached to such certificate a copy of the reprimand. Both the certificate and the copy of the reprimand shall become a part of the record in the disciplinary proceeding. </li> \n <li>In the event of a final judgment in favor of the respondent, the State Bar of Georgia shall, if directed by the respondent, give notice thereof to the clerk of the Superior Court in the county in which the respondent resides.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision270"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"97c32cdd-b655-4893-b2ed-0f800248552f","Title":"Rule 4-221. Hearing Procedures","Content":"(a) Oaths. Before entering upon his duties as herein provided, each member of the State Disciplinary Board, each member of the State Disciplinary Review Board, and each Special Master shall swear or affirm to the following oath by signing a copy and returning it to the Clerk of the Boards or to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia, as appropriate.\n “I do solemnly swear or affirm that I will faithfully and impartially \t discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as a member of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia/member of the State Disciplinary Review Board of the State Bar of Georgia/Special Master according to the best of my ability and \t understanding and agreeable to the laws and Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States.”\nThe Clerk of the Boards shall maintain the completed Oaths of Board members, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall file the completed Oaths of Special Masters.\n(b) Pleadings and Copies. Original pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia, and the parties shall serve copies upon the Special Master and the opposing party pursuant to the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Depositions and other original discovery shall be retained by counsel and shall not be filed except as permitted under the Uniform Superior Court Rules.\n(c) Witnesses and Evidence; Contempt.\n(1) The respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall have the right to require the issuance of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses to testify or to produce books and papers. The Special Master shall have the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents relevant to the matter under investigation, by subpoena, and as further provided by law in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n(2) The following shall subject a person to rule for contempt of the Special Master or State Disciplinary Board:\n(i) disregard, in any manner whatsoever, of a subpoena issued pursuant to Rules 4-203 (9), 4-210 (h) or 4-221 (c) (1);\n(ii) refusal to answer any pertinent or proper question of a Special Master; or\n(iii) willful or flagrant violation of a lawful directive of a Special Master.\nIt shall be the duty of the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or Special Master to report the facts supporting contempt to the Chief Judge of the Superior Court in and for the county in which the investigation, trial or hearing is being held. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of the matter and shall follow the procedures for contempt as are applicable in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil case before the Superior Court under the laws in Georgia.\n (3) Any Special Master shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue any subpoena herein provided for. \n \n(4) Depositions may be taken by the respondent or the State Bar of Georgia in the same manner and under the same provisions as may be done in civil cases under the laws of Georgia, and such depositions may be used upon the trial or an investigation or hearing in the same manner as such depositions may be used in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n(5) All witnesses attending any hearing provided for under these Rules shall be entitled to the same fees as now are allowed by law to witnesses attending trials in civil cases in the Superior Courts of this State under subpoena.\n(d) Venue of Hearings.\n (1) The hearings on all complaints and charges against a resident respondent shall be held in the county of the respondent’s main office or the county of residence of the respondent unless he otherwise agrees. \n \n(2) Where the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the complaint arose in the State of Georgia, the hearing shall be held in the county where the complaint arose. \n \n(3) When the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the offense occurs outside the State, the hearing may be held in the county of the State Bar of Georgia headquarters.\n","UrlName":"rule156","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"5c9f9944-ca22-4108-8823-d32bea898b29","ParentId":"97c32cdd-b655-4893-b2ed-0f800248552f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Oaths. Before entering upon his duties as herein provided, each member of the State Disciplinary Board and each Special Master shall subscribe to an oath to be administered by any person authorized to administer oaths under the laws of this State, such oath to be in writing and filed with the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia. The form of such oath shall be:\n\"I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as a member of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia/Special Master according to the best of my ability and understanding and agreeable to the laws and Constitution of this State and the Constitution of the United States so help me God.\"\n(b) Witnesses and Evidence; Contempt.\n(1) The respondent and the State Bar of Georgia shall have the right to require the issuance of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses to testify or to produce books and papers. The State Disciplinary Board or a special master shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents, relevant to the matter under investigation, by subpoena, and as further provided by law in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n \n(2) The following shall subject a person to rule for contempt of the Special Master or Panel:\n \n(i) disregard, in any manner whatever, of a subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 4-221 (b) (1),\n \n(ii) refusal to answer any pertinent or proper question of a Special Master or Board member, or\n \n(iii) wilful or flagrant violation of a lawful directive of a Special Master or Board member.\n \nIt shall be the duty of the chairperson of the affected Panel or Special Master to report the fact to the Chief Judge of the superior court in and for the county in which said investigation, trial or hearing is being held. The superior court shall have jurisdiction of the matter and shall follow the procedures for contempt as are applicable in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil case before the superior court under the laws in Georgia.\n \n(3) Any member of the State Disciplinary Board and any Special Master shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations and to issue any subpoena herein provided for. \n \n(4) Depositions may be taken by the respondent or the State Bar of Georgia in the same manner and under the same provisions as may be done in civil cases under the laws of Georgia, and such depositions may be used upon the trial or an investigation or hearing in the same manner as such depositions are admissible in evidence in civil cases under the laws of Georgia.\n \n(5) All witnesses attending any hearing provided for under these Rules shall be entitled to the same fees as now are allowed by law to witnesses attending trials in civil cases in the superior courts of this State under subpoena, and said fees shall be assessed against the parties to the proceedings under the rule of law applicable to civil suits in the superior courts of this State. \n \n(6) Whenever the deposition of any person is to be taken in this State pursuant to the laws of another state, territory, province or commonwealth, or of the United States or of another country for use in attorney discipline, fitness or disability proceedings there, the chairperson of the Investigative Panel, or his or her designee upon petition, may issue a summons or subpoena as provided in this Rule to compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents at such deposition.\n \n(c) Venue of Hearings.\n \n(1) The hearings on all complaints and charges against resident respondents shall be held in the county of residence of the respondent unless he otherwise agrees. \n \n(2) Where the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the complaint arose in the State of Georgia, the hearing shall be held in the county where the complaint arose. \n \n(3) When the respondent is a nonresident of the State of Georgia and the offense occurs outside the State, the hearing may be held in the county of the State Bar of Georgia headquarters.\n \n(d) Confidentiality of Investigations and Proceedings.\n \n(1) The State Bar of Georgia shall maintain as confidential all disciplinary investigations and proceedings pending at the screening or investigative stage, unless otherwise provided by these Rules. \n \n(2) After a proceeding under these Rules is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all evidentiary and motions hearings shall be open to the public and all reports rendered shall be public documents. \n \n(3) Nothing in these Rules shall prohibit the complainant, respondent or third party from disclosing information regarding a disciplinary proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia or a Special Master in proceedings under these Rules. \n \n(4) The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia or the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board may reveal or authorize disclosure of information which would otherwise be confidential under this Rule under the following circumstances:\n \n(i) In the event of a charge of wrongful conduct against any member of the State Disciplinary Board or any person who is otherwise connected with the disciplinary proceeding in any way, either Panel of the Board or its Chairperson or his or her designee, may authorize the use of information concerning disciplinary investigations or proceedings to aid in the defense against such charge. \n \n(ii) In the event the Office of the General Counsel receives information that suggests criminal activity, such information may be revealed to the appropriate criminal prosecutor. \n \n(iii) In the event of subsequent disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, the Office of the General Counsel may, in aggravation of discipline in the pending disciplinary case, reveal the imposition of confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208 and facts underlying the imposition of discipline. \n \n(iv) A complainant or lawyer representing the complainant may be notified of the status or disposition of the complaint. \n \n(v) When public statements that are false or misleading are made about any otherwise confidential disciplinary case, the Office of the General Counsel may disclose all information necessary to correct such false or misleading statements.\n \n(5) The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information to the following persons if it appears that the information may assist them in the discharge of their duties:\n \n(i) The Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(ii) The Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(iii) The Judicial Nominating Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(iv) The Lawyer Assistance Program or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(v) The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(vi) The Judicial Qualifications Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions; \n \n(vii) The Executive Committee with the specific approval of the following representatives of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board: the chairperson, the vice-chairperson and a third representative designated by the chairperson; \n \n(viii) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board; \n \n(ix) The Consumer Assistance Program; \n \n(x) The General Counsel Overview Committee; \n  \n(xi) An office or committee charged with discipline appointed by the United States Circuit or District Court or the highest court of any state, District of Columbia, commonwealth or possession of the United States; and \n \n(xii) The Unlicensed Practice of Law Department.\n \n(6) Any information used by the Office of the General Counsel in a proceeding under Rule 4-108 or in a proceeding to obtain a Receiver to administer the files of a member of the State Bar of Georgia, shall not be confidential under this Rule. \n \n(7) The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information when required by law or court order. \n \n(8) The authority or discretion to reveal confidential information under this Rule shall not constitute a waiver of any evidentiary, statutory or other privilege which may be asserted by the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board under Bar Rules or applicable law. \n \n(9) Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit the Office of the General Counsel or the Investigative Panel from interviewing potential witnesses or placing the Notice of Investigation out for service by sheriff or other authorized person. \n \n(10) Members of the Office of the General Counsel and State Disciplinary Board may respond to specific inquiries concerning matters that have been made public by the complainant, respondent or third parties but are otherwise confidential under these Rules by acknowledging the existence and status of the proceeding. \n \n(11) The State Bar of Georgia shall not disclose information concerning discipline imposed on a lawyer under prior Supreme Court Rules that was confidential when imposed, unless authorized to do so by said prior Rules.\n \n(e) Burden of Proof; Evidence.\n \n(1) In all proceedings under this Chapter the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Georgia, except for proceedings under Rule 4-106. \n \n(2) In all proceedings under this chapter occurring after a finding of probable cause as described in Rule 4-204.4, the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of proof required of the State Bar of Georgia shall be clear and convincing evidence.\n \n(f) Pleadings and Copies. Original pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. Depositions and other original discovery shall be retained by counsel and shall not be filed except as permitted under the Uniform Superior Court Rules. \n \n(g) Pleadings and Communications Privileged. Pleadings and oral and written statements of members of the State Disciplinary Board, members and designees of the Lawyer Assistance Program, Special Masters, Bar counsel and investigators, complainants, witnesses, and respondents and their counsel made to one another or filed in the record during any investigation, intervention, hearing or other disciplinary proceeding under this Part IV, and pertinent to the disciplinary proceeding, are made in performance of a legal and public duty, are absolutely privileged, and under no circumstances form the basis for a right of action.","UrlName":"revision220"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"62b2a0db-ca20-4090-a530-abeb09736218","Title":"Rule 4-221.1 Confidentiality of Investigations and Proceedings","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall maintain as confidential all disciplinary investigations and proceedings pending at the screening or investigative stage, unless otherwise provided by these Rules.</li> \n <li>After a proceeding under these Rules is filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia, all evidentiary and motions hearings shall be open to the public and all documents and pleadings filed of record shall be public documents, unless the Special Master or the Supreme Court of Georgia orders otherwise.</li> \n <li>Nothing in these Rules shall prohibit the complainant, respondent, or a third party from disclosing information regarding a disciplinary proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia or a Special Master in proceedings under these Rules.</li> \n <li> The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board may reveal or authorize disclosure of information that would otherwise be confidential under this Rule under the following circumstances: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>In the event of a charge of wrongful conduct against any member of the State Disciplinary Board, the State Disciplinary Review Board, or any person who is otherwise connected with the disciplinary proceeding in any way, the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair or his designee, may authorize the use of information concerning disciplinary investigations or proceedings to aid in the defense against such charge.</li> \n <li>In the event the Office of the General Counsel receives information that suggests criminal activity, such information may be revealed to the appropriate criminal prosecutor.</li> \n <li>In the event of subsequent disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer, the Office of the General Counsel may, in aggravation of discipline in the pending disciplinary case, reveal the imposition of confidential discipline under Rules 4-205 to 4-208 and facts underlying the imposition of discipline.</li> \n <li>A complainant and/or lawyer representing the complainant shall be notified of the status or disposition of the complaint.</li> \n <li>When public statements that are false or misleading are made about any otherwise confidential disciplinary case, the Office of the General Counsel may disclose all information necessary to correct such false or misleading statements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information to the following persons if it appears that the information may assist them in the discharge of their duties:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Judicial Nominating Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Lawyer Assistance Program or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Judicial Qualifications Commission or the comparable body in other jurisdictions;</li> \n <li>The Executive Committee with the specific approval of the following representatives of the State Disciplinary Board: the Chair, the Vice-Chair, and a third representative designated by the Chair;</li> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board;</li> \n <li>The Client Assistance Program;</li> \n <li>The General Counsel Overview Committee; </li> \n <li>An office or committee charged with discipline appointed by the United States Circuit or District Court or the highest court of any state, District of Columbia, commonwealth or possession of the United States; and</li> \n <li>The Unlicensed Practice of Law Department.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Any information used by the Office of the General Counsel in a proceeding under Rule 4-108 or in a proceeding to obtain a receiver to administer the files of a lawyer, shall not be confidential under this Rule.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may reveal confidential information when required by law or court order.</li> \n <li>The authority or discretion to reveal confidential information under this Rule shall not constitute a waiver of any evidentiary, statutory or other privilege which may be asserted by the State Bar of Georgia or the State Disciplinary Board under Bar Rules or applicable law.</li> \n <li>Nothing in this Rule shall prohibit the Office of the General Counsel or the State Disciplinary Board from interviewing potential witnesses or placing the Notice of Investigation out for service by the sheriff or other authorized person.</li> \n <li>Members of the Office of the General Counsel and State Disciplinary Board may respond to specific inquiries concerning matters that have been made public by the complainant, respondent, or third parties but are otherwise confidential under these Rules by acknowledging the existence and status of the proceeding.</li> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall not disclose information concerning discipline imposed on a lawyer under prior Supreme Court of Georgia Rules that was confidential when imposed, unless authorized to do so by said prior Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule603","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"af4ea35a-2419-4a09-b5c3-0756c324d60c","Title":"Rule 4-221.2. Burden of Proof; Evidence","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>In all proceedings under this Chapter, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Georgia, except for proceedings under Rule 4-106.</li> \n <li>In all proceedings under this Chapter occurring after a finding of Probable Cause as described in Rule 4-204.4, the procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of proof required of the State Bar shall be clear and convincing evidence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule604","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"49a36f5e-540c-43ec-a804-da706530090f","Title":"Rule 4-221.3. Pleadings and Communications Privileged","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Pleadings and oral and written statements of members of the Boards, members and designees of the Lawyer Assistance Program, Special Masters, Bar counsel and investigators, complainants, witnesses, and respondents and their counsel made to one another or filed in the record during any investigation, intervention, hearing, or other disciplinary proceeding under this Part IV, and pertinent to the disciplinary proceeding, are made in performance of a legal and public duty, are absolutely privileged, and under no circumstances form the basis for a right of action.</div>","UrlName":"rule605","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Rule 4-222. Limitation","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance, a written description pursuant to Rule 4-202 (a), or a Client Assistance Program referral form has been received at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted pursuant to these Rules within four years after the commission of the act; provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender’s whereabouts are unknown, or the offender’s name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State.</li> \n <li>Referral of a matter to the State Disciplinary Board shall occur within 12 months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance by the Office of the General Counsel or notification to the respondant of the written description pursuant to Rule 4-202 (a).</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule158","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"14564682-9ff9-4467-9a33-a3b548b47980","ParentId":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance or a Client Assistance Program referral form has been received at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted pursuant to these Rules within four years after the commission of the act; provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender’s whereabouts are unknown, or the offender’s name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State.</li> \n <li>Referral of a matter to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel shall occur within 12 months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance at the State Bar of Georgia headquarters or institution of an investigation.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision403"},{"Id":"3e73be77-4c87-40d4-bbdd-dc450b57681e","ParentId":"da85858c-2b33-459e-bcbb-d086a34c2231","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) No proceeding under Part IV, Chapter 2, shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance has been received at State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted by the Investigative Panel within four years after the commission of the act. Provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the offender's whereabouts are unknown, or the offender's name is removed from the roll of those authorized to practice law in this State. \n \n(b) Referral of a matter to the Investigative Panel by the Office of the General Counsel shall occur within twelve months of the receipt of the Memorandum of Grievance at State Bar of Georgia headquarters or institution of a Memorandum of Grievance by the Investigative Panel.","UrlName":"revision222"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1df80583-9d16-4d87-a330-42a90e455f89","Title":"Rule 4-223. Advisory Opinions","Content":"<div>(a) Any Formal Advisory Opinion issued pursuant to Rule 4-403 which is not thereafter disapproved by the Supreme Court of Georgia shall be binding on the State Bar of Georgia, the State Disciplinary Board, and the person who requested the opinion, in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding involving that person. Formal Advisory Opinions which have been approved or modified by the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 4-403 shall also be binding in subsequent disciplinary proceedings which do not involve the person who requested the opinion.</div><div> </div><div>(b) It shall be considered as mitigation to any matter being investigated under these Rules that the respondent has acted in accordance with and in reasonable reliance upon a written Informal Advisory Opinion requested by the respondent pursuant to Rule 4-401 or a Formal Advisory Opinion issued pursuant to Rule 4-403, but not reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule161","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Rule 4-224. Expungement of Records","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The record of any matter against a respondent under these Rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the Office of the General Counsel in accordance with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>those matters closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202 (e) shall be expunged after one year;</li> \n <li>those matters dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board after a Probable Cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and</li> \n <li>those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court of Georgia after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Definition. The term “expunge” shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed.</li> \n <li>Effect of Expungement. After a file has been expunged, any response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record of such matter has been expunged and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the matter or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged.</li> \n <li>Retention of Records. Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel, for good cause shown, with notice to the respondent and an opportunity to be heard, records which would otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this Rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm that the record was expunged and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked the lawyer has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary Rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been referred to the Client Assistance Program, dismissed, or dismissed with a letter of instruction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule165","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"82fb7844-7595-48b9-83be-4471f2052c22","ParentId":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The record of any grievance against a respondent under these Rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the Office of the General Counsel in accordance with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>those grievances closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202 (e) shall be expunged after one year;</li> \n <li>those grievances dismissed by the State Disciplinary Board after a Probable Cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and</li> \n <li>those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court of Georgia after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Definition. The term “expunge” shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed.</li> \n <li>Effect of Expungement. After a file has been expunged, any response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record of such matter has been expunged and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the grievance or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged.</li> \n <li>Retention of Records. Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by the Office of the General Counsel, for good cause shown, with notice to the respondent and an opportunity to be heard, records that would otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this Rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm that the record was expunged and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged.</li> \n <li>A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if he has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been referred to the Consumer Assistance Program, dismissed, or dismissed with a letter of instruction.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision405"},{"Id":"b7f7fce2-13bc-4974-bfe2-74b8996b5020","ParentId":"d572b274-d244-4c7f-8b2f-c08e56c6b2db","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The record of any grievance against a respondent under these rules which does not result in discipline against the respondent shall be expunged by the State Disciplinary Board in accordance with the following:\n \n(1) those grievances closed by the Office of the General Counsel after screening pursuant to Rule 4-202(c) shall be expunged after one year; \n \n(2) those grievances dismissed by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board after a probable cause investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) shall be expunged after two years; and \n \n(3) those complaints dismissed by the Supreme Court after formal proceedings shall be expunged after two years.\n \n(b) Definition . The terms \"expunge \"and \"expunction \"shall mean that all records or other evidence of the existence of the complaint shall be destroyed. \n \n(c) Effect of Expungement . After a file has been expunged, any agency response to an inquiry requiring a reference to the matter shall state that any record the agency may have had of such matter has been expunged pursuant to court rule and, in addition, shall state that no inference adverse to the respondent is to be drawn on the basis of the incident in question. The respondent may answer any inquiry requiring a reference to an expunged matter by stating that the grievance or formal complaint was dismissed and thereafter expunged pursuant to court rule. \n \n(d) Retention of Records . Upon application to the State Disciplinary Board by bar counsel, for good cause shown and with notice to the respondent and opportunity to be heard, records which should otherwise be expunged under this Rule may be retained for such additional period of time not exceeding three years as the State Disciplinary Board deems appropriate. Counsel may seek a further extension of the period for which retention of the records is authorized whenever a previous application has been granted for the maximum period permitted hereunder. \n \n(e) A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if there are any complaints against the lawyer if the matter has been expunged pursuant to this rule. Before making a negative response to any such inquiry, the lawyer shall confirm the expunction of the record and shall not presume that any matter has been expunged. \n \n(f) A lawyer may respond in the negative when asked if he has ever been professionally disciplined or determined to have violated any professional disciplinary rules if all grievances filed against the lawyer have either been dismissed or dismissed with a letter of instruction. \n ","UrlName":"revision224"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24ba975c-fd01-47a2-90c6-a115ce801d66","Title":"Rule 4-225. Jurisdiction","Content":"The State Disciplinary Board and any person who is connected with disciplinary proceedings in any way shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of any court other than the Supreme Court with respect thereto, except as provided in Rules 4-214, 4-215 and 4-216.","UrlName":"rule175","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"803a6c4e-72bb-403c-8840-d5138b9a5ba8","Title":"Rule 4-226. Immunity","Content":"The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the disciplinary proceedings of the State Bar of Georgia to be judicial and quasi-judicial in nature and within the Court’s regulatory function, and in connection with such disciplinary proceedings, members of the State Disciplinary Boards, the Coordinating Special Master, Special Masters, Bar counsel, special prosecutors, investigators, and staff are entitled to those immunities customarily afforded to persons so participating in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings or engaged in such regulatory activities.","UrlName":"rule184","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"25ef804c-3d2b-4ce9-a5ee-0a54d7c00520","ParentId":"803a6c4e-72bb-403c-8840-d5138b9a5ba8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The regulatory proceedings of the State Bar are judicial in nature. Therefore, members of the State Disciplinary Board, members and designees of the Committee on Lawyer Impairment, special masters, Bar counsel, special prosecutors, investigators and staff are entitled to judicial immunity when engaged in regulatory activities.","UrlName":"revision226"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4c187325-b7ad-49a5-b4db-ae05a2dda250","Title":"Rule 4-227. Petitions for Voluntary Discipline","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>A Petition for Voluntary Discipline shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline.</li> \n <li> Prior to the issuance of a formal complaint, a respondent may submit a Petition for Voluntary Discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Those petitions seeking confidential discipline shall be served on the Office of the General Counsel and assigned to a member of the State Disciplinary Board. The State Disciplinary Board shall conduct an investigation and determine whether to accept or reject the petition as outlined at Rule 4-203 (7). </li> \n <li>Those petitions seeking public discipline shall be filed directly with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The Office of the General Counsel shall have 30 days within which to file a response. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> After the issuance of a formal complaint a respondent may submit a Petition for Voluntary Discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond. The Office of the General Counsel may assent to the petition or may file a response, stating objections and giving the reasons therefor. The Office of the General Counsel shall serve a copy of its response upon the respondent.</li> \n <li>The Special Master shall consider the petition, the State Bar of Georgia’s response, and the record as it then exists and may accept or reject the Petition for Voluntary Discipline.</li> \n <li> The Special Master may reject a petition for such cause or causes as seem appropriate to the Special Master. Such causes may include but are not limited to a finding that:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>the petition fails to contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline;</li> \n <li>the petition fails to request appropriate discipline;</li> \n <li>the petition fails to contain sufficient information concerning the admissions of fact and the admissions of conduct;</li> \n <li>the record in the proceeding does not contain sufficient information upon which to base a decision to accept or reject.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>The Special Master’s decision to reject a Petition for Voluntary Discipline does not preclude the filing of a subsequent petition and is not subject to review by the Supreme Court of Georgia. If the Special Master rejects a Petition for Voluntary Discipline, the disciplinary case shall proceed as provided by these Rules.</li> \n <li>The Special Master may accept the Petition for Voluntary Discipline by entering a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law and delivering same to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall file the report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. A copy of the Special Master’s report shall be served upon the respondent. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.</li> \n <li>Pursuant to Rule 4-210 (e), the Special Master may, in his discretion, extend any of the time limits in these Rules in order to adequately consider a Petition for Voluntary Discipline.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule195","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"66b0daa0-6bd1-49f0-99c4-b6c277f7a4ea","ParentId":"4c187325-b7ad-49a5-b4db-ae05a2dda250","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) A petition for voluntary discipline shall contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline. \n \n(b) Prior to the issuance of a formal complaint, a respondent may submit a petition for voluntary discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n \n(1) Those petitions seeking private discipline shall be filed with the Office of the General Counsel and assigned to a member of the Investigative Panel. The Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board shall conduct an investigation and determine whether to accept or reject the petition as outlined at Rule 4-203 (a) (9). \n \n(2) Those petitions seeking public discipline shall be filed directly with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The Office of the General Counsel shall have 30 days within which to file a response. The Court shall issue an appropriate order.\n \n(c) After the issuance of a formal complaint a respondent may submit a petition for voluntary discipline seeking any level of discipline authorized under these Rules.\n \n(1) The petition shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia and copies served upon the Special Master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Special Master shall allow Bar counsel 30 days within which to respond. The Office of the General Counsel may assent to the petition or may file a response, stating objections and giving the reasons therefor. The Office of the General Counsel shall serve a copy of its response upon the respondent. \n \n(2) The Special Master shall consider the petition, the State Bar of Georgia's response, and the record as it then exists and may accept or reject the petition for voluntary discipline. \n \n(3) The Special Master may reject a petition for such cause or causes as seem appropriate to the Special Master. Such causes may include but are not limited to a finding that:\n \n(i) the petition fails to contain admissions of fact and admissions of conduct in violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of these Rules sufficient to authorize the imposition of discipline; \n \n(ii) the petition fails to request appropriate discipline; \n \n(iii) the petition fails to contain sufficient information concerning the admissions of fact and the admissions of conduct; \n \n(iv) the record in the proceeding does not contain sufficient information upon which to base a decision to accept or reject.\n \n(4) The Special Master's decision to reject a petition for voluntary discipline does not preclude the filing of a subsequent petition and is not subject to review by either the Review Panel or the Supreme Court of Georgia. If the Special Master rejects a petition for voluntary discipline, the disciplinary case shall proceed as provided by these Rules. \n \n(5) If the Special Master accepts the petition for voluntary discipline, s/he shall enter a report making findings of fact and conclusions of law and deliver same to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall file the report and the complete record in the disciplinary proceeding with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia. A copy of the Special Master's report shall be served upon the respondent. The Court shall issue an appropriate order. \n \n(6) Pursuant to Rule 4-210 (5), the Special Master may, in his or her discretion, extend any of the time limits in these Rules in order to adequately consider a petition for voluntary discipline. \n ","UrlName":"revision228"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5b65d67a-c560-4dc6-afb7-72db029c7be1","Title":"Rule 4-228. Receiverships","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Definitions.  \n Absent Lawyer: A member of the State Bar of Georgia (or a Domestic or Foreign lawyer authorized to practice law in Georgia) who has disappeared, died, been disbarred, disciplined or incarcerated, become so impaired as to be unable to properly represent clients, or who poses such a substantial threat of harm to clients or the public that it is necessary for the Supreme Court of Georgia to appoint a receiver. </li> \n <li> Appointment of Receiver.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Upon a final determination by the Supreme Court of Georgia, on a petition filed by the State Bar of Georgia, that a lawyer has become an absent lawyer, and that no partner, associate, or other appropriate representative is available to notify his clients of this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia may order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia be appointed as receiver to take charge of the absent lawyer’s files and records. Such receiver shall review the files, notify the absent lawyer’s clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect the interests of the clients and the public. A motion for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by the respondent, his partners, associates, or legal representatives or by the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>If the receiver should encounter, or anticipate, situations or issues not covered by the order of appointment, including but not limited to, those concerning proper procedure and scope of authority, the receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia for such further order or orders as may be necessary or appropriate to address the situation or issue so encountered or anticipated.</li> \n <li>The receiver shall be entitled to release to each client the papers, money, or other property to which the client is entitled. Before releasing the property, the receiver may require a receipt from the client for the property.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Applicability of Lawyer-Client Rules.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>Confidentiality. The receiver shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or, upon application, by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Lawyer-Client Relationship; Privilege. The receiver relationship standing alone does not create a lawyer-client relationship between the receiver and the clients of the absent lawyer. However, the lawyer-client privilege shall apply to communications by or between the receiver and the clients of the absent lawyer to the same extent as it would have applied to communications by or to the absent lawyer.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Trust Account.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>If after appointment the receiver should determine that the absent lawyer maintained one or more trust accounts and that there are no provisions extant that would allow the clients, or other appropriate entities, to receive from the accounts the funds to which they are entitled, the receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for an order extending the scope of the receivership to include the management of the said trust account or accounts. In the event the scope of the receivership is extended to include the management of the trust account or accounts, the receiver shall file quarterly with the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee a report showing the activity in and status of said accounts.</li> \n <li>Service on a bank or financial institution of a copy of the order extending the scope of the receivership to include management of the trust account or accounts shall operate as a modification of any agreement of deposit among such bank or financial institution, the absent lawyer and any other party to the account so as to make the receiver a necessary signatory on any trust account maintained by the absent lawyer with such bank or financial institution. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee, on application by the receiver, may order that the receiver shall be sole signatory on any such account to the extent necessary for the purposes of these Rules and may direct the disposition and distribution of client and other funds.</li> \n <li>In determining ownership of funds in the trust accounts, including by subrogation or indemnification, the receiver should act as a reasonably prudent lawyer maintaining a client trust account. The receiver may (i) rely on a certification of ownership issued by an auditor employed by the receiver; or (ii) interplead any funds of questionable ownership into the appropriate Superior Court; or (iii) proceed under the terms of the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (OCGA § 44-12-190 et seq.). If the absent lawyer’s trust account does not contain sufficient funds to meet known client balances, the receiver may disburse funds on a pro rata basis.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Payment of Expenses of Receiver. \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The receiver shall be entitled to reimbursement for actual and reasonable costs incurred by the receiver for expenses, including, but not limited to, (i) the actual and reasonable costs associated with the employment of accountants, auditors, and bookkeepers as necessary to determine the source and ownership of funds held in the absent lawyer’s trust account, and (ii) reasonable costs of secretarial, postage, bond premiums, and moving and storage expenses associated with carrying out the receiver’s duties. Application for allowance of costs and expenses shall be made by affidavit to the Supreme Court of Georgia, or its designee, who may determine the amount of the reimbursement. The application shall be accompanied by an accounting in a form and substance acceptable to the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be paid to the receiver by the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia may seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a judgment against the absent lawyer or his or her estate in an amount equal to the amount paid by the State Bar of Georgia to the receiver. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the amount, and the burden of proof shall shift to the absent lawyer or his estate to prove otherwise.</li> \n <li>The provision of paragraph (e) (1) above shall apply to all receivers serving on the effective date of this Rule and thereafter.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Receiver-Client Relationship. With full disclosure and the informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0 (l), of any client of the absent lawyer, the receiver may, but need not, accept employment to complete any legal matter. Any written consent by the client shall include an acknowledgment that the client is not obligated to use the receiver.</li> \n <li> Unclaimed Files.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>If upon completion of the receivership there are files belonging to the clients of the absent lawyer that have not been claimed, the receiver shall deliver them to the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia shall store the files for six years, after which time the State Bar of Georgia may exercise its discretion in maintaining or destroying the files.</li> \n <li>If the receiver determines that an unclaimed file contains a Last Will and Testament, the receiver may, but shall not be required to do so, file said Last Will and Testament in the office of the Probate Court in such county as to the receiver may seem appropriate.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Professional Liability Insurance. Only lawyers who maintain errors and omissions insurance, or other appropriate insurance, may be appointed to the position of receiver.</li> \n <li>Requirement of Bond. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee may require the receiver to post bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duties.</li> \n <li> Immunity.\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the actions of the State Bar of Georgia and the appointed receiver to be within the Court’s regulatory function, and being regulatory in nature, the State Bar of Georgia and the receiver are entitled to that immunity customarily afforded to court-appointed receivers.</li> \n <li>The immunity granted in paragraph (j) (1) above shall not apply if the receiver is employed by a client of the absent lawyer to continue the representation.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Service. Service under this Rule may be perfected under Rule 4-203.1.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule570","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"0ae1002e-8cc7-40fe-8558-fd5dd286fbee","ParentId":"5b65d67a-c560-4dc6-afb7-72db029c7be1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a)  Definitions \nAbsent Attorney – a member of the State Bar of Georgia (or a foreign or domestic lawyer authorized to practice law in Georgia) who shall have disappeared, died, become disbarred, disciplined or incarcerated, or become so impaired as to be unable to properly represent his or her clients or as to pose a substantial threat of harm to his or her clients or the public as to justify appointment of a Receiver hereunder by the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(b)  Appointment of Receiver\n(1) Upon a final determination by the Supreme Court of Georgia, on a petition filed by the State Bar of Georgia, that an attorney has become an Absent Attorney, and that no partner, associate or other appropriate representative is available to notify his or her clients of this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia may order that a member or members of the State Bar of Georgia be appointed as Receiver to take charge of the Absent Attorney's files and records. Such Receiver shall review the files, notify the Absent Attorney's clients and take such steps as seem indicated to protect the interests of the clients, and the public. A motion for reconsideration may be taken from the issuance or denial of such protective order by the respondent, his or her partners, associates or legal representatives or by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(2) If the Receiver should encounter, or anticipate, situations or issues not covered by the Order of appointment, including but not limited to, those concerning proper procedure and scope of authority, the Receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for such further order or orders as may be necessary or appropriate to address the situation or issue so encountered or anticipated.\n(3) The receiver shall be entitled to release to each client the papers, money or other property to which the client is entitled. Before releasing the property, the Receiver may require a receipt from the client for the property.\n(c) Applicability of Attorney-Client Rules\n(1) Confidentiality – The Receiver shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in the files and records in his or her care without the consent of the client to whom such file or record relates, except as clearly necessary to carry out the order of the Supreme Court of Georgia or, upon application, by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(2) Attorney-Client Relationship; Privilege – The Receiver relationship standing alone does not create an attorney-client relationship between the Receiver and the clients of the Absent Attorney. However, the attorney-client privilege shall apply to communications by or between the Receiver and the clients of the Absent Attorney to the same extent as it would have applied to communications by or to the Absent Attorney.\n(d)  Trust Account\n(1) If after appointment the Receiver should determine that the Absent Attorney maintained one or more trust accounts and that there are no provisions extant that would allow the clients, or other appropriate entities, to receive from the accounts the funds to which they are entitled, the Receiver may petition the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee for an order extending the scope of the Receivership to include the management of the said trust account or accounts. In the event the scope of the Receivership is extended to include the management of the trust account or accounts, the Receiver shall file quarterly with the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee a report showing the activity in and status of said accounts.\n(2) Service on a bank or financial institution of a copy of the order extending the scope of the Receivership to include management of the trust account or accounts shall operate as a modification of any agreement of deposit among such bank or financial institution, the Absent Attorney and any other party to the account so as to make the Receiver a necessary signatory on any trust account maintained by the Absent Attorney with such bank or financial institution. The Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee, on application by the Receiver, may order that the Receiver shall be sole signatory on any such account to the extent necessary for the purposes of these Rules and may direct the disposition and distribution of client and other funds. \n(3) In determining ownership of funds in the trust accounts, including by subrogation or indemnification, the Receiver should act as a reasonably prudent lawyer maintaining a client trust account. The Receiver may (1) rely on a certification of ownership issued by an auditor employed by the Receiver; or (2) interplead any funds of questionable ownership into the appropriate Superior Court; or (3) proceed under the terms of the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (O.G.C.A. §44-12-190 et seq.).  If the Absent Attorney’s trust account does not contain sufficient funds to meet known client balances, the Receiver may disburse funds on a pro rata basis.\n(e)  Payment of Expenses of Receiver\n(1) The Receiver shall be entitled to reimbursement for actual and reasonable costs incurred by the Receiver for expenses, including, but not limited to, (i) the actual and reasonable costs associated with the employment of accountants, auditors and bookkeepers as necessary to determine the source and ownership of funds held in the Absent Attorney’s trust account, and (ii) reasonable costs of secretarial, postage, bond premiums, and moving and storage expenses associated with carrying out the Receiver’s duties. Application for allowance of costs and expenses shall be made by affidavit to the Supreme Court of Georgia, or its designee, who may determine the amount of the reimbursement. The application shall be accompanied by an accounting in a form and substance acceptable to the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be paid to the Receiver by the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia may seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a judgment against the Absent Attorney or his or her estate in an amount equal to the amount paid by the State Bar of Georgia to the Receiver. The amount of reimbursement as determined by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee shall be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the amount, and the burden of proof shall shift to the Absent Attorney or his or her estate to prove otherwise. \n(2) The provision of paragraph (1) above shall apply to all Receivers serving on the effective date of this Rule and thereafter.\n(f)  Receiver-Client Relationship\nWith full disclosure and the informed consent, as defined in Bar Rule 1.0 (h), of any client of the Absent Attorney, the Receiver may, but need not, accept employment to complete any legal matter. Any written consent by the client shall include an acknowledgment that the client is not obligated to use the Receiver.\n(g) Unclaimed Files\n(1) If upon completion of the Receivership there are files belonging to the clients of the Absent Attorney that have not been claimed, the Receiver shall deliver them to the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia shall store the files for six years, after which time the State Bar of Georgia may exercise its discretion in maintaining or destroying the files.\n(2) If the Receiver determines that an unclaimed file contains a Last Will and Testament, the Receiver may, but shall not be required to do so, file said Last Will and Testament in the office of the Probate Court in such county as to the Receiver may seem appropriate.\n(h)  Professional Liability Insurance\nOnly attorneys who maintain errors and omissions insurance that  includes coverage for conduct as a Receiver may be appointed to the position of Receiver.\n(i) Requirement of Bond\nThe Supreme Court of Georgia or its designee may require the Receiver to post bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his or her duties. \n(j) Immunity\n(1) The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the actions of the State Bar of Georgia and the appointed Receiver to be within the court's judicial and regulatory functions, and being regulatory and judicial in nature, the State Bar of Georgia and Receiver are entitled to judicial immunity. Any person serving as a Receiver under these rules shall be immune from suit for any conduct undertaken in good faith in the course of his or her official duties.\n(2) The immunity granted in paragraph (1) above shall not apply if the Receiver is employed by a client of the Absent Attorney to continue the representation.\n(k) Service\n Service under this Rule may be perfected under Bar Rule 4-203.1. \n ","UrlName":"revision230"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Title":"CHAPTER 3 This Chapter is Reserved","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter27","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"9352c34c-e065-400d-b993-906e86f9970a","Title":"Rule 4-301","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule218","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"30447727-9b59-4979-909e-06676d7b0368","Title":"Rule 4-302","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule219","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bafec039-e06f-478e-9b11-41d0c6c75154","Title":"Rule 4-303","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule221","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e12e2da1-f716-48af-aa0b-7b06c5ad2041","Title":"Rule 4-304","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule225","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"795a5e24-8385-4369-885c-ceeb0b68ae0c","Title":"Rule 4-305","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule228","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"96205185-2293-4cab-b827-3b0d1b523ee4","Title":"Rule 4-306","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule234","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Title":"CHAPTER 4 ADVISORY OPINIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter28","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"6e17c812-cd79-45f4-a404-f95b8e7c29b9","Title":"Rule 4-401. Informal Advisory Opinions","Content":"The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to render Informal Advisory Opinions concerning the Office of the General Counsel's interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Informal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may be issued in oral or written form. An Informal Advisory Opinion is the personal opinion of the issuing attorney of the Office of the General Counsel and is neither a defense to any complaint nor binding on the State Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court of Georgia, or the State Bar of Georgia. If the person requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion desires, the Office of the General Counsel will transmit the Informal Advisory Opinion to the Formal Advisory Opinion Board for discretionary consideration of the drafting of a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.","UrlName":"rule241","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Rule 4-402. The Formal Advisory Opinion Board","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the State Disciplinary Review Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the State Disciplinary Board and State Disciplinary Review Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"rule243","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"d2387df8-46e6-47b7-b689-b77c9f82b987","ParentId":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the Investigative Panel and Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"revision296"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Rule 4-403. Formal Advisory Opinions","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct.</li> \n <li>When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate.</li> \n <li>If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court.</li> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule248","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"174b3a3d-b53f-4ed3-ade3-857d1d6801c6","ParentId":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(b) When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct. \n \n(c) When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(d) After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notificaiton by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate. \n \n(e) If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court. \n \n(f) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions. \n \n(g) The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.","UrlName":"revision110"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"35733557-f94e-4a97-b5d4-2c0e5fa949d4","Title":"Rule 4-404. Immunity","Content":"The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board, as well as staff persons and counsel assisting the Board and its members, including, but not limited to staff counsel, advisors and the State Bar of Georgia, its officers and employees, members of the Executive Committee, and members of the Board of Governors, shall have absolute immunity from civil liability for all acts performed in the course of their official duties. ","UrlName":"rule253","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fa6bc53e-105d-41e9-ad2c-eb8cb682cc1d","Title":"Internal Rules - State Disciplinary Board","Content":"RULES OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE OF THE STATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD\nPursuant to Rule 4-203 (6) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia establishes the following rules of conduct and procedure (“Internal Rules”):\n Rule 1. Powers and Duties.\nThe State Disciplinary Board shall have the powers and perform the duties set forth in Part IV of the Bar Rules.\n Rule 2. Meetings.\nThe Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall establish a meeting schedule for the Board in consultation with the Office of the General Counsel and the members of the Board. The Board may also meet at other times at the request of a majority of its members. Ten members present and voting constitute a quorum. Ex officio members are counted in determining whether a quorum is present at a meeting. The Board may issue reprimands in the absence of a quorum but may not otherwise decide any disciplinary matter unless a quorum is present.\nBoard meetings are generally conducted informally but in accordance with the requirements of Part IV of the Bar Rules. Robert’s Rules of Order govern any procedural matters that are not addressed in the Bar Rules.\n Rule 3. Election of Officers; Powers and Duties.\nPursuant to Bar Rule 4-201 (b) (5), the State Disciplinary Board shall elect a chair and a vice-chair each Bar year at the first meeting after the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia.\nThe chair shall exercise such powers and assume such duties as provided herein and at Bar Rule 4-203. In case of the absence, disqualification or incapacity of the chair, the vice-chair shall assume the duties and powers of the chair. If both the chair and vice-chair are disqualified from consideration of a matter while a meeting is in session, the remaining members of the Board shall vote upon a member to preside over consideration of the matter at issue. In case of disqualification of both the chair and vice-chair when the Panel is not in session, the president-elect of the State Bar of Georgia shall designate another member of the Board to preside over consideration of the matter at issue.\n Rule 4. Initiation of Grievances; Duties and Powers of the Office of the General Counsel.\n \t (a)\t All grievances against members of the State Bar of Georgia shall be in written memorandum form. Grievances other than those initiated by the State Disciplinary Board shall be signed by the complainant. The State Disciplinary Board shall annually approve the Memorandum of Grievance form.\n \t (b)\t The Office of the General Counsel shall review and screen each Memorandum of Grievance pursuant to Bar Rule 4-202 and shall report to the Board at each meeting the number of grievances it has dismissed since the previous meeting. The Office of the General Counsel shall maintain the file of each dismissed grievance until it is expunged pursuant to Bar Rule 4-224 (a) (1) or (2).\n Rule 5. Evaluation of Grievances; Selection of Investigating Member.\nPursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign cases for investigation by individual lawyer members of the Board. Such assignment shall be in the sound discretion of the Clerk, except that no assignment shall be made to the president-elect of the State Bar of Georgia, the president-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, or the chair of the Board without that member’s prior approval.\n Rule 6. Investigation by the State Disciplinary Board.\n \t (a)\t The investigation of a grievance assigned to a member of the State Disciplinary Board shall be within that member’s exclusive jurisdiction. No other member of the Board shall enter the investigation of the case or engage either the complainant or respondent in communication concerning the investigation without the express prior authorization of the investigating member.\n \t (b)\t The investigating member is encouraged to attempt communication with both the respondent and the complainant as part of the investigation.\n \t (c)\t The investigating member should complete investigation of a matter within 180 days of service of the Notice of Investigation in the case. A member is expected to request an extension and provide an explanation to the rest of the Board when an investigation will take more than 180 days.\n \t (d)\t The investigating Board member is encouraged to report to the full Board when a respondent’s answer is more than 30 days past due so that the matter may be considered for imposition of an interim suspension pursuant to Rule 4-204.3.\n \t (e)\t The Office of the General Counsel will assign each Board member an investigator to assist with the investigation. Board members may also request assistance from other staff of the Office of the General Counsel when investigating files.\n Rule 7. Report of the Investigating Member.\nAt each meeting of the State Disciplinary Board members shall report those cases in which the investigation is complete. The investigating member shall describe his or her findings and make a recommendation regarding disposition of the case. Board members who are not able to attend a meeting may provide a written report and recommendation to be presented to the Board in their absence.\nThe Office of the General Counsel shall provide a copy of the entire investigative file or any portion thereof to any Board member upon request.\n Rule 8. Investigation of Petitions for Voluntary Discipline.\n \t (a)\t If a respondent files a petition seeking confidential discipline in a matter pending at the screening stage, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall assign the matter to a member of the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 4-227. The Office of the General Counsel may file a response to the petition with the investigating member.\n \t (b)\t If a respondent files a petition seeking confidential discipline in a matter pending before the State Disciplinary Board, the petition shall be served on both the investigating Board member and the Office of the General Counsel. The member may continue the investigation and the Office of the General Counsel may file a response to the petition with the investigating member.\n \t (c)\t The investigating member shall report to the State Disciplinary Board on the petition for voluntary discipline and the Office of the General Counsel’s response, and make a recommendation regarding acceptance or rejection of the petition for voluntary discipline.\n Rule 9. Original Documents.\nOriginal documents and other information obtained during the investigation shall be delivered to the Office of the General Counsel following the completion of the member’s investigation.\n Rule 10. Expedited Treatment for Certain Cases.\nAfter the State Disciplinary Board has found probable cause for filing a formal complaint, any member may move that the case be given expedited treatment under the circumstances outlined at Rule 4-108 regarding emergency suspensions.\n Rule 11. Challenges to the Competency, Qualifications or Objectivity of State Disciplinary Board Members.\n \t (a)\t A respondent lawyer shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Board. Within 10 days after service of the Notice of Investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204.1, the respondent lawyer shall deliver to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards written objection to the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Board. The objection shall set forth the factual basis for the challenge. The challenged member may answer the respondent lawyer’s objection in writing and shall deliver the answer to the respondent lawyer and the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. At a regularly scheduled meeting prior to consideration of the case the Board shall consider the objection. The affirmative vote of three members shall be sufficient to sustain the objection.\n \t (b)\t Any member of the Board may decline to participate when the Board considers a grievance.\n Rule 12. Notification to Complainants.\nThe State Disciplinary Board shall notify the complainant or complainants of the disposition of all grievances considered by the Board.\n Rule 13. Violation of Criminal Statute.\nIf the charge against a respondent lawyer amounts to a possible violation of a criminal statute, the State Disciplinary Board may direct the Office of the General Counsel to refer the matter to the appropriate authority for criminal prosecution and the Board may defer any further action to await the disposition of any criminal charges.\n Rule 14. Appearances Before the State Disciplinary Board.\nThe State Disciplinary Board does not permit personal appearances before the Board at meetings, except as otherwise specifically provided in these Rules. Any presentations to the Board should be by brief, memorandum or in other written form unless otherwise decided by a majority vote of the Board members present at a meeting at which a personal appearance is requested.\n Rule 15. Chair’s Review of Screening Decisions.\nWhen requested to do so by the complainant, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board shall have discretionary authority to review a decision of the Office of the General Counsel to dismiss a grievance. If the Chair agrees with the decision to dismiss the grievance, the complainant shall be notified of that decision in writing. If the Chair disagrees with the decision to dismiss the grievance, the grievance shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for further investigation pursuant to Rules 4-204 ff.\n Rule 16. Reconsideration.\nThe Office of the General Counsel, the complainant or the respondent may request reconsideration of the Board’s decision in a matter at any time before a Formal Complaint is filed in the Supreme Court. The investigating member may review the request and decide if the matter should be presented to the entire Board. If the investigating member is no longer on the Board, the Chair may review the request.\n Rule 17. Removal of Board Members.\n \t (a)\t Any State Disciplinary Board member who is absent from either three consecutive meetings or any four meetings in a bar year shall be considered for removal from the Board. The Board shall take the matter up in Executive Session and shall remove the member unless the Board determines, by majority vote, that bona fide, unavoidable reasons exist for some or all of the absences, and that such Board member is not in violation of the case time limits set forth in sub-paragraph (b).\n \t (b)\t Any Board member who fails to meet the deadlines for reporting a case or obtaining an extension as outlined at Rule 6 (c) may be considered for removal from the Board. At the next meeting following said occurrence, the Board may consider the matter in Executive Session to determine whether bona fide, unavoidable reasons exist for the delay and whether the member has met the attendance requirements set forth in subparagraph (a). Cases in which the Supreme Court of Georgia has entered an order imposing an Interim Suspension are excluded from this rule.\n \t (c)\t The Board member being considered for removal shall not vote on the issue of removal and shall not be present during the Board’s deliberation and vote. The Board member under consideration may address the Board in writing, or personally, prior to the Board’s deliberation and vote.\n \t (d)\t The failure of a Board member to comply with any of the provisions of this Rule shall not affect the resolution of any case by the Board and shall not operate as a defense to the Board’s ruling.\n \t (e)\t The vacancy created by any Board member who is removed from the State Disciplinary Board under the provisions of this Rule shall be filled as outlined at Rule 4-201 (b) (3).\n Rule 18. Pending Litigation.\nIn those grievances where there is related litigation pending, the Board may, in its discretion, defer action on the matter until the litigation is completed.\n Rule 19. Disqualification.\nNo member of the State Disciplinary Board shall represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding. If a Board member’s partners or associates represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding, then the Board member is automatically recused from any participation in the investigation, discussion or determination of the disciplinary proceeding.\n Rule 20. Reimbursement of Expenses\nMembers of the State Disciplinary Board may be reimbursed for expenses as follows:\n \t (a)\t Transportation. Members may be reimbursed at the maximum tax free rate permitted by the IRS for automobile travel (currently $0.545) to and from meetings of the Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will calculate the appropriate amount for each meeting using the Board member’s home or work address (as designated by the Board member) and the address of the meeting location, and will submit a request for reimbursement at the member’s request. Although members are encouraged to carpool, only the member providing the vehicle will be approved for reimbursement.\nOther forms of transportation (including flights and rental car expenses) will not be reimbursed, but a member who elects to rent a car or fly to a meeting may receive the mileage reimbursement that would have been due had the member driven a personal vehicle. \nTolls and any cost for parking at a meeting site may be reimbursed at the actual rate. Valet parking expenses will only be reimbursed when self-parking is not available.\nTransportation rates may be adjusted or capped for meetings that take place outside of Georgia. At least 20 days before any out-of-state meeting the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will notify members of the mileage reimbursement for the meeting.\n \t (b)\t Meals. If meals are not provided during the meeting at the Bar’s expense, the State Bar of Georgia will provide a per diem at the same rate as the federal per diem rate for the location where the meeting is held. See https://www.gsa.gov/travel/plan-book/per-diem-rates/meals-and-incidental-expenses-mie-breakdown for a current list of reimbursement amounts for meals and incidentals. The Clerk will advise members of the applicable per diem before each meeting. Section (d) below contains special rules for the meal expenses of lay members of the Board who attend the Bar’s Annual Meeting.\n \t (c)\t Lodging. The Bar shall reimburse the actual cost of hotel sleeping rooms at the group rate obtained by the Bar. The maximum reimbursement to a Board member who elects to stay at a facility other than the designated hotel is the Bar rate. Reimbursement is limited to one night before the meeting, except for meetings that occur in conjunction with a State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors meeting, which shall qualify for two nights’ reimbursement. Members will not be reimbursed if they obtain lodging at no cost to themselves; i.e., for stays with friends or at the expense of others.\n \t (d)\t Annual Meeting – Special Rules for Lay Members. Lay members may receive a total of four nights of per diem and lodging reimbursement for the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. Lay members may receive two tickets for the group dinner events held as part of the meeting, including the Opening Reception, YLD Dinner, and the Presidential Gala. The usual per diem described in Section 2 will otherwise apply to lay member meals during the Annual Meeting. \n \t (e)\t Other expenses. Members may request reimbursement for copying, postage or other expenses related to their investigation with prior notice to the Clerk. Receipts are required for expenditures over $25.\n \t (f)\t Procedure for reimbursement. After each meeting, the Clerk of the Boards will send an email to every Board member asking whether the member will request reimbursement for the meeting. In order to receive reimbursement, a member must respond to the Clerk’s email and make a request within 30 days of the date of the meeting. The Clerk will provide forms for requesting reimbursement via email.\n \t (g)\t Waivers. The General Counsel may waive the requirements of this Rule for good cause.\n<div></div>","UrlName":"part5","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f6fa205f-16f1-432d-b171-9c3877eb4892","Title":"Internal Rules - State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":" RULES OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE OF THE STATE DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD\nPursuant to the powers and duties accorded it in Rule 4-215 (c) in Part IV of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, the State Disciplinary Review Board of the State Bar of Georgia establishes the following Rules of Conduct and Procedure. (Approved January 11, 2019.)\n Rule 1. Oaths of Office.\nMembers of the State Disciplinary Review Board shall, upon their selection, sign the oath of office. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards will preserve the oaths in the records of the State Bar of Georgia at State Bar Headquarters.\n Rule 2. Powers and Duties.\nThe State Disciplinary Review Board shall have such powers and perform such duties as are set forth in Part IV of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Rule 3. Meetings.\nThe State Disciplinary Review Board shall meet at such times and places as may be set by the Board. The Review Board shall also meet at other times on the call of the chair of the Review Board.\n Rule 4. Election of Offices; Powers and Duties.\nAt the first meeting of the Review Board subsequent to the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia, the members of the Review Board shall elect a chair and a vice-chair. The chair shall preside at all meetings of the Review Board and shall serve until a successor is elected or the chair’s term on the Review Board expires.\nThe chair shall also exercise such powers and assume such duties as are hereinafter provided. In case of the absence, disqualification or incapacity of the chair, the vice-chair shall assume the duties and powers of the chair. In case of a disqualification of both the chair and vice-chair, the members of the Review Board shall elect another member of the Board to preside over consideration of the matter at issue.\n Rule 5. Original Pleadings.\nOriginal pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Bar Rule 4-221 (b). Bar Counsel and the respondent lawyer shall be responsible for serving copies of all pleadings on the special master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The original pleadings shall be maintained at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia by the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards until the Clerk files the record in the case with the Supreme Court pursuant to Bar Rule 4-216 (e).\n Rule 6.  Review of the Report of the Special Master.\n(a) If a party requests review by the Review Board pursuant to Rule 4-214 (c), the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards or a designee of the Clerk shall cause copies of the report of the special master and the complete record in the case to be delivered to the members of the Review Board. The Clerk shall transmit the record after the exceptions and the opposing party’s response to the exceptions have been filed, or within 10 days after the time for the response has expired. Pursuant to Rule 4-216 (a), the Review Board shall consider the record, review the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the special master, consider the exceptions and responses filed by the parties, and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court.\n(b) At the time the report of the special master and the record in the case are transmitted to the Board members, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall notify the Respondent in writing of his or her right under Bar Rule 4-216(b) to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any Board member. The procedure for filing such a challenge is set forth in Rule 9 of these Rules.\n(c) In disciplinary proceedings initiated prior to July 1, 2018, the Review Board may grant rehearings or new trials either before itself or before a special master on such issues and within such times as appear to it appropriate to serve the ends of justice. A majority vote of the members present shall be sufficient to order a rehearing or new trial except that there may be no de novo hearing before the Review Board without the unanimous vote of the members present.\n(d) The Review Board may in its discretion grant oral argument. Either party may request oral argument by filing such request with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards within 15 days of transmission of the record, including exceptions and responses to exceptions, to the Review Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall notify the chair of the Review Board upon the filing of a request for oral argument. A subcommittee consisting of the chair, vice-chair and the reviewing Board member shall review the request and shall decide the issue at least 10 days prior to the meeting of the Board at which the case will be considered, and shall notify the parties of the subcommittee’s decision. Any decision denying oral argument shall be subject to review by the entire Review Board.\n Rule 7.  Report to the Supreme Court and Recommendation of Discipline.\nAfter completion of its review of the final report of the special master, or review of a disciplinary proceeding, the Review Board shall prepare a report and recommendation to the Supreme Court. The Review Board may delegate responsibility for the preparation of its report to any member of the Board or to either party.\nThe chairperson of the Review Board shall file the report of the Board with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards and serve a copy of the report on the parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Clerk shall file the report and the complete record with the Supreme Court pursuant to Bar Rule 4-216 (e).\n Rule 8. Preparation of Reprimands.\nUpon final judgment of a Review Board reprimand by the Supreme Court, the chair of the Review Board shall cause to be prepared a written reprimand. The chair may delegate responsibility for preparing written reprimands to the Office of the General Counsel or any Board member, but such written reprimand shall be reviewed and approved by the chair prior to administration to the respondent lawyer.\nThe chair or a designee shall administer the Review Board reprimand at a subsequent meeting of the Review Board. The chair shall be authorized to compel the attendance of the respondent lawyer by subpoena.\n Rule 9.  Challenges to the Competency, Qualifications or Objectivity of Review Board.\n(a) The respondent lawyer shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member of the Review Board considering a disciplinary proceeding against him or her. Within 10 days after the special master’s report or a Notice of Reciprocal Discipline is transmitted to the Review Board, the respondent lawyer may file written objection to the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member or members of the Review Board setting forth a specific factual basis for the challenge. The respondent lawyer shall file a copy of the challenge with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board, and serve a copy of the challenge upon each member of the Review Board and upon the Office of the General Counsel.\nThe challenged member may answer the respondent lawyer’s challenge in writing, at his or her option, but is not required to do so. Any such written answer shall be served on the remaining members of the Review Board, the respondent lawyer and the Office of the General Counsel.\nThe challenged member may also respond to the challenge orally at the next meeting of the Review Board.\nAt its next meeting, the Review Board shall consider the objection and any response. The affirmative vote of three members that the challenged member should be excluded shall be sufficient to sustain the challenge.\n(b) Any member of the Review Board shall have the right to withdraw voluntarily from consideration of any complaint in which his or her competency, qualifications or objectivity are challenged by the respondent lawyer.\n Rule 10. Removal of Board Members.\nAny Review Board member who is absent from either three (3) consecutive Review Board meetings or any four meetings in a bar year, shall be removed from the Review Board. The vacancy shall be filled by appointment pursuant to Rule 4-201.1 (b) (3).\n Rule 11.  Disqualification.\nNo member of the Review Board shall represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding. If a Review Board member’s partners or associates represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding, then the Board member is automatically recused from determination, investigation, or review regarding the case during all phases of the disciplinary proceeding.\n Rule 12. Petitions for Reinstatement.\nIn the event the Supreme Court orders a respondent to file a petition for reinstatement with the Review Board for review and recommendation, the petition for reinstatement shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards in accordance with Bar Rule 4-221(b). The Office of the General Counsel shall have 20 days after service of the petition to respond. When all responses and reports have been filed, the record shall be delivered to the Review Board by the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards.\n Rule 13. Reimbursement of Expenses.\nMembers of the Disciplinary Review Board may be reimbursed for expenses as follows:\n(a) Transportation. Members may be reimbursed at the maximum tax free rate permitted by the IRS for automobile travel to and from meetings of the Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will calculate the appropriate amount for each meeting using the Board member’s home or work address (as designated by the Board member) and the address of the meeting location, and will submit a request for reimbursement at the member’s request. Although members are encouraged to carpool, only the member providing the vehicle will be approved for reimbursement.\nOther forms of transportation (including flights and rental car expenses) will not be reimbursed, but a member who elects to rent a car or fly to a meeting may receive the mileage reimbursement that would have been due had the member driven a personal vehicle.\nTolls and any cost for parking at a meeting site may be reimbursed at the actual rate. Valet parking expenses will only be reimbursed when self-parking is not available.\nTransportation rates may be adjusted or capped for meetings that take place outside of Georgia. At least 20 days before any out-of-state meeting the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will notify members of the mileage reimbursement for the meeting.\n(b) Meals. If meals are not provided during the meeting at the Bar’s expense, the State Bar of Georgia will provide a per diem at the same rate as the federal per diem rate for the location where the meeting is held. See https://www.gsa.gov/travel/plan-book/per-diem-rates/meals-and-incidental-expenses-mie-breakdown for a current list of reimbursement amounts for meals and incidentals. The Clerk will advise members of the applicable per diem before each meeting. Section (d) below contains special rules for the meal expenses of lay members of the Board who attend the Bar’s Annual Meeting.\n(c) Lodging. The Bar shall reimburse the actual cost of hotel sleeping rooms at the group rate obtained by the Bar. The maximum reimbursement to a Board member who elects to stay at a facility other than the designated hotel is the Bar rate. Reimbursement is limited to one night before the meeting, except for meetings that occur in conjunction with a State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors meeting, which shall qualify for two nights’ reimbursement. Members will not be reimbursed if they obtain lodging at no cost to themselves; i.e., for stays with friends or at the expense of others.\n(d) Annual Meeting. Special Rules for Lay Members. Lay members may receive a total of four nights of per diem and lodging reimbursement for the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. Lay members may receive two tickets for the group dinner events held as part of the meeting, including the Opening Reception, YLD Dinner, and the Presidential Gala. The usual per diem described in Section 2 will otherwise apply to lay member meals during the Annual Meeting.\n(e) Other expenses. Members may request reimbursement for copying, postage or other expenses related to their investigation with prior notice to the Clerk. Receipts are required for expenditures over $25.\n(f) Transportation. Procedure for reimbursement. After each meeting, the Clerk of the Boards will send an email to every Board member asking whether the member will request reimbursement for the meeting. In order to receive reimbursement, a member must respond to the Clerk’s email and make a request within 30 days of the date of the meeting. The Clerk will provide forms for requesting reimbursement via email.\n(g) Waivers. The General Counsel may waive the requirements of this Rule for good cause.\n","UrlName":"part7","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"776a56f9-1936-4b66-a139-84b9fd2cccf2","Title":"Rules of the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards","Content":" Rules of the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards\n (Effective date 10/4/2021) \n Rule 1. Office of the Clerk.\n In accordance with Bar Rule <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule156\">4-221 (b)</a> , pleadings or documents in disciplinary cases pending before a special master shall be filed with Office of the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards of the State Bar of Georgia. In lieu of delivering original pleadings to the Clerk for filing, you may e-file in accordance with Rule 3 (a) of these Rules.\n Rule 2. Hours.\nFilings and communications relating to cases shall be directed to the Clerk’s office during office hours. The Clerk’s office is open from 8:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. whenever the State Bar of Georgia is open for business. The telephone number for the Clerk’s office is (404) 527-8721.\n \n Rule 3. Filing.\n (a)\t E-Filing\n Attorneys are highly encouraged to file documents electronically. Pleadings or documents shall be submitted for filing through the State Disciplinary Board E- Filing System <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/SDB-eFiling.cfm/">here . E-filings received by 11:59 p.m. EDT/EST will be considered filed on that date. Only proper pleadings will be accepted for filing. See Rules 5 and 6.\n (b)\t Conventional Paper Filing\nThough e-filing is strongly preferred, paper pleadings or documents may be mailed or delivered to the Clerk’s Office for filing. A document or pleading will be filed when actually received by or delivered to the Clerk’s Office during the days and times the Clerk’s Office is open. A document transmitted by priority, express, or first-class (including certified or registered) mail via the United States Postal Service, or by a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards within three days, shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the official postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service (not a private or commercial postage meter) or the commercial carrier’s transmittal form on the envelope or package containing the document, but only if the envelope or package is properly addressed, postage is prepaid, and the postmark or transmittal date is legible.\n Rule 4. Docket Numbers.\nPleadings or other documents shall bear the appropriate State Disciplinary Board docket number. If a pleading lists more than one State Disciplinary Board docket number, the pleading should be electronically filed in each docket number listed.\n Rule 5. Discovery Documents.\n As provided in Bar Rule <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule156\">4-221(b)</a> , depositions and other original discovery shall not be filed, except in accordance with the Uniform Superior Court Rules.\n Rule 6. Certificate of Service.\nThe parties shall serve copies on opposing parties and the special master, and on counsel for the State Disciplinary Review Board where appropriate, pursuant to the Georgia Civil Practice Act. All pleadings must bear a signed certificate of service, showing service on all parties and on the special master. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards will not file a pleading that does not have an executed certificate of service.\n Rule 7. Filing of Record in the Supreme Court.\n Once the record of a disciplinary proceeding is filed with the Supreme Court in accordance with Bar Rule <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule98\">4-106 (e)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule53\">4-214 (c)</a> or <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule143\">4-216 (e)</a> , subsequent pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and directed to the Court. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards will not file any pleading after the record has been transmitted to the Supreme Court.\n Rule 8. Changes to these Rules.\nThe Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards may amend these Rules at any time consistent with Part IV of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and Enforcement Thereof.","UrlName":"part6","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Title":"Advisory Opinions ","Content":"","UrlName":"hasa3","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"2168028f-f1d0-4bc9-af01-a5b617a0655f","Title":"Internal Rules - Formal Advisory Opinion Board","Content":" FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD INTERNAL OPERATING RULES OF PROCEDURE \n(As Amended on April 25, 2023) \n \nRule 1. Meetings \n \n(a) The Chair or Vice-chair of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (\"Board \") shall determine when and where the meetings of the Board shall occur. \n(b) The Chair shall preside over all meetings of the Board and shall serve until a successor is elected (see Rule 12 below). \n(c) All Board business, including voting on opinions, may be conducted by telephone, e-mail, or other electronic communication device. \n(d) Board members may attend meetings by telephone or other electronic communication device. \n(e) In case of the absence, incapacity, or disqualification of the Chair, the Vice-chair shall assume the duties and powers of the Chair.  If both the Chair and Vice-chair are absent or incapacitated, or disqualified from consideration of a matter while a meeting is in session, the remaining members of the Board shall vote upon a member to preside over the meeting or the consideration of the matter at issue. \n \nRule 2. Quorum Requirement \n \nA majority of the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum. \n \n Rule 2A. Voting Requirements \n \n(a) Regular Business - Subject to sub-paragraph (b) below, a majority of the members of the Board present and voting shall be required to transact the business of the Board. \n(b) Publication under Bar Rule 4-403 (d) - The affirmative vote of not less than five (5) members of the Board shall be required in order to submit opinions for second publication under Bar Rule 4-403 (d). \n \nRule 3. Preliminary Determination of Whether Opinion Should Be Drafted \n \nWhen the Office of the General Counsel receives a request for a Formal Advisory Opinion, the request shall be forwarded to each member of the Board and placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Board for preliminary determination of whether a proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. \n \nRule 4. Assignment of Research and Drafting to Board Members \n \nThe Chair of the Board shall have complete discretion in assigning requests for Formal Advisory Opinions to members of the Board for researching and drafting proposed opinions. The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia will provide staff assistance in researching and drafting opinions upon request by the Board members assigned to draft a proposed opinion. \n \nRule 5. Comments \n \n(a) Any comment to a proposed Formal Advisory Opinion filed pursuant to Rule 4-403 (c) shall be filed with the Board through the Office of the General Counsel within thirty (30) days of the date that the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia. \n(b) There shall be filed a minimum number of one copy of any comment pursuant to Rule 4-403 (c) in order for the comment to be considered by the Board. \n(c) A copy of the petition for discretionary review filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia pursuant to Rule 4-403 (d) must be simultaneously served upon the Board through the Office of the General Counsel. \n(d) Any comment submitted to the Board pursuant to Rule 4-403 (c) is for the Board's internal use in assessing proposed opinions and shall not be released unless the comment has been submitted to the Supreme Court of Georgia in compliance with Bar Rule 4-403 (d). \n \nRule 6. Operating Guidelines \n \n(a) Upon receipt of a request for a Formal Advisory Opinion, the Office of the General Counsel will assign a file number to the request. \n(b) The Office of the General Counsel will transmit the request to the Board. \n(c) The request will be placed on the agenda of the next Board meeting. The Board should make a determination at the meeting as to whether a formal opinion will be drafted. \n(d) At the same meeting, or immediately thereafter, the Board will assign the request to a Board member for the drafting of a proposed opinion. \n(e) The draft opinion should be prepared and transmitted by the drafter to the members of the Board at least one week prior to the next scheduled meeting of the Board. Address labels will be supplied by the Office of the General Counsel for this purpose. \n(f) At the option of the drafter, the draft opinion will be distributed by the Office of the General Counsel at least ten (10) days prior to the next scheduled meeting of the Board. \n(g) At the meeting, the Board will adopt, reject, or revise the opinion. \n(h) Upon adoption, the opinion will be edited for style and published for comment as provided in Bar Rule 4-403 (c). \n(i) As long as the Board complies with Bar Rules, it may take any action it deems necessary to insure that the opinions continue to provide an accurate interpretation of the Bar's ethical rules. \n \nRule 7. Confidentiality \n \n(a) The name of the lawyer making the request will be held confidential unless the lawyer otherwise elects as provided in Bar Rule 4-403 (g). \n(b) The name of the Board member who has been assigned to draft a proposed opinion will be held confidential unless the Board otherwise elects by majority vote. \n(c) All inquiries regarding Formal Advisory Opinions being considered by the Board should be forwarded to the Chair or Vice Chair. \n \nRule 8. E-Mail Voting Procedure \n \nIt is best that the Board meets and holds live discussions as often as possible. However, the Board, in its discretion, may discuss and vote on matters regarding formal advisory opinions by e-mail, rather than at a meeting of the Board. Matters shall be provided to each member of the Board by e-mail, along with a message directing the Board to participate in a discussion by e-mail. The Board Chair determines when the discussion period will end and call for a vote on the matter. At any time, however, any Board member has \"veto power,\"which allows him or her to call for a \"live discussion.\" \n \nRule 9. Presentations to the Board \n \nPresentations to the Board shall be in writing unless oral presentation is permitted in specific cases by the Board. \n \nRule 10. Attendance at Board Meetings \n \nOnly Board members and Office of the General Counsel staff shall be permitted to attend a Formal Advisory Opinion Board meeting during the deliberations of the Board. \n \nRule 11. Contact with the Press \n \nBoard members may be contacted by members of the press regarding opinions and other Board matters. If contacted, Board members must refrain from communicating with the press and immediately contact the Director of the State Bar's Communications Department at 404-527-8761. In compliance with State Bar policy, all inquiries from the press go through the Communications Department to be routed to the appropriate person.\n Rule 12.  Election of Board Officers\n (a) Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-402 (d), the Board will annually elect a Chair and Vice-chair at the first meeting of the Board after July 1 of each year.  At that meeting, the election of the Chair will take place before the election of the Vice-chair.  \n(b) Any Board member may nominate themselves to serve as Chair or Vice-chair. \n(c) The newly elected Chair and Vice-chair term of office will begin at the adjournment of the meeting at which they were elected. \n<div></div>","UrlName":"part10","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0c0141bb-2965-4014-8518-d22f8a1cd496","Title":"Topical Index","Content":" IMPORTANT NOTE: The Index IS NOT, and should not be regarded as, ethics authority.  It is a guide for the convenience of lawyers researching ethics questions.  In many cases the Opinion addresses issues not mentioned in the Index summary.  Before taking action in a given situation, reference should be made to the full text of the Advisory Opinion mentioned in the Index. \n \nReferences to opinions designated \"SDB No. ____,\"are to advisory opinions issued by the State Disciplinary Board under the process by which advisory opinions were issued prior to the present <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule248\">Rule 4-403</a> being adopted. \n \nReferences to \"FAO No. _____,\"are to formal advisory opinions that were drafted by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and issued either by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board or the Supreme Court of Georgia pursuant to <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule248\">Rule 4-403</a> .  Reference the full text of the Advisory Opinion mentioned in the Index to determine by whom the opinion was issued. \n \nTOPICAL INDEX\n \nADVANCE FEES, see ATTORNEY'S FEES and RETAINER FEES \n \nADVERTISING \n      --Nonlawyer's business card must indicate that they are not a lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n      --An attorney may communicate to other attorneys his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law so long as the communication is accurate and not misleading.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n      --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\" \n<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> \n      --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n \nALIMONY \n      --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n \nAPPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY \n      --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \nATTORNEY'S FEES \n   Advance Fees Paid to Attorney \n      --A lawyer is not required to place attorney's fees paid in advance into a trust account except under special circumstances.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a> \n      --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> and does not violate <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule\">Rule 1.5(a)'s</a> requirement of reasonableness.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n   Advance Payment Made by an Attorney to a Client for Certain Expenses \n      --A third party beneficiary or his or her attorney may advance or reimburse an insured for the purchase of optional PIP coverage.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">SDB No. 46</a> \n      --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n   Collection, see COLLECTION \n   Contingency, see CONTINGENCY FEES \n   Division of Fees, see FEE SHARING and FEE SPLITTING \n   Fee Collection Program \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program that purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n   Interest \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --Considerations applicable to payment of interest charged on a loan obtained to cover advances on litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n  Paid by Opponent \n      --Ethical propriety of attorney's fees being paid by opposing side.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a> \n   Reasonableness \n      --Ethical propriety of including attorney's fees as part of a settlement offer in federal civil rights cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a> \n      --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n      --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n      --Where drafter of will or trust serves as executor or trustee, total combined attorney's fee and executor or trustee fee must be reasonable.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n      --A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a> \n      --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) and does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n   Retainers, see RETAINER FEES \n   Security Interest \n     --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n   Sharing Fees, see FEE SHARING \n   Splitting Fees, see FEE SPLITTING \n  Unpaid Fees \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --May a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a> \n   Worker's Compensation Cases \n      --Attorney must advise their client of his or her right to independent counsel if the attorney appeals award of fees granted by the Workman's Compensation Board. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a> \n \nATTORNEY'S LIEN \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n \nBAD CHECKS \n      --Attorney may send statutory notice to drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Georgia Code Ann. §26-1704. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a> \n \nBUSINESS CARD \n      --Nonlawyer's business card must indicate that they are not a lawyer. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n      --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> \n \nCHILD SUPPORT \n      --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n \nCITY COUNCIL \n      --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n      --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \nCLIENT FUNDS, also see TRUST ACCOUNTS \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nCLIENT PAPERS, also see FILES \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\"> FAO No. 93-4 \n </a> \nCLOSING \n      --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3</a> \n      --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n      --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nCOLLECTION \n      --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by that client to collect a debt. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program which purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n      --May a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a> \n \nCOMMUNICATION \n      --An attorney may communicate to other attorneys his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law so long as the communication is accurate and not misleading. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> \n      --Attorney may send statutory notice to drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Georgia Code Ann. §26-1704. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of attorney's fees being paid by opposing side. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a> \n      --Ethical obligation of attorney to resist disclosure of name and/or identity of his client. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a> \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n      --Permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A § 51-12-14 to an unrepresented adverse party, but must specifically state that it is a notice rather than advice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a> \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n      --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n      --A staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group may contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of non-clients and clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a> \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n      --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n      --A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> \n      --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\"> FAO No. 16-3 \n </a> --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> \n \n COMPETENCE \n --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel’s fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm’s clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as “special counsel” for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter Into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>\n CONFIDENTIALITY \n     --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of revealing confidences and secrets necessary to defend against charges of professional misconduct.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule474\">SDB No. 27</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of attorney to resist disclosure of name and/or identity of his client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a> \n     --Under certain circumstances, an attorney may reveal a client's intent to commit suicide.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule486\">SDB No. 42</a> \n     --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program that purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical considerations of a law firm interested in obtaining a loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --May a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n     --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n \nCONFLICTS OF INTEREST \n   Claims and Complaints \n      --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n   Criminal Cases \n      --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n   Domestic Relations \n      --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n   Independent Professional Judgment \n      --Ethical propriety of attorney's fees being paid by opposing side.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a> \n      --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program that purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n      --While it may be possible to do so, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a> \n      --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n      --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n      --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n   Insurance Practice \n      -- Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a> \n      -- Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n   Law Clerks \n      --A law clerk for a superior court judge may not write appellate briefs on behalf of criminal defendants in death penalty cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n   Malpractice Claims, see MALPRACTICE \n   Multi-Firm Employment \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n   Multiple Representation \n      --Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n    Of Counsel \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n   Private Interest v. Public Duty \n     --County Commissioner may not appoint his or her own firm, or a partner in his or her own firm, as County Attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No. 16</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n   Real Estate Transactions \n      --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n   Referrals \n      --While it may be possible to do so, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a> \n   Settlement \n      --Ethical propriety of including attorney's fees as part of settlement offer in federal civil rights cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a> \n      --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n   Temporary/Contract Attorneys \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n   Wills and Trusts \n      --Drafter of will or trust may serve as the executor or trustee even though the lawyer's independent professional judgment may be affected, provided the client consent after full disclosure.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a> \n  Workers' Compensation Cases \n      --Attorney must advise their client of his or her right to independent counsel if the attorney appeals award of fees granted by the Workman's Compensation Board.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a> \n \nCONSULTANT \n      --An attorney may communicate to other attorneys his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law so long as the communication is accurate and not misleading.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> \n      --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n \nCONTINGENCY FEES \n      --Guidelines for payment of expert witness fees in contingency fee cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a> \n      --A contingency fee arrangement in a divorce case is against public policy and is therefore improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=479\%22>SDB No. 36</a> \n      --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n      --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n \nCORPORATE COUNSEL \n      --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n     --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> \n \nCOUNTY ATTORNEY \n     --County Commissioner may not appoint his or her own firm, or a partner in his or her own firm, as County Attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No. 16</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n \nCRIMINAL PRACTICE \n     --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n     --Attorney may send statutory notice to drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Georgia Code Ann. §26-1704.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n \nDEPARTING ATTORNEY \n     --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n     --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>\n DILIGENCE \n      --Not improper for atorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n      --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact of active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicatble ethics rules. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n       --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n      --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nDISCOVERY \n     --Guidelines for use of subpoenas. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO 05-10</a> \n \nDISQUALIFICATION \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n      --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n \nDISTRICT ATTORNEYS, see PROSECUTORS \n \nDOMESTIC RELATIONS \n     --A contingency fee arrangement in a divorce case is against public policy and is therefore improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule479\">SDB No. 36</a> \n     --Guidelines for acceptable contingency fee arrangements in past due alimony and child support cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a> \n     --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n \nDUAL OCCUPATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT \n     --Ethical considerations applicable to a lawyer who is engaged in both the practice of law and another profession or business.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule477\">SDB No. 31</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. \n     --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \n EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY, see HIRING \n \nESCROW ACCOUNT, see TRUST ACCOUNTS \n \nEXECUTOR, see WILLS/TRUSTS \n \nEXPERT WITNESS, see WITNESSES \n \nFEE BILLS \n      --Attorneys may charge interest on client's overdue bills if notice is given to client in advance that interest will be charged on delinquent bills.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a> \n      --May a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program which purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a> \n      --A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a> \n \nFEE SHARING \n      --Prohibition of division of fees with nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n      --Permissible for attorney employee to share attorney's fees with his or her lay organization employer where the attorney's fees are regarded as stipulated liquidated damages.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule513\">FAO No. 88-2</a> \n      --Any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a> \n      --The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his law office in addition to their regular salary is permissible. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n \nFEE SPLITTING \n      --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n \nFIDUCIARY \n      --A lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity may remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule512\">FAO No. 98-2</a> \n      --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence.  A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nFILES \n      --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n      --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\"> FAO No. 96-1 \n </a> \nFILING LAWSUITS \n      --Not improper for attorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n \n FIRM NAME \n --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a>\n FUGITIVES \n      --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n \nGOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, see PUBLIC OFFICIALS and LAW CLERKS\n GUARDIAN AD LITEM \n      --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n \nHOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENTS / INDEMNIFICATION \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a>\n HIRING \n      --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n      --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n      --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nIMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION, see DISQUALIFICATION \n \nINSURANCE PRACTICE \n      --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n      --A third party beneficiary or his or her attorney may advance or reimburse an insured for the purchase of optional PIP coverage.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a> \n      --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n      --Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a> \n      --Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n \nIN HOUSE COUNSEL \n      --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO 05-10</a> \n \nINTERPLEADER \n     \nJUDGES \n      --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n      --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member and the city council appoints Recorder's Court judges.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n      --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n \nLAW CLERKS \n     --Ethical considerations regarding activities of nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --A law clerk for a superior court judge may not write appellate briefs on behalf of criminal defendants in death penalty cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a> \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n \nLAW FIRMS \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state law with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n     --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a law firm or corporate law department hiring attorneys to work for them on a temporary basis.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a> \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law. The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n      --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nLEGAL ASSISTANTS, see NONLAWYERS \n \nLETTERHEAD \n     --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by the client to collect a debt.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n     --Nonlawyers use of a lawyer's letterhead for correspondence regarding a \"legal matter \"signed only by a nonlawyer may be improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a> \n     --Nonlawyer's use of attorney's letterhead for routine correspondence is ethical if supervised by the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state firm with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n     --A lawyer may refer past due accounts to a collection agency.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a> \n     --Lawyers practicing simultaneously in more than one law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a> \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> \n     --A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “&Associates;” however, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> \n \nLITIGATION \n     --Not improper for attorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n     --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. \n     --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a>\n LOANS \n     --Proper for law firm to obtain loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a> \n \nLOCAL COUNSEL \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> \n \nMALPRACTICE \n     --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n     --Corporate in-house counsel may enter into a binding \"hold harmless \"agreement with their employer in lieu of malpractice insurance.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a> \n     --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n \nMULTIPLE REPRESENTATION, see CONFLICTS OF INTEREST \n \n MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE \n --Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a>\n MULTI-STATE FIRM \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state firm with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n \nNONLAWYERS \n     --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by that client to collect a debt.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n     --Nonlawyers use of a lawyer's letterhead for correspondence regarding a \"legal matter \"signed only by a nonlawyer may be improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a> \n     --Ethical considerations regarding activities of nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --Any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his law office in addition to their regular salary is permissible. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nOF-COUNSEL \n     --Because an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the ethics rules applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel.\"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a> \n \nPARALEGALS, see NONLAWYERS \n \nPARTNERSHIPS \n     --Attorney may not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any partnership activity consists of the practice of law.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n \nPERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE \n     --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n     --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n     --Permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A § 51-12-14  to an unrepresented adverse party, but must specifically state that it is a notice rather than advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a> \n     --Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a> \n     --Ethical considerations applicable to an attorney who wishes to defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right to any recovery against the defendant client.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n \nPIP COVERAGE \n     --It is improper for an attorney to charge a contingency fee on routine PIP claims.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a> \n     --A third party beneficiary or his or her attorney may advance or reimburse an insured for the purchase of optional PIP coverage.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a> \n \nPLEA AGREEMENT \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n \nPREPAID FEES, see ATTORNEY'S FEES and RETAINER FEES \n \nPRO HAC VICE \n     --A Georgia attorney serving as local counsel can be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel when local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct, and when local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> \n \nPROSECUTORS \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n \nPUBLIC OFFICIALS \n     --County Commissioner may not appoint his or her own firm, or a partner in his or her own firm, as County Attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=454\%22>SDB No. 16</a> \n     --Part-time judge may also serve as a criminal defense counsel.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule502\">FAO No. 86-2</a> \n     --County Attorney may represent criminal defendants unless there is a violation of a county ordinance charged, and the attorney is sensitive to other conflicts which may arise. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a> \n     --Representation of private clients before the Recorder's Court when attorney is also a city council member.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n     --Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> \n \nREAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3 </a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nREFERRAL AND REFERRAL SERVICES \n     --Any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a non-lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a> \n     --While it may be possible to do so, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a>\n REINSTATEMENT FOR DISBARRED ATTORNEYS \nSee the Office of Bar Admissions' Website, Rules Governing Admission, Part A, Section 10\n REMOTE PRACTICE \n       --Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a>\n REPRESENTING A CHILD \n --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n \nRETAINER FEES \n     --A lawyer is not required to place attorney's fees paid in advance into a trust account except under special circumstances.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) and does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n \nSETTLEMENT \n     --Ethical propriety of including attorney's fees as part of settlement offer in federal civil rights cases.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n     \nSECURITY INTEREST \n     --Attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property only to secure reasonable attorney's fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a> \n \nSIGHT DRAFTS\n SMOOT LETTERS \n     --Improper for plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a> \n \nSOLICITATION, see ADVERTISING \n \nSPECIAL COUNSEL \n     --It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law. The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship. The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> \n \nSTATUTE OF LIMITATIONS \n     --Not improper for attorney to file lawsuit before complete support for claim has been established if there is reasonable possibility that facts can be established after the filing of the claim.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> \n \nSUBPOENAS \n     --Guidelines for use of subpoenas.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a> \n \nSUBROGATION, see INSURANCE PRACTICE \n \nSUICIDE \n     --Under certain circumstances, an attorney may reveal a client's intent to commit suicide.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule486\">SDB No. 42</a> \n \nTERMINATING REPRESENTATION, see WITHDRAWAL \n \nTRANSCRIPTS \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n \nTRUSTS, see WILLS/TRUSTS \n \nTRUST ACCOUNTS \n     --A lawyer is not required to place attorney's fees paid in advance into a trust account except under special circumstances.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a> \n     --A lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity may remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule512\">FAO No. 98-2</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II).  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> \n \nTRUSTEE, see WILLS/TRUSTS \n \nUNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW \n     --An attorney should not furnish his or her letterhead to a client for use by that client to collect a debt.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a> \n     --Nonlawyers use of a lawyer's letterhead for correspondence regarding a \"legal matter \"signed only by a nonlawyer may be improper.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a> \n     --Ethical considerations regarding activities of nonlawyers.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a> \n     --Ethical considerations for a multi-state firm with an office in Georgia.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> \n     --Lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer responsibility of closing a real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a> \n     --An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer; and such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a> \n     --A lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3</a> \n     --If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15(II).  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\"> FAO No. 13-1 \n </a> --Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location?  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a> \n \nWAIVER OF LIABILITY \n     --A lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar complaints by the client against the attorney.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a> \n     --A lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a> \n \nWILLS/TRUSTS \n     --Ethical considerations for an attorney named as the executor or trustee for a will or trust he or she prepared.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a> \n \nWITHDRAWAL \n     --No duty to disclose location of fugitive client to authorities, but the attorney should withdraw from representation if the fugitive insists on pursuing an illegal course of action.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a> \n     --An attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a> \n     --Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a> \n     --An attorney departing a law firm may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, as long as the departing attorney complies with the applicable ethics rules.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a> \n     --A Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) and does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a> \n     --Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk representing a client before a judge who is presently employing the law clerk.  <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> \n     --Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. \n     --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> \n     --Ethical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> \n     --1. May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? 2. May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> \n     --The obligation of confidentiality applies as between two jointly represented clients. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> \n \nWITNESSES \n     --Attorney responsibilities with respect to the payment of witness fees. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a> \n     --Guidelines for payment of expert witness fees in contingency fee cases. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a> \n     --Guidelines for use of Expert Witness consulting service. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule490\">SDB No. 48</a> \n --May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\"> FAO No. 16-2 \n </a> --Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> \n \nWITNESS ONLY CLOSING \n     --A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a (witness only) closing. A Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disperse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>\n WORKERS' COMPENSATION \n     --Attorney must advise their client of his or her right to independent counsel if the attorney appeals award of fees granted by the Workman's Compensation Board. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a>\n","UrlName":"part8","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f7a69edf-8162-48d1-9068-7d8c6c7ed6c5","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion Rules Index","Content":"CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule223\"> Rule 1.0 - Terminology</a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1 - Competence</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule50\">Rule 1.2 - Scope of Representation</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3 - Diligence</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule54\">Rule 1.4 - Communication</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5 - Fees</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule479\">SDB No. 36</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1  </a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule57\">Rule 1.6 - Confidentiality of Information</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule474\">SDB No. 27</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule486\">SDB No. 42</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule588\"> </a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a>   <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7 - Conflict of Interest: General Rule</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No.16</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8 - Conflict of Interest:  Prohibited Transactions</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">Rule 1.9 - Conflict of Interest:  Former Client</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10 - Imputed Disqualification</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule90\">Rule 1.11 - Successive Government and Private Employment</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule93\">Rule 1.12 - Former Judge or Arbitrator</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule97\">Rule 1.13 - Organization as Client</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule107\">Rule 1.14 - Client under a Disability</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule42\">Rule 1.15(I) - Safekeeping Property: General Rule</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule512\">FAO No. 98-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule45\">Rule 1.15(II) - Safekeeping Property: Trust Account and IOLTA</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule47\">Rule 1.15(III) - Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records </a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16 - Declining or Terminating Representation</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2 </a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule49\">Rule 1.17 - Sale of Law Practice</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a> Lawyer As A Counselor<a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule62\">Rule 2.1 - Advisor</a>        <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2 - Intermediary</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule66\">Rule 2.3 - Evaluation for Use by Third Persons</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule68\">Rule 2.4 – Lawyer Serving as a Third-Party Neutral</a> Advocate <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1 - Meritorious Claims and Contentions</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule71\">Rule 3.2 - Expediting Litigation</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule72\">Rule 3.3 - Candor toward the Tribunal</a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule77\"> Rule 3.4 - Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel </a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule490\">SDB No. 48</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule78\">Rule 3.5 - Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule80\"> Rule 3.6 - Trial Publicity </a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule82\">Rule 3.7 - Lawyer as Witness</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule83\">Rule 3.8 - Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule85\">Rule 3.9 - Advocate in Non-adjudicative Proceedings</a> Transactions With Persons Other Than Clients <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule289\">Rule 4.1 - Truthfulness in Statements to Others</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\">Rule 4.2 - Communication with Person Represented by Counsel</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10 </a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule298\">Rule 4.3 - Dealing with Unrepresented Person</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10 </a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule300\">Rule 4.4 - Respect for Rights of Third Persons</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a>Law Firms And Associations <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule302\"> Rule 5.1 - Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyer </a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule111\">Rule 5.2 - Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3 - Responsibilities Regarding Non-Lawyer Assistants</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4 - Professional Independence of a Lawyer</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule513\">FAO No. 88-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5 - Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule490\">SDB No. 48</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule135\">Rule 5.6 - Restrictions on Right to Practice</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule139\">Rule 5.7 - Restrictions Regarding Law-related Services</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule477\">SDB No. 31</a> Public Service <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule140\">Rule 6.1 - Voluntary Pro Bono Public Service</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule141\">Rule 6.2 - Accepting Appointments</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule142\"> Rule 6.3 - Membership in Legal Service Organization </a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule144\">Rule 6.4 - Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule559\">Rule 6.5 - Nonprofit &Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs</a> Information About Legal Services <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1 - Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Service</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule147\">Rule 7.2 - Advertising</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule149\">Rule 7.3 - Direct Contact with Prospective Clients</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule151\">Rule 7.4 - Communication of Fields of Practice</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5 - Firm Names and Letterheads</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> Maintaining The Integrity Of The Profession <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule154\">Rule 8.1 - Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule155\">Rule 8.2 - Judicial and Legal Officials</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule157\">Rule 8.3 - Reporting Professional Misconduct</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4 - Misconduct</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule163\">Rule 8.5 - Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a> Miscellaneous <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule166\">Rule 9.1 - Reporting Requirements</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule182\">Rule 9.2 – Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule196\">Rule 9.3 - Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule203\">Rule 9.4 – Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule207\">Rule 9.5 - Lawyer as a Public Official</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No. 16</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>  ","UrlName":"part9","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinions","Content":"","UrlName":"part46","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"bb655803-b398-4d53-b4ab-9877370f1631","Title":"Advisory Opinion 5","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/opinion-history/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion. State Disciplinary Board September 20, 1968 Amended by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board March 1993 Propriety of an attorney permitting the use of his or her letterhead stationery by a retainer client who is writing as a creditor or as a collection agency seeking to collect an account or debt from the recipient.The question submitted is actually in five differing forms, but each question involves certain ingredients which result in the advisory opinion being the same as to each. DR 3-101(a) provides: \"A lawyer shall not aid a non lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\"See also Standard 24. It may well be that under this rule the varying factual situations may be productive or varying conclusions. The determination of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia is a matter of statutory interpretation, O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50 et.seq., and this opinion is not based on either the above standard or statutes.Standard 4 requires that \"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation.\"In light of these admonitions, it is professionally improper for a lawyer to furnish his or her letterhead to a client for the purpose stated. A lawyer is an officer of the court. As such, the lawyer assumes certain responsibilities, is under certain obligations and the lawyer's conduct is subject to certain restrictions and limitations. The lawyer is obligated to uphold the honor and dignity of the profession. See EC 9-6. The lawyer's participation in conduct contemplated purely and simply to deceive is incompatible with those responsibilities and obligations.In addition, a lawyer has been given certain privileges by the State. Because of these privileges, letters of the character stated in the question purporting to be written by lawyers have a greater weight than those written by laymen. It is obvious that the sole reason for the practice is to give the letter the weight that lawyers alone can contribute. That end can be gained only through the deception which is manifestly out of harmony with the Code of Professional Responsibility. See EC 3-3. The lawyer cannot, therefore, delegate to a nonlawyer.The practice described is violative of both the letter and the spirit of the ethical canons and constitutes unethical practice.","UrlName":"rule492","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1cb4a506-933a-4671-8f87-c92840b06c94","Title":"Advisory Opinion 16","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 16 \nSeptember 21, 1973 \n Propriety of An Attorney Who is a County Commissioner in a Rural County Appointing His Own Firm as County Attorney.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, this State Disciplinary Board, upon request made therefore, renders this its opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State of Georgia as applied to a given state of facts.\nAn advisory opinion has been requested upon the following inquiry:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nA partner in a three-member law firm has been elected Commissioner in a small county. The new Commissioner, who at times in the past has served as County Attorney and who intends to remain active in the law firm, wishes to appoint his law firm as County Attorneys. May he do so consistent with the applicable ethical rules? Would the result be different if the Commissioner's partner were appointed County Attorney in his individual capacity and all legal fees paid by the County were paid directly to this partner rather than into the law firm's general account? There is only one other active law firm in the County; and its members were closely associated politically with the candidate who was defeated in the last election by the present Commissioner. \n</div>\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are Rule 3-108 (Canon 8): EC 8-8, and Rule 3-109 (Canon 9): EC 9-1 and EC 9-2.\nCanon 8 provides \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System.\"The ethical considerations under this Canon relevant to the question presented are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n EC 8-8 Lawyers often serve as legislators or as holders of other public offices. This is highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant contributions to the improvement of the legal system. A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties. \n</div>\nDR 8-101(A)(1) states as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(1) use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious that such action is not in the public interest; \n</div>\nCanon 9 provides \"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety \". The relevant ethical considerations under this Canon are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 9-1 Continuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profession. \nEC 9-2 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to be unethical. In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in the matters being handled for the client. While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that has a tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or in the legal profession, his duty to clients or to the public should never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his obligations may be understood or may tend to subject him or the legal profession to criticism. When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal profession. \n</div>\nThere are numerous Formal and Informal Opinions of the American Bar Association on the subject of the attorney as public official, but these opinions seem to be largely useless to the present inquiry as they consistently address themselves to factual situations in which the duty of the attorney as government official comes into conflict with his duty as counselor or advocate for his non-governmental client. The question here presented is much more subtle than the conflict-of-interest cases and the authorities provide little guidance.\nPutting the first inquiry in its simplest form, the State Disciplinary Board must answer the question:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nWould the proposed employment of the Commissioner's law firm present such a danger of public suspicion of self-dealing that public confidence in attorneys, and in our legal governmental system, would be unnecessarily eroded? \n</div>\nIt is obvious that public confidence in the institution of local government would be damaged if the public came to view local politics as merely a battle between law firms for \"the largest client in the County \". Strong support for this view is found in American Bar Association Formal Opinion No. 192 which states:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n Many opinions have been written by this committee applying each of these Canons. Opinions 16, 30, 34, 77, 118 and 134 relate to Canon 6, and pass on questions concerning the propriety of the conduct of an attorney who is a public officer, in representing private interests adverse to those of the public body which he represents. The principle applied in these opinions is that an attorney holding public office should avoid all conduct which might lead the layman to conclude that the attorney is utilizing his public position to further his professional success or personal interests .\"(emphasis ours) \n</div>\n This language has been carried into EC 8-8 of the present Code of Professional Responsibility, which ethical rule was cited above. The mere fact that there is an opportunity for a County Commissioner to allow his firm to charge excessively or to create legal business for himself and for his law firm acting as County Attorney,does not, of course, imply that such impropriety would necessarily follow. However, it is vitally important that no situation be allowed to exist which might tempt the public to conclude that the County's interest has been subordinated to that of any law firm or attorney. It has long been the law in Georgia that one who is entrusted with the business of others will not be allowed to make out of the same a pecuniary profit to himself however honest and fair the circumstances of employment, and that the citizens of Georgia are entitled to have their officials exercise close and totally objective scrutiny of the performance of those doing the work of government. Montgomery v. City of Atlanta 162 Ga. 534 (1926); Mayor of Macon v. Huff , 60 Ga. 221 (1878); Trainer v. City of Covington , 183 Ga. 759 (1937): Opinions of the Attorney General (unofficial), 1971,p. 286. Numerous statutes which regulate the actions of officers and employees of government have as their goal the prevention of any situation in which the official's personal interest and his public duty may conflict. Ga. Code Annotated Â§ Â§ 2-5606,23-1713, 23-1714, 26-2306, 26-2307, 23-2308, 69-201, 89-103, 89-904, and 89-913 to 918.The statutes and cases cited are grounded in strong public policy which provides a dependable guide in the premises. In light of the public policy favoring avoidance of any actual or imagined conflict-of-interest situation by government officials, we conclude that the only effective way to avoid the possibility of public suspicion of self-dealing and conflicts of interest is for the County Commissioner-attorney to refrain from employing himself as County Attorney. A.B.A. Formal Opinions 33, 49, 50, 72, 103 and 128indicate that no partner or associate of a law firm may undertake any professional relationship which any one of the partners or associates, because of adverse influence and conflicting interests, could not undertake. Consequently, employment of the Commissioner's own firm as County Attorney would be inappropriate. The A.B.A. Formal Opinions cited of knowledge and financial resources and the personal and professional closeness which exists in the legal partnership. It must be remembered, too, that public opinion and appearance of propriety are important considerations in this area, and it is highly probable that employment of the attorney-commissioner's own firm would have the same basic deleterious impact on public opinion and public confidence as would his individual employment as County Attorney. Therefore, the State Disciplinary Board holds that the Attorney-Commissioner may not employ himself or his law firm as County Attorney.\n The second part of the question before the Board has to do with the propriety of the hiring of the Commissioner-Attorney's partner as County Attorney on an individual basis. Again, the public policy considerations discussed in Montgomery ,Trainer , and Mayor of Macon provide guidance. The two evils arising from an official's self-employment outlined in these cases are:\n (1) the temptation to be dishonest in the collection of monies from the government, \n(2) the inability of the official to honestly, objectively, and forcefully exercise control over himself, if a way could be found to avoid these dual evils, then the County Commission or the attorney-commissioner might freely employ the attorney-commissioner's partner on an individual basis. Employment of the partner in his individual capacity and use of contract terms stipulating that the attorney-commissioner shall not benefit in any way from the County Attorney's income would destroy objections based on the first evil, but would not avoid those based on the second.It is true that the Commission and attorney-commissioner will always employ a friend and that, consequently, they and he would always be less than totally objective in judging the work of the County Attorney, but it is also true that an attorney-commissioner who would be the Commissioner best qualified to judge the quality of legal work, would be less likely to expose and criticize poor work on the part of one who is his law partner than one who was merely a good friend.\n The temptation to overlook or conceal the faults of professional or business partner is one with which no attorney or other person charged with public duty should be faced. The Board, in answering the second part of the inquiry,seeks to avoid the possibility of such temptation and answers part two of the inquiry in the negative.","UrlName":"rule454","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"976f93a8-d22a-4926-be94-dd55f7f3e26c","Title":"Advisory Opinion 17","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 17 \nJanuary 18, 1974 \n Duty of an Attorney Representing a Fugitive Upon Warrants for Probation Violation\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, this State Disciplinary Board, upon request made therefor, renders this its opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia as applied to a given state of facts.\nAn advisory opinion has been requested as to the ethical duty of an attorney who, during a professional consultation, learns that his client is a fugitive upon warrants for violation of his probation. The request was made in two parts,as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"When a person who is a fugitive upon warrants for probation violation approaches an attorney and requests that the attorney represent him in any hearings concerning his violation of probation and when the fugitive thus discloses his violations and whereabouts, must the attorney disclose the whereabouts of his client to the proper authorities? If the attorney advises the fugitive to surrender to the authorities and the fugitive refuses to do so, what is the proper course of action of the attorney?\" \n</div>\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are Rule 3-102 (Canon 2); EC 2-32, and DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) are included in that Rule; Rule 3-104(Canon 4); EC 4-1, EC 4-4, DR 4-101(A), DR 4-101(B)(1) and DR 4-101(C)(2) and (3) are all included in that Rule; and Rule 3-107 (Canon 7); EC 7-1, EC 7-5 and DR 7-102(A)(3), (7)and (8) are included under that Rule.\nCanon II provides \"A lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession. Ethical considerations under Canon II which are relevant to the question propounded are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 2-32 A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of compelling circumstances... A lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to minimize the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client and the possibility of prejudice to his client as the result of his withdrawal. Even though he justifiably withdraws a lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by giving due notice of his withdrawal, suggesting employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, cooperating with counsel subsequently employed, and otherwise endeavoring to minimize the possibility of harm... \n</div>\nDR 2-110(C) states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(C) Permissive withdrawal. If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a Tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawals is because: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(1) His client \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (a) ... \n(b) personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct \n</div>\nCanon IV provides \"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.\"Relevant ethical considerations under this Canon are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 4-1 Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. \nEC 4-4 The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to whom the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an obligation to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely assert the privilege unless it is waived by the client. \n</div>\nDR 4-101 states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nDR 4-101 Preservation of Confidence and Secrets of a client \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(A) \"Confidence \"refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law and \"Secret \"refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. \n(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C) a lawyer shall not knowingly \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client \n(2) ... \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(C) A lawyer may reveal: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (1) ... \n(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order; \n(3) the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime; \n</div>\nCanon VII provides \"A lawyer should represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.\"\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 7-1 The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations. The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law, to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means, and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue or defense. \nEC 7-5 A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision. He may continue in the representation of his client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or take a frivolous legal position. A lawyer should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor. \n</div>\nDR 7-102(A) states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) ... \n(2) ... \n(3) conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal;... \n(7) counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent \n(8) knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule. \n</div>\nIn this problem the attorney's duty of loyalty to his client and his duty to the legal system, of which he is an important part, come into direct conflict. The State Disciplinary Board has been asked to resolve this conflict and the applicable rules and advisory opinions of Georgia and of the American Bar Association reflect his conflict as they, too, are in conflict.\nAlthough A.B.A. Formal Opinions 155 and 156 advise of the duty of the attorney to reveal the whereabouts of his fugitive client, the State Disciplinary Board believes that there is no legal or ethical consistency in the rationale of those opinions which would require an attorney whose client is a fugitive from a misdemeanor conviction to notify the authorities while allowing the attorney of a murderer to keep the confession of the murderer secret and confidential.\nThe language of Canon IV is strong and clear, and the importance of the confidentiality between attorney and client in their communications is paramount in our system of justice. EC 4-1, EC 4-4. The exceptions as to revelation of secrets and confidences mentioned in DR 4-101(C), above, would not seem to apply in this situation since the information about the fugitive's whereabouts is privileged in Georgia and the attorney's failure to report the fugitive would not, by itself, be a crime. Of course, the attorney has a duty to report any non-privileged information he knows to the proper authorities, and DR 7-102(A)(7), and (8) indicate clearly that he cannot counsel the client to break the law nor may he take any overt action to aid the fugitive in his flight.\nIn light of the historical importance of the concepts embodied in Canon IV to individuals in our society, the State Disciplinary Board has determined that the attorney of a fugitive has no ethical duty to inform the authorities of the whereabouts of the fugitive. However, once that difficult determination is made, it must be quickly pointed that in the stated situation there is a countervailing duty to our system of law which dictates that the attorney cannot counsel the fugitive to remain in violation of the law. The attorney should, therefore, advise the client to surrender to the authorities at an early date so that the charges against the fugitive may be heard in a fair hearing. By taking such a course of action the attorney observes the spirit of the confidentiality rule while demonstrating the confidence in, and loyalty to, our system of law.\nThe second part of the inquiry asks what should be done if the client refuses the attorney's advice to surrender to the authorities. The ethical considerations and rules under Canon II, stated above, clearly show that in a situation in which a fugitive client refuses to surrender himself, and thus insists on an illegal course of conduct, the attorney should immediately withdraw from the case, taking the precautions he deems necessary to protect his client's interests.","UrlName":"rule465","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"063d68ad-914c-4a5e-b12c-0de2c5de26db","Title":"Advisory Opinion 19","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 19 \nJuly 18, 1975 \n Propriety of a member of the State Bar permitting a paralegal in his employ to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm letterhead under his own signature.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia and the applicable statutes and case law as applied to a specific fact situation.\nAn opinion has been requested concerning the propriety of a member of the State Bar permitting a paralegal in his employ to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm letterhead under his own signature.\n The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia which is applicable to this inquiry is Huber v. State , 234 Ga. at 358, 216 S.E.2d 73 (1975)which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n \"'(W)e are of the opinion that the practice of law...(is) not confined to practice in the courts of this State, but (is) of larger scope, including the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to any action or special proceeding in any court or other judicial body, conveyancing, the preparation of all legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured, the rendering of opinions as to the validity or invalidity of the title to real or personal property, the giving of any legal advice, and any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.' Boykin v. Hopkins , 174 Ga. 511, 519 (162 S.E. 796).\" \n</div>\n Cf. Ga. L. 1931, P. 191 as amended by Ga. L. 1937, p. 753 (Ga.Code Ann. § 9-401).\nThe ethical consideration applicable to this inquiry is State Bar Rule 3-103, EC 3-6 which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries, and other lay persons. Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the delegated work, and has complete professional responsibility for the work product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal services more economically and efficiently.\" \n</div>\nThis disciplinary rule which is applicable to this inquiry is State Bar Rule 4-102.1, DR 3-101(A) which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\" \n</div>\n\"Paralegals,\"\"legal assistants,\"\"law clerks,\"\"paraprofessionals,\"\"litigation assistants,\"etc., are laymen who are not entitled to practice law and who are not entitled to membership in the State Bar of Georgia. Although the State Bar may intercede in a paralegal's activities to the extent that those activities might involve the unauthorized practice of law1, it has not power to discipline paralegals in that its disciplinary jurisdiction is expressly limited to its membership.\nThe State Bar is authorized to advise its members concerning the activities in which their employees, including paralegals, should be allowed to engage. Further, if a member of the State Bar allows a paralegal in his employ to perform functions that amount to the unauthorized practice of law, the Bar is authorized to discipline the member under DR 3-101(A) of State Bar Rule 4-102.1.\nA member of the State Bar may allow a paralegal, as he may allow any other layman, to assist him in such a manner or to perform such tasks on his behalf as do not constitute the practice of law. Therefore, our inquiry must concern:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n (1) The definition of the practice of law in Georgia, and \n(2) Whether the conduct which is the subject of this inquiry transgresses the definition. \n The Supreme Court has defined the practice of law in the Huber case, supra. Does correspondence by a paralegal on his firm's letterhead bearing his own signature and concerning \"legal matters \"fall within the Supreme Court's definition? The answer depends upon the party to whom the correspondence is written and the substance of the correspondence. \n</div>\nWe are of the opinion that the phrase \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law \"in the above quoted definition is intended to comprehend communication connected with any legally enforceable right or remedy without regard to whether a suit is actually pending before a court in this State. Therefore, even pre-litigation communication falls within the definition if it is directed to a potentially adverse party, his agents, assigns, or beneficiaries and if it attempts to suggest or assert an actual or potential claim of right to legal or equitable relief for another upon the condition, either expressed or implied, that a failure to satisfy such suggestion or assertion may result in litigation. Any such correspondence written on a law firm letterhead, by its very nature, implicitly suggests subsequent legal proceedings and thus constitutes the practice of law. To that extent, if a member of the State Bar allows a paralegal in his employ to sign correspondence on the law firm letterhead, he aids the paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law and opens himself to discipline.\nWe specifically restrict the foregoing opinion to letters directed to adverse or potentially adverse parties, their agents, assigns or beneficiaries. Under EC 3-6 of State Bar Rule 3-103, a member may ethically utilize the services of paralegals in a wide range of circumstances such as investigating potential claims and pending cases, taking statements from clients and witnesses, engaging in legal research, preparing legal documents and pleadings under direct supervision of the member, performing administrative duties within and on behalf of the law firm, and performing secretarial or clerical duties. To the extent necessary to perform these functions and to the extent that these functions do not fall within the above-cited definition of the practice of law, a paralegal may correspond on the law firm letterhead in his own name.\nWhen a paralegal in the employ of a member of the State Bar is permitted by the member to correspond on the law firm letterhead, the member must be sure that the paralegal clearly identifies his status by the use of an appropriate designation such as \"paralegal,\"\"legal assistant,\"or \"law clerk.\"The failure to do so could easily mislead the recipient of the correspondence and might constitute a representation on the part of the member that the paralegal in his employ is a member of the State Bar and authorized to practice law in this State.\n 1 Ga. L. 1946, p. 171 (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-306 through 9-411).","UrlName":"rule468","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b4d1ac85-398b-4a45-b8dd-39cbe70d0b0b","Title":"Advisory Opinion 21","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 21 \nSeptember 16, 1977 \n \n \nGuidelines for Attorneys Utilizing Paralegals. \nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government. of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented:\nWhat are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legal assistants or paraprofessionals and permit them to deal with other lawyers, clients and the public?\nThe ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is Rule 3-103 (Canon III): EC 3-1, EC 3-2, ES 3-6, DR 3-101(A) and DR 3-103 are all included in that Rule. It is also noted that the provisions of Canon III appear as Disciplinary Standards 24, 25 and 26 in Part IV (discipline) of the Rules of the State Bar.\nCanon III provides:\n\"A lawyer should assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of law.\"\nEthical Considerations under this Canon relevant to the question propounded are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"EC 3-1 The prohibition against the practice of law by  a layman is grounded in the need of the public for integrity and competence of those who undertake to render legal services. Because of the fiduciary and personal character of  the lawyer-client relationship and the inherently complex nature of our legal system, the public can better be assured of the requisite responsibility and competence if the  practice of law is confined to those who are subject to the requirements and regulations imposed upon members of the legal profession.\" \n\"EC 3-2 The sensitive variations in the considerations that bear on legal determinations often make it difficult even for a lawyer to exercise appropriate professional judgment, and it is therefore essential that  the personal nature of the relationship of client and lawyer be preserved. Competent professional judgment is the product of a trained familiarity with law and legal processes, a disciplined, analytical approach to legal problems, and a firm ethical  commitment.\" \n\"EC 3-6 A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries and other lay persons. Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the delegated work and has complete professional responsibility for the work product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal service more economically and efficiently.\" \n</div>\n\"DR 3-101 Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law. \n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.: \n</div>\n\"DR 3-102 Dividing Legal Fees with a Nonlawyer. \n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that: \n <div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n (1) ... \n    (2) ... \n    (3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.\" \n </div> \n</div>\n\"DR 3-103 Forming a Partnership with a Nonlawyer. \n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of  law.\" \n</div>\nFor purposes of this opinion the terms \"legal assistant \", \"paraprofessional \"and \"paralegal \"are defined as any lay person, not admitted to the practice of law in this State, who is an employee of, or an assistant to, an active member of the State Bar of Georgia or to a partnership or professional corporation comprised of active members of the State Bar of Georgia and who renders services relating to the law to such member, partnership or professional corporation under the direct control, supervision and compensation of a member of the State Bar of Georgia.\nThe overriding consideration in this opinion will be that the definition of the practice of law is very wide in the State of Georgia and that strict adherence to a program of supervision and direction of a paralegal is required in order to avoid any charges that the attorney is aiding his paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law. Ga. Code Ann. 9-401, 9-402. Avoidance of charges that the paralegal is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law may be achieved only by strict observance of the direction found in EC 3-6, quoted above, indicating that delegation of activities which ordinarily comprise the practice of law is proper only if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with the client involved, supervises and directs the work delegated to the paralegal and assumes complete ultimate professional responsibility for the work product produced by the paralegal. Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.\nIt is the opinion of this Board that the following may be delegated to nonlawyer paralegals, provided that proper and effective supervision and control by the attorney exists:\n(1) The interview of clients, witnesses and other persons with information pertinent to any cause being handled by the attorney.\n(2) Legal research and drafting of pleadings, briefs of law and other legal documents for the attorney's review, approval and use.\n(3) Drafting and signing of routine correspondence with the clients of the attorney when such correspondence does not require the application of legal knowledge or the rendering of legal advice to the client.\n(4) Investigation of facts relating to the cause of a client of the attorney, including examinations of land records and reporting of his findings to the attorney.\n(5) Scheduling of the attorney's activities in the law office and scheduling of his appearance before courts, tribunals and administrative agencies.\n(6) Billing of clients and general management of the lawfirm's office and nonlegal staff.\n(7) Routine contacts with opposing counsel on topics not effecting the merits of the cause of action at issue between the attorneys or requiring the use or application of legal knowledge.\n(8) Rendering of specialized advice to the clients of the attorney on scientific and technical topics, provided that such advice does not require the application of legal judgment or knowledge to the facts or opinions to be discussed with the client.\nIt is the opinion of the Board that the following duties should not be delegated to paralegals:\n(1) Any contact with clients or opposite counsel requiring the rendering of legal advice of any type.\n(2) Any appearance as a lawyer at depositions, hearings,calendar calls or trials or before any administrative Tribunal unless otherwise preempted by Federal law or regulation.\n(3) Responsibility for making final decisions as to the ethics of activities of paralegal employees of an attorney.\n(4) Drafting, without review and approval by a member of the Bar, of any pleading or legal document.\n(5) Negotiation with opposing parties or their counsel on substantive issues in expected or pending litigation.\n(6) Contacting an opposite party or his counsel in a situation in which legal rights of the firm's client will be asserted or negotiated.\n(7) Signature of pleadings, briefs or other legal documents for presentation to any court or explanation of legal document s to the client of the lawyer or to the opposite party in any negotiation or litigation.\nIt is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that there are other duties incumbent upon lawyers supervising the work of paralegals as follows:\n(1)     (a) In order to avoid any appearance that the lawyer is aiding the paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law,including unauthorized practice by way of \"holding out as an attorney \"(see Ga.Code Ann. 9-402), any letters or documents signed by the paralegal should clearly indicate the status of the paralegal and such status should be made clear by the nature of the typed signature or by express language in the text of the letter or document. See Advisory Opinion No. 19.\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> (b) The name of the paralegal should not appear on the letterhead or on the office door of any lawyer engaged in private practice. The paralegal may have a business card containing the name of the firm by which he or she is employed, but the card must contain the word \"paralegal \"to clearly convey  that the paralegal is not a lawyer. \n(c) In oral communications, either face-to-face or on the  telephone, the paralegal should begin the conversation with a clear statement that he or she is speaking as a paralegal employee of the lawyer or the law firm. Such  communication concerning the status of the paralegal should be given prior to all oral communications with clients, opposite parties, and other attorneys unless previous contacts with such persons would justify the paralegal in believing that their status  was clearly known to such persons. \n</div>\n(2) A paralegal may not be a partner in a law firm nor have a financial interest that amounts to a partnership interest in such firm other than participation in a profit sharing plan allowed under Bar ethics rules. [DR 2-102 (A) ]\n(3) As the paralegal is the agent of the attorney, the paralegal has a duty to protect and preserve the confidences and secrets of the firm's clients. [EC 4-2 and DR 4-102 ]\n(4) As the paralegal is an agent of the lawyer or law firm, it is the duty of the supervising lawyer to carefully instruct the paralegal so that the paralegal will avoid taking any action which the attorney himself is prohibited from taking, including avoidance of solicitation of cases or clients for the lawyer or the lawfirm and avoiding any other activity which would be improper activity if performed by the supervising lawyer or his firm.","UrlName":"rule469","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4aec2d84-6b6f-406d-bb03-6688acfb2fce","Title":"Advisory Opinion 22","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 22 \nMarch 31, 1978 \nAmended by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board \nJanuary 14, 1993 \n \nEthical propriety of a lawyer communicating to other lawyers his or her availability to act as a consultant in particular areas of the law. \nThe question presented is whether it is unethical for a lawyer to communicate to other lawyers his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law without running afoul of the requirements of Standard 6 and the provisions set forth in EC 2-6, 2-7, and 2-8, Section of a Lawyer: Professional Notices and Listings.\nThe policy considerations upon which Standard 6 and the other advertising and solicitation rules are based are the result of a concern that the public should be protected from misrepresentation, fraud, intimidation , undue influence, and overreaching in the selection of a lawyer. These concerns would not be applicable to a lawyer communicating with another lawyer.\nAn attorney making contact with other members of the profession for the purpose of advising his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law is not in anyway relieved from making certain that all representations are both accurate and not in anyway misleading. Such communication is not in violation of Standard 6.","UrlName":"rule471","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de595ba8-201d-4582-b5db-f6909521b3f2","Title":"Advisory Opinion 23","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 23 \nMay 19, 1978 \n \nMulti-State Law Firm Office Within the State of Georgia.\nPursuant to Bar Rule 4-223, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia renders the following advisory opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the Canons of Ethics as applied to the following state of facts:\nMay an out-of-state law firm open and maintain an office in the State of Georgia under the direction of a full-time associate of that firm, said associate being a full-time Georgia resident and a member of the State Bar of Georgia? Relevant ethics DR 2-102(A)(4); DR 2-102(C) and (D), and DR 3-101(B).\nDR 2-102 (D) [Disciplinary Standard 11] reads as follows:\n\"A partnership shall not be formed or continued between or among lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the members and associates of the firm on its letterhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations of those members and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions. However, the same firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.\"\nThe provision of DR 2-102(D) clearly indicates that it is appropriate for multi-state firms to maintain home or branch offices within the State of Georgia under the same firm name as is used in other jurisdictions. However, an examination of the various ethics rules applicable to such an office indicates that a Georgia attorney practicing in such an office is under an affirmative responsibility to take steps to fully inform the public of limitations on the ability and qualifications of out-of-state attorneys to practice within the State of Georgia and to prevent the unauthorized practice of law within this State.1 The provisions of DR 2-102(A)(4) and of DR 2-102(D) clearly require that the letterhead of the multi-state firm make absolutely clear the jurisdictional limitations on the legal practice of members and associates of the firm who are not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions.\nDR 2-102(C) reads as follows:\n\"A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in fact partners.\"\nEC 2-13 reads as follows:\n\"In order to avoid the possibility of misleading persons with whom he deals, a lawyer should be scrupulous in the representation of his professional status. He should not hold himself out as being a partner or associate of a law firm if he is not one in fact, and thus should not hold himself out as a partner or association if he only shares offices with another lawyer.\"The provisions of EC 2-13 and DR 2-102(C) clearly indicates that any partner, associate or member of a firm, whether fully within the State of Georgia or part of a multi-state firm, must deal honestly with the Bar and the public with respect to his status with the firm.\nDR 3-101 reads as follows:\nAiding Unauthorized Practice of Law \"(A) A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. (B) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction.\"\nEC 3-9 reads, in part, as follows:\n \"Regulation of the practice of law is accomplished principally by the respective states. Authority to engage in the practice of law conferred in any jurisdiction is not per se, a grant of the right to practice elsewhere and it is improper for a lawyer to engage in practice where he is not permitted by law or by court order to do so...\"The provisions of DR 3-101 and EC 3-9 indicates that although a local attorney may be a member of a multi-state law firm, he may not aid lawyers not properly licensed in the State of Georgia to engage in the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. Additionally,\nDR 3-101(B) clearly indicates that practice by nonlicensed lawyers in Georgia will subject them to discipline in Georgia and, possibly, in their home state as well. Consequently, with the exception of those areas of law which fall within federal preemption, only those attorneys who are licensed within the State of Georgia may be based in, and may perform daily services amounting to the practice of law in, Georgia branch offices of multi-state law firms. This does not, however, mean that an out-of-state member of the firm may not cooperate with fully licensed local firm members to advise firm clients on legal problems which involve the law of more than one state or the law of Georgia and any other jurisdiction.\n The establishment of a thorough examination requirement by the Supreme Court of Georgia properly seeks to protect the citizens of the State of Georgia by assuring them that any persons undertaking to perform legal services within this State has met high standards of character and education. The definition of the practice of law found in Ga. Code Ann. § 9-401, et seq ., is quite broad and the resident associate of the out-of-state firm would be responsible for making sure that no improper practice of law results from the presence of his branch office within the State of Georgia.\nSpecial care should be taken by the local associate to insure that, where appropriate, fiduciary funds are placed in Georgia bank accounts as required by DR 9-102(A).\nThe authorities having been reviewed, the Board answers the inquiry in the affirmative, but notes that certain other requirements must also be met by the local associate of the out-of-state firm.","UrlName":"rule472","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d14bd42c-e9c6-48d9-965a-9c36d718da6f","Title":"Advisory Opinion 26","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 26 \nNovember 21, 1980 \n \nEthical Propriety of a Lawyer Sending Statutory Notice to Drawer of Bad Check Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and \"Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\nQuestion Presented:\nIs it ethically improper for a lawyer to send a statutory notice to the drawer of a bad check that states that unless said drawer pays the amount of the check in full within a specified period he will be subject to criminal prosecution?\nThe ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is Rule 3-107 (Canon &), EC-21 and DR 7-105(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Standard 49 of Rule 4-102 of the Georgia Bar Rules).\nDR 7-105(A) (Standard 49) provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> \n\"DR 7-105 - Threatening Criminal Prosecution \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(A) a lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter \". \n </div> \n</div>\nThe ethical consideration under this section states the following:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \nEC 7-21 The civil adjudicative process is primarily designed for the settlement of disputes between parties, while the criminal process is designed for the protection of society as a whole. Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process to coerce adjustment or private civil claims or controversies is a subversion of that process; further, the person against whom the criminal process is so misused may be deterred from asserting his legal rights and thus the usefulness of the civil process in settling private disputes is impaired. As in all cases of abuse of judicial process, the improper use of criminal process tends to diminish public confidence in our legal system \"Also applicable to this inquiry is Section 26-1704(a) of the Georgia Code Annotated, which provides as follows: \n</div>\n\"Bad Checks \"\n(a) A person commits criminal issuance of a bad check when he makes, draws, utters, or delivers a check, draft, or order for the payment of money on any bank or other depository in exchange for a present consideration or wages, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee. For the purposes of this section, it is prima facie evidence that the accused knew the instrument would not be honored if:\n(1) The accused had no account with the drawee at the time the instrument was made, drawn, uttered, or delivered; or,\n(2) Payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon presentation within 30 days after the delivery and the accused, or someone for him shall not have paid the holder thereof the amount due thereon, together with a service charge not to exceed $5 or five percent of the face amount of the instrument, whichever is greater, within 10 days after receiving written notice that payment was refused upon such instrument. For purposes of of this subsection (2):\n(A) Notice mailed by certified or registered mail, evidenced by return receipt, to the address printed on the instrument or given at the time of issuance shall be deemed sufficient and equivalent to notice having been received by the person making, drawing, uttering, or delivering said instrument whether such notice shall be returned undelivered or not.\n(B) The form of notice shall be substantially as follows:\n\"You are hereby notified that a check or instrument numbered _____, issued by you on _____ (date), drawn upon _____, (name of bank), and payable to _____, has been dishonored. Pursuant to Georgia Law, you have 10 days from receipt of this notice to tender payment of the full amount of such check or instrument plus a service charge of $5.00 or 5 percent (of the face amount of the check), whichever is greater, the total amount due being $_____ and _____ cents. Unless this amount is paid in full within the specified time above, the holder of such check or instrument may turn over the dishonored check or instrument and all other available information relating to this incident to the District Attorney or Solicitor for criminal prosecution.'\n(C) Any party holding a worthless check or instrument and giving notice in substantially similar form the that provided in subparagraph (B) shall be immune from civil liability for the giving of such notice and for proceeding under the forms of such notice.\"\n It should be noted that the State Bar directory rule and disciplinary standard provide that a lawyer should not threaten criminal prosecution solely to gain advantage in a civil matter (emphasis added). Before the drawer of a bad check drawn on his bank can be found in violation of Section26-1704 of the Criminal Code, he must be given written notice that payment of the check was refused by the bank. He must then fail to make payment to the holder of the bad check within ten days of the date he received written notice. Thus, notice sent pursuant to Section 26-1704 of the Georgia Code Annotated does not constitute an abuse of the criminal process in order to gain advantage in a civil matter. Rather, the notice allows the drawer of the bad check to avoid criminal liability by making the check good within ten days of the date he receives notice that the check was not honored by the bank. The notice is sent to the issuer of the bad check to make him aware that the instrument had not been honored by the bank and to allow him a reasonable time to correct what could be a valid mistake in accounting made by the drawer himself or by the bank.\nAccordingly, it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that it is not ethically improper for a lawyer to send notice to the drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Section 26-1704 of the Georgia Code Annotated.","UrlName":"rule473","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ce234b2f-f812-4354-b267-ebfbdd4d4056","Title":"Advisory Opinion 27","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 27 \nNovember 21, 1980 \n \nEthical Propriety of Revealing Confidences and Secrets Necessary to Defend Against Charges of Professional Misconduct \nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and \"Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Facts: An attorney represented two defendants who are each charged with criminal offenses arising out of the same incident. Both defendants were later found guilty of crimes in this matter. Subsequently, each defendant filed a Motion for new trial based on, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. At the hearing on the Motion for new trial the issue of the attorney's professional misconduct is raised. Later the attorney is charged by the state Bar with violations of disciplinary standards arising out of the same events.\n Question presented: Would it be ethically proper for the lawyer to reveal confidences or secrets of these clients which may be necessary to the lawyer's defense against the charges of professional misconduct?\nThe ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is RD 4-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Standard 28 of Rule 4-102 of the Georgia Bar Rules). DR 4-101 provides as follows:\nPreservation of Confidences and Secrets of Client\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (A) \"Confidence \"refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and \"secrets \"refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. \n \n(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 \n \n(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client: \n(2) use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client; \n(3) use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure. \n </div> \n</div>\n(C) A lawyer may reveal:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected; \n(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required law or court order; \n(3) the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime; \n(4) confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct. \n </div> \n(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-101 (C) through an employee. \n</div>\nAnother relevant consideration to this inquiry is the evidentiary rule known as the attorney-client privilege. This rule is stated at Georgia Code Annotated 38-419:\n\"38-419 Communications to Attorney by Client\nCommunication to any attorney, or his clerk, to be transmitted to the attorney pending his employment, or in anticipation thereof, shall never be heard by the court. So the attorney shall not disclose the advice or counsel he may give to his client, nor produce or deliver up title deeds or other papers, except evidences of debt left in his possession by his client. This rule will not exclude the attorney as a witness to any facts which may transpire in connection with his employment.\"\nAlso it should be noted that EC 4-4 recognizes that \"the attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client.\"\n With these rules in mind it appears that DR 4-101 (C) (4) specifically controls the situation presented by this inquiry. This rule holds that \"a lawyer may reveal the confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.\"(emphasis added)\n The policy considerations applicable to this situation are stated in Hyde v. State, 70 Ga App. 823, at 827:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n\"Where an attorney's fidelity as to a transaction has been attacked, with the imputation that he has been unfaithful to the interest of his client, it would be a harsh rule to permit testimony by the client in a cause, spread upon the public record, of this character, and not to permit the attorney to explain. The rule is settled by all the authorities that in litigation between the client and his attorney, the attorney, of course, has the right to make a full disclosure bearing upon the litigation, for the purpose of defending his property rights; the defense of character, where publicly attacked is just as important, and to some more so, than property rights; it would violate a principal of natural justice and inherent equity to say that the right of the attorney's defense is merged in a privileged communication when the client himself makes a public accusation (the relationship between client and attorney, having been private as to that particular matter, has become public by the act of the client) the spirit of the rule ceases when the client charges fraud. By making the attack in his unsworn statement upon the character and professional conduct of the attorney, the defendant waived his right to have their transactions considered as privileged (Code, 38-419), and the attorney was competent to give testimony to show that he did not act basely in the transaction, as his one-time client claimed. And it was not error to permit the attorney to testify to facts so far as necessary to defend his character, notwithstanding the rule against the disclosure of confidential communications between attorney and client.\" \n</div>\nAccordingly, the State Disciplinary Board is of the opinion that it would be ethically proper for the lawyer to reveal the confidences or secrets of these clients in any proceedings in which they may be necessary to defend the lawyer against charges of professional misconduct.","UrlName":"rule474","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5ab4c155-ef55-4395-a579-65fff5f4c2f8","Title":"Advisory Opinion 29","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 29 \n November 20, 1981\n Guidelines for Disputes with Attorneys' Fees Set by Workman's Compensation Board\nPursuant to the provisions of the Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Factual Background:\nThe State Board of Workers' Compensation is authorized by Georgia Law to approve the fee of attorneys who represent workers' compensation claimants. Occasionally, the Workers' Compensation Board may approve an attorney's fee, which it has determined is reasonable, but which is less than the amount the attorney and client (workers' compensation claimant) have agreed upon in the fee contract. The lawyer may then appeal the determination of the Workers' Compensation Board concerning his fee to the Superior Court. In such an appeal, the only issue before the Superior Court is the decision of the Superior Court in favor of the attorney is to reduce the client's/claimant's share of the workers' compensation award while increasing proportionately the lawyer's share of the award.\n Question Presented:\nDoes a lawyer who has represented a claimant in a workers' compensation case have an ethical obligation to advise his client of his right to obtain independent counsel to represent the client when the lawyer decides to appeal the amount the Workers' Compensation Board has approved as the lawyer's fee?\nA lawyer has a duty to exercise his independent professional judgment at all times on behalf of and for the protection of his client. Whenever the lawyer's personal interests or the interests of others cause him to compromise his loyalty and objectivity to his client, a conflict of interest exists, and it is improper for the lawyer to undertake or continue representation of the client under these circumstances.\nAn association marked by trust and intimacy develops between a client and a lawyer who has represented that client throughout vigorous workers' compensation litigation, and who has obtained a satisfactory workers' compensation award for the client. If a lawyer decides that he will appeal the attorney's fee award of the workers' Compensation Board to the Superior Court, the client may not understand that suddenly he and the lawyer are adversaries, and the lawyer will no longer be acting his best interest. The lawyer should, therefore, explain to the client that since he is appealing the amount of fees the Board has approved, he is seeking to reduce the amount of money the client will receive in order to increase the amount he will receive. For that reason, the lawyer should take care to make a full disclosure to the client of their respective positions during the appeal and advise the client of his right to obtain independent counsel to advise him during this stage of the litigation.\n The Georgia Supreme Court indicated in Arey v. Davis, 233 Ga. 951 (1975), that even when the original attorney-client relationship has ended, if a fiduciary relationship continues to exist between a lawyer and client, the lawyer is required to advise the client to seek independent legal advice from another lawyer before pursuing a course of conduct to protect the interest of the lawyer at the expense of the client.\nIt should be noted that there is no conflict of interest in those cases in which the claimant's attorney seeks an assessment of punitive attorney's fees under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 114-712 (b). In these instances, the employer-insurer will be responsible for the additional fees rather than the client/claimant.\n Conclusion:\nIn workers' compensation cases in which the employee-claimant's attorney seeks to increase his fee by appealing the Board's fee determination to the Superior Court, the lawyer is involved in a conflict of interest if he does not give the client a full explanation concerning their conflicting positions in the appeal and advise the client of his right to obtain independent legal counsel to protect the client's interests during this stage of litigation.","UrlName":"rule475","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fdc1d4eb-86b0-4daf-b413-a2a9ebaf8552","Title":"Advisory Opinion 30","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 30 \n November 17, 1982\n Ethical Propriety of Agreement by Which Attorney's Fees are Paid by Opposing Party\n Question : A is the plaintiff in a lawsuit against B which is pending in the Northern District of Georgia. B is the debtor in a proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Texas. In addition, there is pending in the same Bankruptcy Court in Texas an action in which B is the plaintiff and C, D, and E are defendants. E is also a full-time employee of A. B contends that C, D, and E are or may be liable to B for all or part of the claims being asserted against B by A in the Georgia litigation.\nA and B have agreed upon a complete settlement of all matters in controversy between them in a settlement agreement which must be approved by the Bankruptcy Court.\nThe settlement agreement provides that the Georgia litigation will be dismissed with prejudice. B will ask the Bankruptcy Court to dismiss E as a defendant in that Court, without prejudice to further proceedings by B against C and D, and will give E a covenant not to sue. however, the parties recognize that there is a possibility that C and/or D will assert claims against E and/or A, seeking contribution from either or both of them, either in the pending action in the Bankruptcy Court or in some other action. In order to protect both E and A, B has agreed to indemnify and hold them harmless from \"expenses and costs of defending such claims, including reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees,\"subject to obtaining a written opinion from the State Bar of Georgia that such agreement is ethical and is not a violation of the Canons of Ethics.\n Opinion : It is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia that the foregoing agreement is ethical and is not a violation of the Canons of Ethics, provided that a full disclosure of all pertinent facts has been made to all parties who may be affected by such agreement, give their written consent to it; and, provided further, that the attorneys at all times exercise their independent professional judgment for their respective clients regardless of who is responsible for paying the fees of the attorneys.","UrlName":"rule476","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a3bad30b-fb21-4d48-9502-6ddfeaa79f95","Title":"Advisory Opinion 31","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 31 \nNovember 19, 1982 \n Dual Occupations: Ethical considerations applicable to a Lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and another profession or business.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and the Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Questions presented:\n(1) Should a Georgia attorney, also possessing a Georgia real estate salesperson's license, who arranges a real estate transaction in his or her capacity as a real estate salesperson decline to perform any title work or other legal work in order to avoid an appearance of professional impropriety?\n(2) If, in the course of representing a client in an unrelated legal matter, the client requests the attorney (also possessing a real estate salesperson's license) to locate a buyer or seller for the client's real estate, is it proper for the attorney to accept?\nThe American Bar Association stated in Formal Opinion No. 328, June 1972, that it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer simultaneously to hold himself out as a lawyer and as a member of another profession or business. However, the American Bar Association concluded that a lawyer that is engaged in the practice of law and another profession which is closely related to law, must govern his conduct according to the professional standards of the legal profession while engaged in the non-legal profession or business.\nFollowing the rationale of the American Bar Association, it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that a Georgia attorney who is also engaged in the real estate business should conform his behavior to the standards of conduct of the State Bar of Georgia while engaged in both professions. Accordingly, it would not be improper for the attorney to perform the work requested in both of your inquiries provided the attorney complies with the provisions of DR 2-103, DR 2-104, and DR 2-105 of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility (Standards 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 of Rule 4-102 of the Georgia Bar Rules).\nWhen an attorney, who is actively practicing law in the State of Georgia, is also engaged in a second profession or business closely related to the practice of law, all of the provisions of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable to the lawyer's conduct in both professions.","UrlName":"rule477","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24ef30af-01cf-4b5c-b5cf-d2841117e5e8","Title":"Advisory Opinion 35","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 35 \nJuly 15, 1983 \n Attorney's Responsibilities with Respect to the Payment of Witness Fees\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations of the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request of such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Attorney (A) represents Client (C), the plaintiff in a civil suit for damages. In the course of preparation for C's case, A uses the services of an expert witness (W); nothing specific is mentioned concerning compensation of W.\nC has no substantial asset other than the claim that is the subject of the suit, and will be able to pay the witness fees only if he is successful in securing a recovery. By the same token, if A advances the fees to W, A will have little or no chance of being reimbursed by C, if C loses his case.\n(1) Would it be proper for A to pay the costs, realizing that he might never be reimbursed by C?\n(2) Would it be proper for A to say nothing and keep W waiting for payment until some recovery has been had?\n(3) Generally, should the State Bar reconsider the ethical prohibition against contingency fees for expert witnesses in light of the practicalities involved?\n Opinion: Standard 58 of Bar Rule 4-102 and DR 7-109 (c) expressly prohibit payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the outcome of a case. Standard 58 does not, however, prohibit an attorney from advancing, guaranteeing or acquiescing in the payment of expenses reasonably incurred by a witness.\nStandard 32 of Bar Rule 4-102 requires that the client must remain ultimately liable for any expenses advanced or guaranteed by the attorney. Ethical Consideration 5-8 (Canon 5) explains that it is not proper for an attorney to have a financial interest in the outcome of his client's case, as such an interest might affect his independent professional judgment; thus, the client must remain ultimately liable for the expenses of litigation.\nA (the attorney in the set of facts above) is not sure what he is ethically required to do in light of Standards 32 and 58. If A pays the fees to W and C loses his case, C will not be able to repay A. Is this, in fact, a violation of Standard 32?\nThe Board's answer to this question must be that such a situation does not violate Standard 32. While it is true that A may never be paid by C for the expenses advanced to W, C is still ultimately liable to A for his expenses. A can pursue legal remedy against C and might be reimbursed at some point in the future. Thus, A's liability to W is at most penultimate.\n It should be noted that in Brown and Huseby, Inc. v. Chrietzberg, 242 Ga. 232, 248 S.E. 2d 631 (1978), the Supreme Court of Georgia held an attorney may be liable for court reporter's fees if he personally guarantees payment therefor and the reporter reasonably relies upon the attorney for their payments. The Court stated that such a holding did not force the attorney to violate Standard 32, as the client would remain ultimately liable to the attorney.\nA also wonders if he can simply make W wait until the final outcome of the case, realizing that, in effect, W can only collect from C if C is successful. A fears that such a course of action (or inaction) might violate Standard 58's prohibition against contingency fees for witnesses.\n The Board, once again, finds no violation of a disciplinary standard here. First, there is no actual contingency. The term contingency implies that no liability will arise without the happening of a certain event. In this case, C will have a legal obligation to pay W even if he cannot, in fact, pay him. Secondly, A might be required to pay W under the doctrine of Brown and Huseby. In either event, W will not be required to await the outcome of the case to have a claim against C and/or A for recovery of the services he has rendered.\nFinally, A thinks that the prohibition against contingency fees for witnesses is impractical and ought to be reconsidered.\n It should be noted that rules substantially similar to Rule 58 have met constitutional challenges (e.g. Pearson v. Association of Bar of City of New York, cert. den. 434 US 924 (1978) ). The Board finds that the problem in A's case does not stem from any impracticality inherent in rule 58. Rather, A's problem arose when he failed to discuss the details of compensation with W, before he used W's services. Witnesses should know who to look to for payment for their services from the outset. An attorney's failure to appraise the witness of such details might put him in A's seemingly no-win (financial, rather than ethical) situation.","UrlName":"rule478","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"99a17efa-1ad2-4b79-b3fb-0c795e3ce6f0","Title":"Advisory Opinion 36","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 36 \nSeptember 23, 1983 \n Contingent Fees in Divorce Cases\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented:\nWhether it is ethically proper for an attorney to enter into a contingency-fee arrangement in a divorce case.\n The question presented for resolution by this Board involves questions of law as well as ethics. It should be noted that the Georgia Appellate Courts have consistently held that contingency fee arrangements in divorce cases are void as against public policy, Evans v. Hartley , 57 Ga. App. 598 (1938); Fleming v. Phinizy , 35 Ga. App. 792 (1926); and that similar arrangements in cases to collect future child support are likewise invalid, Thomas v. Holt , 209 Ga. 133 (1952). The courts in Georgia have not considered the question of whether contingency fees are proper in an action to enforce past due alimony or child support.\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are DR 5-103, EC 5-7 and DR 2-106 and EC 2-20.\nCanon 5, DR 5-103 and EC 5-7 pertain to the ethical propriety of contingency fees in general. These ethical guidelines discourage lawyers from accepting cases on a contingency fee basis to avoid the possibility of an adverse effect on the lawyer's independent professional judgment. While recognizing that a contingency-fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, EC 5-7 states that \"a reasonable contingency fee is permissible in civil cases because it may be the only means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice.\"This Rule, however, cautions a lawyer to enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those instances where the arrangement will be beneficial to the client.\nThe question presented by this inquiry is directly addressed by EC 2-20. In pertinent part, this Ethical Consideration provides that contingent-fee arrangements in domestic relation cases, are rarely justified \"because of the human relationships involved and the unique character of the proceedings.\"\nApplying the above-cited authorities to the question presented, it is the opinion of this Board that a contingent fee arrangement in a divorce case is against public policy and is therefore improper. It should be noted that this opinion is limited to the type of fee arrangements prohibited by the Georgia courts in the cases cited above, and does not address the ethical propriety of a contingency arrangement where the matter is limited solely to the collection of a liquidated amount.","UrlName":"rule479","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ca62537e-c6f2-4350-aade-b31ec2a4b3af","Title":"Advisory Opinion 37","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 37 \nJanuary 20, 1984 \n Attorney's Fees for Collecting PIP Benefits\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented:\nIs it ethically proper for an attorney to take a contingent fee from a client's PIP benefits?\n Opinion:\nThe applicable ethical rules are DR 2-106 and Standard 31(b) of Bar Rule 4-102. Directory Rule 2-106 provides in part:\nDR 2-106--Fees for Legal Services.\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. \n(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; \n(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; \n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; \n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; \n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; \n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; \n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer, or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. \n </div> \n</div>\n Standard 31(b) allow an attorney to \"contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case \"(emphasis added).\nUnder the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-1 through 13) all insurance policies must provide for compensation to injured persons, without regard to fault, for medical expenses, loss of wages, some expenses and burial expenses. This insurance coverage is generally known as PIP coverage. Payments of PIP benefits are required to be made within thirty (30) days after the insurance carrier receives reasonable proof of the fact and the amount of loss. All that is needed to file for PIP benefits is a simple, factual claim form.\nThe basis on which attorneys are allowed to take contingency fees is that the claim on which the attorney represents the client is itself contingent. Blacks Law Dictionary defines contingent as \"possible, but not assured.\"\nExcept in unusual circumstances, the benefits paid under PIP coverage are assured. It is the opinion of this Board that the taking of a contingency fee for the filling out of routine, undisputed PIP claim forms is unreasonable and a violation of DR 2-106(B)(1) and Standard 31(b). An attorney may charge a reasonable fee for the attorney's time spent in processing a PIP claim.\nIn those unusual circumstances when the payment of PIP benefits is not assured, this Board does not wish to prohibit contingency fees in general. However, the attorney should examine the factors set out in DR 2-106(B) to determine whether a contingent fee arrangement would be reasonable.","UrlName":"rule480","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"53c376e7-f51d-4714-aca7-e9d14a5be5ae","Title":"Advisory Opinion 38","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 38 \nJuly 20, 1984 \n Law Clerks Preparing Appellate Briefs\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: May a Law Clerk for a Superior Court Judge prepare appellate briefs on behalf of defendants in criminal cases where the death penalty has been imposed under the following circumstances?\n 1) The cases would be from other judicial circuits; \n3) The work would be performed in the Law Clerk's spare time and he would receive no compensation; \n2) Both the prisoner and judge consent to the Law Clerk's representation after full disclosure; \n4) No county or state materials would be used; \n5) The Law Clerk is paid by the county and serves at the judge's pleasure.\n Opinion: The applicable ethical rules are Canons 5 and 9; ECs 5-14, 5-15, 9-1 and 9-2; DR 5-105; and Standards 35 and 37.\nThe Law Clerk for a Superior Court Judge occupies a unique position. The \"client \"of the Law Clerk is the State of Georgia through the Judge who supervises the Clerk's activities. While a Law Clerk is not specifically subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Clerk is in a close relationship with the Judge who is subject to that code. Lawyers and members of the public view a Law Clerk as an extension of the Judge for whom the Clerk works.\nFor a Law Clerk to take a position against the State representing a prisoner who has been convicted in the State of Georgia, the Clerk will be in a conflict of interest situation. On one hand, the Clerk is representing the person against the State while on the other hand, the Clerk represents the State in the administration of justice through the Superior Court Judge.\nCanon 9 states that:\n\"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of a Professional Impropriety.\"\nIt is the opinion of this Board that a Law Clerk representing criminal defendants would give rise to the appearance of professional impropriety under Canon 9 and ECs 9-1 and 9-2. Additionally, Standard 37 (and DR 5-105) allows a lawyer to represent multiple clients in a conflict of interest situation only if \"it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each \". It is the opinion this Board that a Law Clerk cannot adequately represent the interest of the State of Georgia in death penalty cases and the interest of other prisoners in other death penalty cases.\nThe State Disciplinary Board does not reach the question of whether or not the Law Clerk is subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct as that is a proper question for the Judicial Qualifications Commission.","UrlName":"rule481","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5900d6f6-52be-4831-8e0c-04216eeffa05","Title":"Advisory Opinion 39","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 39 \nJuly 20, 1984 \n Propriety of Defendant's Tender of Lump Sum Settlement Offers to Plaintiffs in Federal Civil Rights Actions Wherein Statutory Attorney Fees are Provided for Successful Plaintiffs\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations of the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Questions Presented : In the U.S. District Court, plaintiff files his claim alleging a violation of first and fourteenth amendments as well as 42 USC §1983, etc. Plaintiff's counsel is typically a corresponding attorney with the American Civil liberties Union. The defendant is typically a private physician, private hospital or drug rehabilitation facility.\nRelated state claims are frequently also raised in such cases, including charges of false imprisonment, battery, medical negligence and violation of state laws regarding involuntary hospitalization, etc. In addition to amounts sought for compensatory and punitive damages, there is also a prayer if not expressly contained in the complaint then, implicitly under the U.S. Code, for statutory attorney's fees under 42 USC §1988.\nIf it is determined during the course of the pre-trial discovery process that an offer to settle the case should be extended to the plaintiffs, such an offer would typically be in the form of a lump sum which would represent the total amount to be paid by the insurance carrier for compensatory and punitive damages as well as any attorney's fees. Neither the defendant nor the insurance carrier would have any interest as to how that lump sum would be divided between the plaintiff and his attorney, the only interest therein being that it represented the maximum extent of their exposure.\nIn a case involving alleged violations of Federal civil rights statutes pending the U.S. District Court in Georgia where the prevailing party would be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as expenses of the litigation, is it unethical or in any way improper for the defendant, in an attempt to settle the case prior to trial, to offer a dollar amount representing the total of compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees which would be received by the plaintiff and his counsel?\nIf the answer to the foregoing is yes, could the ethical violation be cured by entering into an agreement between plaintiff, his attorneys and the defendant, agreeing upon an amount representing compensatory and punitive damages to be received by the plaintiff himself and a separate amount representing compensation for legal services?\n Opinion: It should be first noted that to the extent that the foregoing questions involve interpretations of federal or other law, that the State Disciplinary Board is without authority to consider those aspects of this matter. This opinion will, therefore, address only the ethical aspects of the conduct in question according to the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility. Furthermore, the State Disciplinary Board recognizes that since this inquiry arises in a federal setting, a separate body of federal ethical rules may apply and in responding, the State Disciplinary Board will not undertake to interpret any federal ethical rules.\n The State Disciplinary Board is aware of at least one other Bar Association which has issued a written opinion concerning a similar, if not identical, fact situation. Having read and considered Opinion Nos. 80-94 and 82-80 of the Ethics Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York , which opinions hold that it is unethical for a defendant's counsel to demand a waiver of statutory attorney fees from plaintiff as a condition for settlement in federal civil rights cases involving statutory attorney fees, we decline to adopt the position taken by the majority of that Committee in both of those two opinions. Briefly stated, those opinions held that defendant's demands for waiver of the statutory attorney fees \"had the effect of placing the plaintiff's lawyers in conflict with their clients and undercutting the policies of the civil rights statutes which provided for fees and that accordingly the demands were prejudicial to the administration of justice.\"Opinion No. 82-80 . We are instead, more persuaded by the position taken by the dissent in Opinion No. 82-80 , which cited with approval the following language from the United States Supreme Court in White v. New Hampshire , 455 U.S. 445, 71 L. Ed. 2d 325, 332, n. 15 (1982), a case where the issue of the ethical propriety of simultaneous negotiation of attorney fees in federal civil rights actions was raised, but not actually decided:\n\"In considering whether to enter a negotiated settlement, a defendant may have good reason to demand to know his total liability from both damages and fees. Although such situations may raise difficult ethical issues for a plaintiff's attorney, we are reluctant to hold that no resolution is ever available to ethical counsel.\"\nAlthough no provisions of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility appear to address this issue directly, Standard 45(f) of Bar Rule 4-102 states, in pertinent part, that a lawyer shall not \"settle a legal proceeding or claim without obtaining proper authorization from his client.\"Implicit in this rule is the notion that attorneys must communicate with their clients concerning possible settlement of a cause of action, and offer the benefit of their professional advice and judgment so that the client's decision to make a settlement offer is as informed and intelligent a choice as is reasonably possible.\nClearly, in appropriate cases, the question of a defendant's liability for plaintiff's attorney fees, where so provided by statute, can be a significant factor in reaching a decision as to whether to make an offer of settlement. To force a defendant into proposing a settlement offer wherein plaintiffs statutory attorney fees are not negotiated and incorporated into the final settlement offer leaves a defendant in a position of exposure that is at best, uncertain, and at worst so tenuous that meaningful settlement proposals might never be made. Such a situation undeniably impedes the settlement process and is inimical to the resolution of disputes between parties. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Board that it is not unethical for defendant's counsel to offer to plaintiff, under the facts presented, a lump sum settlement offer prior to trial for a dollar amount representing the total amount of damages and attorney fees for plaintiff's counsel.\nOur resolution of this first question appears to make an answer the second question unnecessary.","UrlName":"rule482","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e6164aab-18be-4105-9bf9-dcd212735ac6","Title":"Advisory Opinion 40","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 40 \nSeptember 21, 1984 \n Misuse of Subpoenas\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Standards of Conduct of the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Whether or not it is a violation of Standard 4 of the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Georgia for an attorney to issue a subpoena for the Production of Documents pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a), directing the witness to appear at a lawyer's office or some other location, when in fact no hearing or trial is taking place and no notice of such subpoena is served upon opposing counsel?\nWhether or not it is a violation of Standard 4 of the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Georgia for an attorney to issue a subpoena pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-45 when no notice of deposition has been filed and served upon all parties and when no deposition has in fact been scheduled?\n Discussion: Disciplinary Standard 4 of the State Bar of Georgia provides as follows:\nA lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation. A violation of this Standard may be punished by disbarment.\n A subpoena is a judicial writ issued in the name of the court by the clerk when attendance is required at court. (See Agnor's Georgia Evidence § 2-3). In the case of White v. Gulf States Paper , 119 Ga. App. 271, 273 (1969), it was stated that our subpoena statutes were limited only to producing documentary evidence at a hearing or trial. In the White decision, the court noted that the old Georgia Code Section 38-8 and 38-9 dealt only with the production of documentary evidence at a hearing or trial and that the new Act (1966 which constitutes our present subpoena law) did not enlarge the provisions of the repealed law to allow use of a Notice to Produce at depositions. This particular case brought about the amendment to Rule 45 of the Civil Practice Act.\nO.C.G.A. § 9-11-45 provides that a subpoena shall issue for persons sought to be deposed and may command the person to produce documents. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-30(b)(1) requires notice to every other party of all depositions. Reading Rule 30 and Rule 45 together, it is obvious that before a subpoena can be issued, notice of the deposition must be given to all parties.\nIn consideration of the above, a subpoena issued pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a) should only be issued for actual hearings and trials and should not be requested when in fact no hearing or trial has been scheduled. Likewise, a subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 45 of the Civil Practice Act should be requested and issued only for depositions which have been actually scheduled by agreement between parties or where a notice of deposition has been filed and served upon all parties, and should not be issued when no deposition has been scheduled.\nThe Board is concerned with the misuse of subpoenas as presented in the two situations discussed because subpoenas are court documents. Non-party witnesses would be misled by such court process into releasing confidential or privileged material without the party having a chance to contest the relevancy, confidentiality or privilege of the material contained in the file because the subpoena is sent without notice to any other party or their counsel. Notice is a concept embraced by the Civil Practice Act. There is no need for notice of a subpoena issue pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a) because all parties receive notice of hearings and trials, so long as they are real hearings and real trials.\n Conclusion: In the opinion of the Board, the use of subpoenas as described herein is a willful misrepresentation to and fraud upon:\n (1) The issuing court; \n(2) The issuing clerk: \n(3) The person or entities to whom the subpoena is directed; and, \n(4) The opposing party and counsel, with the purview of Disciplinary Standard 4.","UrlName":"rule484","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d056c887-3e39-4cb9-97b0-abb52d8d7909","Title":"Advisory Opinion 41","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 41 \nSeptember 24, 1984, \nas amended November 15, 1985 \n \nClient Confidentiality \nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations of the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia starting with Rules and Regulations (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request of such, rendered its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Lawyer X has received cash fees from clients in excess of $10,000 several times in the past three years. All of these fees were for representation in criminal matters. Each time, X has deposited the money in either his operating account or escrow account, when appropriate, and filed a Currency Transaction Report, as required by 31 C.F.R. § 103.22. Subsequently, X received a telephone inquiry from a revenue agent with the Georgia Department of Revenue inquiring into the source of the funds recorded on the currency transaction report. Lawyer X refused to divulge the names of his clients.\nThe State of Georgia then issued a Notice to Produce, requiring production of \"...all books, records, papers and/or documents pertaining to [Lawyer X's personal Corporate Georgia Income Tax] For the periods indicated [1981-1983].\"The Notice to Produce did not name a specific person as a client for an investigation, but Lawyer X was verbally advised by the revenue agent that in fact, the purpose of this Notice to Produce was to discover, at random, the names of the client, and to audit the lawyer.\n(1) Will Lawyer X violate the confidences and secrets provision of the Code of Ethics by complying with the Notice to Produce in revealing the identity of the client in those transactions in excess of $10,000?\n(2) Additionally, will Lawyer X violate the confidences and secrets provision of the Code of Ethics by complying with the Notice to Produce in revealing the identity of all of his clients and the amount of fees paid, whether by case, check, or any amount above or less than $10,000?\n Opinion : The applicable ethical rules are Canon 4; EC's 4-1 through 4-6; and Standard 28.\nIt should be first noted that the questions addressed in this opinion pertain only to a general Notice to Produce seeking information from an attorney's file. The dollar amount involved in the hypothetical is not controlling; rather it is the fact that the Notice to Produce is not addressed to a particular client or clients that is of concern to the Board.\nCanon 4 states: \"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.\"As EC 4-1 explains, the observance of the lawyer's ethical obligation to hold inviolate confidences and secrets of his client encourages laymen to seek legal assistance and facilitates full development of the facts essential to proper representation of the client. EC 4-5 directs that a lawyer should not use secrets acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client. This obligation continues even after the termination of the lawyer's employment. (EC 4-6)\nThese principles are incorporated in the Director Rules and Disciplinary Standards. DR 4-101 and Standard 28 prohibit a lawyer from revealing the confidences and secrets of a client. A violation of this Standard is punishable by disbarment. A lawyer may reveal confidences and secrets of a client only (1) if the clients consents after full disclosure; (2) where the confidences or secrets are permitted to be disclosed under the Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order; (3) where the client intends to commit a crime and information is necessary to prevent the crime; or (4) where it is necessary for the lawyer to establish and collect his fee, or defend himself against the accusation of wrongful conduct.\n The ethical and disciplinary rules distinguish between \"confidences \"and \"secrets.\"The former is information protected by the attorney/client privilege as determined by applicable law, and is more limited than the ethical obligation of the lawyer to guard the secrets of his client. A secret, on the other hand, refers to \"other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which could be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client .\"(emphasis supplied) [DR 4-101(a) and Standard 28(c)].\nIt is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that in responding to a general Notice to Produce Lawyer X must not voluntarily reveal the name/identity of his clients to the Georgia Department of Revenue unless he obtains the consent of the client or clients affected after a full disclosure. [Standard 28(b)(1)] Further, Lawyer X must resist disclosure until a court orders disclosure [Standard 28(b)(2)] and thereafter he may pursue all reasonable avenues of appeal.\nThis decision finds support in the opinions of at least four other Bar Associations which have issued opinions concerning a similar, if not identical, factual situation. Briefly stated, these opinions hold that an attorney must resist disclosure of the name/identity of his client. The District of Columbia, Philadelphia and Birmingham Opinions go further and require an attorney to utilize all appellate avenues before making disclosure.\n Opinion No. 124 of the Committee on Legal Ethics the District of Columbia Bar Association (March 22, 1983); Opinion No. 81-95 of the Professional Guidance Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association (undated); Opinion of Professional Ethics of the Birmingham Bar Association (unnumbered) (January 9, 1981); and Informal Opinion No. 81-3 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Connecticut Bar Association (October 9, 1980).","UrlName":"rule485","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f82c57c-2110-4fac-bd3d-bac1613e6045","Title":"Advisory Opinion 42","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 42 \nNovember 16, 1984 \n Attorney's Disclosure of Client's Possible Intent to Commit Suicide\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. as amended) the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Attorney (A) represents client (C), who is facing a multiple felony indictment and substantial possibility of conviction thereon. C has sought advice from A concerning matters one would normally expect to be consulted about by a terminally ill person trying to put his affairs in order prior to death. Although C has never directly so stated to A, by his actions and conduct, C has led A to believe that C intends to commit suicide prior to his criminal trial.\nA has inquired whether Informal Opinion No. 83-1500 of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (June 24, 1983), which authorized a lawyer to disclose to other persons the definite threat of his client to take his own life would apply to a situation where the client has not definitely expressed such an intention, but, by his actions, has given his attorney reason to believe that he intends to take his own life.\n Opinion: For the same reasons set forth in ABA Informal Opinion No. 83-1500 (A copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference), the Board is of the opinion that when an attorney reasonably believes his client is contemplating suicide, he should be permitted to disclose such information as a last resort in a life-or-death situation when the lawyer's efforts to counsel the client have apparently failed.\n Standing Committee on Ethics \nand Professional Responsibility\n<div align=\"left\"> \n <table width=\"75%\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td valign=\"top\"> Informal Op. 83-1500  \n         Disclosure of Client's Intent \n         to Commit Suicide </td> \n <td valign=\"top\">June 24, 1983</td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n </table> \n</div>\nThis inquiry involves the situation in which a client who has retained a lawyer to draft her will confides to the lawyer that she intends to take her own life. The client also disclosed that she has been hospitalized for mental exhaustion on at least one occasion after a previous suicide attempt. Neither suicide nor attempted suicide is a crime in the jurisdiction. The lawyer asks whether the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits the lawyer from disclosing to a third person the intention of his client to take her own life.\nDR 4-101(B) of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from revealing a confidence or secret of his client. An exception is provided in DR 4-101(C)(3), which permits a lawyer to reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. A literal reading of \"crime \"in this provision renders the exception inapplicable in the inquiring lawyer's jurisdiction. The same conclusion would be reached under proposed Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), which provides that a lawyer may reveal information relating to representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act the lawyer believes likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.\n Ethics committees in two states have dealt with his problem. In Opinion 486 (1978), the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar Association concluded that while suicide had been decriminalized in New York and DR4-101(C)(3) did not literally apply, the overriding social concern for the preservation of human life permitted the lawyer to disclose the information. The New York committee pointed out that the decriminalization of suicide in the state was not intended to effect any basic change in underlying common law and statutory provisions reflecting deep concern for the preservation of human life and the prevention of suicide. Accordingly, the committee analyzed an announced intention to commit suicide in the same manner as proposed criminal conduct under DR 4-101(C)(3). Addressing the same issue in Opinion 79-61 (1979),the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar Association determined that although neither suicide nor attempted suicide is in itself punishable under the criminal law of Massachusetts, both have in other respects been deemed to be malum in se and treated as unlawful and criminal.\nThat committee cited the New York State Bar Association Opinion 486 and reached the same conclusion.\nWe believe that in light of the following language of EC7-12 relating to proper conduct in dealing with the client with a disability, these Committees reached the proper conclusion:\n<blockquote> \nAny mental or physical condition of a client that renders  him incapable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf, casts additional  responsibilities on his lawyer... If the disability of a client, in the lack of a legal  representative compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should  consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance  the interest of his client.... \n</blockquote>\nThis concept is also recognized in the ABA proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct:\n<blockquote> \nA lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take  other protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably  believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest. \n</blockquote>\nThe inquirer may justifiably conclude that his client is unable to make a considered judgment on this ultimate life or death question and should be permitted to disclose the information as a last resort when the lawyer's efforts to counsel the client have apparently failed. This interpretation is limited to the circumstance of this particular opinion request and should not be relied upon to permit the disclosure of any other information in any other situation.","UrlName":"rule486","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"183aad70-d7cd-4ada-9b59-ecb93c8bc202","Title":"Advisory Opinion 45","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 45 \nMarch 15, 1985, \nas amended November 15, 1985 \n Charging Interest on Clients' Overdue Bills\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Questions Presented:\n<div>1. A client is billed for service rendered and fails to pay after thirty (30) days have elapsed. Is it permissible to notify the client, by letter, that unless his account is paid in full, interest will be charged on the next bill on the unpaid balance?</div>\n2. A client signs a fee contract with an attorney providing for the charging of interest on any unpaid balance. Is it permissible for the attorney to charge interest?\n 3. An attorney notifies his or her client by letter that interest will be charged unless their accounts are paid in full. If the conduct described in question 1 is impermissible, can the attorney rectify the situation by rebilling the clients with any interest charged deducted, or if interest was paid returned? \n \n Opinion: The State Disciplinary Board is of the opinion that an attorney may ethically unilaterally charge interest on client's overdue bills. A lawyer may ethically do so provided that he or she complies with all applicable law, specifically O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts contained in Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act as amended (15 USC 1601 et seq.) and EC 2-19, which states: As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed, it is desirable that he reach a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made. Such a course will not only prevent later misunderstanding but will also work for good relations between the lawyer and the client. It is usually beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent. A lawyer should be mindful that many persons who desire to employ him may have had little or no experience with fee charges of lawyers, and for this reason he should explain fully to such persons the reasons for the particular fee arrangement he proposes. The Board is of the opinion that an attorney can comply with EC 2-19 and unilaterally charge interest without a prior specific agreement with a client if notice is given to the client in advance that interest will be charged on fee bills which become delinquent after a stated period of time, but not less than 30 days. The Board recommends that notice be provided on the bill at the time it is sent and that the notice be conspicuous and printed in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the bill. The notice must specify the amount of interest to be charged and the period of time after which it will be imposed.\n Attorneys should be aware that additional notice and disclosure requirements may be imposed by law, including the specific requirements of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 and the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts, supra . This opinion relates only to those instances where a charge of interest is imposed on a client's overdue bill and has no applicability to the extension of credit or the obtaining of security by an attorney.\nTherefore, the questions presented are answered as follows:\n<div> 1. Yes. An attorney may charge his clients interest provided the attorney complies with EC 2-19 and all applicable law, specifically O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 and the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts, supra .</div>\n2. See the answer to question 1.\n3. Due to the Board's answer to question 1, this question need not be addressed.","UrlName":"rule487","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a84f55f1-df09-45e3-afdf-f116e9ecc1f4","Title":"Advisory Opinion 46","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 46 \nMarch 15, 1985 \n Third Party Advancing or Reimbursing an Insured (Policyholder) for the Latter's Purchase of Optional PIP Coverage\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Factual Background: Attorney (A) represents Client (C) whose spouse was struck and killed by a van as he crossed the street. The deceased spouse had no automobile insurance, while the van driver was insured and his policy provided only basic PIP benefits. These basic benefits extended to the deceased's family and were paid out by the driver's insurance.\nEventually, a settlement of the liability claim was reached. A approached the attorney (X) who represented the driver (Y) and inquired as to whether or not his client would be willing to apply for and tender the premium for optional PIP coverage available under former O.C.g.A. § 33-34-5(B) (Ga. Code Ann. § 56-34046). X consulted with Y and advised that Y would be willing to do so but only on condition that C advance Y the amount for the additional premium and pay Y for his time in making the application for the optional coverage.\n According to a recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Bailey v. Georgia Mutual Ins. Co. , 168 Ga. App. 706, 309 S.E. 2d 870 (1983), \"a demand for increased coverage by the policyholder is necessary before those who would be incidental or third-party beneficiaries as 'other insureds' can seek optional benefits.\"Thus, C and the child of the deceased pedestrian, who was not a direct policyholder, would not have legal standing to apply for and obtain those optional benefits according to the Court of Appeals' ruling.\n Questions Presented:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n 1. May C or A advance to Y the premium amount for the optional PIP coverage? \n2. May A or C compensate Y for his time in applying for and obtaining this coverage? \n3. If the insurer refuses to pay the benefits and litigation results, would C be barred from compensating Y for his time and effort in pursuing the claim in court, in addition to witness and mileage fees allowed by statute? Opinion: The ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are EC 5-8, EC 7-28, DR 5-103(B), DR 7-109(C), and Standards 32 and 58. \n</div>\nThe State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia answers the questions presented as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n1. C or A may ethically advance to Y the premium amount of optional PIP coverage as long as A's conduct is otherwise in accordance with the requirements of Standard 32. Standard 32 provides: \n</div>\nWhile presenting a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examinations, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses. A violation of this standard may be punished by a public reprimand.\n2. A or C may ethically compensate Y for his time in applying for and obtaining the optional PIP coverage, as long as A's conduct is otherwise in accordance with the requirements of Standard 32 cited above.\n3. If the insurer refuses to pay the benefits and litigation results, C is not ethically barred from compensating Y for his time and effort in pursuing the claim in court, provided that the requirements of Standard 58 are observed. Standard 58 provides:\nA lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n(a) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying;\n(b) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or testifying;\n(c) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.\nA violation of this standard may be punished by disbarment.","UrlName":"rule488","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"33a5434e-7c81-4023-8874-318faac1e449","Title":"Advisory Opinion 47","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 47 \nJuly 26, 1985 \n Contingency Fees to Collect Past Due Alimony and/or Child Support\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Is it ethical to charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony and/or child support payments?\n Opinion: The ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are EC 2-23, EC 2-20, DR 2-106, EC 5-7, DR 5-103 and Disciplinary Standard 31.\nThe question presented for resolution by this Board is the question specifically left unanswered in Formal Advisory Opinion 36, which held that contingent fee arrangements in divorce cases and in cases to collect future child support are against public policy and are therefore improper.\n It is the opinion of the Board that it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony or child support for the following reasons: Collection of these amounts occurs after the divorce, i.e. it is a post-judgment proceeding; a suit for execution of a judgment on such arrearages is neither a \"domestic relations \"nor a \"divorce \"case; the human relationships involved and the unique character of domestic relations proceedings which generally prohibit contingent fees are not present and do not apply in these cases; and, most importantly, in many circumstances, a contingent fee arrangement may be the only means by which these vital legal rights can be enforced. Canon 2, EC 2-20 and EC 5-7.\nAlthough it is ethically proper to charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony or child support, the lawyer should strive to meet the following criteria:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n1. A contingent fee arrangement must be the only practical means by which one having a claim for past due alimony or child support can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute the claim (EC's 2-20 and 5-7); \n2. The contingent fee must be reasonable. Guidelines for determining the reasonableness of a fee are set forth in DR 2-106. \n</div>\n DR 2-106 - Fees for Legal Services.\n(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.\n(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;\n(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;\n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;\n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;\n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;\n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;\n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer, or lawyers performing the services;\n(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.\n(C) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.\n3. Any court-awarded fees must be credited against the contingent fee. EC 2-23. These criteria should be carefully followed, particularly in cases seeking to collect past due child support.\n This decision finds support in the opinions of at least eleven other Bar Associations. Opinion 1982-4 , Legal Ethics Committee of the Dallas Bar Association (11/22/82); Opinion 80-34 , Committee on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. (undated); Opinion CI-828 and CI-1050U , Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Michigan (9/2/82) (10/30/84); Opinion 88 , Ethics Committee of the Mississippi State Bar (9/23/83); Opinion 405 , approved by the Virginia State Bar Council (9/8/83); Opinion 82-1 , Legal Ethics Committee of the West Virginia State Bar (6/18/82); Opinion 660 , New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics (5/4/84); Formal Ethics Opinion No. 82-F-26 , Ethics Committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee (2/22/82); Opinion 1983-4/2 , New Hampshire Bar Association Ethics Committee (9/20/83); Opinion 67 , Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee (undated).","UrlName":"rule489","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0044f666-ad1a-473b-ab90-6d63b2df6094","Title":"Advisory Opinion 48","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 48 \nJuly 26, 1985 \n Expert Witness Consulting Services\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873,as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Facts: A client asks an attorney to investigate a possible medical malpractice claim. An appropriate expert is located and the attorney advises the client that the expert requires an hourly fee of X dollars per hour to review the records and that the first hour must be paid in advance.\nThe client tells the attorney that the client cannot pay the expert's fee and asks whether there are any possible alternatives. The attorney is aware of one alternative whereby the client contracts with an expert witness consulting service to locate the services of an appropriate medical expert to review the records to determine whether a cause of action exists. If the expert determines that no cause of action exists, then the client would be so advised and no fee would be owed. If, on the other hand, there appears to be a cause of action, the client would agree to compensate the consulting service on a contingent fee basis from any recovery generated.\nThe consulting service would contract directly with the client, rather than the attorney, and would agree to pay the expert on an hourly basis for time spent by the expert in case preparation, including research, depositions and trial.The expert is not an employee of this organization, however, and would work directly with the attorney on the client's behalf.\nUpon successful completion of the case, the consulting service would receive approximately 7% of the recovery plus reimbursement for any fees paid to the expert by the service according to the rate specified in the contract. The attorney would also sign the contract to guarantee payment of the consulting service on behalf of the client from the proceeds in the attorney's possession. If no recovery is obtained, the the client would only be required by the contract to reimburse the service for any hourly fees paid to the expert.\n Question: Does the proposed use of such an expert witness consulting service violate Bar Rules?\n Opinion: The Board first recognizes the existence of several such services and that for some clients, an arrangement similar to that proposed may be the only means available to retain the services of an expert to pursue a cause of action. Since there is substantial uncertainty about the existence of a cause of action until an appropriate expert offers a favorable opinion, a lawyer may be unwilling or unable to assume the risk of personally advancing the necessary expenses to the client, particularly where it appears likely that the client will not reimburse the attorney if the expert's investigation reveals that there is no cause of action.\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n Standard 58 of Bar Rule 4-102 states as follows:  \n \"A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce  in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony  or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the  payment of:  \n (a) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in  attending or testifying; \n(b) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or  testifying; \n(c) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.  \nA violation of this standard may be punished by  disbarment.\" \n</div>\n Under the proposed arrangement, the lawyer would acquiesce in the payment of a contingent fee to the organization that locates the expert witness, but only in the payment of a fixed fee to the expert. Provided the fee paid to the expert by the consulting service is reasonable, Standard 58 does not appear to be violated. It is very important, however, that the attorney determine that the expert has absolutely no connection with the consulting service, since the reason for the prohibition on contingency compensation to witnesses is to promote truthful testimony uncolored by an financial interest of the witness in the proceedings. See Person v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York , 554 F. 2d 534 (2nd Cir.), cert. den. , 434U.S. 924 (1977). Such impermissible interests could range from significant evidence of interest by the particular expert in future repeated referrals by the consulting service in exchange for a demonstrated willingness to provide favorable opinions, to some type of financial interest of the expert in the service as a director, officer, shareholder or some other form of profit-sharing. The lawyer also cannot permit the consulting service or its employees to provide any testimony or evidence either directly or indirectly through substantial technical assistance to the expert which might somehow fundamentally affect the expert's opinion and transform him into a mere \"mouthpiece \"for the service.In summary, the expert and his opinion must be completely neutral, detached and independent from the consulting service.\nStandard 26 prohibits an attorney from aiding a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. In this regard, the lawyer should insure that the contract with the consulting service does not impair the lawyer's strategic and tactical responsibility to decide which witnesses to call and what evidence and testimony to present on behalf of the client. So long as the participation of the consulting service in the case is confined to locating an appropriate expert and assuming a portion of the risk of prosecuting the cause of action, it would not appear that the lawyer has aided the consulting service in the unauthorized practice of law.\nFinally, the contract in question provides for the payment of a portion of any proceeds recovered by the lawyer to the consulting service which raises the issue of fee splitting with a lay organization. With certain inapplicable exceptions, Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. In this case, however, the contract does not split attorney fees with the organization since it is the client that contracts with the organization to pay a specific share of the client's recovery to the organization in exchange for its services. The attorney is obligated only to guarantee the client's reimbursement of expenses advanced by the organization and, where appropriate, the payment of the consulting service's share of any recovery. Fees charged by the attorney, however, should be computed and paid without reduction by the fee paid to the consulting service. Otherwise, the contract becomes a mere subterfuge for fee splitting between the attorney and a lay organization. Provided the attorney insures the client is fully advised of these consequences of the contract and the client freely agrees to be so bound, there appears to be no fee splitting involved in the proposed arrangement.\nThis opinion finds support in similar opinions issued by the following organizations:\n Informal Opinion 1375 of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (1976);\n Opinion Nos. 55 and 56 of the Committee on Legal Ethics of the District of Columbia Bar (1978);\n Formal Opinion 1984-79 of the California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct (1984).","UrlName":"rule490","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cd62708d-7e7a-477f-b187-c8e01ee2faa4","Title":"Advisory Opinion 49","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 49 \nJuly 26, 1985 \n Lawyer's Use of a Lay Collection Agency to Collect Overdue Accounts for Legal Services\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Facts: Lawyer L has represented a number of clients whose cases have been completed. The fees in these cases have not been fully paid. Lawyer L has on a monthly basis submitted bills to the clients requesting payment. After thirty (30) days, Lawyer L has sent a letter demanding that immediate payment be made or that arrangements for weekly payments be made. There is no effort to pay in full or to make payments by Client C.\nWhen the account is sixty (60) days old, Lawyer L desires to turn the unpaid bill of Client C over to a commercial collection agency for collection of the account on a contingency fee basis. The commercial collection agency will be calling the client and demanding payment and failing voluntary payment, will employ Georgia counsel at their expenses to file a lawsuit to collect the account. The fee is 45% for accounts less than or equal to 120 days delinquent and 50% for accounts over 120 days delinquent.\n Question Presented: May Lawyer L ethically retain the collection agency on the terms stated?\n Opinion: The aspirational guidance of EC 2-23 suggest that \"[a] lawyer should be zealous in his efforts to avoid controversies over fees with clients and should attempt to resolve amicably any differences on the subject.\"Referral to a collection agency, however, much like filing suit against one's client, is a measure of last resort and should be undertaken only after the lawyer is sure that all reasonable alternatives have been pursued, including an offer by the lawyer to voluntarily submit the matter to the Fee Arbitration Program sponsored by the State Bar. See Part IV--Arbitration of Fee Disputes--Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia . Unfortunately, the good faith efforts of an attorney are not always successful, and, this Board recognizes that on occasion, a client will absolutely refuse to pay an attorney's bill despite all reasonable attempts at compromise. Under such circumstances, its would appear to be unfair to deprive an attorney of a lawful means available to other professions and businesses through which compensation properly earned can be collected. While the Board is of the opinion that the proposed arrangement is ethically permissible, discussion of certain additional considerations is required.\nSince a client's non-payment often stems from a belief that the lawyer's bill is excessive, a lawyer should first, before referral, satisfy himself that the unpaid bill is reasonable. In this regard, the guidelines of DR 2-106 are most instructive and should be carefully considered by the lawyer. It should also be pointed out that although it appears from these facts that Lawyer L has made a reasonable attempt to collect these overdue fees through his personal efforts before referral, an arbitrary deadline of 60 days past due may not, in all cases be appropriate. In reaching a decision of whether or not referral is appropriate, a lawyer should individually consider each case and not apply an arbitrary deadline for the sake of administrative efficiency. Where it is clear, however, the the client's refusal is due to willful indifference and not to an inability to pay or to circumstances beyond the client's control, and the lawyer is satisfied that the non-payment constitutes, in essence, a fraud or gross imposition by the client, then referral to a reputable collection agency is proper.\nWhile Standard 28(b)(4) of Bar Rule 4-102 permits a lawyer to reveal \"confidences and secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee \", a lawyer should exercise this option with considerable caution. Specifically, Lawyer L should reveal to the collection agency only such minimal background information about the client as is absolutely necessary for the agency to properly perform its job. Additionally, just as with any of his employees, the lawyer needs to exercise reasonable care to insure that the agency employees disclose only such client confidences or secrets as are permitted under Standard 28 since a failure in this regard subjects the lawyer to potential disbarment under Standard 29 of Bar Rule 4-102.\nFinally, brief clarification of a possible problem with fee splitting is necessary. With certain inapplicable exceptions, Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. While the fees sought to be collected on behalf of Lawyer L by the collection agency represent legal fees earned by the lawyer, the fees have already been completely earned when referred and the collection agency has not participated in the actual earning of the fees in violation of the prohibition against a lawyer aiding the unauthorized practice of law. See Standard 24. Accordingly, the Board is of the opinion that under the given facts, the fees referred to the collection agency are more in the nature of accounts receivable, the splitting of which Standard 26 is not intended to prevent.\nThe Board finds support for its conclusion that provided the foregoing considerations are satisfied, the conduct in question is ethically proper in similar opinions issued by the following jurisdictions:\n Opinion 82-24 of the Committee on Ethics of the Maryland Bar Association (1982);\n Opinion 82-2 of the Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Arizona (1982);\n Opinion 81-3 of the Ethics Committee of the Florida Bar (1981);\n Opinion No. 225 of the Oregon State Bar (1972);\n Opinion No. 20 of the Colorado Bar Association (1961).\n<hr align=\"left\" width=\"50%\">\n 1 Ga. L. 1946, p. 171 (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-306 through 9-411). 2 Ga. Code Ann § 26-1704 recodified as O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20.","UrlName":"rule491","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f11f9977-b716-4737-964c-231658b7d25c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On August 23, 1989 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2 The adoption of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct does not require a change in this opinion, which is based on the Code of Judicial Conduct and Georgia law.  However, the Code of Judicial Conduct and Georgia law may have been revised since this opinion was issued. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. QUESTION PRESENTED: Ethical propriety of a part-time judge also serving as a criminal defense counsel. OPINION: The Supreme Court of Georgia approves, as amended, Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2 requesting an Advisory Opinion as to the ethical propriety of a part-time judge serving in a judicial capacity while also serving as a criminal defense counsel. Georgia law authorizes part-time Judges to practice law, subject to certain restrictions. OCGA § 15-7-21 provides that part-time State Court Judges may engage in the private practice of law in other courts, but prohibits practice in the Judge's own court or appearances in any matter as to which the Judge has exercised any jurisdiction. OCGA § 15-10-22 (b) provides that Magistrates who are attorneys may practice in other courts, but not in their own courts, nor may they appear in any matter as to which their court has exercised any jurisdiction. In addition, the Compliance section of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:A. Part-time Judges. A part-time judge is a judge who serves on a continuing or periodic basis, but who is permitted by law to devote time to some other profession or occupation and whose compensation for that reason is less than that of a full-time judge. Part-time judges: . . . . . (2) should not practice law in the court on which they serve or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the courts on which they serve, or act as lawyers in proceedings in which they have served as judges or in any other proceeding related thereto. From this, it is clear that both the statutes and the Canons authorize the practice of law by part-time Judges and spell out the restrictions on such practice. For that reason, representation of a defendant in a criminal case by a part-time judge cannot be said to be per se inappropriate or unethical. At the same time, Canon 2 admonishes that:Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. For that reason, although such representation is not in and of itself inappropriate, the regular or exclusive representation of such defendants by a Judge whose responsibilities include the issuance of criminal warrants or the trial of criminal cases might destroy the appearance of impartiality and integrity essential to the administration of justice and, therefore, be inappropriate. In reaching this conclusion, we have been aware of the holding in Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, et al. , 249 Ga. 543 (291 SE2d 524) (1982); however, in Hudson v. State , 250 Ga. 479 (299 SE2d 531) (1983), this Court declined to adopt a rule which would require disqualification of any part-time Judge serving as an attorney in a criminal defense action. As Judge Gregory stated at Page 482 of the Hudson opinion:Further, we decline to adopt the broad rule proposed by defendant which would require automatic disqualification of every attorney in a criminal defense action where the attorney is simultaneously employed as either a state court solicitor or probate judge. We therefore concluded that part-time Judges are not prohibited from representing defendants in criminal cases, subject to the reservations spelled out in the statutes and the Canons as above set forth.","UrlName":"rule502","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ada8ae14-da3a-4fec-800d-cfc72f209e71","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On December 17, 1987 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-3 For references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . For references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rules 1.7(a)</a> , and <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">2.2(a)</a> . For references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of County Attorneys Representing Criminal Defendants. There is no basis for a per se ethical disqualification of county attorneys from the representation of criminal defendants, unless the defendant is charged with a violation of a county ordinance. Any conflict of interest raised by a county attorney's representation of clients other than the county should be analyzed in the same fashion as any other conflict arising from the representation of differing or potentially differing interests. County attorneys must be especially sensitive to the possibility of conflict created by their role, if any, as prosecutor. Correspondent requests guidance as to whether county attorneys or their partners or associates may represent criminal defendants. The primary issue is potential conflict of interest. The position of county attorney obviously creates a lawyer-client relationship between the attorney and the county governmental unit. The county attorney is not called upon by election or oath of office to enforce the laws of the State. The county attorney is, however, authorized to prosecute violations of county ordinances on behalf of the county. When he or she is acting in such a capacity the duty to the county is similar to that of a solicitor to the state. Based on the reasoning of Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2, it would be ethically improper for a county attorney to represent a criminal defendant charged with a violation of a county ordinance. More generally, the county attorney's obligation is zealous representation of the best interests of his or her client. Any conflict of interest created by a county attorney's representation of clients other than the county should be analyzed like any other conflict arising from the representation of differing or potentially differing interests. There is, therefore, no basis for a per se ethical disqualification of a county attorney or partners or associates from the representation of criminal defendants. In those specific situations in which such representation would violate Standards No. 35 or 36, the representation is obviously prohibited. When representation is prohibited by Standard No. 35 or Standard No. 36, Standard No. 38, as amended, would impute the disqualification of the attorney to all members of the firm. While no per se disqualification bars county attorneys unless the defendant is charged with a violation of a county ordinance, a given county attorney may nevertheless be ethically disqualified from the representation of criminal defendants in the county. Legal representation of county prosecution or law enforcement agencies may affect adversely the attorney's independent professional judgment. All county attorneys need to be sensitive to the possibility of such potential conflict. This advisory opinion is necessarily limited to the ethical propriety of the conduct in question. We offer no opinion on either the constitutional issues of ineffective assistance of counsel or statutory issues of disqualification. ","UrlName":"rule504","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2e4e03ed-ea51-4ef9-8868-7e2a20277106","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-4","Content":"State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On December 17, 1987 Formal Advisory Opinion No 86-4 This opinion relies on both Directory Rules and Standards of Conduct that bear upon matters addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">Rule 4.2</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of the Plaintiff's Attorney in a Personal Injury Case Writing a Letter to the Insured Defendant Which May Contain Legal Advice. It is ethically improper for the plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which contains legal advice. The plaintiff's lawyer can properly write a letter to the attorney for the insured and the insurer making an offer of settlement. The letter may properly request the lawyer to provide this information to the insured as well as the insurer. If the plaintiff's lawyer needs information as to the name of the insured's insurer, he or she may properly write the insured requesting this information. But the contents of the letter shall be limited to a request for the necessary information. The plaintiff's attorney may not render legal advice to the insured. It is ethically improper for the plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice. The problem is raised by letter to insureds notifying them of the potential liability of their insurers for failure to settle within policy limits. It is important first to state the applicable rules of law. An insurer is normally liable only for any judgment within the policy limits. The insured is normally liable for any judgment in excess of the policy limits. An insurer has a good faith duty to the insured, however, to settle a claim within the policy limits under the \"equal consideration \"rule. National Emblem Insurance Co. v. Pritchard, 140 Ga. App. 350, 231 S.E. 2d 126 (1976); United States Fidelity &Guaranty Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E. 2d 809, aff'd, 223 Ga. 789, 158 S.E. 2d 243(1967). The failure of the insurer to fulfill this good faith duty may cause the insurer to be liable for any excess judgment. State Farm Insurance Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d331 (5th Cir. 1967). These legal rules make apparent the reason a plaintiff's attorney may wish to write the insured directly. The letter will lay the basis for seeking recovery against the insurer for the portion of a judgment rendered in excess of the policy limits. Attorneys for plaintiffs may also perceive an advantage in having the insurer know that the insured is fully aware of his or her rights. That is, the communication with the insured is a helpful pressure tactic. Such a letter is impermissible, regardless of whether it is sent before or after the insured is represented by counsel. A lawyer is precluded from contacting a person represented by a lawyer as to matters relevant to the representation without the written consent of that person's lawyer. Ga. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104(A)(1), Standard 47. Georgia Advisory Opinion No. 10 (July 18,1969), held that such contact with an insured defendant is not improper if undertaken before the defendant is represented by a lawyer and before an action is filed. Opinion 10, however, was written prior to the adoption of our current Code of Professional Responsibility and Standards of Conduct and was based upon former Bar Rule 3-109 which is very similar to our current DR 7-104(A)(1) and Standard 47. Apparently there was no counterpart to DR 7-104(A)(2) and Standard 49, which now prohibit a lawyer from giving legal advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, whenever the interests of the recipient are or may be in conflict with the interests of the lawyer's client. Advisory Opinion No. 10 was implicitly overruled upon the adoption of DR 7-104(A)(2) and Standard 48, and is now expressly overruled to the extent it conflicts with that Standard. Under Standard 48, a plaintiff's attorney may communicate with the unrepresented potential defendant, but is precluded from rendering legal advice. This is consistent with ABA Informal Opinion 1034 (May 30, 1968); which held that advising the insured of the effect of the insurer's refusal to settle within policy limits constitutes \"legal advice.\"The ABA then quotes an earlier opinion, which involved a complaint about two collection letters, but the language is nonetheless relevant and applicable.       The adroit wording of the questioned paragraphs avoids any direct statement or advice as to what the final results of seeking the threatened remedies will be, and no lawyer would be likely to be misled by it. In each case, however, the overall effect upon lay recipients of such letters probably will be, and probably was intended by the writer to be, that they had better \"pay up or else.\"Rather than state simply that if payment is not made as demanded, his clients will pursue all legal remedies available to them to enforce payment, the writer chooses to describe in legal terms the collection suits that will be filed and then to threaten, in addition, the proceedings [which will be pursued]. The only purpose of threatening such additional proceedings, which would have no direct connection with actions to collect debts, appears to have been to coerce and frighten the alleged debtors. ABA Informal Opinion 1034 at 219 citing ABA Informal Opinion 734. Under Standard 48, a lawyer may communicate by letter with an adverse unrepresented person informing him of a demand on his insurance carrier and that suit will be filed if the demand is not met by a certain date, and that he should seek counsel, but no more. Under Standard 47, no communication with a represented adverse party is written consent without permission of adverse counsel. It is obvious that the letter to the insured is meant for the insurer. It is equally obvious that the insured has a right to information not only as to his own legal rights, but also the legal duties of the insurer to him. It is not, however, obvious that the plaintiff's attorney is the proper person to inform the insured of these rights and duties. The appropriate attorney for this purpose is the insured's attorney. The problem here, of course, is that the attorney for the insured is also the attorney for the insurer. And given the context of the representation, it seems clear that the insurer would prefer that the insured not be made aware of its duty to settle theclaim in good faith. The lawyer representing the insured and the insurer thus faces an apparent dilemma. But the dilemma is only apparent. He or she represents the insured as a client and has a duty to keep the insured fully informed by virtue of the rules of ethics. See Proposed Georgia Rules and Disciplinary Standards of Conduct, Rule 1.4; Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund &Belom, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 40 Ill. Dec. 816, 407 N.E. 2d 47 (1980). The lawyer for the insurer has a duty to inform the insured not only of any offer of settlement; See Proposed Georgia Rules and Disciplinary Standards of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2(c), but also of the potential liability of the insurer for a bad faith refusal to accept any reasonable offer within the policy limits. Id. Rule 1.4(b). To recognize that the plaintiff's lawyer has a right to communicate directly with the insured as to his or her rights would create new problems. Apart from the rules of ethics, to recognize that the plaintiff's lawyer has a right so to advise the insured may well create a duty on the part of the lawyer to do so. For if the lawyer can advise the adversary client for the purpose of laying a predicate for the insurer's liability for an excess judgment, but fails to do so, he or she may be liable to the client for malpractice. The plaintiff's lawyer can properly write a letter to the attorney for the insured and the insurer making the offer of settlement. The letter may properly request the lawyer to provide this information to the insured as well as the insurer. The failure of the insured's lawyer to do so would be breach of the lawyer's duty to keep the client informed and may well subject the lawyer to liability. If the plaintiff's lawyer needs information as to the name of the insured's insurer, he or she may properly write the insured requesting this information. But the contents of the letter shall be limited to no more than a demand, a request for the necessary information and a suggestion to seek counsel. The plaintiff's attorney may not render legal advice to the insured. Ga. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104(A)(2) and Standard 48.","UrlName":"rule463","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"92f36050-992d-4193-a891-fe7da3894f6f","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On May 12, 1989 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a>. For references to Rule 3-103 (Canon III) please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a>. For references to EC 3-1, please see Comment 2 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a>. For references to EC 3-2, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a> and Comment 5 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a>. For references to EC 3-6, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3(b)</a> and Comment 1 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a>. For references to DR 3-101(A), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a>. For references to DR 3-102(A), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a>. For references to DR 3-103, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(b)</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of Lawyer's Delegating to Nonlawyers the Closing of Real Estate Transactions.The closing of real estate transaction constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A § 15-19-50. Accordingly, it would be ethically improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. Certain tasks can be delegated to nonlawyers, subject to the type of supervision and control outlined in State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21. The lawyer cannot, however, delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to \"close \"the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.Correspondent asks whether it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to delegate to a nonlawyer the closing of real estate transactions. This question involves, among other things, an interpretation of Standard 24, Rule 3-103 (Canon III), EC 3-1, EC 3-2, EC 3-6, DR 3-101 (A), DR 3-102 (A), and DR 3-103. With the exception of Standard 24, all of the foregoing Ethical Considerations and Directory Rules are cited and quoted in State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21 (attached hereto).Standard 24 provides as follows: A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. A violation of this Standard may be punished by a public reprimand.As the role of nonlawyers (particularly paralegals and legal secretaries) in the closing of real estate transactions has expanded in recent years, questions have arisen as to the scope of duties which can be delegated to nonlawyers. A general discussion of duties which may ethically be delegated to nonlawyers can be found in State Bar Advisory Opinion Nos. 19 and 21. In short, those Advisory Opinions stress thatAvoidance of charges that the paralegal is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law may be achieved only by strict observance of the direction found in EC 3-6, quoted above, indicating that delegation of activities which ordinarily comprise the practice of law is proper only if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with the client involved, supervises and directs the work delegated to the paralegal and assumes complete ultimate professional responsibility for the work product produced by the paralegal. Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law. State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21 .The question to be addressed in this opinion is whether the closing of a real estate transaction constitutes \"the practice of law.\" This in turn depends upon what it means to \"close \"a real estate transaction. If the \"closing\" is defined as the entire series of events through which title to the land is conveyed from one party to another party, it would be ethically improper for a nonlawyer to \"close \"a real estate transaction. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50 states that the \"practice of law \"includes \"conveyancing,\" \"the giving of any legal advice,\" and \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.\" In Georgia Bar Association v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 222 Ga. 657 (1966), the Georgia Supreme Court characterizes the \"closing of real estate transactions between applicants for title insurance and third persons \"as the rendering of legal services and advice. Moreover, to the extent that any legal advice is given during any part of the closing, this would constitute \"the practice of law \"by definition and could not be ethically delegated to nonlawyers. In light of all of the foregoing, it appears that the closing of real estate transactions constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A. 15-19-50. Accordingly, pursuant to Standard 24, Canon III, and the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules cited above, it would be ethically improper for a lawyer to aid nonlawyers to \"close \"real estate transactions. This does not mean that certain tasks cannot be delegated to nonlawyers, subject to the type of supervision and control outlined in State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21. The lawyer cannot, however, delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to \"close \"the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.","UrlName":"rule505","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"75986703-9764-4c87-ae04-faba35fed32e","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-7","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On December 17, 1987 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-7 For references to Standard of Conduct 31, please see Rules <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">1.5(a)</a> and <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(j)</a>. For references to Standard of Conduct 30, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a>. For references to Standard of Conduct 33, please see Rule <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(a)</a>. This opinion also relies on the Canons of Ethics, specifically Ethical Consideration 5.7 that bears upon matters addressed by Comment 10 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of a Lawyer's Acquisition of a Security Interest in Marital Property to Secure Attorney's Fees in a Domestic Relations Case. An attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property to secure reasonable attorney's fees in a domestic relations case if the security agreement is fully disclosed and consented to by the client in writing, and does not violate any court order. The security interest may serve no other purpose. Correspondent asks whether it is ethically proper for a lawyer to take a security interest in marital property<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\">1 </a> to secure his or her fee in a domestic relations case. The question presented involves an interpretation of Standard No. 31. A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he may: (a) acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses. Standard No. 31's roots are in the common law crime of champerty. It is designed to prevent attorneys from acquiring financial interests in the outcome of litigation other than an attorney's interests in reasonable attorneys fees.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\">2 </a> Standard No. 31 excepts \"acquir/ing/ a lien granted by law to secure . . . fee/s/ or expenses. Standard No. 31 is taken from Directory Rule 5-103. Interpretative guidance for Directory Rule 5-103 is found in the aspirational statement of Ethical Consideration 5-7.The possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment by a lawyer on behalf of his client during litigation generally makes it undesirable for the lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of his client or otherwise to become financially interested in the outcome of the litigation. However, it is not improper for a lawyer to protect his right to collect a fee for his services by the assertion of legally permissible liens, even though by doing so he may acquire an interest in the outcome of litigation.The guidance of Ethical Consideration 5-7 is that \"liens granted by law\" should be read broadly as the equivalent of \"legally permissible liens rather than narrowly as statutory charging liens and retaining liens for the benefit of attorneys.\" Such an interpretation is consistent with the champerty concerns underlying Standard No. 31, in that legally permissible liens used to secure attorneys fees do not create any financial motive for the attorney beyond that of collecting reasonable attorneys fees. A security interest in marital property used to secure attorneys fees in a domestic relations case is therefore permitted by Standard No. 31. It would be improper to use such an arrangement to secure fees if it created an impermissible financial conflict in violation of Standard No. 30. Standard No. 30 would be violated if the attorney's security interest in the marital property would, or reasonably could, affect the exercise of the attorney's independent professional judgment on behalf of the client. An exception is provided under Standard No. 30 when the client gives written consent after full disclosure of the conflict's potential for affecting the attorney's independent professional judgment. Accordingly, an attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property to secure his or her fee in a domestic relations case if the client consents in writing after full disclosure, so long as the lawyer does not violate a court order.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\">3 </a> Consistent with the requirements of this opinion, the interest acquired by the attorney must be a security interest to secure reasonable attorneys fees. Any interest acquired in the subject matter of litigation beyond that necessary to secure fees would be in violation of Standard No. 31 and could violate Standard No. 33 as well. The Bar is cautioned that there are ethical opinions in other jurisdictions finding violation of DR 5-103 in situations in which the interest acquired by the attorney in the subject matter of litigation was not a security interest.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\">4 </a><hr> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"1\"> 1</a>Marital property is defined in Georgia as \"that property acquired as a direct result of the labor and investment of the /parties/during the marriage. . . .\"Courtney v. Courtney , 256 Ga. 97, 98 (1986), citing White v. White , 253 Ga. 267, 269 (1984). See also Moore v. Moore , 249 Ga. 27 (l982). The legal issues raised by using marital property as security for attorney fees in a domestic relations case are not addressed in this advisory opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"2\"> 2</a>Proprietary interests are prohibited under Standard No. 31. It is possible to interpret the term \"proprietary\" to exclude interests which serve only as security for fees. See, for example, Oklahoma Bar Association Advisory Opinion No. 297, May 16, 1980. It is, however, not necessary to attempt a definition of \"proprietary\" here. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"3\"> 3</a>In accord, Greater Cleveland Bar Association, Advisory Opinion No. 151 (May 11, 1983). See, also, Giles v. Russell , 222 Kan. 629, 567 P.2d 845 (1977). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"4\"> 4</a>See, for example, ABA Informal Opinion No. 1397.","UrlName":"rule506","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2e662b0d-a5f1-44d6-b050-3afc2312eade","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On January 11, 1989 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-1 For references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> and Comments 1 and 3 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4</a> For references to Standard of Conduct 44, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3</a> and Comments 1, 2 and 3 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3</a>. For references to DR 7-102(a)(2), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1(b)</a>. For references to EC 7-4, please see Comment 2 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1</a>. For references to EC 7-5, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule50\">Rule 1.2(d)</a> and Comment 6 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule50\">Rule 1.2</a> , Comment 3 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of Filing a Lawsuit in Order to be Within the Statute of Limitations, But Before Sufficient Information is Acquired to Determine if a Legitimate Cause of Action Exists. It is not ethically improper for an attorney to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the attorney determines that a reasonable attorney would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the attorney is not required by rules of procedure, or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the attorney will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. QUESTION PRESENTED: Are there ethical prohibitions against filing suit when the lawyer does not know whether facts exist which would constitute a cause of action, and the information needed to make that determination cannot be acquired prior to the expiration of the pertinent statute of limitations? OPINION: It cannot be determined from these facts whether filing of the suit would constitute a violation of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, or of the requirements of Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92 (1986); nor is such determination within the scope of an ethical opinion. This opinion considers only whether the applicable ethical regulations proscribe filing suit in the situation described by correspondent. There is no Standard of Conduct directly applicable. Specifically, no Standard of Conduct speaks to the situation in which the facts presented by a client suggest a cause of action, but additional facts are necessary for the attorney to make a clear assessment of the claim. Accordingly, the filing of the claim alone cannot be the basis for discipline in Georgia under the present Standards of Conduct. If, however, the attorney is required, by rules of procedure or otherwise, to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis, the attorney cannot make that representation in the situation in question. To make such a representation in this situation would constitute a violation of Standard 4 and would subject the attorney to discipline. If such a representation is required, the effect of the proscription may be to postpone the filing of the suit to beyond the date of the applicable statute of limitations. That is a matter for ethical regulation only if the delay in the investigation prior to the filing was caused by the attorney's \"willful neglect\" (constituting a violation of Standard 44 for which discipline is sanctioned). The absence of Standards of Conduct does not, however, leave the lawyer without a source of guidance. The canons, ethical considerations, and directory rules are helpful in dealing with the question presented. This guidance is found in the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility:     DR 7-102 -- Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.         (A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:             (2) knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law DR 7-102(A)(2) creates a subjective test by use of the term \"knowingly.\" It is violated when the attorney knows that the proposed claim is unwarranted. Such knowledge is not present in the situation in question. EC 7-4 and EC 7-5 advise the attorney to avoid \"frivolous\" claims. Claims may be frivolous because the legal arguments for a cause of action are frivolous, or because factual support is clearly lacking for any cause of action. Only the second form of frivolousness is in question here. Consistent with the overall structure of the Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-4 creates an objective standard for the attorney which is more demanding than the subjective standard of DR 7-102(A)(2). A claim is frivolous under EC 7-4 when there is no reasonable possibility of the existence of the factual basis for the cause of action. EC 7-4 does not require complete factual support for the cause of action prior to the filing, but does require that a reasonable attorney would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the claim can be established after the claim is filed. EC 7-4 permits, for example, the use of discovery to determine if the factual basis of a claim exists if there is a reasonable possibility that is does. This use is consistent with part of the purpose of discovery, i.e., to reveal facts which require dismissal of a claim. In the situation in question, the attorney is acting consistent with ethical guidance if he or she determines that a reasonable attorney would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim.","UrlName":"rule507","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"02a13dc9-48f2-4e53-8bdc-1960fd653f00","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On September 26, 1988 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5 For references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Assertion of Attorneys' Retaining Liens. An attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. QUESTION PRESENTED: What are the ethical duties of a lawyer under Standard 22(b) with respect to the return of a client's papers and property when the lawyer has not been paid in view of the statutory retaining lien authorized by O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(a) (Conflict between Standard 22(b) and Attorneys' Holding Lien)? SUMMARY ANSWER: An attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute.  Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. OPINION: Section 15-19-14(a) of the Georgia Code gives attorneys a lien for services rendered on their clients' papers and moneys in their possession. Specifically, that statute provides as follows: Attorneys at law shall have a lien on all papers and money of their clients in their possession for services rendered to them. They may retain the papers until the claims are satisfied and may apply the money to the satisfaction of the claims. [T]he lien attaches to the fruits of the labor and skill of the attorney, whether realized by judgment or decree, or by virtue of an award, or in any other way, so long as they are the results of his exertions. Brotherton v. Stone,197 Ga. 74, 74-75(3) (1943) quoting Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324(1-b),329 (1927). This definition suggests that anything the attorney prepared or attains for the client can be subject to the statutory lien if the client fails to pay the attorney's fee. By way of illustration and not limitation, the following items are examples of client papers to which a lien may attach: Anything which the client gives to the attorney to use or consider in the representation; Evidence, including demonstrative evidence, photographs, statements of witnesses, affidavits, deposition and hearing transcripts, exhibits and physical evidence; Expert evidence, including tests, opinions and reports; Agreements, contracts, instruments, notes and other documents used or to be used in transactions of any kind; Corporate records, minute books and records of organizations; Wills, trusts and other estate planning documents; and Legal memoranda and analyses. The power to exercise this statutory right is not without limitation, however, in view of Standard 22(b) of the Standards of Conduct of the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia which mandates as follows:A lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including . . . delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled and complying with applicable laws and rules.Due to the facial conflict between the grant of power in the lien statute and the limitation that Standard 22(b) imposes on that power, this opinion will address whether and when an attorney ethically may exercise his or her statutory lien rights upon withdrawal of representation. As a general rule, an attorney cannot exercise statutory lien rights to the foreseeable prejudice of the client. Such ethical considerations maintain preeminence over legislative grants of power to attorneys. For example, First Bank &Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E. 2d 676 (1983), held inapplicable in cases of attorney malpractice the liability shield legislatively afforded by the professional corporate statute. The Supreme Court \"has the authority and in fact the duty to regulate the law practice. . . .\"Id. at 845, 302 S.E. 2d at 675. Although recognizing the right of the legislature to enact technical rules governing corporations, Zagoria cautioned that the legislature \"cannot constitutionally cross the gulf separating the branches of government by imposing regulations upon the practice of law.\" Id. at 845-46, 302 S.E. 2d at 675. Despite the existence of the lien statute, and because \"[a] lawyer's relationship to his client is a very special one,\" id. at 846, 302 S.E. 2d at 675, the power of attorneys to exercise their rights under the lien statute must give way to their ethical obligation not to cause their clients prejudice. The majority of jurisdictions that have considered this question are in accord. Standard 22(b) prohibits attorneys from holding their clients' papers if such an action foreseeably will cause them prejudice. The right to claim a lien in such papers under the statute will not protect the attorney in the case of prejudice to the client. Because it would be only in the rarest of circumstances that a client could be deprived of his or her files without eventually suffering some prejudice, the better practice is for attorneys to forgo retention of client papers in all but the clearest cases. This practice would avoid the necessity of speculating whether an attorney's action might cause some future harm. In accord with certain other jurisdictions, however, we limit the duty to turn over client files and papers to those for which the client has been or will be charged, that is, all work products created during \"billable time.\"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\">1 </a> For matters that are handled under arrangements other than hourly charges, any work product intended for use in the case would be included in those documents that should be returned to the client.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\">2 </a> For example, because attorneys do not bill clients for the creation of time records and they would not be used in the case (absent a claim for fees), these records would probably be retained. Despite the obligation to return original documents to their clients, attorneys are entitled to keep copies of their clients' files.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\">3 </a> Absent a prior agreement that the client will be responsible for copying charges, however, the attorney bears the cost of copying.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\">4 </a> Notably, even if such an agreement exists, in the event that the client refuses to pay, the attorney must advance the cost and then add the charge to the client's outstanding bill.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\">5 </a> We do not endorse the practice of some jurisdictions of allowing the attorney to require the client to post comparable security before releasing the papers.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#6\">6 </a> To allow an attorney to require security in a bona fide fee dispute would be unfair to the client because it may require him or her to encumber property without justification. However, if the client offers to post security for the attorneys' fees and expenses pending resolution of a dispute, the attorney must release the papers. Similarly, we do not unequivocably approve the practice of some jurisdictions of holding summary hearings because this is likely to result in duplicative proceedings.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#7\">7 </a> Therefore, we conclude that an attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.<hr> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"1\"> 1</a>See, e.g., San Francisco Comm. Opin. No. 1984-1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"2\"> 2</a>See also Michigan Opin. No. CI-926. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"3\"> 3</a>See id. See also New Jersey Sup. Ct. Advis. Comm. Opin. No. 554 (May 23, 1985). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"4\"> 4</a>See San Francisco Comm. Opin. No. 1984-1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"5\"> 5</a>See id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"6\"> 6</a>See Foor v. Huntington National Bank, No. 85AP-167, slip op. (Feb. 11, 1986); Michigan Op. No. CI-930 (May 4, 1983). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"7\"> 7</a>See Foor v. Huntington National Bank, No. 85AP-167, slip op. (Feb. 11, 1986).","UrlName":"rule508","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d61a86be-a78b-4975-92a6-005c5e62635e","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 88-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn November 10, 1988 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 88-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 26, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical Propriety of an Attorney-Employee Sharing Attorney's Fees With a Lay Organization-Employer.\n \nIt is ethically permissible for an attorney-employee to collect attorney's fees on a note or loan which fees accrue to the benefit of the attorney's employer, where the attorney's fees are regarded as stipulated liquidated damages under Georgia law.\n \nCorrespondent asks if it is ethically permissible for an attorney to collect attorney's fees which would accrue to the benefit of the attorney's employer, a lay organization, in the following situation: A bank employs a full time, licensed, attorney to handle collections, foreclosures and bankruptcies. Contracts signed by the bank's customers provide for 15 percent of the unpaid balance as attorney's fees if the loan goes into default and has to be collected by or through an attorney. \n \nStandard No. 26 provides, in part, that \"a lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer. . . .\" \n \nThe policy behind this prohibition against fee sharing between a lawyer and a layman is the preservation of a lawyer's independent professional judgment. It is feared that laymen, or lay organizations, sharing a financial interest in the representation and not being under professional obligations, may influence the attorney's judgment against the client's welfare. \n \nThe conduct in question here is not in violation of this policy. The lay organization, with whom the fees are shared, is the client. No influence on independent professional judgment contrary to the interests of the client is present. This situation is clearly distinguishable from the numerous advisory opinions and cases prohibiting fee sharing with a nonlawyer other than the client. Curran v. Department of the Treasury , 805 F.2d 1406 (1986); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States , 656 F.2d 848 (1981). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> \n \nThe Committee concludes that fee sharing with the employer bank is not prohibited under Standard No. 26. The Committee also notes that the conduct described by correspondent is not fee sharing in the sense of that term in Standard No. 26. In correspondent's situation, statutory attorney's fees are regarded as stipulated liquidated damages for collection costs, belonging to the client. The attorney is then free to contract with the client for the agreed upon fee or any other fee. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a> Rylee v. Bank of Statham , 7 Ga. App. 489 (1918). \n \nThe requirements of O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11, that collection efforts must be made \"by and through an attorney \"in order to enforce this statutory attorney's fees provision, have been met. See, United States v. Allen , 699 F.2d 1117 (1983); In re East Side Investors , 694 F.2d 242 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Village Apartment Associates , 9 B.R. 211 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ga. 1981).\n<hr>\n\n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> See, also, MASSACHUSETTS BAR OPINION 84-1 (1984). \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> See, also ABA FORMAL OPINION NO 157.","UrlName":"rule513","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"63344d77-a55d-4911-9c94-1b8cdaa01551","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 88-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn November 29, 1988 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 88-3 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 48, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule298\">Rule 4.3(a)</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule298\">4.3(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 47, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\">Rule 4.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical Propriety of Sending Notice Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 to an Unrepresented Party. \n \nIt is ethically permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 to an unrepresented party. An attorney sending the required notice, however, must do so in such a manner as to inform the unrepresented opposing party that the notice is sent merely to establish a claim for interest, that it is not to be construed as legal advice, and that the attorney sending the notice represents the opposing interests in the dispute.\n \nCorrespondent asks if it is a violation of Standard 48 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia for correspondent to comply with the notice requirement of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 by sending a demand notice to an unrepresented party. That statute requires that written notice of the demand for unliquidated damages be sent to the person \"against whom the claim is made \"in order to entitle the claimant to receive twelve (12) percent interest on judgments in excess of unliquidated damages. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> \n \nStandard 48 provides:\n \nDuring the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.\n \nIn interpreting Standard 48, Formal Opinion No. 86-4 (86-R7), concluded that it was ethically improper for a plaintiff's attorney to send a letter directly to an insured defendant which would notify the defendant about the potential liability of his or her insurer for failure to settle within policy limits. The letter would be considered \"legal advice \"in that plaintiff's attorney impliedly would be advising settlement within policy limits. Accord, ABA Informal Opinion 734 (June 16, 1964). The Opinion correctly focused upon the policy behind Standard 48 which is to avoid creating in an unrepresented party a false impression that the attorney is advising inaccordance with the unrepresented party's interests or is neutral in the dispute. The present situation is distinguishable. Where an attorney sends a formal notice which is required by law, there is much less concern that a false impression will be created. \n \nIt is ethically permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, stating specifically that it is a notice rather than advice. An attorney sending the required notice, however, must do so in such a manner as to inform the unrepresented opposing party that the notice is sent merely to establish a claim for interest, that it is not to be construed as legal advice, that the recipient may seek his independent legal advice and that the attorney sending the notice represents the opposing interests in the dispute. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> The full text of O.C.G.A.§ 51-12-14 is as follows:\n \"Procedure for demand of unliquidated damages in tort actions; when interest may be recovered. \n          (a)    Where a claimant has given written notice by registered or certified mail to a person against whom claim is made for unliquidated damages in a tort action and the person against whom such claim is made fails to pay such amount within 30 days from the mailing of the notice, the claimant shall be  entitled to receive interest on the claimed sum if, upon trial of the case in which the claim is made, the judgment is for an amount not less than the sum claimed. \n          (b)    The written notice referred to in subsection (a) of this Code section may be given on only one occasion and shall specify that it is being given pursuant to this Code section. \n          (c)    The interest provided for by this Code section  shall be at the rate of 12 percent per annum and shall begin to run from the thirtieth day following the date of the mailing of the written notice until the date of judgment. \n          (d)    Evidence or discussion of interest on liquidated damages, as well as evidence of the offer, shall not be submitted to the jury. Interest shall be made a part of the judgment upon presentation of evidence to the satisfaction of the court that this Code section has been complied with and that the verdict of the jury or the award by the judge trying the case without a jury is equal to or exceeds the amount claimed in the notice. \n          (e)    This Code section shall be known and may be cited as the \"Unliquidated Damages Interest Act.\"(Ga. L. 1968, p. 1156, § 1,  Ga. L. 1975, p. 395, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 681, § 1.)\"\n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> If the adverse party isrepresented, the statutory notice need not contain the disclaimers here described, but must be sent to the adverse party's attorney rather than the party. Standard 47.","UrlName":"rule515","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2103ee5e-58dc-4434-b3df-550b3c594488","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 89-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn February 9, 1989 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 89-2 \n \nThis opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including both Directory Rules and Ethical Considerations that bear upon matters directly addressed by Comment 2 of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule78\">Rule 3.5</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical propriety of an attorney/city council member's representing private clients before city council-appointed Judges of the Recorder's Court if the attorney abstains from voting on the appointment.\n \nAn attorney, who is also a member of the city council, should avoid representing private clients before the Recorder's Court when the city council appoints the judges of the Recorders Court, and should not abstain from voting on judicial appointments.\n \nCorrespondent asks if it is ethically proper for an attorney, who is also a member of the city council, to represent private clients before the Recorder's Court, when the city council appoints the Judges of the Recorder's Court, if the attorney abstains from voting on judicial appointments. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> Correspondent also asks if other members of his or her law firm would be prohibited from such representation by imputed disqualification. \n \nA full response to this inquiry would go beyond the ethical regulations and requires interpretation of Young v. Champion , 142 Ga. App. 687 (1977), in which the Court upheld the disqualification of a Commissioner from representation before a Recorder's Court judge who was appointed by the Commission. The Advisory Opinion Board, however, is without authority to interpret court opinions. \n \nThere are no Georgia Standards of Conduct applicable to this particular situation. An advisory opinion is not, however, limited to disciplinary issues in its interpretations of the ethical regulations of the State Bar of Georgia. This Advisory Opinion therefore offers ethical advice based on the applicable ethical regulations.\n \nDirectory Rule 8-101(a)(2) provides:\n\"A lawyer who holds public office shall not use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or a client.\"The city council is, in the situation in question, in the position of employer of the Judge of the Recorder's Court. There is inherent influence in such a position. An attorney/council member who appears before that Judge exercises that influence however unintentional the \"use \"of it may be and however determined both the Judge and the attorney may be to avoid its effect. Even the effort to avoid the effect changes the nature of the relationship between the Judge and the attorney. As a matter of ethical advice, we believe that the attorney/council member should avoid representation before the Judge of the Recorder's Court.\n \nCorrespondent's question seeks to avoid the inherent influence of his or her position by abstaining from all voting on the appointment of the Judges of the Recorder's Court. We cannot advise abstention as a remedy. The attorney, as noted in Ethical Consideration 8-6, is uniquely qualified to evaluate the qualifications of those seeking appointment to the bench. Lawyers have a \"special responsibility to aid in the selection of only those who are qualified.\"EC 8-6. The attorney/council member should not avoid that public responsibility for private gain. To do so would be counter to the ethical advice of Ethical Consideration 8-8, \"A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties.\" \n \nIf correspondent follows the advice of this Opinion he will disqualify himself from representation before the Judges of the Recorder's Court. That disqualification is personal and is not imputed to the other members of the firm. In this case there are no concerns of conflicts of interest of confidentiality requiring imputed disqualification. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> This opinion would not apply where city council members do not participate in appointing city judges. \n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> The Board notes that its opinion in this case, and the holding of Young v. Champion, appear to be contrary to the following Advisory Opinions from other jurisdictions:  Adv. Opin. #5 (New Hampshire, 10/23/81);  Adv. Opin. #84-18 (South Carolina, undated);  Adv. Opin. CI #990 (Michigan 12/13/83).","UrlName":"rule518","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e03a86bc-50c0-4e1f-95c8-5dd8674a2920","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 90-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule525","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a2f3d2c0-230e-4d16-9110-f62c3ff3ad17","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 90-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule526","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"95073992-e622-4976-ab26-2e53c62ea65c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 13, 1991 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 91-1 \n \nThis opinion relies on Standard of Conduct 30 and Ethical Consideration 5-6 that bear upon matters directly addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> . <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. \n \nThe Form Notification and Consent Letter , which is an addendum to this opinion, continues to be useful and valid. \n \nEthical propriety of drafter of will serving as executor. \nIt is not ethically improper for a lawyer to be named executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared when the lawyer does not consciously influence the client in the decision to name him or her executor or trustee, so long as he or she obtains the client's written consent in some form or gives the client written notice in some form after a full disclosure of all the possible conflicts of interest. In addition, the total combined attorney's fee and executor or trustee fee or commission must be reasonable and procedures used in obtaining this fee should be in accord with Georgia law.\n \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n Is it ethically proper for a lawyer to be named executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared? \n \nOPINION: \n \nDisciplinary Standard of Conduct No. 30 provides:\n \nExcept with the written consent or written notice to his client after full disclosure a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interests.\n \nThe financial interests of an executor or trustee reasonably may affect an attorney's independent professional judgment on behalf of the client. The conduct in question falls clearly within the coverage of Standard No. 30. Standard No. 30, however, provides exceptions for this type of conflict. These exceptions to a conflict of interest are the client's written consent or written notice to the client after full disclosure. These exceptions are in question here. \n \nThere is no limitation on client consent in Standard No. 30 unless the \"appearance of impropriety \"prohibition of Canon 9 of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility creates an implied limitation. It is our opinion that the conduct in question does not necessarily create an \"appearance of impropriety,\"and we note that the \"appearance of impropriety \"prohibition is not included in the Standards of Conduct. \n \nThis opinion finds support in the interpretive guidance of the aspirational statement in Ethical Consideration 5-6.\n \nEC 5-6 - A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.\n \nThe implication of Ethical Consideration 5-6 is that the naming of an attorney as executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared does not per se create an appearance of impropriety, but that such an arrangement creates a risk of appearing to be improper, which must be guarded against by the attorney. \n \nA testator's or settlor's freedom to select an executor or trustee is an important freedom, and it should not be restricted absent strong justification. For a variety of reasons, the attorney may be the most appropriate choice of fiduciary for the client. The risk that some lawyers may take advantage of a lawyer-client relationship to benefit themselves in a manner not in the client's best interest should not outweigh that freedom. \n \nThis risk of self-dealing instead creates the need for restrictions that offer assurance that the naming of the lawyer as executor or trustee is the informed decision of the testator or settlor. An attorney's full disclosure is essential to the client's informed decision and consent. Disclosure requires notification of the attorney's potential interest in the arrangement; i.e., the ability to collect an executor's or trustee's fee and possibly attorneys fees. Unlike a real estate transaction where an attorney has a personal interest in the property, being named as executor or trustee does not give the attorney any personal interest in the estate or trust assets other than the fee charged. Waiver of State law fiduciary requirements in the document is permissible as long as waiver is ordinary and customary in similar documents for similar clients that do not name the attorney as fiduciary. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a>\nIn the light of the above, full disclosure in this context should include an explanation of the following:\n \n1. All potential choices of executor or trustee, their relative abilities, competence, safety and integrity, and their fee structure; \n2. The nature of the representation and service that will result if  the client wishes to name the attorney as executor or trustee (i.e., what the exact role of the lawyer as fiduciary will be, what the lawyer's fee structure will be as a lawyer/fiduciary, etc.); \n3. The potential for the attorney executor or trustee hiring him or herself or his or her firm to represent the estate or trust, and the fee arrangement anticipated; and \n4. An explanation of the potential advantages to the client of seeking independent legal advice.\n \nThese disclosures may be made orally or in writing, but the client's consent or the attorney's notice to the client should be in writing. \n \nThe client's consent could be obtained by having the client sign a consent form that outlines the information described above. \n \nConsistent with other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue and the Standards and Rules of the Georgia Bar, it our opinion that it is ethically permissible for testator or settlor to name as executor in a will or trustee of a trust the lawyer who has prepared the instrument when the lawyer: (a) does not promote himself or herself or consciously influence the client in the decision; (b) fully discloses the conflict as described above, and (c) either obtains client consent in some form of writing or notifies the client in writing. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a> \n \nAny executor or trustee is allowed by Georgia law to hire legal counsel, according to the needs of the estate or trust he represents, and pay reasonable fees for their services. O.C.G.A. §53-7-10. An attorney who has ethically named himself or herself as executor or trustee in an instrument he or she has prepared may act as an attorney for the estate or hire a member of his or her firm as attorney. The fiduciary and the attorney, however, must exercise caution to avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest in this circumstance. \n \nWhen a lawyer has ethically named himself or herself as executor or trustee in an instrument he or she has prepared, the lawyer can receive fees for performing both services. If, however, any costs of preparation or execution overlap, the attorney must see that these costs are charged only once. He or she may not charge both the client and the estate or trust for a single task. \n \nAs a lawyer prepares a will or trust instrument, he or she is performing services for the client-testator/settlor as a lawyer. It is the lawyer's task at this time to make sure the client's wishes for the later disposition and distribution of the client's property are integrated into a plan acceptable to the client. \n \nThe lawyer acting in his or her capacity as an executor or trustee is performing a different function altogether. It is the lawyer's task as executor or trustee to effectively implement the integrated plan for disposition and distribution of the testator's or settlor's property. Not only is the lawyer's function different, the tasks are different. The lawyer should still be appropriately and reasonably compensated whether the compensation is provided in the instrument or by statute, but an attorney acting as a fiduciary should not double dip fees charged to the client or estate. \n \nGeorgia law provides that an attorney serving as an administrator cannot double dip in fees. See McDow v. Corley 154 Ga. App. 575 (1980); and Davidson v. Story , 106 Ga. 799, 32 S.E. 867 (1899). It is recognized that if the attorney is serving as both executor or trustee and as legal counsel, it maybe difficult to sort out each task performed as one performed clearly in one capacity or the other. Any fees above Georgia's statutory provisions for compensating executors that an attorney may incur in a dual role as lawyer and fiduciary must be collected by filing an application for extra compensation with the Probate Court under O.C.G.A. §53-6-150. McDow , 154 Ga. App. at 576; and Davidson , 106 Ga. at 801. In keeping with both Georgia law and ethical considerations, the total fees charged by an attorney in such a dual role should be reasonable. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a>\n \n Addendum to Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-R1 \nForm Notification and Consent Letter \n \n[MR. OR MS. FULL NAME] \n[ADDRESS] \n[CITY, STATE ZIP] \n \nDear [MR. OR MS. LAST NAME]: \n \n     Because you have asked me to serve as Executor and Trustee under your will, I must explain certain ethical considerations to you and obtain your written consent to the potential conflicts of interests that could develop. The purpose of this letter is to summarize our discussions about your naming me as fiduciary in your will. \n \n     A lawyer cannot prepare a will or trust in which the client names that lawyer as fiduciary unless that decision originates with the client. The lawyer should never suggest that he/she be named or promote himself/herself to serve in that capacity. \n \n     Others who might serve as your fiduciaries include your spouse, one or more of your children, a relative, a personal friend, a business associate, a bank with trust powers, your accountant, or an investment advisor. \n \n     I can serve as executor and trustee if that is your desire. The potential conflict arises primarily from the probability that I will hire this firm to serve as attorneys for the estate and trust. An attorney is entitled to compensation for legal services performed on behalf of the estate and trust, and the executor and trustee are also entitled to compensation for services in that capacity. When a lawyer has been named as executor and trustee pursuant to the ethical requirements of the State Bar, he/she can receive fees for performing services both as executor and trustee and as attorney as long as he/she charges only once for any single service. Further, the total compensation for serving as both fiduciary and attorney must be reasonable. If you name me as executor and trustee in your will, I and the other lawyers in my firm will charge at our normal hourly rates for all services performed. [NOTE: Modify the preceding sentence as appropriate.] \n \n     I must also point out to you that a lawyer's independence is compromised when he/she acts as both fiduciary and as lawyer for the fiduciary. Some of the potential conflicts in this regard are:\n\n1.  The question whether a particular task is \"legal \"or \"fiduciary \"in nature;\n2.  The question whether services being performed are really necessary in the  circumstances;\n3.  The propriety of giving the fiduciary broad disrectionary powers and exemption from bond;\n4.  The lack of independent review of the document by an attorney other than the one who drafted it; and\n5.  There may be other potential conflicts that have not occurred to me.\n \n     In accordance with the ethical requirements of the State Bar of Georgia, it is necessary for me to obtain your statement that the potential conflicts of interests have been explained to you. In that regard, please review the statement of consent below. If it is satisfactory to you, please sign and return the enclosed copy to me. If you want to discuss any point further, please call. If you decide not to execute the consent, please advise me whom you would like to serve as executor and trustee instead of me. \n \n     If you have any doubt concerning the information contained in this letter or the effect of signing the consent, you should discuss it with another lawyer of your choice. \n \n                                                                Sincerely, \n        \n \n                                                                ________________________ \n                                                                Attorney\n \nCONSENT \n \n     I, ______________________ (Client) _______________, have voluntarily named as executor and trustee in my will and trust, ______________________(Attorney) _________________, who prepared the instrument in his/her capacity as my attorney. Mr./Ms. ________________ (Attorney) ______________ did not promote himself/herself or consciously influence me in the decision to name him/her as executorand trustee. In addition, Mr./Ms. _____________ (Attorney) ______________ has disclosed the potential conflicts which he/she thinks might arise as a result of his/her serving as both executor and trustee and as attorney for the estate and trust. An explanation of the different roles as fiduciary and attorney, an explanation of the risks and disadvantages of this dual representation, an explanation of the manner in which his/her compensation will be determined, and an opportunity to seek independent legal advice were provided to me prior to my signing this consent. \n \nDate__________________                    _________________________________\n(Signature)\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> For example, granting broad powers to a fiduciary or relieving the fiduciary of return or bond requirements is a common practice, can substantially reduce the expense of administration of an estate or trust, and does not relieve the fiduciary of the duty to administer the estate properly in or reduce substantially the rights of the beneficiaries to enforce that duty. On the other hand, a provision that attempted to relieve the fiduciary of negligence would probably not be ordinary and customary and would be improper. \n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2  </a> In Pennsylvania, an attorney ethically may act as co-executor in a will that he or she prepares as long as the attorney advises the client (in a way never specified) of the potential problem that the attorney may be required to testify regarding the will if it is challenged. Professional Guidance Opinion 80-2 of the Philadelphia Bar Association. The attorney also may not take advantage of his position as draftsman to promote himself or herself or \"sell \"the ideas to the client. See also Professional Guidance Opinion 8-17 of the Philadelphia Bar Association (concerning an attorney naming himself successor-trustee in a will he drafted). \n \n <a name=\"3\"> 3 </a> In accord . Okl. Opin. No. 298 (Feb. 28, 1991) (attorney serving as executor of estate and as attorney for the estate may charge reasonable fees for each so long as charges do not overlap.); Ala. Opin. No. 81-503 (undated) (attorney may serve as administrator of estate and as attorney for the estate and may charge reasonable fees for each); Wis. Opin. No. E-80-14 (Dec. 1980) (a lawyer, appointed as guardian, may serve as attorney for the guardian, and may charge reasonable fees for performing in both capacities).","UrlName":"rule520","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ef91d436-d7b1-4547-9817-70a6d7e729ca","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 20, 1991 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 91-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 31, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(a)</a> . \n \nThis opinion also relies on the Canons of Ethics, specifically Ethical Considerations EC 2-19 and 2-23, that bear upon matters directly addressed by Comments 2 and 9 of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5</a> .\n ADVANCE FEE PAYMENTS \n \nA lawyer need not place any fees into a trust account absent special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of the client. Such circumstances may be the agreement of the parties, the size and amount of the fee, and the length of time contemplated for the undertaking.\n \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nWhether a lawyer may deposit into a general operating account a retainer that represents payment of fees yet to be earned. \n \n OPINION: \n \nThe question posed by correspondent is not clear. \"Fees yet to be earned \"are prepaid fees. \"Prepaid fees \"also include \"fixed \"or \"flat fees,\"which are not earned until the task is completed. The terms \"retainer \"and \"prepaid fees \"have different meanings. For purposes of clarity, the terms are defined as here used. \n \nA retainer is \"...the fee which the client pays when he retains the attorney to act for him, and thereby prevents him from acting for his adversary.\"Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Thus, retainer fees are earned by the attorney by agreeing to be \"on call \"for the client and by not accepting employment from the client's adversaries. McNulty, George &Hall v. Pruden , 62 Ga. 135, 141 (1878). \n \nA \"flat \"or \"fixed \"fee is one charged by an attorney to perform a task to completion, for example, to draw a contract, prepare a will, or represent the client in court, as in an uncontested divorce or a criminal case. Such a fee may be paid before or after the task is completed. \n \nA \"prepaid fee \"is a fee paid by the client with the understanding that the attorney will earn the fee as he or she performs the task agreed upon. \n \nUnder these various definitions, one can reasonably take the position that \"retainers \"and \"flat fees \"may be placed in the general operating account when paid. Prepaid fees may be placed in a trust account until earned. \n \nTerminology as to the various types of fee arrangements does not alter the fact that the lawyer is a fiduciary. Therefore, the lawyer's duties as to fees should be uniform and governed by the same rules regardless of the particular fee arrangement. Those duties are as follows:\n 1.  To have a clear understanding with the client as to the details of the fee arrangement prior to undertaking the representation, preferably in writing. \n2.  To return to the client any unearned portion of a fee. \n3.  To accept the client's dismissal of him or her (with or without cause) without imposing any penalty on the client for the dismissal. \n4.  Comply with the provisions of Standard 31 as to reasonableness of the fee.\n \nThe law is well settled that a client can dismiss a lawyer for any reason or for no reason, and the lawyer has a duty to return any unearned portion of the fee. In the Matter of Collins , 246 Ga. 325, 271 S.E.2d 473 (1980).\nThe exercise of the right to discharge an attorney with or without cause does not constitute a breach of contract because it is a basic term of the contract, implied by law into it by reason of the nature of the attorney-client relationship, that the client may terminate that contract at any time.\n Henry, Walden &Davis v. Goodman , 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W. 2d 233 (1987). \n \nThe client, of course, may not be penalized for exercising the right to dismiss the lawyer. Id . In view of these duties, a lawyer need not place any fees into a trust account absent special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of the client. Such circumstances may be the agreement of the parties, the size and amount of the fee, and the length of time contemplated for the undertaking. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a>\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> A fee paid for retainer of the attorney, as narrowly defined in this opinion, illustrates the importance of an agreement or understanding in writing outlining, among other things: geographic area involved, duration, scope of proposed legal services, fees and expenses for legal services rendered, and due date of future retainer fees covered by the retainer agreement. The agreement should also contain specific terms as to refunds of any portion of the fee should the agreement be terminated prior to its expiration date. See Ethical Considerations 2-19 and 2-23.","UrlName":"rule521","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"30cda581-2c94-4c74-9631-35c49e6e1705","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-3","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule527","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bc8cdcc5-d2a7-4fa3-b010-ec92ba3f0b94","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 92-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule528","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2f1e7d3d-e2e0-4017-92f4-5641db555d63","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 92-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule529","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bdfa90bd-93a1-49af-9f47-e6bca8ffd4d0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule530","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cd42c0f8-57d8-48cf-b273-d4d851d38f12","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule531","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"44debefd-6424-4f86-9611-83a86779ae21","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court \nOn September 17, 1993 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 93-3 \n \nThis opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including both Directory Rules and Ethical Considerations, that bear upon matters addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule83\">Rules 3.8(b)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">1.7(a)</a> (see especially Comments 6 and 10), <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">1.1</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">1.5(a)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(d)</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(f)(2)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">5.4(c)</a> and<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule207\">9.5</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee. \n \nThe question presented is whether it is unethical for a prosecutor to condition a plea agreement on an appointed or pro bono counsel's waiver of any claims for attorneys' fees. \n \nIn order to answer this inquiry, we must consider the unique nature of the American adversarial system, especially in criminal litigation. Lawyers typically occupy the three key roles in our system, as prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge. Each participant has a distinct role to play, and it is the carefully crafted balance of the public, ethical and professional responsibilities of the players that makes the system operate in accordance with Constitutional guarantees and the rightful expectations of the populace. As the Preamble to our Code of Professional Responsibility states:\n \n[I] It is peculiarly essential that the system for  establishing and dispensing justice be so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration... It cannot be so  maintained unless the conduct and motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit approval of all just men.\n \nThe first participant, the prosecutor, is an advocate like all lawyers, but he or she also has a unique responsibility as lawyer for the sovereign. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> \"The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a> While operating within the adversarial system, the prosecutor's obligation is to protect the innocent as well as convict the guilty, and to guard the rights of the accused as well as enforce the rights of the public. Thus, the prosecutor acts almost as a \"minister of justice,\"occupying a quasi-judicial position. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a> \n \nThe EC's seek to balance a prosecutor's duty to act in the best interests of the client (the state) with the duty to avoid an unjust result. For instance, the prosecutor:\n \nshould make timely disclosure to the defense of available evidence... that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid  pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\"> 4 </a>\n \nBecause of the prosecutor's unique position and responsibilities, conduct that is tolerable on the part of a private person may be intolerable when done by the prosecutor on behalf of the state. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\"> 5 </a> \n \nThe second participant in the system, the defense attorney, plays another role with markedly different responsibilities. The defense attorney's primary allegiance is to the client, the overriding goal being the achievement of that which is in the client's best interests, as the client perceives them. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#6\"> 6 </a> The principal duty the defense attorney owes to the administration of justice is \"to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate with courage, devotion, and to the utmost of his or her learning and ability and according to the law.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#7\"> 7 </a> \n \nThese duties devolve upon the defense attorney both as a member of the legal profession and as a party with a contractual relationship with the defendant. Even more importantly, however, these responsibilities are an outgrowth of the defendant's right to \"effective assistance of counsel \"guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 8 the Fourteenth Amendment to the Georgia Constitution 9 and court rule. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#10\"> 10 </a> \n \nThe third participant in the adversarial system is the judge. As stated in the Code of Judicial Conduct:\n \nOur legal system is based on the principle that an  independent, fair and competent judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and  the rule of law . . . The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of  disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under the rule of law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#11\"> 11 </a>\n \nAs arbiter, the judge must of course remain neutral and impartial. At the same time, however, judges are also responsible for guaranteeing that defendants receive fair trials and effective representation. \n \nThe prosecutor who conditions a plea agreement in a criminal case on waiver of attorneys' fees upsets the delicate balance of the adversarial system by interfering with both the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and the people's right to maintain a fair system of justice, and by sullying the judicial system's reputation for fair and ethical treatment of all persons. It does this in several important ways. \n \nFirst, such a condition creates a conflict of interest for the defense attorney, who is torn between the need to receive compensation for his or her work and the duty to protect the freedom, sometimes even the life, of the client. This conflict substantially interferes with the right, guaranteed by Constitutional mandate and court rules, to be assisted by competent, conflict-free counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#12\"> 12 </a>\n Standard 30 provides: \n \nExcept with the written consent of his client after full  disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his  professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#13\"> 13 </a>\n \nA prosecutor's condition such as the one discussed here creates such a conflict. \"[A]dequate compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity of the profession.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#14\"> 14 </a> \"When members of the Bar are induced to render legal services for inadequate compensation, as a consequence the quality of the service rendered may be lowered, the welfare of the profession injured and the administration of justice made less efficient.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#15\"> 15 </a> The defense attorney in the situation posited here would not receive adequate, or even any, compensation when the prosecutor confronts him with a plea agreement based on the waiver of his fees. \n \nThe risk of inadequate representation exists not only in cases where individual lawyers are unpaid or are unsure about the prospects of payment. The potential risk will pervade every criminal prosecution unless a clear signal is sent that this sort of bargain is unacceptable in any circumstance. Thus, the prosecutor puts the defense attorney, and through him the defendant, in an impossible position. Certainty regarding payment in representation of the defendant is needed so that defense counsel can properly balance his workload. With uncertainty in the process, defense counsel may do that which is only human - devote less time and energy to that which is less likely to result in adequate remuneration. \n \nStandard 30 does permit an attorney to accept or continue representation in the face of personal conflict with written consent or notice to the client after full disclosure. Despite the literal language of the Standard, a client's written consent cannot waive this kind of personal conflict. This is true for at least two reasons. First, conflicts should be resolved before representation begins. This avoids harmful uncertainty, and prevents a late withdrawal of counsel that would be detrimental to both the client and the cause of justice. Second, as long as this tool remains an option, it is never clear when the prosecutor may use it. The fear that a prosecutor will use it may cause defense attorneys to stop taking the cases altogether <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#16\"> 16 </a> or to jealously guard their time while representing a defendant in the fear that they will ultimately have to yield their fees. \n \nIt should be noted that blanket proscriptions aimed at preventing conflicts in criminal cases are nothing new. Standard 34, which is sandwiched between other Standards dealing with impermissible conflicts, states:\n \nPrior to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in publication  rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed employment. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#17\"> 17 </a>\n \nThe reasoning behind this Standard, for which there is no consent exception, is obvious actions which are appropriate or necessary in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of a description of the representation. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#18\"> 18 </a> Thus, there is precedent for adoption of prophylactic rules limiting both the lawyer's and client's options, in order to protect the client's interest in competent and zealous representation. \n \nThe second reason why the prosecutor's condition is improper is that it jeopardizes the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant. The Constitution demands that \"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#19\"> 19 </a> This amendment guarantees effective and conflict free representation. The Courts have already held that some conflicts may not be waived under any circumstances, especially in death penalty cases. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#20\"> 20 </a> Creating conflicts of interest and interfering with effective assistance of counsel is inconsistent with the prosecutor's duty as a \"minister of justice \" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://21/"> 21 </a> to seek justice, and not merely convict. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#22\"> 22 </a> \n \nThird, the prosecutor's condition imperils the interest of the people in maintaining a system that operates fairly and in the state's best interests. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#23\"> 23 </a> Justice is imperiled in several ways: first, the mere possibility that counsel will not be paid will decrease the likelihood that competent counsel will come forward to represent the defendant; second, counsel who does come forward cannot safely devote his undivided loyalty to the best interests of the defendant, for fear that uncompensated work will divert attention from paying work; third, the conflict created by the prosecutor's actual or possible conditioning of the reduced sentence on the waiver of fees will increase the likelihood that defendants will later seek to set aside convictions or guilty pleas on the ground that they were not represented by conflict-free counsel; and fourth, if the crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted really should carry a particular sentence under state law, it is inappropriate for that interest to be ignored solely for the purpose of saving money. \n \nFinally, the actions of the prosecutor conflict with his obligation to \"avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#24\"> 24 </a> As the EC's in Canon 9 provide:\n \nContinuation of the American concept that we are to be  governed by rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be  obtained through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our  system and in the legal profession . . . Public confidence in law and lawyers may be  eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer . . . . When explicit ethical  guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner  that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and  the legal profession. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#25\"> 25 </a>\n \nAll of this is especially true, of course, of a prosecutor. Public confidence in the legal system is certainly not promoted by actions which have the effect of discouraging competent counsel from representing criminal defendants,interfering with rights guaranteed by the state and Federal constitutions, and sacrificing the best interests of the state for purely monetary reasons. \n \nFor these reasons, we conclude that it is unethical for a prosecutor to condition a plea agreement in a criminal case on appointed or pro bono counsel's waiver of any claims for attorneys' fees.\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> The prosecutor is bound by the Standards of Conduct (hereinafter \"Standards \") and the aspirational Directory Rules (hereinafter \"DR \") and Ethical Considerations (hereinafter \"EC \"). See Standard 70(a). \n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> EC 7-13. \n \n <a name=\"3\"> 3 </a> See DR 7-103 and EC's 7-13 and 7-14; Model Rule 3.8; and ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (hereinafter \"Justice Standards \") 3-1.1. \n \n <a name=\"4\"> 4 </a> EC 7-13. \n \n <a name=\"5\"> 5 </a> Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 214 (1990). \n \n <a name=\"6\"> 6 </a> See The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Rule 3.1 (1982). \n \n <a name=\"7\"> 7 </a> Criminal Justice Standard 4-1.1(b); See EC 7-19, stating that \"The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.\"See also DR7-101; Model Rule 1.3 (Diligence), comment. Also see The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Rule 3.1, which states, \"A lawyer shall use all legal means that are consistent with the retainer agreement, and reasonable available, to advance a client's interests as the client perceives them.\" \n \n <a name=\"8\"> 8 </a> See United States Constitution, amend. VI, which provides, \"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.\"Also see Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984). \n \n <a name=\"9\"> 9 </a> See Georgia Constitution, Art. 1, § 1, ~ 14 of the Georgia Constitution, stating \"Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel . . . . \"Also see Austin v. Carter, 248 Ga. 774 (1982). \n \n <a name=\"10\"> 10 </a> See Uniform Superior Court Rule 29.8(C), which provides that \"More difficult cases shall be assigned to attorneys with sufficient levels of experience and competence to afford adequate representation.\"Also see Rules 29.8(D), providing that \"Less experienced attorneys should be assigned cases which are within their capabilities. ..\"and 29.8(E) providing, \"Cases in which the death penalty is sought shall be assigned only to attorneys of sufficient experience, skill, and competence to render effective assistance of counsel to defendants. . . .\" \n \n <a name=\"11\"> 11 </a> ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble (1990). \n \n <a name=\"12\"> 12 </a> See Cuylerv. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) and Wilson v. State, 257 Ga. 352 (1987). \n \n <a name=\"13\"> 13 </a> (emphasis supplied). DR 5-101 states essentially the same rule, but in aspirational form. The DR, however, does not require that the consent of a client be written. \n \n <a name=\"14\"> 14 </a> EC 2-17. \n \n <a name=\"15\"> 15 </a> ABA Opinion 302(1961). \n \n <a name=\"16\"> 16 </a> The EC's encourage lawyers to do pro bono work (See EC 2-25, stating \"[E]very lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged . . . \"\"When a lawyer is appointed by a court or requested by a bar association to undertake representation of a person unable to obtain counsel, . . .he should not seek to be excused from undertaking the representation except for compelling reasons.\"EC 2-29. \n          At the same time, lawyers are not expected to unselfishly offer unlimited time for inadequate pay. In Opinion 87-3, the Nebraska State Bar Committee on Ethics found that a \"compelling reason \"to decline appointment to represent an indigent in a criminal defense matter is that \"[a]cceptance would impose unreasonable financial hardship on the lawyer.\" \n \n <a name=\"17\"> 17 </a> DR 5-104(B) states the same rule, but in aspirational form. \n \n <a name=\"18\"> 18 </a> See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981), in which the Court noted that the publication agreement affected counsel's tactical choices. To enhance the sensationalism of the trial, he failed to adequately investigate, seek a continuance, or request a change of venue; he also put defendant on the stand. \n \n <a name=\"19\"> 19 </a> U.S. Const. amend.VI. \n \n <a name=\"20\"> 20 </a> Fleming v. State,246 Ga. 90 (1980) (death penalty appeal invoking the State Supreme Court's \"supervisory role of the bar \"). \n \n <a name=\"21\"> 21 </a> Criminal Justice Standards, supra. \n \n <a name=\"22\"> 22 </a> See EC 7-13. \n \n <a name=\"23\"> 23 </a> EC 7-13 states,\"[H]is duty is to seek justice . . . during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all . . . .\"In criminal litigation, it is the prosecutor who stands in the shoes of the people, and it is his responsibility to make sure that both fairness and justice are pursued. \n \n <a name=\"24\"> 24 </a> Canon 9 provides, \"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.\" \n <a name=\"25\"> \n25 </a> EC 9-1, 9-2.","UrlName":"rule524","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9dbbe297-9392-4abb-950b-e9f9ff39dc02","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-4","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn November 10, 1993 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 93-4 \n For references to Standard of Conduct 21, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(a)</a> .\n For references to Standards of Conduct 22, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.\nStandard 22(b) requires a criminal defense attorney to provide copies of transcripts to indigent clients, without cost to the clients, whenever that is necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the clients upon termination of the representation of the clients by the defense attorney.\nCorrespondent asks if public defenders are ethically obligated to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies. Apparently, the public defender office does not provide representation on collateral post-conviction remedies yet wishes to retain the paupered transcript in its file for its own purposes. Making additional copies of transcripts for indigent clients will impose a financial burden upon the public defender.\nStandard 22(b) requires the public defender or any criminal defense attorney to provide copies of transcripts to indigent clients, without cost to the clients, whenever that is necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client upon termination of the representation of the client by the public defender. Standard 22(b), in its pertinent part, provides:\n A lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including . . . delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled. While, by its own terms, Standard 22(b) applies only upon withdrawal, the purpose of Standard 22(b) is invoked whenever there is a termination of a lawyer-client relationship. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a>\n A paupered transcript is a \"paper . . . to which the client is entitled.\"That phrase must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the Standard which is to avoid prejudice to a client's rights. There can be no doubt that the lack of a transcript can prejudice the assertion of rights by the client in a collateral post-conviction relief matter. In addition, the attorney obtained the paupered transcript under a claim of right which belongs to the client -- not to the attorney. Standard 22(b) obligates attorneys to deliver transcripts and any other court documents which would be useful in the client's pursuit of rights. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\nThe obligation created by Standard 22 is limited to those situations in which the client would be prejudiced by the failure to deliver the transcript. If an additional copy of a paupered transcript is available to the client from the court for use in collateral post-conviction proceedings, the client may not be prejudiced by a refusal to deliver the transcript. Whether additional copies of paupered transcripts are or should be available from the court is not a matter for this opinion.\n As we stated in Advisory Opinion 87-5, attorneys are entitled to keep copies of papers in their client files, but, absent a prior agreement as to costs, a situation inapplicable here, the attorney bears the cost of copying. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a> It would be completely inconsistent with the nature of the relationship between the public defender or other defense counsel and the indigent criminal defendant to condition release of documents essential to further appeals upon the payment of costs of copying.\nIn cases where the criminal defense lawyer does not have the transcript available through no fault of his own, he has no obligation to provide it.\n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> Standard 21 makes the withdrawal rules applicable to cases of discharge by the client as well: \n \"A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment and a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if he is discharged by his client.\"\n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> In accord, ABA Informal Opinion 1376.\n <a name=\"3\"> 3 </a> In accord, Michigan Opin. No. CI-926.","UrlName":"rule493","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bbfafeeb-e7ee-496f-a711-95698670b72b","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 94-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 9, 1994 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 94-1 \n \nOn June 9, 2004, the Supreme Court of Georgia amended Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3. As a result, this formal advisory opinion no longer provides an accurate interpretation of the ethical rules. Please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule149\">Rule 7.3 (c)(2)</a> which adequately addresses the issue discussed in this opinion. \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical Propriety of Lawyer Referral Service Collecting a Percentage of Fees in Certain Cases Referred to Participating Attorneys by the Service\nAny division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a nonlawyer in violation of Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102.\n Correspondent represents a local bar association that operates a non-profit lawyer referral service. The inquiry concerns the ethical propriety of the lawyer referral service collecting a percentage of fees in certain cases referred to participating attorneys by the service. \n \nStandard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102 provides in pertinent part that a lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer. \n \nWhile the membership of the local bar association is composed of lawyers who are licensed to practice law in the state, the local bar association, in and of itself, has no authority to engage in the practice of law.  Therefore, any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service would constitute the sharing of fees with a nonlawyer in violation of Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102. \n \nMoreover, \"[a] lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization...as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his [or her] employment by a client.\"The lawyer may pay only \"the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bona fide lawyer referral service operated by an organization authorized by law....\"Standard 13(b). \n ","UrlName":"rule494","Order":46,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"310bbc9a-b051-4601-ad7b-9bcc928207e9","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 95-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn October 4, 1995 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 95-1 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 23, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 26, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 28, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule57\">Rules 1.6</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 30, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http:// /Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 31(a), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 40, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(f)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program which purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client? To participate in the program, the lawyer must enroll and pay a fee; and agree to assign the client's fees bills and share information about the client and the client's case with the program. \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nBecause the lawyer's participation will result in a violation of one or more disciplinary Standards, members of the State Bar of Georgia cannot ethically participate in the program. \n \nOPINION: \n \nI. Introduction and Background \n \nA fee collection program purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client. To participate in the program, the lawyer must enroll and pay a fee; and agree to assign the client's fees bills and share information about the client and the client's case with the program. \n \nIf the client is credit worthy, the program will pay the client's bill and then proceed to collect the fees from the client on an installment basis, charging interest according to the credit worthiness of the client; if the client is not credit worthy, the program will proceed to collect the fees for the lawyer, but without any advance payment, remitting only 80% of the amount of the fees collected. \n \nThe lawyer is required by the program's Participation Agreement to grade clients according to their legal needs and ability to pay. The Participation Agreement contains the following provisions: \n \nThe lawyer must \"disclose events or circumstances materially affecting...credit worthiness \"of the client. The lawyer is required to warrant and covenant, among other terms, the following: that the application, credit agreement and voucher \"have been signed by either the Client, a person authorized to sign on the Client's behalf, or the person who will be responsible for repaying the credit extended under the Program, and such Client or person has been identified by a valid driver's license or state identification card;\"\"the Voucher accurately describes and evidences the type of service which has been provided to the Client;\"\"the Client is not in default with respect to any agreement between Client and Participant (lawyer), other than regarding accounts receivable;\"and \"Participant has no knowledge of any facts which may result in the uncollectability and/or unenforceability of the Credit Agreement.\" \n \nThus to participate in the program, the lawyer must provide information about the client that may well violate the client's right of confidentiality. Moreover, the client must sign the lawyer's voucher warranting the satisfactory nature of the lawyer's services, acknowledging that the fees are reasonable, and agreeing to pay finance charges in addition to the reasonable fee. \n \nII. The Ethical and Legal Considerations in the Program\nPreliminarily, it should be noted that a client's use of a program voucher is not analogous to a client's use of all-purpose credit cards to pay for services of a lawyer. Rather, the program is essentially a finance company designed to provide a service exclusively for lawyers and clients.\n In Georgia, lawyers are officers of the Court, Platen v. Byck , 50 Ga. 245, 248 (1873); Bibb County v. Hancock , 211 Ga. 429, 438 (1955); Sams v. Olah , 225 Ga. 497, 504 (1969), and, as members of the State Bar, are members of the administrative arm of the Georgia Supreme Court engaged in the administration of justice.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \nThe office of attorney is indispensable to the administration of justice and is intimate and peculiar in its relation to, and vital to the well-being of, the court. \n</blockquote>\n Sams v. Olah , supra, at 504. Thus, the lawyer is \"an officer of the state, with an obligation to the courts and to the public no less significant than his obligation to his client,\"id., and the legal profession \"[d]emands adherence to the public interest as the foremost obligation of the practitioner.\"First Bank &Trust Co. v. Zagoria , 250 Ga. 844, 845 (1983).\n The basic vice of the program is that it violates both the spirit and the letter of these precepts by requiring the lawyer to dilute his or her role as fiduciary. For example, the lawyer requires the client to sign a warranty as to the services rendered, which purports to contract away the client's legal right to complain or to dismiss the lawyer. A fundamental rule applicable to the lawyer as fiduciary is that \"a client has the absolute right to discharge the attorney and terminate the relation at any time, even without cause.\"White v. Aiken , 197 Ga. 29 (1943). (See also Standard 26).\n The dilution of the lawyer's fiduciary role is further indicated by the fact that a lawyer's participation in the program entails the possible violation of at least six standards of the State Bar of Georgia: Standards 23, 26, 28, 30, 31(a), and 40.\nStandard 23 requires a lawyer who withdraws from employment to refund any unearned fees. Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. Standard 28 prohibits a lawyer from revealing the confidences or secrets of a client. Standard 30 prohibits representation where the lawyer's exercise of professional judgment on behalf of a client may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interest. Standard 31(a) prohibits the lawyer from charging a clearly excessive fee. And Standard 40 prohibits a lawyer from accepting compensation from one other than the client for representation of the client without the consent of the client.\nBecause the lawyer's participation will result in a violation of one or more of these Standards, members of the State Bar of Georgia cannot ethically participate in the program.\n","UrlName":"rule497","Order":47,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e6be1456-c2e5-4c7e-8a30-90b9f1b623ec","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 96-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn January 25, 1996 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 96-1 \n \nThis opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including both Directory Rules and Ethical Considerations, that bear upon matters directly addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> . The conduct, which is the subject of this Formal Advisory Opinion, is now specifically and clearly prohibited by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nThe question presented is whether an attorney may require a client, who desires to discharge the lawyer, to enter into an agreement releasing the lawyer for all claims by the client against the lawyer, including any disciplinary complaint with the State Bar, in order to obtain the client's files from the lawyer and a waiver of any claim of lien by the lawyer against such files. \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nA lawyer should represent a client competently and should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client by putting the interests of a client ahead of the lawyer's own personal interests. Therefore, a lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar disciplinary complaints by the client against the lawyer. \n \nOPINION:\nIt has been brought to the attention of the State Bar's Disciplinary Board that lawyers are following a practice of requiring a client, who desires to discharge the lawyer, to execute an agreement releasing the lawyer from any liability for claims relating to the lawyer's representation of the client in order for the client to obtain the papers and documents that constitute the client's file. One such agreement includes the following provision:\n \n...it is hereby agreed that [the client] hereby releases and forever discharges [the lawyers]...from all...claims,...including any disciplinary complaint with the State Bar of Georgia...which [the client] ever had or may have [against the lawyers] including but not limited to [the lawyers] representation of [the client] in the above stated matter. ...\n[The lawyers]...waive any claim of lien that they have in said matter.\nIt is apparent from reviewing this provision that the lawyer being discharged is attempting to condition the release of the client's files upon the waiver of any claims, including claims for malpractice and State Bar disciplinary complaints, by the client against the lawyer. This attempt by the lawyer to limit his or her liability for malpractice constitutes a failure to comply with Canon 6 of the Canon of Ethics, which provides that a lawyer should represent a client competently. As clearly explained in Ethical Consideration 6-6:\n \nA lawyer should not seek, by contract or other means, to limit his individual liability to his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of his client properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly should not [be] permitted to do so.\nThe provisions of this Ethical Consideration are emphasized by Directory Rule 6-102:\n \n(A) A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his personal malpractice.\nClearly, the practice of requiring a client, who desires to discharge the lawyer, to execute an agreement as described herein before releasing the client's files is an attempt to exonerate the lawyer from individual liability to his or her client. As such, this practice constitutes a violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Ethics.\nFurthermore, Canon 5 of the Canons of Ethics provides that a \"a lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client.\"As explained in Ethical Consideration 5-1:\n \nThe professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of uncompromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.\nBy attempting to limit his or her liability for malpractice as a condition of releasing the client's files, the lawyer puts himself or herself into an adversarial relationship with the client. By purposefully withholding papers, documents, and evidence in the client's file until the client agrees to execute an agreement releasing the lawyer from any liability for claims or malpractice, the lawyer's personal interests are placed ahead of the interests of the client. This conduct amounts to a failure to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client in violation of Canon 5 of the State Bar of Georgia's Canons of Ethics.\nIn addition, by conditioning the return of a client's files and the waiver of any lien that the lawyer might have against such files upon the execution of a release of claims for malpractice and complaints to the State Disciplinary Board, the lawyer has potentially caused prejudice to the client in violation of Standard 22(b) of the Standards of Conduct for the State Bar of Georgia which provides as follows:\n \nA lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled and complying with applicable laws and rules.\nBy such conduct, the lawyer has also potentially caused prejudice to the client in violation of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5 which provides as follows:\n \nAn attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.\nIn summary, the practice of requiring a client, that desires to discharge a lawyer, to execute an agreement, such as described herein, is an attempt by the lawyer to either exonerate himself or herself from claims for malpractice or limit his or her liability to the client for acts of malpractice, and such conduct is improper.\n","UrlName":"rule499","Order":48,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"63202f2d-83ee-40bd-800d-bdca8d755ce9","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 96-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule501","Order":49,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71867a07-e1b4-41ac-98ca-7d95ebce8c0d","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule503","Order":50,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"290106da-aa32-4732-a959-855c97f91929","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn February 13, 1997 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 97-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(c), please see Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> Comments. \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (trade names), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (lawyers practicing together under firm name), please see Comments [1] and [6] of<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor reference to Standard of Conduct 9(b) (use of name of lawyer-pubic official in firm name), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(c)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 35-38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rules 1.7</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(c)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">1.9</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">2.2</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay an attorney practice in more than one law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nAn attorney may practice simultaneously in more than one firm so long as those firms represent different ownership, the public and individual clients are clearly informed, and each firm adheres to all requirements of the Standards governing conflicts of interest and client confidences and secrets. \n \nOPINION: \n \nCorrespondent asks whether an attorney may practice in more than one law firm. Correspondent suggests several possible variations, including firms with overlapping partners, firms with different associates, and firms formed for different clients or different purposes. Each potential structure raises different problems under the Georgia Standards of Conduct. In addition to the structural concerns raised by Correspondent, overlapping firms create special problems of conflict of interest and client confidentiality. \n \nStandard 9(c) speaks to multiple structures: \"A law firm shall not simultaneously practice law under more than one name.\"Thus firms composed of the same principals may not form parallel firms for the practice of law, whether by using different associates, or for different practice areas or different clients. Standard 9(c) prohibits only multiple practices by the same \"law firm,\"however. Thus it does not forbid a member of one firm from joining with different principals simultaneously in a different practice or practices. Other Standards recognize and accept nontraditional practice forms. Standard 10 recognizes that \"[a] partnership for the practice of law may be composed of one or more individual professional corporations.\"Standard 11 deals with interstate law firms in which personnel and admissions to practice are distinct from state to state. \n \nThe principal problem created by distinct but overlapping practice firms is actual or potential client confusion. The Georgia Standards uniformly protect against any firm structure or designation which creates that possibility. Standard 8 (firm names, printing and publications) and Standard 9(a) (trade names) forbid any \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"usage. Standard 9(a) ties these concerns to client understandings \"as to the lawyer or lawyers practicing under that name or to the type of practice in which the lawyer or lawyers are engaged.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general). Standard 10 adds that \"[a] lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are ... partners.\"See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (\"special counsel \"relationship \"must be ... identified correctly so that clients and potential clients are fully aware \"). In addition, Standard 9(b) prohibits using the name of a lawyer-public official \"not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general); Advisory Opinion No. 23 (disclosure requirements for office of multistate firm). \n \nIn short, a lawyer's engaging in multiple practices with distinct ownership is not prohibited by the Standards, so long as neither the general public nor any individual client is or may be misled thereby. \n \nThe precise steps which each firm must take to avoid being \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"are beyond the scope of this opinion. If a lawyer practices in more than one active firm, he or she may be required to identify those firms in all communications to the general public, together with appropriate distinctions between or among them; and may need to explain to each client or potential client at the outset how that client will or would be served. The client needs to understand who is offering to perform or will perform services, and to whom the client should look for answers or redress in case of any problem. \n \nParticipation in simultaneous practices also raises concerns for conflict of interest and client confidences or secrets, arising from the overlapping lawyer's or lawyers' work in another firm or firms. The relevant Standards apply with full force to interrelated practices. Confidences and secrets must be protected regardless of where they were obtained. Individual lawyers are disqualified equally wherever they go. Standard 38 vicariously disqualifies each firm in case of any individual disqualification under Standards 35-37, regardless of which firm's work gives rise to individual disqualification. See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (vicarious disqualification in the similar context of \"special counsel \").","UrlName":"rule510","Order":51,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[{"Id":"5fcb0eb2-9077-4634-a325-aae0d50cfaae","ParentId":"290106da-aa32-4732-a959-855c97f91929","Title":"Version 2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn February 13, 1997 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 97-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(c), please see Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> Comments. \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (trade names), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (lawyers practicing together under firm name), please see Comments [1] and [6] of<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(e)</a> . \n \nFor reference to Standard of Conduct 9(b) (use of name of lawyer-pubic official in firm name), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(c)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 35-38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rules 1.7</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(c)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">1.9</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">2.2</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay an attorney practice in more than one law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nAn attorney may practice simultaneously in more than one firm so long as those firms represent different ownership, the public and individual clients are clearly informed, and each firm adheres to all requirements of the Standards governing conflicts of interest and client confidences and secrets. \n \nOPINION: \n \nCorrespondent asks whether an attorney may practice in more than one law firm. Correspondent suggests several possible variations, including firms with overlapping partners, firms with different associates, and firms formed for different clients or different purposes. Each potential structure raises different problems under the Georgia Standards of Conduct. In addition to the structural concerns raised by Correspondent, overlapping firms create special problems of conflict of interest and client confidentiality. \n \nStandard 9(c) speaks to multiple structures: \"A law firm shall not simultaneously practice law under more than one name.\"Thus firms composed of the same principals may not form parallel firms for the practice of law, whether by using different associates, or for different practice areas or different clients. Standard 9(c) prohibits only multiple practices by the same \"law firm,\"however. Thus it does not forbid a member of one firm from joining with different principals simultaneously in a different practice or practices. Other Standards recognize and accept nontraditional practice forms. Standard 10 recognizes that \"[a] partnership for the practice of law may be composed of one or more individual professional corporations.\"Standard 11 deals with interstate law firms in which personnel and admissions to practice are distinct from state to state. \n \nThe principal problem created by distinct but overlapping practice firms is actual or potential client confusion. The Georgia Standards uniformly protect against any firm structure or designation which creates that possibility. Standard 8 (firm names, printing and publications) and Standard 9(a) (trade names) forbid any \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"usage. Standard 9(a) ties these concerns to client understandings \"as to the lawyer or lawyers practicing under that name or to the type of practice in which the lawyer or lawyers are engaged.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general). Standard 10 adds that \"[a] lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are ... partners.\"See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (\"special counsel \"relationship \"must be ... identified correctly so that clients and potential clients are fully aware \"). In addition, Standard 9(b) prohibits using the name of a lawyer-public official \"not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general); Advisory Opinion No. 23 (disclosure requirements for office of multistate firm). \n \nIn short, a lawyer's engaging in multiple practices with distinct ownership is not prohibited by the Standards, so long as neither the general public nor any individual client is or may be misled thereby. \n \nThe precise steps which each firm must take to avoid being \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"are beyond the scope of this opinion. If a lawyer practices in more than one active firm, he or she may be required to identify those firms in all communications to the general public, together with appropriate distinctions between or among them; and may need to explain to each client or potential client at the outset how that client will or would be served. The client needs to understand who is offering to perform or will perform services, and to whom the client should look for answers or redress in case of any problem. \n \nParticipation in simultaneous practices also raises concerns for conflict of interest and client confidences or secrets, arising from the overlapping lawyer's or lawyers' work in another firm or firms. The relevant Standards apply with full force to interrelated practices. Confidences and secrets must be protected regardless of where they were obtained. Individual lawyers are disqualified equally wherever they go. Standard 38 vicariously disqualifies each firm in case of any individual disqualification under Standards 35-37, regardless of which firm's work gives rise to individual disqualification. See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (vicarious disqualification in the similar context of \"special counsel \").","UrlName":"revision329"}],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2cec141b-260d-471a-8871-f253d226bc46","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 4, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 97-3 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 6, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule149\">Rule 7.3(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 22, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 44, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 45(b), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1(a)(1)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nWhether it is ethically permissible for a departing attorney to send a communication to clients of the former law firm? \n \nOPINION: \n \nNo Standard prohibits a departing attorney from contacting those clients with whom the attorney personally worked while at the law firm. A client is not the property of a certain attorney. The main consideration underlying our Canons of Ethics is the best interest and protection of the client. \n \nAn attorney has a duty to keep a client informed. This duty flows in part from Standard 22 which provides that a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until that lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client including giving due notice to the client of the lawyer's withdrawal, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules. Furthermore, Standard 44 prohibits an attorney's willful abandonment or disregard of a legal matter to the client's detriment. Therefore, to the extent that a lawyer's departure from the firm affects the client's legal matters, this client should be informed of the attorney's departure. The fact or circumstances of an attorney's departure from a law firm should not be misrepresented to the firm's clients. See Standard 4 (which prohibits an attorney from engaging in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation); and Standard 45(b) (which prohibits an attorney from knowingly making a false statement of law or fact in his representation of a client). \n \nIf the departing attorney either had significant contact with or actively represented a client on the client's legal matters, the attorney may communicate with the client, in either written or oral form, to advise the client of the attorney's departure from the firm. An appropriate communication may advise the client of the fact of the attorney's departure, the attorney's new location, the attorney's willingness to provide legal services to the client, and the client's right to select who handles the client's future legal representation. \n \nAssuming the departing attorney either had significant contact with or actively represented the client, the written communication to the client does not need to comply with the provisions governing advertisements contained in Standard 6, because it would not constitute \"a written communication to a prospective client for the purposes of obtaining professional employment \"as contemplated by Standard 6 (i.e. the written communication is not required to be labeled an \"advertisement \"). Of course, any written communication regarding a lawyer's services must also comply with Standard 5, which prohibits any false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading communications; and with any other applicable standards of conduct. \n \nA similar analysis should also apply to an oral communication by the departing attorney to a client with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation on legal matters while at the firm. If the departing attorney contacts such a client orally, that attorney should only provide information that is deemed appropriate in a written communication as set forth above. \n \nWith respect to the timing of the disclosure of the attorney's departure to the client, the ultimate consideration is the client's best interest. To the extent practical, a joint notification by the law firm and the departing attorney to the affected clients of the change is the preferred course of action for safeguarding the client's best interests. However, the appropriate timing of a notification to the client is determined on a case by case basis. Depending on the nature of the departing attorney's work for the client, the client may need advance notification of the departure to make a determination as to future representation. \n \nThe departing attorney may also owe certain duties to the firm which may require that the departing attorney should advise the firm of the attorney's intention to leave the firm and the attorney's intention to notify clients of his or her impending departure, prior to informing the clients of the situation. Specifically, the departing attorney should not engage in professional conduct which involves \"dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation \"with respect to the attorney's dealings with the firm as set forth in Standard 4. \n \nIn conclusion, as long as the departing attorney complies with the Standards governing advertisements, solicitation, and general professional conduct, the attorney may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, so as to advise the clients of the attorney's departure as well as the client's right to select his or her legal counsel. Legal issues which may arise from a particular set of facts involving a departing attorney including, but not limited to, contract or tortious interference with contract, are beyond the scope of this formal advisory opinion.","UrlName":"rule511","Order":52,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"761858ac-f617-4774-af9c-1a3463724b8a","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule462","Order":53,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"25cb30ff-9539-4f82-a2f3-ebfd4fd3216d","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn June 1, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-2 \n \nThis opinion relies on Standards of Conduct 61, 62, 63, and 65 that bear upon matters directly addressed by Rule <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule42\">1.15(I)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nWhen a lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity is unable to locate the rightful recipient of such funds after exhausting all reasonable efforts, may that lawyer remove the unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nA lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity may remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act only if the lawyer, prior to delivery, has exhausted all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient. \n \nOPINION: \n \nMany members of the Bar have contacted the State Bar of Georgia for guidance on how to manage client funds and/or other funds held in a fiduciary capacity in the lawyer's escrow trust account when the lawyer is unable to locate the rightful recipient of the funds and the rightful recipient fails to claim the funds. More specifically, the lawyers have asked whether they could ethically remove the unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and disburse the funds in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq., the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. \n \nIn those cases where a lawyer is holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity, the lawyer must do so in compliance with Standards 61, 62, 63 and 65. When the funds become payable or distributable, Standard 61 speaks to the lawyer's duty to deliver funds: \"A lawyer shall promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities or other properties and shall promptly deliver such funds, securities or other properties to the client.\"Implicit both in this Standard, and the lawyer's responsibility to zealously represent the client, is the lawyer's duty to exhaust all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient in order to ensure delivery. \n \nWhen a lawyer holding funds attempts to deliver those funds in compliance with Standard 61 but is unable to locate the rightful recipient, the lawyer has a duty to exhaust all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient. After exhausting all reasonable efforts and the expiration of the five year period discussed in the Act, if the lawyer is still unable to locate the rightful recipient and the rightful recipient fails to claim the funds, the funds are no longer considered client funds or funds held in a fiduciary capacity, but rather, the funds are presumed to be abandoned as a matter of law, except as otherwise provided by the Act, and the lawyer may then deliver the unclaimed funds to the State of Georgia in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq., the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. A lawyer who disburses the unclaimed funds as discussed above shall not be in violation of the Standards.","UrlName":"rule512","Order":54,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4da258c4-e1db-411a-8ab9-783ceb32a90c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn June 1, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-3 \n For reference to Standard of Conduct 47, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\">Rule 4.2(b)(1)</a> .\n For reference to Standard of Conduct 48, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> .\n For reference to DR 7-103, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule83\">Rule 3.8(a)</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nMay a staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of non-clients?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \nA staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group may contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of non-clients and clients alike because such communication is authorized by law and because the State is not an adverse party in that situation.\n OPINION: \nI. Factual Scenario:\nA staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group (hereinafter \"lawyer \") receives information that a state prison inmate is denied a constitutionally protected right by the housing institution. The lawyer contacts the Warden of the institution in writing, notifying the Warden of the situation from the perspective of the inmate. In addition, the writing cites legal authority and argues that the institution has denied the inmate's constitutionally protected rights. In conclusion, the letter asks the Warden to conform to the inmate's demands in light of the legal authority cited in the letter.\nThe lawyer knows that the Warden is a state official with managerial responsibilities. The lawyer also knows that the State is represented by the Attorney General of the State. The lawyer does not seek approval from the Attorney General's office prior to his correspondence.\nII. Ethical and Legal Considerations\n The factual scenario raises questions about the application of Standard 47. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> More particularly, the questions at issue are whether the government is a \"party \"as contemplated by Standard 47 and whether the communication described falls within the \"authorized by law \"exception to Standard 47.\n Standard 47 \nDuring the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior written consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so. A violation of this standard may be punished by a public reprimand.\n The factual scenario describes a lawyer's communication with a government agency he knows to be represented by a lawyer, without the prior written consent of the lawyer representing the government agency. While the question presented refers to a \"non-client,\"the factual scenario describes a situation where the lawyer is offering legal assistance on behalf of a person who presumably requested the assistance. See Huddleston v. State , 259 Ga. 45 (1989) and Legacy Homes v. Cole , 205 Ga. App. 34 (1992) for a description of the formation of the attorney-client relationship. Thus, the communication is the subject of the lawyer's representation of a client.\n Because the government is not an adverse party in this situation and because the communication described is authorized by law, Standard 47 does not apply to the factual scenario presented. The communication prohibited by Standard 47 protects an adverse party from overreaching by opposing counsel, protects the attorney-client relationship, and reduces the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged information that could harm their interests. See , ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 95-396 for a description of the history and purpose of similar rules prohibiting such communication.\n Standard 47 contemplates a situation where a party might take advantage of another with an adverse interest , through unauthorized communication. However, the factual scenario described above is not such a situation. The purpose of the government is to protect its people, including those it has taken into custody. This fundamental concept is well represented in our laws, including our Bar Rules.\nThe petition clause of the First Amendment is directly on point in this regard: Congress shall make no law...abridging...the right of the people...to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The government has a duty to make itself available to those who have legitimate grievances.\nThe government has a duty to make itself available to those who have legitimate grievances. If a person, even a lawyer representing a person incarcerated by the State, has reason to believe that the State is acting in an oppressive manner, that person has a right to communicate this grievance directly to the government agency involved. To do so is a Constitutionally protected right and thus falls within the \"authorized by law \"exception to Standard 47.\nEven where State officials initiate a clearly adversarial proceeding, lawyers for the State are obligated to protect the interests of the accused. This concept is reflected in Directory Rule DR 7-103:\n(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.\nWhile the First Amendment and DR 7-103 contemplate different situations, they both incorporate the notion that the government has an interest in protecting its citizens that is a paramount to any interests it has in being protected from them. In the factual scenario provided, the government agency has an interest in addressing the concerns raised by the lawyer. While the government may have competing interests, that alone does not make the government an adverse party.\n In summary, a staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group may contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of clients because such communication is authorized by law and because the State is not an adverse party in that situation. Regardless of the adversarial nature of the situation, a lawyer should always strive to maintain the integrity of the profession (Canon 1 ) while representing the best interest of his client, and should consider providing copies of the communication to the State lawyer.\n <a name=\"1\">1</a> This opinion does not address Standard 48 which prohibits a lawyers advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer where the interests of the person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client. In the factual scenario described in this opinion, the lawyer knows that the state institution is represented by the Attorney General for the State.","UrlName":"rule514","Order":55,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"98088e98-4d7c-4bbb-b291-7a762393dfa0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn October 29, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> ; (incorporating <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ). \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 37, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> (incorporating <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ) and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-13, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(B), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(C), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(b)</a> , which includes additional procedural requirements.\n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(D), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nIs it ethically proper for a lawyer to represent a criminal defendant when a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution is represented by a second attorney who is listed on letterhead as \"of counsel \"to the same law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nBecause an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, regular, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the standards of conduct applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel \"attorneys. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. \n \nOPINION: \n \nI. Use of the Term \"Of Counsel \"on Materials Intended for Public Distribution. \n \nThe use of the term \"of counsel \"to denote relationships between attorneys and law firms has increased in recent years. Traditionally the term was used to designate semi-retired lawyers who desired to maintain a regular association with a law firm for which they were previously a full-time attorney. Today, the term \"of counsel \"is used to describe a wide range of associations and relationships including lateral hires or attorneys who are in-between associate and partnership classifications. While the primary purpose of this opinion is not to limit or define the terms of such relationships, the Board does believe that some clarification is necessary to protect members of the public who may rely upon the \"of counsel \"designation in selecting legal representation. \n \nAlthough the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility does not define the term \"of counsel \", the American Bar Association has issued a formal opinion which describes the core characteristics of the term as follows:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n ... A close, regular, personal relationship ; but a relationship which is neither that of a partner (or its equivalent, a principal of a professional corporation), with the shared liability and/or managerial responsibility implied by that term; nor, on the other hand, the status ordinarily conveyed by the term 'associate', which is to say a junior non-partner lawyer, regularly employed by the firm. \n</blockquote>\n (Emphasis added). ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 90-357 (1990). The ABA also continues to adhere to aspects of its earlier opinion which prohibited the use of the term \"of counsel \"to designate the following relationships: (1) a relationship involving only a single case, (2) a relationship of forwarder or receiver of legal business, (3) a relationship involving only occasional collaborative efforts, and (4) relationship of an outside consultant. See ABA Formal Opinion 90-357 (1990) (reaffirming in part ABA Formal Opinion 330 (1972)). Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have adhered to the ABA's description of the \"of counsel \"relationships. See Florida Professional Ethics Committee Opinion Nos. 94-7 (1995); State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Opinion No. 1993-129 and the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 262 (1972). \n \nThe Board is of the opinion that the use of the term \"of counsel \"on letterhead, placards, advertisements and other materials intended for public distribution should denote more than casual contact such as mere office-sharing arrangements and that requiring a close, regular, personal relationship between the \"of counsel \"attorney and the principal firm is in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the consuming public. Requiring attorneys who are held out to the public as \"of counsel \"to have a close, regular, personal relationship with the principal firm is also in keeping with well-established standards of conduct requiring lawyers to be scrupulous in the representation of their professional status and prohibiting attorneys from practicing under trade names which are false, fraudulent, deceptive or that would tend to mislead laypersons as to the identity of lawyers actually practicing in the firm. See Standards of Conduct 8 and 9 and EC 2-11 and EC 2-13. \n \nII. Conflicts Analysis for \"Of Counsel \"Relationships. \n \nThe issue as to whether or not a member of a law firm may represent a defendant who potentially has an adverse interest to a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution and who is simultaneously being represented by an \"of counsel \"attorney to the same firm must be analyzed in light of the requirement that such an \"of counsel \"relationship be \"close, regular and personal.\"The Board believes that the prudent and ethical course is for the attorneys involved to apply the same standards in analyzing this potential for conflict of representation as would be applied in more traditional relationships existing between associates and partners with other attorneys in their law firms. \n \nUnder these long-standing rules, an attorney is prohibited from continuing multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be, or is likely to be, adversely affected by his representation of another client. See Standards of Conduct 35 and 36 and DR 5-105(B). If the lawyer is required to decline or withdraw from employment due to the reasons stated in Standards 35 and 36, then no partner or associate of his firm may accept or continue such employment. See Standard of Conduct 38 and DR 5-105(D). The standards do provide for an exception if it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent the interest of each of the clients and each client consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of each client. See Standard of Conduct 37 and DR 5-105(C). \n \nIn addition to associates and partners of law firms, the Board believes that these are sound principles for \"of counsel \"attorneys to follow as well. This is especially true, given the requirement that attorneys listed as \"of counsel \"on letterhead and other materials distributed to the public have a close, regular, personal, relationship with the principal firm. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then, under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. This opinion is consistent with those reached by other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue. See State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 1993-129; Florida Professional Ethics Committee, Opinion 94-7 (1995); and Opinion 72-41 (1973)","UrlName":"rule516","Order":56,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[{"Id":"662c582a-4db3-4868-8e82-12d27bd91e69","ParentId":"98088e98-4d7c-4bbb-b291-7a762393dfa0","Title":"Version 2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn October 29, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> ; (incorporating <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ). \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)(1)</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)(2)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 37, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> (incorporating<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ), <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(e)(1)</a> and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-13, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(B), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(C), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(b)</a> , which includes additional procedural requirements.\n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(D), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nIs it ethically proper for a lawyer to represent a criminal defendant when a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution is represented by a second attorney who is listed on letterhead as \"of counsel \"to the same law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nBecause an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, regular, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the standards of conduct applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel \"attorneys. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. \n \nOPINION: \n \nI. Use of the Term \"Of Counsel \"on Materials Intended for Public Distribution. \n \nThe use of the term \"of counsel \"to denote relationships between attorneys and law firms has increased in recent years. Traditionally the term was used to designate semi-retired lawyers who desired to maintain a regular association with a law firm for which they were previously a full-time attorney. Today, the term \"of counsel \"is used to describe a wide range of associations and relationships including lateral hires or attorneys who are in-between associate and partnership classifications. While the primary purpose of this opinion is not to limit or define the terms of such relationships, the Board does believe that some clarification is necessary to protect members of the public who may rely upon the \"of counsel \"designation in selecting legal representation. \n \nAlthough the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility does not define the term \"of counsel \", the American Bar Association has issued a formal opinion which describes the core characteristics of the term as follows:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n ... A close, regular, personal relationship ; but a relationship which is neither that of a partner (or its equivalent, a principal of a professional corporation), with the shared liability and/or managerial responsibility implied by that term; nor, on the other hand, the status ordinarily conveyed by the term 'associate', which is to say a junior non-partner lawyer, regularly employed by the firm. \n</blockquote>\n (Emphasis added). ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 90-357 (1990). The ABA also continues to adhere to aspects of its earlier opinion which prohibited the use of the term \"of counsel \"to designate the following relationships: (1) a relationship involving only a single case, (2) a relationship of forwarder or receiver of legal business, (3) a relationship involving only occasional collaborative efforts, and (4) relationship of an outside consultant. See ABA Formal Opinion 90-357 (1990) (reaffirming in part ABA Formal Opinion 330 (1972)). Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have adhered to the ABA's description of the \"of counsel \"relationships. See Florida Professional Ethics Committee Opinion Nos. 94-7 (1995); State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Opinion No. 1993-129 and the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 262 (1972). \n \nThe Board is of the opinion that the use of the term \"of counsel \"on letterhead, placards, advertisements and other materials intended for public distribution should denote more than casual contact such as mere office-sharing arrangements and that requiring a close, regular, personal relationship between the \"of counsel \"attorney and the principal firm is in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the consuming public. Requiring attorneys who are held out to the public as \"of counsel \"to have a close, regular, personal relationship with the principal firm is also in keeping with well-established standards of conduct requiring lawyers to be scrupulous in the representation of their professional status and prohibiting attorneys from practicing under trade names which are false, fraudulent, deceptive or that would tend to mislead laypersons as to the identity of lawyers actually practicing in the firm. See Standards of Conduct 8 and 9 and EC 2-11 and EC 2-13. \n \nII. Conflicts Analysis for \"Of Counsel \"Relationships. \n \nThe issue as to whether or not a member of a law firm may represent a defendant who potentially has an adverse interest to a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution and who is simultaneously being represented by an \"of counsel \"attorney to the same firm must be analyzed in light of the requirement that such an \"of counsel \"relationship be \"close, regular and personal.\"The Board believes that the prudent and ethical course is for the attorneys involved to apply the same standards in analyzing this potential for conflict of representation as would be applied in more traditional relationships existing between associates and partners with other attorneys in their law firms. \n \nUnder these long-standing rules, an attorney is prohibited from continuing multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be, or is likely to be, adversely affected by his representation of another client. See Standards of Conduct 35 and 36 and DR 5-105(B). If the lawyer is required to decline or withdraw from employment due to the reasons stated in Standards 35 and 36, then no partner or associate of his firm may accept or continue such employment. See Standard of Conduct 38 and DR 5-105(D). The standards do provide for an exception if it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent the interest of each of the clients and each client consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of each client. See Standard of Conduct 37 and DR 5-105(C). \n \nIn addition to associates and partners of law firms, the Board believes that these are sound principles for \"of counsel \"attorneys to follow as well. This is especially true, given the requirement that attorneys listed as \"of counsel \"on letterhead and other materials distributed to the public have a close, regular, personal, relationship with the principal firm. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then, under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. This opinion is consistent with those reached by other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue. See State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 1993-129; Florida Professional Ethics Committee, Opinion 94-7 (1995); and Opinion 72-41 (1973)","UrlName":"revision331"}],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"08e11fad-a1e2-4fb1-9414-08306ff815b0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 99-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule517","Order":57,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"55a23b3f-e03d-4462-b7c8-b177bf7efd80","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 99-2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON OCTOBER 18, 1999 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 99-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Canon 3, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 3-1, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 3-8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">5.4(b)</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">5.4(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 3-101, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Canon 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 5-14, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 5-20, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2.</a> \n \nFor references to DR 5-105, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nIn a transaction involving a real estate lending institution and its customer, may the in-house counsel for the institution provide legal services to the customer relative to the transaction? May the real estate lending institution charge the customer a fee for any legal services rendered relative to the transaction? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nThe answer to both questions is \"no.\"An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer. Such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest under Standards 35 and 36. This prohibition does not, however, prevent in-house counsel from attending closings as attorney for the institution and preparing the documents necessary to effectuate the closing including those documents that must be signed by the customer and that may benefit both the institution and the customer. Nor does the prohibition prevent the institution from seeking reimbursement for the legal expenses incurred in the transaction by including them in the cost of doing business when determining its charge to its customer. The charge, however, may not be denominated as a legal or attorney fee but must be included in the charge being made by the institution. There is inherent risk of confusion on the part of the customer regarding the role of in-house counsel. Prudent lawyers will act on the assumption that courts will honor the customer's reasonable expectation of in-house counsel's duties created by the closing attorney's conduct at the closing. \n \nOPINION: \n \nStandard 24, proscribing assistance in the unauthorized practice of law, prohibits in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution from providing legal services to its customers. See also, Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 3; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Considerations 3-1 &3-8; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Directory Rule 3-101, and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 5.4(d). Standards 35 and 36 prohibit such conduct if the ability to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of one client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the obligation to another client. See also, Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 5-14 - 5-20; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Directory Rule 5-105, and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 1.7. Specifically, in-house counsel may not provide legal services at a closing or elsewhere to a customer borrowing from the lending institution and arising out of the existing relationship between the customer and the institution. This is true whether or not the customer is charged for these services. The role of employee renders the actions of in-house counsel the action of the employer. The employer, not being a lawyer, is thus being assisted in and is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The in-house counsel by virtue of the existing employer/employee relationship and its accompanying obligation of loyalty to the employer cannot exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the customer. \n \nThis prohibition does not, however, prevent in-house counsel from attending the closing as the institution's legal representative and preparing those documents necessary to effectuate the closing. This includes those documents that must be signed by the customer. In such a situation, in-house counsel is providing legal services directly to the institution even though others, including the customer, may benefit from them. \n \nThe prohibition on assisting in the unauthorized practice of law does not prevent the lending institution from including the expense of in-house counsel in the cost of doing business when determining the fee to charge its customer. The lending institution may, in other words, recoup the expenses of the transaction including the cost of legal services. This conduct does not in and of itself, create a duty to the customer on the part of the in-house counsel nor does it constitute a violation of the prohibition against the sharing of legal fees with a non-lawyer. On the other hand, charging the cost of legal services to the customer (1) is likely to create an unintended expectation in the mind of the customer, (2) constitutes a non-lawyer receiving the fee for legal services rather than an attorney, (3) constitutes a lawyer splitting a fee with a non-lawyer, or (4) directly invites the unauthorized practice of law. It is accordingly prohibited even if limited to actual costs. The customer cannot be made a part of the attorney/client, employer/employee relationship. \n \nThe situation in which in-house counsel attends closings as attorney for the lending institution and prepares the documents necessary to effectuate the closing is fraught with both legal and ethical risks beyond assistance in the unauthorized practice of law and conflict of interests. Even though the above analysis (1) requires that in-house counsel's lawyer-client relationship be restricted to the lending institution, and (2) prohibits the direct billing for legal services by the institution, the fact remains that the customer may benefit from the actions of in-house counsel. Thus the risk of confusion about the role of in-house counsel at the closing will be high. Prudent in-house counsel should anticipate that courts may treat the reasonable customer expectations regarding these legal services as creating duties even in the absence of a lawyer-client relationship. The Restatement (Second) of Torts reports that an attorney who represents only the lender may still be held liable in negligence to a borrower. See, e.g., Seigle v. Jasper, 867 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). A similar result may obtain under traditional contract or agency principles regarding third party beneficiaries. This position is supported by the Restatement of the Law of Lawyering. While declaring the current state of Georgia law on this issue would be inappropriate and beyond the scope of this Formal Advisory Opinion, it is clear that prudent in-house counsel will not ignore these risks both in advising the lending institution and in his or her conduct toward the customer as a matter of good lawyering.","UrlName":"rule519","Order":58,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7bc27240-327a-4d4c-9816-05a91687ed94","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule464","Order":59,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a1dae58c-d3c7-4e94-aa69-a190cd06e723","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 00-2 \n For references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1(a) and (c)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a> and Comments [1] and [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> .\n For references to EC 3-2, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule62\">Rule 2.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-6, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nIs a lawyer aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n Yes, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. Generally, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer effectively substitutes the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, a lawyer should never place a nonlawyer in situations in which he or she is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nothing in this limitation precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\nIn order to enforce this limitation in the public interest, it is necessary to find a violation of the provisions prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own in the representation of the lawyer's client.\nAs applied to the specific questions presented, a lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to give legal advice to the lawyer's client based on the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer rather than the lawyer, would be in clear violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because doing so creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\n OPINION:\n This request for a Formal Advisory Opinion was submitted by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board along with examples of numerous grievances regarding this issue recently considered by the Panel. Essentially, the request prompts the Formal Advisory Opinion Board to return to previously issued advisory opinions on the subject of the use of nonlawyers to see if the guidance of those previous opinions remains valid for current practice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a>\nThe primary disciplinary standard involved in answering the question presented is: Standard 24, (\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\") As will become clear in this Opinion, however, Standard 4 (\"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation.\") and Standard 5 (\"A lawyer shall not make any false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.\") are also involved.\nIn interpreting these disciplinary standards as applied to the question presented, we are guided by Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law,\"and, more specifically, the following Ethical Considerations: Ethical Consideration 3-2, Ethical Consideration 3-5, and Ethical Consideration 3-6.\n In Advisory Opinion No. 19, an Opinion issued before the creation of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and the issuance of advisory opinions by the Supreme Court, the State Disciplinary Board addressed the propriety of Georgia lawyers permitting nonlawyer employees to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm's letterhead under the nonlawyer's signature. The Board said that in determining the propriety of this conduct it must first define the practice of law in Georgia. In doing so, it relied upon the very broad language of a then recent Georgia Supreme Court opinion, Huber v. State , 234 Ga. 458 (1975), which included within the definition of the practice \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law,\"to conclude that the conduct in question, regardless of whether a law suit was pending, constituted the practice of law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\"> 4 </a> Any lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to engage in this conduct would be assisting in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, the Board said. The Board specifically limited this prohibition, however, to letters addressed to adverse or potentially adverse parties that, in essence, threatened or implied a threat of litigation. Furthermore, the Board noted that there was a broad range of activities, including investigating, taking statements from clients and other witnesses, conducting legal research, preparing legal documents (under \"direct supervision of the member \"), and performing administrative, secretarial, or clerical duties that were appropriate for nonlawyers. In the course of performing these activities, nonlawyers could correspond on the firm's letterhead under their own signature. This was permitted as long as the nonlawyer clearly identified his or her status as a nonlawyer in a manner that would avoid misleading the recipient into thinking that the nonlawyer was authorized to practice law.\nWhatever the merits of the answer to the particular question presented, this Opinion's general approach to the issue, i.e., does the conduct of the nonlawyer, considered outside of the context of supervision by a licensed lawyer, appear to fit the broad legal definition of the practice of law, would have severely limited the role of lawyer-supervised nonlawyers to what might be described as in-house and investigatory functions. This Opinion was followed two years later, however, by Advisory Opinion No. 21, an Opinion in which the State Disciplinary Board adopted a different approach.\nThe specific question presented in Advisory Opinion No. 21 was: \"What are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legal assistants or paraprofessionals and permit them to deal with other lawyers, clients, and the public?\"After noting the very broad legal definition of the practice of law in Georgia, the Board said that the issue was instead one of \"strict adherence to a program of supervision and direction of a nonlawyer.\"\nThis insight, an insight we reaffirm in this Opinion, was that the legal issue of what constitutes the practice of law should be separated from the issue of when does the practice of law by an attorney become the practice of law by a nonlawyer because of a lack of involvement by the lawyer in the representation. Under this analysis, it is clear that while most activities conducted by nonlawyers for lawyers are within the legal definition of the practice of law, in that these activities are \"action[s] taken for others in . . . matter[s] connected with the law,\"lawyers are assisting in the unauthorized practice of law only when they inappropriately delegate tasks to a nonlawyer or inadequately supervise appropriately delegated tasks.\nImplicitly suggesting that whether or not a particular task should be delegated to a nonlawyer was too contextual a matter both for effective discipline and for guidance, the Disciplinary Board provided a list of specific tasks that could be safely delegated to nonlawyers \"provided that proper and effective supervision and control by the attorney exists.\"The Board also provided a list of tasks that should not be delegated, apparently without regard to the potential for supervision and control that existed.\nWere we to determine that the lists of delegable and non-delegable tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 fully governed the question presented here, it would be clear that a lawyer would be aiding the unauthorized practice if the lawyer permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to clients providing legal advice (because it would be \"contact with clients . . . requiring the rendering of legal advice) or permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons threatening legal action (because it would be \"contacting an opposite party or his counsel in a situation in which legal rights of the firm's clients will be asserted or negotiated \"). It is our opinion, however, that applying the lists of tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 in a categorical manner runs risks of both over regulation and under regulation of the use of nonlawyers and, thereby, risks both the loss of the efficiency nonlawyers can provide and the loss of adequate protection of the public from unauthorized practice. Rather than being applied categorically, these lists should instead be considered good general guidance for the more particular determination of whether the representation of the client has been turned over, effectively, to the nonlawyer by the lawyer permitting a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own. If such substitution has occurred then the lawyer is aiding the nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whether or not the conduct is proscribed by any list.\nThe question of whether the lawyer has permitted a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own is adequate, we believe, for guidance to attorneys in determining what can and cannot be delegated to nonlawyers. Our task, here, however, is broader than just giving guidance. We must also be concerned in issuing this opinion with the protection of the public interest in avoiding unauthorized practice, and we must be aware of the use of this opinions by various bar organizations, such as the State Disciplinary Board, for determining when there has been a violation of a Standard of Conduct.\nFor the purposes of enforcement, as opposed to guidance, it is not adequate to say that substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own constitutes a violation of the applicable Standards. The information for determining what supervision was given to the nonlawyer, that is, what was and was not a substitution of legal knowledge and judgment, will always be within the control of the attorney alleged to have violated the applicable Standards. To render this guidance enforceable, therefore, it is necessary to find a violation of the Standards prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own.\n Thus, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer creates a reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, lawyers should never place nonlawyers in situations in which the nonlawyer is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nor should a nonlawyer be placed in situations in which decisions must be made for the lawyer's client or advice given to the lawyer's client based on the nonlawyer's legal knowledge, rather than that of the lawyer. Finally, nonlawyers should not be placed in situations in which the nonlawyer, rather than the lawyer, is called upon to argue the client's position. Nothing in these limitations precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\"> 5 </a>\nIn addition to assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by creating the reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer was substituting a nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for his or her own, a lawyer permitting this would also be misrepresenting the nature of the services provided and the nature of the representation in violation of Standards of Conduct 4 and 5. In those circumstances where nonlawyer representation is specifically authorized by regulation, statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, it must be made clear to the client that they will be receiving nonlawyer representation and not representation by a lawyer.\nApplying this analysis to the question presented, if by \"prepare and sign \"it is meant that the legal advice to be given to the client is advice based upon the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer, it is clear that the representation would effectively be representation by a nonlawyer rather than by the retained lawyer. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to do this would be in violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would also be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because by doing so he or she creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\nFor public policy reasons it is important that the legal profession restrict its use of nonlawyers to those uses that would improve the quality, including the efficiency and cost-efficiency, of legal representation rather than using nonlawyers as substitutes for legal representation. Lawyers, as professionals, are ultimately responsible for maintaining the quality of the legal conversation in both the prevention and the resolution of disputes. This professional responsibility cannot be delegated to others without jeopardizing the good work that lawyers have done throughout history in meeting this responsibility.\n Footnotes \n<a name=\"1\">1.</a> The term \"nonlawyer \"includes paralegals. \n<a name=\"2\">2.</a> See footnote 5 infra. \n<a name=\"3\">3.</a> In addition to those opinions discussed in this opinion, there are two other Advisory Opinions concerning the prohibition on assisting the unauthorized practice of law. In Advisory Opinion No. 23, the State Disciplinary Board was asked if an out-of-state law firm could open and maintain an office in the State of Georgia under the direction of a full-time associate of that firm who was a member of the State Bar of Georgia. In determining that it could, the Board warned about the possibility that the local attorney would be assisting the nonlicensed lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. In Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5, an Opinion issued by the Supreme Court, the Board was asked if it would be improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. The Board determined that it would be if the responsibility for \"closing \"was delegated to the nonlawyer without participation by the attorney. We view the holding of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 as consistent with the Opinion issued here. \n<a name=\"4\">4.</a> The language relied upon from Huber v. State was later codified in O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. \n<a name=\"5\">5.</a> For example, it is perfectly permissible for a nonlawyer, employed as a paralegal by a law firm or by a non-profit corporation, such as the Georgia Legal Service Program, doing business as a law firm, to represent his or her own clients whenever paralegal representation is permitted by law, as it would be if the representation were on a food stamp problem at an administrative hearing, or before the Social Security Administration, or in other circumstances where a statute or the authorized rules of the adjudicatory body specifically allow for and regulate representation or counsel by persons other than a lawyer. It must be made clear to the clients, of course, that what they will be receiving is paralegal representation and not representation by a lawyer. Nothing in this opinion is intended to conflict with regulation, by statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, of use of nonlawyers in such authorized roles.","UrlName":"rule466","Order":60,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[{"Id":"eaaaecc8-1e76-4e5a-9526-a3cbadc0ad19","ParentId":"a1dae58c-d3c7-4e94-aa69-a190cd06e723","Title":"Version 2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 00-2 \n For references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1(a) and (c)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a> and Comments [1] and [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> .\n For references to EC 3-2, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule62\">Rule 2.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-6, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nIs a lawyer aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n Yes, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. Generally, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer effectively substitutes the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, a lawyer should never place a nonlawyer in situations in which he or she is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nothing in this limitation precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\nIn order to enforce this limitation in the public interest, it is necessary to find a violation of the provisions prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own in the representation of the lawyer's client.\nAs applied to the specific questions presented, a lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to give legal advice to the lawyer's client based on the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer rather than the lawyer, would be in clear violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because doing so creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\n OPINION:\n This request for a Formal Advisory Opinion was submitted by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board along with examples of numerous grievances regarding this issue recently considered by the Panel. Essentially, the request prompts the Formal Advisory Opinion Board to return to previously issued advisory opinions on the subject of the use of nonlawyers to see if the guidance of those previous opinions remains valid for current practice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a>\nThe primary disciplinary standard involved in answering the question presented is: Standard 24, (\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\") As will become clear in this Opinion, however, Standard 4 (\"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation.\") and Standard 5 (\"A lawyer shall not make any false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.\") are also involved.\nIn interpreting these disciplinary standards as applied to the question presented, we are guided by Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law,\"and, more specifically, the following Ethical Considerations: Ethical Consideration 3-2, Ethical Consideration 3-5, and Ethical Consideration 3-6.\n In Advisory Opinion No. 19, an Opinion issued before the creation of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and the issuance of advisory opinions by the Supreme Court, the State Disciplinary Board addressed the propriety of Georgia lawyers permitting nonlawyer employees to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm's letterhead under the nonlawyer's signature. The Board said that in determining the propriety of this conduct it must first define the practice of law in Georgia. In doing so, it relied upon the very broad language of a then recent Georgia Supreme Court opinion, Huber v. State , 234 Ga. 458 (1975), which included within the definition of the practice \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law,\"to conclude that the conduct in question, regardless of whether a law suit was pending, constituted the practice of law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\"> 4 </a> Any lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to engage in this conduct would be assisting in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, the Board said. The Board specifically limited this prohibition, however, to letters addressed to adverse or potentially adverse parties that, in essence, threatened or implied a threat of litigation. Furthermore, the Board noted that there was a broad range of activities, including investigating, taking statements from clients and other witnesses, conducting legal research, preparing legal documents (under \"direct supervision of the member \"), and performing administrative, secretarial, or clerical duties that were appropriate for nonlawyers. In the course of performing these activities, nonlawyers could correspond on the firm's letterhead under their own signature. This was permitted as long as the nonlawyer clearly identified his or her status as a nonlawyer in a manner that would avoid misleading the recipient into thinking that the nonlawyer was authorized to practice law.\nWhatever the merits of the answer to the particular question presented, this Opinion's general approach to the issue, i.e., does the conduct of the nonlawyer, considered outside of the context of supervision by a licensed lawyer, appear to fit the broad legal definition of the practice of law, would have severely limited the role of lawyer-supervised nonlawyers to what might be described as in-house and investigatory functions. This Opinion was followed two years later, however, by Advisory Opinion No. 21, an Opinion in which the State Disciplinary Board adopted a different approach.\nThe specific question presented in Advisory Opinion No. 21 was: \"What are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legal assistants or paraprofessionals and permit them to deal with other lawyers, clients, and the public?\"After noting the very broad legal definition of the practice of law in Georgia, the Board said that the issue was instead one of \"strict adherence to a program of supervision and direction of a nonlawyer.\"\nThis insight, an insight we reaffirm in this Opinion, was that the legal issue of what constitutes the practice of law should be separated from the issue of when does the practice of law by an attorney become the practice of law by a nonlawyer because of a lack of involvement by the lawyer in the representation. Under this analysis, it is clear that while most activities conducted by nonlawyers for lawyers are within the legal definition of the practice of law, in that these activities are \"action[s] taken for others in . . . matter[s] connected with the law,\"lawyers are assisting in the unauthorized practice of law only when they inappropriately delegate tasks to a nonlawyer or inadequately supervise appropriately delegated tasks.\nImplicitly suggesting that whether or not a particular task should be delegated to a nonlawyer was too contextual a matter both for effective discipline and for guidance, the Disciplinary Board provided a list of specific tasks that could be safely delegated to nonlawyers \"provided that proper and effective supervision and control by the attorney exists.\"The Board also provided a list of tasks that should not be delegated, apparently without regard to the potential for supervision and control that existed.\nWere we to determine that the lists of delegable and non-delegable tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 fully governed the question presented here, it would be clear that a lawyer would be aiding the unauthorized practice if the lawyer permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to clients providing legal advice (because it would be \"contact with clients . . . requiring the rendering of legal advice) or permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons threatening legal action (because it would be \"contacting an opposite party or his counsel in a situation in which legal rights of the firm's clients will be asserted or negotiated \"). It is our opinion, however, that applying the lists of tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 in a categorical manner runs risks of both over regulation and under regulation of the use of nonlawyers and, thereby, risks both the loss of the efficiency nonlawyers can provide and the loss of adequate protection of the public from unauthorized practice. Rather than being applied categorically, these lists should instead be considered good general guidance for the more particular determination of whether the representation of the client has been turned over, effectively, to the nonlawyer by the lawyer permitting a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own. If such substitution has occurred then the lawyer is aiding the nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whether or not the conduct is proscribed by any list.\nThe question of whether the lawyer has permitted a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own is adequate, we believe, for guidance to attorneys in determining what can and cannot be delegated to nonlawyers. Our task, here, however, is broader than just giving guidance. We must also be concerned in issuing this opinion with the protection of the public interest in avoiding unauthorized practice, and we must be aware of the use of this opinions by various bar organizations, such as the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board, for determining when there has been a violation of a Standard of Conduct.\nFor the purposes of enforcement, as opposed to guidance, it is not adequate to say that substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own constitutes a violation of the applicable Standards. The information for determining what supervision was given to the nonlawyer, that is, what was and was not a substitution of legal knowledge and judgment, will always be within the control of the attorney alleged to have violated the applicable Standards. To render this guidance enforceable, therefore, it is necessary to find a violation of the Standards prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own.\n Thus, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer creates a reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, lawyers should never place nonlawyers in situations in which the nonlawyer is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nor should a nonlawyer be placed in situations in which decisions must be made for the lawyer's client or advice given to the lawyer's client based on the nonlawyer's legal knowledge, rather than that of the lawyer. Finally, nonlawyers should not be placed in situations in which the nonlawyer, rather than the lawyer, is called upon to argue the client's position. Nothing in these limitations precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\"> 5 </a>\nIn addition to assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by creating the reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer was substituting a nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for his or her own, a lawyer permitting this would also be misrepresenting the nature of the services provided and the nature of the representation in violation of Standards of Conduct 4 and 5. In those circumstances where nonlawyer representation is specifically authorized by regulation, statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, it must be made clear to the client that they will be receiving nonlawyer representation and not representation by a lawyer.\nApplying this analysis to the question presented, if by \"prepare and sign \"it is meant that the legal advice to be given to the client is advice based upon the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer, it is clear that the representation would effectively be representation by a nonlawyer rather than by the retained lawyer. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to do this would be in violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would also be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because by doing so he or she creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\nFor public policy reasons it is important that the legal profession restrict its use of nonlawyers to those uses that would improve the quality, including the efficiency and cost-efficiency, of legal representation rather than using nonlawyers as substitutes for legal representation. Lawyers, as professionals, are ultimately responsible for maintaining the quality of the legal conversation in both the prevention and the resolution of disputes. This professional responsibility cannot be delegated to others without jeopardizing the good work that lawyers have done throughout history in meeting this responsibility.\n Footnotes \n<a name=\"1\">1.</a> The term \"nonlawyer \"includes paralegals. \n<a name=\"2\">2.</a> See footnote 5 infra. \n<a name=\"3\">3.</a> In addition to those opinions discussed in this opinion, there are two other Advisory Opinions concerning the prohibition on assisting the unauthorized practice of law. In Advisory Opinion No. 23, the State Disciplinary Board was asked if an out-of-state law firm could open and maintain an office in the State of Georgia under the direction of a full-time associate of that firm who was a member of the State Bar of Georgia. In determining that it could, the Board warned about the possibility that the local attorney would be assisting the nonlicensed lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. In Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5, an Opinion issued by the Supreme Court, the Board was asked if it would be improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. The Board determined that it would be if the responsibility for \"closing \"was delegated to the nonlawyer without participation by the attorney. We view the holding of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 as consistent with the Opinion issued here. \n<a name=\"4\">4.</a> The language relied upon from Huber v. State was later codified in O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. \n<a name=\"5\">5.</a> For example, it is perfectly permissible for a nonlawyer, employed as a paralegal by a law firm or by a non-profit corporation, such as the Georgia Legal Service Program, doing business as a law firm, to represent his or her own clients whenever paralegal representation is permitted by law, as it would be if the representation were on a food stamp problem at an administrative hearing, or before the Social Security Administration, or in other circumstances where a statute or the authorized rules of the adjudicatory body specifically allow for and regulate representation or counsel by persons other than a lawyer. It must be made clear to the clients, of course, that what they will be receiving is paralegal representation and not representation by a lawyer. Nothing in this opinion is intended to conflict with regulation, by statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, of use of nonlawyers in such authorized roles.","UrlName":"revision304"}],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c57a6dbd-832f-47f2-bf00-9921847be770","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-3","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 00-3 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nEthical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites. \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 explains that a lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to \"close \"the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 also provides that \"Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.\"The lawyer's physical presence at a closing will assure that there is supervision of the work of the paralegal which is direct and constant. \n \nOPINION: \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 (86-R9) issued by the Supreme Court states that the closing of real estate transactions constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. Therefore, it is ethically improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. Correspondent inquires whether it is ethically permissible to allow a paralegal to be physically present at a remote site for the purpose of witnessing signatures and assuring that documents are signed properly. The paralegal announces to the borrower that they are there to assist the attorney in the closing process. The lawyer is contacted by telephone by the paralegal during the closing to discuss the legal aspects of the closing. \n \nThe critical issue in this inquiry is what constitutes the participation of the attorney in the closing transaction. The lawyer must be in control of the closing process from beginning to end. The supervision of the paralegal must be direct and constant. \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 states that \"If the 'closing' is defined as the entire series of events through which title to the land is conveyed from one party to another party, it would be ethically improper for a nonlawyer to 'close' a real estate transaction.\"Under the circumstances described by the correspondent, the participation of the lawyer is less than meaningful. The lawyer is not in control of the actual closing processing from beginning to end. The lawyer is brought into the closing process after it has already begun. Even though the paralegal may state that they are not a lawyer and is not there for the purpose of giving legal advice, circumstances may arise where one involved in this process as a purchaser, seller or lender would look to the paralegal for advice and/or explanations normally provided by a lawyer. This is not permissible. \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 provides that \"Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.\"By allowing a paralegal to appear at closings at remote sites at which lawyers are present only by telephone conference will obviously increase the likelihood that the paralegal may be placed in circumstances where the paralegal is actually providing legal advice or explanations, or exercising independent judgement as to whether legal advice or explanation is required. \n \nStandard 24 is not met by the lawyer being called on the telephone during the course of the closing process for the purpose of responding to questions or reviewing documents. The lawyer's physical presence at a closing will assure that there is supervision of the work of the paralegal which is direct and constant.","UrlName":"rule447","Order":61,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ac45d0cc-215b-4970-b298-1548b9c16986","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 01-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA ON MAY 3, 2001 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 01-1 \n \n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(b)</a> is recited in this opinion; however, on November 3, 2011, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(b)</a> was amended by the Supreme Court of Georgia and now reads as follows:\n“The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.”\nThe amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion.\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \n    Is it ethically permissible for an attorney, with or without notice to a client, to charge for a standard time unit without regard to how much time is actually expended? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \n    A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee. \n \n OPINION: \n \n    Given the proper resources, equipment and effort, time can be measured with infinitesimal precision. As a practical matter, however, clients routinely require only sufficient precision in attorney billings to determine reasonableness and fairness, and this would not normally necessitate a level of precision in recording the time expended by an attorney that would require hair-splitting accuracy. It is the practice of many attorneys to bill on a time-expended basis, and to bill for time expended by rounding to standard units of from 6 to 15 minutes. This gives rise to the possibility that a lawyer could spend one minute on a client matter, and bill the client for 15 minutes. While \"rounding up \"is permissible, see, e.g., ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 (December 6, 1993), repeatedly rounding up from one minute to fifteen minutes is questionable at best and would raise substantial issues as to whether the fee was reasonable under Rule 1.5(a), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See also Rule 1.5(a) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer could avoid a challenge to rounded up fees as excessive by using a smaller minimum unit (a six minute unit is preferable), and only rounding up if more than half that time was actually expended. See Ross, The Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time-Based Billing by Attorneys (Carolina Academic Press: 1996), p. 169. \n \n    It must be noted that even this practice, billing in six minute units but only billing a unit if more than three minutes was expended, results in the attorney billing for time not actually expended on the client matter. Rule 1.5(b), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, provides:\nWhen the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.\n In order to comply with Rule 1.5(b), the lawyer must take care to clarify to the client the basis for the billing. To simply inform a client that the lawyer would bill on a time expended basis, without explaining any standard unit billing practice, would not be a clear communication of the basis for the fee. \n \n    In addition, we note that Rule 7.1(a)(1), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, governs \"Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services \", and provides: \n \n    [A] communication is false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading it if:\n(1) ...omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.\n Comment 1 to Rule 7.1 provides that Rule 7.1 to applies to \"all communications about a lawyer's services....\" \n \n    To simply inform a client that the lawyer would bill on a time expended basis, without explaining any standard unit billing practice, would omit a fact necessary to make the statement as a whole not materially misleading, and would violate Rule 7.1 (a). \n \n    To insure a clear understanding between the attorney and the client, the attorney should provide the client with an explanation in writing of the basis for the fee. Rule 1.5(b), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See also Rule 1.5(b) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In order to comply with Rule 1.5(b), the attorney must communicate the basis for the fee to the client, and in order to comply with Rule 7.1(a), the communication must include an explanation of any standard unit billing practice.","UrlName":"rule467","Order":62,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2e2e3b18-70d9-4bec-8e51-fbb7027d87a4","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 03-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \n PURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2003 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 03-1 \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nMay a Georgia attorney contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \nA Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as:  1) the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) to refund \"any advance payment of fee that has not been earned \"upon termination of the representation by the attorney or by the client; and 2) the contracted for fee, as well as any resulting fee upon termination, does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness.\n OPINION: \nThis issue is governed primarily by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(d) which provides:  \"Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests such as . . . refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.\"\n A special retainer is a contract for representation obligating a client to pay fees in advance for specified services to be provided by an attorney.  This definition applies regardless of the manner of determining the amount of the fee or the terminology used to designate the fee, e.g., hourly fee, percentage fee, flat fee, fixed fees, or minimum fees.  Generally, fees paid in advance under a special retainer are earned as the specified services are provided.  Some services, for example, the services of the attorney's commitment to the client's case and acceptance of potential disqualification from other representations, are provided as soon as the contract is signed <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> .  The portion of the fee reasonably allocated to these services is, therefore, earned immediately.  These fees, and any other fees that have been earned by providing specified services to the client, need not be refunded to the client.  In this sense, a special retainer can be made non-refundable.\nIn Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2 (FAO 91-2), we said:\n\"Terminology as to the various types of fee arrangements does not alter the fact that the lawyer is a fiduciary.  Therefore, the lawyer's duties as to fees should be uniform and governed by the same rules regardless of the particular fee arrangement.  Those duties are . . . :  1) To have a clear understanding with the client as to the details of the fee arrangement prior to undertaking the representation, preferably in writing.  2) To return to the client any unearned portion of a fee.  3) To accept the client's dismissal of him or her (with or without cause) without imposing any penalty on the client for the dismissal.  4) To comply with the provisions of Standard 31 as to reasonableness of the fee.\"\nThe same Formal Advisory Opinion citing In the Matter of Collins, 246 Ga. 325 (1980), states:\n \"The law is well settled that a client can dismiss a lawyer for any reason or for no reason, and the lawyer has a duty to return any unearned portion of the fee.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a>\nContracts to violate the ethical requirements upon which FAO 91-2 was based are not permitted, because those requirements are now expressed in Rule 1.16(d) and Rule 1.5(a).  Moreover, attorneys should take care to avoid misrepresentation concerning their obligation to return unearned fees upon termination.\nThe ethical obligation to refund unearned fees, however, does not prohibit an attorney from designating by contract points in a representation at which specific advance fees payments under a special retainer will have been earned, so long as this is done in good faith and not as an attempt to penalize a client for termination of the representation by refusing to refund unearned fees or otherwise avoid the requirements of Rule 1.16(d), and the resulting fee is reasonable.  Nor does this obligation call in to question the use of flat fees, minimum fees, or any other form of advance fee payment so long as such fees when unearned are refunded to the client upon termination of the representation by the client or by the attorney.  It also does not require that fees be determined on an hourly basis.  Nor need an attorney place any fees into a trust account absent special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of the client.  See Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2.  Additionally, this obligation does not restrict the non-refundability of fees for any reason other than whether they have been earned upon termination.  Finally, there is nothing in this obligation that prohibits an attorney from contracting for large fees for excellent work done quickly.  When the contracted for work is done, however quickly it may have been done, the fees have been earned and there is no issue as to their non-refundability.  Of course, such fees, like all fee agreements, are subject to Rule 1.5, which provides that the reasonableness of a fee shall be determined by the following factors:\n(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;\n(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;\n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;\n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;\n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;\n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.\n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and\n(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.\n The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2003 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on August 7, 2003.  The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August 21, 2003.  No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion.  In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. \n <a name=\"ftn1\"> [1] </a> The \"likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer \"is a factor the attorney must consider in determining the reasonableness of a fee under Rule 1.5.  This preclusion, therefore, should be considered part of the service the attorney is providing to the client by agreeing to enter into the representation.\n <a name=\"ftn2\"> [2] </a> Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2.         \n","UrlName":"rule532","Order":63,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"584715c9-9860-4b38-a411-02ff8b2244d6","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 03-3","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON JANUARY 6, 2004 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 03-3 \n \n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. The amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion.\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \n    Is it ethically permissible for an attorney to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \n    While it may be possible to structure a solicitation agreement to comply with ethical requirements, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to attempt to do so.  In addition to numerous other ethical concerns, Rule 1.7 Conflicts of Interest: General Rule, would require at a minimum that a \"solicitation agreement \"providing referral fees to the attorney be disclosed to the client in writing in a manner sufficient to permit the client to give informed consent to the personal interest conflict created by the agreement after having the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.  Comment 6 to Rule 1.7 provides: \"A lawyer may not allow related business interest to affect representation by, for example, referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed business interest.\"Additionally, the terms of the \"solicitation agreement \"must be such that the lawyer will exercise his or her independent professional judgment in deciding whether or not to refer a particular client to the financial investment adviser.  Prudentially, this would require the lawyer to document each referral in such a way as to be able to demonstrate that the referral choice was not dictated by the lawyer's financial interests but by the merits of the institution to whom the client was referred.  The agreement must not obligate the attorney to reveal confidential information to the adviser absent the consent of the client; the fees paid to the attorney under the agreement must not be structured in such a way as to create a financial interest adverse to the client or otherwise adversely affect the client, and the agreement must itself be in compliance with other laws the violation of which would be a violation of Rule 8.4 Misconduct, especially those laws concerning the regulation of securities enforceable by criminal sanctions.  This is not an exhaustive list of ethical requirements in that the terms of particular agreements may generate other ethical concerns. \n \nOPINION: \n \n    \"Anytime a lawyer's financial or property interests could be affected by advice the lawyer gives a client, the lawyer had better watch out.\"ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct 51:405.  In the circumstances described in the Question Presented, a lawyer, obligated to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client in deciding if a referral is appropriate and deciding to whom to make the referral, would be in a situation in which his or her financial interests would be affected by the advice given.  This conflict between the obligation of independent professional judgment and the lawyer's financial interest is governed by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 which provides, in relevant part, that:\n (A) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests . . . will materially or adversely affect the representation of the client . . . . \n \n    The Committee is guided in its interpretation of this provision in these circumstances by Comment 6 to Rule 1.7: \n \nA lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.\n \n    Under Rule 1.7, client consent to such a personal interest conflict is permissible after: \"(1) consultation with the lawyer, (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the materials risks of the representation, and (3) having been given an opportunity to consult with independent counsel.\"Thus, at a minimum, a \"solicitation agreement \"providing referral fees to the attorney would have to be disclosed to the client in writing in a manner sufficient to permit the client to give informed consent to the personal interest conflict created by the agreement after having the opportunity to consult with independent counsel. \n \n     In addition to this minimum requirement, there are numerous other ethical obligations that would dictate the permitted terms of such an agreement.  The following obligations are offered as a non-exhaustive list of examples for the terms of particular agreements may generate other ethical concerns. \n \n    1)  The agreement must not bind the attorney to make referrals or to make referrals only to the adviser for such an obligation would be inconsistent with the attorney's obligation to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client in determining whether a referral is appropriate and to whom the client should be referred.  Both determinations must always be  made only in consideration of the client's best interests.  Prudentially, this would require the lawyer to document each referral in such a way as to be able to demonstrate that the referral choice was not dictated by the lawyer's financial interests but by the merits of the institution to whom the client was referred.  In order to be able to do this well the lawyer would need to stay abreast of the quality and cost of services provided by other similar financial institutions. \n \n    2)  The agreement cannot restrict the information the attorney can provide the client concerning a referral by requiring, for example, the attorney to use only materials prepared or approved by the adviser.  Such a restriction is not only inconsistent with the attorney's obligations to exercise independent professional judgment but also with the attorney's obligations under Rule 1.4 Communications concerning the attorney's obligation to provide information to clients sufficient for informed decision making. \n \n    3)  The agreement cannot obligate the attorney to provide confidential information, as defined in Rule 1.6 Confidentiality, to the adviser absent client consent. \n \n    4)  The fees paid to the attorney for the referral cannot be structured in such a way as to create a financial interest or other interest adverse to the client.  Rule 1.8 Conflicts of Interest: Prohibited Transactions provides \". . . nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client . . .\" \n \n    5)  Finally, any such agreement would have to be in compliance with other laws the violations of which could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4 Misconduct.  For example, the agreement may not violate any of the legal or administrative regulations governing trading in securities enforceable by criminal sanctions. \n \n    Thus, while it may be possible to structure a solicitation agreement to comply with ethical requirements, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to attempt to do so. \n \n \n    The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2003 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on August 7, 2003. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August 21, 2003. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. ","UrlName":"rule534","Order":64,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"45c117b6-5506-46bb-964e-9d539032442c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1","Content":"FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 04-1 Approved And Issued On February 13, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia With Comments <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-041.pdf?sfvrsn=c065786b_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S05U1720</a> COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAWe grant a petition for discretionary review brought by the State Bar of Georgia to consider the proposed opinion of the Formal Advisory Board1 (hereinafter \"Board \") that, if an attorney supervises the closing of a real estate transaction conducted by a non-lawyer entity, the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and the closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with the trust account and IOLTA provisions of Rule 1.15(II) of Bar Rule 4-102(d) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.  Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1 (August 6, 2004).  See State Bar Rule 4-403(d) (authorizing this Court to grant a petition for discretionary review).2 For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Board that a lawyer directing the closing of a real estate transaction holds money which belongs to another (either a client or a third-party) as an incident to that practice, and must keep that money in an IOLTA account.  We further add that if the proceeds are not subject to the rules of IOLTA subsection (c)(2), then the funds must be deposited in an interest-bearing account for the client's benefit.  Rule 1.15(II)(c)(1).  Under no circumstances may the closing proceeds be commingled with funds belonging to the lawyer, the law office, or any entity other than as explicitly provided in the Rule.The matter came before the Board pursuant to a request for an advisory opinion on the following question:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">May a lawyer participate in a non-lawyer entity created by the lawyer for the purpose of conducting residential real estate closings where the closing proceeds received by the entity are deposited in a non-IOLTA interest bearing bank trust account rather than an IOLTA account?</div>The opinion first appeared in the June 2004 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal.  In response, the Board received comments both in support of and in opposition to the opinion.  The modified opinion appeared in the October 2004 Georgia Bar Journal, and the State Bar thereafter sought discretionary review.The closing of a real estate transaction in this State constitutes the practice of law, and, if performed by someone other than a duly-licensed Georgia attorney, results in the prohibited unlicensed practice of law.  In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 277 Ga. 472 (588 SE2d 741) (2003).  The attorney participating in the closing is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds, which must be handled in accordance with the trust account and IOLTA provisions in Rule 1.15(II).3 Specifically, when a lawyer holds client funds in trust, the lawyer must make an initial determination whether the funds are eligible for the IOLTA program.  Closing proceeds from a real estate transaction which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time (i.e., funds that cannot otherwise generate net earnings for the client) must be deposited into an Interest on Lawyer's Trust Account (IOLTA Account).  Funds that are not nominal in amount or funds, no matter what amount, that are not to be held for a short period of time, are ineligible for placement in an IOLTA account and must be placed in an interest-bearing account, with the net interest generated paid to the client.  Rule 1.15(II)(c).  See also Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (155 LE2d 376, 123 SC 1406) (2003).  Under either circumstance, Rule 1.15(II) instructs that a lawyer involved in a closing has a strict fiduciary duty to deposit a client's real estate closing proceeds in a separate IOLTA or non-IOLTA interest bearing trust account.The Board's recognition that, under all circumstances, the interest generated on the client's closing funds is governed by Rule 1.15(II), ensures full compliance where real estate closings are involved.  Accordingly, we adopt Formal Advisory Opinion 04-1 to the extent it is in accord with the rule that attorneys must place client closing proceeds that are nominal or held for a short period of time in an IOLTA account.  We clarify that closing proceeds that are more than nominal in amount or that will be deposited for more than a short period of time must be placed in a non-IOLTA interest bearing account with interest payable to the client.  Rule 1.15(II)(c)(1).Formal Advisory Opinion approved, as modified.  All the Justices concur.<hr align=\"left\" width=\"33%\" size=\"1\">1. State Bar Rule 4-403(a) authorizes the Formal Advisory Opinion Board to draft proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning the proper interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.2. Formal Advisory Opinion Board opinions, which are approved or modified by this Court, are \"binding on all members of the State Bar.\"State Bar Rule 4-403(e).3. The sole issue addressed in the proposed opinion is whether an attorney may participate in a non-lawyer entity which the attorney created for the purpose of conducting residential real estate closings without depositing the closing proceeds in an IOLTA account.FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 04-1Question Presented: May a lawyer participate in a non-lawyer entity created by the lawyer for the purpose of conducting residential real estate closings where the closing proceeds received by the entity are deposited in a non-IOLTA interest bearing bank trust account rather than an IOLTA account?Summary Answer: The closing of a real estate transaction constitutes the practice of law.  If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15 (II).  If the attorney does not supervise the closings, then, under the facts set forth above, the lawyer is assisting a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.Opinion: The closing of a real estate transaction in the state of Georgia constitutes the practice of law.  See, In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. 472, 588 S.E. 2d 741 (Nov. 10, 2003), O.C.G.A. §15-19-50 and Formal Advisory Opinions Nos. 86-5 and 00-3.  Thus, to the extent that a non-lawyer entity is conducting residential real estate closings not under the supervision of a lawyer, the non-lawyer entity is engaged in the practice of law.  If an attorney supervises the residential closing <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\"> [1] </a> , then that attorney is a fiduciary with respects to the closing proceeds.  If the attorney participates in but does not supervise the closings, then the non-lawyer entity is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  In such event, the attorney assisting the non-lawyer entity would be doing so in violation of Rule 5.5 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\"> [2] </a>When a lawyer is supervising a real estate closing, the lawyer is professionally responsible for such closings.  Any closing funds received by the lawyer or by persons or entities supervised by the lawyer are held by the lawyer as a fiduciary.  The lawyer's responsibility with regard to such funds is addressed by Rule 1.15 (II) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct which states in relevant part:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - GENERAL <div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(a) Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available a trust account as required by these Rules.  All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from such account.* * * * *(c) All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(1) With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15(III)(c)(1), with the interest to be paid to the client.  No earnings from such an account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.(2) With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) in compliance with the following provisions:* * * * *</div></div></div>As set out in Subsection (c)(2) above, this Rule applies to all client funds which are nominal or are to be held for a short period of time.  As closing proceeds are not nominal in amount, but are to be held for only a short period of time, they are subject to the IOLTA provisions.  Therefore, the funds received in connection with the real estate closing conducted by the lawyer or the non-lawyer entity in the circumstances described above must be deposited into an IOLTA compliant account.<hr align=\"left\" width=\"33%\" size=\"1\"><a name=\"_ftn1\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">1.</a> Adequate supervision would require the lawyer to be present at the closing.  See FAO . . . .etc.<a name=\"_ftn2\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">2.</a> Rule 5.5 states in relevant part that:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW  A lawyer shall not: * * * * * *(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.</div> ","UrlName":"rule448","Order":65,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"17c4efaa-3729-4d7d-8769-425ee4dc9b18","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-2","Content":"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-2 Approved And Issued On April 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule525\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">FAO No. 90-1</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-052.pdf?sfvrsn=bbd66b45_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0791</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     \"Hold Harmless \"Agreements Between Employers and Their In-House Counsel.     Whether an attorney employed in-house by a corporation may enter into an agreement by which his or her employer shall hold the attorney harmless for malpractice committed in the course of his employment. SUMMARY ANSWER:     \"Hold harmless \"agreements between employers and attorneys employed in-house are ethical if the employer is exercising an informed business judgment in utilizing the \"hold harmless \"agreement in lieu of malpractice insurance on the advice of counsel and the agreement is permitted by law. OPINION:\n     Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h) offers the following direction:     \"A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement . . . .\"\nThis rule seeks to prevent attorneys from taking advantage of clients and avoiding the removal of negative consequences for malpractice. See, Opinion 193 (D.C. 1989). Neither of these policies would be well served by prohibiting the use of \"hold harmless \"agreements between employers and attorneys employed in house if the employer is exercising an informed business judgment in utilizing the \"hold harmless \"agreement in lieu of malpractice insurance and doing so on the advise of any counsel other than the counsel being employed.  Consultation with in-house counsel satisfies the requirement of the rule.  First, the position of the client as employer, and the sophistication of those who employ in house counsel, eliminates almost all overreaching concerns. Secondly, the lawyer as employee does not avoid the negative consequences of malpractice because he or she is subject to being discharged by the employer. Apparently, discharge is preferred by employers of in house counsel to malpractice suits as a remedy for negligent performance. See, Opinion 193 (D.C. 1989).     Accordingly, we conclude that \"hold harmless \"agreements are ethical when an employer of in house counsel makes an informed business judgment that such an agreement is preferable to employee malpractice insurance, is done on the advice of counsel, and is permitted by law.  The determination of whether such agreements are permitted by law is not within the scope of  this Opinion.  Finally, we note that the proposed \"hold harmless \"agreement does not limit liability to third parties affected by in house counsel representation.  Instead, the agreement shifts the responsibility for employee conduct from an insurance carrier to the organization as a self insurer.\n","UrlName":"rule453","Order":66,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f2f84f41-0470-4657-aa2e-22cd66687968","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-3","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-3 Approved And Issued On April 26, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule526\">FAO No. 90-2</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-053.pdf?sfvrsn=9f662036_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0795</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk appearing as an attorney before his or her present employer-judge. SUMMARY ANSWER:     The representation of clients by a law clerk before a present employer-judge is a violation of Rule 1.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. OPINION:     This question involves an application of Rule 1.7 governing personal interest conflicts.  Rule 1.7 provides:(a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b). (b) If client consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected or former client consents, preferably in writing, to the representation after: (1) consultation with the lawyer, (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation, and (3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel. (c) Client consent is not permissible if the representation: (1) is prohibited by law or these rules;  . . . (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.     There are two threats to professional judgment posed when  a law clerk undertakes to represent a client before the judge by whom the law clerk is also currently employed.  The first is that the lawyer will be unduly restrained in client representation before the employer-judge.  Comment [6] to Rule 1.7 states that \"the lawyer's personal or economic interest should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.\"And Comment [4] explains that: \"loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interest.  The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.\"     Because of this risk, the representation of clients by a law clerk before an employer-judge is a violation of  Rule 1.7.  Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that for a full-time law clerk concurrently to serve as appointed co-counsel for a criminal defendant before one of the judges by whom the law clerk is employed constitutes an actual conflict of interest depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right of counsel. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a>     Rule 1.7 permits client waiver of personal interest conflicts through client consultation with the lawyer, providing reasonable and adequate written information about the material risks of the representation to the client, and giving the client the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.  This waiver provision must be read consistently with other guidance from the profession.  Because of a second threat to professional judgment, client waiver is impermissible in this situation.  Client waiver is inconsistent with the guidance of Rule 3.5(a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits a lawyer from seeking to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law.  (There is an implication of improper influence in the very fact of the employment of the attorney for one of the parties as the judge's current law clerk. It is also inconsistent with the guidance of Rule 3.5(a) Comment [2] which states,\"If we are to maintain integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law.  The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process.  Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided.  The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety.Accordingly, a part-time law clerk should not seek client waiver of the conflict of interest created by representation of clients before the employer-judge. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\"> [2] </a>A related rule is found in Rule 1.12(b), which states:A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator.  A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator.  In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.Rule 1.12(b) allows a law clerk for a judge to accept employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially with the approval of the judge and prompt written notice to all counsel of record in matters in which the prospective employer of the law clerk is involved.  Rule 1.12 (b) addresses future employment by a judge's law clerk and should not be read to allow a law clerk to represent a party before the judge whom he is currently employed.  Rule 3.5 (a) and Comment [2] to that Rule would prohibit the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality that the close employment relationship between judge and current law clerk would inevitably raise.     This opinion addresses the propriety of the lawyer's conduct under the Georgia Rules of Professional Responsibility.  It does not address the ethical propriety of the same conduct in his or her capacity as part-time clerk.  We do note, however, that many courts have prevented the conduct in question here as a matter of court rules in accord with this opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn3\"> [3] </a> We also note that judicial clerks are often treated as \"other judicial officers \"for the purpose of determining disqualifications and other ethical concerns. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn4\"> [4] </a> Under that treatment, the conduct in question here would be analogous to a request by a part-time judge to practice before his or her own court in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and statutory provisions. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn5\"> [5] </a> See O.C.G.A. § 15-7-21. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn6\">[6]</a> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> 269 Ga. 446, 499 S.E. 2d 897 (1998). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn2\">2.</a> In accord, Advisory Opinion CI-951 (Michigan) (1983).  (Part-time law clerk may not work in any capacity as private counsel on any case pending in employer-judge's circuit and must give notice to clients of his inability to appear in the circuit.) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn3\">3.</a> Sup. Ct. R. 7.  (An employee of the Supreme Court shall not practice as an attorney in any court while employed by the Court.) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn4\">4.</a> See, eg., ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 91:4503 and cases cited therein; see, also, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12 (1984); and Opinion 38 (Georgia 1984) (\"Lawyers and members of the public view a Law Clerk as an extension of the Judge for whom the Clerk works \"). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn5\">5.</a> Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct.  (Part-time judges: (2) should not practice law in the court on which they serve, or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court on which they serve, or act as lawyers in proceedings in which they have served as judges or in any other proceeding related thereto.) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn6\">6.</a> O.C.G.A. § 15-7-21(b).  A part-time judge of the state court may engage in the private practice of law in other courts but may not practice in his own court or appear in any matter as to which that judge has exercised any jurisdiction.","UrlName":"rule455","Order":67,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5a8729aa-cd15-4ad1-982a-0d67bed33fce","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-4","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-4 Approved And Issued On March 19, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia With Comments Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule527\">FAO No. 91-3</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-054.pdf?sfvrsn=a3362275_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0797</a> COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA     We granted a petition for discretionary review brought by the State Bar of Georgia asking the Court to adopt an opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (\"Board \").  At issue is Formal Advisory Opinion (\"FAO \") 05-4, which is a redrafted version of FAO 91-3.  Although both FAO 91-3 and FAO 05-4 address the ethical propriety of a lawyer paying nonlawyer employees a monthly bonus from the gross proceeds of the lawyer's firm, the board reached contrary conclusions in these opinions based on ethical rules in place at the time.  For the reasons which follow, we agree with the board that under current Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4, the payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his or her law office in addition to the nonlawyer employees' regular monthly salary is permissible; and that it is ethically proper to compensate nonlawyer employees pursuant to a plan that is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.     In 1990 this Court issued FAO 91-3 addressing the same issue under former Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102 (and identical Directory Rule 3-102), which, in pertinent part, prohibited a lawyer from sharing fees with a nonlawyer except that \"a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing agreement.\"Former Standard 26 (c).  In 2000 the Court issued the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 2001, to replace the former Standards of Conduct.  Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 supercedes Standard 26 (c) and enlarges the circumstances under which a lawyer or law firm may share legal fees with a nonlawyer. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a> In pertinent part, Rule 5.4 (a) (3) provides:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that . . . . <div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit- sharing arrangement.</div></div> The Board reviewed FAO 91-3 to determine what impact, if any, application of the Rules of Professional Conduct would have on the opinion and concluded that the substance and conclusions reached in FAO 91-3 are no longer in compliance with current ethical considerations. As a result, the board drafted FAO 05-4.  That opinion was published in the April and October 2005 issues of the Georgia Bar Journal; no comments were received in response to the publications, see Rule of Professional Conduct 4-403 (c); and the State Bar sought and was granted discretionary review by this Court.  Rule of Professional Conduct 4-403 (d). The distinction between Rule 5.4 (a) (3) and Standard 26 (c) is that the former permits a nonlawyer employee to participate in both a compensation and retirement plan, whereas the latter permitted nonlawyer compensation only in the context of a retirement plan.  We agree with the board that the support for FAO 91-3 has changed due to the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct and that FA0 91-3 no longer provides an accurate interpretation of the applicable rules of ethics.  In contrast, FAO 05-4 is consistent with current Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 (a) (3) in that it allows compensation to a nonlawyer employee in the form of a monthly bonus paid from the gross receipts of the law firm under the rule that a nonlawyer employee may participate in a compensation plan, even though based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.  Accordingly, we adopt proposed FAO 05-4 and retract FAO 91-3.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\"> [2] </a>Formal Advisory Opinion 05-4 approved. All the Justices concur. <div style=\"text-align: center\">FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-4</div> Question Presented: Ethical propriety of a lawyer paying his nonlawyer employees a monthly bonus from the gross receipts of his law office. Summary Answer: The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his law office in addition to their regular monthly salary is permissible under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.  It is ethically proper for a lawyer to compensate his nonlawyer employees based upon a plan that is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement. Opinion: Correspondent asks whether a lawyer may pay nonlawyer employees a monthly bonus which is a percentage of gross receipts of the law office.Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 necessitates the modification of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-3, which was based largely on Standard No. 26 of Georgia Bar Rule 4-102.  Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 replaces the former standard and provides as follows:<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\">(a)    A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:</div><div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"></div><div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after his death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</div> <div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(2) a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;</div> <div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and</div> <div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(4) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.</div>     Georgia's Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 is analogous to its counterpart in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. In 1980, the ABA amended DR 3-102(A) to add an additional exception regarding the sharing of fees with nonlawyer employees: \"A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit sharing arrangement.\"(emphasis added). ABA DR 3-102(A)(3).  The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are consistent with the ABA's principles of fee sharing with non-attorneys.As the Comment to the Model Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, the policy underlying the limitation on the sharing of fees between lawyer and layperson seeks to protect the lawyer's independent professional judgment. The Comment cautions that if a layperson, not guided by professional obligations, shares an interest in the outcome of the representation of a client, the possibility exists that he or she may influence the attorney's judgment.In light of all of the foregoing, we conclude that the payment of a monthly bonus payable to nonlawyer employees based upon a plan that is in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement does not constitute a sharing of legal fees in violation of Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.<hr> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> Rule 5.4 is now analogous to its counterpart in the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA DR 3-102 (A) (3). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn2\">2.</a> By our approval of FA0 05-4, it becomes \"binding on all members of the State Bar [of Georgia].\"Rules of Professional Conduct 4-403 (e). ","UrlName":"rule456","Order":68,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"165c44b4-73cc-445c-972f-2aa61b908729","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-5","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-5 Approved And Issued On February 13, 2007 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule528\"> FAO No. 92-1 </a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-055.pdf?sfvrsn=6659a864_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0798</a>  QUESTION PRESENTED: 1) Ethical propriety of a law firm obtaining a loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses;2) Ethical considerations applicable to payment of interest charged on loan obtained by law firm to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses. OPINION: Correspondent law firm asks if it is ethically permissible to employ the following system for payment of certain costs and expenses in contingent fee cases. The law firm would set up a draw account with a bank, with the account secured by a note from the firm's individual lawyers. When it becomes necessary to pay court costs, deposition expenses, expert witness fees, or other out-of-pocket litigation expenses, the law firm would obtain an advance under the note. The firm would pay the interest charged by the bank as it is incurred on a monthly or quarterly basis. When a client makes a payment toward expenses incurred in his or her case, the amount of that payment would be paid to the bank to pay down the balance owed on his or her share of expenses advanced under the note. When a case is settled or verdict paid, the firm would pay off the client's share of the money advanced on the loan. If no verdict or settlement is obtained, the firm would pay the balance owed to the bank and bill the client. Some portion of the interest costs incurred in this arrangement would be charged to the client. The contingent fee contract would specify the client's obligations to pay reasonable expenses and interest fees incurred in this arrangement.The first issue is whether it is ethically permissible for lawyers to borrow funds for the purpose of advancing reasonable expenses on their clients' behalf. If so, we must then determine the propriety of charging clients interest to defray part of the expense of the loan.In addressing the first issue, lawyers are generally discouraged from providing financial assistance to their clients. Rule 1.8(e) states:A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or(2) a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</div>Despite that general admonition, contingent fee arrangements are permitted by Rule 1.5(c), which states:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.(2) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(i) the outcome of the matter; and,(ii) if there is a recovery, showing the:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(A) remittance to the client; (B) the method of its determination; (C) the amount of the attorney fee; and (D) if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined. </div></div></div>The correspondent's proposed arrangement covers only those expenses which are permitted under Rule 1.8(e). Paragraph (e) of Rule 1.8 eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer and further limits permitted assistance to cover costs and expenses directly related to litigation. See Comment (4) to Rule 1.8.The arrangement also provides that when any recovery is made on the client's behalf, the recovery would first be debited by the advances made under the note, with payment for those advances being made by the firm directly to the bank. The client thus receives only that recovery which remains after expenses have been paid. The client is informed of this in correspondent's contingent fee contract, which states that \"all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the representation of said claims shall be deducted after division as herein provided to compensate attorney for his fee.\"In the case where recovery is not obtained, however, the lawyers themselves are contractually obligated to pay the amount owed directly to the bank. Correspondent's proposed contract as outlined in the request for this opinion does not inform the client as to possible responsibility for such expenses where there is no recovery. It is the opinion of this Board that Rules 1.5(c) and 1.8(e), taken together, require that the contingent fee contract inform the client whether he is or is not responsible for these expenses, even if there is no recovery.Although the client may remain \"responsible for all or a portion of these expenses,\"decisions regarding the appropriate actions to be taken to deal with such liability are entirely within the discretion of the lawyers. Since this discretion has always existed, the fact that the lawyers have originally borrowed the money instead of advancing it out-of-pocket would seem to be irrelevant, and the arrangement is thus not impermissible.The bank's involvement would be relevant, however, were it allowed to affect the attorney-client relationship, such as if the bank were made privy to clients' confidences or secrets (including client identity) or permitted to affect the lawyer's judgment in representing his or her client. See generally, Rule 1.6. Thus, the lawyer must be careful to make sure that the bank understands that its contractual arrangement can in no way affect or compromise the lawyer's obligations to his or her individual clients.The remaining issue is whether it is ethically permissible for lawyers to charge clients interest on the expenses and costs advanced via this arrangement with the bank. As in the first issue, the fact that the expenses originated with a bank instead of the law firm itself is irrelevant, unless the relationship between lawyer and bank interferes with the relationship between lawyer and client. Assuming it does not, the question is whether lawyers should be permitted to charge their clients interest on advances.In Advisory Opinion No. 45 (March 15, 1985, as amended November 15, 1985), the State Disciplinary Board held that a lawyer may ethically charge interest on clients' overdue bills \"without a prior specific agreement with a client if notice is given to the client in advance that interest will be charged on fee bills which become delinquent after a stated period of time, but not less than 30 days.\"Thus, the Board found no general impropriety in charging interest on overdue bills. There is no apparent reason why advanced expenses for which a client may be responsible under a contingent fee agreement (whether they are billed to the client or deducted from a recovery) should be treated any differently. Thus, we find no ethical impropriety in charging lawful interest on such amounts advanced on the client's behalf. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a>In approving the practice of charging interest on overdue bills, the Board held that a lawyer must comply with \"all applicable law <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a> . . . and ethical considerations.\"The obvious intent of Rule 1.5(c) is to ensure that clients are adequately informed of all relevant aspects of contingent fee arrangements, including all factors taken into account in determining the amount of their ultimate recovery. Since any interest charged on advances could affect the ultimate recovery as much as other factors mentioned in Rule 1.5(c), it would be inconsistent to permit lawyers to charge interest on these advances without revealing the intent to do so in the fee contract. Thus, we conclude that it is permissible to charge interest on such advances only if (i) the client is notified in the contingent fee contract of the maximum rate of interest the lawyer will or may charge on such advances; and (ii) the written statement given to the client upon conclusion of the matter reflects the interest charged on the expenses advanced in the matter.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> The opinion makes specific mention of O.C.G.A. 7-4-16, the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts in Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act as amended (15 USC 1601 et seq.). We state no opinion as to the applicability of these acts or others to the matter at hand.","UrlName":"rule457","Order":69,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d3aa0fac-a8e9-447d-b4ff-50a72bfd7734","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-6","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-6 Approved and Issued On May 3, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule529\"> FAO No. 92-2 </a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-056.pdf?sfvrsn=5bf532e5_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0799</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement. SUMMARY ANSWER:     It is ethically improper for a lawyer to advertise for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement and without complying with the disciplinary standards of conduct applicable to lawyer referral services. OPINION:     Correspondent seeks ethical advice for a practicing attorney who advertises legal services but whose ads do not disclose that a majority of the responding callers will be referred to other lawyers.  The issue is whether the failure to include information about the lawyers referral practices in the ad is misleading in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 7.1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct governing the dissemination of legal services permits a lawyer to \"advertise through all forms of public media...so long as the communication is not a false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.\"A communication is false or misleading if it \"[c]ontains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading,\"Rule 7.1(a)(1).The advertisement of legal services is protected commercial speech under the First Amendment.  Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).  Commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature and prices of products and services.  In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decision-making.  Id. at 364.  Thus, the Court has held that truthful ads including areas of practice which did not conform to the bar's approved list were informative and not misleading and could not be restricted by the state bar.  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).Although actually or inherently misleading advertisements may be prohibited, potentially misleading ads cannot be prohibited if the information in the ad can be presented in a way that is not deceiving.  Gary E. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 2287-2289 (1990). Requiring additional information so as to clarify a potentially misleading communication does not infringe on the attorney's First Amendment.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct balance the lawyer's First Amendment rights with the consumer's interest in accurate information.  In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal.A true statement which omits relevant information is as misleading as a false statement. So, for example, when contingency fees are mentioned in the communication, the fees must be explained.  Rule 7.1(a)(5).  The Rules prohibit communications which are likely to create an unjustified explanation about results the lawyer can achieve or comparison of service unless the comparison can be substantiated.  Rule 7.1(a)(2), (3).The Rules evidence a policy of full disclosure enabling the client to investigate the attorney(s) and the services offered.  Any advertisement must be clearly marked as an ad, unless it is otherwise apparent from the context that it is such a communication and at least one responsible attorney's name must be included.  Rule 7.1(a)(4), (6)(b).  Law firms practicing under a trade name must include names of practicing attorneys.  The firm's trade name cannot imply connections to an organization with which it has no connection.  Rule 7.5(a)(2).  An attorney is prohibited from implying associations with other attorneys when an association does not exist and may state or imply practice in a partnership or other organizations only when that is the fact.  Rule 7.5(d).  These disclosure requirements assure that the public receives accurate information on which to base decisions.Similarly, other jurisdictions have required disclosure of attorney names and professional associations in the advertisement of either legal services or referral services.  A group of attorneys and law firms in the Washington, D.C. area planned to create a private lawyer referral service.  The referral service's advertising campaign was to be handled by a corporation entitled \"The Litigation Group.\"Ads would state that lawyers in the group were willing to represent clients in personal injury matters.  The person answering the telephone calls generated by the ad would refer the caller to one of the member law firms or lawyers.The Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics found the name misleading because it implied the entity was a law firm rather than simply a referral service.  The Committee required the ad include a disclaimer explaining that \"The Litigation Group \"was not a law firm.  Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on legal Ethics, Opinion 1029, 2/1/88.The Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics was presented with facts identical to those presented in Virginia.  The Maryland Committee also required additional information in the ad to indicate the group was not a law firm or single entity providing legal services.  Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics, Opinion 88-65, 2/24/88.Similarly, an opinion by the New York Bar Association prohibited an attorney from using an advertising service which published ads for generic legal services.  Ads for legal services were required to include the names and addresses of participating lawyers and disclose the relationship between the lawyers.  New York Bar Association, Opinion 597, 1/23/89.The situations presented to the Virginia, Maryland and New York committees are analogous to the facts presented here.  The advertiser in all these cases refers a majority of the business generated by the ad, without disclosure.  The ad here does not disclose any association with other attorneys.The advertisement at issue conveys only the offer of legal services by the advertising attorney and no other service or attorney.  The ad does not accurately reflect the attorney's business.  The ad conveys incomplete information regarding referrals, and the omitted information is important to those clients selecting an attorney rather than an attorney referral service.Furthermore, the attorney making the referrals may be circumventing the regulations governing lawyer referral services.  Attorneys may subscribe to and accept referrals from a \"a bona fide lawyer referral service operated by an organization authorized and qualified to do business in this state; provided, however, such organization has filed with the State Disciplinary Board, at least annually a report showing its terms, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating, and the names and addresses of lawyers participating in the service.\"Rule 7.3(c)(1).  These regulations help clients select competent counsel.  If the attorney is not operating a bona fide lawyer referral in accordance with the Rules, the client is deprived of all of this information.  The attorneys accepting the referrals also violate Rule 7.3(c) by participating in the illicit service and paying for the referrals.Assuming that the advertisements at issue offers only the advertising attorneys services and that the attorney accepts cases from the callers, the ad is not false or inherently misleading. However, where a majority of the responding callers are referred out, this becomes a lawyer referral service.  The Rules require disclosure of the referral as well as compliance with the Rules applicable to referral services.","UrlName":"rule458","Order":70,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b2d78f9a-f1d9-40e7-bb3c-4469eafbf541","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-7","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-7 Approved And Issued On November 26, 2007 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule531\"> FAO No. 93-2 </a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-057.pdf?sfvrsn=260f7e4_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S08U0023</a> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=58\%22>Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, Rule 1.7 was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. The amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion. QUESTION PRESENTED: Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured. SUMMARY ANSWER: A lawyer representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim should not undertake the simultaneous representation of the insured on related claims, unless it is reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to both clients, and only if both the insurance company and the insured have consented to the representation after consultation with the lawyer, have received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation, and have been given the opportunity to consult with the independent counsel.  Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule. OPINION: This inquiry addresses several questions as to ethical propriety and possible conflicts between the representation of the client, the insurance company, and its insured.Hypothetical Fact SituationThe insurance company makes a payment to its insured under a provision of an insurance policy which provides that such payment is contingent upon the transfer and assignment of subrogation of the insured's rights to a third party for recovery with respect to such payment.Question 1: May the attorney institute suit against the tortfeasor in the insured's name without getting the insured's permission?Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.2(a), a lawyer may not institute a legal proceeding without obtaining proper authorization from his client.  The ordinary provision in an insurance policy giving the insurance company the right of subrogation does not give the lawyer the right to institute a lawsuit in the name of the insured without specific authority from the insured.  The normal subrogation agreements, trust agreements or loan receipts which are executed at the time of the payment by the insurer usually give the insurance company the right to pursue the claim in the insured's name and depending upon the language may grant proper authorization from the insured to proceed in such fashion.  Appropriate authorization to bring the suit in the insured's name should be obtained and the insured should be kept advised with respect to developments in the case.Question 2: Does the attorney represent both the insured and the insurance company, and, if so, would he then have a duty to inform the insured of his potential causes of action such as for diminution of value and personal injury?The insurance policy does not create an attorney/client relationship between the lawyer and the insured.  If the lawyer undertakes to represent the insured, the lawyer has duties to the insured, which must be respected with respect to advising the insured as to other potential causes of action such as diminution of value and personal injury.  Rule 1.7(b); see also, Comment 10 (assuring independence of counsel) and Comment 12 (common representations permissible even with some differences in interests).Question 3: Is there a conflict of interest in representing the insured as to other potential causes of action?In most instances no problem would be presented with representing the insured as to his deductible, diminution of value, etc.  Generally an insurance company retains the right to compromise the claim, which would reasonably result in a pro-rata payment to the insurance carrier and the insured.  The attorney representing the insured must be cautious to avoid taking any action, which would preclude the insured from any recovery to which the insured might otherwise be entitled.  Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule, (b); see also, Comment 10 (assuring independence of counsel) and Comment 12 (common representations permissible even with some differences in interest.) to Rule 1.7.A much more difficult problem is presented in the event an attorney attempts to represent both an insurance company's subrogation interest in property damage and an insured's personal injury claim.  In most cases the possibility of settlement must be considered.  Any aggregate settlement would necessarily have to be allocated between the liquidated damages of the subrogated property loss and the unliquidated damages of the personal injury claim.  Any aggregate settlement would require each client's consent after consultation, and this requirement cannot be met by blanket consent prior to settlement negotiations.  Rule 1.8(g); see also Comment 6 to Rule 1.8.  Only the most sophisticated of insureds could intelligently waive such a conflict, and therefore in almost all cases an attorney would be precluded from representing both the insurer and the insured in such cases.In conclusion, a lawyer representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim should not undertake the simultaneous representation of the insured on related claims, unless it is reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to both clients, and only if both the insurance company and the insured have consented to the representation after consultation with the lawyer, have received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation, and have been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.  Rule 1.7(a) and (b).","UrlName":"rule459","Order":71,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0ae1e8f5-517c-4259-8e2c-723c20267185","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-8","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD NO. 05-8 Approved And Issued On April 4, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule501\">FAO No. 96-2</a> (Modified to Correct Error Pursuant to Supreme Court Order on April 11, 2008) <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-058.pdf?sfvrsn=5a0cb79a_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0800</a> Please note that in the reference to <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> in this opinion, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> is only quoted in pertinent part. QUESTION PRESENTED: The question presented is whether an attorney may stamp client correspondence with a notice stating that the client has a particular period of time to notify the lawyer if he/she is dissatisfied with the lawyer and that if the client did not notify the lawyer of his/her dissatisfaction within that period of time, the client would waive any claim for malpractice. SUMMARY ANSWER: A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement.  Therefore, in the absence of independent representation of the client, the lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice and should not attempt to cause the waiver of any claim for malpractice by the inclusion of language amounting to such a waiver in correspondence with a client. OPINION: A member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board has brought to the attention of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board a practice by lawyers of adding the following language (by rubber stamp) to correspondence with clients:Important Message If you disagree with anything set forth in this communication or the way I have represented you to date, please notify me by certified mail at the address set forth herein immediately. If I do not hear from you, it shall be an acknowledgment by you per our agreement that you are satisfied with my representation of you to date and you agree with my statements in this communication.The intended effect of this \"message \"is to create a short period of time within which the client must decide whether he or she is satisfied with the representation, and if not satisfied, the client must notify the lawyer \"immediately.\"If such notification is not provided \"immediately,\"the client will have acknowledged an \"agreement \"that the client is satisfied with the representation.It is apparent from reviewing this \"message \"that the lawyer is attempting to exonerate himself or herself from any claim of malpractice or to cause a waiver of any claim for malpractice by the client against the lawyer.  By attempting to limit his or her liability for malpractice or to cause a waiver of any claim for malpractice, the lawyer is putting himself or herself into an adversarial relationship with the client.  While providing advice to the client on the one hand, the lawyer is attempting to limit or excuse his or her liability for claims of malpractice resulting from the provision of such advice on the other hand.  Such conduct places the lawyer's personal interests ahead of the interests of the client.  This conduct is expressly forbidden by Rule 1.8(h), which provides that \"A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement.\"In summary, the use of a message or notice, such as described herein, is a violation of Rule 1.8(h), and subjects an attorney to discipline, for which the maximum penalty is a public reprimand.","UrlName":"rule460","Order":72,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"410020ea-d24b-4223-b6c4-3c43b3cf6cb6","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-9","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-9 Approved And Issued On April 13, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule503\"> FAO No. 97-1 </a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-059.pdf?sfvrsn=2a5783e9_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06R0802</a> See Comments [4] through [9] to <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">Rule 1.9</a> for additional ethical guidance applicable to lawyers moving between firms. QUESTION PRESENTED: Is it ethically proper to work on a temporary basis for other attorneys?  Is it ethically proper for a lawyer, law firm, or corporate law department to hire other attorneys on a temporary basis? SUMMARY ANSWER: Yes.  While a temporary lawyer and the employing firm or corporate law department must be sensitive to the unique problems of conflicts of interest, confidentiality, imputed disqualification, client participation, use of placement agencies and fee division produced by the use of temporary lawyers, there is nothing in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that prohibits the use of temporary lawyers. OPINION: I.  Conflicts of InterestAn attorney is ethically obligated to avoid conflicts of interest with respect to that attorney's client.  A temporary lawyer represents the client of a firm when that lawyer works on a matter for a client.  Thus, a temporary lawyer employed to represent clients or assist in representation of clients enters into an attorney/client relationship with those particular clients as an associate of the firm.  Accordingly, the general rules pertaining to all attorneys regarding conflicts of interest are applicable to the temporary lawyer.  Specifically, the temporary lawyer and the employing law firm or corporate law department must comply with Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10 governing personal interests, simultaneous representation, and subsequent representation conflicts of interest, and imputed disqualification.  Generally, a temporary lawyer should not represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation without obtaining the consent of the affected clients in accordance with the consent requirement of Rule 1.7.The opportunity for conflicts of interest is heightened in the context of the employment of temporary lawyers.  The very nature of a temporary lawyer invokes conflict of interest issues.  Obviously, a temporary lawyer is likely to be employed by many different firms or legal departments during the course of his or her practice.  Therefore, the potential for conflicts of interest is great.  As a practical matter, this potential for conflict imposes upon temporary lawyers and employing law firms or corporate law departments an obligation of great care in both record keeping and screening for conflicts.  In fact, the potential for conflict is so high that law firms or corporate law departments that employ temporary lawyers would be acting unethically if they did not carefully evaluate each proposed employment for actual conflicting interests and potentially conflicting interests.  Additionally, the temporary lawyer should maintain a record of clients and matters worked on in order to evaluate possible conflicts of interest should they arise.  All firms employing temporary lawyers should also maintain a complete and accurate record of all matters on which each temporary lawyer works.One of the most difficult issues involving conflict of interest in the employment of temporary lawyers is imputed disqualification issues.  In other words, when would the firm or legal department be vicariously disqualified due to conflict of interest with respect to the temporary lawyer? Since a temporary attorney is considered to be an associate of the particular firm or corporate law department for which he or she is temporarily working, the normal rules governing imputed disqualification apply.  Specifically, Rule 1.10(a) provides that if any attorney is individually precluded from undertaking representation by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2, then a firm with whom the attorney is associated is also precluded from undertaking that representation.  Also, and most importantly in the temporary lawyer context, Rule 1.9(b) says that a lawyer \"shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previous represented a client: (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and (2) about whom the lawyer had acquired [confidential] information . . . , unless the client consents after consultation.\"The effect of these rules working in conjunction is that a firm employing a temporary lawyer would be disqualified by imputed disqualification from any unconsented to representation materially adverse to a former client of the former firms of the temporary lawyer in the same or a substantially related matter if the temporary lawyer had acquired confidential information about the former representation.II. ConfidentialityIn addition to avoiding conflicts of interest, an attorney also is obligated to protect the client's confidences.  As noted above, a temporary lawyer who is involved in the representation of clients or who provides assistance in the representation of clients enters into an attorney/client relationship with those clients.  Therefore, the temporary attorney is obligated not to disclose client confidences.  A temporary attorney is required to keep all information gained in the professional relationship with a client confidential in accordance with Rule 1.6.<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">Furthermore, Rule 5.1 requires:(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable effort to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</div>This Rule obligates the employing firm or corporate law department to impose upon temporary lawyers obligations of confidentiality identical to those requirements imposed on an associate or any other employee.  This obligation of confidentiality includes all information regarding the representation of all clients of the firm or departments when the temporary lawyer acquires that information during his or her engagement.To protect confidentiality and to avoid excessive risks of imputed disqualification it is a prudent practice for all law firms and corporate law departments, to the extent practicable, to screen each temporary lawyer from access to any information relating to clients that is not related to the temporary lawyer's assignment.  Moreover, a temporary lawyer working for several firms shall make every effort to avoid exposure within those firms to any information relating to clients on matters not assigned to the temporary attorney.III.  Use of Placement Agency for Temporary AttorneysPlacement agencies participate in a business that furnishes law firms and corporate departments with the services of lawyers desiring to obtain part-time or temporary employment.  Firms and corporate legal departments look to these agencies to find temporary attorneys.  In accordance with ABA Formal Opinion 88-356 (1988), a firm does not violate ethical regulations by utilizing a placement agency.  However, there are certain guidelines that should be followed to ensure that no ethical violations occur.  First of all, the firm or corporate legal department must prevent any third party from exerting any control as to the client representation.  Such control would be a violation of Rule 5.4(c).  For example, an agency may have an interest in an attorney's taking additional time on a project so that it will result in higher fees.  The solution is to prevent any control by the agency of the attorney's time.Furthermore, there is an increased risk of disclosure of confidential information even though there must be compliance with the Rules relating to confidential information and conflicts of interest.  This risk of disclosure may be lessened by the screening of temporary attorneys by the firm that, as discussed above, insures the temporary lawyers do not obtain unnecessary information.  Moreover, a client is entitled to be informed that a temporary attorney is being used.  A client reasonably assumes that only attorneys within the firm are doing work on that client's case, and thus, a client should be informed that the firm is using a temporary attorney to do the firm's work.  Because there is some risk of third party interference with the representation, the client should be advised of that risk.  Compliance with Rule 5.4(c), which prohibits third party control of the client representation requires full disclosure to the client of the arrangement.IV.  Fee ArrangementsThe last consideration that needs to be addressed is the appropriate manner in which to handle the fee arrangement.  In accordance with the rationale contained in ABA Formal Opinion 88-356, a fee division with a temporary attorney is allowed.  If a temporary attorney is directly supervised by an attorney in a law firm, that arrangement is analogous to fee splitting with an associate in a law firm, which is allowed by Rule 1.5(e). Thus, in that situation there is no requirement of consent by the client regarding the fee.  Nevertheless, the ethically proper and prudent course is to seek consent of a client under all circumstances in which the temporary lawyer's assistance will be a material component of the representation.  The fee division with a temporary attorney is also allowed even if there is no direct supervision if three criteria are met: (1) the fee is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer; (2) the client is advised of the fee splitting situation and consents; and (3) the total fee is reasonable.   Rule 1.5(e).In that the agency providing the temporary lawyer is not authorized to practice law, any sharing of fees with such an agency would be in violation of Rule 5.4(a).  Therefore, while it is perfectly permissible to compensate an agency for providing a temporary lawyer, such compensation must not be based on a portion of client fees collected by the firm or the temporary lawyer.In summary, employment as a temporary lawyer and use of temporary lawyers are proper when adequate measures, consistent with the guidance offered in this opinion, are employed by the temporary lawyer and the employing firm or corporate law department.  These measures respond to the unique problems created by the use of temporary lawyers, including conflicts of interest, imputed disqualification, confidentiality, fee arrangements, use of placement agencies, and client participation.  Generally, firms employing temporary lawyers should: (1) carefully evaluate each proposed employment for conflicting interests and potentially conflicting interests; (2) if conflicting or potentially conflicting interests exist, then determine if imputed disqualification rules will impute the conflict to the firm; (3) screen each temporary lawyer from all information relating to clients for which a temporary lawyer does not work, to the extent practicable; (4) make sure the client is fully informed as to all matters relating to the temporary lawyer's representation; and (5) maintain complete records on all matters upon which each temporary lawyer works.","UrlName":"rule461","Order":73,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"920b6f2f-60e1-43db-8db3-867ad4c24b5f","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-10","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-10 Approved And Issued On April 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule462\">FAO No. 98-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0510.pdf?sfvrsn=97d84043_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0803</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     Can a Georgia attorney, who has agreed to serve as local counsel, be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia? SUMMARY ANSWER:     A Georgia attorney, serving as local counsel, can be disciplined under Rule 5.1(c) for discovery abuses committed by an out-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel when the local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct.  Knowledge in this situation includes \"willful blindness \"by the local counsel.  Local counsel can also be disciplined for discovery abuse committed by an out-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel when the local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel also in accordance with Rule 5.1(c).  Finally, the role of local counsel, as defined by the parties and understood by the court, may carry with it affirmative ethical obligations. OPINION:     A client has asked in-house or other out-of-state counsel, who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, to represent him as lead counsel in a case venued in Georgia.  Lead counsel associates local counsel, who is a member of the State Bar of Georgia, to assist in the handling of the case.  Local counsel moves the admission of lead counsel pro hac vice, and the motion is granted.  During discovery, lead counsel engages in some form of discovery abuse.     Discipline of local counsel for the discovery abuse of lead counsel would, in all cases, be limited to discovery abuse that is in violation of a particular Rule of Professional Conduct.  If the discovery abuse is a violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct, for example, the destruction of documents subject to a motion to produce, Rules 5.1(c) and 3.4(a) defines local counsel's responsibility for the abuse.  Because Rule 5.1(c) is entitled \"Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \"it may not be obvious to all attorneys that the language of this statute applies to the questions regarding ethical responsibilities between lead and local counsel.  Nevertheless, the language of the Rule clearly applies and is in accord with common principles of accessory culpability:     A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:  (1) The . . . supervisory lawyer orders, or with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; . . . .     Under this Rule the extent of local counsel's accessory culpability for lead counsel's discovery abuse is determined by the answers to two questions:  (1) What constitutes knowledge of the abuse by local counsel?  (2) What constitutes ratification of the violative conduct by local counsel?     Actual knowledge, of course, would always be sufficient to meet the knowledge requirement of this Rule.  Consistent with the doctrine of \"willful blindness \"applied in other legal contexts, however, sufficient knowledge could be imputed to local counsel if he or she, suspicious that lead counsel was engaging in or was about to engage in a violation of ethical requirements, sought to avoid acquiring actual knowledge of the conduct.  The doctrine of \"willful blindness \"applies in these circumstances because local counsel's conduct in avoiding actual knowledge displays the same level of culpability as actual knowledge.     Thus, if local counsel was suspicious that lead counsel was \"engag[ing] in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation \"in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4), local counsel would meet the knowledge requirement of accessory culpability if he or she purposely avoided further inquiry.  What would be sufficient suspicion, of course, is difficult to determine in the abstract.  To avoid the risk of the effect of the doctrine of willful blindness, a prudent attorney should treat any reasonable suspicion as sufficient to prompt inquiry of the in-house or other out-of-state counsel.     What constitutes ratification is also difficult to determine in the abstract.  Consistent with the definition of accessory culpability in other legal contexts, however, an attorney should avoid any conduct that does not actively oppose the violation.  The specific conduct required may include withdrawal from the representation or, in some cases, disclosure of the violation to the court.  Which measures are appropriate will depend upon the particular circumstances and consideration of other ethical requirements.  In all circumstances, however, we would expect local counsel to remonstrate with lead counsel and to warn lead counsel of local counsel's ethical obligations under Rule 5.1(c).     Other than accessory culpability, and depending upon how the parties and the court have defined it in the particular representation, the role of local counsel itself may include an affirmative duty to inquire into the conduct of lead counsel and other affirmative ethical obligations.  This is true, for example, if the court understands the role of local counsel as carrying with it any direct supervisory authority over out-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel.  In such circumstances, Rule 5.1(c) provides:     A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of Rules of Professional Conduct if:  (2) the lawyer . . . has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.     Furthermore, at times lead and local counsel may have defined the relationship so that it is indistinguishable from that of co-counsel.  In such cases the usual principles of ethical responsibility apply.  Even short of this co-counsel role, however, typical acts required of local counsel such as moving of admission pro hac vice or the signing of pleadings, always carry with them affirmative ethical obligations.  For example, in this, as in all circumstances, the signing of pleadings by an attorney constitutes a good faith representation regarding the pleadings and the conduct of the discovery procedure of which the pleadings are a part.  There is nothing in the role of local counsel that changes this basic ethical responsibility.  Local counsel, if he or she signs the pleadings, must be familiar with them and investigate them to the extent required by this good faith requirement.     Finally, there is nothing in the role of local counsel that excuses an attorney from the usual ethical requirements applicable to his or her own conduct in the representation, either individually or in conjunction with lead counsel.  If local counsel engages in any unethical conduct, it is no defense to a violation that the conduct was suggested, initiated, or required by lead counsel.     Generally, Rules 1.2(a) and (d); 1.6; 3.3(a)(1) and (4); 3.3(c); 3.4(a), (b) and (f); 3.5(b); 4.1(a); 4.2(a); 4.3(a) and (b); 5.1(c); 5.3; 5.4(c); 8.4(a)(1) and (4) may apply to the conduct of local counsel depending upon the degree of local counsel's involvement in the discovery process.  While all these Rules might not be applicable in a given case, taken together they cover the range of conduct that may be involved.","UrlName":"rule449","Order":74,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de27d0c5-6cfb-402d-a735-cb573cdcf915","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-11","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-11 Approved and Issued On September 22, 2008 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule517\">FAO No. 99-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0511.pdf?sfvrsn=5fdb84f6_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U1854</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=58\%22> </a> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. The amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion. COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA PER CURIAM.     We granted a petition for discretionary review brought by the State Bar of Georgia asking this Court to adopt an opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (\"Board \") and retract an earlier version of the Formal Advisory Opinion (\"FAO \"). At issue is Proposed Opinion 05-11, which is a re-drafted version of FAO 99-1.1 Both opinions address the ethical propriety of an attorney defending a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client. Having examined FAO 99-1 in light of the issuance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, we agree that the new Rules require a different result than that reached in FAO 99-1 and that Proposed Opinion 05-11 should be adopted and FAO 99-1 retracted.     In FAO 99-1, issued on May 27, 1999, the Board applied Standards 30, 35 and 36 and Ethical Considerations 5-14 and 5-15 to the question presented and concludedan attorney may not simultaneously represent clients that have directly adverse interests in litigation that is the subject matter of either one of the representations. Whether or not this is the case ... depends upon the nature of the representation of the insurance company.     If it is, in fact, the insurance company that is the true client in the unrelated matter, then the interests of the simultaneously represented clients in the litigation against the insured client are directly adverse even though the insurance company is not a party to the litigation and the representations are unrelated. The consent by the clients provided for in Standard 37 is not available in these circumstances because it is not obvious that the attorney can adequately represent the interests of each client. This is true because adequate representation includes a requirement of an appearance of trustworthiness that is inconsistent with the conflict of interest between these simultaneously represented clients.     If, however, as is far more typically the case, it is not the insurance company that is the true client in the unrelated matter, but an insured of the insurance company, then there is no simultaneous representation of directly adverse interests in litigation and these Standards do not apply. Instead, the attorney may have a personal interest conflict under Standard 30 in that the attorney has a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the insurance company. This personal interest conflict may be consented to by the insured client after full disclosure of the potential conflict and careful consideration. The Standard 37 limitation on consent to conflicts does not apply to Standard 30 conflicts. Such consent, however, should not be sought by an attorney when the attorney believes that the representation of the insured will be adversely affected by his or her personal interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the insurance company for to do so would be to violate the attorney's general obligation of zealous representation to the insured client.In its 2006 re-examination of the question presented in FAO 99-1, the Board applied Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Comment 8 thereto and concluded that the attorney's representation of the insured would be an impermissible conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a) if the insurance company is the client in the unrelated matter, and that consent of both clients would not be available to cure the impermissible conflict because the conflict necessarily \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\"Rule 1.7(c)(3). This was the same result as was reached when Standards 35 and 36 were applied in FAO 99-1, though Proposed Opinion 05-11 clarifies that the attorney's successful representation of the insured client would reduce or eliminate the potential subrogation claim of the insurance company client, making advocacy on behalf of one client in these circumstances advocacy against a simultaneously represented client.     In addressing the far more typical case of the client in the unrelated matter being an insured of the insurance company rather than the insurance company itself, the Board in Proposed Opinion 05-11 again echoed FAO 99-1 in its finding that there would be no impermissible advocacy against a simultaneous representation client, but the attorney might have a conflict with the attorney's own interests under Rule 1.7(a), since the attorney would have a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the non-client insurance company. In a departure from FAO 99-1, the Board in Proposed Opinion 05-11 opines that \"the likelihood that the representation [of the insured] will be harmed by this financial interest makes this a risky situation for the attorney,\"noting that while Rule 1.7(b) permits the personal conflict to be cured by consent of all affected clients under some circumstances, consent is not available to cure the conflict if the conflict triggers Rule 1.7(c)(3), i.e., the conflict \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer [would] be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\"Thus, Proposed Opinion 05-11 corrects an error in FAO 99-1, which had required only the consent of the insured client to the personal interest conflict, and replaces the \"warning \"contained in FAO 99-1 (\"No attorney, however, should seek such consent [to an attorney's personal interest conflict] if he or she believes that his or her business interest will, in fact, adversely affect the quality of the representation with the insured client \") with the ethical requirement of Rule 1.7(c).     Inasmuch as FAO 99-1 no longer provides the most current ethical guidance to the members of the State Bar of Georgia since it is not based on the current ethical rules, and Proposed Opinion 05-11 interprets the current ethical rules, clarifies a point made in FAO 99-1, corrects an error in FAO 99-1, and recognizes the conversion of the warning contained in FAO 99-1 into an ethical requirement, we conclude that it is appropriate to adopt Proposed Opinion 05-11 and retract FAO 99-1.2 Formal Advisory Opinion 05-11 approved. All the Justices concur. 1-With the issuance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the Standards of Conduct were replaced and the Canons of Ethics, including Ethical Considerations and Directory Rules, were deleted. At the request of the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, the Board undertook a review of the FAOs issued by this Court that were based on the Standards of Conduct and Canons of Ethics to determine the impact, if any, of the issuance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. 2-Our approval of FAO 05-11 makes it \"binding on all members of the State Bar [of Georgia].\"Rule 4-403(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.   FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-11 QUESTION PRESENTED:     May an attorney ethically defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents, in an unrelated matter, the insurance company with a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client? SUMMARY ANSWER:     In this hypothetical, the attorney's successful representation of the insured would reduce or eliminate the potential subrogation claim of the insurance company that is a client of the same attorney in an unrelated matter. Thus, essentially, advocacy on behalf of one client in these circumstances constitutes advocacy against a simultaneously represented client. \"Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as an advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated.\"See, Rule 1.7, Comment 8. This is true because adequate representation of any client includes a requirement of an appearance of trustworthiness that is inconsistent with advocacy against that client.     Thus, if the insurance company, as opposed to an insured of that company, is in fact the client of the attorney in the unrelated matter, then this representation would be an impermissible conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a) and consent of both clients, as sometimes permitted under Rule 1.7 to cure an impermissible conflict, would not be available. See, Rule 1.7(c)(3).     If, however, as is far more typically the case, it is not the insurance company that is the client in the unrelated matter, but an insured of the insurance company, then there is no advocacy against a simultaneous representation client and the representation is not prohibited for that reason. Instead, in such circumstances, the attorney may have a conflict with the attorney's own interests under Rule 1.7 (a) in that the attorney has a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the non-client insurance company. The likelihood that the representation will be harmed by this financial interest makes this a risky situation for the attorney. Nevertheless, under some circumstances the rules permit this personal interest conflict to be cured by consent of all affected clients after compliance with the requirements for consent found in Rule 1.7(b). Consent would not be available to cure the conflict, however, if the conflict \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer [would] be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affect clients.\"See, Rule 1.7(c). The question this asks is not the subjective one of whether or not the attorney thinks he or she will be able to provide adequate representation despite the conflict, but whether others would reasonably view the situation as such. The attorney makes this determination at his or her own peril. OPINION:     Correspondent asks whether an attorney may ethically defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents, in an unrelated matter, the insurance company with a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client. In this hypothetical, the attorney's successful representation of the insured would reduce or eliminate the potential subrogation claim of the insurance company that is a client of the same attorney in an unrelated matter.     This situation is governed by Rule 1.7, which provides:     (a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).     (b) If client consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected or former client consents, preferably in writing, to the representation after:         (1) consultation with the lawyer;         (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation; and         (3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.     (c) Client consent is not permissible if the representation:         (1) is prohibited by law or these rules;         (2) includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or         (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.     If the representation of the insurance company in the unrelated matter is, in fact, representation of the insurance company, and not representation of an insured of the company, then we get additional assistance in interpreting Rule 1.7 from Comment 8 which states that: \"Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as an advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated.\"This is true because adequate representation of any client includes a requirement of an appearance of trustworthiness that is inconsistent with advocacy against that client. This prohibition is not because Georgia lawyers are not sufficiently trustworthy to act professionally in these circumstances by providing independent professional judgment for each client unfettered by the interests of the other client. It is, instead, a reflection of the reality that reasonable client concerns with the appearance created by such conflicts could, by themselves, adversely affect the quality of the representation.     Thus, in this situation there is an impermissible conflict of interest between simultaneously represented clients under Rule 1.7(a) and consent to cure this conflict is not available under Rule 1.7(c) because it necessarily \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\"See, generally, ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 51:104-105 and cases and advisory opinions cited therein. See, also, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495 (1982) (lawyer may not accept employment adverse to existing client even in unrelated matter; prohibition applies even when present client employs most lawyers in immediate geographical area, thereby making it difficult for adversary to retain equivalent counsel).     If, however, as is far more typically the case, it is not the insurance company that is the client in the unrelated matter, but an insured of the insurance company, then there is no advocacy against a simultaneous representation client and the representation is not prohibited for that reason. Instead, in such circumstances, the attorney may have a conflict with the attorney's own interests under Rule 1.7 (a) in that the attorney has a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the non-client insurance company. The likelihood that the representation will be harmed by this financial interest makes this a risky situation for the attorney. Nevertheless, under some circumstances the rules permit this personal interest conflict to be cured by consent of all affected clients after compliance with the requirements for consent found in Rule 1.7(b). Consent would not be available to cure the conflict, however, if the conflict \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer [would] be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affect clients.\"See, Rule 1.7(c). The question this asks is not the subjective one of whether or not the attorney thinks he or she will be able to provide adequate representation despite the conflict, but whether others would reasonably view the situation as such. The attorney makes this determination at his or her own peril.  ","UrlName":"rule450","Order":75,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71f6c658-da8f-4a6f-9144-290755e07eb8","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-12","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-12 Approved And Issued On July 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule464\">FAO No. 00-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0512.pdf?sfvrsn=41d1bdd3_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U1489</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     When the City Council controls the salary and benefits of the members of the Police Department, may a councilperson, who is an attorney, represent criminal defendants in matters where the police exercise discretion in determining the charges? SUMMARY ANSWER:     Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law.  In any circumstance where the representation may create an appearance of impropriety it should be avoided. OPINION:     This opinion addresses itself to a situation where the City Council member votes on salary and benefits for the police.  Particularly in small municipalities, this situation could give rise to a perception that a police officer's judgment might be affected.  For example, a police officer might be reluctant to oppose a request that he recommend lesser charges or the dismissal of charges when the request comes from a council member representing the accused.  Situations like the one at hand give rise to inherent influence which is present even if the attorney who is also a City Council member attempts to avoid using that position to influence the proceedings.     Rule 3.5 provides that \"A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter:  (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law....\"As a general matter, a police officer is a public official. See White v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 233 Ga. 919 (1975); Sauls v. State, 220 Ga. App. 115 (1996).  But see O.C.G.A. §45-5-6.  Where a police officer exercises discretion as to the prosecution of criminal charges, the police officer is a public official within the meaning of Rule 3.5(a).  By its express terms, Rule 3.5(a) applies only when an attorney seeks to influence, that is where an attorney has the intent to influence, an official by means prohibited by law.  If an attorney were to indicate to an officer that as a result of the attorney's position as a member of the City Council a favorable recommendation as to one of the attorney's clients would result in benefits flowing to the officer, or that an unfavorable recommendation would result in harm, the attorney would have committed the offense of bribery, OCGA §16-10-2 (a)(1), or extortion, OCGA §16-8-16(a)(4).  The attorney would also have violated Rule 3.5(a).     The mere fact of representation of a criminal defendant by an attorney who is a member of the City Council, when the City Council controls the salary and benefits of the members of the Police Department, and when the police exercise discretion in determining the charges does not, by itself, establish a violation of Rule 3.5(a).  To establish a violation, there must be a showing that the attorney sought to exercise influence in a manner prohibited by law.  We note, however, that Comment 2 to Rule 3.5 provides that \"The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety.\"Pursuant to Rule 3.5, therefore, an attorney should not represent a criminal defendant where an inference of improper influence can reasonably be drawn.","UrlName":"rule451","Order":76,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3465bd6d-ed00-45d1-b591-ca67726e53d2","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-13","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-13 Approved And Issued On June 21, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule530\">FAO No. 93-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0513.pdf?sfvrsn=46b5264d_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S07U1159</a>             QUESTION PRESENTED:     (1) Whether the designation \"Special Counsel \"may be used to describe an attorney and/or law firm affiliated with another law firm for the specific purpose of providing consultation and advice to the other firm in specialized legal areas:  (2) and whether the ethical rules governing conflict of interest apply as if the firm, the affiliated attorney and the affiliated firm constitute a single firm. SUMMARY ANSWER:     It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship.  The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm. OPINION:     This opinion deals with the following questions:<ol><li>May a law firm which associates a lawyer for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters identify that lawyer as being, for example, \"Special Counsel for Trust and Estate and Industrial Tax Matters \"?</li><li>May a law firm which associates another law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters identify that law firm as being, for example, \"Special Counsel for Tax and ERISA Matters \"?</li><li>Should Rule 1.10, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\">[1]</a> the vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer, apply to outside associated lawyers and law firms? </li></ol>     The problem should be viewed from the standpoint of clients.  Can the law firm render better service to its clients if it establishes such relationships?  If the answer is yes, there is no reason such relationships cannot be created and publicized.     There is no Rule which would prohibit a law firm from associating either an individual lawyer or law firm as special counsel and such association may be required by Rule 1.1.; <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\">[2]</a> While the American Bar Association has concluded that one firm may not serve as counsel for another (Formal Opinion No. 330, August 1972) this court declines to follow that precedent.  Moreover, a subsequent ABA opinion recognized that one firm may be associated or affiliated with another without being designated \"of counsel.\"(Formal Opinion No. 84-351, October 20, 1984).  In the view of this court, it is not improper to establish the type of relationship proposed.  If established, it must be identified and identified correctly so that clients and potential clients are fully aware of the nature of the relationship.     Finally, the relationship between the law firm and special counsel (whether an individual lawyer or a law firm) must be a bona fide relationship that entails the use of special counsel's expertise.  The relationship cannot be established merely to serve as a referral source.  Any fees charged between special counsel and the law firm, of course, must be divided in accordance with the requirements of Rule 1.5. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn3\">[3]</a>     The first two questions are answered in the affirmative.     The third question presents a more complex issue.     The Georgia vicarious disqualification rule is founded on the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client.  This duty is expressed in the obligations to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client, and to decline representation or withdraw if the ability to do so is adversely affected by the representation of another client.  Recognizing that the client is the client of the firm and that the duty of loyalty extends to all firm members, it follows that the duty to decline or withdraw extends to all firm members.  Rule 1.10.     Identifying an associated firm or lawyer is calculated to raise the expectation in the mind of the client that the relationship is something more than casual.  Indeed it is calculated to convey to the client that the client's matter is being handled by a unit made up of the associating and associated firm or lawyer, so that the expertise of all can be brought to bear on the problem.  Accordingly, in the situation presupposed in the hypothetical, the clients of the associating firm become, for the purposes of Rule 1.10, the clients of the associated firm or lawyer and vice versa.  The unit as a whole has a duty of loyalty to the client and must exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client as an entirety.     Reference should be made to Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10, imputed disqualification; General Rule.  Rule 1.10 discusses when an imputed disqualification can bar all attorneys at a firm or office from representing a particular client.     Rule 1.10 and Comment 1 of the Rule make affiliations among lawyers or law firms less complex.  Rule 1.10 applies to entities other than associated lawyers and law firms to include in addition to lawyers in a private firm, lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in legal services organizations.     As set forth in Comment 1, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn4\">[4]</a> two practitioners who share office space and who occasionally assist each other in representation of clients, may not regard themselves as a law firm.  However, if they present themselves to the public suggesting that they are indeed a firm, they may be regarded as a firm for purposes of these Rules.  Factors such as formal agreements between associated lawyers, as well as maintenance of mutual access to information concerning clients, may be relevant in determining whether practitioners who are sharing space may be considered a firm under the Rule.     The third question is answered in the affirmative.  In light of the adoption of Rule 1.1, ethical rules governing conflict of interest apply to entities and affiliations of lawyers in a broader sense than what has traditionally been considered a \"law firm.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> Rule 1.10     (a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.     (b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:     (1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and     (2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.     (c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn2\">2.</a> Rule 1.1     A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer's level of competence without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in question. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn3\">3.</a> Rule 1.5     (a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:     (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;     (2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;     (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;     (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;     (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;     (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;     (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and     (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.     (b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.     (c) (1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. (2) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:     (i) the outcome of the matter; and,     (ii) if there is a recovery, showing the:         (A) remittance to the client;         (B) the method of its determination;         (C) the amount of the attorney fee; and         (D) if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.     (d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:     (1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or     (2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.     (e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:     (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;     (2) the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and     (3) the total fee is reasonable. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn4\">4.</a> Comment 1 of Rule 1.10     [1] For purposes of these Rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other.","UrlName":"rule452","Order":77,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"020d144f-0976-45a8-9c93-e61d8d9bbcc7","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 07-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON SEPTEMBER 5, 2007 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 07-1 \n             \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? \n \n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nA lawyer may ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between himself and his client in direct efforts to collect a fee, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency.  Otherwise, a lawyer may not report the failure of a client to pay the lawyer's bill to third parties, including major credit reporting services, in an effort to collect a fee. \n \n OPINION: \n \n    This issue is governed primarily by Rule 1.6 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.6 provides, in pertinent part:\n \n    (a) A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the Court. \n \n    Comment 5 to Rule 1.6 provides further guidance: \n \n    Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.  A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.\n \n    Former Standard 28 limited confidentiality to \"confidences and secrets of a client.\"However, Rule 1.6 expands the obligations by requiring a lawyer to \"maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship \"including the client's secrets and confidences. \n \n    An attorney's ethical duty to maintain confidentiality of client information is distinguishable from the attorney-client evidentiary privilege of O.C.G.A. §§24-9-21, 24-9-24 and 24-9-25.  Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Louisiana Forum Corp., 273 Ga. 206, 209-10 (2000).  Thus, Rule 1.6 applies not only to matters governed by the attorney-client privilege, but also to non-privileged information arising from the course of representation.  Information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and client, including the amount of fees that the lawyer contends the client owes, may not be disclosed, except as permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, other law, order of the court or if the client consents.\n \n    Rule 1.6 authorizes disclosure in the following circumstances: \n \n    (b)(1) A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: \n    . . . \n    (iii) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil action against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.\n \n    The comments to Rule 1.6 clarify that such disclosures should be made only in limited circumstances.  While Comment 17 to Rule 1.6 provides that a lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted to prove the services rendered in an action to collect that fee, it cautions that a lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information related to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure.  Further caution is found in Comment 12, which provides that \"[i]n any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than a lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose.\" \n \n    In Georgia, it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to retain a collection agency as a measure of last resort in order to collect a fee that has been properly earned.  Advisory Opinion No. 49 issued by the State Disciplinary Board.  Advisory Opinion 49, however, only applies to a referral to a \"reputable collection agency \".  Advisory Opinion 49 further states that a lawyer should exercise the option of revealing confidences and secrets necessary to establish or collect a fee with considerable caution.  Thus, while use of a reputable collection agency to collect a fee is ethically proper, disclosures to other third parties may not be ethically permissible. Formal Advisory Opinion 95-1 provides that limitations exist on a lawyer's efforts to collect a fee from his client even through a fee collection program. \n \n    Other jurisdictions that have considered similar issues  have distinguished between direct efforts to collect an unpaid fee, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency, from indirect methods in which information is disclosed to third parties in an effort to collect unpaid fees.  In these cases, the direct methods have generally been found to be ethical, while more indirect methods, such as reporting non-paying clients to credit bureaus, have been found to be unethical.  South Carolina Bar Advisory Opinion 94-11 concluded that a lawyer may ethically use a collection agency to collect past due accounts for legal services rendered but cannot report past due accounts to a credit bureau.  The Opinion advises against reporting non-paying clients to credit bureaus because (1) it is not necessary for establishing the lawyer's claim for compensation, (2) it risks disclosure of confidential information, and (3) it smacks of punishment in trying to lower the client's credit rating.  S.C. Ethics Op. 94-11 (1994).  See also South Dakota Ethics Op. 95-3 (1995) and Mass. Ethics Op. 00-3 (2000) \n \n    The Alaska Bar Association reached a similar conclusion when it determined that \"an attorney who lists a client with a credit agency has revealed confidential information about the client for a purpose not permitted by ARPC 1.6 (b) (2) since such a referral is at most an indirect attempt to pressure the client to pay the fee.\"Alaska Ethics Op. No. 2000-3 (2000).  The Alaska Bar Ethics Opinion is based on the notion that listing an unpaid fee with a credit bureau is likely to create pressure on the client to pay the unpaid fee more from an in terrorem effect of a bad credit rating than from any merit to the claim. \n \n    The State Bar of Montana Ethics Committee concluded that an attorney may not report and disclose unpaid fees to a credit bureau because such reporting \"is not necessary to collect a fee because a delinquent fee can be collected without it.\"Mont. Ethics Op. 001027 (2000).  The Montana Opinion further concluded, \"The effect of a negative report is primarily punitive [and] it risks disclosure of confidential information about the former client which the lawyer is not permitted to reveal under Rule 1.6.\"See also New York State Ethics Opinion 684 (1996)  (reporting client's delinquent account to credit bureau does not qualify as an action \"to establish or collect the lawyer's fee \"within the meaning of the exception to the prohibition on disclosure of client information).  But see Florida Ethics Opinion 90-2 (1991) (it is ethically permissible for an attorney to report a delinquent former client to a credit reporting service, provided that confidential information unrelated to the collection of the debt was not disclosed and the debt was not in dispute). \n \n    While recognizing that in collecting a fee a lawyer may use collection agencies or retain counsel, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers concludes that a lawyer may not disclose or threaten to disclose information to non-clients not involved in the suit in order to coerce the client into settling and may not use or threaten tactics, such as personal harassment or asserting frivolous claims, in an effort to collect fees.  Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 41, comment d (2000).  The Restatement has determined that collection methods must preserve the client's right to contest the lawyer's position on the merits.  Id.  The direct methods that have been found to be ethical in other jurisdictions, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency, allow the client to contest the lawyer's position on the merits.  Indirect efforts, such as reporting a client to a credit bureau or disclosing client financial information to other creditors of a client or to individuals or entities with whom the client may do business, are in the nature of personal harassment and are not ethically permissible.  Accordingly, a lawyer may not disclose information concerning the financial relationship between himself and his client to third parties, other than through direct efforts to collect a fee, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency.\n The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2007 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about August 7, 2007.  The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August15, 2007.  No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion.  In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.","UrlName":"rule535","Order":78,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b190b9c0-1a52-4f28-910d-d3949f312ad5","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 10-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 10-1 Approved and Issued On July 11, 2013 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court of Georgia With Comments <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-101.pdf?sfvrsn=ca230921_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S10U1679</a> COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA Responding to a letter from the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council (GPDSC), the State Bar Formal Advisory Opinion Board (Board) issued Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1 (FAO 10-1), in which the Board concluded that the standard for the imputation of conflicts of interest under Rule 1.10 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct applies to the office of a circuit public defender as it would to a private law firm. FAO 10-1 was published in the June 2010 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal and was filed in this Court on June 15, 2010. On July 5, 2010, the GPDSC filed a petition for discretionary review which this Court granted on January 18, 2011. The Court heard oral argument on January 10, 2012. For reasons set forth below, we conclude, as did the Board, that Rule 1.10 (a) applies to a circuit public defender office as it would to a private law firm, and pursuant to State Bar Rule 4.403 (d), we hereby approve FAO 10-1 to the extent it so holds.1 1. At the heart of FAO 10-1 is the constitutional right to conflict-free counsel and the construction of Rule 1.10 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. “Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.” Wood v. Georgia , 450 U.S. 261, 271 ( 101 SC 1097, 67 LE2d 220) (2008). Indeed, this Court has stated in no uncertain terms that, “Effective counsel is counsel free from conflicts of interest.” Garland v. State , 283 Ga. 201 (657 SE2d 842) (2008). In keeping with this unequivocal right to conflict-free representation, Rule 1.10 (a) provides as follows:While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary .(Emphasis in original.) Comment [1] concerning Rule 1.10 defines “firm” to include “lawyers . . . in a legal services organization.” Comment [3] further provides “Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, . . . .”Under a plain reading of Rule 1.10 (a) and the comments thereto, circuit public defenders working in the circuit public defender office of the same judicial circuit are akin to lawyers working in the same unit of a legal services organization and each judicial circuit’s public defender’s office2 is a “firm” as the term is used in the rule. This construction is in keeping with our past jurisprudence. Cf. Hung v. State , 282 Ga. 684 (2) (653 SE2d 48) (2007) (attorney who filed motion for new trial was not considered to be “new” counsel for the purpose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where he and trial counsel were from the same public defender’s office); Kennebrew v. State , 267 Ga. 400 (480 SE2d 1) (1996) (appellate counsel who was from the same public defender office as appellant’s trial lawyer could not represent appellant on appeal where appellant had an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Ryan v. Thomas , 261 Ga. 661 (409 SE2d 507) (1991) (for the purpose of raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “attorneys in a public defender’s office are to be treated as members of a law firm...”); Love v. State , 293 Ga. App. 499, 501 at fn. 1 (667 SE2d 656) (2008). See also Reynolds v. Chapman , 253 F3d 1337, 1343-1344 (11th Cir. 2001) (“While public defenders’ offices have certain characteristics that distinguish them from typical law firms, our cases have not drawn a distinction between the two.”). Accordingly, FAO 10-1 is correct inasmuch is it concludes that public defenders working in the same judicial circuit are “firms” subject to the prohibition set forth in Rule 1.10 (a) when a conflict exists pursuant to the conflict of interest rules listed therein, including in particular Rule 1.7.3 That is, if it is determined that a single public defender in the circuit public defender’s office of a particular judicial circuit has an impermissible conflict of interest concerning the representation of co-defendants, then that conflict of interest is imputed to all of the public defenders working in the circuit public defender office of that particular judicial circuit. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §123 (d)(iv) (“The rules on imputed conflicts ...apply to a public-defender organization as they do to a law firm in private practice...”).2. Despite the unambiguous application of Rule 1.10 (a) to circuit public defenders, GPDSC complains that FAO 10-1 creates a per se or automatic rule of disqualification of a circuit public defender office. We disagree. This Court has stated that “[g]iven that multiple representation alone does not amount to a conflict of interest when one attorney is involved, it follows that counsel from the same [public defender office] are not automatically disqualified from representing multiple defendants charged with offenses arising from the same conduct.” Burns v. State , 281 Ga. 338, 340 (638 SE2d 299) (2006) (emphasis in the original). Here, Rule 1.10 does not become relevant or applicable until after an impermissible conflict of interest has been found to exist. It is only when it is decided that a public defender has an impermissible conflict in representing multiple defendants that the conflict is imputed to the other attorneys in that public defender’s office. Even then, multiple representations still may be permissible in some circumstances. See, e.g., Rule 1.10 (c) (“A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.) Thus, FAO 10-1 does not create a per se rule of disqualification of a circuit public defender’s office prior to the determination that an impermissible conflict of interest exists and cannot be waived or otherwise overcome.Although a lawyer (and by imputation his law firm, including his circuit public defender office) may not always have an impermissible conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case, this should not be read as suggesting that such multiple representation can routinely occur. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct explain that multiple representation of criminal defendants is ethically permissible only in the unusual case. See Rule 1.7, Comment [7] (“The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-defendant.”). We realize that the professional responsibility of lawyers to avoid even imputed conflicts of interest in criminal cases pursuant to Rule 1.10 (a) imposes real costs on Georgia’s indigent defense system, which continually struggles to obtain the resources needed to provide effective representation of poor defendants as the Constitution requires. See Gideon v. Wainwright , 373 U.S. 335 (83 SC 792, 9 LE2d 799) (1963). But the problem of adequately funding indigent defense cannot be solved by compromising the promise of Gideon . See Garland v. State , 283 Ga. 201, 204 (657 SE2d 842) (2008).Since FAO 10-1 accurately interprets Rule 1.10 (a) as it is to be applied to public defenders working in circuit public defender offices in the various judicial circuits of this State, it is approved.4Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1 approved. All the Justices concur.<hr width=\"33%\" size=\"1\" align=\"left\"> 1. In FAO 10-1, the Board purported to answer a broader question–whether “different lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit [may] represent codefendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so” – and we asked the parties to address a similar question in their briefs to this Court. That statement of the question, however, is too broad. The real issue addressed by the Board – and addressed in this opinion – is solely a question of conflict imputation, that is, whether Rule 1.10 (a) applies equally to circuit public defender offices and to private law firms. No doubt, the question of conflict imputation under Rule 1.10 (a) is part of the broader question that the Board purported to answer and that we posed to the parties. But whether multiple representations are absolutely prohibited upon imputation of a conflict – even with, for instance, the informed consent of the client or the employment of “screening” measures within an office or firm – is a question that goes beyond Rule 1.10 (a), and it is one that we do not attempt to answer in this opinion. To the extent that FAO 10-1 speaks to the broader question, we offer no opinion about its correctness.2.  There are 43 circuit public defender offices in Georgia.3.  Rule 1.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct provides:(a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).(b) If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing to the representation after: (1) consultation with the lawyer pursuant to Rule 1.0(c); (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation; and (3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.(c) Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation: (1) is prohibited by law or these Rules; (2) includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or a substantially related proceeding; or (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.4.  Our opinion cites several precedents that concern the constitutional guarantee of the assistance of counsel, and it is only fitting that we think about the constitutional values that Rule 1.10 promotes as we consider the meaning of Rule 1.10. We do not hold that the imputation of conflicts required by Rule 1.10 is compelled by the Constitution, nor do we express any opinion about the constitutionality of any other standard for imputation. Rule 1.10 is a useful aid in the fulfillment of the constitutional guarantee of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, but we do not hold today that it is essential to fulfill the constitutional guarantee. We do not endorse any particular alternative to Rule 1.10 (a), but we also do not foreclose the possibility that Rule 1.10 (a) could be amended so as to adequately safeguard high professional standards and the constitutional rights of an accused – by ensuring, among other things, the independent judgment of his counsel and the preservation of his confidences – and, at the same time, permit circuit public defender offices more flexibility in the representations of co-defendants. As of now, Rule 1.10 is the rule that we have adopted in Georgia, FAO 10-1 correctly interprets it, and we decide nothing more.FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 10-1 QUESTION PRESENTED: May different lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so? SUMMARY ANSWER: Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. OPINIONS: In Georgia, a substantial majority of criminal defendants are indigent.  Many of these defendants receive representation through the offices of the circuit public defenders.  More than 40 judicial circuit public defender offices operate across the State.Issues concerning conflicts of interest often arise in the area of criminal defense.  For example, a single lawyer may be asked to represent co-defendants who have antagonistic or otherwise conflicting interests.  The lawyer’s obligation to one such client would materially and adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent the other co-defendant, and therefore there would be a conflict of interest under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a).  See also Comment [7] to Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 (“…The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant”).  Each such client would also be entitled to the protection of Rule 1.6, which requires a lawyer to maintain the confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship with the client.  One lawyer representing co-defendants with conflicting interests certainly could not effectively represent both while keeping one client’s information confidential from the other.  See Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation…”).Some conflicts of interest are imputed from one lawyer to another within an organization.  Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a), “[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so….”  Therefore, the answer to the question presented depends in part upon whether a circuit public defender office constitutes a “firm” within the meaning of Rule 1.10.Neither the text nor the comments of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly answers the question.  The terminology section of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct defines “firm” as a “lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services organization.  See Comment, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification.”  Comment [1] to Rule 1.10 states that the term “firm” includes lawyers “in a legal services organization,” without defining a legal services organization.  Comment [3], however, provides that:Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid.  Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units.  As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation.That is the extent of the guidance in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and the comments thereto.  In the terms used in this Comment, the answer to the question presented is determined by whether lawyers in a circuit public defender’s office are in the same “unit” of a legal services organization.The Supreme Court of Georgia has not answered the question presented.  The closest it has come to doing so was in the case of Burns v. State , 281 Ga. 338 (2006).  In that case, two lawyers from the same circuit public defender’s office represented separate defendants who were tried together for burglary and other crimes.  The Court held that such representation was permissible because there was no conflict between the two defendants.  Presumably, therefore, the same assistant public defender could have represented both defendants.  The Court recognized that its conclusion left open “the issue whether public defenders should be automatically disqualified or be treated differently from private law firm lawyers when actual or possible conflicts arise in multiple defendant representation cases.”  Id. at 341.Other states, in case law and ethics opinions, have decided the question presented in disparate ways.  Some impute conflicts within particular local defender offices. See Commonwealth v. Westbrook , 400 A2d 160, 162 (Pa. 1979); Turner v. State , 340 So.2d 132, 133 (Fla. App. 2nd Dist. 1976); Tex. Ethics Op . 579 (November 2007);Va. Legal Ethics Op . No. 1776 (May 2003); Ct. Informal Op . 92-23 (July 1992);S.C. Bar Advisory Op . 92-21 (July 1992).  Some courts and committees have allowed for the possibility that there can be sufficient separation of lawyers even within the same office that imputation should not be automatic.  Graves v. State , 619 A.2d 123, 133-134 (Md. Ct. of Special Appeals 1993); Cal. Formal Op . No. 2002-158 (Sept. 2002); Montana Ethics Op . 960924.  Others have decided more generally against a per se rule of imputation of conflicts.  See Bolin v. State , 137 P.3d 136, 145 (Wyo.  2006); State v. Bell , 447 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1982); People v. Robinson , 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (Ill. 1979); State v. Cook , 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (Idaho App. 2007).The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals looked at an imputed conflict situation in a Georgia public defender office.  The Court noted that “[t]he current disciplinary rules of the State Bar in Georgia preclude an attorney from representing a client if one of his or her law partners cannot represent that client due to a conflict of interest.”  Reynolds v. Chapman , 253 F.3d 1337, 1344 (2001).  The Court further stated that “[w]hile public defender’s offices have certain characteristics that distinguish them from typical law firms, our cases have not drawn a distinction between the two.”  Reynolds , supra, p. 1343.The general rule on imputing conflicts within a law firm reflects two concerns.  One is the common economic interest among lawyers in a firm.  All lawyers in a firm might benefit if one lawyer sacrifices the interests of one client to serve the interests of a different, more lucrative client.  The firm, as a unified economic entity, might be tempted to serve this common interest, just as a single lawyer representing both clients would be tempted.  Second, it is routine for lawyers in a firm to have access to confidential information of clients.  A lawyer could access the confidential information of one of the firm’s clients to benefit a different client.  For at least these two reasons, a conflict of one lawyer in a private firm is routinely imputed to all the lawyers in the firm.  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Third, Sec. 123, Comment b.The first of these concerns is not relevant to a circuit public defender office.  “The salaried government employee does not have the financial interest in the success of departmental representation that is inherent in private practice.”  Frazier v. State , 257 Ga. 690, 695 (1987) citing ABA Formal Opinion 342.The concerns about confidentiality, however, are another matter.  The chance that a lawyer for one defendant might learn the confidential information of another defendant, even inadvertently, is too great to overlook.Other concerns include the independence of the assistant public defender and the allocation of office resources.  If one supervisor oversees the representation by two assistants of two clients whose interests conflict, the potential exists for an assistant to feel pressured to represent his or her client in a particular way, one that might not be in the client’s best interest.  Furthermore, conflicts could arise within the office over the allocation of investigatory or other resources between clients with conflicting interests.The ethical rules of the State Bar of Georgia should not be relaxed because clients in criminal cases are indigent.  Lawyers must maintain the same level of ethical responsibilities whether their clients are poor or rich.Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office are members of the same “unit” of a legal services organization and therefore constitute a “firm” within the meaning of Rule 1.10.  Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  Conversely, lawyers employed in circuit public defender offices in different judicial circuits are not considered members of the same “unit” or “firm” within the meaning of Rule 1.10.","UrlName":"rule557","Order":79,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"660638f2-b1d4-4ba1-adfc-8a9a2b9b48d0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 11-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON APRIL 14, 2011 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 11-1 \n \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nEthical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. \n \nOPINION: \n \n    Contracts to render legal services for a fixed fee are implicitly allowed by Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct (Ga. R.P.C.) 1.5 (a)(8) so long as the fee is reasonable. It is commonplace that criminal defense lawyers may provide legal services in return for a fixed fee. Lawyers engaged in civil practice also use fixed-fee contracts. A lawyer might, for example, properly charge a fixed fee to draft a will, handle a divorce, or bring a civil action. In these instances the client engaging the lawyer's services is known and the scope of the particular engagement overall can be foreseen and taken into account when the fee for services is mutually agreed. The principal ethical considerations guiding the agreement are that the lawyer must be competent to handle the matter (Ga. R.P.C. 1.1) and the fee charged must be reasonable and not excessive. See Ga. R.P.C. 1.5(a). \n \n    Analysis suggests that the ethical considerations that bear on the decision of a lawyer to enter into a fixed fee contract to provide legal services can grow more complex and nuanced as the specific context changes. What if, for example, the amount of legal services to be provided is indeterminate and cannot be forecast with certainty at the outset? Or that someone else is compensating the lawyer for the services to be provided to the lawyer's client? It is useful to consider such variations along a spectrum starting from the relatively simple case of a fixed fee paid by the client who will receive the legal representation for a contemplated, particular piece of legal work (e.g., drafting a will; defending a criminal prosecution) to appreciate the growing ethical complexity as the circumstances change. \n \n1. A sophisticated user of legal services offers to retain a lawyer or law firm to provide it with an indeterminate amount of legal services of a particular type for an agreed upon fixed fee. \n \n    In today's economic climate experienced users of legal services are increasingly looking for ways to curb the costs of their legal services and to reduce the uncertainty of these costs. Fixed fee contracts for legal services that promise both certainty and the reduction of costs can be an attractive alternative to an hourly-rate fee arrangement. A lawyer contemplating entering into a contract to furnish an unknown and indeterminate amount of legal services to such a client for a fixed fee should bear in mind that the fee set must be reasonable (Ga. R.P.C. 1.5(a)) and that the lawyer will be obligated to provide competent, diligent representation even if the amount of legal services required ultimately makes the arrangement less profitable than initially contemplated. The lawyer must accept and factor in that possibility when negotiating the fixed fee. \n \n    This situation differs from the standard case of a fixed-fee for an identified piece of legal work only because the amount of legal work that will be required is indeterminate and thus it is harder to predict the time and effort that may be required. Even though the difficulty or amount of work that may be required under such an arrangement will likely be harder to forecast at the outset, such arrangements can benefit both the client and the lawyer. The client, by agreeing to give, for example, all of its work of a particular type to a particular lawyer or law firm will presumably be able to get a discount and reduce its costs for legal services; the lawyer or law firm accepting the engagement can be assured of a steady and predictable stream of revenue during the term of the engagement. \n \n    There are, moreover, structural features in this arrangement that tend to harmonize the interests of the client and the lawyer. A lawyer or law firm contemplating such a fixed fee agreement will presumably be able to consult historical data of the client and its own experiences in handling similar matters in the past to arrive at an appropriate fee to charge. And the client who is paying for the legal services has a direct financial interest in their quality. The client will be the one harmed if the quality of legal services provided are inadequate. The client in these circumstances normally is in position to monitor the quality of the legal services it is receiving. It has every incentive not to reduce its expenditures for legal services below the level necessary to receive satisfactory representation in return. Accordingly, such fixed-fee contracts for an indeterminate amount of legal services to be rendered to the client compensating the lawyer for such services are allowable so long as the fee set complies with Ga. R.P.C. 1.5(a) and the lawyer fulfills his or her obligation to provide competent representation (Ga. R.P.C. 1.1) in a diligent manner (Ga. R.P.C. 1.3), even if the work becomes less profitable than anticipated. \n \n2. A third-party offers to retain a lawyer/law firm to handle an indeterminate amount of legal work of a particular type for a fixed fee for those whom the third-party is contractually obligated to defend and indemnify who will be the client of the lawyer/law firm. \n \n    This situation differs from the last because the third-party paying for the legal services is doing so for another who is the client of the lawyer. An example of this situation is where a liability insurer offers a lawyer or law firm a flat fee to defend all of its insureds in motor vehicle accident cases in a certain geographic area. Like the last situation, there is the problem of the indeterminacy of the amount of legal work that may be required for the fixed fee; and, in addition, there is the new factor that the lawyer will be accepting compensation for representing the client from one other than the client. \n \n    Several state bar association ethics committees have addressed the issue of whether a lawyer or law firm may enter into a contract with a liability insurer in which the lawyer or law firm agrees to handle all or some portion of the insurer's defense work for a fixed flat fee. With the exception of one state, Kentucky, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> all the other state bar associations' ethics opinions have determined that such arrangements are not per se prohibited by their ethics rules and have allowed lawyers to enter into such arrangements, with certain caveats. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2]  </a> It should be noted that all of the arrangements approved involved a flat fee per case, rather than a set fee regardless of the number of cases. \n \n    Although the significance of this fact was not directly discussed in the opinions, it does tend to reduce the risks arising from uncertainty and indeterminacy. Even though some cases may be more complex and time-consuming than the norm, others will be less so. While the lawyer will be obligated under the contract to handle each matter for the same fixed fee, the risk of a far greater volume of cases than projected is significantly reduced by a fixed fee per case arrangement. The lawyer or law firm can afford to increase staff to handle the work load, and under the law of large numbers, a larger pool of cases will tend to even out the average cost per case. \n \n    In analyzing the ethical concerns implicated by lawyers entering into fixed-fee contracts with liability insurers to represent their insureds, several state bar association ethics opinions have warned of the danger presented if the fixed fee does not provide adequate compensation. An arrangement that seriously under-compensates the lawyer could threaten to compromise the lawyer's ability to meet his or her professional obligations as a competent and zealous advocate and adversely affect the lawyer's independent professional judgment on behalf of each client. \n \n    As Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners Opinion 97-7 (December 5, 1997) explains it:\n \n    If a liability insurer pays an attorney or law firm a fixed flat fee which is insufficient in regards to the time and effort spent on the defense work, there is a risk that the attorney's interest in the matter and his or her professional judgment on behalf of the insured may be compromised by the insufficient compensation paid by the insurer. An attorney or law firm cannot enter into such an agreement.\n \n    The same point was echoed in Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 98-2 (June 18, 1998) in which the Florida board determined that such flat fixed-fee contracts are not prohibited under the Florida Rules but cautioned that the lawyer \"may not enter into a set fee agreement in which the set fee is so low as to impair her independent professional judgment or cause her to limit the representation of the insured.\" \n \n    In addition to the Georgia Rules referenced above, a Georgia lawyer considering entering into such an agreement should bear in mind Ga. R.P.C. 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) as well as Ga. R.P.C. 1.7(a) and its Comment [6]. \n \n    Rule 1.8(f) cautious that \"A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless. . . (2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship. . . <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a>\n \n    Ga. R.P.C. 1.7(a) provides that: \n \n    A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interest or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as provided in (b) [which allows client consent to cure conflicts in certain circumstances].\n \n    Ga. R.P.C. 1.7(c) makes it clear, however, that client consent to cure a conflict of interest is \"not permissible if the representation . . . (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\" \n \n    When a lawyer agrees to handle an unknown and indeterminable amount of work for a fixed fee, inadequate compensation and work overload may result. In turn, such effects could not only short-change competent and diligent representation of clients but generate a conflict between the lawyer's own personal and economic interests in earning a livelihood and maintaining the practice and effectively and competently representing the assigned clients. See Comment [6] to Rule 1.7: \"The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.\" \n \n    As other state bar ethics opinions have concluded, this situation does not lend itself to hard and fast categorical answers. Nothing in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct would forbid such a fee agreement per se. But \"it is clear that a lawyer may not accept a fixed fee arrangement if that will induce the lawyer to curtail providing competent and diligent representation of proper scope and exercising independent professional judgment.\"Michigan Bar Ethics Opinion RI-343 (January 25, 2008). Whether the acceptance of a fixed fee for an indeterminate amount of legal work poses an unacceptable risk that it will cause a violation of the lawyer's obligation to his or her clients cannot be answered in the abstract. It requires a judgment of the lawyer in the particular situation. \n \n    A structural factor tends to militate against an outsized risk of compromising the ability of the lawyer to provide an acceptable quality of legal representation in these circumstances just as it did in the last. The indemnity obligation means the insurer must bear the judgment-related financial risk up to the policy limits. Hence, \"the duty to indemnify encourages insurers to defend prudently.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> A liability insurer helps itself - not just its insured - by spending wisely on the defense of cases if it is liable for the judgment on a covered claim. Coupled with the lawyer's own professional obligation to provide competent representation in each case, this factor lessens the danger that the fixed fee will be set at so low a rate as to compromise appropriate representation of insureds by lawyers retained for this purpose by the insurer. \n \n3. A third-party offers to retain a lawyer or law firm to provide an indeterminate amount of legal work for an indeterminate number of clients where the third-party paying for the legal service has an obligation to furnish the assistance of counsel to those who will be clients of the lawyer but does not have a direct stake in the outcome of any representation. \n \n    A situation where a third party that will not be harmed directly itself by the result of the lawyer's representation is compensating the lawyer with a fixed fee to provide an indeterminate amount of legal services to the clients of the lawyer may present an unacceptable risk that the workload and compensation will compromise the competent and diligent representation of those clients. Examples might be a legal aid society that contracts with an outside lawyer to handle all civil cases of a particular type for a set fee for low-income or indigent clients or a governmental or private entity that contracts with independent contractor lawyers to provide legal representation to certain indigent criminal defendants. \n \n    In contrast to the earlier sets of circumstances, several structural factors that might ameliorate the danger of the arrangement resulting in an unmanageable work load and inadequate compensation that could compromise the legal representation are absent in this situation. First, and most obviously, there is a disconnection between the adequacy of the legal service rendered and an impact on the one paying for the legal representation. The one paying for the legal services is neither the client itself nor one obligated to indemnify the client and who therefore bears a judgment-related risk. While the third-party payor is in a position to monitor the adequacy of the legal representation it provides through the lawyers it engages and has an interest in assuring effective representation, it does not bear the same risk of inadequate representation as the client itself in situation No. 1 or the liability insurer in situation No. 2. \n \n    Second, and perhaps less obviously, this last situation is fraught with even greater risk from indeterminacy if there is no ceiling set on the number of cases that can be assigned and there is no provision for adjusting the agreed-upon compensation if the volume of cases or the demands of certain cases turns out to far exceed what was contemplated. Sheer workload can compromise the quality of legal services whatever the arrangement for compensation. But, where the payment is set at a fixed annual fee rather than on a fixed fee per case basis, the ability of the lawyer to staff up to handle a greater-than-expected volume with increased revenue is removed. \n \n    Accordingly, as compared to the other examples, the risk that inadequate compensation and case overload may eventually compromise the adequacy of the legal representation is heightened in these circumstances. A lawyer entering into such a contract must assess carefully the likelihood that such an arrangement in actual operation, if not on its face, will pose significant risks of non-compliance with Ga. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.8(f) or 1.7. \n \n    In this regard, a fee arrangement that is so seriously inadequate that it systematically threatens to undermine the ability of the lawyer to deliver competent legal services is not a reasonable fee. Ga. R.P.C. 1.5 Comment [3] warns that:\n \n    An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required. . . .\n \n   And Comment [1] to Ga. R.P.C. 1.3 reminds that \"A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that each matter can be handled adequately.\" \n \n   A failure to assess realistically at the outset the volume of cases and the adequacy of the compensation and to make an informed judgment about the lawyer's ability to render competent and diligent representation to the clients under the agreement could also result in prohibited conflicts of interest under Ga. R. P.C. 1.7(a). If an un-capped caseload or under-compensation forces a lawyer to underserve some clients by limiting preparation <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\"> [5] </a> and advocacy in order to handle adequately the representation of other clients or the fixed fee systematically confronts the lawyer with choosing between the lawyer's own economic interests and the adequate representation of clients a conflict of interest is present. Ga. R. P. C. 1.7 (c) makes it clear that a conflict that renders it \"reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the effected clients \"cannot be under-taken or continued, even with client consent. \n \n   It is not possible in the abstract to say categorically whether any particular agreement by a lawyer to provide legal services in this third situation violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. However, arrangements that obligate lawyers to handle an unknown and indeterminate number of cases without any ceiling on case volume or any off-setting increase in compensation due to the case volume carry very significant risks that competent and diligent representation of clients may be compromised and that the lawyer's own interests or duties to another client will adversely affect the representation. Lawyers contemplating entering into such arrangements need to give utmost attention to these concerns and exercise a most considered judgment about the likelihood that the contractual obligations that they will be accepting can be satisfied in a manner fully consistent with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer faced with a representation that will result in the violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct must decline or terminate it, Ga. R. P. C. 1.16(a)(1) <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\"> [6] </a> , unless ordered by a court to continue. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\"> [7] </a> \n \n <a name=\"ftn1\"> 1. </a> Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion KBA E - 368 (July 1994). This opinion prohibiting per se lawyers from entering into set flat fee contracts to do all of a liability insurer's defense work was adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in American Insurance Association v. Kentucky Bar Association , 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996). The result and rationale are strongly criticized by Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle Over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 Conn. Ins. L. J. 205 (1997-98). \n \n <a name=\"ftn2\"> 2. </a> Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 98-2 (June 18, 1998) (An attorney may accept a set fee per case from an insurance company to defend all of the insurer's third party insurance defense work unless the attorney concludes that her independent professional judgment will be affected by the agreement); Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct Ethics Opinion 86-13 (February 11, 1987) (agreement to provide specific professional services for a fixed fee is not improper where service is inherently capable of being stated and circumscribed and any additional professional services that become necessary will be compensated at attorney's regular hourly rate.); Michigan Bar Ethics Opinion RI-343 (January 25, 2008) (Not a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to contract with an insurance company to represent its insureds on a fixed fee basis, so long as the arrangement does not adversely affect the lawyer's independent professional judgment and the lawyer represents the insured with competence and diligence.); New Hampshire Bar Association  Formal Ethics Opinion 1990-91|5 (Fixed fee for insurance defense work is not per se prohibited; but attorney, no matter what the fee arrangement, is duty bound to act with diligence.); Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Opinion 97-7 (December 5, 1997) (Fixed fee agreement to do all of liability insurer's defense work must provide reasonable and adequate compensation. The set fee must not be so inadequate that it compromises the attorney's professional obligations as a competent and zealous advocate); Oregon State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion No. 2005-98 (Lawyer may enter flat fee per case contract to represent insureds but this does not limit, in any way lawyer's obligations to each client to render competent and diligent representation. \"Lawyer owes same duty to 'flat fee' clients that lawyer would own to any other client.\"\"Lawyers may not accept a fee so low as to compel the conclusion that insurer was seeking to shirk its duties to insureds and to enlist lawyer's assistance in doing so.\"); Wisconsin State Bar Ethics Opinion E-83-15 (Fixed fee for each case of insurance defense is permissible; attorney reminded of duty to represent a client both competently and zealously.) \n \n <a name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> . Rule 5.4(c) similarly commands that:  \"A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.\" \n \n <a name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> . Silver, note 1 at 236. \n \n <a name=\"ftn5\"> 5 </a> . Ga. R. P. C. 1.1 requires that a lawyer \"provide competent representation to a client.\"Comment [5] spells out the thoroughness and preparation that a lawyer must put forth, noting that \"[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation . (emphasis added). \n \n <a name=\"ftn6\"> 6 </a> . See ABA Formal Opinion 06-441 (May 2006) titled \"Ethical Obligations of Lawyers Who Represent Indigent Criminal Defendants When Excessive Caseloads Interfere With Competent and Diligent Representation,\"suggesting that if a caseload becomes too burdensome for a lawyer to handle competently and ethically the lawyer \"must decline to accept new cases rather than withdraw from existing cases if the acceptance of a new case will result in her workload becoming excessive.\" \n \n <a name=\"ftn7\"> 7 </a> . \". . . When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.\"Ga. R. P. C. 1.16(c). \n \n    The second publication of this opinion appeared in the June 2011 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about June 6, 2011. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on June 23, 2011. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. \n ","UrlName":"rule536","Order":80,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d0f6cc2e-d9eb-4fa2-823c-4b4489dcb26e","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 13-1","Content":"FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 13-1 Approved And Issued On September 22, 2014 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order of The Supreme Court Of Georgia <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-131.pdf?sfvrsn=1ef116f6_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S14U0705</a>                                                     QUESTIONS PRESENTED : 1.    Does a Lawyer <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct when he/she conducts a “witness only” real estate closing? 2.    Can a Lawyer who is closing a real estate transaction meet his/her obligations under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by reviewing, revising as necessary, and adopting documents sent from a lender or from other sources? 3.    Must all funds received by a Lawyer in a real estate closing be deposited into and disbursed from the Lawyer’s trust account? SUMMARY ANSWER : 1.    A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a “witness only” closing. Unless parties to a transaction are handling it pursuant to Georgia’s pro se exemption, Georgia law requires that a Lawyer handle a real estate closing (see O.C.G.A § 15-19-50, UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> . When handling a real estate closing in Georgia a Lawyer does not absolve himself/herself from violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by claiming that he/she has acted only as a witness and not as an attorney. (See UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1). 2.    The closing Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction, resolve any errors in the paperwork, detect and resolve ambiguities in title or title defects, and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer conducting a real estate closing may use documents prepared by others after ensuring their accuracy, making necessary revisions, and adopting the work. 3.    A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disburse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer. (See Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(II) and Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1). OPINION:     A “witness only” closing occurs when an individual presides over the execution of deeds of conveyance and other closing documents but purports to do so merely as a witness and notary, not as someone who is practicing law. (UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2). In order to protect the public from those not properly trained or qualified to render these services, Lawyers are required to “be in control of the closing process from beginning to end.” (Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-3). A Lawyer who purports to handle a closing in the limited role of a witness violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.     In recent years many out-of-state lenders, including some of the largest banking institutions in the country, have changed the way they manage the real estate transactions they fund. The following practices of these lenders have been reported. These national lenders hire attorneys who agree to serve the limited role of presiding over the execution of the documents (i.e., “witness only” closings). In advance of a “witness only” closing an attorney typically receives “signing instructions” and a packet of documents prepared by the lender or at the lender’s direction. The instructions specifically warn the attorney NOT to review the documents or give legal advice to any of the parties to the transaction. The “witness only” attorney obtains the appropriate signatures on the documents, notarizes them, and returns them by mail to the lender or to a third party entity.     The Lawyer’s failure to review closing documents can facilitate foreclosure fraud, problems with title, and other errors that may not be detected until years later when the owner of a property attempts to refinance, sell or convey it.     A Lawyer must provide competent representation and must exercise independent professional judgment in rendering advice. (Rules 1.1 and 2.1, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct). When a Lawyer agrees to serve as a mere figurehead, so that it appears there is a Lawyer “handling” a closing, the Lawyer violates his/her obligations under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 8.4). The Lawyer’s acceptance of the closing documents or signature on the closing statement is the imprimatur of a successful transaction. Because UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and the Supreme Court Order adopting it require (subject to the pro se exception) that only a Lawyer can close a real estate transaction, the Lawyer signing the closing statement or accepting the closing documents would be found to be doing so in his or her capacity as a Lawyer. Therefore, when a closing Lawyer purports to act merely as a witness, this is a misrepresentation of the Lawyer’s role in the transaction. Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(4) provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in “conduct involving . . . misrepresentation.”     The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct allow Lawyers to outsource both legal and nonlegal work. (See ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 08-451.) A Lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by receiving documents from the client or elsewhere for use in a closing transaction, even though the Lawyer has not supervised the preparation of the documents. However, the Lawyer is responsible for utilizing these documents in compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, and must review and adopt work used in a closing. Georgia law allows a title insurance company or other persons to examine records of title to real property, prepare abstracts of title, and issue related insurance. (O.C.G.A. § 15-19-53). Other persons may provide attorneys with paralegal and clerical services, so long as “at all times the attorney receiving the information or services shall maintain full professional and direct responsibility to his clients for the information and services received.” (O.C.G.A. § 15-19-54; also see UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and Rules 5.3 and 5.5, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct).     The obligation to review, revise, approve and adopt documents used in a real estate closing applies to the entire series of events that comprise a closing. (Formal Advisory Opinions No. 86-5 and 00-3, and UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2). While the Supreme Court has not explicitly enumerated what all of those events are, they may include, but not be limited to: (i) rendering an opinion as to title and the resolution of any defects in marketable title; (ii) preparation of deeds of conveyance, including warranty deeds, quitclaim deeds, deeds to secure debt, and mortgage deeds; (iii) overseeing and participating in the execution of instruments conveying title; (iv) supervising the recordation of documents conveying title; and (v) in those situations where the Lawyer receives funds, depositing and disbursing those funds in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). Even if some of these steps are performed elsewhere, the Lawyer maintains full professional and direct responsibility for the entire transaction and for the services rendered to the client.     Finally, as in any transaction in which a Lawyer receives client funds, a Lawyer must comply with Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(II) when handling a real estate closing. If the Lawyer receives funds on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity he/she must deposit the funds into, and administer them from, a trust account in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). (Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1). It should be noted that Georgia law also allows the lender to disburse funds. (O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13(a)(10)). A Lawyer violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct when he/she delivers closing proceeds to a title company or to a third party settlement company for disbursement instead of depositing them into and disbursing them from an attorney escrow account. __________________________________________________ <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1. </a> Bar Rule 1.0(j) provides that “Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its Rules to practice law in the State of Georgia, including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2. </a> The result is to exclude Nonlawyers as defined by Bar Rule 1.0(k), Domestic Lawyers as defined by Bar Rule 1.0(d), and Foreign Lawyers as defined by Bar Rule 1.0(f), from the real estate closing process.","UrlName":"rule572","Order":81,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0607ab69-dce9-40fe-943c-d25edbc1a458","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 13-2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON OCTOBER 23, 2013 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 13-2 \n<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=33056\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S14U0706</a> \n QUESTIONS PRESENTED: \n<ol> \n <li>May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?</li> \n <li>May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?</li> \n</ol>\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n<ol> \n <li>A lawyer may not ethically agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such agreements violate Rule 1.8(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from providing financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation.</li> \n <li>Further, a lawyer may not seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such conduct violates Rule 8.4(a)(1) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from knowingly inducing another lawyer to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n</ol>\n OPINION: \nLawyers often represent clients in civil actions, such as personal injury or medical malpractice, who have incurred substantial medical bills as a result of their injuries. These lawyers are required to work diligently to obtain a fair settlement for these clients. Obtaining a settlement or judgment can sometimes take years.\nThe proper disbursement of settlement proceeds is a tremendous responsibility for a lawyer who receives such proceeds. Clients are often in need of funds from the settlement. Lawyers need payment for their services. And third persons such as medical providers, insurance carriers, or Medicare and Medicaid seek reimbursement of their expenses from the settlement.\n Increasingly, lawyers who represent plaintiffs are being asked to personally indemnify the opposing party and counsel from claims by third persons to the settlement proceeds. Lawyers are concerned not only about whether it is ethical to enter into such an agreement but also whether it is ethical to seek to require other lawyers to enter into such an agreement. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> \n 1. A lawyer may not ethically agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. \nThe first issue is governed by Rule 1.8(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as follows:\n“A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n1. a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or\n2. a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.”\nComment 4 provides further guidance:\n“Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above.”\n Financial assistance can take many forms. Such assistance includes gifts, loans and loan guarantees. Any type of guarantee to cover a client’s debts constitutes financial assistance. Rule 1.8(e) provides narrow exceptions to the prohibition on a lawyer providing financial assistance to a client in connection with litigation. Those exceptions do not apply when a lawyer enters into a personal indemnification agreement. Because a lawyer, under Rule 1.8(e), may not provide financial assistance to a client by, for example, paying or advancing the client’s medical expenses in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, it follows that a lawyer may not agree, either voluntarily or at the insistence of the client or parties being released, to guarantee or accept ultimate responsibility for such expenses. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> \n Moreover, any insistence by a client that the lawyer accept a settlement offer containing an indemnification agreement on the part of the lawyer might require the lawyer to withdraw from the representation. The lawyer may otherwise be in violation of Rule 1.16(a)(1), which provides that “a lawyer shall … withdraw from the representation of a client if … the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> \n 2. A lawyer may not seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. \n The second issue is governed by Rule 8.4(a)(1), which provides that “It shall be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to … violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.” (emphasis added). Comment 1 to Rule 8.4 also provides direction:\n“The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevent a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer cannot.”\n<blockquote style=\"margin-left: 80px\"></blockquote>\n In light of the conclusion that plaintiff’s counsel may not agree to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third parties, it is also improper for a lawyer representing a defendant to seek to require that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third parties to the settlement funds. Nor can the lawyer representing the defendant avoid such a violation by instructing his client or the insurance company to propose or demand the indemnification. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> \n_______________________________________________\n <a name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> .This opinion is intended to address the ethical concerns associated with a lawyer’s agreement to indemnify. This opinion does not address the legal or ethical issues involved in the disbursement of settlement funds.\n\n <a name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> . This opinion is consistent with advisory opinions from other states holding that an agreement by a client’s lawyer to guarantee a client’s obligations to third parties amounts to guaranteeing financial assistance to the client, in violation of Rule 1.8(e) or its equivalent. See, e.g. , Alabama State Bar Ethics Opinion RO 2011-01; Arizona State Bar Ethics Opinion 03-05; Delaware State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 2011-1; Florida Bar Staff Opinion 30310 (2011); Illinois State Bar Association Advisory Opinion 06-01 (violation of Illinois Rule 1.8(d), which is similar to Rule 1.8(e)); Indiana State Bar Association Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1 of 2005 (non-Medicare and Medicaid settlement agreement that requires counsel to indemnify opposing party from subrogation liens and third-party claims violates Indiana rules); Maine Ethics Opinion 204 (2011); Missouri Formal Advisory Opinion 125 (2008); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics Formal Opinion 2010-3; Supreme Court of Ohio Opinion 2011-1; Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee Opinion 2011-6 (2012); South Carolina Ethics Advisory Opinion 08-07; Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion 11-01; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1858 (2011); Washington State Bar Association Advisory Opinion 1736 (1997); Wisconsin Formal Opinion E-87-11 (1998).\n\nMany of these jurisdictions also hold that an agreement to guarantee a client’s obligations to third parties also violates Rule 1.7(a) or its equivalent regarding conflicts of interest. In reaching its decision, the Board does not consider it necessary to address that issue here.\n <a name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> .The mere suggestion by the client that the lawyer guarantee or indemnify against claims would not require withdrawal by the lawyer, only the client’s demand that the lawyer do so would require withdrawal. See Rule 1.16(a)(1) (“A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.”).\n\n <a name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> .This opinion is consistent with advisory opinions from other states holding that a lawyer’s demand that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third parties to the settlement funds violates Rule 8.4(a)(1) or its equivalent. See, e.g. , Alabama State Bar Ethics Opinion RO 2011-01; Florida Bar Staff Opinion 30310 (2011); Missouri Formal Advisory Opinion 125 (2008); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics Formal Opinion 2010-3; Supreme Court of Ohio Opinion 2011-1; Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion 11-01; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1858 (2011)). \n \n\n The second publication of this opinion appeared in the December 2013 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about December 19, 2013. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on January 21, 2014. No review was requested within the 20-day review period. On March 28, 2014, the Supreme Court of Georgiai issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.","UrlName":"rule569","Order":82,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d9515c0b-e7cb-489c-937b-a0a3195f0368","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD PURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON JULY 25, 2016 FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16-1 (Redrafted Version of FAO No. 03-2) <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-161.pdf?sfvrsn=e4dc72e3_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S16U1765</a>                                                     QUESTION PRESENTED: Does the obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, apply as between two jointly represented clients? SUMMARY ANSWER: The obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, applies as between two jointly represented clients. An attorney must honor one client’s request that information be kept confidential from the other jointly represented client. Honoring the client’s request will, in almost all circumstances, require the attorney to withdraw from the joint representation. OPINION: Unlike the attorney-client privilege, jointly represented clients do not lose the protection of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, as to each other by entering into the joint representation. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, Opinion No. 296 (2000) and Committee on Professional Ethics, New York State Bar Association, Opinion No. 555 (1984). Nor do jointly represented clients impliedly consent to a sharing of confidences with each other.When one client in a joint representation requests that some information relevant to the representation be kept confidential from the other client, the attorney must honor the request and then determine if continuing with the representation while honoring the request will: a) be inconsistent with the lawyer’s obligations to keep the other client informed under Rule 1.4, Communication; b) materially and adversely affect the representation of the other client under Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule; or c) both.The lawyer has discretion to continue with the joint representation while not revealing the confidential information to the other client only to the extent that he or she can do so consistent with these rules. If maintaining the confidence will constitute a violation of Rule 1.4 or Rule 1.7, as it almost certainly will, the lawyer should maintain the confidence and discontinue the joint representation. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> Consent to conflicting representations, of course, is permitted under Rule 1.7. Consent to continued joint representation in these circumstances, however, ordinarily would not be available either because it would be impossible to obtain the required informed consent without disclosing the confidential information in question <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> or because consent is not permitted under Rule 1.7 in that the continued joint representation would “involve circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.” Rule 1.7 (c) (3).The potential problems that confidentiality can create between jointly represented clients make it especially important that clients understand the requirements of a joint representation prior to entering into one. When an attorney is considering a joint representation, informed consent of the clients, confirmed in writing, is required prior to the representation “if there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s . . . duties to [either of the jointly represented clients] . . . will materially and adversely affect the representation of [the other] client.” Rule 1.7. Whether or not informed consent is required, however, a prudent attorney will always discuss with clients wishing to be jointly represented the need for sharing confidences between them, obtain their consent to such sharing, and inform them of the consequences of either client’s nevertheless insisting on confidentiality as to the other client and, in effect, revoking the consent. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> If it appears to the attorney that either client is uncomfortable with the required sharing of confidential information that joint representation requires, the attorney should reconsider whether joint representation is appropriate in the circumstances. If a putative jointly represented client indicates a need for confidentiality from another putative jointly represented client, then it is very likely that joint representation is inappropriate and the putative clients need individual representation by separate attorneys.The above guidelines, derived from the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and consistent with the primary advisory opinions from other jurisdictions, are general in nature. There is no doubt that their application in some specific contexts will create additional specific concerns seemingly unaddressed in the general ethical requirements. We are, however, without authority to depart from the Rules of Professional Conduct that are intended to be generally applicable to the profession. For example, there is no doubt that the application of these requirements to the joint representation of spouses in estate planning will sometimes place attorneys in the awkward position of having to withdraw from a joint representation of spouses because of a request by one spouse to keep relevant information confidential from the other and, by withdrawing, not only ending trusted lawyer-client relationships but also essentially notifying the other client that an issue of confidentiality has arisen. See, e.g., Florida State Bar Opinion 95-4 (1997) (“The attorney may not reveal confidential information to the wife when the husband tells the attorney that he wishes to provide for a beneficiary that is unknown to the wife. The attorney must withdraw from the representation of both husband and wife because of the conflict presented when the attorney must maintain the husband’s separate confidences regarding the joint representation.”) A large number of highly varied recommendations have been made about how to deal with these specific concerns in this specific practice setting. See, e.g., Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses , 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1253 (1994); and, Collett, And The Two Shall Become As One . . . Until The Lawyers Are Done , 7 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics &Public Policy 101 (1993) for discussion of these recommendations. Which recommendations are followed, we believe, is best left to the practical wisdom of the good lawyers practicing in this field so long as the general ethical requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct as described in this Opinion are met.___________________________________________<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7, cmt. 31 (“As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation.”)<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> See GEORGIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.0(h) (defining “informed consent” as “the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct”); see also id ., cmt. 6 (“The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client’s or other person’s options and alternatives.”)<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7, cmt. 31 (advising that “[a] lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other). The second publication of this opinion appeared in the June 2016 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about June 7. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on July 1, 2016. No review was requested within the 20-day review period. On July 25, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.  ","UrlName":"rule590","Order":83,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9b253c5e-3f55-491e-8e49-20b048a5a176","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION 16-2 Approved And Issued On April 16, 2018 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-162.pdf?sfvrsn=4ea19b8c_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S17U0553</a> QUESTION PRESENTED: May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? SUMMARY ANSWER: When it becomes clear that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the child's wishes and the attorney's considered opinion of the child's best interests, the attorney must withdraw from his or her role as the child's guardian ad litem. OPINION: Relevant Rules This question squarely implicates several of Georgia's Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly, Rule 1.14.  Rule 1.14, dealing with an attorney's ethical duties towards a child or other client with diminished capacity, provides that \"the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.\"Comment 1 to Rule 1.14 goes on to note that \"children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> This question also involves Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation, and Rule 1.7, governing conflicts of interest. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> Comment 2 to Rule 1.7 indicates that \"[l]oyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests.  The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> This situation also implicates Rule 3.7, the lawyer as a witness, to the extent that the guardian ad litem must testify and may need to advise the court of the conflict between the child's expressed wishes and what he deems the best interests of the child.  Finally, Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, may also be violated if the attorney presents the disagreement to the Court.Statutory Background Georgia law requires the appointment of an attorney for a child as the child's counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> The statute also provides that the court shall additionally appoint a guardian ad litem for the child, and that the child's counsel is eligible to serve as the guardian ad litem unless there is a conflict of interest between the lawyer’s duty as an attorney for the child and the lawyer’s “considered opinion” of the child’s best interest as the guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\"> [5] </a> In addition to the child's statutory right to counsel, a child in a termination of parental rights proceedings also has a federal constitutional right to counsel. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\"> [6] </a> In Georgia, a guardian ad litem's role is \"to protect the interests of the child and to investigate and present evidence to the court on the child's behalf.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\"> [7] </a> The best interests of the child standard is paramount in considering changes or termination of parental custody.  See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 276 Ga. 372, 377 (2003) (\"[t]he paramount concern in any change of custody must be the best interests and welfare of the minor child \").  The Georgia Court of Appeals held in In re A.P. based on the facts of that case that the attorney-guardian ad litem dual representation provided for under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(a) (the predecessor to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d)) does not result in an inherent conflict of interest, given that \"the fundamental duty of both a guardian ad litem and an attorney is to act in the best interests of the [child]. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn8\"> [8] </a> This advisory opinion is necessarily limited to the ethical obligations of an attorney once a conflict of interest in the representation has already arisen.  Therefore, we need not address whether or not the dual representation provided for under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d) results in an inherent conflict of interest. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn9\"> [9] </a> Discussion The child's attorney's first responsibility is to his or her client. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn10\"> [10] </a> Rule 1.2 makes clear that an attorney in a normal attorney-client relationship is bound to defer to a client's wishes regarding the ultimate objectives of the representation. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn11\"> [11] </a> Rule 1.14 requires the attorney to maintain, \"as far as reasonably possible . . . a normal client-lawyer relationship with the [child]. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn12\"> [12] </a> An attorney who \"reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest \"may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn13\"> [13] </a> Importantly, the Rule does not simply direct the attorney to act in the client's best interests, as determined solely by the attorney.  At the point that the attorney concludes that the child's wishes and best interests are in conflict, the attorney must petition the court for removal as the child's guardian ad litem.  The attorney must consider Rule 1.6 before disclosing any confidential client information other than that there is a conflict which requires such removal.  If the conflict between the attorney's view of the child's best interests and the child's view of his or her own interests is severe, the attorney may seek to withdraw entirely under Rule 1.16(b)(3). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn14\"> 14 </a> The attorney may not withdraw as the child's counsel and then seek appointment as the child's guardian ad litem, as the child would then be a former client to whom the former attorney/guardian ad litem would owe a continuing duty of confidentiality. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn15\"> 15 </a> This conclusion is in accord with many other states. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn16\"> 16 </a> For instance, Ohio permits an attorney to be appointed both as a child's counsel and as the child's guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn17\"> 17 </a> Ohio ethics rules prohibit continued service in the dual roles when there is a conflict between the attorney's determination of best interests and the child's express wishes. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn18\"> 18 </a> Court rules and applicable statutes require the court to appoint another person as guardian ad litem for the child. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn19\"> 19 </a> An attorney who perceives a conflict between his role as counsel and as guardian ad litem is expressly instructed to notify the court of the conflict and seek withdrawal as guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn20\"> 20 </a> This solution (withdrawal from the guardian ad litem role once it conflicts with the role as counsel) is in accord with an attorney's duty to the client. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn21\"> 21 </a> Connecticut's Bar Association provided similar advice to its attorneys, and Connecticut's legislature subsequently codified that position into law. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn22\"> 22 </a> Similarly, in Massachusetts, an attorney representing a child must represent the child's expressed preferences, assuming that the child is reasonably able to make \"an adequately considered decision . . . even if the attorney believes the child's position to be unwise or not in the child's best interest. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn23\"> 23 </a> Even if a child is unable to make an adequately considered decision, the attorney still has the duty to represent the child's expressed preferences unless doing so would \"place the child at risk of substantial harm. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn24\"> 24 </a> In New Jersey, a court-appointed attorney needs to be \"a zealous advocate for the wishes of the client . . . unless the decisions are patently absurd or pose an undue risk of harm. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn25\"> 25 </a> New Jersey's Supreme Court was skeptical that an attorney's duty of advocacy could be successfully reconciled with concern for the client's best interests. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn26\"> 26 </a> In contrast, other states have developed a \"hybrid \"model for attorneys in child custody cases serving simultaneously as counsel for the child and as their guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn27\"> 27 </a> This \"hybrid \"approach \"necessitates a modified application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn28\"> 28 </a> That is, the states following the hybrid model, acknowledge the \"'hybrid' nature of the role of attorney/guardian ad litem which necessitates a modified application of the Rules of Professional Conduct,\"excusing strict adherence to those rules. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn29\"> 29 </a> The attorney under this approach is bound by the client's best interests, not the client's expressed interests. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn30\"> 30 </a> The attorney must present the child's wishes and the reasons the attorney disagrees to the court. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn31\"> 31 </a> Although acknowledging that this approach has practical benefits, we conclude that strict adherence to the Rules of Professional Conduct is the sounder approach.Conclusion At the point that the attorney concludes that the child's wishes and best interests are in conflict, the attorney must petition the court for removal as the child's guardian ad litem and must consider Rule 1.6 before disclosing any confidential client information other than that there is a conflict which requires such removal.  If the conflict between the attorney's view of the child's best interests and the child's view of his or her own interests is severe, the attorney may seek to withdraw entirely following Rule 1.16(b)(3).________________________________________<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14, Comment 1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.2, 1.7. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, Comment 4. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(b) (“The court shall appoint an attorney for a child in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The appointment shall be made as soon as practicable to ensure adequate representation of such child and, in any event, before the first court hearing that may substantially affect the interests of such child”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn5\"> 5 </a> O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d) (“The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child in a termination proceeding; provided, however, that such guardian ad litem may be the same person as the child's attorney unless or until there is a conflict of interest between the attorney's duty to such child as such child's attorney and the attorney's considered opinion of such child's best interests as guardian ad litem”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn6\"> 6 </a> Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359-61 (N.D. Ga. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 2010 WL 1558980 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2010). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn7\"> 7 </a> See Padilla v. Melendez, 228 Ga. App. 460, 462 (1997). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ft87\"> 8 </a> In re A.P., 291 Ga. App. 690, 691 (2008). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn9\"> 9 </a> See, e.g., Wis. Ethics Op. E-89-13 (finding no inherent conflict of interest with the dual representation of an attorney and guardian but concluding that if a conflict does arise based on specific facts, the attorney's ethical responsibility is to resign as the guardian). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn10\"> 10 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn11\"> 11 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2, Comment 1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn12\"> 12 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn13\"> 13 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn14\"> 14 </a> Rule 1.16 (b)(3) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a lawyer may seek to withdraw if “the client insists upon pusuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn15\"> 15 </a> See Rule 1.6(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn16\"> 16 </a> See, e.g., Wis. Ethics Op. E-89-13, Conflicts of Interests; Guardians (1989) (providing that dual representation as counsel and guardian ad litem is permitted until conflict between the roles occurs, and then the attorney must petition the court for a new guardian ad litem); Ariz. Ethics Op. 86-13, Juvenile Proceedings; Guardians (1986) (providing that a \"lawyer may serve as counsel and guardian ad litem for a minor child in a dependency proceeding so long as there is no conflict between the child's wishes and the best interests of the child \"). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn17\"> 17 </a> Ohio Board of Comm'rs. on Griev. and Discipline, Op. 2006-5, 2006 WL 2000108, at*1 (2006). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn18\"> 18 </a> Id. at *2. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn19\"> 19 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn20\"> 20 </a> Id., quoting In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St. 3d 229, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985) (superseded by statute on other grounds). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn21\"> 21 </a> Id. See also Baxter, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 232 (\"[w]hen an attorney is appointed to represent a person and is also appointed guardian ad litem for that person, his first and highest duty is to zealously represent his client within the bounds of the law and to champion his client's cause \"). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn22\"> 22 </a> See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, CT Eth. Op. 94-29, 1994 WL 780846, at *3 (1994); In re Tayquon, 821 A.2d 796, 803-04 (Conn. App. 2003) (discussing revisions to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-129a). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn23\"> 23 </a> See Mass Comm. For Public Counsel Servs., Performance Standards, Standard 1.6(b), at 8-10, available at http://www.publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_manual/private_counsel_manual_pdf/chapters/chapter_4_sections/civil/trial_panel_standards.pdf; See also In re Georgette, 785 N.E.2d 356, 368 (Mass. 2003). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn24\"> 24 </a> Mass Comm. For Public Counsel Servs., Performance Standards, Standard 1.6(d) at 11. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn25\"> 25 </a> In re Mason, 701 A.2d 979, 982 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (internal citations omitted). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn26\"> 26 </a> See In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1285 (N.J. 1994). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn27\"> 27 </a> See Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 153-54 (Wyo. 1998); In re Marriage of Rolfe, 216 Mont. 39, 51-53, 699 P.2d 79, 86-87 (Mont. 1985); In re Christina W., 639 S.E.2d at 777 (requiring the guardian to give the child's opinions consideration \"where the child has demonstrated an adequate level of competency [but] there is no requirement that the child's wishes govern.\"); see also Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 390 (Alaska 1977) (\"[I]t is equally plain that the guardian is not required to advocate whatever placement might seem preferable to a client of tender years.\") (superseded by statute on other grounds); Alaska Bar Assn Ethics Committee Op. 85-4 (November 8, 1985)(concluding that duty of confidentiality is modified in order to effectuate the child's best interests); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee Op. No. 07-02 (June 7, 2007) (noting that Utah statute requires a guardian ad litem to notify the Court if the minor's wishes differ from the attorney's determination of best interests). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn28\"> 28 </a> Clark, 953 P.2d at 153. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn29\"> 29 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn30\"> 30 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn31\"> 31 </a> Id. at 153-54; Rolfe, 699 P.2d at 87. <div></div> </div>","UrlName":"rule600","Order":84,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"53dcc89b-edd1-496d-a18f-a08bc17059cc","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-3","Content":"STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD PURSUANT TO BAR RULE 4-403 ON JUNE 14, 2016 FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16-3 (Proposed FAO No. 15-R1) <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-163.pdf?sfvrsn=f384af46_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S17U0554</a>QUESTION PRESENTED: May a sole practitioner <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[1] </a>use a firm name that includes “group,” “firm,” “& Associates”?SUMMARY ANSWER: A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “& Associates” because both terms would incorrectly imply that the sole practitioner practices with other lawyers. However, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.”OPINION: The question presented is governed by Rules 7.1 and 7.5 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 7.5(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.” Rule 7.1(a), in turn, provides that advertisements about a lawyer’s services may not be “false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading.” A firm name is a form of advertising about a lawyer’s services, and so a firm name may not be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading either. Rule 7.5 Comment [1]. In addition, Rule 7.5(d) provides that a firm name may state or imply that a lawyer “practice[s] in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.”In applying these rules to the question presented, the Board is mindful that lawyer advertising is commercial speech that is entitled to some protection by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. , 433 U.S. 350 (1977); In re Robbins , 266 Ga. 681 (1996) (per curiam). Commercial speech is not entitled to absolute protection, and false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech may be freely regulated or even prohibited entirely. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. , 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio , 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985); In re Robbins , 266 Ga. at 683. Thus, there is no constitutional impediment to prohibiting names of law firms that are false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading.The question, of course, is whether a particular firm name is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. The requestor has asked only about whether the use of “group” in a sole practitioner’s firm name, such as Doe Law Group, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[2] </a>is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. Because the use of “firm” and “& Associates” in a sole practitioner’s firm name, such as Doe Law Firm and Doe & Associates, is so similar to the use of “group,” this opinion considers all three. Indeed, the Office of the General Counsel regularly receives requests for ethical guidance regarding the use of all of these terms in firm names, not just the use of “group” as the requestor has asked, and so it is appropriate to expand the scope of the requestor’s request.In determining whether it is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading for a sole practitioner to use “group” in his firm name, this opinion first considers the common dictionary definitions of this term. According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, a “group” in the business context is “a number of people who work together or share certain beliefs.” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 768 (3d ed. 2010). Merriam-Webster similarly defines “group” as “a number of individuals assembled together or having some unifying relationship.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 552 (11th ed. 2011). These common dictionary definitions of “group,” as well as the absence of a specialized definition of “group” in the context of the legal profession, lead to the conclusion that a sole practitioner may not use “group” in his firm name because this term would incorrectly imply that the firm consists of multiple lawyers. This conclusion is consistent with ethics opinions in other jurisdictions, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[3] </a>and it is also consistent with the position taken by the Office of the General Counsel when it has been presented with informal inquiries regarding the use of “group” in a sole practitioner’s firm name.A different result is required with respect to the use of “firm” in a sole practitioner’s firm name. Although there is some similarity between the meanings of “firm” and “group” in denoting the name of a business, a different result is required because the Rules define a “firm” as “a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law.” Rule 1.0(e). “This specific definition is, at least implicitly, a recognition that firms may consist of many lawyers or only a single practitioner.” D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 332 (2005).Nevertheless, it should be noted that the common dictionary definitions of “firm” are not as clear as the common dictionary definitions of “group.” The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “firm” as “a business concern, esp. one involving a partnership of two or more people; a law firm .” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY at 651. Although this definition assumes that most firms will be comprised of more than one person, it allows for the possibility that a firm will have only one person. Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines “firm” as “a partnership of two or more persons that is not recognized as a legal person distinct from the members composing it,” but it also defines “firm” as “the name or title under which a company transacts business.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 472. Even Black’s Law Dictionary is ambiguous about whether “firm” signifies more than one person. It defines “firm” both as “[t]he title under which one or more persons conduct business jointly” and as “[t]he association by which persons are united for business purposes.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (10th ed. 2014). Thus, unlike “group,” “firm” is not necessarily pluralistic.The definition of “firm” in the Rules means that it is not false or untruthful for a sole practitioner to use a firm name that includes “firm.” But because an accurate firm name still may be deceptive or misleading, this opinion must consider whether a firm name such as Doe Law Firm is deceptive or misleading when Doe is a sole practitioner. This name is not inherently deceptive or misleading because it would not cause a reasonable member of the public to believe that Doe necessarily practices with other lawyers. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[4] </a>However, the use of “firm” in a sole practitioner’s firm name could be deceptive or misleading in certain contexts, and so a sole practitioner who uses “firm” in his firm name must be mindful of his obligations under Rules 7.1 and 7.5.The use of “& Associates” in a sole practitioner’s firm name, such as Doe & Associates, is a much more common issue. Whether this is proper depends on the meaning of “associate.” Generally, an associate is “a partner or colleague in business or at work” or “a person with limited or subordinate membership in an organization.” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY at 97; see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 75 (defining “associate” as “an entry-level member (as of a learned society, professional organization, or profession)”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 147 (defining “associate” as “[a] colleague or companion”). But “associate” has acquired a specific meaning in the context of the legal profession:An associate is a … lawyer-employee who is not a partner of the firm. All other non-lawyer employees are to be considered simply employees and not associates. This category of employees includes paralegals, secretaries, non-lawyer clerks, officer [sic] managers and the like. When the word associates is employed on firm letterhead or in commercial advertisement such term refers to lawyers working in the firm who are employees of the firm and not partners.Florida Bar v. Fetterman , 439 So. 2d 835, 838-39 (1983) (per curiam); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 147 (defining “associate” as “[a] junior member of an organization or profession; esp., a lawyer in a law firm, usu. with fewer than a certain number of years in practice, who may, upon achieving the requisite seniority, receive an offer to become a partner or shareholder”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[5]</a>This opinion adopts this definition. This means that a sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “& Associates” because, by definition, a sole practitioner does not have any associates. A sole practitioner also may not use “& Associates” in his firm name to refer to partners or non-lawyer employees, such as paralegals, investigators, nurse consultants, etc., because they are not associates. For the same reason, a sole practitioner also may not use “& Associates” in his firm name to refer to lawyers with whom he has an office-sharing arrangement. Thus, for a firm name that includes “& Associates” to be proper, there must be at least one lawyer who employs two or more associates. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[6] </a>For example, a firm name such as Doe & Associates is proper only if Doe is the only partner in the firm and the firm employs at least two associates. Otherwise, the name would be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading because it would incorrectly identify the number of lawyers in the firm and misrepresent the status of the firm’s lawyers and employees.This conclusion raises additional questions, and although it is not possible to foresee all questions that may arise, a couple of the more obvious ones are addressed here. First, is it proper to use “& Associates” in a firm name to refer to part-time associates, lawyers designated as “of counsel,” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[7] </a>and lawyers hired on a contract basis? The answer depends on the degree to which the lawyer practices with the firm. For example, a part-time associate who works one day every month might not qualify, but a part-time associate who works twenty-five hours every week probably would qualify. The key is not the lawyer’s title but rather whether the lawyer actively and regularly practices with the firm. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn8\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[8] </a>If the lawyer does so, he falls within the definition of “associate” quoted above, even though he may not work full-time hours and may actually be a contractor rather than an employee.Second, must a lawyer whose firm name includes “& Associates” change the name of the firm when the number of associates employed by the firm falls below two? At that time, the name of the firm has become inaccurate, but this opinion recognizes the practical difficulties associated with changing a firm’s name. When confronted with this issue, other jurisdictions have taken a flexible approach. In Minnesota, the continued use of “& Associates” in a firm name will not subject the lawyer to discipline if the requisite number of associates are hired within a reasonable amount of time or if the lawyer reasonably and objectively anticipates hiring the requisite number of associates within a reasonable amount of time. Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Resp. Bd., Op. 20 (2009). In Alabama, a disciplinary decision may depend on how long the firm has been without the requisite number of associates and what efforts have been made to hire more associates. Ala. State Bar, Off. of Gen. Couns., Formal Op. 1993-11 (1993). Similarly, in the District of Columbia, the factors considered include the frequency and duration of the firm’s time without the requisite number of associates and the extent of the efforts made to hire more associates. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 189 (1988). Ultimately, though, a law firm will have to change its name if it no longer employs at least two associates. This opinion agrees with the flexibility used in Minnesota, Alabama, and the District of Columbia, but determining whether a firm name violates Rules 7.1 or 7.5 because of hiring and firing decisions will have to be made on a case-by-case basis.Although this opinion does not consider all of the possible terminology that could be used in the name of a sole practitioner’s firm, it does establish the principle that any name implying that a firm is larger than it truly is will be considered false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading and, therefore, a violation of Rules 7.1 and 7.5.__________________1 For purposes of this opinion, a sole practitioner is a lawyer who does not have any partners and does not employ any other lawyers.2 This opinion uses Doe Law Group, Doe Law Firm, and Doe & Associates as examples of firm names implicated by the question presented. These sample names are fictitious and are not intended to refer to actual law firms or lawyers.3 It appears that there are opinions on this issue from only four other jurisdictions, and all four concluded that a firm name may include “group” only if there are two or more lawyers practicing together. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 2163 (2007); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 2121 (2006); Sup. Ct. of Ohio, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances &Discipline, Op. 2006-2 (2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 732 (2000); Mo. Bar, Informal Advisory Op. 20000142 (2000).4 Again, it appears that there are very few opinions on this issue from other jurisdictions. All of them agree that a sole practitioner may use the term “firm” in his firm name. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 869 (2011); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 332 (2005); Ala. State Bar, Off. of Gen. Couns., Formal Op. 1993-11 (1993); Iowa Sup. Ct., Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &Conduct, Op. 79-68 (1979).5 In the analogous context of interpreting a statute, “the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter.” O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(b). This principle warrants reliance on the specific definition that “associate” has acquired in the context of the legal profession rather than on its general definition.6 Almost all other state bar associations that have considered this issue, as well as the American Bar Association, agree with this conclusion. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 931 (2012); Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Resp. Bd., Op. 20 (2009); State Bar of N.M., Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Ethics Advisory Op. 2006-1 (2006); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 05-19 (2005); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 332 (2005); Sup. Ct. of Ohio, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances &Discipline, Op. 95-1 (1995); Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 138 (1994); Va. State Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 1532 (1993); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 189 (1988); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 1086 (1987); Fla. Bar, Ethics Op. 86-1 (1986); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 919 (1985); Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 93 (1984); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 178 (1984); Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-246 (1981); Okla. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 288 (1975); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 286 (1973); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 50 (1972); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 318 (1967); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 310 (1963). Two states, Alabama and Arizona, appear to allow the use of “& Associates” when there is only one associate employed by the firm. Ala. State Bar, Off. of Gen. Couns., Formal Op. 1993-11 (1993); State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 90-01 (1990). This opinion rejects this view because “& Associates,” as a plural term, obviously refers to more than one associate. Thus, the use of “& Associates” in a firm name to refer to only one associate is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. However, the use of “&Associate” would present a different question.7 See State Bar of Ga., Formal Advisory Op. 98-4 (1998) (defining what constitutes an “of counsel” relationship between a lawyer and a law firm).8 In Utah, a lawyer qualifies as an “associate” only if he “regularly spends a majority of [his] time working on legal matters for the firm.” Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 04-03 (2004). This standard is too stringent, especially in light of the fact that a lawyer in Georgia is permitted to practice in multiple law firms. State Bar of Ga., Formal Advisory Op. 97-2 (1997).The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2016 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal and was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on November 10, 2016. No petition for discretionary review was filed within the 20-day review period, and on December 8, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 4-403(d), Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-3 is an opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and is binding on the requestor and the State Bar of Georgia, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.","UrlName":"rule591","Order":85,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ef8d23f5-10fe-4c92-85da-bc1d7a5ec09a","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 20-1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 20-1 Approved On May 3, 2022 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 94-3 <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://efile.gasupreme.us/viewFiling?filingId=d3c8f438-8ff4-4397-b003-0a56b73fa577\%22 target=\"_blank\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">Supreme Court Docket No. S21U0879</a> QUESTION PRESENTED : Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. SUMMARY ANSWER : Generally, a lawyer may communicate with a former employee of an organization that is represented by counsel without obtaining that counsel’s consent, provided that the lawyer fully discloses to the former employee, before initiating the communication, the following information: (1) the identity of the lawyer’s client and the nature of that client’s interest in relation to the organization (i.e., the former employer); and (2) the reason for the communication and the essence of the information sought. After making these disclosures, the lawyer must also obtain the former employee’s consent to the communication. Furthermore, in communicating with the former employee, the lawyer must not utilize methods of obtaining information that would violate the legal rights of the former employee or the represented organization, such as inquiring into information that may be protected by the attorney-client privilege or other evidentiary privilege.Finally, if the lawyer knows or at any point determines that the former employee is individually represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer may not communicate with the former employee, unless authorized by law or court order to do so, without obtaining the former employee’s counsel’s consent. OPINION : The question presented relates to the propriety of a lawyer seeking to obtain information from a former employee of an organization that is represented by counsel. Counsel for an organizational client undoubtedly would prefer that an adverse lawyer not be permitted to communicate with former employees of the organization for the purpose of obtaining information that could be used against the organization. However, prohibiting such communications by a lawyer, without the consent of the organization's counsel, would give that counsel a right of information control that is not supported by any rule of professional conduct. Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2, commonly known as the anti-contact rule, only addresses a lawyer’s ability to communicate about the subject matter of a representation with a person who is represented by counsel in the matter. Specifically, Rule 4.2(a) provides:A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.Rule 4.2 prohibits communication with some but not all of the constituents of the organization. Comment 4A to Rule 4.2 explains which constituents fall within the rule’s anti-contact protections—In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.The Comment does not anywhere suggest that a former employee comes within Rule 4.2’s protections. The only reasonable conclusion to draw from this omission is that Rule 4.2 does not apply to former employees.That, however, does not fully address a lawyer’s ethical obligations in this context. While a lawyer may communicate with a former employee <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> of an organization without first obtaining the consent of that organization’s counsel, the lawyer must comply with Rule 4.3 and make it clear that he or she is not disinterested and explain the nature of and reasons for the communication with the former employee. In particular, the lawyer must fully disclose to the former employee, before initiating the communication, the following information: (1) the identity of the lawyer’s client and the nature of that client’s interest in relation to the organization (i.e., the former employer); and (2) the reason for the communication and the essence of the information sought. After the required disclosures are made, the lawyer must secure the former employee’s consent to the communication. If the former employee refuses to consent, the lawyer must proceed through the formal discovery process in order to obtain the desired information. The lawyer must also exercise caution in communicating with the former employee and avoid utilizing methods of obtaining information that would violate the legal rights of the former employee or the represented organization. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> In particular, the lawyer must refrain from inquiring into information that may be protected by the attorney-client privilege or some other evidentiary privilege. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> Along the same lines, before initiating the communication, the lawyer should ensure that the former employee is not personally represented by counsel in the matter.  If the lawyer knows or determines that the former employee is individually represented by counsel, the lawyer must comply with Rule 4.2 and obtain the consent of the former employee’s counsel, unless the lawyer is otherwise authorized by law or court order to make the communication.  Finally, while this opinion focuses on a lawyer communicating with a former employee of an organization that is represented by counsel, the guidance it provides is also instructive for navigating the same situation when the organization is not represented by counsel. A former employee under such circumstances likewise has a right to know the identity of the lawyer’s client and the nature of and reasons for the lawyer’s communication. Therefore, even when the organization is not represented by counsel, a lawyer should make full disclosure to the former employee as set forth in this opinion and obtain the former employee’s consent before engaging in any other communication._________________________________________<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> Rule 4.3 addresses a lawyer’s duties in dealing with an unrepresented person: In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: a. state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter,    the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and b. give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client GEORGIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 4.3 (2020) [hereinafter “GEORGIA RULES”].<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> See GEORGIA RULES, R. 4.4(a). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> See GEORGIA RULES, R. 4.4(a), cmt. [1] (“Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, butthey include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships .”) (emphasis added).  </div>","UrlName":"rule610","Order":86,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c7276add-2da8-45be-963a-23e26b88e132","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 22-1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 22-1 (Proposed FAO No. 21-R1) Approved on June 11, 2024 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://efile.gasupreme.us/viewFiling?filingId=a54f05c4-2ba1-46ff-a036-bb55ab7c3e55\%22 target=\"_blank\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">Supreme Court Docket No. S24U0609</a> (Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 21-R1) QUESTION PRESENTED: Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location? SUMMARY ANSWER: Yes, under certain conditions. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer residing and working in Georgia may provide legal services by remote means that have no relationship to Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location if: (a) the lawyer does not hold out or otherwise represent that they are licensed in Georgia; (b) the lawyer takes reasonable steps to ensure that the lawyer’s Georgia location is not generally known; and (c) the lawyer takes reasonable steps to correct any misunderstanding about the lawyer’s licensure. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> OPINION: Under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer who is licensed elsewhere but not in Georgia is defined as either a “Domestic Lawyer” or a “Foreign Lawyer.” A “Domestic Lawyer” is “a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> A “Foreign Lawyer” is “a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> The Formal Advisory Opinion Board (“FAOB”) has been asked to provide guidance about a hypothetical Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who has taken up residence in Georgia. Using telephone, email, cloud file storage, videoconferencing, and other technologies, the lawyer practices law from Georgia while residing in Georgia but provides no legal services that have any connection to Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location. The narrow question for the FAOB is whether Rule 5.5 is violated under these specific circumstances. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 sets forth the limited circumstances under which a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may provide legal services “in Georgia.” It permits Domestic Lawyers to provide in Georgia certain services on an ongoing basis for the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal or Georgia law. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\"> [5] </a> Foreign Lawyers may provide in Georgia some ongoing services for the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\"> [6] </a> Rule 5.5 also permits both Domestic and Foreign Lawyers to provide some legal services in Georgia if the services are performed on a temporary basis. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\"> [7] </a> The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not define what it means to provide legal services “in Georgia.” This Opinion concerns only hypothetical activities that have no connection to Georgia other than the physical location of the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer rendering the service. The hypothetical services do not relate to any Georgia client, lawsuit, or alternative dispute resolution proceeding. They do not involve Georgia law or any property located in Georgia. They do not involve any organization or its affiliates with offices in Georgia. The FAOB concludes that providing such legal services from Georgia is not the provision of legal services “in Georgia” within the meaning of Rule 5.5. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn8\"> [8] </a> The limitations of Rule 5.5 on the circumstances under which Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may provide legal services in Georgia are thus inapplicable to the hypothetical activities addressed in this Opinion. Even if a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not providing legal services “in Georgia,” Rule 5.5 prohibits certain other activities. Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may not, except as authorized by other rules or other law, “establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law” or “hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the [Domestic Lawyer or Foreign Lawyer] is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn9\"> [9] </a> The purpose of these prohibitions is to prevent the public from being misled about the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer’s licensure. Obviously, an affirmative misrepresentation creates a risk that the public will be misled. So does the establishment of a physical office or other systematic and continuous presence for the practice of law in a state where the lawyer is not licensed. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn10\"> [10] </a> The question for the FAOB therefore is whether a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who resides in Georgia and renders legal services by remote means from Georgia can take steps to ensure that the public will not be misled about the lawyer’s licensure. The answer is yes. The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer must not affirmatively misrepresent themselves as licensed in Georgia. The lawyer must practice only remotely and take all other reasonable steps to ensure that the lawyer’s provision of legal services from Georgia is not generally known to the public. For example, the lawyer must not reveal their Georgia location in advertisements, letterhead, business cards, or on the internet. If the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a member of the public believes that the lawyer is licensed in Georgia, the lawyer must give an appropriate disclaimer. By providing legal services from Georgia under these conditions, even on a continuous basis, the lawyer negates the risk that the public will be confused about the lawyer’s licensure. The hypothetical Domestic or Foreign Lawyer has not therefore established an office or other continuous and systematic presence for the practice of law in Georgia in violation of Rule 5.5.Other authorities agree. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn11\"> [11] </a> For example, the Supreme Court of Florida approved an advisory opinion that it would be permissible for a lawyer not licensed in Florida to practice federal intellectual property law from his Florida home through his internet connection to his New Jersey law firm, where the lawyer “would have no public presence or profile as an attorney in Florida” and “neither he nor his firm will advertise or otherwise inform the public of his remote work presence in Florida.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn12\"> [12] </a> That opinion concluded that, under Florida’s version of Rule 5.5, the lawyer “will not be establishing a regular presence in Florida for the practice of law; he will merely be living here.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn13\"> [13] </a> Since then, the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct have been amended to add a comment to its version of Rule 5.5 that is consistent with the Florida advisory opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn14\"> [14] </a> Similarly, the Utah Ethics Advisory Committee posed and answered this question about Utah’s version of Rule 5.5: “what interest does the Utah State Bar have in regulating an out-of-state lawyer’s practice for out-of-state clients simply because he has a private home in Utah? And the answer is ... none.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn15\"> [15] </a> In New Jersey, a lawyer licensed elsewhere does not establish a continuous and systematic presence for the practice of law if the lawyer only practices out-of-state law and has no “outward manifestation of physical presence, as a lawyer, in New Jersey.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn16\"> [16] </a> It is important to highlight the limits of this opinion. We conclude that a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer does not violate Rule 5.5 by providing legal services by remote means from Georgia (but not “in Georgia”) while residing in Georgia, under specific conditions. The lawyer must not misrepresent the lawyer’s lack of Georgia law license. The lawyer also must take reasonable steps to ensure that the Georgia location of the lawyer is not generally known and to correct any misunderstanding of the lawyer’s licensure. For Domestic and Foreign Lawyers who wish to practice from Georgia, this Opinion provides a safe harbor from the limits of Rule 5.5. This Opinion does not purport, however, to provide guidance beyond that. Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide services “in Georgia” or whose presence in Georgia becomes generally known must consult Rule 5.5 and other applicable law to determine the propriety of such activities.<div>_________________________________________</div><div><a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> Apart from the question addressed in this opinion, Domestic and Foreign Lawyers must consider whether practicing while physically residing in Georgia violates Georgia law. Part 14 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the State Bar of Georgia sets forth the rules governing the investigation and prosecution of the unlicensed practice of law. Rule 14-1.1 notes that the Supreme Court of Georgia has the inherent authority to regulate the practice of law, including the unlicensed practice of law. Rule 14-2.1 (a) defines the unlicensed practice of law to “mean the practice of law, as prohibited by statute, court rule, and case law of the State of Georgia.” Under OCGA § 15-19-51, it is a crime for “any person other than a duly licensed attorney” to practice law in Georgia. Whether the activities of a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is physically residing in Georgia violate Georgia law is a question of law on which the FAOB may not render an opinion, as its authority is limited to interpreting the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-403 (a) (2023). </div><a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (f) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (h) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> A corollary question concerns the circumstances under which lawyers admitted to practice in Georgia may practice law by remote means while physically residing outside of Georgia. Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5 (a), a lawyer licensed in Georgia is subject to the disciplinary authority of Georgia no matter where the lawyer’s activities occur. Georgia Rule 5.5 (a) provides: “A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.” Georgia lawyers who are practicing law remotely from other jurisdictions must ensure that their activities do not violate the law or the rules of those jurisdictions. This is potentially a complex question for which Georgia lawyers may need to consult authorities from other jurisdictions, such as those cited in this Opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn5\"> 5 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (d) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn6\"> 6 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (f) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn7\"> 7 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (c) (2023) (Domestic Lawyers) and 5.5 (e) (Foreign Lawyers). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn8\"> 8 </a> See Hazard, Hodes, Jarvis &Thompson, LAW OF LAWYERING FOURTH ED. § 49.05 (2022-1 Supp. At 49-23) (“As a matter of public policy, the legitimate interest of the state of residence of the lawyer's home office in enforcing its own UPL rules in such instances will be either small or nonexistent. Practicing law ‘from’ a state in the absence of other connections between that practice and the state is not the same as practicing law ‘in’ a state.”) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn9\"> 9 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (b) (Domestic Lawyers) and 5.5 (e) (Foreign Lawyers) (2022). This Opinion assumes that the hypothetical Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not authorized by any rule or other law to establish an office or other continuous and systematic presence in Georgia for the practice of law. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn10\"> 10 </a> See Hazard, Hodes, Jarvis &Thompson, LAW OF LAWYERING FOURTH ED. § 49.05 (2022-1 Supp. at 49-24) (“a prohibition against maintaining a physical office for lawyers not licensed in the state is sensible, precisely because members of the public will not even think to ask about licensure when they are sitting across an office table from a flesh and blood lawyer….) and 49-26 (“In addition to the ban on out-of-state lawyers opening in-state offices, Rule 5.5 (b) (1) also prohibits the establishment of any ‘other systematic and continuous presence’ in the jurisdiction for the practice of law (emphasis added). Although this second dividing line is not as sharp as the first one, the idea animating the two prohibitions is the same.”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn11\"> 11 </a> Other states differ somewhat in how they articulate the conclusion, but only the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has taken a more restrictive view. It concluded that a lawyer not licensed in the District of Columbia could provide services from D.C. only if the lawyer was practicing from home due to the COVID-19 pandemic and other conditions were met. See Opinion 24-20: Teleworking from Home and the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn12\"> 12 </a> The Florida Bar: Re Advisory Opinion – Out-of-State Attorney Working Remotely from Florida Home, 318 So. 3d 538, 540 (2021). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn13\"> 13 </a> Id. at 541. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn14\"> 14 </a> In Re Amendments to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-5.5, 334 So.3d 1272 (2022). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn15\"> 15 </a> Utah Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 19-03 (2019) at 7. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn16\"> 16 </a> Joint Opinion of the New Jersey Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (Opinion 59) and the New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (Opinion 742) at 2 – 3 (2021). See also Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1896 (2022); Wisconsin Formal Ethics Opinion EF-21-02 (2021); ABA Formal Op. 495 (2020). Arizona, New York, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Carolina have addressed the issue in their rules rather than by ethics opinions. AZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.5(d); N.Y. CT. APP. RULES FOR THE TEMPORARY PRACTICE OF LAW IN NEW YORK § 523.5; MN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.5(d); N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)(3); N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.5(d)(2). </div>","UrlName":"rule648","Order":87,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":[]},{"Id":"7826fba6-ef90-4ca7-a5b1-06838914ac24","Title":"Section 2. Amendments.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> These Bylaws may be amended by a majority vote of the members of the Center present and voting at any properly called meeting at which a quorum is present and subsequent approval thereof by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n<div></div></div>","UrlName":"rule646","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3a88e514-3202-4c3a-9518-05713178d26c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3a88e514-3202-4c3a-9518-05713178d26c","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f0537a29-5947-4179-a303-ad003d45df74","Title":"Section 2. Legislative Activity. Limitations.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Center may, from time to time, as limited by the Rules, Bylaws, and Standing Board policies of the State Bar of Georgia, sponsor, promote, study, or review proposed legislation. The Center will take no action on its own behalf or on behalf of the State Bar of Georgia concerning any legislative activities except as authorized by Bar Rules, Policies, and Bylaws.</div>","UrlName":"rule641","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"24d67f29-6543-42a4-83fc-13b0eb0be860","Title":"Section 2. Use of Funds.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Funds of the Center shall be expended for such purposes related to the stated activities of the Center as from time to time shall be authorized by the Center’s Executive Committee. All expenditures of the Center are subject to review and approval by the Treasurer and the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule635","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ed5b1929-f5bc-492c-8f47-e8e0513dd344","Title":"Section 2. Special Meetings.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Subject to the provisions of Section 5 of this Article, the Chairperson may call for a Special or Called Meeting of the Center to be convened at such time and place and with such agenda and order of business as may be fixed by the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule626","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"53468669-efe8-4105-9e65-95ea65cbee25","Title":"Section 2. Membership Fees. How Established.","Content":"The annual Membership fees for the Center shall be established from time to time by the Center Executive Committee and submitted to the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia for approval.","UrlName":"rule624","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"7f42beef-8fa3-46c5-bedb-57885b70ecb6","Title":"Section 2. Authority.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except for actions requiring a vote from the members of the Center, the Executive Committee shall have full authority to act for the Center in any way the Center membership itself would be authorized to act. Any such action taken by the Executive Committee under this provision shall be reported to the members of the Center at its next meeting, by email, or by the publication of a newsletter.</div>","UrlName":"rule621","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b42adcbd-c619-426d-8f16-a2edd8b08252","Title":"Section 2. Terms of Office.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each Officer shall hold office for a one (1) year term beginning at the close of the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia at which the Officer is elected and ending at the close of the next succeeding Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia, and until his or her successor shall have been elected and qualified. If a vacancy shall arise in the office of the Vice Chairperson, Secretary, or Treasurer, the Chairperson shall appoint a successor for the unexpired term(s). If a vacancy shall arise in the office of the Chairperson, the Vice Chairperson shall become Chairperson for the unexpired term. If a vacancy shall arise in the office of the Chairperson and there shall, at the same time, exist a vacancy in the office of the Vice Chairperson, the president of the State Bar of Georgia, in consultation with the Center Executive Committee, shall appoint a successor Chairperson and Vice Chairperson for the unexpired terms.</div>","UrlName":"rule615","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Title":"ARTICLE II LEADERSHIP","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"></div>","UrlName":"chapter86","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"309e9994-7408-41f9-acc2-b98c77f2c307","Title":"Section 1. Officers.","Content":"The general Center operation will be overseen by its officers and a Center Executive Committee. Officers of the Center shall be a Chairperson, a Vice Chairperson, a Secretary, and a Treasurer, all of whom shall be members in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. The initial officers will be selected by the President of the State Bar of Georgia and, thereafter, elected by members of the Center for Lawyer Wellbeing.","UrlName":"rule614","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b42adcbd-c619-426d-8f16-a2edd8b08252","Title":"Section 2. Terms of Office.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each Officer shall hold office for a one (1) year term beginning at the close of the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia at which the Officer is elected and ending at the close of the next succeeding Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia, and until his or her successor shall have been elected and qualified. If a vacancy shall arise in the office of the Vice Chairperson, Secretary, or Treasurer, the Chairperson shall appoint a successor for the unexpired term(s). If a vacancy shall arise in the office of the Chairperson, the Vice Chairperson shall become Chairperson for the unexpired term. If a vacancy shall arise in the office of the Chairperson and there shall, at the same time, exist a vacancy in the office of the Vice Chairperson, the president of the State Bar of Georgia, in consultation with the Center Executive Committee, shall appoint a successor Chairperson and Vice Chairperson for the unexpired terms.</div>","UrlName":"rule615","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5d1d5240-fc31-44f8-ab4c-1022d2678d1e","Title":"Section 3. Duties of the Chairperson.","Content":"The Chairperson shall preside at all meetings of the Center and all meetings of the Center Executive Committee, appoint appropriate committees of the Center to serve during the Chairperson’s term, plan and supervise the programs of the Center at its annual meeting, and perform all other executive and administrative duties necessary or proper to the organization and functioning of the Center, including any duty as from time to time may be prescribed by the members of the Center or by the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule616","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"465889e7-fbf9-4adc-b25f-c637a8a1a723","Title":"Section 4. Duties of the Vice Chairperson.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Vice Chairperson shall assist the Chairperson and, in the absence or disability of the Chairperson, shall perform the duties of the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule617","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"219f5979-948a-4b0e-92da-1dacec98c386","Title":"Section 5. Duties of the Secretary.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Secretary shall keep minutes of all meetings of the Center, maintain the permanent records of the Center, give notices of meetings, and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule618","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e5a50b54-e9ca-4b36-b2ba-ee6d6f38511e","Title":"Section 6. Duties of the Treasurer.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Treasurer shall maintain the budget of the Center, update the income and expenses of the Center, ensure that the bills of the Center are paid, maintain contact with the Finance Department of the State Bar of Georgia for purposes of maintaining the budget, and report on the budget at the annual meeting or when otherwise requested by the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule619","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2bfb79e8-467e-44e1-a898-3f6bbc389ca3","Title":"Section 2. Affiliation","Content":"The Secretary shall present the affiliation petition for approval at the meeting of the YLD membership next following the Secretary’s receipt of the affiliation petition. Upon approval by a majority of the YLD members  present and voting, the applicant shall immediately be an Affiliate Unit. ","UrlName":"rule582","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e4d6a71d-6c69-4a3a-aae6-2a60069a7c0d","Title":"Section 2. Publications","Content":"No publication shall be distributed, published or publicly endorsed in the name of the Young Lawyers Division except by approval of the President, and only then to the extent consistent with and in the manner set forth for issuing publications by the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia Standing Policies. ","UrlName":"rule580","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"1f727ce3-2645-4c8d-8fba-02702db81392","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["1f727ce3-2645-4c8d-8fba-02702db81392","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0d1d6c61-5a1e-4b00-8c01-f0e342b407a7","Title":"Section 2. Representative Council Meetings","Content":" (a) Scheduling of Meetings . The President or the Representative Council, by majority vote of the members present and voting, may designate the time and location of the Representative Council meetings. The Secretary shall cause notice of such meetings to be given to all members of the Representative Council not less than thirty (30) days before such meetings.\n (b) Attendance Requirement . Unless otherwise modified by majority vote of the Representative Council, or if such provision is waived or suspended by a majority vote of the Representative Council, each member of the Representative Council shall be required to attend at least three (3) of the meetings set forth in Section 1 of this Article. \n \n ","UrlName":"rule396","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9f268165-1c27-4b6c-b772-a9c0143a6ed8","Title":"Section 2. Special Committees","Content":" The President shall appoint such special committees as he or she shall deem necessary and proper and shall designate their duties and their size. Upon motion of any YLD member and the passage of such motion by a majority vote at any meeting of the YLD membership, a committee for any specific purpose may be formed, and it shall be mandatory for the President to make the appointment of such committee. The President may delegate the appointment of committee members to the Committee Chairperson of the respective committees. \n ","UrlName":"rule404","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"995dc54a-7a19-4f64-95fe-ad49f3d35ac5","Title":"Section 2. Change of Residence of Office of Certain Persons","Content":"In the event that:\n(a) any member of the Representative Council representing a specific Federal Judicial District ceases to be a resident of the Federal Judicial District which such member represents; or \n (b) a nonresident member of the Representative Council becomes a resident of a Federal Judicial District in the State of Georgia, such member shall continue to serve on the Representative Council only until the next State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. If the term of office of such member does not normally expire at such Annual Meeting, there shall be a special nomination and election to elect a new member to serve for the remainder of such unexpired term. Such special election and nominations shall be conducted as elections and nominations for such position are normally conducted. \n ","UrlName":"rule403","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"41338f77-f837-4efb-9e24-7edfc41888d3","Title":"Section 2. Offices Filled by Election","Content":"(a) The President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary shall be elected consistent with and in the manner set forth in Section 6 of this Article.\n(b) Members of the Representative Council representing Federal Judicial Districts, non-resident members of the Representative Council, and members at large of the Representative Council shall be elected consistent with and in the manner set forth in Section 7 of this Article. Provided, however, that elections of Representative Council members representing Federal Judicial Districts shall be staggered, with no more than five (5) representatives from each district elected per year.","UrlName":"rule410","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"4f1f2493-4481-4295-bb3e-ee4e848135a2","Title":"Section 2. Composition of the Representative Council","Content":"The Representative Council shall be composed of:\n(a) the Officers of the Young Lawyers Division.\n(b) No less than six (6) and no more than ten (10) YLD members from each Federal Judicial District within the State of Georgia, provided that each such member is a resident of the Federal Judicial District such person represents. A YLD member shall be considered a resident of a particular Federal Judicial District within the State of Georgia if he or she maintains either his or her residence or his or her primary office in that Federal Judicial District, and residency shall be determined at the time of the YLD member’s election to the Representative Council.\n(c) two (2) YLD members who are not residents of any Federal Judicial District within the State of Georgia. \n(d) twelve (12) YLD members at large.\n(e) the president or chairperson of each Affiliate Unit (as defined in Article XII of these bylaws); provided, however, that each president or chairperson may, by written notice to the Secretary at least ten (10) days prior to each Representative Council meeting, appoint a member of such Affiliate Unit as an alternate delegate to serve on the Representative Council in the event of his or her absence.\n(f) the third-year law student serving as the YLD Law School Fellow from each law school in the State of Georgia participating in the YLD Law School Fellows program. These persons shall be members ex officio but nonvoting.","UrlName":"rule398","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b12de819-f879-4bcd-9f93-1818bfd5d464","Title":"Section 2. Composition of the Executive Committee","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Executive Committee shall be composed of: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> the Officers; and\n \n </li> \n <li> the appointed Directors.\n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule400","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[{"Id":"1daac522-a7f6-4606-a668-59456f34136a","ParentId":"b12de819-f879-4bcd-9f93-1818bfd5d464","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Executive Committee shall be composed of: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> the Officers; and\n \n </li> \n <li> the appointed Directors.\n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision44"}],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"120c5f38-9b7f-4df4-aca4-fdba3d21b88e","Title":"Section 2. Eligibility","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election shall be eligible to serve as an Officer of the Young Lawyers Division.</li> \n <li>The President-Elect position may be filled by any YLD Member who is also an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia without regard to the location of his or her residence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule397","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[{"Id":"03f84c3b-8fa1-4dbe-a938-a14fc386f9db","ParentId":"120c5f38-9b7f-4df4-aca4-fdba3d21b88e","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election shall be eligible to serve as an Officer of the Young Lawyers Division.</li> \n <li>The President-Elect position may be filled by any YLD Member who is also an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia without regard to the location of his or her residence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision43"}],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"80252a80-bdc7-4231-94f9-8181a7200df5","Title":"Section 2. Honorary Membership","Content":" Any person who has served as President shall be an “Honorary Member ” of the Young Lawyers Division for his or her lifetime after the date on which such person’s membership would have otherwise terminated pursuant to Section 4(a) of this Article. Honorary Members shall not be eligible to vote or hold office in the Young Lawyers Division; provided, however that the Immediate Past President shall be eligible to vote and shall be a member of the Executive committee during the term of such office. Membership as an Honorary Member shall terminate should an Honorary Member cease to be a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule401","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Title":"ARTICLE II MEMBERSHIP","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter59","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"14d71c00-1600-4124-9c44-65d432e9c703","Title":"Section 1 Qualification for Membership","Content":" A \"YLD member \"is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia whose membership in the Young Lawyers Division has not terminated pursuant to Section 4 of this Article. Membership in the Young Lawyers Division is automatic.","UrlName":"rule374","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"80252a80-bdc7-4231-94f9-8181a7200df5","Title":"Section 2. Honorary Membership","Content":" Any person who has served as President shall be an “Honorary Member ” of the Young Lawyers Division for his or her lifetime after the date on which such person’s membership would have otherwise terminated pursuant to Section 4(a) of this Article. Honorary Members shall not be eligible to vote or hold office in the Young Lawyers Division; provided, however that the Immediate Past President shall be eligible to vote and shall be a member of the Executive committee during the term of such office. Membership as an Honorary Member shall terminate should an Honorary Member cease to be a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule401","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c6675b8f-15c6-4d43-be20-d9be0c719677","Title":"Section 3. Associate Membership","Content":" The Young Lawyers Division may recognize, as an “Affiliate Member ,” any person who is licensed to practice law, who has not yet reached either of the thresholds for termination of membership in the YLD as set forth in Section 4(a) of this Article, and who is not authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia, but who is (a) employed in Georgia by the government or a governmental agency, the armed services, or a private or commercial institution, or (b) a third-year law student or LLM student attending a law school in the State of Georgia that is approved by the American Bar Association or the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners. Any individual desiring to become an Affiliate Member shall be considered for membership after submitting a letter of interest in the manner provided for and consistent with Article I, Section 6 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. Such letter of interest shall be considered by and approved by the Young Lawyers Division in the manner provided for and consistent with the consideration and approval of Affiliate Membership to the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule412","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"03d405d2-a506-4a60-92f8-e57c29ab5e83","Title":"Section 4. Termination of Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in The Young Lawyers Division shall terminate: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> at the end of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia (the \"Bar Year \") after (1) the member attains the age of thirty-six (36) or (2) the fifth anniversary of the member's being admitted to their first bar, whichever date is later (other than Honorary Members); or </li> \n <li>upon such member ceasing to be an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia; or</li> \n <li>in the case of Affiliate Members, by the vote of a majority of the YLD members in attendance at any meeting of the YLD membership.</li> \n </ol> \nNotwithstanding the foregoing, a person who met the requirements of Section 4(a) above at the time such person was elected President-Elect shall continue to be a YLD Member for the duration of the terms of President and Immediate Past President to which he or she succeeds. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule425","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[{"Id":"cdf005df-9270-4c68-b701-b45cc8677d2c","ParentId":"03d405d2-a506-4a60-92f8-e57c29ab5e83","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in The Young Lawyers Division shall terminate: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> at the end of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia (the \"Bar Year \") after (1) the member attains the age of thirty-six (36) or (2) the fifth anniversary of the member's being admitted to their first bar, whichever date is later (other than Honorary Members); or </li> \n <li>upon such member ceasing to be an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia; or</li> \n <li>in the case of Affiliate Members, by the vote of a majority of the YLD members in attendance at any meeting of the YLD membership.</li> \n </ol> \nNotwithstanding the foregoing, a person who met the requirements of Section 4(a) above at the time such person was elected President-Elect shall continue to be a YLD Member for the duration of the terms of President and Immediate Past President to which he or she succeeds. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision42"}],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0c084e4f-0de6-41c9-bf89-e81236e8a044","Title":"Section 2. Purpose","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the Young Lawyers Division shall be: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to encourage the interest and participation of YLD members in the activities, objectives, and purpose of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to aid and promote the advancement of YLD members in the activities of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to foster among YLD members the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to provide YLD members with an opportunity to participate in activities directed toward improving the administration of justice;</li> \n <li>to foster discussion and interchange of ideas among YLD members relating to the duties, responsibilities, and problems of YLD members; and</li> \n <li> to provide a full and complete program of activities and projects in those areas of the State Bar of Georgia in which YLD members are particularly suited. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule406","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","Revisions":[{"Id":"34713ad7-3bf8-406b-add1-f560900ad881","ParentId":"0c084e4f-0de6-41c9-bf89-e81236e8a044","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the Young Lawyers Division shall be: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to encourage the interest and participation of YLD members in the activities, objectives, and purpose of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to aid and promote the advancement of YLD members in the activities of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to foster among YLD members the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to provide YLD members with an opportunity to participate in activities directed toward improving the administration of justice;</li> \n <li>to foster discussion and interchange of ideas among YLD members relating to the duties, responsibilities, and problems of YLD members; and</li> \n <li> to provide a full and complete program of activities and projects in those areas of the State Bar of Georgia in which YLD members are particularly suited. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision41"}],"Ancestors":["9781b6d2-79e1-40d4-9c99-7089e7cbd45c","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b12e0a8a-dc68-4267-8f76-8229000103a7","Title":"Section 2. Filing and Publication of Proceedings.","Content":"All addresses, reports and other papers read at any meeting of the State Bar shall be filed with the Executive Director within thirty days from the adjournment of the meeting. The Board of Governors may publish any part of the proceedings it deems appropriate.","UrlName":"rule341","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f4ae6946-5737-4883-b8ac-be5b6d00115e","Title":"Section 2. Vacancies in Board of Governors.","Content":"Vacancies on the Board of Governors shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Section 8. ","UrlName":"rule360","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"26befd6f-9815-4cb5-b1b3-266f68646176","Title":"Section 2. Terms of Office.","Content":"Except as otherwise provided in this Article, the delegates shall serve for two years from the adjournment of the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in the year of election to the adjournment of the annual meeting two years later. ","UrlName":"rule355","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"58132d2b-946f-4479-ac14-8113f7895e54","Title":"Section 2. Senior Lawyers Section.","Content":" There shall be a section of the State Bar to be known as the Senior Lawyers Section composed of all members of the State Bar who have reached their 65th birthday prior to the close of the preceding Annual Meeting of the State Bar provided, however, that all those members of the State Bar who are between 60 and 65 years of age and are members in good standing of the Senior Section (sometimes called the Senior Law Section) at the time this amendment is adopted shall become members of the Senior Lawyers Section. This Section is formed for the purpose of fostering discussion, interchange of ideas, and camaraderie among the older members of the State Bar and to promote professionalism, CLE, CJE and other activities of the State Bar as shall be determined by the Section officers, Executive Committee and members. The Senior Lawyers Section shall have such officers, committees and government as shall be determined by its Bylaws, subject to the Rules and Bylaws of the State Bar. \n \nThe State Bar shall furnish reasonable postage and mailing expense and staff liaison assistance for the Section. All other items of Section expense shall be the responsibility of the Section unless specifically authorized and approved by both the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors as a separate budget item. \n \nThe Section shall be authorized to accept voluntary contributions which shall be held by the State Bar for use by the Section. Any funds of the old Senior Section (which Section is abolished by this amendment) in existence at the time of this amendment shall be held by the State Bar for the use of the new Senior Lawyers Section.","UrlName":"rule349","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a76f2b23-51a4-4015-ac91-96e01ed4670f","Title":"Section 2. Special Committees.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Special Committees; Statement of Purpose . The President may create special committees for such purposes as deemed appropriate. A list of the special committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose and the names of current committee members. The President shall designate a specific term, not to exceed the President's term in office, for the work of the committee. The incoming President shall review the special committees whose terms are expiring to determine whether such committee or committees should continue. The incoming President may extend the term of such special committees for a specific term, not to exceed the incoming President's term in office. </li> \n <li> Non-voting Advisory and Liasion Members . There may be non-voting advisory and liaison appointments to special committees appointed by the President at his or her discretion. The presence of non-voting advisory and liaison members at a committee meeting shall not be considered when determining a quorum for the committee, nor may they vote in any committee meeting. </li> \n <li> Ex-Officio Members. Ex-officio members shall have voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a special committee. </li> \n <li> Terms of Members . All appointments shall be for the term of the committee as established by the appointing President. Should an incoming President extend the term of the committee for a specific term, the incoming President may reappoint any current members he or she may choose, appoint new members to replace the original members or appoint additional members to the special committee. The terms of the new or additional members shall be for the extended term as established by the incoming President. </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, Vice Chairperson and Vice Co-chairs . The President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs, and vice-chairperson or vice co-chairs of each special committee. The chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Executive Committee Liaison Members . Not later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee Liaison member to such special committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee Liaison members shall serve for a term of one year, with such term expiring on the first June 30 after such appointment. Executive Committee Liaison members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a special committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule352","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","Revisions":[{"Id":"2e09210e-3737-4753-8c2f-5848a7a768aa","ParentId":"a76f2b23-51a4-4015-ac91-96e01ed4670f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Special Committees; Statement of Purpose . The President may create special committees for such purposes as deemed appropriate. A list of the special committees of the State Bar shall be published annually in the State Bar Directory. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose and the names of current committee members. The President shall designate a specific term, not to exceed three years, for the work of the committee. The incoming President shall review the special committees whose terms are expiring to determine whether such committee of committees should continue. The President may extend the term of such special committees for a specific term, not to exceed three years. </li> \n <li> Non-voting and Liasion Members . There may be non-voting advisory and liaison appointments to special committees appointed by the President at his or her discretion. </li> \n <li> Terms of Members . All appointments shall be for the term of the committee as established by the appointing President. Should the President extend the term of the committee for a specific term, the President may reappoint any current members he or she may choose, appoint new members to replace the original members, or appoint additional members to the special committee. The terms of the new or additional members shall be for the extended term as established by the appointing President. </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, Vice Chairperson and Vice Co-chairs . The President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs and vice-chairperson or vice co-chairs  of each special committee. \n \n The chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Executive Committee Liaison Members . Not later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee Liaison member to such special committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee Liaison Members shall serve for a term of one year, with such term expiring on the first June 30 after such appointment. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count towards a quorum at any meeting of a special committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision290"},{"Id":"90dee42b-0b79-4d91-a836-8db62a691b4a","ParentId":"a76f2b23-51a4-4015-ac91-96e01ed4670f","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Creation of Special Committees; Statement of Purpose . The President may create special committees for such purposes as deemed appropriate. A list of the special committees of the State Bar of Georgia shall be published annually on the official State Bar website. The publication shall include a description of each committee's purpose and the names of current committee members. The President shall designate a specific term, not to exceed the President's term in office, for the work of the committee. The incoming President shall review the special committees whose terms are expiring to determine whether such committee or committees should continue. The incoming President may extend the term of such special committees for a specific term, not to exceed the incoming President's term in office. </li> \n <li> Non-voting and Liasion Members . There may be non-voting advisory and liaison appointments to special committees appointed by the President at his or her discretion. </li> \n <li> Terms of Members . All appointments shall be for the term of the committee as established by the appointing President. Should an incoming President extend the term of the committee for a specific term, the incoming President may reappoint any current members he or she may choose, appoint new members to replace the original members or appoint additional members to the special committee. The terms of the new or additional members shall be for the extended term as established by the incoming President. </li> \n <li> Chairperson, Co-chairs, Vice Chairperson and Vice Co-chairs . The President shall appoint a chairperson or co-chairs, and vice-chairperson or vice co-chairs of each special committee. The chairperson or, in the absence of the chairperson, the vice-chairperson may act on behalf of the committee when it is not practical or possible to confer with the committee. </li> \n <li> Executive Committee Liaison Members . Not later than the second Board of Governors meeting during the President's term in office, the President may appoint an Executive Committee Liaison member to such special committees as the President chooses. Such Executive Committee Liaison members shall serve for a term of one year, with such term expiring on the first June 30 after such appointment. Such members shall have full voting privileges and count toward a quorum at any meeting of a special committee. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision413"}],"Ancestors":["859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5f5ca23d-7efd-4047-b88d-032fb8c383b8","Title":"Section 2. Nomination of Members for the Board of Governors.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Circuit Members. When the term of a member of the Board of Governors representing a circuit is to expire at the next Annual Meeting, members of that circuit may nominate a candidate for that office for the ensuing two-year term by filing with the Executive Director, on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article, a petition in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article. If an incumbent member of the Board of Governors intends to offer as a candidate for re-election, the incumbent shall file a petition, in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article, with the Executive Director on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article. The petition shall be signed by a minimum number of active members of the State Bar from the circuit as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>three from a circuit having less than twenty-five members;</li> \n <li>seven from a circuit having more than twenty-four but less than one hundred members; or</li> \n <li>twenty from a circuit having more than ninety-nine members.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Nonresident Members. Nominations for election of a nonresident member of the Board of Governors shall be filed with the Executive Director on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article and shall be in written form as prescribed in this Article. The petition shall be signed by at least five active nonresident members of the State Bar. </li> \n <li> Write-in Candidates. No person, other than a candidate nominated as provided in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, may be elected by \"write-in \"ballots or otherwise to any position described in this Section, unless that person shall have filed with the Executive Director, not less than ten days prior to the date on which the ballots are to be mailed to the membership, a written statement that he or she is a \"write-in \"candidate for the Board of Governors for the circuit indicated and intends to serve if elected. </li> \n <li> Vacant Positions. Should any position on the Board of Governors which is scheduled for an election not receive a nomination as provided in subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) above, such position shall be declared vacant, and shall be filled under Article III, Section 8 of these bylaws. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule342","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[{"Id":"c4f466e2-2220-4f1e-9a74-39e482dec8a2","ParentId":"5f5ca23d-7efd-4047-b88d-032fb8c383b8","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Circuit Members. When the term of a member of the Board of Governors representing a circuit is to expire at the next Annual Meeting, members of that circuit may nominate a candidate for that office for the ensuing two-year term by filing with the Executive Director, on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article, a petition in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article. If an incumbent member of the Board of Governors intends to offer as a candidate for re-election, the incumbent shall file a petition, in the form and subject to the requirements prescribed in this Article, with the Executive Director on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article. The petition shall be signed by a minimum number of active members of the State Bar from the circuit as follows:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>three from a circuit having less than twenty-five members;</li> \n <li>seven from a circuit having more than twenty-four but less than one hundred members; or</li> \n <li>twenty from a circuit having more than ninety-nine members.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Nonresident Members. Nominations for election of a nonresident member of the Board of Governors shall be filed with the Executive Director on the date determined according to Section 14 of this Article and shall be in written form as prescribed in this Article. The petition shall be signed by at least five active nonresident members of the State Bar. </li> \n <li> Write-in Candidates. No person, other than a candidate nominated as provided in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, may be elected by \"write-in \"ballots or otherwise to any position described in this Section, unless that person shall have filed with the Executive Director, not less than ten days prior to the date on which the ballots are to be mailed to the membership, a written statement that he or she is a \"write-in \"candidate for the Board of Governors for the circuit indicated and intends to serve if elected. </li> \n <li> Vacant Positions. Should any position on the Board of Governors which is scheduled for an election not receive a nomination as provided in subparagraphs (a), (b) or (c) above, such position shall be declared vacant, and shall be filled under Article III, Section 8 of these bylaws. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision34"}],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"aeab8063-7c51-4c82-bceb-392280f202c8","Title":"Section 2. Salary, Duties, and Term.","Content":"The salary and duties of the Executive Director shall be fixed and outlined by the Board of Governors. The term of office of the Executive Director shall be one year. Upon the death, resignation, or disability of the Secretary or the Treasurer, the duties of the Secretary or Treasurer shall be performed by the Executive Director until a successor is appointed as provided in Article XII, Section 1. ","UrlName":"rule346","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"20105829-5a6d-43e3-b12f-59d11fb03609","Title":"Section 2. The President.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The President shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>preside at all meetings of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>chair the Board of Governors and preside at all of its meetings;</li> \n <li>submit to the Board of Governors no later than the second meeting of the Board which the President chairs, a proposed program of activities for the year, a list of the appointments of chairpersons and members of standing committees for the year as provided by the Rules and these Bylaws, and budgetary recommendations as deemed appropriate; and</li> \n <li>choose the site for the Annual Meeting to be held at the end of his or her term and deliver a report at the Annual Meeting of the members on the activities of the State Bar of Georgia during his or her term of office.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule358","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[{"Id":"84155d4d-3c78-49c2-8475-b80ca8817626","ParentId":"20105829-5a6d-43e3-b12f-59d11fb03609","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The President shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>preside at all meetings of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>chair the Board of Governors and preside at all of its meetings;</li> \n <li>submit to the Board of Governors no later than the second meeting of the Board which the President chairs, a proposed program of activities for the year, a list of the appointments of chairpersons and members of standing committees for the year as provided by the Rules and these Bylaws, and budgetary recommendations as deemed appropriate; and</li> \n <li>choose the site for the Annual Meeting to be held at the end of his or her term and deliver a report at the Annual Meeting of the members on the activities of the State Bar of Georgia during his or her term of office.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision29"}],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a1904a34-6251-49f2-8669-e6a36fcf138f","Title":"Section 2. Duties.","Content":"The Executive Committee shall exercise all of the powers of the Board of Governors between meetings of the Board and shall report to each meeting of the Board. In lieu of meeting in person, and with notice to all Executive Committee members, the Executive Committee may meet by telephone or by electronic conference. Specially called Executive Committee meetings may occur upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the entire membership of the Executive Committee.","UrlName":"rule340","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"98044720-6463-456f-b055-8193d16b3025","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["98044720-6463-456f-b055-8193d16b3025","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"35ca45b6-8020-4bcf-b7ed-8d77b0b66c11","Title":"Section 2.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Officer Members. The Officer Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of the President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, and the Attorney General.</li> \n <li>Circuit Members. The Circuit Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of a number of members from each Judicial Circuit equal to the number of members as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governors members to be elected from the Atlanta Judicial Circuit. Each Judicial Circuit may gain an additional member for each additional 500 active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. Every judicial circuit shall be entitled to elect at least one member of the Board.</li> \n <li>Nonresident Members. There shall be two nonresident members of the Board of Governors who shall be an active members of the State Bar in good standing residing outside of Georgia. The nonresident members shall be from different states. One nonresident member seat shall be an \"odd \"seat and the other an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below.</li> \n <li>Appointed Members. The President-elect in office when this Bylaw becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. The first two positions will be considered \"odd \"seats, and the third will be considered an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint two members in years when the \"odd \"seats expire and one member in the years \"even \"seats expire. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>The number of the circuit members, plus the nonresident members, plus the appointed members of the Board of Governors shall not exceed 150, except as set out in Section 6(a) below.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule337","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"a59adb57-f942-45ff-8497-173c151b86a0","ParentId":"35ca45b6-8020-4bcf-b7ed-8d77b0b66c11","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Officer Members. The Officer Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of the President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, and the Attorney General.</li> \n <li>Circuit Members. The Circuit Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of a number of members from each Judicial Circuit equal to the number of members as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governors members to be elected from the Atlanta Judicial Circuit. Each Judicial Circuit may gain an additional member for each additional 500 active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. Every judicial circuit shall be entitled to elect at least one member of the Board.</li> \n <li>Nonresident Members. There shall be two nonresident members of the Board of Governors who shall be an active members of the State Bar in good standing residing outside of Georgia. The nonresident members shall be from different states. One nonresident member seat shall be an \"odd \"seat and the other an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below.</li> \n <li>Appointed Members. The President-elect in office when this Bylaw becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. The first two positions will be considered \"odd \"seats, and the third will be considered an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint two members in years when the \"odd \"seats expire and one member in the years \"even \"seats expire. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>The number of the circuit members, plus the nonresident members, plus the appointed members of the Board of Governors shall not exceed 150, except as set out in Section 6(a) below.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision26"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"47f33920-1cad-43f9-a12c-19ee07a79b76","Title":"Section 2. Rules of Order.","Content":" At all meetings of the members of the State Bar, its Board of Governors, or any committee thereof, Robert's Rules of Order, Newly Revised shall govern as to parliamentary procedure, except where those rules conflict with any provision of the Rules or Bylaws of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule343","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Title":"ARTICLE II MEETINGS OF MEMBERS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter46","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"51ad7581-bebc-4c3d-a602-c46bf3ecabf1","Title":"Section 1. Annual and Midyear Meeting.","Content":"(a) The members of the State Bar of Georgia shall meet at least once each Bar year at a time and place designated by the Board of Governors. That meeting may be held at either the Annual or Midyear meeting or both.\n(b) The members of the State Bar of Georgia may meet at other times during the Bar year as designated by the Board of Governors.\n(c) The Board of Governors, or in its absence, the Executive Committee, may vote to hold a meeting of members by electronic means as deemed prudent or necessary.\n(d) A meeting of members may be held at a location designated by the Board of Governors, or by electronic means, including but not limited to telephone conferencing and live video conferencing, subject to any limitations established by the Board of Governors.\n(e) If approved by the Board of Governors, any meeting of members may be held electronically by live video conferencing, social media broadcast, or by any other electronic means approved by the Board of Governors.\n(f) Any voting required by the membership may be conducted electronically with a ballot provided directly to the member or available on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia. Instructions for electronic voting will be provided to every member and posted on the official State Bar of Georgia website at least ten days before any meeting to be held electronically.","UrlName":"rule317","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[{"Id":"3cdf5a27-d589-400a-a75c-7b61eb190c9c","ParentId":"51ad7581-bebc-4c3d-a602-c46bf3ecabf1","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The members of the State Bar shall meet at least once each year at a time and place designated by the Board of Governors. That meeting shall be called the Annual Meeting.","UrlName":"revision310"}],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"47f33920-1cad-43f9-a12c-19ee07a79b76","Title":"Section 2. Rules of Order.","Content":" At all meetings of the members of the State Bar, its Board of Governors, or any committee thereof, Robert's Rules of Order, Newly Revised shall govern as to parliamentary procedure, except where those rules conflict with any provision of the Rules or Bylaws of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule343","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"579d8fb2-4528-4651-8eb1-5f825d1225e2","Title":"Section 3. Order of Business.","Content":"At each meeting of the members of the State Bar, the order of business may be prescribed by the Board of Governors, except as provided in these Bylaws. The order of business may be changed by majority vote of the members present. ","UrlName":"rule365","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1ba05433-8d7f-49af-9b6c-5ed6bb178138","Title":"Section 4. Quorum.","Content":"A quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the members of the State Bar shall consist of fifty active members in attendance.","UrlName":"rule384","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3ecd1e37-0965-4882-a6d5-7d7e8ae31ee4","Title":"Section 5. Reserved.","Content":"","UrlName":"rule407","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bc6dda3b-3981-4a84-a927-10297696efc4","Title":"Section 6. Proposed Legislation.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li> No legislation shall be recommended, supported or opposed by the State Bar unless:\n <ol style=\"list-style: decimal outside none\"> \n <li>such action has been initiated by an appropriate committee or section, or by any ten members of the Board of Governors; and</li> \n <li>the text of the legislation is furnished to the President, the President-elect and the Advisory Committee on Legislation at least thirty days prior to its submission for approval or disapproval as set forth below; and</li> \n <li> provided further:\n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-roman outside none\"> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a majority vote of the members of the State Bar present at a meeting; or</li> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting; or</li> \n <li>when the Board of Governors is not in session, such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Executive Committee voting.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In addition to and in aid of these legislative powers, the Board shall have the power to adopt, by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Board present and voting, a Standing Board Policy regarding legislation. Such Standing Board Policy shall be binding from session to session unless suspended, modified or rescinded pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board present and voting.</li> \n <li>No committee or section of the State Bar shall recommend, support or oppose any legislation except in the manner herein provided.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule339","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[{"Id":"42bf3308-9f47-4240-96de-67928cd4da40","ParentId":"bc6dda3b-3981-4a84-a927-10297696efc4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li> No legislation shall be recommended, supported or opposed by the State Bar unless:\n <ol style=\"list-style: decimal outside none\"> \n <li>such action has been initiated by an appropriate committee or section, or by any ten members of the Board of Governors; and</li> \n <li>the text of the legislation is furnished to the President, the President-elect and the Advisory Committee on Legislation at least thirty days prior to its submission for approval or disapproval as set forth below; and</li> \n <li> provided further:\n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-roman outside none\"> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a majority vote of the members of the State Bar present at a meeting; or</li> \n <li>that such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board of Governors present and voting; or</li> \n <li>when the Board of Governors is not in session, such legislative position receives a two-thirds vote of the members of the Executive Committee voting.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>In addition to and in aid of these legislative powers, the Board shall have the power to adopt, by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Board present and voting, a Standing Board Policy regarding legislation. Such Standing Board Policy shall be binding from session to session unless suspended, modified or rescinded pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the members of the Board present and voting.</li> \n <li>No committee or section of the State Bar shall recommend, support or oppose any legislation except in the manner herein provided.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision25"}],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e81fa00c-7c65-4003-9f48-31a86f43e5b7","Title":"Section 2. Active Members and Foreign Law Consultants.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>Only active members of the State Bar are entitled to give legal advice and otherwise practice law.</li> \n <li>Only foreign law consultants are entitled to give legal advice as authorized by their license.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule338","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"c1e39857-301b-4bab-9d0e-f8a118abfa98","ParentId":"e81fa00c-7c65-4003-9f48-31a86f43e5b7","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>Only active members of the State Bar are entitled to give legal advice and otherwise practice law.</li> \n <li>Only foreign law consultants are entitled to give legal advice as authorized by their license.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision130"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","Title":"CHAPTER 2 EFFECTIVE DATE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter16","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8144b7fa-6279-4729-b8ff-3208b55c7a21","Title":"Rule 5-201. Effective Date","Content":" These rules, as recodified, shall be effective January 1, 1977 except that Part IV, Chapter 2, Disciplinary Proceedings, shall be effective April 1, 1977; provided, however, any complaints pending before grievance tribunals on such date shall be handled to conclusion under the disciplinary proceedings now in effect. ","UrlName":"rule171","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9e6fd451-bd43-48ad-a02d-9da3806827d9","Title":"Rule 5-102. Objection to Amendment.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall be entitled to file a written objection to any motion to amend these rules by the State Bar of Georgia. Each objection shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the grounds on which the objection is based;</li> \n <li>a request for oral argument on the proposed amendment if such argument is desired by the objecting member.</li> \n </ol> \nAll written objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia before the date which the State Bar of Georgia has designated for filing its said motion to amend these rules under Bar Rule 5-101. Any member filing a written objection shall serve the State Bar of Georgia with a copy thereof by mailing the same to the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the address of its headquarters.</div>","UrlName":"rule168","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0863f3ed-29f9-4771-9797-6b0a9a5737db","ParentId":"9e6fd451-bd43-48ad-a02d-9da3806827d9","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall be entitled to file a written objection to any motion to amend these rules by the State Bar of Georgia. Each objection shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the grounds on which the objection is based;</li> \n <li>a request for oral argument on the proposed amendment if such argument is desired by the objecting member.</li> \n </ol> \nAll written objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia before the date which the State Bar of Georgia has designated for filing its said motion to amend these rules under Rule 5-101. Any member filing a written objection shall serve the State Bar of Georgia with a copy thereof by mailing the same to the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the address of its headquarters.</div>","UrlName":"revision22"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","Title":"Part II - Admission to the Bar","Content":"","UrlName":"part14","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","Title":"CHAPTER 1 ADMISSION TO THE BAR","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter12","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"833c2dff-d778-433d-b2f3-1a28757f9761","Title":"Rule 2-101. Admission to the Bar.","Content":"No person may be admitted to the State Bar as an active, emeritus or inactive member, or licensed as an attorney to practice law in this State without complying with the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule44","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5182c8b4-1d0c-4da0-aee0-db4ac4acf50a","03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["03f775c3-7216-4e0d-88a1-aff88d44df74","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48d18380-5591-4a80-9130-1c469fa12873","Title":"Rule 1-801.1. Annual Midyear Meeting","Content":"An annual midyear meeting of the State Bar of Georgia may be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors. If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct an annual midyear meeting by an electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.\n","UrlName":"rule32","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"f37c69ca-79d6-4579-9b5c-08ae2743319f","ParentId":"48d18380-5591-4a80-9130-1c469fa12873","Title":"Version 2","Content":"An annual midyear meeting of the State Bar of Georgia may be held each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board of Governors.\n","UrlName":"revision343"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d18cf30d-c7f6-4399-a812-f4d7b9458ad5","Title":"Rule 1-702. Standing Committees; Special Committees","Content":"Unless otherwise provided in these rules, there shall be standing and special committees, which shall be composed of such members, serving such terms, appointed in such manner, and having such duties as the bylaws may provide. A statement of the purpose of each committee shall be published annually on the official State Bar of Georgia website.","UrlName":"rule99","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[{"Id":"b554a052-a70a-4b72-a7d0-945286b71bed","ParentId":"d18cf30d-c7f6-4399-a812-f4d7b9458ad5","Title":"Version 2","Content":" Unless otherwise provided in these rules, there shall be standing and special committees, which shall be composed of such members, serving such terms, appointed in such manner, and having such duties as the bylaws may provide. A statement of the purpose of each committee shall be published annually in the State Bar Directory .","UrlName":"revision319"}],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"10f78a46-1a55-46a1-ada7-c3593c52f792","Title":"Rule 1-602","Content":"The Board of Governors, the Executive Committee or any ten members of the State Bar of Georgia may propose bylaws and amendments thereto for consideration at a midyear, annual or special called membership meeting. Proposals from ten or more members of the State Bar of Georgia must be provided to the Secretary at least 60 days prior to the midyear, annual or special called membership meeting. Written notice of proposed bylaws and amendments shall be published 20 days prior to the midyear, annual or special called meeting of the membership through any one or more of the official publications of the State Bar of Georgia including the official website for the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule91","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b66555-b8c9-47db-abc2-e73238af242b","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"17c92ac4-ffe4-4796-835e-40234198055d","Title":"Rule 1-501.1. License Fees - Late Fee","Content":" Any member who has not paid his or her license fee for the State Bar of Georgia on or before August 1 shall be penalized in the amount of $75, which will be added to the member’s outstanding license fee. Any member who has not paid his or her license fee on or after January 1 of each year shall be penalized an additional amount of $100 for a total of $175, which will be added to the member’s outstanding license fee. \n \nA member may submit a request for waiver of any late fees in writing to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon good cause shown, any late fee or penalty imposed by this rule may be waived by a majority vote of the Executive Committee.","UrlName":"rule56","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d49dab6c-ff52-4a9c-adf2-bca1fa65dae7","Title":"Rule 1-402. Election of Officers","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia shall, in its bylaws, establish the method of election of the officers. Such method of election shall contain provisions equivalent to those required by Bar Rule 1-304 relating to election of members of the Board of Governors. Officers may be nominated by the Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule37","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"db94abe0-413c-469f-88ed-67188923c732","Title":"Rule 1-302. Composition","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> The President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and the Attorney General of Georgia; \n   </li> \n <li> the number of Board of Governors members for each Judicial Circuit as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governor members to be elected from the Atlanta Circuit. \n \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> Each Judicial Circuit shall have an additional member for each additional five hundred active members of the State Bar of Georgia added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. The size of the Board of Governors, excluding those designated in subsection (a)(1) above, shall not exceed 150, except as set out in subsection (b) below. \n   </li> \n <li> If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of superior court judges to which that circuit was entitled on July 1, 1979, then and in that event, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board of Governors representing that circuit provided there was more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event that there is such a reduction, the last created post will be the first post eliminated. \n   </li> \n <li> If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of superior court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board of Governors as it had on July 1, 1979. Additional Board representation will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing in that circuit as provided above. A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon that circuit's Board of Governors' representatives, except as otherwise provided. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> two representatives of the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state of Georgia, who themselves must be residents of different states of the United States. The nonresident representative shall be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing residing outside of the state of Georgia. \n   </li> \n <li> three members appointed as follows: The President-elect in office when this rule becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint the number of such members whose term expired at the annual meeting at which the President-elect assumed office. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Upon the creation of a new circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to elect one member to the Board of Governors even if the cap of 150 Board of Governors members has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to elect additional members depending on the number of active members of the state of Georgia residing in the circuit as provided above. \n   </li> \n <li> A member of the Board of Governors must be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. A member representing a judicial circuit shall be a member of the bar of that circuit. \n   </li> \n <li>Members of the Board of Governors shall receive no compensation for their services.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule21","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"3b61d104-26c7-4e13-8f9f-50ad90ec8de1","ParentId":"db94abe0-413c-469f-88ed-67188923c732","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> The President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and the Attorney General of Georgia; \n   </li> \n <li> the number of Board of Governors members for each Judicial Circuit as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governor members to be elected from the Atlanta Circuit. \n \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> Each Judicial Circuit shall have an additional member for each additional five hundred active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. The size of the Board of Governors, excluding those designated in subsection (a)(1) above, shall not exceed 150, except as set out in subsection (b) below. \n   </li> \n <li> If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges to which that circuit was entitled on July 1, 1979, then and in that event, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board of Governors representing that circuit provided there was more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event that there is such a reduction, the last created post will be the first post eliminated. \n   </li> \n <li> If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board of Governors as it had on July 1, 1979. Additional Board representation will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar residing in that circuit as provided above. A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon that circuit's Board of Governors' representatives, except as otherwise provided. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> two representatives of the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State of Georgia, who themselves must be residents of different states of the United States. The nonresident representative shall be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing residing outside of the State of Georgia. \n   </li> \n <li> three members appointed as follows: The President-elect in office when this rule becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint the number of such members whose term expired at the annual meeting at which the President-elect assumed office. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Upon the creation of a new circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to elect one member to the Board of Governors even if the cap of 150 Board of Governors members has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to elect additional members depending on the number of active members of the State of Georgia residing in the circuit as provided above. \n   </li> \n <li> A member of the Board of Governors must be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. A member representing a judicial circuit shall be a member of the bar of that circuit. \n   </li> \n <li>Members of the Board of Governors shall receive no compensation for their services.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision16"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6c08a734-b5e8-4fbe-9bfe-72e39fc62151","Title":"Rule 1-202. Membership Status","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of six categories: active, inactive, foreign law consultant, emeritus, members unable to practice law due to a disability, and retired status members. The bylaws shall make provision for the registration of each active member and the location of his or her principal office for the practice of law, the registration of each foreign law consultant and the location of his or her principal office, and the registration of emeritus and inactive members and their mailing addresses. Only Active Status members and Emeritus Status members may vote on any State Bar of Georgia matter or election or nominate an active member for office. Emeritus Status members can vote only in person or electronically. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive Status Members . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia may contact the Membership Department and elect to be transferred to Inactive Status membership provided that the member:\n <ol> \n <li>is not engaged in the practice of law;</li> \n <li>does not hold himself or herself out as a practicing lawyer or attorney;</li> \n <li>does not occupy any public or private position in which the member may be called upon to give legal advice or counsel; and</li> \n <li>does not examine the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law for the benefit of another person, company, or corporation.</li> \n </ol> \n Members who are in active military service may choose inactive status if they so elect. </li> \n <li> Active Status Members . Active Status members shall be all other lawyers, including judges but excluding foreign law consultants. Only Active Status members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Foreign Law Consultant Status . Foreign Law Consultants shall be those persons, who are licensed under the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Emeritus Status Members . Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia who will attain the age of 70 years in a Bar year and who shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, five years of which must be as a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia, may request Emeritus Status from the State Bar of Georgia upon petition to and approval by the Membership Department. When approved, the member shall be transferred to Emeritus Status. An Emeritus Status member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be required to pay license fees or other fees and may not hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. An Emeritus Status member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be privileged to practice law except that an Emeritus Status member may handle pro bono cases referred by either an organized pro bono program recognized by the Pro Bono Project of the State Bar of Georgia or a non-profit corporation that delivers legal services to the poor. An Emeritus Status member may be reinstated to active or inactive membership upon application to the Membership Department and payment of non-prorated license fees for the year in which the Emeritus Status member returns to Active Status or Inactive Status membership. </li> \n <li> Members Unable to Practice Law Due to Disability . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is temporarily or permanently disabled may submit to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia a written request to be transferred to Disabled Status. Members who elect this status must submit adequate medical and/or psychological documentation of their disability with the written request. Adequate documentation includes:\n <ol> \n <li>documentation from the Social Security Administration of approval of disability;</li> \n <li>documentation from an insurance company of receipt of benefits based upon disability; or</li> \n <li>documentation from a medical doctor that the member is disabled.</li> \n </ol> \n Any request by a member to be transferred to Disabled Status must comply with all of the provisions contained in Article I, Section 10 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Retired Status Members .\n <ol> \n <li>Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is not engaged in the active practice of law in any state, district, or territory of the United States may transfer to Retired Status by submitting a request in writing to the Executive Director and General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon approval by the Executive Director and General Counsel, the Membership Department shall transfer the member to Retired Status. A member in Retired Status shall not be entitled to practice law in this state and may not practice law in any other jurisdiction. Further, such member shall not be eligible to vote or hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. Any member transferred to Retired Status shall be relieved of his or her membership fees and CLE obligations.</li> \n <li>A request for Retired Status must be unqualified, is irrevocable, and permanent. A member in Retired Status will appear in the State Bar of Georgia member directory as “Retired.”</li> \n <li>A member of the State Bar of Georgia with a pending disciplinary matter may transfer to Retired Status with the consent of the Office of the General Counsel. Grievances received after a member has transferred to Retired Status may be investigated and prosecuted through the disciplinary process at the option of the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li>A member suspended from the practice of law because of failure to meet CLE requirements or failure to pay Bar membership fees is not eligible for Retired Status.</li> \n </ol> \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule12","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"84ad6676-28b9-4f47-9574-000b6e7c9439","ParentId":"6c08a734-b5e8-4fbe-9bfe-72e39fc62151","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of five classes: active, foreign law consultant, emeritus, disabled and inactive. The bylaws shall make provision for the registration of each active member and the location of his or her principal office for the practice of law, the registration of each foreign law consultant and the location of his or her principal office, and the registration of emeritus and inactive members and their mailing addresses. Only active members and emeritus members may vote on any State Bar matter or election or nominate an active member for office. Emeritus members can vote only in person or electronically. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive Members . All lawyers who are neither engaged in the practice of law nor holding themselves out as practicing attorneys nor occupying any public or private position in which they may be called upon to give legal advice or counsel, to examine the law or to pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law may be inactive members at their election. Members who are in military service may be inactive if they so elect. </li> \n <li> Active Members . Active members shall be all other lawyers including judges but excluding foreign law consultants. Only active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Foreign Law Consultants . Foreign Law Consultants shall be those persons, who are licensed under the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Emeritus Members . Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia who will attain the age of 70 years in a Bar year and who shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, five years of which must be as a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia, may request emeritus status from the State Bar of Georgia upon petition to and approval by the membership department. When approved, the member shall hold emeritus status. An emeritus member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be required to pay dues or annual fees, and may not hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. An emeritus member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be privileged to practice law except that an emeritus member may handle pro bono cases referred by either an organized pro bono program recognized by the Pro Bono Project of the State Bar of Georgia or a non-profit corporation that delivers legal services to the poor. An emeritus member may be reinstated to active or inactive membership upon application to the membership department and payment of non-prorated dues for the year in which the emeritus members return to active or inactive service. </li> \n <li> Disabled Members . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Executive Committee for disabled status provided the member meets one of the following criteria:\n <ol> \n <li>the member has been determined to be permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration; or</li> \n <li>the member is in the process of applying to the Social Security Administration for permanent disability status; or </li> \n <li>the member has been determined to be permanently disabled or disabled for a period in excess of one year by an insurance company and is receiving payments pursuant to a disability insurance policy; or</li> \n <li>the member has a signed statement from a medical doctor that the member is permanently disabled, or disabled for a period in excess of one year, and unable to practice law.</li> \n </ol> \n Upon the Executive Committee’s grant of the member’s petition for disability status, the disabled member shall be treated as an inactive member of the State Bar of Georgia and shall not be privileged to practice law. A member holding disabled status shall not be required to pay dues or annual fees. A disabled member shall continue in such status until the member requests reinstatement by written application to the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia. \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision385"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Title":"CHAPTER 2 MEMBERSHIP","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter5","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"f1dc3d58-7f1e-4a81-93ca-6f4eda03d2da","Title":"Rule 1-201. Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> All persons now or hereafter who are: \n <ol> \n <li>authorized to practice law in this State or;</li> \n <li>authorized to act as a Foreign Legal Consultant shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule11","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6c08a734-b5e8-4fbe-9bfe-72e39fc62151","Title":"Rule 1-202. Membership Status","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of six categories: active, inactive, foreign law consultant, emeritus, members unable to practice law due to a disability, and retired status members. The bylaws shall make provision for the registration of each active member and the location of his or her principal office for the practice of law, the registration of each foreign law consultant and the location of his or her principal office, and the registration of emeritus and inactive members and their mailing addresses. Only Active Status members and Emeritus Status members may vote on any State Bar of Georgia matter or election or nominate an active member for office. Emeritus Status members can vote only in person or electronically. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive Status Members . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia may contact the Membership Department and elect to be transferred to Inactive Status membership provided that the member:\n <ol> \n <li>is not engaged in the practice of law;</li> \n <li>does not hold himself or herself out as a practicing lawyer or attorney;</li> \n <li>does not occupy any public or private position in which the member may be called upon to give legal advice or counsel; and</li> \n <li>does not examine the law or pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law for the benefit of another person, company, or corporation.</li> \n </ol> \n Members who are in active military service may choose inactive status if they so elect. </li> \n <li> Active Status Members . Active Status members shall be all other lawyers, including judges but excluding foreign law consultants. Only Active Status members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Foreign Law Consultant Status . Foreign Law Consultants shall be those persons, who are licensed under the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Emeritus Status Members . Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia who will attain the age of 70 years in a Bar year and who shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, five years of which must be as a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia, may request Emeritus Status from the State Bar of Georgia upon petition to and approval by the Membership Department. When approved, the member shall be transferred to Emeritus Status. An Emeritus Status member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be required to pay license fees or other fees and may not hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. An Emeritus Status member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be privileged to practice law except that an Emeritus Status member may handle pro bono cases referred by either an organized pro bono program recognized by the Pro Bono Project of the State Bar of Georgia or a non-profit corporation that delivers legal services to the poor. An Emeritus Status member may be reinstated to active or inactive membership upon application to the Membership Department and payment of non-prorated license fees for the year in which the Emeritus Status member returns to Active Status or Inactive Status membership. </li> \n <li> Members Unable to Practice Law Due to Disability . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is temporarily or permanently disabled may submit to the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia a written request to be transferred to Disabled Status. Members who elect this status must submit adequate medical and/or psychological documentation of their disability with the written request. Adequate documentation includes:\n <ol> \n <li>documentation from the Social Security Administration of approval of disability;</li> \n <li>documentation from an insurance company of receipt of benefits based upon disability; or</li> \n <li>documentation from a medical doctor that the member is disabled.</li> \n </ol> \n Any request by a member to be transferred to Disabled Status must comply with all of the provisions contained in Article I, Section 10 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Retired Status Members .\n <ol> \n <li>Any member of the State Bar of Georgia who is not engaged in the active practice of law in any state, district, or territory of the United States may transfer to Retired Status by submitting a request in writing to the Executive Director and General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Upon approval by the Executive Director and General Counsel, the Membership Department shall transfer the member to Retired Status. A member in Retired Status shall not be entitled to practice law in this state and may not practice law in any other jurisdiction. Further, such member shall not be eligible to vote or hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. Any member transferred to Retired Status shall be relieved of his or her membership fees and CLE obligations.</li> \n <li>A request for Retired Status must be unqualified, is irrevocable, and permanent. A member in Retired Status will appear in the State Bar of Georgia member directory as “Retired.”</li> \n <li>A member of the State Bar of Georgia with a pending disciplinary matter may transfer to Retired Status with the consent of the Office of the General Counsel. Grievances received after a member has transferred to Retired Status may be investigated and prosecuted through the disciplinary process at the option of the Office of the General Counsel.</li> \n <li>A member suspended from the practice of law because of failure to meet CLE requirements or failure to pay Bar membership fees is not eligible for Retired Status.</li> \n </ol> \n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule12","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"84ad6676-28b9-4f47-9574-000b6e7c9439","ParentId":"6c08a734-b5e8-4fbe-9bfe-72e39fc62151","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in the State Bar of Georgia shall consist of five classes: active, foreign law consultant, emeritus, disabled and inactive. The bylaws shall make provision for the registration of each active member and the location of his or her principal office for the practice of law, the registration of each foreign law consultant and the location of his or her principal office, and the registration of emeritus and inactive members and their mailing addresses. Only active members and emeritus members may vote on any State Bar matter or election or nominate an active member for office. Emeritus members can vote only in person or electronically. \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive Members . All lawyers who are neither engaged in the practice of law nor holding themselves out as practicing attorneys nor occupying any public or private position in which they may be called upon to give legal advice or counsel, to examine the law or to pass upon the legal effect of any act, document, or law may be inactive members at their election. Members who are in military service may be inactive if they so elect. </li> \n <li> Active Members . Active members shall be all other lawyers including judges but excluding foreign law consultants. Only active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Foreign Law Consultants . Foreign Law Consultants shall be those persons, who are licensed under the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia. </li> \n <li> Emeritus Members . Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia who will attain the age of 70 years in a Bar year and who shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least 25 years, five years of which must be as a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia, may request emeritus status from the State Bar of Georgia upon petition to and approval by the membership department. When approved, the member shall hold emeritus status. An emeritus member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be required to pay dues or annual fees, and may not hold office in the State Bar of Georgia. An emeritus member of the State Bar of Georgia shall not be privileged to practice law except that an emeritus member may handle pro bono cases referred by either an organized pro bono program recognized by the Pro Bono Project of the State Bar of Georgia or a non-profit corporation that delivers legal services to the poor. An emeritus member may be reinstated to active or inactive membership upon application to the membership department and payment of non-prorated dues for the year in which the emeritus members return to active or inactive service. </li> \n <li> Disabled Members . Any member of the State Bar of Georgia may petition the Executive Committee for disabled status provided the member meets one of the following criteria:\n <ol> \n <li>the member has been determined to be permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration; or</li> \n <li>the member is in the process of applying to the Social Security Administration for permanent disability status; or </li> \n <li>the member has been determined to be permanently disabled or disabled for a period in excess of one year by an insurance company and is receiving payments pursuant to a disability insurance policy; or</li> \n <li>the member has a signed statement from a medical doctor that the member is permanently disabled, or disabled for a period in excess of one year, and unable to practice law.</li> \n </ol> \n Upon the Executive Committee’s grant of the member’s petition for disability status, the disabled member shall be treated as an inactive member of the State Bar of Georgia and shall not be privileged to practice law. A member holding disabled status shall not be required to pay dues or annual fees. A disabled member shall continue in such status until the member requests reinstatement by written application to the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia. \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision385"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fba14cfd-a73b-4163-84c9-18a132c4f63f","Title":"Rule 1-203. Practice by Active Members; Nonresidents","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No person shall practice law in this state unless such person is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing; except as provided below: \n <ol> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state in isolated cases in the discretion of the judge of such court; or</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state if such person:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>is enrolled in a full time graduate degree program at an accredited law school in this state; and</li> \n <li>is under the supervision of a resident attorney; and</li> \n <li>limits his or her practice to the appearance in the courts of this state to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities of such graduate degree program.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A person who is admitted to the State Bar of Georgia as a foreign law consultant pursuant to Part E of the Rules Governing the Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gasupreme.us/">www.gasupreme.us , may render legal services in the state of Georgia solely with respect to the laws of the foreign country (i.e., a country other than the United States of America, its possessions and territories) where such person is admitted to practice, to the extent provided by and in strict compliance with the provisions of Part D of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law, but shall not otherwise render legal services in this state. </li> \n <li> Persons who are authorized to practice law in this state are hereby authorized to practice law as sole proprietorships or as partners, shareholders, or members of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>partnerships under OCGA § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability partnerships under OCGA § 14-8-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional corporations under OCGA § 14-7-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional associations under OCGA § 14-10-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability companies under OGCA § 14-11-100 et seq.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XV, Rules 91-95, Student Practice Rule.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XVI, Rules 97-103, Law School Graduates, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XX, Rules 114-120, Extended Public Service Program, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XXI, Rule 121, Provision of Legal Services Following Determination of Major Disaster. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule13","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"67da6646-3933-45cf-a9f3-5bd64ddcff21","ParentId":"fba14cfd-a73b-4163-84c9-18a132c4f63f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"No person shall practice law in this State unless such person is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing; except as provided below:\n<ol> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state in isolated cases in the discretion of the judge of such court; or</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state if such person:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>is enrolled in a full time graduate degree program at an accredited law school in this state; and</li> \n <li>is under the supervision of a resident attorney; and</li> \n <li>limits his or her practice to the appearance in the courts of this state to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities of such graduate degree program.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A person who is admitted to the Bar as a foreign law consultant pursuant to Part E of the Rules Governing the Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, Ga. Ct. &Bar Rules, p. 12-1 et seq., may render legal services in the state of Georgia solely with respect to the laws of the foreign country (i.e., a country other than the United States of America, its possessions and territories) where such person is admitted to practice, to the extent provided by and in strict compliance with the provisions of Part D of the Rules Governing Admission to Practice, but shall not otherwise render legal services in this State.</li> \n <li> Persons who are authorized to practice law in this State are hereby authorized to practice law as sole proprietorships or as partners, shareholders, or members of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>partnerships under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability partnerships under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional corporations under O.C.G.A. § 14-7-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional associations under O.C.G.A. § 14-10-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability companies under O.C.G.A. § 14-11-100 et. seq.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n","UrlName":"revision8"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ed518433-bfb5-4ff7-9abd-1d2a819f46cd","Title":"Rule 1-204. Good Standing","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No lawyer shall be deemed a member in good standing: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>while delinquent after September 1 of any year for nonpayment of the annual license fee and any costs or fees of any type as prescribed in Chapter 5, Bar Rule 1-501 (a)-(c);</li> \n <li>while suspended for disciplinary reasons;</li> \n <li>while disbarred;</li> \n <li>while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements; or</li> \n <li>while in violation of Bar Rule 1-209 for failure to pay child support obligations.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule14","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"9867c2be-d9e8-4f01-b3d2-f2b96c9cf38e","ParentId":"ed518433-bfb5-4ff7-9abd-1d2a819f46cd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No lawyer shall be deemed a member in good standing: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>while delinquent after September 1 of any year for nonpayment of the annual license fee and any costs or fees of any type as prescribed in Chapter 5, Rule 1-501 (a)-(c);</li> \n <li>while suspended for disciplinary reasons;</li> \n <li>while disbarred;</li> \n <li>while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements; or</li> \n <li>while in violation of Rule 1-209 for failure to pay child support obligations.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision13"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"93927872-3c21-4742-b79c-f7a5937c5647","Title":"Rule 1-205. Bar of Judicial Circuit","Content":"Each member who is a resident of this state shall be considered a member of the bar of the judicial circuit in which his principal office for the practice of law is located, or, at his election, the circuit in which he resides, or if he has no office, the circuit in which he resides or last resided.\n","UrlName":"rule15","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b9a37083-773c-4ce7-8ce8-88269bc55266","Title":"Rule 1-206. Affiliate Members","Content":"In addition to the membership and classes of membership provided in this chapter, the State Bar of Georgia may recognize as affiliates, without the rights and privileges of membership, members of the legal profession not authorized to practice law in Georgia, but who are licensed to practice law in another state or the District of Columbia, and are in good standing in all jurisdictions in which they are licensed. Affiliate members may be furnished copies of appropriate publications and may be entitled to attend and participate, without the right to vote or hold office, in those meetings and activities conducted by the State Bar of Georgia and any of its component parts or sections.\n","UrlName":"rule16","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6e87a3b6-6173-4c3a-a2c4-178843aa70a3","Title":"Rule 1-206.1. Law Student Members","Content":"In addition to the membership and classes of membership provided in this chapter, the State Bar of Georgia may recognize as law student members, without the rights and privileges of membership, those law students currently enrolled in a law school approved by the American Bar Association or any law school approved by the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners. Law student members may be furnished copies of appropriate publications electronically and may be entitled to attend and participate, without the right to vote or hold office, in those meetings and activities conducted by the State Bar of Georgia and any of its component parts or sections.\n","UrlName":"rule17","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0835bb73-8231-43bf-a560-8c59908439fd","Title":"Rule 1-207. Change of Address","Content":" All members of the State Bar of Georgia shall keep the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia informed of their current name, official address and telephone number. The Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia may rely on the official address given to the membership department and failure on the part of a member to notify the membership department may have adverse consequences to a member. The choice of a member to use only a post office box address on the State Bar of Georgia membership records shall constitute an election to waive personal service in any proceedings between the bar and the member. Notification given to any department of the State Bar of Georgia other than the membership department shall not satisfy this requirement.\n","UrlName":"rule18","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"97fc1270-8ef5-4b57-be01-91223448bdaa","Title":"Rule 1-208. Resignation from Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Resignation while in good standing. A member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar of Georgia. Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing unless such person complies with part (f) or part (g) of this rule.</li> \n <li>Resignation while delinquent or suspended for failure to pay dues or for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements. A member of the State Bar of Georgia who is delinquent or suspended (but not terminated) for failure to pay dues or failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar of Georgia. Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar of Georgia unless such person complies with part (f) or part (g) of this rule.</li> \n <li> A petition for leave to resign from membership with the State Bar of Georgia shall comply with the following:  \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>the petition shall be filed under oath with the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia and shall contain a statement that there are no disciplinary actions or criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner; and</li> \n <li>the petition shall contain a statement as to whether the petition is being filed under part (a) or part (b) of this rule. If the petition is being filed under part (b), the petition shall state the term of the delinquency and/or suspension for failure to pay dues or to comply with continuing legal education requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No petition for leave to resign shall be accepted if there are disciplinary proceedings or criminal charges pending against the member, or if the member is not in good standing for failure to pay child support obligations under Bar Rule 1-209. A petition filed under this rule shall constitute a waiver of the confidentiality provisions of Bar Rule 4-221 (d) as to any pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li>Resignation shall not be a bar to institution of subsequent disciplinary proceedings for any conduct of the resigned person occurring prior to the resignation. If the penalty imposed on the resigned member is disbarment or suspension, the status of the member shall be changed from “resigned member” to that of a person so disciplined.</li> \n <li>A petition filed under this rule shall not toll the provisions of Bar Rule 1-501 (c).</li> \n <li> Readmission within five years after resignation. For a period of five years after the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the member of the State Bar of Georgia who has resigned pursuant to this rule may apply for readmission to the State Bar of Georgia upon completion of the following terms and conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>payment in full of any delinquent dues, late fees and penalties owing at the time the petition for leave to resign was accepted, and payment in full of the current dues for the year in which readmission is sought;</li> \n <li>payment of a readmission fee to the State Bar of Georgia equal to the amount the member seeking readmission would have paid during the period of resignation if he or she had instead elected inactive status;</li> \n <li>for resignations while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements under part (b) of this rule, submission of a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency declaring that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; and</li> \n <li>submission to the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants. Provided the former member seeking readmission has applied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants before the expiration of the five-year period after his or her resignation, the former member shall be readmitted upon submitting a determination of fitness even if the five-year period has expired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Readmission after five years. After the expiration of five years from the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the former member must comply with the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule19","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"865943ac-a42d-44b7-839d-3d9105500eca","ParentId":"97fc1270-8ef5-4b57-be01-91223448bdaa","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Resignation while in good standing. A member of the State Bar in good standing may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar. Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar in good standing unless such person \n complies with part (f) or part (g) of this Rule. </li> \n <li>Resignation while delinquent or suspended for failure to pay dues or for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements:  A member of the State Bar who is delinquent or suspended (but not terminated) for failure to pay dues or failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements may, under oath, petition the Executive Committee for leave to resign from the State Bar.  Upon acceptance of such petition by the Executive Committee by majority vote, such person shall not practice law in this state nor be entitled to any privileges and benefits accorded to active members of the State Bar unless such person complies with part (f) or part (g) of this Rule.</li> \n <li> A petition for leave to resign from membership with the State Bar shall comply with the following: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> the petition shall be filed under oath with the Executive Director of the State Bar and shall contain a statement that there are no disciplinary actions or criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner; and \n   </li> \n <li>the petition shall contain a statement as to whether the petition is being filed under part (a) or part (b) of this Rule. If the petition is being filed under part (b), the petition shall state the term of the delinquency and/or suspension for failure to pay dues or to comply with continuing legal education requirements.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>No petition for leave to resign shall be accepted if there are disciplinary proceedings or criminal charges pending against the member, or if the member is not in good standing for failure to pay child support obligations under Bar Rule 1-209.</li> \n <li>A petition filed under this Rule shall constitute a waiver of the confidentiality provisions of Rule 4-221(d) as to any pending disciplinary proceedings.</li> \n <li> Readmission within five years after resignation. For a period of five years after the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the member of the State Bar who has resigned pursuant to this Rule may apply for readmission to the State Bar upon completion of the following terms and conditions: \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> payment in full of any delinquent dues, late fees and penalties  owing at the time the petition for leave to resign was accepted, and payment in full of the current dues for the year in which readmission is sought; \n   </li> \n <li> payment of a readmission fee to the State Bar equal to the amount the member seeking readmission would have paid during the period of resignation if he or she had instead elected inactive status; \n   </li> \n <li> for resignations while suspended for failure to comply with continuing legal education requirements under part (b) of this Rule, submission of a certificate from the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency declaring that the suspended member is current on all requirements for continuing legal education; and \n   </li> \n <li>submission to the membership department of the State Bar of a determination of fitness from the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants. Provided the former member seeking readmission has applied to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants before the expiration of the five year period after his or her resignation, the former member shall be readmitted upon submitting a determination of fitness even if the five year period has expired.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>Readmission after five years. After the expiration of five years from the effective date of a voluntary resignation, the former member must comply with the Rules governing admission to the practice of law in Georgia as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision14"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1b4ac2a9-af48-4439-a51a-5e7145202db3","Title":"Rule 1-209. Failure to Pay Child Support Obligations","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Obligation to Pay Child Support. A Bar member shall not willfully refuse, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction under the procedures of OCGA § 19-6-28.1, to timely pay a child support obligation and continue such refusal for 30 days after said determination becomes final. A certified copy of a court order finding that the member has willfully failed to maintain compliance with child support obligations shall be conclusive evidence of an infraction of this rule. So long as a member is complying fully with the purge provisions of a court order of contempt for non-payment of child support, this rule shall not apply. </li> \n <li> Not in Good Standing Upon Non Compliance. In the event a court of competent jurisdiction makes a finding, under the procedures of OCGA § 19-6-28.1, that a member has willfully failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for 30 days after said determination becomes final, the member shall be deemed not to be in good standing and shall remain in such status until such time as the noncompliance is corrected. </li> \n <li> Action by State Bar of Georgia. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, under the procedures of OCGA § 19-6-28.1, finding that a member has failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for 30 days after said determination becomes final, a notice shall be mailed by certified mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia. The notice is deemed received whenever actually received or five days after the notice is mailed, whichever is sooner. </li> \n <li> Return to Good Standing. A member deemed not to be in good standing under this rule shall be deemed to be in good standing upon providing the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia a certified copy of a court order finding that the delinquency has been satisfied and by paying an administrative fee set by the Executive Committee. The member shall be returned to good standing only upon compliance with the foregoing conditions.  </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule20","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"3334e7a0-542a-4f6e-b855-d46b5386d701","ParentId":"1b4ac2a9-af48-4439-a51a-5e7145202db3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Obligation to Pay Child Support. A Bar member shall not willfully refuse, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction under the procedures of O.G.C.A. § 19-6-28.1, to timely pay a child support obligation and continue such refusal for thirty days after said determination becomes final. A certified copy of a court order finding that the member has willfully failed to maintain compliance with child support obligations shall be conclusive evidence of an infraction of this Rule. So long as a member is complying fully with the purge provisions of a court order of contempt for non-payment of child support, this Rule shall not apply. </li> \n <li> Not in Good Standing Upon Non Compliance. In the event a court of competent jurisdiction makes a finding, under the procedures of O.G.C.A. § 19-6-28.1, that a member has willfully failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for thirty days after said determination becomes final, the member shall be deemed not to be in good standing and shall remain in such status until such time as the noncompliance is corrected. </li> \n <li> Action by State Bar of Georgia. Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, under the procedures of O.G.C.A. § 19-6-28.1, finding that a member has failed to timely pay a child support obligation and continues such refusal for thirty days after said determination becomes final, a notice shall be mailed by certified mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar. The notice is deemed received whenever actually received or five days after the notice is mailed, whichever is sooner. </li> \n <li> Return to Good Standing. A member deemed not to be in good standing under this Rule shall be deemed to be in good standing upon providing the Executive Director of the State Bar a certified copy of a court order finding that the delinquency has been satisfied and by paying an administrative fee set by the Executive Committee. The member shall be returned to good standing only upon compliance with the foregoing conditions.  </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision15"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b7d724f8-0863-4dbf-8187-660d1b24a48d","Title":"Rule 1-102. Powers","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia shall be a legal entity; may sue and be sued; shall have perpetual existence; may contract; may purchase, receive, lease, acquire, own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal with real and personal property and any legal or equitable interest in property, wherever located; may sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property; may adopt and use an official seal; shall establish a principal office; and shall have such other powers, privileges and duties as may be reasonable and necessary for the proper fulfillment of its purposes.","UrlName":"rule7","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"06add8eb-7362-4022-a8ad-f12f94850910","Title":"Section 3. No compensation. Reimbursable Expenses.","Content":"Officers and members of the Center shall not be compensated for services rendered to the Center. However, officers and members may be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses in the furtherance of Center business upon submission of receipts of any reimbursable expenditure to the Center Treasurer and subsequent approval by the Center Executive Committee. All approved reimbursements shall be submitted to the Finance Department of the State Bar of Georgia for payment.","UrlName":"rule636","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Title":"State Bar Programs","Content":"","UrlName":"ha1","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Title":"Part VI - Arbitration of Fee Disputes","Content":"","UrlName":"part13","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"98a6c37a-3249-4f7f-8a90-7c19e78d12d4","Title":"Preamble","Content":"The purpose of the State Bar of Georgia’s program for the arbitration of fee disputes is to provide a convenient mechanism for the resolution of disputes (1) between lawyers and clients over fees; (2) between lawyers in connection with the dissolution of a practice or the withdrawal of a lawyer from a partnership or practice; or (3) between lawyers concerning the allocation of fees earned from joint services. If the parties to such a dispute have been unable to reach an agreement between or among themselves, either side may petition the State Bar Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes (“Committee”) to arbitrate the dispute pursuant to these rules.\nRegardless of whether a lawyer or a client initiates the filing of petitions requesting arbitration of the dispute, by filing the petition, the petitioner shall be bound by the result of the arbitration. This is intended to discourage the filing of complaints that are frivolous or that seek to invoke the process simply to obtain an “advisory opinion.” If the respondent also agrees to be bound, the resulting arbitration award shall be enforceable under the Georgia Arbitration Code, OCGA § 9-9-1 et seq.\nIf a client initiates the arbitration process and the respondent lawyer refuses to be bound by any resulting award, the matter will not be accepted for arbitration.\nIf at any time during the process as set forth in these rules, based upon information received or a lack of information received, the Committee may make a referral to the Office of the General Counsel for consideration of an inquiry into a possible disciplinary action based on Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct including Rule 1.5 (unreasonable fees) and/or Rule 1.16 (d) (failure to return unearned fees) or other applicable rules.","UrlName":"chapter72","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Title":"CHAPTER 1 COMMITTEE ON ARBITRATION OF ATTORNEY FEE DISPUTES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter4","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"642dae74-1c81-41c1-82f3-b1da08d54f39","Title":"Rule 6-101. Administration of Program.","Content":"This program will be administered by the State Bar Committee on the Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes (\"Committee \").","UrlName":"rule9","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"29f3f762-3ce4-41d2-a479-5529e061675b","Title":"Rule 6-102. Committee Membership.","Content":"The Committee shall consist of six lawyer members and three public members who are not lawyers. The six lawyer members shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, and the three public members shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule10","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a36635da-b8cb-4b17-b5cd-e12e05e7593a","Title":"Rule 6-103. Terms.","Content":"Initially, two members of the Committee, including one of the public members, shall be appointed for a period of three years; two members, including the remaining public members, for a period of two years; and one member for a period of one year. As each member's term of office on the Committee expires, his or her successor shall be appointed for a period of three years. The President of the State Bar shall appoint the chair of the Committee each year from among the members. Vacancies in unexpired terms shall be filled by their respective appointing authorities.","UrlName":"rule172","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"255e70a0-1276-4d24-8aa1-0d397fa52545","Title":"Rule 6-104. Powers and Duties of Committee.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Committee shall have the following powers and duties: \n(a) To determine whether to accept jurisdiction over a dispute; \n(b) To appoint and remove lawyer and nonlawyer arbitrators and panels of arbitrators; \n(c) To oversee the operation of the arbitration process; \n(d) To develop and implement fee arbitration procedures; \n(e) To interpret these rules and to decide any disputes regarding the interpretation and application of these rules; \n(f) To determine challenges to, and rule on, the neutrality of an arbitrator where the arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw; \n(g) To maintain the records of the State Bar of Georgia’s Fee Arbitration Program; and \n (h) To perform all other acts necessary for the effective operation of the Fee Arbitration Program. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule173","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[{"Id":"64c1f09c-e527-429e-9eb0-8d007bc8ab57","ParentId":"255e70a0-1276-4d24-8aa1-0d397fa52545","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Committee shall have the following powers and duties: \n(a) To determine whether to accept jurisdiction over a dispute; \n(b) To appoint and remove lawyer and nonlawyer arbitrators and panels of arbitrators; \n(c) To oversee the operation of the arbitration process; \n(d) To develop and implement fee arbitration procedures; \n(e) To interpret these rules and to decide any disputes regarding the interpretation and application of these rules; \n(f) To determine challenges to the neutrality of an arbitrator where the arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw; \n(g) To maintain the records of the State Bar of Georgia’s Fee Arbitration Program; and \n (h) To perform all other acts necessary for the effective operation of the Fee Arbitration Program. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision357"}],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"752ac92e-7474-4c51-872a-c6f423da39f2","Title":"Rule 6-105. Staff's Responsibilities.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> State Bar of Georgia staff shall be assigned to assist the Committee. The assigned staff will have such administrative responsibilities as may be delegated by the Committee, which may include the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Receive and review arbitration requests and discuss them with the parties, if necessary;</li> \n <li>Conduct inquiries to obtain additional information as needed;</li> \n <li>Make recommendations to the Committee whether to accept or decline jurisdiction; and</li> \n <li>Transmit notices of arbitration hearings, arbitration awards, and other Committee correspondence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule174","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Title":"CHAPTER 2 JURISDICTIONAL GUIDELINES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter17","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"3fb4159c-c10f-4b1f-8aa0-e9cb1e7dc1c2","Title":"Rule 6-201. Petition.","Content":"A request for arbitration of a fee dispute is initiated by the filing of a petition with the Committee. Each petition shall be filed on the Fee Arbitration Petition Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) A statement of the nature of the dispute and the petitioner’s statement of facts, including relevant exhibits and dates. The statement must be double-spaced, typed in a 12-point font or handwritten and is limited to 50 pages, including exhibits. The page limit may be increased by the Fee Arbitration staff for good cause shown;\n(b) The names and addresses of the client(s) and the lawyer(s);\n(c) A statement as to whether or not the petitioner has made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute;\n(d) A statement that by filing the petition, the petitioner has agreed to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(e) The date of the petition; and\n (f) Each petitioner’s signature. \n ","UrlName":"rule177","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"ef060a7a-5f9b-4270-9963-dc8231b9c971","ParentId":"3fb4159c-c10f-4b1f-8aa0-e9cb1e7dc1c2","Title":"Version 2","Content":"A request for arbitration of a fee dispute is initiated by the filing of a petition with the Committee. Each petition shall be filed on the Fee Arbitration Petition Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) A statement of the nature of the dispute and the petitioner’s statement of facts, including relevant dates;\n(b) The names and addresses of the client(s) and the attorney(s);\n(c) A statement that the petitioner has made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute and the details of that effort;\n(d) A statement that the petitioner agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(e) The date of the petition; and\n (f) Each petitioner’s signature. \n ","UrlName":"revision359"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a7affb39-3c1e-480a-b1e2-bc8eb86219a0","Title":"Rule 6-202. Service of Petition.","Content":"If a petition has been properly completed and appears to have merit, Committee staff shall serve a copy of the petition, along with a Fee Arbitration Answer Form and an acknowledgment of service form, upon the respondent by first class mail addressed to such party’s last known address. A signed acknowledgment of service form or a written answer from the respondent or respondent’s counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.\nIn the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent's counsel, service shall be certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to such party’s last known address.\nIn unusual circumstances as determined by the Committee or its staff, when service has not been accomplished by other less costly measures, service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or a court-approved agent for service of process.\n If service is not accomplished, the Committee shall not accept jurisdiction of the case. \n \n","UrlName":"rule178","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"da76d6ca-f51b-4f59-8c4b-ecab17268315","ParentId":"a7affb39-3c1e-480a-b1e2-bc8eb86219a0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"If a petition has been properly completed and appears to have merit, Committee staff shall serve a copy of the petition, along with a Fee Arbitration Answer Form and an acknowledgment of service form, upon the respondent by first class mail addressed to such party’s last known address. A signed acknowledgment of service form or a written answer from the respondent or respondent’s attorney shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.\nIn the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent's counsel, service shall be certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to such party’s last known address.\nIn unusual circumstances as determined by the Committee or its staff, when service has not been accomplished by other less costly measures, service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or a court-approved agent for service of process.\n If service is not accomplished, the Committee shall not accept jurisdiction of the case. \n \n","UrlName":"revision361"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"48a54110-ea1d-4783-8deb-3924cb6387bf","Title":"Rule 6-203. Answer.","Content":"Each respondent shall have 20 calendar days after service of a petition to file an answer with the Committee. Staff, in its discretion, may grant appropriate extensions of time for the filing of an answer.\nThe answer shall be filed on or with the Fee Arbitration Answer Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) If the respondent is the client and/or payer, a statement as to whether the respondent agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(b) The respondent’s statement of facts. The statement must be double-spaced, typed in a 12-point font or handwritten, and the submission is limited to 50 pages including exhibits. The page limit may be increased by the Fee Arbitration staff for good cause;\n(c) Any defenses the respondent intends to assert;\n(d) The date of the answer; and\n(e) Each respondent’s signature.\nCommittee staff shall serve a copy of the answer upon each petitioner by first class mail, addressed to such party’s last known address.\n The failure to file an answer shall not deprive the Committee of jurisdiction and shall not result in a default judgment against the respondent. \n \n","UrlName":"rule179","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"6a4dda32-6b9f-4864-8070-e7664c2b9fcb","ParentId":"48a54110-ea1d-4783-8deb-3924cb6387bf","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Each respondent shall have 20 calendar days after service of a petition to file an answer with the Committee. Staff, in its discretion, may grant appropriate extensions of time for the filing of an answer.\nThe answer shall be filed on or with the Fee Arbitration Answer Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) A statement as to whether the respondent agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(b) The respondent’s statement of facts;\n(c) Any defenses the respondent intends to assert;\n(d) The date of the answer; and\n(e) Each respondent’s signature.\nCommittee staff shall serve a copy of the answer upon each petitioner by first class mail, addressed to such party’s last known address.\n The failure to file an answer shall not deprive the Committee of jurisdiction and shall not result in a default judgment against the respondent. \n \n","UrlName":"revision363"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"13d790b3-03e5-48b3-bccc-2d96f5e50433","Title":"Rule 6-204. Accepting Jurisdiction.","Content":"The Committee or its designee may accept jurisdiction over a fee dispute only if the following requirements are considered satisfied:\n(a) The fee in question, whether paid or unpaid, was for legal services rendered by a lawyer who is, or was at the time the services were rendered, a member of the State Bar of Georgia or otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia.\n(b) The legal services in question were performed:\n(1) in the State of Georgia; or\n(2) from an office located in the State of Georgia; or\n(3) by a lawyer who is not admitted to the practice of law in any United States jurisdiction other than Georgia, and the circumstances are such that if the State Bar of Georgia does not accept jurisdiction, no other United States jurisdiction will be available to a client who has filed a petition under this program.\n(c) The disputed fee exceeds $1,000;\n(d) The amount of the disputed fee is not governed by statute or other law, nor has any court fixed or approved the full amount or all terms of the disputed fee. \n(e) The fee dispute is not the subject of litigation in court at the time the petition for arbitration is filed or when the Committee determines jurisdiction.\n(f) The petition seeking arbitration of the fee dispute is filed with the Committee no more than two years following the date on which the controversy arose.  If this date is disputed, it shall be determined in the same manner as the commencement of a cause of action on the underlying contract.\n(g) In the case of disputes between lawyers and clients, a lawyer/client relationship existed between the petitioner and the respondent at the time the legal services in question were performed.  A relative or other person paying the legal fees of the client may request arbitration of disputes over those fees, provided both the client and the other person payor join as co-petitioners or co-respondents and both agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\n(h) The client, whether petitioner or respondent, agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration. If the respondent lawyer does not agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration, the Committee will not accept the matter for arbitration.\n(i) In disputes between lawyers, the lawyers who are parties to the dispute are all members of the State Bar of Georgia and have all agreed to arbitrate the dispute under this program and to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\n(j) Where the parties to a fee dispute have signed a written agreement to submit fee disputes to binding arbitration with the State Bar of Georgia’s Attorney Fee Arbitration Program, the Committee will consider the agreement enforceable if it is:\n(1) set out in a separate paragraph;\n(2) written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract; and\n(3) separately initialed by the client and the lawyer.\n(k) In deciding whether to accept jurisdiction, the Committee shall review available evidence, including the recommendations of the staff, and make a determination whether to accept or decline jurisdiction. The Committee’s decisions on jurisdiction are final, except that such decisions are subject to reconsideration by the Committee upon the request of either party made within 30 days of the initial decision. Staff shall notify the parties of the Committee’s decision on jurisdiction by first class mail.","UrlName":"rule549","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"27c60fa8-a43f-4f2d-a0f6-00ca04c76bf5","ParentId":"13d790b3-03e5-48b3-bccc-2d96f5e50433","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee or its designee may accept jurisdiction over a fee dispute only if the following requirements are satisfied:\n(a) The fee in question, whether paid or unpaid, was for legal services rendered by a lawyer who is, or was at the time the services were rendered, a member of the State Bar of Georgia or otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia.\n(b) The legal services in question were performed:\n(1) in the State of Georgia; or\n(2) from an office located in the State of Georgia; or\n(3) by a lawyer who is not admitted to the practice of law in any United States jurisdiction other than Georgia, and the circumstances are such that if the State Bar of Georgia does not accept jurisdiction, no other United States jurisdiction will be available to a client who has filed a petition under this program.\n(c) The disputed fee exceeds $750.\n(d) The amount of the disputed fee is not governed by statute or other law, nor has any court fixed or approved the full amount or all terms of the disputed fee. \n(e) The fee dispute is not the subject of litigation in court at the time the petition for arbitration is filed or when the Committee determines jurisdiction.\n(f) The petition seeking arbitration of the fee dispute is filed with the Committee no more than two years following the date on which the controversy arose.  If this date is disputed, it shall be determined in the same manner as the commencement of a cause of action on the underlying contract.\n(g) In the case of disputes between lawyers and clients, a lawyer/client relationship existed between the petitioner and the respondent at the time the legal services in question were performed.  A relative or other person paying the legal fees of the client may request arbitration of disputes over those fees, provided both the client and the other person payor join as co-petitioners or co-respondents and both agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\n(h) The client, whether petitioner or respondent, agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration.  If the respondent attorney does not agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration, the Committee in its discretion may determine that it is in the best interest of the public and the legal profession to accept jurisdiction.  When the Committee accepts jurisdiction under these circumstances, the nonconsenting lawyer shall be considered a “party” for purposes of these rules.\n(i) In disputes between lawyers, the lawyers who are parties to the dispute are all members of the State Bar of Georgia and have all agreed to arbitrate the dispute under this program and to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\nAdditionally, where the parties to a fee dispute have signed  a written agreement to submit fee disputes to binding arbitration with the State Bar of Georgia’s Attorney Fee Arbitration Program, the Committee will consider the agreement enforceable if it is:\n(1) set out in a separate paragraph;\n(2) written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract; and\n(3) separately initialed by the client and the attorney.\nIn deciding whether to accept jurisdiction, the Committee shall review available evidence, including the recommendations of the staff, and make a determination whether to accept or decline jurisdiction. The Committee’s decisions on jurisdiction are final, except that such decisions are subject to reconsideration by the Committee upon the request of either party made within 30 days of the initial decision. Staff shall notify the parties of the Committee’s decision on jurisdiction by first class mail.","UrlName":"revision365"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"8123bb59-247d-435f-bea0-859a90d06ffa","Title":"Rule 6-205. Termination or Suspension of Proceedings.","Content":"The Committee may suspend or terminate arbitration proceedings or may decline or terminate jurisdiction if the client, in addition to pursuing arbitration of a fee dispute under these rules, asserts a claim against the lawyer in any court arising out of the same set of circumstances, including any claim of malpractice. Any claim or evidence of professional misconduct within the meaning of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility may be reported by the arbitrators or the Committee to the Office of the General Counsel for consideration under its normal procedures.","UrlName":"rule550","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f8255db1-a6cd-4071-a0a1-c7e81913363b","ParentId":"8123bb59-247d-435f-bea0-859a90d06ffa","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee may suspend or terminate arbitration proceedings or may decline or terminate jurisdiction if the client, in addition to pursuing arbitration of a fee dispute under these rules, asserts a claim against the lawyer in any court arising out of the same set of circumstances, including any claim of malpractice. Any claim or evidence of professional misconduct within the meaning of the Code of Professional Responsibility may be reported by the arbitrators or the Committee to the Office of the General Counsel for consideration under its normal procedures.","UrlName":"revision367"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"f8dac68a-526f-47ad-8e34-e42a22f77a1a","Title":"Rule 6-206. Revocation.","Content":"After jurisdiction has been accepted by the Committee, the submission to arbitration shall be irrevocable except by consent of all parties or by action of the Committee or the arbitration panel for good cause shown.","UrlName":"rule551","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9079abb2-ccbb-451c-b864-b8988ddc8c07","ParentId":"f8dac68a-526f-47ad-8e34-e42a22f77a1a","Title":"Version 2","Content":"After jurisdiction has been accepted by the Committee and the other party has agreed in writing to be bound by the award, the submission to arbitration shall be irrevocable except by consent of all parties or by action of the Committee or the arbitration panel for good cause shown.","UrlName":"revision369"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Title":"CHAPTER 3 SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter18","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"49642da5-76db-4c3e-a55c-54962c92493b","Title":"Rule 6-301. Roster of Arbitrators.","Content":"The Committee shall maintain a roster of lawyers available to serve as arbitrators on an “as needed” basis in appropriate geographical areas throughout the state. To the extent possible, the arbitration should take place in the same geographical area where the services in question were performed; however, the final decision as to the location of the arbitration remains with the Committee.\nThe Committee shall likewise maintain a roster of nonlawyer public members selected by the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n","UrlName":"rule180","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a4d46334-9f7d-45fd-b7d1-433a746e77cc","Title":"Rule 6-302. Neutrality of Arbitrators.","Content":"No person shall serve as an arbitrator in any matter in which that person has any financial or personal interest. Upon appointment to a particular arbitration, each arbitrator shall disclose to the Committee any circumstance that may affect his or her neutrality in regard to the dispute in question.\nIf an arbitrator becomes aware of any circumstances that might preclude that arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial determination of the proceeding, the arbitrator must disclose that potential conflict as soon as practicable. If the arbitrator becomes aware of the potential conflict prior to the hearing, the disclosure shall be made to the Committee, which shall forward the disclosure to the parties. If the potential conflict becomes apparent during the hearing, the disclosure shall be made directly to the parties.\nIf a party believes that an arbitrator has a potential conflict of interest and should withdraw or be disqualified, and the arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw, the party shall promptly notify the Committee so that the issue may be addressed and resolved as early in the arbitration process as possible.","UrlName":"rule181","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"4ac30ef0-882a-4203-9baf-dd794ef07068","Title":"Rule 6-303. Selection of Arbitrators.","Content":"The arbitration panel shall be selected by the Committee or its staff. Except as provided below, the arbitration panel shall consist of two lawyer members who have practiced law actively for at least five years and one nonlawyer public member.\nIn cases involving disputed amounts not exceeding $2,500, the Committee in its sole discretion may appoint an arbitration panel consisting of one lawyer who has practiced law actively for at least five years.\nPetitioner and respondent by mutual agreement shall have the right to select the three arbitrators. They also may mutually agree to have the dispute determined by a sole arbitrator jointly selected by them, provided any such sole arbitrator shall be one of the persons on the roster of arbitrators or shall have been approved in advance by the Committee upon the joint request of petitioner and respondent.","UrlName":"rule183","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[{"Id":"f73558d0-6378-4352-a982-582b853de4ce","ParentId":"4ac30ef0-882a-4203-9baf-dd794ef07068","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The arbitrator panel shall be selected by the Committee or its staff.  Except as provided below,  the arbitration panel shall consist of two attorney members who have practiced law actively for at least five years and one nonlawyer public member.\nIn cases involving disputed amounts greater than $750 but not exceeding $2,500, the Committee in its sole discretion may appoint an arbitration panel consisting of one lawyer who has practiced law actively for at least five years.\nPetitioner and respondent by mutual agreement shall have the right to select the three arbitrators. They also may mutually agree to have the dispute determined by a sole arbitrator jointly selected by them, provided any such sole arbitrator shall be one of the persons on the roster of arbitrators or shall have been approved in advance by the Committee upon the joint request of petitioner and respondent.","UrlName":"revision371"}],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d57de479-547d-46d6-a5b5-e7e9cb582eca","Title":"Rule 6-304. Qualifications of Lawyer Arbitrators.","Content":"In addition to being impartial, lawyer arbitrators shall:\n(a) Have practiced law actively for at least five years; and\n(b) Be an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule185","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3e661f11-40e6-4182-aa13-7dd5e7857e8b","Title":"Rule 6-305. Powers and Duties of Arbitration Panel.","Content":"The panel of arbitrators shall have the following powers and duties:\n(a) To compel by subpoena the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and things; \n(b) To decide the extent and method of any discovery;\n(c) To administer oaths and affirmations;\n(d) To take and hear evidence pertaining to the proceeding;\n(e) To rule on the admissibility of evidence;\n(f) To interpret and apply these rules insofar as they relate to the arbitrators’ powers and duties; and\n (g) To perform all acts necessary to conduct an effective arbitration hearing. \n ","UrlName":"rule186","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"26bdffc6-e867-429c-a54c-d7ad1be29212","Title":"Rule 6-306. Compensation.","Content":"All arbitrators shall serve voluntarily and without fee or expense reimbursement; provided, however, that arbitrators selected to serve in disputes in which all the parties are lawyers may at the discretion of the Committee be compensated, with such compensation to be paid by the lawyer parties as directed by the Committee.","UrlName":"rule553","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Title":"CHAPTER 4 RULES OF PROCEDURE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter19","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"20f2a648-ece6-4efc-9992-e43296cee870","Title":"Rule 6-401. Representation by Counsel.","Content":"Parties may be represented throughout the arbitration by counsel at their own expense, or they may represent themselves.","UrlName":"rule187","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"aaa86634-ba25-4cdf-b355-36c7f53fa339","Title":"Rule 6-402. Time and Place of Arbitration Hearing.","Content":"Upon their appointment by the Committee, the arbitrators shall elect a chair and then shall fix a time and place for the arbitration hearing. To the extent feasible, the hearing shall be held no more than 60 days after the appointment of the last arbitrator. At least ten calendar days prior to the hearing, the Committee shall mail notices of the time and place of the hearing to each party by first class mail, addressed to each party’s last known address.","UrlName":"rule188","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"65b02520-e02c-4413-a445-3ff54639f0d5","Title":"Rule 6-403. Attendance and Participation at Hearing.","Content":"The parties shall have the right to attend and participate in the arbitration hearing at their own expense. It shall be discretionary with the arbitrators whether to allow the attendance of any persons who are not parties, witnesses, or counsel to one of the parties. \nAt the discretion of the arbitrators, a party may be permitted to appear or present witness testimony at the hearing by telephone conference call, video conference, computer-facilitated conference, or similar telecommunications equipment, provided all persons participating in the hearing can simultaneously hear each other during the hearing. \n","UrlName":"rule189","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"49ef6373-fb5c-4517-94f8-165b1ef56f0f","Title":"Rule 6-404. Stenographic Record.","Content":"Any party may ask the Committee to arrange for the taking of a stenographic record of the proceeding. If a party orders a transcript, that party shall acquire and provide a certified copy of the transcript for the record at no cost to the panel. Other parties are entitled at their own expense to acquire a copy of the transcript by making arrangements directly with the court reporter. However, it shall not be necessary to have a stenographic record of the hearing.","UrlName":"rule190","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"44186e12-ec9b-43b5-b9e4-c363cb6f7cea","Title":"Rule 6-405. Death, Disability, or Resignation of Arbitrator.","Content":"If an arbitrator dies, resigns, or becomes unable to continue to act while an arbitration is pending, the remaining two arbitrators shall not proceed with the arbitration. The Committee or its designee shall determine the course of further proceedings and may appoint a substitute or replacement arbitrator or, by agreement of the parties, may proceed with one arbitrator.","UrlName":"rule191","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"f7b776c0-3747-4c04-8d11-7a0bd312df21","Title":"Rule 6-406. Discovery, Subpoenas and Witnesses.","Content":"Upon the written request of a party or the panel’s own motion, discovery may be allowed to the extent deemed necessary by the arbitrators in their sole discretion.\nThe arbitrators may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the production of documents and things, and may do so either upon the arbitrators’ own initiative or upon the request of a party. These subpoenas shall be served and, upon application to the Superior Court in the county in which the arbitration is pending by a party or the arbitrators, enforced in the same manner provided by law for the service and enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action.","UrlName":"rule192","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"b7e42b81-ba5a-4f3d-912a-e12ae1c3a3e3","Title":"Rule 6-407. Adjournments.","Content":" The arbitrators for good cause shown may adjourn the hearing upon the request of either party or upon the arbitrators' own initiative. ","UrlName":"rule193","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"efdc6ba2-56b1-4006-94fe-ae7dca366e98","Title":"Rule 6-408. Arbitrators' Oath.","Content":" Before proceeding with the hearing, the arbitrators shall take an oath of office. The arbitrators have the discretion to require witnesses to testify under oath or affirmation, and, if requested by either party, shall so require. ","UrlName":"rule194","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3f53cce9-e1f8-4480-a4b4-8bb5d6b7e4fd","Title":"Rule 6-409. Order of Proceedings.","Content":"The hearing shall be opened by the filing of the oath of the arbitrators. Next, the panel shall record the place, time, and date of the hearing, the names of the arbitrators, the parties, parties’ counsel, and any witnesses who will be presenting evidence during the hearing.\nThe normal order of proceedings shall be the same as at a trial, with the petitioner’s claim being presented first. However, the arbitrators shall have the discretion to vary the normal order of proceedings.\nThe petitioner shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.","UrlName":"rule197","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"b1c4a2cb-3c73-45d9-b7de-b661610769e1","Title":"Rule 6-410. Arbitration in the Absence of a Party.","Content":"The arbitration may proceed in the absence of a party, who, after due notice, fails to be present in person or by telephonic or electronic means. An award shall not be made solely on the default of a party; the arbitrators shall require the other party or parties to present such evidence as the arbitrators may require for the making of an award.","UrlName":"rule198","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3215dffa-e984-435d-9ff0-85df6a75b24d","Title":"Rule 6-411. Evidence.","Content":"(a) Parties may offer such relevant and material evidence as they desire and shall produce such additional evidence as the arbitrators may deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. The arbitrators shall be the judge of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence offered. The rules of evidence shall be liberally interpreted, and hearsay may be utilized at the discretion of the arbitrators and given such weight as the arbitrators deem appropriate.\n(b) A list shall be made of all exhibits received into evidence by the arbitrators. Exhibits shall be listed in the order in which they were received, and the list shall be made a part of the record.\n(c) The names and addresses of all witnesses who testify at the arbitration shall be made a part of the record. Upon their own motion or at the request of any party, the arbitrators shall have the power to require the sequestration of any witness during the testimony of other witnesses. \n(d) The arbitrators may receive and consider the evidence of witnesses by affidavit (copies of which shall be served on the opposing party at least five days prior to the hearing), but shall give such evidence only such weight as the arbitrators deem proper after consideration of any objections made to its admissibility.\n(e) The petition, answer, and other pleadings, including any documents attached thereto, may be considered as evidence at the discretion of the arbitrators and given such weight as the arbitrators deem appropriate.\n(f) The receipt of testimony by deposition, conference telephone calls, and other procedures is within the discretion of the arbitrators upon their own motion or at the request of any party.","UrlName":"rule199","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5b41d4f3-36ae-4d0e-b4ad-607c8c10a944","Title":"Rule 6-412. Written Contract.","Content":"Arbitrators shall give due regard to the terms of any written contract signed by the parties.","UrlName":"rule200","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d6c18e65-5e62-4119-a49a-835e0927524c","Title":"Rule 6-413. Closing of Hearings.","Content":"Prior to the closing of an arbitration hearing, the arbitrators shall inquire of all parties whether they have any further evidence to offer or additional witnesses to be heard. If no further evidence is to be presented by either party, the arbitrators shall declare the hearing closed and make a record of that fact.","UrlName":"rule201","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a6b13526-5aec-49d4-9e32-4066ae85ffa4","Title":"Rule 6-414. Reopening of Hearings.","Content":"Upon the motion of the arbitrators or of a party, an arbitration may be reopened for good cause shown at any time before an award is made. However, if the reopening of the hearing would prevent the award from being rendered within the time provided by these rules, the matter may not be reopened unless both parties agree upon the extension of such time limit.","UrlName":"rule202","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"eb4c3ca3-b9c6-4656-a8b7-b2b5edd8963e","Title":"Rule 6-415. Waiver of Rules.","Content":"Any party who, knowing of a failure to comply with a provision or requirement of these rules, fails to state an objection on the record or in writing prior to the closing of the hearing, shall be deemed to have waived any right to object.","UrlName":"rule204","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"6959e076-bd5e-4f3a-8c67-a4ac34a0e283","Title":"Rule 6-416. Waiver of Oral Hearings.","Content":"The parties may provide by written agreement for the waiver of oral hearings.","UrlName":"rule205","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"067c6e9c-370c-42f5-a25e-e094623f77a8","Title":"Rule 6-417. Award.","Content":"The award of the arbitrators is final and binding upon the parties.","UrlName":"rule206","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[{"Id":"591cde2c-2b91-46dd-8c09-c62a31b3ca17","ParentId":"067c6e9c-370c-42f5-a25e-e094623f77a8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"If both parties have agreed to be bound by the arbitration, the award of the arbitrators is final and binding upon the parties.\nIn cases in which a lawyer refuses to be bound by the result of the arbitration, the award rendered will be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the award in any action brought to enforce the award, and the burden of proof shall shift to the lawyer to prove otherwise.","UrlName":"revision373"}],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"f6376b54-55fe-4be5-89fd-cb9106b70698","Title":"Rule 6-418. Time of Award.","Content":"The arbitrators shall make all reasonable efforts to render their award promptly and not later than 30 days from the date of the closing of the hearing, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties with the consent of the arbitrators or an extension is obtained from the Committee or its chair. If oral hearing has been waived, then the time period for rendering the award shall begin to run from the date of the receipt of final statements and evidence by the arbitrators.","UrlName":"rule208","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"1dd28e4a-284c-4947-be5c-0b314c7f0a94","Title":"Rule 6-419. Form of Award.","Content":" The award shall be in writing and shall be signed by the arbitrators or by a concurring majority. The parties shall advise the arbitrators in writing prior to the close of the hearing if they request the arbitrators to accompany the award with an opinion. ","UrlName":"rule209","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"7d6a4e7e-9738-4eef-b6ee-5791206b029a","Title":"Rule 6-420. Award Upon Settlement.","Content":" If the parties settle their dispute during the course of the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrators, the Committee, or the Committee’s designee, upon the written consent of all parties, may set forth the terms of the settlement in an award. \n ","UrlName":"rule210","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"0de27bf3-375e-48aa-a91f-064d3e3e6e06","Title":"Rule 6-421. Service of Award Upon Parties.","Content":" Service of the award upon the parties shall be the responsibility of Committee staff. Service of the award shall be accomplished by depositing a copy of the award in the United States Mail in a properly addressed envelope with adequate first class postage thereon and addressed to each party at his or her last known address. \n ","UrlName":"rule211","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c7b66407-2c38-435d-8e09-dfdd6b29e9b4","Title":"Rule 6-422. Communication with Arbitrators.","Content":" There shall be no ex parte communication between a party and an arbitrator. ","UrlName":"rule212","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3cfd41d2-7dc6-495f-a2d4-5d5a296bb92d","Title":"Rule 6-423. Interpretation and Application of Rules.","Content":"If the arbitrators on a panel disagree as to the interpretation or application of any rule relating to the arbitrators’ powers and duties, such dispute shall be decided by a majority vote of the arbitrators. If the dispute cannot be resolved in that manner, an arbitrator or a party may refer the question to the Committee for its determination. The Committee’s decision on the interpretation or application of these rules shall be final.","UrlName":"rule213","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","Title":"CHAPTER 5 POST-AWARD PROCEEDINGS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter20","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"da1136f9-65ac-4998-b3f2-ce4ed8f29cb0","Title":"Rule 6-501. Confirmation of Award in Favor of Client.","Content":"In cases where an award in favor of a client has not been satisfied within three months after it was served upon the parties, the client may apply to the appropriate Georgia superior court for confirmation of the award in accordance with the Georgia Arbitration Code, OCGA § 9-9-1 et seq. \n Upon the written request of a client, the Committee may provide a lawyer to represent the client in post-award proceedings at no cost to the client other than court filing fees and litigation expenses. Alternatively, the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia may represent, assist, or advise a client in post-award proceedings, provided the client shall be responsible for all court filing fees and litigation expenses. \n ","UrlName":"rule214","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","Revisions":[{"Id":"cf4b1901-5eea-40a9-a832-4ddcb059257f","ParentId":"da1136f9-65ac-4998-b3f2-ce4ed8f29cb0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"In cases where both parties agreed to be bound by the result of the arbitration and an award in favor of a client has not been satisfied within three months after it was served upon the parties, the client may apply to the appropriate Georgia superior court for confirmation of the award in accordance with the Georgia Arbitration Code, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 et seq. \n Upon the written request of a client, the Committee may provide a lawyer to represent the client in post-award proceedings at no cost to the client other than court filing fees and litigation expenses. Alternatively, the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia may represent, assist, or advise a client in post-award proceedings, provided the client shall be responsible for all court filing fees and litigation expenses. \n ","UrlName":"revision375"}],"Ancestors":["402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"2e4eb30e-dedb-4a6b-893e-b3fc6d5a0344","Title":"Rule 6-502. Confirmation of Award in Favor of Lawyer.","Content":"In cases where an award has been issued in favor of a lawyer, the lawyer may apply to the appropriate Georgia superior court for confirmation of the award in accordance with the Georgia Arbitration Code, OCGA § 9-9-1 et seq. \nThe State Bar will not represent, assist, or advise the lawyer except to provide copies of any necessary papers from the fee arbitration file pursuant to State Bar policies.","UrlName":"rule215","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","Revisions":[{"Id":"9f427d40-d68a-44bc-a6bc-1f90fc3a2ea4","ParentId":"2e4eb30e-dedb-4a6b-893e-b3fc6d5a0344","Title":"Version 2","Content":"In cases where both parties agreed to be bound by the result of the arbitration and an award has been issued in favor of an attorney, the attorney may apply to the appropriate Georgia superior court for confirmation of the award in accordance with the Georgia Arbitration Code, O.C.G.A. § 9-9-1 et seq. \nThe State Bar will not represent, assist, or advise the attorney except to provide copies of any necessary papers from the fee arbitration file pursuant to State Bar policies.","UrlName":"revision377"}],"Ancestors":["402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"cb46df7c-4172-4cc3-ade3-ad17921cc071","Title":"Rule 6-503. Procedure Where Lawyer Refuses to be Bound.","Content":"All arbitration awards under these rules are enforceable under the Georgia Arbitration Code, OCGA § 9-9-1 et seq.\nUpon the written request of a client, the Committee may provide a lawyer to represent the client in post-award proceedings at no cost to the client other than court filing fees and litigation expenses. Alternatively, the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia may represent, assist, or advise a client in post-award proceedings, provided the client shall be responsible for all court filing fees and litigation expenses.","UrlName":"rule554","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","Revisions":[{"Id":"eb170cfc-de72-4945-8a97-e432a253a214","ParentId":"cb46df7c-4172-4cc3-ade3-ad17921cc071","Title":"Version 2","Content":"In cases where an attorney refuses to be bound by the result of an arbitration and an award in favor of a client remains unsatisfied three months after service of the award upon the parties, the State Bar of Georgia, upon the written request of the client, may provide a lawyer to represent the client in post-award proceedings at no cost to the client other than court filing fees and litigation expenses. Alternatively, the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia may represent, assist, or advise a client in post-award proceedings, provided the client shall be responsible for all court filing fees and litigation expenses.\nAn award rendered in favor of a client in a case in which the attorney refused to be bound by the result of the arbitration will be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the award, and the burden of proof shall shift to the lawyer to prove otherwise.","UrlName":"revision379"}],"Ancestors":["402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","Title":"CHAPTER 6 CONFIDENTIALITY, RECORD RETENTION, AND IMMUNITY","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter21","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"c2e0301e-0a12-4c2a-9386-363280cfa9f5","Title":"Rule 6-601. Confidentiality.","Content":"All records, documents, files, proceedings, and hearings pertaining to the arbitration of a fee dispute under this program are the property of the State Bar of Georgia and, except for the award itself, shall be deemed confidential and shall not be made public by the State Bar of Georgia.\nA person who was not a party to the dispute shall not be allowed access to such materials unless all parties to the arbitration consent in writing or a court of competent jurisdiction orders such access. However, the Committee, its staff, or representative may reveal confidential information in those circumstances in which the Office of the General Counsel is authorized by Bar Rule 4-221.1 to do so.","UrlName":"rule216","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","Revisions":[{"Id":"7b16926f-ca59-4097-88ac-b6c6df82ed55","ParentId":"c2e0301e-0a12-4c2a-9386-363280cfa9f5","Title":"Version 2","Content":"All records, documents, files, proceedings, and hearings pertaining to the arbitration of a fee dispute under this program are the property of the State Bar of Georgia and, except for the award itself, shall be deemed confidential and shall not be made public. \nA person who was not a party to the dispute shall not be allowed access to such materials unless all parties to the arbitration consent in writing or a court of competent jurisdiction orders such access. However, the Committee, its staff, or representative may reveal confidential information in those circumstances in which the Office of the General Counsel is authorized by Bar Rule 4-221(d) to do so.","UrlName":"revision381"}],"Ancestors":["3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ef81550f-6aa4-4427-9eb1-91fe9f396730","Title":"Rule 6-602. Record Retention.","Content":"The record of any fee dispute under these rules shall be retained by the Committee in accordance with policies adopted by the Committee.","UrlName":"rule555","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"586f5f38-e08a-4af0-b679-25c9b10631bc","Title":"Rule 6-603. Immunity.","Content":"The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the Fee Arbitration Program of the State Bar of Georgia to be judicial and quasi-judicial in nature and within the Court’s regulatory function, and in connection with such arbitration proceedings, members of the Fee Arbitration Committee, volunteer arbitrators, appointed voluntary counsel assisting the program and State Bar of Georgia Fee Arbitration staff are entitled to those immunities customarily afforded to persons so participating in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings or engaged in such arbitration activities.","UrlName":"rule556","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","Revisions":[{"Id":"d921256b-a2e8-4d6b-83b3-131c2dcc637c","ParentId":"586f5f38-e08a-4af0-b679-25c9b10631bc","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Committee members, arbitrators, staff, and appointed voluntary counsel assisting the program shall be immune from suit for any conduct in the course and scope of their official duties under this program. Parties and witnesses shall have such immunity as is applicable in a civil action in Georgia.","UrlName":"revision383"}],"Ancestors":["3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Title":"Part VII - Lawyer Assistance Program","Content":"","UrlName":"part15","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Title":"CHAPTER 1 LAWYER ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter24","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"3205e5e5-546f-4a68-82ab-11c137545e52","Title":"Preamble.","Content":"The purpose of the Lawyer Assistance Program (“LAP”) is to confidentially assist State Bar of Georgia members who may be experiencing mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related problems that may impact their ability to function effectively as lawyers or judges, through education, peer support and professional clinical services.","UrlName":"rule230","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"b1c0cf7b-27ef-47df-b082-d125b4e66b25","ParentId":"3205e5e5-546f-4a68-82ab-11c137545e52","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The purpose of the Lawyer Assistance Program is to confidentially identify and assist Bar members who are experiencing problems which negatively impact their quality of life and their ability to function effectively as members of the Bar through education, intervention, peer support and professional clinical treatment.","UrlName":"revision238"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ee7bce3a-4857-4d1f-8c1e-fede853e08b5","Title":"Rule 7-101. Committee.","Content":"The LAP shall be administered by the State Bar of Georgia’s Lawyer Assistance Program Committee (“Committee”). The Committee shall monitor and provide advice to the staff and provide recommendations to the Executive Committee and Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia with respect to the rules, procedures, policies and operation of the LAP, while maintaining its obligation of privacy as set forth in these Rules. The Committee shall create internal rules for the day-to-day operation of the LAP and the implementation of these Rules. The internal rules and any amendments thereto shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule232","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"6dad650a-31bc-48c9-9ac4-06c935b10870","ParentId":"ee7bce3a-4857-4d1f-8c1e-fede853e08b5","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The program will be administered by the State Bar's Lawyer Assistance Committee (\"Committee \"). The Committee shall monitor and render advice to the staff, Executive Committee, and Board of Governors with respect to the rules, procedures, policies and operation of a Lawyer Assistance Program (\"LAP \").","UrlName":"revision240"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"13a9ac41-b84b-4415-8fe5-3c5e64e8928d","Title":"Rule 7-102. Membership.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Committee members shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia for a three-year term in accordance with Article VIII, Section 1 of the bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.  In addition, the President shall appoint four non-lawyers to serve on the Committee, provided that such non-lawyers are licensed, certified addiction counselors, certified employee assistance professionals, licensed therapists, or other licensed mental/behavioral health professionals or other persons who have experience in conducting alcohol and drug rehabilitation intervention programs or mental health assistance programs. The term of such non-lawyer appointment shall be three years. Any member of the Committee with a previously identified chemical or alcohol dependence or other addiction must have a period of sobriety of at least five years prior to becoming a member of the Committee. Any member of the Committee who has received inpatient treatment for mental illness must have been released from the facility at which such treatment was provided at least two years prior to becoming a member of the Committee. The Committee may also appoint peer support volunteers as volunteer members in accordance with its rules.  Peer support volunteers must comply with this Rule concerning substance abuse and mental illness. Any Committee member or peer support volunteer with a previously identified chemical or alcohol dependence or other addiction or who has received inpatient treatment for mental illness must certify their recovery, sobriety, or satisfactory completion of medical treatment and release from treatment as provided in the internal rules of the Committee.</li> \n <li>Any Committee member or peer volunteer who suffers a relapse related to a substance use disorder and/or experiences challenges related to a diagnosed mental illness of any type to the degree to which significantly impairs his or her ability to serve shall be removed as a member of the Committee and/or as a peer volunteer pursuant to its internal rules.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule237","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"6349932c-e941-4f2f-b5ba-513e6cbc9845","ParentId":"13a9ac41-b84b-4415-8fe5-3c5e64e8928d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar in accordance with Article VIII, Section 1, of the bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. In addition, the President, at his or her discretion, may appoint up to four non-lawyers to serve on the Committee, provided that such non-lawyers are licensed, certified addiction counselors, certified employee assistance professionals, licensed therapists, or other persons who have experience in conducting alcohol and drug rehabilitation intervention programs or mental health assistance programs. The term of such non-lawyer appointment shall be one year. Any member of the Committee who is a recovered chemical or alcohol dependent person must have a period of sobriety of at least five years.","UrlName":"revision242"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c1bbc00d-3d22-43b9-a931-47f6c3bb75a5","Title":"Rule 7-103. Responsibility.","Content":"The Committee shall be responsible for implementing programs within the scope of these Rules to assist State Bar of Georgia members who request help from the LAP for mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related issues. Such programs shall provide for education, support, and/or professional clinical services through a LAP health care provider or referral for other counseling or treatment where appropriate. All programs shall require approval of the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule240","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"397fe879-f8ee-4b8a-8b75-c65181c535b5","ParentId":"c1bbc00d-3d22-43b9-a931-47f6c3bb75a5","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall be responsible for implementing an impairment program that provides education, referral and intervention.","UrlName":"revision244"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"899b1465-f896-417f-a71a-4fde6e2fb7b0","Title":"Rule 7-104. Funding.","Content":"The work of the Committee and any health care provider selected to assist the Committee in carrying out the work of the LAP, with approval of the Executive Committee, may be funded from the general budget of the State Bar of Georgia and/or through donations and grants from the Georgia Bar Foundation or other public or private sources.","UrlName":"rule247","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"4db66563-97fb-4b10-bb6b-5b2a14b7b3e9","ParentId":"899b1465-f896-417f-a71a-4fde6e2fb7b0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The work of the Committee and any treatment provider selected to assist the Committee in carrying out the work of the program shall be funded from the general budget of the State Bar and/or through donations and grants from the Georgia Bar Foundation or other public or private sources.","UrlName":"revision246"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Title":"CHAPTER 2 GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter25","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"139bb72c-2008-477e-ad31-3cf9f56d1ea7","Title":"Rule 7-201. Education, Information and Awareness.","Content":"The Committee shall promote and implement procedures to communicate to State Bar of Georgia members that there are programs within the LAP available and ready to help lawyers in need to overcome mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related problems. All such communication procedures shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule250","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"32c2e946-5a3a-4e6e-b77c-c92d2baf9f96","ParentId":"139bb72c-2008-477e-ad31-3cf9f56d1ea7","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall promote and implement procedures to communicate to impaired attorneys and the Bar in general the fact that there is a program available and ready to assist in helping the impaired attorneys to overcome their problem.","UrlName":"revision248"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"0c9649b8-2d6f-403d-b8a7-31e0c3e134bd","Title":"Rule 7-202. Volunteers.","Content":"The Committee may establish a network of peer support volunteers, as defined in Rule 7-204, who can provide support to lawyers in need.","UrlName":"rule254","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"acba73ef-9086-4f21-94c5-f5376c3861ef","ParentId":"0c9649b8-2d6f-403d-b8a7-31e0c3e134bd","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee may establish a network of attorneys and lay persons throughout the state of Georgia who are experienced or trained in impairment counseling, treatment or rehabilitation, who can conduct education and awareness programs and assist in counseling and intervention programs and services. The Committee may also establish a network of peer-support volunteers who are members of the State Bar of Georgia who are not trained in impairment counseling, treatment or rehabilitation, who can provide support to impaired or potentially impaired attorneys by sharing their life experiences in dealing with (a) mental or emotional health problems, (b) substance abuse problems or (c) other similar problems that can adversely affect the quality of attorneys’ lives and their ability to function effectively as lawyers.","UrlName":"revision250"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"28532539-dfc4-468c-b730-9c3f6d3b099c","Title":"Rule 7-203. Procedures for Receiving and Action on Information Concerning Request for Assistance.","Content":"The Committee shall establish, design and implement procedures necessary for a health care provider to directly and confidentially receive information concerning lawyers requesting assistance with mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related issues. All such procedures shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule256","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d02711e-9a3f-493f-a9be-09e71a1a8646","ParentId":"28532539-dfc4-468c-b730-9c3f6d3b099c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The members of the Committee shall establish, design and implement all procedures necessary to receive information concerning impaired attorneys. Upon a determination that an attorney is impaired, the Committee shall implement such resources as to the Committee appear appropriate in each individual case. In carrying out its duties under this rule, the Committee, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee, is authorized to outsource the clinical portion of the Lawyer Assistance Program to private sector health care professionals. Such health care professionals and their related staff, consultants and other designees shall be authorized to communicate with each other and with the Committee regarding the program or persons referred to the program by the Committee. Said communications shall not constitute a violation of the confidentiality rules established herein.","UrlName":"revision252"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5b7f375a-f3c9-429d-ac6e-ec4df5fe7745","Title":"Rule 7-204. Definitions.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Lawyer. A lawyer, for the purposes of this Rule, is a member of the State Bar of Georgia as defined in Part I, Chapter 2, Rule 1-202 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Health Care Provider. A person authorized by the State of Georgia to practice a health care discipline and performing within the scope of his or her practice as defined by State law or an entity under Georgia law to employ such person.</li> \n <li>Peer Support Volunteers. Lawyers who have been approved by the Committee to serve as volunteer members by offering empathy and validation to a lawyer who may be suffering from a mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related problem, generally by providing practical, social, and emotional support, potentially based on their own experiences with a similar illness, stress or condition.</li> \n <li>Professional Clinical Services. Services provided by licensed mental health and substance abuse counselors in connection with the diagnosis, assessment, evaluation, treatment or prevention of psychological, emotional, psychophysiological and behavioral problems and addiction. These services include procedures for understanding, predicting, and alleviating intellectual, emotional, physical, and psychological distress, social and behavioral maladjustment, mental illness and addiction, as well as other forms of discomfort.</li> \n <li>Substance Abuse. A dependence on an addictive substance, especially alcohol or drugs.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule260","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"98e009e3-e914-4a2a-a16b-21f4b87b9111","ParentId":"5b7f375a-f3c9-429d-ac6e-ec4df5fe7745","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> \n <ol> \n <li>Attorney, as used in this Part VII, shall include active, inactive, emeritus and foreign law consultant members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>An impaired attorney is an attorney who, in the opinion of the members of the Committee, the State Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court of Georgia, or the members of the professional health care provider selected in accordance with Rule 7-203 above, who suffers from a medical, psychological, emotional, or stress-related disease or problem, or who is actively abusing alcohol or other chemical substances, or has become dependent upon alcohol or such substances, such that the attorney poses a substantial threat of harm to the attorney or the attorney's clients, or the public.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision253"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Title":"CHAPTER 3 PROCEDURES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter26","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"f2cb6b1f-2931-480b-bea0-2d433d04dab8","Title":"Rule 7-301. Outsourcing of Clinical Services.","Content":"In carrying out its duties, the Committee, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee, is authorized to outsource the clinical portion(s) of the LAP to private sector health care providers.","UrlName":"rule262","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"e8926b20-cd90-4425-b6ca-6aaf692fdcae","ParentId":"f2cb6b1f-2931-480b-bea0-2d433d04dab8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall be authorized to establish and implement procedures to handle all contacts from or concerning impaired or potentially impaired attorneys, either through its chosen health care professional source, the statewide network established pursuant to Rule 7-202, or by any other procedure through which appropriate counseling or assistance to such attorneys may be provided.","UrlName":"revision255"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"16602d5a-7789-4890-b5c5-baa7c707d48f","Title":"Rule 7-302. Confidentiality.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except as provided in this Rule or by court order, all information in the possession or control of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301), or any peer support volunteer or other designee, concerning any person who has sought, has been identified as a potential recipient of, or has received assistance from the LAP, or has volunteered to serve as a peer support volunteer, shall be maintained in confidence unless the person who is the subject of the information otherwise elects, except that any person may reveal: \n <ol> \n <li>to police or emergency responders, or any person in imminent danger, information needed to avoid or prevent death or substantial bodily harm, and</li> \n <li> information that is:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>mandated by statute to be reported;</li> \n <li>necessary to respond in any proceeding to allegation of malfeasance concerning actions taken by such person as a member or designee of the Committee pursuant to any LAP program, including any assistance he or she provided to a lawyer as part of a volunteer network established pursuant to Rule 7-102; or</li> \n <li>necessary for disclosure to counsel in order to secure legal advice about his or her compliance with these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n Confidential information in the possession of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301) or any peer support volunteer or other designee, also may be privileged under OCGA § 24-5-501 (a) (5), (a) (6), (a) (7) or (a) (8). Communications that are needed to carry out the LAP’s purposes are authorized between or among members of the Committee, its staff, any peer support volunteers, and/or the employees, staff or agents of any health care provider selected under Rule 7-301. Such communications shall not constitute breaches of the confidentiality required under this Rule, provided that the identity of any lawyer who has sought assistance directly from a health care provider selected under Rule 7-301 shall not be disclosed to the Committee, its members, staff, or designees, unless said member of the State Bar of Georgia has consented to such disclosure. Statements by a lawyer seeking or receiving assistance from the LAP to the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301), or any peer support volunteer or other designee shall not be admissible against the lawyer in any disciplinary proceeding under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule264","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"5e944b86-4f41-45be-a95d-aab96e2d5526","ParentId":"16602d5a-7789-4890-b5c5-baa7c707d48f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Upon the referral of any case to the Committee by the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, the Committee shall provide assistance to the impaired attorney referred by the Disciplinary Board as otherwise authorized by these rules. The Committee shall report to the Board, from time to time, the progress or lack of progress of the attorney so referred.","UrlName":"revision260"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"265273d2-e7a2-40ad-9608-2305521f7b94","Title":"Rule 7-303. Reports.","Content":"The Committee shall implement and design such reports and documentation on an annual basis or as requested by the President of the State Bar of Georgia for reporting purposes to the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 7-302. Recognizing that disclosure of the identity of members of the State Bar of Georgia who have sought LAP assistance would be contrary to the purposes for which the Committee was established, neither the Committee, peer support volunteers, nor any health care provider selected under Rule 7-301 shall be required to provide confidential information concerning any such person to any private or government entity except by court order or as provided in Rule 7-302.","UrlName":"rule267","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"d3a1733d-1a6e-43d8-b308-ab3fb9d1946d","ParentId":"265273d2-e7a2-40ad-9608-2305521f7b94","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except as provided in this Rule and in Rule 4-104 (b), Rule 4-104 (c), Rule 7-203 and Rule 7-305, all proceedings and records of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation its contractor for clinical services) and other designees, including any information provided to any of them, shall be confidential unless the attorney who has provided the information or caused the record to be created otherwise elects, except that any such person may reveal (i) to police or emergency responders, or any person in imminent danger, information needed to avoid or prevent death or substantial bodily harm, and (ii) information: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>which is mandated by statute to be reported;</li> \n <li>to respond in any proceeding to allegations of misfeasance concerning the assistance he or she has provided to an impaired attorney as part of a volunteer network established pursuant to Rule 7-202; and</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about his or her compliance with these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision257"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ffceaf66-d6c8-42c8-8028-cf63d43bb8b3","Title":"Rule 7-304. Immunity.","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia, its employees, and members of the Committee and its selected clinical outsource private health care professionals shall be absolutely immune from civil liability for all acts taken in the course of their official duties pursuant to these Rules.","UrlName":"rule269","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"b7cecee4-4602-4186-b714-413b40ffb2f7","ParentId":"ffceaf66-d6c8-42c8-8028-cf63d43bb8b3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall implement and design such reports and documentation as it deems necessary or as is requested by the president of the State Bar, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 7-303.","UrlName":"revision259"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","Title":"Part VIII - Continuing Legal Education","Content":"","UrlName":"part16","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Title":"CHAPTER 1 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter29","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"1d102211-07ba-4ccd-8e93-650241a83304","Title":"Rule 8-101. Purpose.","Content":"It is of utmost importance to members of the Bar and to the public that attorneys maintain their professional competence throughout their active practice of law. To that end, these rules establish the minimum requirements for continuing legal education.","UrlName":"rule222","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d5906dc3-8e74-4e63-ba85-0e2f4c5082bb","Title":"Rule 8-102. Definition.","Content":"(a) \"Accredited sponsor \"shall mean an organization whose entire continuing legal education program has been accredited by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. A specific, individual continuing legal education activity presented by such a sponsor constitutes an approved legal education activity.\n(b) \"Active member \"shall include any person who is licensed to practice law in the State of Georgia and who is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, but shall not include the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, other Constitutional Executive Officers elected statewide, members of the Georgia Senate and the Georgia House of Representatives, United States Senators and Representatives, and shall not include judges who are prohibited by law, statute, or ordinance from engaging in the practice of law.\n(c) \"Commission \"shall mean the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (CCLC).\n(d) \"Inactive member \"shall mean a member of the State Bar who is on inactive status.\n(e) \"Supreme Court \"shall mean the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(f) \"Year \"shall mean the calendar year.","UrlName":"rule224","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"6f28e2b3-d8e4-4921-8603-7376b4054e6d","Title":"Rule 8-103. Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.","Content":"(A) Membership, Appointment and Terms:\nThere is established a permanent commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.  The Commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and six (6) by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be designated by the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, one (1) shall be designated by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and one (1) shall be designated by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia. Members shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia. Members of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and by the Board of Governors of the State Bar shall be appointed for staggered three (3) year terms and until their successors are appointed, except that the initial appointed members of the Commission shall consist of four (4) members appointed for a term of one (1) year, four (4) members appointed for a term of two (2) years, and four (4) members appointed for a term of three (3) years. The appointed members of the initial Commission shall be appointed half by the Supreme Court and half by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. No member appointed by the Supreme Court or the Board of Governors may serve more than two (2) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be reappointed otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years. Members of the Commission designated by the Executive Committee, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the President of the Young Lawyers Division shall each serve for a term of one (1) year. No person so designated to the Commission may serve more than three (3) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be redesignated otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years.\nThe Commission shall designate each year one of its members to serve as Chairperson. The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as ex-officio members of the Commission, but shall have no vote. The Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as Secretary of the Commission.\n Regulations \n (1)Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quorum of the CCLC. \n (2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calendar year. \n (3) Vice Chair . The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each calendar year. \n (4) Executive Committee . The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary business of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC. \n (5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission. \n (6) Other Committees . The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable. \n (7) Vacancy . A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected. \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Board:\n(1) The Commission shall have general supervisory authority to administer these Rules.\n(2) The Commission shall have specific duties and responsibilities:\n(a) To approve all or portions of individual courses and programs of a sponsor which satisfy the educational requirements of Rule 8-106;\n(b) To determine the number of credit hours allowed for each course or educational activity;\n(c) To encourage courses and programs by established organizations, whether offered within or without the State;\n(d) To educate the public about the legal profession;\n(e) To adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with these Rules;\n(f) To establish an office or offices and to employ such persons as the Commission deems necessary for the proper administration of these Rules and to delegate to them appropriate authority, subject to the review of the Commission;\n(g) To report at least annually to the State Bar and to the Supreme Court the activities and recommendations of the Commission and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these Rules;\n(h) To report promptly to the Supreme Court any violation of these Rules.\n Regulations \n (1) Appeals . The CCLC is the final authority on all matters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal. \n (2) Amendments . The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation. \n (3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call. \n(C) Finances:\n(1) Purpose. The Commission should be adequately funded to enable it to perform its duties in a financially independent manner.\n(2) Sources. Costs of administration of the Commission shall be derived from charges to members of the State Bar for continuing legal education activities.\n(a) Sponsors of CLE programs to be held within the State of Georgia shall, as a condition of accreditation, agree to remit a list of Georgia attendees and to pay a fee for each active State Bar member who attends the program. This sponsor's fee shall be based on each day of attendance, with a proportional fee for programs lasting less than a whole day. The rate shall be set by the Commission.\n(b) The Commission shall fix a reasonably comparable fee to be paid by individual attorneys who either (a) attend approved CLE programs outside the State of Georgia or (b) attend un-approved CLE programs within the State of Georgia that would have been approved for credit except for the failure of the sponsor to pay the fee described in the preceding paragraph. Such fee shall accompany the attorney's annual report.\n(3) Uses. Funds may be expended for the proper administration of the Commission. However, the members of the Commission shall serve on a voluntary basis without expense reimbursement or compensation.\n Regulations \n (1) Sponsor Fee. The sponsor fee, a charge paid directly by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia and for distance learning programs attended by Georgia attorneys. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list showing the names and Georgia Bar membership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"420\" height=\"109\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour per attendee CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by total approved CLE hours </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by number of Georgia attorney attendees </td> \n <td> x 10 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total sponsor fee due \n </td> \n <td> $120.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no sponsor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee for courses taken in the current year, by March 31 of the following year. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"348\" height=\"98\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by hours taken by attendee </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total attendee fee due </td> \n <td> $12.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (3) Fee Review . The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner. \n (4) Uniform Application . The fee shall be applied uniformly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee. \n (5) Professionalism Fee . All active members of the State Bar of Georgia currently are assessed a $11 surcharge annually on their dues notice. The surcharge is determined each year by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism. This surcharge will allow for unlimited professionalism courses taken during that calendar year for CLE credit. The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit including professionalism. ","UrlName":"rule226","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"50a9d8d6-c3a3-48a4-b863-40809dd99622","ParentId":"6f28e2b3-d8e4-4921-8603-7376b4054e6d","Title":"Version 3","Content":"(A) Membership, Appointment and Terms:\nThere is established a permanent commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.  The Commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and six (6) by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be designated by the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, one (1) shall be designated by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and one (1) shall be designated by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia. Members shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia. Members of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and by the Board of Governors of the State Bar shall be appointed for staggered three (3) year terms and until their successors are appointed, except that the initial appointed members of the Commission shall consist of four (4) members appointed for a term of one (1) year, four (4) members appointed for a term of two (2) years, and four (4) members appointed for a term of three (3) years. The appointed members of the initial Commission shall be appointed half by the Supreme Court and half by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. No member appointed by the Supreme Court or the Board of Governors may serve more than two (2) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be reappointed otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years. Members of the Commission designated by the Executive Committee, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the President of the Young Lawyers Division shall each serve for a term of one (1) year. No person so designated to the Commission may serve more than three (3) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be redesignated otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years.\nThe Commission shall designate each year one of its members to serve as Chairperson. The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as ex-officio members of the Commission, but shall have no vote. The Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as Secretary of the Commission.\n Regulations \n (1)Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quorum of the CCLC. \n (2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calendar year. \n (3) Vice Chair . The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each calendar year. \n (4) Executive Committee . The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary business of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC. \n (5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission. \n (6) Other Committees . The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable. \n (7) Vacancy . A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected. \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Board:\n(1) The Commission shall have general supervisory authority to administer these Rules.\n(2) The Commission shall have specific duties and responsibilities:\n(a) To approve all or portions of individual courses and programs of a sponsor which satisfy the educational requirements of Rule 8-106;\n(b) To determine the number of credit hours allowed for each course or educational activity;\n(c) To encourage courses and programs by established organizations, whether offered within or without the State;\n(d) To educate the public about the legal profession;\n(e) To adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with these Rules;\n(f) To establish an office or offices and to employ such persons as the Commission deems necessary for the proper administration of these Rules and to delegate to them appropriate authority, subject to the review of the Commission;\n(g) To report at least annually to the State Bar and to the Supreme Court the activities and recommendations of the Commission and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these Rules;\n(h) To report promptly to the Supreme Court any violation of these Rules.\n Regulations \n (1) Appeals . The CCLC is the final authority on all matters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal. \n (2) Amendments . The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation. \n (3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call. \n(C) Finances:\n(1) Purpose. The Commission should be adequately funded to enable it to perform its duties in a financially independent manner.\n(2) Sources. Costs of administration of the Commission shall be derived from charges to members of the State Bar for continuing legal education activities.\n(a) Sponsors of CLE programs to be held within the State of Georgia shall, as a condition of accreditation, agree to remit a list of Georgia attendees and to pay a fee for each active State Bar member who attends the program. This sponsor's fee shall be based on each day of attendance, with a proportional fee for programs lasting less than a whole day. The rate shall be set by the Commission.\n(b) The Commission shall fix a reasonably comparable fee to be paid by individual attorneys who either (a) attend approved CLE programs outside the State of Georgia or (b) attend un-approved CLE programs within the State of Georgia that would have been approved for credit except for the failure of the sponsor to pay the fee described in the preceding paragraph. Such fee shall accompany the attorney's annual report.\n(3) Uses. Funds may be expended for the proper administration of the Commission. However, the members of the Commission shall serve on a voluntary basis without expense reimbursement or compensation.\n Regulations \n (1) Sponsor Fee. The sponsor fee, a charge paid directly by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia and for distance learning programs attended by Georgia attorneys. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list showing the names and Georgia Bar membership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"420\" height=\"109\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour per attendee CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by total approved CLE hours </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by number of Georgia attorney attendees </td> \n <td> x 10 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total sponsor fee due \n </td> \n <td> $120.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no sponsor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee for courses taken in the current year, by March 31 of the following year. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"348\" height=\"98\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by hours taken by attendee </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total attendee fee due </td> \n <td> $12.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (3) Fee Review . The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner. \n (4) Uniform Application . The fee shall be applied uniformly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee. \n (5) Professionalism Fee . Effective July 1, 2018, all active members of the State Bar of Georgia will be assessed a $15 surcharge annually on their dues notice. This surcharge will allow for unlimited professionalism courses taken during that calendar year for CLE credit. The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit including professionalism. ","UrlName":"revision335"},{"Id":"b25f504f-c0b7-433d-9e60-a48d98de1d71","ParentId":"6f28e2b3-d8e4-4921-8603-7376b4054e6d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(A) Membership, Appointment and Terms:\nThere is established a permanent commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.  The Commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and six (6) by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be designated by the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, one (1) shall be designated by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and one (1) shall be designated by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia. Members shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia. Members of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and by the Board of Governors of the State Bar shall be appointed for staggered three (3) year terms and until their successors are appointed, except that the initial appointed members of the Commission shall consist of four (4) members appointed for a term of one (1) year, four (4) members appointed for a term of two (2) years, and four (4) members appointed for a term of three (3) years. The appointed members of the initial Commission shall be appointed half by the Supreme Court and half by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. No member appointed by the Supreme Court or the Board of Governors may serve more than two (2) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be reappointed otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years. Members of the Commission designated by the Executive Committee, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the President of the Young Lawyers Division shall each serve for a term of one (1) year. No person so designated to the Commission may serve more than three (3) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be redesignated otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years.\nThe Commission shall designate each year one of its members to serve as Chairperson. The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as ex-officio members of the Commission, but shall have no vote. The Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as Secretary of the Commission.\n Regulations \n (1)Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quorum of the CCLC. \n (2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calendar year. \n (3) Vice Chair . The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each calendar year. \n (4) Executive Committee . The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary business of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC. \n (5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission. \n (6) Other Committees . The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable. \n (7) Vacancy . A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected. \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Board:\n(1) The Commission shall have general supervisory authority to administer these Rules.\n(2) The Commission shall have specific duties and responsibilities:\n(a) To approve all or portions of individual courses and programs of a sponsor which satisfy the educational requirements of Rule 8-106;\n(b) To determine the number of credit hours allowed for each course or educational activity;\n(c) To encourage courses and programs by established organizations, whether offered within or without the State;\n(d) To educate the public about the legal profession;\n(e) To adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with these Rules;\n(f) To establish an office or offices and to employ such persons as the Commission deems necessary for the proper administration of these Rules and to delegate to them appropriate authority, subject to the review of the Commission;\n(g) To report at least annually to the State Bar and to the Supreme Court the activities and recommendations of the Commission and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these Rules;\n(h) To report promptly to the Supreme Court any violation of these Rules.\n Regulations \n (1) Appeals . The CCLC is the final authority on all matters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal. \n (2) Amendments . The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation. \n (3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call. \n(C) Finances:\n(1) Purpose. The Commission should be adequately funded to enable it to perform its duties in a financially independent manner.\n(2) Sources. Costs of administration of the Commission shall be derived from charges to members of the State Bar for continuing legal education activities.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n(a) Sponsors of CLE programs to be held within the State of Georgia shall, as a condition of accreditation, agree to remit a list of Georgia attendees and to pay a fee for each active State Bar member who attends the program. This sponsor's fee shall be based on each day of attendance, with a proportional fee for programs lasting less than a whole day. The rate shall be set by the Commission. \n(b) The Commission shall fix a reasonably comparable fee to be paid by individual attorneys who either (a) attend approved CLE programs outside the State of Georgia or (b) attend un-approved CLE programs within the State of Georgia that would have been approved for credit except for the failure of the sponsor to pay the fee described in the preceding paragraph. Such fee shall accompany the attorney's annual report. \n</blockquote>\n(3) Uses. Funds may be expended for the proper administration of the Commission. However, the members of the Commission shall serve on a voluntary basis without expense reimbursement or compensation.\n Regulations \n (1) Sponsor Fee. The Sponsor fee, a charge paid directly by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list in alphabetical order showing the names and Georgia Bar membership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. The amount of the fee is set at $5.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following formula and example: \n<table style=\"width: 440px; height: 102px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Formula </td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Fee </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by total approved CLE hours </td> \n <td> x ? </td> \n <td> x 5.4 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by number of Georgia attendees </td> \n <td> x ? </td> \n <td> x 129 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total sponsor fee </td> \n <td> $ ? </td> \n <td> $3483.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no sponsor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee along with their annual report before January 31st following the calendar year for which the report is being submitted. The amount of the fee is set at $5.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following formula and example: \n<table style=\"width: 432px; height: 98px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Formula </td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Fee </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by the total approved CLE hours for which the attorney seeks credit but for which sponsor fee was paid. </td> \n <td> x ? </td> \n <td> x 3.3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total attendee fee </td> \n <td> $ ? </td> \n <td> $16.50 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (3) Fee Review . The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner. \n (4) Uniform Application . The fee shall be applied uniformly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee. \n (5)  Professionalism Fee. The charge for professionalism credit is $15.00 per professionalism hour per attendee. This is in addition to the $5.00 per credit hour per attendee required by the CCLC. Each professionalism hour thus carries a charge per attendee of $20.00. The sponsor shall remit payment for CLE credit as follows: \n A check for $5.00 per total CLE hour (including professionalism) per attendee should be made payable to CCLC and mailed with the attendance list to the CCLC at the State Bar address.\n A check for $15.00 per professionalism CLE hour per attendee should be made payable to CJCP (Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism) and mailed to the CJCP at the State Bar address.\n For example, if the sponsor is paying for 5 attendees who attended a 6-hour seminar including 1 hour of ethics and 1 hour of professionalism, payment should be as follows:\n $5 per hour x 6 hours of CLE x 5 attendees = $150 (payable to CCLC)\n $15 per Professionalism hour x 5 attendees = $75 (payable to CJCP)\n The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit including professionalism. ","UrlName":"revision118"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Rule 8-104. Education Requirements and Exemptions.","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Approval of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status. Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice. Have been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia for not less than five years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation. Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action. Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand; State Disciplinary Board Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action. During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor. \n \n </ul> \n</ul>\n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"rule227","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"db934e62-2bbb-4245-8c8d-2ae03a5332eb","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 4","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"></blockquote>\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand; State Disciplinary Board Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n \n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision327"},{"Id":"b1a82c24-91d5-46f9-8604-88e8f775e64c","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 5","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"></blockquote>\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia for not less than five years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand; State Disciplinary Board Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n \n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision407"},{"Id":"bb484df1-773b-4421-ac38-9cf0fdbb97bd","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 3","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"></blockquote>\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; Review Panel Reprimand; Investigative Panel Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n \n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision298"},{"Id":"23f48cdd-629e-4093-b77f-be7f614a24a3","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year. \n <blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year. \n </blockquote> \n (2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years. \n \n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years. \n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings. \n <blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating. \n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules. \n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order. \n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records. \n </blockquote></blockquote> Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div> \n</blockquote>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics includes instruction on professional responsibility and malpractice. It does not include such topics as attorney fees, client development, law office economics, and practice systems except to the extent that professional responsibility is directly discussed in connection with these topics. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; Review Panel Reprimand; Investigative Panel Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n\n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n \n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n v. An actual or simulated mediation. \n</blockquote>Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision120"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"234876e2-c895-4b7a-914d-459926995947","Title":"Rule 8-105. Annual Report.","Content":"The Commission shall provide at the end of each year to all non-exempt active members an Annual Report of their CLE record in such form as the Commission shall prescribe.\nA member whose record contains credit for unearned hours shall report corrections on or before January 31st. A member whose record fails to include credit for earned hours may report corrections on or before January 31st.","UrlName":"rule229","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Rule 8-106. Hours and Accreditation.","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = CLE hours (round down to \n    nearest half hour ) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Lawyer Wellness. Wellness and mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104(A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life and law practice topics. To receive CLE credit these wellness topics must be discussed in the context of the legal profession and the effects on the quality of the legal services the lawyer is able to provide. Presentations approved may include stress management in the context of work/life balance in the practice of law, signs of substance abuse or mental health issues in oneself or a colleague within the legal community, lawyer assistance programs and other topics that are focused on the impact of substance abuse, mental health issues or stress management on lawyers and judges. CLE credit will not be given to presentations which solely focus on personal stress reduction techniques such as breathing exercises, meditation and yoga. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.  \n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest half hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $4 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys.\nThese In-House CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions:\n a. All In-House CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters.\ne. Attorneys can earn all or any portion of their CLE requirement through approved In-House CLE activities.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) Distance Learning CLE . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; computer-based CLE activities, on demand CLE programs, teleconference CLE programs and live CLE webcasts/webinars. Attorneys can earn all or any portion of their CLE requirement through Distance Learning CLE programs.\n (16)Interactivity Requirement for Approval of Distance Learning CLE. (Effective January 2022) CLE sponsors are reminded that CCLC emphasizes the importance of engagement in distance learning programming. The CCLC recognizes high levels of interaction that can be achieved through ubiquitous video streaming services and encourages the use of these technologies to maximum the educational experience.\nCourses must provide mechanisms to ensure interactivity and permit the attendee to interact with the presenter, other attendees or with the educational software itself based on responses by the participant. The following methods are provided as examples of course monitoring: Periodic Quizzing, Response Tracking, Web Logs, Video Monitoring, Time Recorders, Final Tests, User Navigation Monitoring and User Prompts.\nThe CCLC does not undertake the indeterminate task of issuing precise definitions of interactivity. Specific implementation of all of the above is not required, but incorporation of technology to ensure a positive and interactive educational experience is required.\nCLE Sponsors should provide high quality written instructional materials. These materials may be available for download or otherwise furnished so attendees will have the ability to refer to such material during and subsequent to the program.","UrlName":"rule231","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"19f67b1c-65a4-4673-8100-2dfc2cc8b047","ParentId":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Version 5","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = CLE hours (round down to \n    nearest half hour ) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Lawyer Wellness. Wellness and mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104(A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life and law practice topics. To receive CLE credit these wellness topics must be discussed in the context of the legal profession and the effects on the quality of the legal services the lawyer is able to provide. Presentations approved may include stress management in the context of work/life balance in the practice of law, signs of substance abuse or mental health issues in oneself or a colleague within the legal community, lawyer assistance programs and other topics that are focused on the impact of substance abuse, mental health issues or stress management on lawyers and judges. CLE credit will not be given to presentations which solely focus on personal stress reduction techniques such as breathing exercises, meditation and yoga. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.  \n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest half hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $4 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys. \nThese In-House CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions:\n a. All In-House CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters.\ne. Attorneys can earn all or any portion of their CLE requirement through approved In-House CLE activities.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) Distance Learning CLE . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; computer-based CLE activities, on demand CLE programs, teleconference CLE programs and live CLE webcasts/webinars. Attorneys can earn all or any portion of their CLE requirement through Distance Learning CLE programs.","UrlName":"revision337"},{"Id":"30480843-e0d7-4b44-89f1-351acf5dc9f1","ParentId":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE and ethics hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = total hours (round to the \n nearest 1/10th of an hour) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Mental Health.  Mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104 (A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life topics. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.\n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest tenth of an hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $5 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n (8) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE affidavit, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia.\n (9) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House/Self-Study CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys. However, it is also educational and beneficial for attorneys to meet and learn from colleagues who practice in other firms, corporate legal departments, or similar entities including sole practitioners.\nThe Commission recognizes that active member attorneys on an individual basis may participate in distance learning CLE activities, which constitutes Self-Study.\n These In-House/Self-Study CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions: \n \n a. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House/Self-Study CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters. \n \ne. Up to six (6) CLE hours may be earned by an attorney in a calendar year through any combination of approved In-House/Self-Study activities. In addition, up to six hours of In-House/Self-Study credit may be carried forward and applied to In-House/Self-Study CLE for the next calendar year or carried back to the previous year to satisfy a CLE deficiency as long as the In-House/Self-Study limit for that year has not been met. While In-House credits count toward this six (6) CLE hour annual limit for all members of the sponsoring law firm or legal department, non-member attorneys who attend those In-House CLE programs will receive regular credit that does not count toward the six (6) CLE hour annual limit. For example, if a law firm conducts a seminar attended both by its partners or associates and by in-house counsel of its corporate client or other invited attorney guests, these credits would count toward the six (6) hour limit for the firm's partners and associates, but not for the non-member guests.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) CLE Delivery Formats . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. These distance learning CLE activities may be attended by an individual attorney with no minimum number of attendees needed to receive approved MCLE credit, but must comply with the In-House/Self-Study CLE Regulation 8 to Rule 8-106(B). Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; on-line computer CLE activities, CD-ROM and DVD interactive CLE activities; and written correspondence CLE courses. When attended by an individual attorney, the distance learning activity constitutes Self-Study CLE. Examples of non-qualifying educational activities that are encouraged on a non-MCLE approved credit basis include: reading cases and advance sheets, legal research, internet chat groups and jury duty.","UrlName":"revision232"},{"Id":"b3d2ff93-39f2-4f01-9942-9c79d3076c72","ParentId":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Version 3","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = CLE hours (round down to \n    nearest half hour ) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Lawyer Wellness. Wellness and mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104(A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life and law practice topics. To receive CLE credit these wellness topics must be discussed in the context of the legal profession and the effects on the quality of the legal services the lawyer is able to provide. Presentations approved may include stress management in the context of work/life balance in the practice of law, signs of substance abuse or mental health issues in oneself or a colleague within the legal community, lawyer assistance programs and other topics that are focused on the impact of substance abuse, mental health issues or stress management on lawyers and judges. CLE credit will not be given to presentations which solely focus on personal stress reduction techniques such as breathing exercises, meditation and yoga. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.  \n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest tenth of an hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $5 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House/Self-Study CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys. However, it is also educational and beneficial for attorneys to meet and learn from colleagues who practice in other firms, corporate legal departments, or similar entities including sole practitioners.\nThe Commission recognizes that active member attorneys on an individual basis may participate in distance learning CLE activities, which constitutes Self-Study.\n These In-House/Self-Study CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions: \n \n a. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House/Self-Study CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters. \n \ne. Up to six (6) CLE hours may be earned by an attorney in a calendar year through any combination of approved In-House/Self-Study activities. In addition, up to six hours of In-House/Self-Study credit may be carried forward and applied to In-House/Self-Study CLE for the next calendar year or carried back to the previous year to satisfy a CLE deficiency as long as the In-House/Self-Study limit for that year has not been met. While In-House credits count toward this six (6) CLE hour annual limit for all members of the sponsoring law firm or legal department, non-member attorneys who attend those In-House CLE programs will receive regular credit that does not count toward the six (6) CLE hour annual limit. For example, if a law firm conducts a seminar attended both by its partners or associates and by in-house counsel of its corporate client or other invited attorney guests, these credits would count toward the six (6) hour limit for the firm's partners and associates, but not for the non-member guests.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) CLE Delivery Formats . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. These distance learning CLE activities may be attended by an individual attorney with no minimum number of attendees needed to receive approved MCLE credit, but must comply with the In-House/Self-Study CLE Regulation 8 to Rule 8-106(B). Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; on-line computer CLE activities, CD-ROM and DVD interactive CLE activities; and written correspondence CLE courses. When attended by an individual attorney, the distance learning activity constitutes Self-Study CLE. Examples of non-qualifying educational activities that are encouraged on a non-MCLE approved credit basis include: reading cases and advance sheets, legal research, internet chat groups and jury duty.","UrlName":"revision284"},{"Id":"04fad5b2-f9de-44c5-9dd3-dbc30cf2c95b","ParentId":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Version 4","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = CLE hours (round down to \n    nearest half hour ) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Lawyer Wellness. Wellness and mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104(A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life and law practice topics. To receive CLE credit these wellness topics must be discussed in the context of the legal profession and the effects on the quality of the legal services the lawyer is able to provide. Presentations approved may include stress management in the context of work/life balance in the practice of law, signs of substance abuse or mental health issues in oneself or a colleague within the legal community, lawyer assistance programs and other topics that are focused on the impact of substance abuse, mental health issues or stress management on lawyers and judges. CLE credit will not be given to presentations which solely focus on personal stress reduction techniques such as breathing exercises, meditation and yoga. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.  \n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest half hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $4 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House/Self-Study CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys. However, it is also educational and beneficial for attorneys to meet and learn from colleagues who practice in other firms, corporate legal departments, or similar entities including sole practitioners.\nThe Commission recognizes that active member attorneys on an individual basis may participate in distance learning CLE activities, which constitutes Self-Study.\n These In-House/Self-Study CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions: \n \n a. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House/Self-Study CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters. \n \ne. Up to six (6) CLE hours may be earned by an attorney in a calendar year through any combination of approved In-House/Self-Study activities. In addition, up to six hours of In-House/Self-Study credit may be carried forward and applied to In-House/Self-Study CLE for the next calendar year or carried back to the previous year to satisfy a CLE deficiency as long as the In-House/Self-Study limit for that year has not been met. While In-House credits count toward this six (6) CLE hour annual limit for all members of the sponsoring law firm or legal department, non-member attorneys who attend those In-House CLE programs will receive regular credit that does not count toward the six (6) CLE hour annual limit. For example, if a law firm conducts a seminar attended both by its partners or associates and by in-house counsel of its corporate client or other invited attorney guests, these credits would count toward the six (6) hour limit for the firm's partners and associates, but not for the non-member guests.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) Distance Learning CLE . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. These distance learning CLE activities may be attended by an individual attorney with no minimum number of attendees needed to receive approved MCLE credit, but must comply with the In-House/Self-Study CLE Regulation 8 to Rule 8-106(B). Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; computer based CLE activities, on demand CLE programs, teleconference CLE programs and live CLE webcasts/webinars. When attended by an individual attorney on a computer, telephone or other electronic device, the distance learning activity constitutes self-study CLE and is subject to the 6-hour per year limit. Examples of non-qualifying education activities that are encouraged on a non-MCLE approved credit basis include: reading cases and advance sheets, legal research, internet chat groups and jury duty.","UrlName":"revision333"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"266c6b45-1a94-400a-863a-b6418b115455","Title":"Rule 8-107. Grace Period and Noncompliance.","Content":"(A) Grace Period\n(1) Members who are deficient in their CLE, fees, or other requirements at the end of a calendar year are entitled to an automatic grace period until March 31st of the succeeding year to make up their deficiency.  This does not change the requirement that members file their annual report by January 31st.\n(2) Members who remain deficient on April 1st of the succeeding year shall pay a late CLE fee in an amount to be set by the Commission.\n(B) Noncompliance\n(1) Notice.  Members who remain deficient in their CLE, annual report filing, fees, or other requirements on April 1st of the succeeding year are in noncompliance.  The Commission shall so notify the members by first class mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia.  Service or actual receipt is not a prerequisite to actions authorized by these Rules.\n(2) Hearing.  Members may contest their noncompliance by requesting a hearing before the Commission.  The request should be in writing, contain the reasons for their contest, and be made within 60 days of the date of the notice of noncompliance mailed by the Commission.  The Commission shall hear the matter at its next meeting.  No action will be taken while hearings are pending.\n(3) Report.  The Commission shall report to the Supreme Court those members who remain in noncompliance after the time to request hearings has expired or any requested hearings have been held.\n(4) Supreme Court of Georgia Action.  Upon receipt from the Commission of a report of noncompliance, the Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an order it deems appropriate including an allowance of additional time for compliance or summary suspension from the practice of law until further order of the Court.\n Regulation \n (1) Late CLE Fee: An attorney who does not complete the annual, minimum CLE requirement until after March 31st of the following year shall pay a $100 late CLE fee. This fee shall be due April 1st. Thereafter, if the attorney's CLE deficiency is not corrected by September 30th of the same year, or if the $100 late CLE fee remains unpaid on that September 30th, an additional $150 late fee shall be due immediately. ","UrlName":"rule233","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"e8bac0ec-f8e9-4bf9-a681-0e6c37bb1e16","ParentId":"266c6b45-1a94-400a-863a-b6418b115455","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(A) Grace Period\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(1) Members who are deficient in their CLE, fees, or other requirements at the end of a calendar year are entitled to an automatic grace period until March 31st of the succeeding year to make up their deficiency.  This does not change the requirement that members file their annual report by January 31st. \n(2) Members who remain deficient on April 1st of the succeeding year shall pay a late CLE fee in an amount to be set by the Commission. \n</blockquote>\n(B) Noncompliance\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(1) Notice.  Members who remain deficient in their CLE, annual report filing, fees, or other requirements on April 1st of the succeeding year are in noncompliance.  The Commission shall so notify the members by first class mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia.  Service or actual receipt is not a prerequisite to actions authorized by these Rules. \n(2) Hearing.  Members may contest their noncompliance by requesting a hearing before the Commission.  The request should be in writing, contain the reasons for their contest, and be made within 60 days of the date of the notice of noncompliance mailed by the Commission.  The Commission shall hear the matter at its next meeting.  No action will be taken while hearings are pending. \n(3) Report.  The Commission shall report to the Supreme Court those members who remain in noncompliance after the time to request hearings has expired or any requested hearings have been held. \n(4) Supreme Court of Georgia Action.  Upon receipt from the Commission of a report of noncompliance, the Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an order it deems appropriate including an allowance of additional time for compliance or summary suspension from the practice of law until further order of the Court. \n</blockquote>\n Regulation \n (1) Late CLE Fee: An attorney who does not complete the annual, minimum CLE requirement until after March 31st of the following year shall pay a $100 late CLE fee. This fee shall be due April 1st. Thereafter, if the attorney's CLE deficiency is not corrected by September 30th of the same year, or if the $100 late CLE fee remains unpaid on that September 30th, an additional $150 late fee shall be due immediately. ","UrlName":"revision122"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"4e777d00-7e87-4b74-9e57-1b3035be1b91","Title":"Rule 8-108. Reinstatement.","Content":"An active member suspended under the provisions of these rules may be reinstated by the Court upon motion of the Commission and upon a showing that the delinquency has been corrected and payment to the Commission of a uniform reinstatement fee fixed by the Commission.\n Regulations\n\n (1) Reinstatement Fee . The uniform reinstatement fee is $500 for a member's first reinstatement, $1,000 for a second reinstatement by the same member, and $2,000 for all subsequent reinstatements by the same member. This fee must accompany the reinstatement motion. It shall not be waived and is non-refundable in the event reinstatement is not granted. \n \n (2) Policy . Reinstatement will be granted only upon a showing that the member has attended sufficient approved CLE activity to make-up the deficiencies causing the suspension and all deficiencies in subsequent years. Also, the member's progress toward meeting MCLE requirements in the calendar year in which the reinstatement is requested will be included as information in the CCLC's motion to the Supreme Court. \n (3) Motion . The motion for reinstatement shall list the CLE activities by course number, sponsor, location, dates and hours. It shall be accompanied by proof of attendance, any attendee fee that may be due, and the reinstatement fee. \n (4) CCLC Action . If the suspended member is found to be in compliance, the CCLC will file a motion with the Supreme Court of Georgia setting forth the facts along with its recommendation which may or may not be that reinstatement be granted. The Supreme Court will make the final decision on reinstatement. If the suspended member is found to not be in compliance, the CCLC will inform him of the curative actions necessary to cure his deficiencies. \n","UrlName":"rule235","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"fe21c281-665f-4fe6-8be4-3c1b916559bd","Title":"Rule 8-109. Confidentiality.","Content":" Records of the Commission are not confidential. ","UrlName":"rule236","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"fd93ea26-48d3-4c8f-a64e-9744cf85d1a1","Title":"Rule 8-110. Immunity.","Content":"The State Bar, its employees, the Standards of the Profession Committee members and advisory, the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, its employees, members and advisory, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, its employees, members, and advisors shall be absolutely immune from civil liability of all acts in the course of their official duties.","UrlName":"rule238","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"15aa377a-5ae9-43b7-a0d7-86e81483c7bb","Title":"Rule 8-112. Foreign Law Consultants.","Content":" Foreign law consultant members of the State Bar of Georgia shall be subject to and shall comply with the provisions of this Part VIII in the same manner and to the extent as active members of the State Bar of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule239","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Title":"Part IX - Professionalism","Content":"","UrlName":"part17","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"74e37760-4769-4c30-b3c6-35245b8965ac","Title":"Rule 9-101. Purpose.","Content":" This Part of the State Bar Rules is adopted in recognition of the importance of professionalism as the ultimate hallmark of the practice of law. The purpose of this Part is to create within the State Bar a Commission to identify, enunciate and encourage adherence to non-mandatory standards of professional conduct. These standards should involve aspirations higher than those required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in Part IV. ","UrlName":"rule162","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"b91acfb8-11a5-4905-99ea-884b1f9bc906","Title":"Rule 9-102. Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism","Content":" (A) Membership, Appointment and Terms \n \nThere is established a permanent Commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism. The Commission shall consist of twenty-two (22) members as follows: (1) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia or his or her designee, who shall serve as Chair of the Commission; (2) The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals or his or her designee; (3) one superior court judge designated by the Council of Superior Court Judges; (4) one state court judge designated by the Council of State Court Judges; (5) five law school faculty members designated by the deans of the accredited law schools in the State of Georgia, one of whom must be a member of the State Bar Committee on Professionalism; provided, however, such faculty members shall not be from the same law school; (6) two non-lawyer citizens from the public at large; (7) the President of the State Bar of Georgia; (8) the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; (9) one Federal District Judge; and (10) eight members of the State Bar of Georgia actively engaged in the practice of law, one of whom must be employed by a unit of federal state, or local government, one must be engaged primarily in criminal defense practice, one must be a federal or state prosecutor, and one must be in-house counsel. \n \nThree of the practicing lawyers and one of the non-lawyer citizens from the public at large shall be appointed by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. The remaining members of the Commission, with the exception of the President of the State Bar of Georgia, the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, the superior court judge, and the state court judge, shall be appointed by the Supreme Court. The terms of the members of the Commission shall be staggered and that shall be accomplished by the initial appointments being as follows: two of the practicing lawyer members appointed by the Board of Governors shall serve until the conclusion of the State Bar Annual Meeting in 1990; the non-lawyer general public member shall serve until the conclusion of the State Bar Annual Meeting in 1990; the superior court judge member, one practicing lawyer member appointed by the Board of Governors and one law faculty member shall serve until the conclusion of the State Bar Annual Meeting in 1991. The remaining members of the Commission shall serve until the conclusion of the Annual Meeting of the State Bar in 1992. Thereafter, the superior court judge member shall serve for a two year term as designated by the Council of Superior Court Judges, the state court judge member shall serve for a two year term as designated by the Council of State Court Judges, and all other members of the Commission shall serve for three (3) year terms, and no member (except the Chief Justice, that member appointed by the Court of Appeals, and the law school representatives) may serve more than two (2) terms on the Commission. \n \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Commission: \n \nThe Commission's major responsibilities shall be: \n \n    (1) To consider efforts by lawyers and judges to improve the administration of justice; \n \n    (2) To examine ways of making the system of justice more accessible to the public; \n \n    (3) To monitor and coordinate Georgia's professionalism efforts in such institutional settings as its bar, courts, law schools and law firms; \n \n    (4) To monitor professionalism efforts in jurisdictions outside Georgia; \n \n    (5) To conduct a study and issue a report on the present state of professionalism within Georgia; \n \n    (6) To plan the yearly Convocation on Professionalism; \n \n    (7) To promote various regional convocations on professionalism; \n \n    (8) To provide guidance and support to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency in its implementation and execution of the continuing legal education professionalism requirement; \n \n    (9) To help implement a professionalism component in the Bridge-the-Gap program; \n \n    (10) To make recommendations to the Supreme Court and the State Bar concerning additional means by which professionalism can be enhanced; \n \n    (11) To receive and administer gifts and grants; and \n \n    (12) The Commission shall have no authority to impose sanctions of any kind upon any member of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(C) Finances \n \nFunding for the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism shall be provided by an additional surcharge for each active State Bar member who attends a course in professionalism sponsored by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education (ICLE) or by any other sponsor approved by the Commission. The rate shall be set annually by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the surcharge shall be remitted directly to it by ICLE, by any other such sponsor, or, in an appropriate case, by the individual State Bar member who attended a course in professionalism approved by the Commission.","UrlName":"rule164","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"58edf3c5-f552-42ea-8380-54bba954d82f","Title":"A Lawyer's Creed","Content":" To my clients, I offer faithfulness, competence, diligence, and good judgment. I will strive to represent you as I would want to be represented and to be worthy of your trust. \n \nTo the opposing parties and their counsel, I offer fairness, integrity, and civility. I will seek reconciliation and, if we fail, I will strive to make our dispute a dignified one. \n \nTo the courts, and other tribunals, and to those who assist them, I offer respect, candor, and courtesy. I will strive to do honor to the search for justice. \n \nTo my colleagues in the practice of law, I offer concern for your welfare. I will strive to make our association a professional friendship. \n \nTo the profession, I offer assistance. I will strive to keep our business a profession and our profession a calling in the spirit of public service. \n \nTo the public and our systems of justice, I offer service. I will strive to improve the law and our legal system, to make the law and our legal system available to all, and to seek the common good through the representation of my clients. ","UrlName":"rule420","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d96bbaad-bb59-4029-a036-5dd4774dfe02","Title":"Aspirational Statements","Content":"The Court believes there are unfortunate trends of commercialization and loss of professional community in the current practice of law. These trends are manifested in an undue emphasis on the financial rewards of practice, a lack of courtesy and civility among members of our profession, a lack of respect for the judiciary and for our systems of justice, and a lack of regard for others and for the common good. As a community of professionals, we should strive to make the internal rewards of service, craft, and character, and not the external reward of financial gain, the primary rewards of the practice of law. In our practices we should remember that the primary justification for who we are and what we do is the common good we can achieve through the faithful representation of people who desire to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner and to prevent future disputes. We should remember, and we should help our clients remember, that the way in which our clients resolve their disputes defines part of the character of our society and we should act accordingly.\nAs professionals, we need aspirational ideals to help bind us together in a professional community. Accordingly, the Court issues the following Aspirational Statement setting forth general and specific aspirational ideals of our profession. This statement is a beginning list of the ideals of our profession. It is primarily illustrative. Our purpose is not to regulate, and certainly not to provide a basis for discipline, but rather to assist the Bar’s efforts to maintain a professionalism that can stand against the negative trends of commercialization and loss of community. It is the Court’s hope that Georgia’s lawyers, judges, and legal educators will use the following aspirational ideals to reexamine the justifications of the practice of law in our society and to consider the implications of those justifications for their conduct. The Court feels that enhancement of professionalism can be best brought about by the cooperative efforts of the organized bar, the courts, and the law schools with each group working independently, but also jointly in that effort.\n\n GENERAL ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As a lawyer , I will aspire:\n(a) To put fidelity to clients and, through clients, to the common good, before selfish interests.\n(b) To model for others, and particularly for my clients, the respect due to those we call upon to resolve our disputes and the regard due to all participants in our dispute resolution processes.\n(c) To avoid all forms of wrongful discrimination in all of my activities including discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, handicap, veteran status, or national origin. The social goals of equality and fairness will be personal goals for me.\n(d) To preserve and improve the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes as instruments for the common good.\n(e) To make the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes available to all.\n(f) To practice with a personal commitment to the rules governing our profession and to encourage others to do the same.\n(g) To preserve the dignity and the integrity of our profession by my conduct. The dignity and the integrity of our profession is an inheritance that must be maintained by each successive generation of lawyers.\n(h) To achieve the excellence of our craft, especially those that permit me to be the moral voice of clients to the public in advocacy while being the moral voice of the public to clients in counseling. Good lawyering should be a moral achievement for both the lawyer and the client.\n (i) To practice law not as a business, but as a calling in the spirit of public service. \n \n SPECIFIC ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As to clients , I will aspire:\n(a)  To expeditious and economical achievement of all client objectives.\n(b)  To fully informed client decision-making. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Counsel clients about all forms of dispute resolution;\n(2) Counsel clients about the value of cooperation as a means toward the productive resolution of disputes;\n(3) Maintain the sympathetic detachment that permits objective and independent advice to clients;\n(4) Communicate promptly and clearly with clients; and\n(5) Reach clear agreements with clients concerning the nature of the representation.\n\n(c)  To fair and equitable fee agreements. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Discuss alternative methods of charging fees with all clients;\n(2) Offer fee arrangements that reflect the true value of the services rendered;\n(3) Reach agreements with clients as early in the relationship as possible;\n(4) Determine the amount of fees by consideration of many factors and not just time spent by the attorney;\n(5) Provide written agreements as to all fee arrangements; and\n(6) Resolve all fee disputes through the arbitration methods provided by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(d)  To comply with the obligations of confidentiality and the avoidance of conflicting loyalties in a manner designed to achieve the fidelity to clients that is the purpose of these obligations.\n As to opposing parties and their counsel , I will aspire:\n(a)  To cooperate with opposing counsel in a manner consistent with the competent representation of all parties. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Notify opposing counsel in a timely fashion of any canceled appearance;\n(2) Grant reasonable requests for extensions or scheduling changes; and\n(3) Consult with opposing counsel in the scheduling of appearances, meetings, and depositions.\n(b)  To treat opposing counsel in a manner consistent with his or her professional obligations and consistent with the dignity of the search for justice. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Not serve motions or pleadings in such a manner or at such a time as to preclude opportunity for a competent response;\n(2) Be courteous and civil in all communications;\n(3) Respond promptly to all requests by opposing counsel;\n(4) Avoid rudeness and other acts of disrespect in all meetings including depositions and negotiations;\n(5) Prepare documents that accurately reflect the agreement of all parties; and\n (6) Clearly identify all changes made in documents submitted by opposing counsel for review. \n \n As to the courts, other tribunals, and to those who assist them , I will aspire:\n(a)  To represent my clients in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of a fair, efficient, and humane system of justice. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Avoid non-essential litigation and non-essential pleading in litigation;\n(2) Explore the possibilities of settlement of all litigated matters;\n(3) Seek non-coerced agreement between the parties on procedural and discovery matters;\n(4) Avoid all delays not dictated by a competent presentation of a client’s claims;\n(5) Prevent misuses of court time by verifying the availability of key participants for scheduled appearances before the court and by being punctual; and\n(6) Advise clients about the obligations of civility, courtesy, fairness, cooperation, and other proper behavior expected of those who use our systems of justice.\n(b)  To model for others the respect due to our courts. As a professional I should:\n(1) Act with complete honesty;\n(2) Know court rules and procedures;\n(3) Give appropriate deference to court rulings;\n(4) Avoid undue familiarity with members of the judiciary;\n(5) Avoid unfounded, unsubstantiated, or unjustified public criticism of members of the judiciary;\n(6) Show respect by attire and demeanor;\n(7) Assist the judiciary in determining the applicable law; and\n(8) Seek to understand the judiciary’s obligations of informed and impartial decision making.\n As to my colleagues in the practice of law , I will aspire:\n(a)  To recognize and to develop our interdependence;\n(b)  To respect the needs of others, especially the need to develop as a whole person; and,\n(c)  To assist my colleagues become better people in the practice of law and to accept their assistance offered to me.\n As to our profession , I will aspire:\n(a)  To improve the practice of law. As a professional, I should:\n(1)  Assist in continuing legal education efforts;\n(2)  Assist in organized bar activities; and,\n(3)  Assist law schools in the education of our future lawyers.\n(b)  To protect the public from incompetent or other wrongful lawyering. As a professional, I should:\n(1)  Assist in bar admissions activities;\n(2)  Report violations of ethical regulations by fellow lawyers; and,\n(3)  Assist in the enforcement of the legal and ethical standards imposed upon all lawyers.\n As to the public and our systems of justice , I will aspire:\n(a) To counsel clients about the moral and social consequences of their conduct.\n(b) To consider the effect of my conduct on the image of our systems of justice including the social effect of advertising methods. As a professional, I should ensure that any advertisement of my services:\n(1) Is consistent with the dignity of the justice system and a learned profession;\n(2) Provides a beneficial service to the public by providing accurate information about the availability of legal services;\n(3) Educates the public about the law and the legal system;\n(4) Provides completely honest and straightforward information about my qualifications, fees, and costs; and\n(5) Does not imply that clients’ legal needs can be met only through aggressive tactics.\n(c) To provide the pro bono representation that is necessary to make our system of justice available to all.\n(d) To support organizations that provide pro bono representation to indigent clients.\n (e) To improve our laws and legal system by, for example: \n \n(1) Serving as a public official;\n(2) Assisting in the education of the public concerning our laws and legal system;\n(3) Commenting publicly upon our laws; and\n(4) Using other appropriate methods of effecting positive change in our laws and legal system.\n","UrlName":"rule422","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[{"Id":"a0014544-e522-4d87-9bb3-c28985efe1ce","ParentId":"d96bbaad-bb59-4029-a036-5dd4774dfe02","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Court believes there are unfortunate trends of commercialization and loss of professional community in the current practice of law. These trends are manifested in an undue emphasis on the financial rewards of practice, a lack of courtesy and civility among members of our profession, a lack of respect for the judiciary and for our systems of justice, and a lack of regard for others and for the common good. As a community of professionals, we should strive to make the internal rewards of service, craft, and character, and not the external reward of financial gain, the primary rewards of the practice of law. In our practices we should remember that the primary justification for who we are and what we do is the common good we can achieve through the faithful representation of people who desire to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner and to prevent future disputes. We should remember, and we should help our clients remember, that the way in which our clients resolve their disputes defines part of the character of our society and we should act accordingly.\nAs professionals, we need aspirational ideals to help bind us together in a professional community. Accordingly, the Court issues the following Aspirational Statement setting forth general and specific aspirational ideals of our profession. This statement is a beginning list of the ideals of our profession. It is primarily illustrative. Our purpose is not to regulate, and certainly not to provide a basis for discipline, but rather to assist the Bar’s efforts to maintain a professionalism that can stand against the negative trends of commercialization and loss of community. It is the Court’s hope that Georgia’s lawyers, judges, and legal educators will use the following aspirational ideals to reexamine the justifications of the practice of law in our society and to consider the implications of those justifications for their conduct. The Court feels that enhancement of professionalism can be best brought about by the cooperative efforts of the organized bar, the courts, and the law schools with each group working independently, but also jointly in that effort.\n\n GENERAL ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As a lawyer , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a) To put fidelity to clients and, through clients, to the common good, before selfish interests. \n(b) To model for others, and particularly for my clients, the respect due to those we call upon to resolve our disputes and the regard due to all participants in our dispute resolution processes. \n(c) To avoid all forms of wrongful discrimination in all of my activities including discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, handicap, veteran status, or national origin. The social goals of equality and fairness will be personal goals for me. \n(d) To preserve and improve the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes as instruments for the common good. \n(e) To make the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes available to all. \n(f) To practice with a personal commitment to the rules governing our profession and to encourage others to do the same. \n(g) To preserve the dignity and the integrity of our profession by my conduct. The dignity and the integrity of our profession is an inheritance that must be maintained by each successive generation of lawyers. \n(h) To achieve the excellence of our craft, especially those that permit me to be the moral voice of clients to the public in advocacy while being the moral voice of the public to clients in counseling. Good lawyering should be a moral achievement for both the lawyer and the client. \n (i) To practice law not as a business, but as a calling in the spirit of public service. \n  \n</blockquote>\n SPECIFIC ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As to clients , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To expeditious and economical achievement of all client objectives. \n(b)  To fully informed client decision-making. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Counsel clients about all forms of dispute resolution; \n(2) Counsel clients about the value of cooperation as a means toward the productive resolution of disputes; \n(3) Maintain the sympathetic detachment that permits objective and independent advice to clients; \n(4) Communicate promptly and clearly with clients; and \n(5) Reach clear agreements with clients concerning the nature of the representation. \n </blockquote> \n(c)  To fair and equitable fee agreements. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Discuss alternative methods of charging fees with all clients; \n(2) Offer fee arrangements that reflect the true value of the services rendered; \n(3) Reach agreements with clients as early in the relationship as possible; \n(4) Determine the amount of fees by consideration of many factors and not just time spent by the attorney; \n(5) Provide written agreements as to all fee arrangements; and \n(6) Resolve all fee disputes through the arbitration methods provided by the State Bar of Georgia. \n </blockquote> \n(d)  To comply with the obligations of confidentiality and the avoidance of conflicting loyalties in a manner designed to achieve the fidelity to clients that is the purpose of these obligations. \n</blockquote>\n As to opposing parties and their counsel , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To cooperate with opposing counsel in a manner consistent with the competent representation of all parties. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Notify opposing counsel in a timely fashion of any canceled appearance; \n(2) Grant reasonable requests for extensions or scheduling changes; and \n(3) Consult with opposing counsel in the scheduling of appearances, meetings, and depositions. \n </blockquote> \n(b)  To treat opposing counsel in a manner consistent with his or her professional obligations and consistent with the dignity of the search for justice. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Not serve motions or pleadings in such a manner or at such a time as to preclude opportunity for a competent response; \n(2) Be courteous and civil in all communications; \n(3) Respond promptly to all requests by opposing counsel; \n(4) Avoid rudeness and other acts of disrespect in all meetings including depositions and negotiations; \n(5) Prepare documents that accurately reflect the agreement of all parties; and \n(6) Clearly identify all changes made in documents submitted by opposing counsel for review. \n \n </blockquote></blockquote>\n As to the courts, other tribunals, and to those who assist them , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To represent my clients in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of a fair, efficient, and humane system of justice. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Avoid non-essential litigation and non-essential pleading in litigation; \n(2) Explore the possibilities of settlement of all litigated matters; \n(3) Seek non-coerced agreement between the parties on procedural and discovery matters; \n(4) Avoid all delays not dictated by a competent presentation of a client’s claims; \n(5) Prevent misuses of court time by verifying the availability of key participants for scheduled appearances before the court and by being punctual; and \n(6) Advise clients about the obligations of civility, courtesy, fairness, cooperation, and other proper behavior expected of those who use our systems of justice. \n </blockquote> \n(b)  To model for others the respect due to our courts. As a professional I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Act with complete honesty; \n(2) Know court rules and procedures; \n(3) Give appropriate deference to court rulings; \n(4) Avoid undue familiarity with members of the judiciary; \n(5) Avoid unfounded, unsubstantiated, or unjustified public criticism of members of the judiciary; \n(6) Show respect by attire and demeanor; \n(7) Assist the judiciary in determining the applicable law; and \n(8) Seek to understand the judiciary’s obligations of informed and impartial decision making. \n </blockquote></blockquote>\n As to my colleagues in the practice of law , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To recognize and to develop our interdependence; \n(b)  To respect the needs of others, especially the need to develop as a whole person; and, \n(c)  To assist my colleagues become better people in the practice of law and to accept their assistance offered to me. \n</blockquote>\n As to our profession , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To improve the practice of law. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1)  Assist in continuing legal education efforts; \n(2)  Assist in organized bar activities; and, \n(3)  Assist law schools in the education of our future lawyers. \n </blockquote> \n(b)  To protect the public from incompetent or other wrongful lawyering. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1)  Assist in bar admissions activities; \n(2)  Report violations of ethical regulations by fellow lawyers; and, \n(3)  Assist in the enforcement of the legal and ethical standards imposed upon all lawyers. \n </blockquote></blockquote>\n As to the public and our systems of justice , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a) To counsel clients about the moral and social consequences of their conduct. \n(b) To consider the effect of my conduct on the image of our systems of justice including the social effect of advertising methods. As a professional, I should ensure that any advertisement of my services: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Is consistent with the dignity of the justice system and a learned profession; \n(2) Provides a beneficial service to the public by providing accurate information about the availability of legal services; \n(3) Educates the public about the law and the legal system; \n(4) Provides completely honest and straightforward information about my qualifications, fees, and costs; and \n(5) Does not imply that clients’ legal needs can be met only through aggressive tactics. \n </blockquote> \n(c) To provide the pro bono representation that is necessary to make our system of justice available to all. \n(d) To support organizations that provide pro bono representation to indigent clients. \n (e) To improve our laws and legal system by, for example: \n  \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Serving as a public official; \n(2) Assisting in the education of the public concerning our laws and legal system; \n(3) Commenting publicly upon our laws; and \n(4) Using other appropriate methods of effecting positive change in our laws and legal system. \n </blockquote> <blockquote></blockquote> \n \n<blockquote></blockquote></blockquote>","UrlName":"revision124"}],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Title":"Part X - Clients' Security Fund","Content":"","UrlName":"part18","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"5e5e8ce3-d220-425a-90ea-b78e9d91c4bb","Title":"Preamble","Content":"The purpose of the Clients' Security Fund is to promote public confidence in the administration of justice and the integrity of the legal profession by providing monetary relief to persons who suffer reimbursable losses as a result of the dishonest conduct of members of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"chapter73","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"93550340-da74-4648-93c8-4646122b543f","Title":"Rule 10-101. Fund Established.","Content":" There is established a separate fund of the State Bar of Georgia designated \"Clients' Security Fund of the State Bar of Georgia.\"There is also established a Clients' Security Fund Board of Trustees, which shall receive, hold, manage and disburse from the Fund such monies as may from time to time be appropriated to it by the State Bar of Georgia, or received through voluntary contributions, income from investments or other funding sources. ","UrlName":"rule242","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c4488ddb-bf7d-4d36-9b41-196101a279bb","Title":"Rule 10-102. Definitions.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> For this Rule, the terms shall have the following meanings: \n <ol> \n <li>\"Board \"means the Clients' Security Fund Board of Trustees.</li> \n <li>\"Client \"means one who files a claim for reimbursement with the Board of Trustees.</li> \n <li>\"Fund \"means the Clients' Security Fund of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>\"Lawyer \"or \"attorney \"means one who, at the time of the commencement of his or her handling of the matter in which the loss arose, was a member of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule244","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5136b95b-6421-4adb-a38e-198afee9d553","Title":"Rule 10-103. Funding.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall provide funding for the payment of claims and the costs of administering the Fund. Funding shall be through an annual assessment of $15 per dues-paying lawyer. The Trustees shall not spend more than received through the annual assessment in a single year. The Board of Governors may from time to time adjust the Fund's maximum annual assessment to advance the purposes of the Fund or to preserve the fiscal integrity of the Fund.</li> \n <li>All monies or other assets of the Fund shall constitute a trust and shall be held in the name of the Fund, subject to the direction of the Board.</li> \n <li>Only the Board of Trustees may authorize the payment of money from the Fund.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule245","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[{"Id":"13338ad5-1181-44a7-ad6a-62c6a4fe85a4","ParentId":"5136b95b-6421-4adb-a38e-198afee9d553","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> The State Bar of Georgia shall provide funding for the payment of claims and the costs of administering the Fund. In any year following a year in which the gross aggregate balance of the Fund falls below $1,000,000, the State Bar of Georgia shall assess and collect from each dues-paying member a pro rata share of the difference between the actual Fund balance and $1,000,000, provided that such assessments shall not exceed $25 in any single year. The aggregate amount paid to claimants from the Fund in any year shall not exceed $500,000. The Board of Governors may from time to time adjust the Fund's minimum aggregate balance, maximum annual payout, or maximum annual assessment to advance the purposes of the Fund or to preserve the fiscal integrity of the Fund. </li> \n <li>All monies or other assets of the Fund shall constitute a trust and shall be held in the name of the Fund, subject to the direction of the Board.</li> \n <li>Only the Board of Trustees may authorize the payment of money from the Fund.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision355"}],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c8912fe0-1ddc-4628-84f0-101089be48db","Title":"Rule 10-104. Board of Trustees.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> The Board of Trustees shall consist of six lawyers and one non-lawyer appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia. The initial appointments to the Board shall be for such terms as to result in the staggered expiration of the terms of all members of the Board. Thereafter, the appointments shall be for a term of three years. </li> \n <li>Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar of Georgia for any unexpired term.</li> \n <li>The Board members shall select a chairperson, who is a member of good standing of the State Bar of Georgia and such other officers as the Board members deem appropriate.</li> \n <li>A quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the Board shall consist of three current members in attendance.</li> \n <li> The Board may adopt a regulation to terminate Trustees who fail to regularly attend meetings and may adopt additional regulations for the administration of the Fund which are not otherwise inconsistent with these Rules. </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule246","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"30e342ce-55d6-4a09-a476-08d4ed049de7","Title":"Rule 10-105. Investigations.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Board shall review every claim, and in its discretion, will investigate to the extent the Board deems appropriate those claims that appear to meet the requirements for payment as described in these Rules.</li> \n <li>The Board may approve for payment from the fund such claims as are found, after investigation, to be meritorious and in accordance with these Rules.</li> \n <li>Applications for relief shall be submitted on forms prescribed by the Board.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule249","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"0ebf1739-eb85-4863-8e63-86a464e13bce","Title":"Rule 10-106. Eligible Claims.","Content":"(a) The loss must be caused by the dishonest conduct of the lawyer and shall have arisen out of and because of a lawyer-client relationship, or a fiduciary relationship, between the lawyer and the claimant.\n(b) As used in these Rules, “dishonest conduct” means wrongful acts committed by a lawyer in the nature of theft or embezzlement of money or the wrongful taking or conversion of money, property or other things of value.\n(c) There must be a final disposition resulting in indefinite suspension, disbarment, or voluntary surrender of license.\n(d) The claim shall be filed no later than two years after the date of final disciplinary action by the Supreme Court of Georgia. In the event disciplinary action cannot be prosecuted due to the fact that the attorney is either deceased or cannot be located, the claim shall be filed no later than five years after the dishonest conduct was first discovered by the applicant; provided, however, the claim shall be filed no later than seven years after the dishonest conduct occurred.\n(e) Except as provided by part (f) of this Rule, the following losses shall not be reimbursable:\n(1) losses incurred by spouses, children, parents, grandparents, siblings, partners, associates and employees of lawyer(s) causing the losses;\n(2) losses covered by any bond, surety agreement, or insurance contract to the extent covered thereby, including any loss to which any bonding agent, surety or insurer is subrogated, to the extent of that subrogated interest;\n(3) losses incurred by any financial institution, which are recoverable under a \"banker's blanket bond \"or similar commonly available insurance or surety contract;\n(4) losses incurred by any business entity controlled by the lawyer, or any person or entity described in part (e) (1) hereof;\n(5) losses incurred by any governmental entity or agency;\n(6) losses incurred by corporations or partnerships, including general or limited.\n(f) In cases of extreme hardship or special and unusual circumstances, the Board may, in its discretion, recognize a claim that otherwise would be excluded under these Rules in order to achieve the purpose of the Fund.\n(g) In cases where it appears that there will be unjust enrichment, or the claimant unreasonably or knowingly contributed to the loss, the Board, in its discretion, may deny the claim.\n(h) The Board shall require the applicant to exhaust his or her civil remedies unless the Board determines that the pursuit of the civil claim is not feasible or practical.","UrlName":"rule251","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"e081ab06-6f1e-4d1b-a266-a55b4cc09f6f","Title":"Rule 10-107. Payments.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Board may exercise its discretion to grant monetary relief as a matter of grace and not of right if it determines that a claimant has suffered a reimbursable loss under these Rules and the circumstances warrant relief. Before granting such a claim, the Board must take into consideration the resources of the Fund and the priority to be assigned to a claimant’s application.</li> \n <li>Such monetary relief shall be in an amount as the Board may determine and shall be payable in a manner and upon conditions and terms as the Board shall prescribe.</li> \n <li>This process is designed so that a claimant should not require legal counsel to assist with a claim. However, if a claimant desires legal counsel, no lawyer may accept any payment for assisting a claimant with prosecuting a claim under these Rules unless such payment has been approved by the Board.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule252","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"418cd771-3795-4cd7-9bc4-62307fa0e422","Title":"Rule 10-108. Right to Payment and Right of Appeal.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>No person shall have any legal right to payment or reimbursement from the Fund whether as a claimant, third-party beneficiary, or otherwise. Any amount paid to a claimant by the Fund may be appealed to the Board by the claimant.</li> \n <li>The claimant may request reconsideration within 30 days of notice of the denial or determination of the amount of a claim. If the claimant fails to make a request or the request is denied, the decision of the Board is final, and there is no further right of reconsideration or appeal.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule255","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"2f0f6498-e261-49c2-9185-3333676194f1","Title":"Rule 10-109. Restitution and Subrogation.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>A lawyer whose dishonest conduct results in reimbursement to a claimant shall be liable to the Fund for restitution; the Board may bring such action as it deems advisable to enforce such obligation.</li> \n <li>As a condition of reimbursement, a claimant shall be required to provide the Fund with a pro tanto release and transfer of the claimant's rights against the lawyer, the lawyer's legal representative, estate or assigns, and the claimant's rights against any third party or entity who may be liable for the claimant's loss.</li> \n <li>No petition for reinstatement to practice law in the state of Georgia shall be granted until the petitioner has made restitution to the Clients' Security Fund for all amounts paid by the Fund as a result of the petitioner's conduct.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule257","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a02f4e27-ddfa-4967-94e2-b8c29ad99dcc","Title":"Rule 10-110 Immunity.","Content":"The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the actions of the State Bar of Georgia and this program to be within the Court’s judicial and regulatory functions. As such, the State Bar of Georgia, its employees, the Office of the General Counsel, its staff liaison to the program, the Clients’ Security Fund Board of Trustees, and any outside counsel advising and assisting the program shall be entitled to that immunity customarily afforded to persons performing such functions.","UrlName":"rule258","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"aaf3358c-1227-4eff-b692-52c9c0bf7f9d","Title":"Rule 10-111. Confidentiality.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Claims, proceedings and reports involving claims for reimbursement are confidential until the Board authorizes reimbursement to the claimant, except as provided below. After payment of the reimbursement, the Board may publicize the nature of the claim, the amount of reimbursement, and the name of the lawyer. The name and the address of the claimant shall not be publicized by the Board unless specific permission has been granted by the claimant.</li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to deny access to relevant information by professional discipline agencies or other law enforcement authorities as the Board shall authorize, or the release of statistical information that does not disclose the identity of the lawyer or the parties, or use of such information as necessary to pursue the Fund's restitution and subrogation rights Rule under Rule 10-109.</li> \n <li>In the event a lawyer whose conduct resulted in the payment of a claim files a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law, the Board shall release all information pertaining to the claim to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants as may be pertinent to the reinstatement proceeding.</li> \n <li>Any disciplinary information obtained by the Board or a Trustee during the investigation of a claim is confidential to the same extent as required by Bar Rule 4-221 (d).</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule259","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[{"Id":"004f73f5-9058-4b00-9295-599640dd95b6","ParentId":"aaf3358c-1227-4eff-b692-52c9c0bf7f9d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Claims, proceedings and reports involving claims for reimbursement are confidential until the Board authorizes reimbursement to the claimant, except as provided below. After payment of the reimbursement, the Board may publicize the nature of the claim, the amount of reimbursement, and the name of the lawyer. The name and the address of the claimant shall not be publicized by the Board unless specific permission has been granted by the claimant.</li> \n <li>This Rule shall not be construed to deny access to relevant information by professional discipline agencies or other law enforcement authorities as the Board shall authorize, or the release of statistical information which does not disclose the identity of the lawyer or the parties.</li> \n <li>In the event a lawyer whose conduct resulted in the payment of a claim files a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law, the Board shall release all information pertaining to the claim to the Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants as may be pertinent to the reinstatement proceeding.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision132"}],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"cd9a37b7-b3ec-412f-b24b-c5b33a9cabf7","Title":"Rule 10-112. Repeal of Resolution.","Content":" Any Resolution of the State Bar of Georgia currently in force and covering the subject matter of these Rules 10-101 through 10-112, shall be repealed upon adoption of these Rules by the Supreme Court of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule261","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","Title":"Part XI - Law Practice Management","Content":"","UrlName":"part19","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"e057a758-19a6-4b91-aa2c-27716fe29afe","Title":"Preamble","Content":"The purpose of the Law Practice Management Program is to provide law office management consulting services and materials to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, and thereby to facilitate and improve the delivery of legal services to the public.","UrlName":"chapter74","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"269aa772-115c-4ad7-a865-d1e3d98f0a63","Title":"CHAPTER 1 CONFIDENTIALITY","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter30","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"ee9bd98a-3daa-4962-b06c-6bea6246f600","Title":"Rule 11-101. Confidentiality.","Content":" Information obtained by the staff of the Law Practice Management Program shall be confidential unless the affected attorney otherwise elects or unless the information clearly shows the attorney intends to engage in criminal conduct in the future. ","UrlName":"rule263","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"269aa772-115c-4ad7-a865-d1e3d98f0a63","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["269aa772-115c-4ad7-a865-d1e3d98f0a63","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Title":"CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter31","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"78774bbc-595d-42cb-a538-66726783ea27","Title":"Rule 11-201. Committee.","Content":"The advisory and oversight responsibility for this program will be vested in the Law Practice Management Committee (\"Committee \").","UrlName":"rule265","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ba0b308b-9123-4ebf-9d90-19cf49fb8189","Title":"Rule 11-202. Membership.","Content":" The Committee shall consist of nine members, at least three of whom shall be members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar at the time of their appointment. The Director of the Law Practice Management Program, the Executive Director of the State Bar, or his or her designee, and the Executive Director of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar shall be non-voting, ex-officio members of the Committee. ","UrlName":"rule266","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"b441399a-b21a-4bfe-a88a-82409ca36fe4","Title":"Rule 11-203. Terms.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Initially, three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the Immediate Past President for one-year terms; three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President for two-year terms; and three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President-elect for three-year terms. The President of the State Bar shall appoint the chairperson of the Committee during the initial year from among the members. These appointments shall become effective July 1, 1995, and shall be made by those serving at that time in the offices of Immediate Past President, President and President-elect.</li> \n <li>In each year following the initial year, the President-elect shall appoint three members, at least one of whom shall be a member of the Board of Governors at the time of their appointment, to three-year terms.</li> \n <li>The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deem appropriate.</li> \n <li>Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule268","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[{"Id":"54e77533-6267-4ddb-85d7-64ebaf8b841f","ParentId":"b441399a-b21a-4bfe-a88a-82409ca36fe4","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Initially, three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the Immediate Past President for one-year terms; three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President for two-year terms; and three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President-elect for three-year terms. The President of the State Bar shall appoint the chairperson of the Committee during the initial year from among the members. These appointments shall become effective July 1, 1995, and shall be made by those serving at that time in the offices of Immediate Past President, President and President-elect.\n(b) In each year following the initial year, the President-elect shall appoint three members, at least one of whom shall be a member of the Board of Governors at the time of their appointment, to three-year terms.\n(c) The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deem appropriate.\n(d) Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.","UrlName":"revision126"}],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"f6785d30-3572-45d2-b973-8afaf7e89dde","Title":"Rule 11-204. Purpose and Responsibility.","Content":"The Committee shall meet for the purposes of oversight of the Law Practice Management Program, coordination of the Program's goals, and implementation of directives and resolutions from the Board of Governors. Additionally, the Committee will from time to time develop recommendations for submission to the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors with regard to the funding, staffing, administration, and operation of the program, which may include proposed changes to Bylaws or Rules of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule270","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"94d7f5cf-90c2-48cd-9262-316e84caf0ce","Title":"Rule 11-205. Staff and Funding.","Content":" The State Bar may provide such staff as it deems necessary, including a Director and support staff. The work of the Director and staff shall be funded through the general budget of the State Bar or through donations and grants from foundations or other public or private sources. The income generated by this program through consultation fees, sales of materials, and other means shall be remitted directly to the State Bar by the Director and staff. ","UrlName":"rule271","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5c397aff-c206-4808-a6f5-eb8f35bece4d","Title":"Rule 11-206. Consultation Fees.","Content":" The Committee shall be authorized to charge consultation fees and costs for materials in conjunction with law practice management services. ","UrlName":"rule273","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"36993efd-527e-458e-97da-2d20ae0afe76","Title":"Rule 11-207. Immunity.","Content":" The State Bar, its employees, and members of the Committee shall be absolutely immune from civil liability for all acts in the course of their official duties. ","UrlName":"rule274","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","Title":"Part XII - Client Assistance Program.","Content":"","UrlName":"part20","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"111abe9c-09aa-4be6-ad14-9b6db247f8fc","Title":"Preamble","Content":"The purpose of the Client Assistance Program is to respond to inquiries from the public regarding State Bar members and to assist the public through informal methods including the resolution of inquiries that may involve minor violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.","UrlName":"chapter75","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"bfb0d9f0-5ac5-4fe7-8c47-27f24ed10928","Title":"Rule 12-101. Client Assistance Committee.","Content":" The advisory and oversight responsibility for this program will be vested in the General Counsel Office Overview Committee. ","UrlName":"rule276","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","Revisions":[{"Id":"80f76520-e553-4811-a180-5faecaee5d7c","ParentId":"bfb0d9f0-5ac5-4fe7-8c47-27f24ed10928","Title":"Version 2","Content":" The advisory and oversight responsibility for this program will be vested in the Consumer Assistance Committee (\"Committee \"). ","UrlName":"revision234"}],"Ancestors":["b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"82a998d1-4e27-4565-9e16-bd032e85e54f","Title":"Rule 12-102. Supervision.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Client Assistance Program shall operate under the supervision of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Program staff may be used to help clients understand their rights, obligations, and options.</div>","UrlName":"rule277","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","Revisions":[{"Id":"85ae109e-5559-410d-b962-00d7271a647f","ParentId":"82a998d1-4e27-4565-9e16-bd032e85e54f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The Committee shall consist of eight members including seven State Bar members and one public member. At least two-thirds of the State Bar members shall be members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar at the time of their appointment. Committee members shall serve staggered three-year terms. The number of members shall be subject to change by a majority vote of the Board of Governors but shall never be less than five.\n(b) The public member shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a three year term. All other Committee members shall be appointed by the President of the Bar for three year terms except, initially, two Committee members shall be appointed for one-year terms, two members shall be appointed for two-year terms, and two members shall be appointed for a three-year term. Committee terms shall begin with the operational year of the State Bar. Should additional members be approved, their three-year terms shall be assigned in such fashion as to best maintain uniformity in the number of members to be appointed each year.\n(c) The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deemed appropriate.\n(d) Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.","UrlName":"revision128"},{"Id":"8542a508-2193-4cc2-b380-6dabcd0a8d4a","ParentId":"82a998d1-4e27-4565-9e16-bd032e85e54f","Title":"Version 4","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Committee shall consist of eight members including seven State Bar of Georgia members and one public member. At least two-thirds of the State Bar of Georgia members shall be members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at the time of their appointment. Committee members shall serve staggered three-year terms. The number of members shall be subject to change by a majority vote of the Board of Governors but shall never be less than five.</li> \n <li>The public member shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia for a three-year term. All other Committee members shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia for three-year terms except, initially, two Committee members shall be appointed for one-year terms, two members shall be appointed for two-year terms, and two members shall be appointed for three-year terms. Committee terms shall begin with the operational year of the State Bar of Georgia. Should additional members be approved, their three-year terms shall be assigned in such fashion as to best maintain uniformity in the number of members to be appointed each year.</li> \n <li>The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deem appropriate.</li> \n <li>Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar of Georgia for any unexpired term.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision236"},{"Id":"32fadb17-b279-49ac-a372-bda21e9dd338","ParentId":"82a998d1-4e27-4565-9e16-bd032e85e54f","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Committee shall consist of eight members including seven State Bar members and one public member. At least two-thirds of the State Bar members shall be members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar at the time of their appointment. Committee members shall serve staggered three-year terms. The number of members shall be subject to change by a majority vote of the Board of Governors but shall never be less than five.</li> \n <li>The public member shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a three year term. All other Committee members shall be appointed by the President of the Bar for three year terms except, initially, two Committee members shall be appointed for one-year terms, two members shall be appointed for two-year terms, and two members shall be appointed for a three-year term. Committee terms shall begin with the operational year of the State Bar. Should additional members be approved, their three-year terms shall be assigned in such fashion as to best maintain uniformity in the number of members to be appointed each year.</li> \n <li>The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li>Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision134"}],"Ancestors":["b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ae23c186-5d69-4a94-a574-7ed5ba8b2803","Title":"Part XIII - Reserved","Content":"","UrlName":"part21","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Title":"Part XIV - Rules Governing the Investigation and Prosecution of the Unlicensed Practice of Law","Content":"","UrlName":"part22","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"19754a27-3bb0-46cd-971b-2665c8d089a9","Title":"14-1. PREAMBLE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter32","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"1f8ab0c2-dfb1-4739-b979-d3d4ebce258b","Title":"RULE 14-1.1 JURISDICTION","Content":" The Supreme Court of Georgia has the inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. Wallace v. Wallace , 225 Ga. 102, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939 (1969); Sams v. Olah , 225 Ga. 497, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914 (1970); Fleming v. State , 246 Ga. 90, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980). This authority necessarily includes jurisdiction over the unlicensed practice of law.","UrlName":"rule291","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"19754a27-3bb0-46cd-971b-2665c8d089a9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["19754a27-3bb0-46cd-971b-2665c8d089a9","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"27e9308b-35e0-4506-9a6d-47895253b221","Title":"RULE 14-1.2 DUTY OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia, as an official arm of the Court, is charged with the duty of considering, investigating, and seeking the prohibition of matters pertaining to the unlicensed practice of law and the prosecution of alleged offenders. The Court hereby establishes a Standing Committee on the unlicensed practice of law and at least one District Committee on unlicensed practice of law in each judicial district.","UrlName":"rule292","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"19754a27-3bb0-46cd-971b-2665c8d089a9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["19754a27-3bb0-46cd-971b-2665c8d089a9","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5533f82e-c949-48f7-baf9-a6f13292014b","Title":"14-2. DEFINITIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter34","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"3eab6510-5bbd-4e21-a27d-d0220e45c2f4","Title":"RULE 14-2.1 GENERALLY","Content":" Whenever used in these rules the following words or terms shall have the meaning herein set forth unless the use thereof shall clearly indicate a different meaning: \n \n(a) Unlicensed Practice of Law. The unlicensed practice of law shall mean the practice of law, as prohibited by statute, court rule, and case law of the State of Georgia. \n \n(b) Nonlawyer or Nonattorney. For purposes of this chapter, a nonlawyer or nonattorney is an individual who is not an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. This includes, but is not limited to, lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions, law students, law graduates, applicants to the State Bar of Georgia, inactive lawyers, disbarred lawyers, and suspended lawyers during the period of suspension. \n \n(c) This Court or the Court. This Court or the Court shall mean the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n(d) Counsel for the Bar. Counsel for the Bar is a member of the State Bar of Georgia other than Staff Counsel representing the Bar in any proceedings under these rules. \n \n(e) Respondent. A respondent is a nonlawyer who is either accused of engaging in the unlicensed practice of law or whose conduct is under investigation. \n \n(f) Judge. A Judge is the Superior Court Judge who conducts proceedings as provided under these rules. \n \n(g) Standing Committee. The Standing Committee on UPL is the committee constituted according to the directives contained in these rules. \n \n(h) District Committee. A District Committee is a local unlicensed practice of law District Committee. \n \n(i) Staff Counsel. Staff counsel is an attorney employee of the State Bar of Georgia employed to perform such duties as may be assigned. \n \n(j) UPL. UPL is the unlicensed practice of law. \n \n(k) The Board or Board of Governors. The Board or Board of Governors is the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(l) Executive Committee. The Executive Committee is the Executive Committee of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, composed of such officers and members of the Board of Governors as may be designated in the bylaws, which shall exercise the powers and duties of the Board of Governors when it is not in session, subject to such limitations as the bylaws may provide.","UrlName":"rule294","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5533f82e-c949-48f7-baf9-a6f13292014b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["5533f82e-c949-48f7-baf9-a6f13292014b","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","Title":"14-3. STANDING COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter35","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"703c2df9-4e6f-4c72-ab6a-ecda60d8e363","Title":"RULE 14-3.1 GENERALLY","Content":"(a) Appointment and Terms. The Standing Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, and shall consist of 23 members, 12 of whom shall be nonlawyers and 11 of whom shall be lawyers and members in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. The nonlawyer members should be geographically representative of the State. The lawyer members shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall include at least one member from each judicial district. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall appoint a chair and at least one vice-chair of the Standing Committee. Eight of the members of the Standing Committee shall constitute a quorum. All appointments to the Standing Committee shall be for a term of three years, except that it shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually. The members who initially serve terms of less than three years shall be eligible for immediate reappointment. No member shall be appointed to more than two full consecutive terms.\n(b) Duties. It shall be the duty of the Standing Committee to receive and evaluate District Committee reports and to determine whether litigation should be instituted in Superior Court against any alleged offender. The Standing Committee may approve civil injunctive proceedings, civil or criminal contempt proceedings, a combination of injunctive and contempt proceedings, or such other action as may be appropriate. In addition, the duties of the Standing Committee shall include, but not be limited to:\n(1) consideration and investigation of activities that may, or do, constitute the unlicensed practice of law;\n(2) supervision of the District Committees, which shall include, but not be limited to:\n (A) prescribing rules of procedure for District Committees; \n(B) assigning reports of unlicensed practice of law for investigation; \n(C) reassigning or withdrawing matters previously assigned, exercising final authority to close cases not deemed by the Standing Committee to then warrant further action by the State Bar of Georgia for unlicensed practice of law, and closing cases proposed to be resolved by a cease and desist affidavit where staff counsel objects to the closing of the case or the acceptance of a cease and desist affidavit by the District Committee; \n(D) joining with a District Committee in a particular investigation; \n(E) requesting staff investigators, staff counsel, and voluntary bar counsel to conduct investigations on behalf of or in concert with the District Committees; and \n(F) suspending District Committee members and chairs for cause and appointing a temporary District Committee chair where there has been a suspension, resignation, or removal, pending the appointment of a replacement chair by the Supreme Court of Georgia;\n(3) initiation and supervision of litigation, including the delegation of responsibility to staff, or counsel for the State Bar of Georgia to prosecute such litigation;\n(4) giving advice regarding the unlicensed practice of law policy to the officers, Board of Governors, staff, sections, or committees of the State Bar of Georgia as requested; and\n(5) furnishing any and all information, confidential records, and files regarding pending or closed investigations of unlicensed practice of law to any state or federal law enforcement or regulatory agency, United States Attorney, District Attorney, Solicitor, the Georgia Office of Bar Admissions and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions where there is or may be a violation of state or federal law or the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Georgia, or when required by law or court order.\n","UrlName":"rule295","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","Revisions":[{"Id":"75a98a82-5349-4b8a-9ca1-ef2d7faa1625","ParentId":"703c2df9-4e6f-4c72-ab6a-ecda60d8e363","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Appointment and Terms. The Standing Committee shall be appointed by the Court, and shall consist of 23 members, 11 of whom shall be nonlawyers. The nonlawyer members should be geographically representative of the State. The lawyer members shall be appointed by the Court and shall include at least one member from each judicial district. The Court shall appoint a chair and at least 1 vice-chair of the Standing Committee, both of whom may be nonlawyers. Eight of the members of the Standing Committee shall constitute a quorum. All appointments to the Standing Committee shall be for a term of 3 years, except that it shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third (1/3) of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually. The members who initially serve terms of less than 3 years shall be eligible for immediate reappointment. No member shall be appointed to more than 2 full consecutive terms.\n(b) Duties. It shall be the duty of the Standing Committee to receive and evaluate District Committee reports and to determine whether litigation should be instituted in Superior Court against any alleged offender. The Standing Committee may approve civil injunctive proceedings, civil or criminal contempt proceedings, a combination of injunctive and contempt proceedings, or such other action as may be appropriate. In addition, the duties of the Standing Committee shall include, but not be limited to:\n(1) the consideration and investigation of activities that may, or do, constitute the unlicensed practice of law;\n(2) the supervision of the District Committees, which shall include, but not be limited to:\n \n(A) prescribing rules of procedure for District Committees; \n(B) assigning reports of unlicensed practice of law for investigation; \n(C) reassigning or withdrawing matters previously assigned, exercising final authority to close cases not deemed by the Standing Committee to then warrant further action by the State Bar of Georgia for unlicensed practice of law, and closing cases proposed to be resolved by a cease and desist affidavit where staff counsel objects to the closing of the case or the acceptance of a cease and desist affidavit by the District Committee; \n(D) joining with a District Committee in a particular investigation; and \n(E) request staff investigators, staff counsel, and voluntary bar counsel to conduct investigations on behalf of or in concert with the District Committees; and \n(F) suspending District Committee members and chairs for cause and appointing a temporary District Committee chair where there has been a suspension, resignation, or removal, pending the appointment of a replacement chair by the Court;\n(3) the initiation and supervision of litigation, including the delegation of responsibility to staff, or Counsel for the Bar to prosecute such litigation;\n(4) the giving of advice regarding the unlicensed practice of law policy to the officers, Board of Governors, staff, sections, or committees of the State Bar of Georgia as requested; and\n(5) furnishing any and all information, confidential records, and files regarding pending or closed investigations of unlicensed practice of law to any state or federal law enforcement or regulatory agency, United States Attorney, District Attorney, Solicitor, the Georgia Office of Bar Admissions and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions where there is or may be a violation of state or federal law or the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Georgia, or when required by law or court order.\n","UrlName":"revision266"}],"Ancestors":["e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"784c7c9f-b763-470f-8489-cf00b6ff4b7d","Title":"RULE 14-3.2 STAFF COUNSEL AND COUNSEL FOR THE BAR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> Staff Counsel. The State Bar of Georgia shall provide staff counsel and other employees sufficient to assist the Standing Committee and the District Committee in carrying out their responsibilities as prescribed elsewhere in these rules. \n </li> \n <li> Appointment of Counsel for the Bar. The President of the State Bar of Georgia may appoint one or more Counsel for the Bar to assist the State Bar of Georgia in meeting its duties as prescribed in (a) above. </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule297","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"23e5bb25-854c-4e86-9d27-7b002e764d24","Title":"14-4. DISTRICT COMMITTEES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter36","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"d1f6c3e4-a6cf-4bac-b342-73354c06cda8","Title":"RULE 14-4.1 GENERALLY","Content":"(a) Appointment and Terms. Each District Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall consist of not fewer than three members, no more than 49 percent of whom shall be lawyers and members in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. All appointees shall be residents of the judicial district or have their principal office in the district. The terms of the members of District Committees shall be for three years from the date of appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia or until such time as their successors are appointed, except that it shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually. The members who initially serve terms of less than two years shall be eligible for immediate reappointment. Continuous service of a member shall not exceed six years. The expiration of the term of any member shall not disqualify that member from concluding any investigations pending before that member. Any member of a District Committee may be removed from office by the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(b) Committee Chair. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall designate a chair for each District Committee. The chair of each District Committee may designate a vice-chair and secretary. The chair shall be a nonlawyer member or a lawyer member in good standing with the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) Quorum. Three members of the District Committee or a majority of the members, whichever is less, shall constitute a quorum.\n(d) Panels. The chair of a District Committee may divide that committee into panels of not fewer than three members, one of whom must be a lawyer member in good standing with the State Bar of Georgia. The three-member panel shall elect one of its members to preside over the panel's actions. If the chair or vice-chair of the District Committee is a member of a three-member panel, the chair or vice-chair shall be the presiding officer.\n(e) Duties. It shall be the duty of each District Committee to investigate, with dispatch, all reports of unlicensed practice of law and to make prompt written report of its investigation and findings to staff counsel. In addition, the duties of the District Committee shall include, but not be limited to:\n (1) closing cases not deemed by the District Committee to warrant further action by the State Bar of Georgia; \n(2) closing cases proposed to be resolved by a cease and desist affidavit; and \n(3) forwarding to staff counsel recommendations for litigation to be reviewed by the Standing Committee.\n(f) District Committee Meetings. District Committees should meet at regularly scheduled times. Either the chair or vice-chair may call special meetings. District Committees should meet as often as necessary during any period when the committee has one or more pending cases assigned for investigation and report. The time, date and place of scheduled meetings should be set in advance by agreement between each committee and staff counsel. Meetings may be conducted by telephone conference or by any other technology available and agreed upon by the committee. Any participant, including staff counsel, may participate in the meeting by telephone conference or any other technology agreed upon by the committee.","UrlName":"rule299","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23e5bb25-854c-4e86-9d27-7b002e764d24","Revisions":[{"Id":"2fdbcddc-4d9a-41e2-956c-62f6f847b2d6","ParentId":"d1f6c3e4-a6cf-4bac-b342-73354c06cda8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Appointment and Terms. Each District Committee shall be appointed by the Court and shall consist of not fewer than 3 members, at least one-third of whom shall be nonlawyers. All appointees shall be residents of the judicial district or have their principal office in the district. The terms of the members of District Committees shall be for 3 years from the date of appointment by the Court or until such time as their successors are appointed, except that it shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third (1/3) of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually. The members who initially serve terms of less than 2 years shall be eligible for immediate reappointment. Continuous service of a member shall not exceed 6 years. The expiration of the term of any member shall not disqualify that member from concluding any investigations pending before that member. Any member of a District Committee may be removed from office by the Court.\n(b) Committee Chair. For each District Committee there shall be a chair designated by the Court. A vice-chair and secretary may be designated by the chair of each District Committee. The chair shall be a member of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) Quorum. Three members of the District Committee or a majority of the members, whichever is less, shall constitute a quorum.\n(d) Panels. The Chair of a District Committee may divide that Committee into panels of not fewer than 3 members, 1 of whom must be a nonlawyer. The 3-member panel shall elect 1 of its members to preside over the panel's actions. If the chair or vice-chair of the District Committee is a member of a 3-member panel, the chair or vice- chair shall be the presiding officer.\n(e) Duties. It shall be the duty of each District Committee to investigate, with dispatch, all reports of unlicensed practice of law and to make prompt written report of its investigation and findings to staff counsel. In addition, the duties of the District Committee shall include, but not be limited to:\n (1) closing cases not deemed by the District Committee to warrant further action by the State Bar of Georgia; \n(2) closing cases proposed to be resolved by a cease and desist affidavit; and \n(3) forwarding to staff counsel recommendations for litigation to be reviewed by the Standing Committee.\n(f) District Committee Meetings. District Committees should meet at regularly scheduled times. Either the chair or vice chair may call special meetings. District Committees should meet as often as necessary during any period when the Committee has 1 or more pending cases assigned for investigation and report. The time, date and place of scheduled meetings should be set in advance by agreement between each Committee and staff counsel. Meetings may be conducted by telephone conference or by any other technology available and agreed upon by the Committee. Any participant, including staff counsel, may participate in the meeting by telephone conference or any other technology agreed upon by the Committee.","UrlName":"revision268"}],"Ancestors":["23e5bb25-854c-4e86-9d27-7b002e764d24","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"db99762a-cf7e-4661-9013-67cb87c5debe","Title":"14-5. COMPLAINT PROCESSING AND INITIAL INVESTIGATORY PROCEDURES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter37","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"0212cfb4-1a2f-4fb7-a34d-183e553dc9a9","Title":"RULE 14-5.1 COMPLAINT PROCESSING","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Complaints. All complaints alleging unlicensed practice of law, except those initiated by the State Bar of Georgia, shall be in writing and signed by the complainant in such form as may be prescribed by the Standing Committee.</li> \n <li>Review by Staff Counsel. Staff counsel shall review the complaint and determine whether the alleged conduct, if proven, would constitute a violation of the prohibition against engaging in the unlicensed practice of law. Staff counsel may conduct a preliminary, informal investigation to aid in this determination and may use a State Bar of Georgia staff investigator to aid in the preliminary investigation. If staff counsel determines that the facts, if proven, would not constitute a violation, staff counsel may decline to pursue the complaint. A decision by staff counsel not to pursue a complaint shall not preclude further action or review under the rules regulating the State Bar of Georgia. The complainant shall be notified of a decision not to pursue a complaint.</li> \n <li>Referral to District Committee. Staff counsel may refer a UPL file to the appropriate District Committee for further investigation or action as authorized elsewhere in these rules.</li> \n <li>Closing by Staff Counsel and Committee Chair. If staff counsel and a District Committee chair concur in a finding that the case should be closed without a finding of unlicensed practice of law, the complaint may be closed on such finding without reference to the District Committee or Standing Committee.</li> \n <li>Referral to Staff Counsel for Opening. A complaint received by a District Committee or Standing Committee member directly from a complainant shall be reported to staff counsel for docketing and assignment of a case number. Should the District Committee or Standing Committee member decide that the facts, if proven, would not constitute the unlicensed practice of law, the District Committee or Standing Committee member shall forward this finding to staff counsel along with the complaint for notification to the complainant as outlined above. Formal investigation by a District Committee may proceed after the matter has been referred to staff counsel for docketing.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule301","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"db99762a-cf7e-4661-9013-67cb87c5debe","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["db99762a-cf7e-4661-9013-67cb87c5debe","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","Title":"14-6. PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter38","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"6decbd1b-5407-4ef7-aa15-4cbb538e9a3d","Title":"RULE 14-6.1 HEARINGS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Conduct of Proceedings. The proceedings of District Committees and the Standing Committee when hearings are held may be informal in nature and the committees shall not be bound by the rules of evidence. Committee deliberations shall be closed.</li> \n <li>Taking Testimony. Counsel for the Bar, Staff counsel, the Standing Committee, each District Committee, and members thereof conducting investigations are empowered to take and have transcribed the testimony and evidence of witnesses. If the testimony is recorded stenographically or otherwise, the witness shall be sworn by any person authorized by law to administer oaths.</li> \n <li>Rights and Responsibilities of Respondent. The respondent may be required to appear and to produce evidence as any other witness unless the respondent claims a privilege or right properly available to the respondent under applicable federal or state law. The respondent may be accompanied by counsel.</li> \n <li>Rights of Complaining Witness. The complaining witness is not a party to the investigative proceeding although the complainant may be called as a witness should the matter come before a Judge. The complainant may be granted the right to be present at any District Committee hearing when the respondent is present before the committee. The complaining witness shall have no right to appeal the finding of the District Committee.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule303","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"0c46ae97-c528-406e-b0e9-f0cb5254c79f","Title":"RULE 14-6.2 SUBPOENAS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Issuance by Superior Court. Upon receiving a written application of the chair of the Standing Committee or of a District Committee or staff counsel alleging facts indicating that a person or entity is or may be practicing law without a license and that the issuance of a subpoena is necessary for the investigation of such unlicensed practice, the clerk of the Superior Court in which the committee is located shall issue subpoenas in the name of the chief Judge of the Superior Court for the attendance of any person and production of books and records before staff counsel or the investigating District Committee or any member thereof at the time and place within its district designated in such application. Such subpoenas shall be returnable to the Superior Court of the residence or place of business of the person subpoenaed. A like subpoena shall issue upon application by any person or entity under investigation.</li> \n <li>Failure to Comply. Failure to comply with any subpoena shall constitute a contempt of court and may be punished by the Superior Court that issued the subpoena or where the contemnor may be found. The Superior Court shall have the power to enter such orders as may be necessary for the enforcement of the subpoena.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule304","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3772e718-9509-4f18-b01a-d198a16d543b","Title":"RULE 14-6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>District Committee Action. Upon concluding its investigation, the District Committee shall forward a report to staff counsel regarding the disposition of those cases closed, those cases where a cease and desist affidavit has been accepted, and those cases where litigation is recommended. A majority of those present is required for all District Committee recommendations; however, the vote may be taken by mail, telephone, fax, e-mail or other means rather than at a formal meeting. All recommendations for litigation under these rules shall be reviewed by the Standing Committee for final approval prior to initiating litigation.</li> \n <li>Action by Staff Counsel. Staff counsel shall review the disposition reports of the District Committee. If staff counsel objects to any action taken by the District Committee, staff counsel shall forward such objection to the District Committee within 10 business days of receipt of the District Committee report. Staff counsel shall place the action and objection before the Standing Committee for review at its next scheduled meeting. The Standing Committee shall review the District Committee action and the objection, and shall vote on the final disposition of the case. Once a case is closed or a cease and desist affidavit is accepted by the District Committee or by the Standing Committee, staff counsel shall inform the complainant and, if contacted, the respondent of the disposition of the complaint.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule305","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"1a2f76f8-6f0d-4abe-8e0d-0a63201da9ac","Title":"14-7. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE A JUDGE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter39","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"cca12592-68e9-469a-9392-f455a948d04b","Title":"RULE 14-7.1 PROCEEDINGS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF","Content":"(a) Filing Complaints. In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 15-19-58, complaints for civil injunctive relief shall be by petition filed in the Superior Court in which the respondent resides or where venue might otherwise be proper by the State Bar of Georgia in its name.\n(b) Petitions for Injunctive Relief. Except as provided in sub-paragraphs (1) through (7) of this Rule 14-7.1(b) such petition shall be processed in the Superior Court in substantial compliance with Georgia law:\n(1) The petition shall not be framed in technical language, but shall with reasonable clarity set forth the facts constituting the unlicensed practice of law. A demand for relief may be included in the petition but shall not be required.\n(2) The Superior Court, upon consideration of any petition so filed, may issue its order to show cause directed to the respondent commanding the respondent to show cause, if there be any, why the respondent should not be enjoined from the unlicensed practice of law alleged, and further requiring the respondent to file with the Superior Court and serve upon staff counsel within 30 days after service on the respondent of the petition and order to show cause a written answer admitting or denying each of the matters set forth in the petition. The order and petition shall be served upon the respondent in the manner provided for service of process by Georgia law, and service of all other pleadings shall be governed by the procedures applicable under Georgia law.\n(3) If no response or defense is filed within the time permitted, the allegations of the petition shall be taken as true for purposes of that action. The Superior Court will then, upon its motion or upon motion of any party, decide the case upon its merits, granting such relief and issuing such order as might be appropriate.\n(4) If a response or defense filed by a respondent raises no issue of material fact, any party, upon motion, may request summary judgment and the Superior Court may rule thereon as a matter of law.\n(5) The Superior Court may, upon its motion or upon motion of any party, enter a judgment on the pleadings or conduct a hearing with regard to the allegations contained in the petition.\n(6) Subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence shall be issued in the name of the Superior Court upon request of a party. Failure or refusal to comply with any subpoena shall be contempt of court.\n(7) The Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure, including those provisions pertaining to discovery, not inconsistent with these rules shall apply in injunctive proceedings before the Judge. The powers and jurisdiction generally reposed in the Superior Court under those rules may in this action be exercised by the Judge. The State Bar of Georgia may in every case amend its petition one time as a matter of right, within 60 days after the filing of the petition. All proceedings under these rules shall be heard by a Judge sitting without a jury. There shall be no right to a trial by jury with regard to any proceeding conducted under these rules.\n(c) Judge's Order.\n(1) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Judge shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the respondent has engaged in the unlicensed practice of law, whether the respondent's activities should be enjoined by appropriate order, whether costs should be awarded, and whether further relief shall be granted. Copies of the Judge's order shall be served upon all parties.\n(2) The Judge shall have discretion to recommend the assessment of costs. Taxable costs of the proceeding shall include only:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (A) investigative costs; \n(B) court reporters' fees; \n(C) copy costs; \n(D) telephone charges; \n(E) fees for translation services; \n(F) witness expenses, including travel and out-of-pocket expenses; \n(G) travel and out-of-pocket expenses of the Judge; and \n(H) any other costs which may properly be taxed in civil litigation.</div>\n(3) Should the parties enter into a stipulated injunction prior to the hearing, the stipulation shall be filed with the Judge. The Judge may approve the stipulation or reject the stipulation and schedule a hearing as provided elsewhere in these rules.\n(d) Review by the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(1) Objections to the order of the Judge shall be filed with the Court by any party aggrieved, within 30 days after the filing of the order. If the objector desires, a brief or memorandum of law in support of the objections may be filed at the time the objections are filed. Any other party may file a responsive brief or memorandum of law within 20 day of service of the objector's brief or memorandum of law. The objector may file a reply brief or memorandum of law within 10 days of service of the opposing party's responsive brief or memorandum of law. Oral argument will be allowed at the court's discretion.\n(2) Upon the expiration of the time to file objections to the Judge's order, the Court shall review the order of the Judge, together with any briefs or memoranda of law or objections filed in support of or opposition to such order. After review, the Court shall determine as a matter of law whether the respondent has engaged in the unlicensed practice of law, whether the respondent's activities should be enjoined by appropriate order, whether costs should be awarded, and whether further relief shall be granted.\nIssuance of Preliminary or Temporary Injunction. Nothing set forth in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the Superior Court, upon proper application, to issue a preliminary or temporary injunction, or at any stage of the proceedings to enter any such order as the Superior Court deems proper when public harm or the possibility thereof is made apparent to the Superior Court, in order that such harm may be summarily prevented or speedily enjoined.","UrlName":"rule306","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"1a2f76f8-6f0d-4abe-8e0d-0a63201da9ac","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["1a2f76f8-6f0d-4abe-8e0d-0a63201da9ac","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"2cfa914b-377c-488a-87a7-d7b5f4061a9e","Title":"14-8. CONFIDENTIALITY","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter40","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"577e3647-fdef-4348-80c5-13971098990e","Title":"RULE 14-8.1 FILES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Files Are Property of Bar. All matters, including files, preliminary investigation reports, interoffice memoranda, records of investigations, and the records in trials and other proceedings under these rules, except those unlicensed practice of law matters conducted in Superior Courts, are property of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Limitations on Disclosure. Any material provided to or promulgated by the State Bar of Georgia that is confidential under applicable law shall remain confidential and shall not be disclosed except as authorized by the applicable law.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule307","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2cfa914b-377c-488a-87a7-d7b5f4061a9e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2cfa914b-377c-488a-87a7-d7b5f4061a9e","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"77064c10-0dba-47c7-9b4e-d68ee2f5de83","Title":"14-9. ADVISORY OPINIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter41","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8a7fa7b7-a0eb-49b9-9ce5-4a5948c5192f","Title":"RULE 14-9.1 PROCEDURES FOR ISSUANCE OF ADVISORY OPINIONS ON THE UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW","Content":" (a) Definitions. \n \n(1) Committee. The Standing Committee as constituted according to the directives contained in these rules. \n \n(2) Petitioner. An individual or organization seeking guidance as to the applicability, in a hypothetical situation, of the state's prohibitions against the unlicensed practice of law. \n \n(3) Public Notice. Publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the hearing will be held and in the Georgia Bar Journal. \n \n(4) Court. The Supreme Court of Georgia (or such other court in the state of Georgia as the Supreme Court may designate). \n \n(b) Requests for Advisory Opinions. The Committee shall respond to written requests from all persons and entities seeking advisory opinions concerning activities that may constitute the unlicensed practice of law. Such requests shall be in writing and addressed to the State Bar of Georgia. The request for an advisory opinion shall state in detail all operative facts upon which the request for opinion is based and contain the name and address of the petitioner. \n \n(c) Limitations on Opinions. No opinion shall be rendered with respect to any case or controversy pending in any court in this jurisdiction and no informal opinion shall be issued except as provided in rule 14-9.1(g)(1). \n \n(d) Services of Voluntary Counsel. The Committee shall be empowered to request and accept the voluntary services of a person licensed to practice in this state when the Committee deems it advisable to receive written or oral advice regarding the question presented by the petitioner. \n \n(e) Conflict of Interest. Committee members shall not participate in any matter in which they have either a material pecuniary interest that would be affected by a proposed advisory opinion or Committee recommendation or any other conflict of interest that should prevent them from participating. However, no action of the Committee will be invalid where full disclosure has been made and the Committee has not decided that the member's participation was improper. \n \n (f) Notice, Appearance, and Service. \n \n(1) At least 30 days in advance of the Committee meeting at which initial action is to be taken with respect to a potential advisory opinion, the Committee shall give public notice of the date, time, and place of the meeting, state the question presented, and invite written comments on the question. On the announced date the Committee shall hold a public hearing at which any person affected shall be entitled to present oral testimony and be represented by counsel. Oral testimony by other persons may be allowed by the Committee at its discretion. At the time of or prior to the hearing any other person shall be entitled to file written testimony on the issue before the Committee. Additional procedures not inconsistent with this rule may be adopted by the Committee. \n \n(2) The Committee shall issue either a written proposed advisory opinion, or a letter that declines to issue an opinion, or an informal opinion as provided in rule 14-9.1(g)(1). No other form of communication shall be deemed to be an advisory opinion. \n \n(3) A proposed advisory opinion shall be in writing and shall bear a date of issuance. The proposed opinion shall prominently bear a title indicating that it is a proposed advisory opinion and a disclaimer stating that it is only an interpretation of the law and does not constitute final court action. The Committee shall arrange for the publication of notice of filing the proposed advisory opinion and a summary thereof in the Georgia Bar Journal within a reasonable time. Interested parties shall be furnished a copy of the full opinion upon request. \n \n(g) Service and Judicial Review of Proposed Advisory Opinions. \n \n(1) In the case of any proposed advisory opinion in which the Standing Committee concludes that the conduct in question is not the unlicensed practice of law, it shall decide, by a vote of a majority of the Committee members present, either to publish the advisory opinion as provided in rule 14-9.1(f)(3) as an informal advisory opinion, or to file a copy of the opinion with the Court as provided in rule 14-9.1(g)(2). \n \n(2) In the case of any proposed advisory opinion in which the Standing Committee concludes that the conduct in question constitutes or would constitute the unlicensed practice of law, the Committee shall file a copy of the opinion and all materials considered by the Committee in adopting the opinion with the clerk of the Court. The advisory opinion, together with notice of the filing thereof, shall be furnished by certified mail to the petitioner. Unless the Court grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the Committee, the State Bar of Georgia, and the petitioner, and not on the Supreme Court, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. \n \n(3) Within 20 days of the filing of the Advisory Opinion or the date the publication is mailed to the members of the Bar, whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the petitioner may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Court, copies of which shall be served on the Committee. The petition shall designate the Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Court grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Committee. The State Bar of Georgia and the petitioner shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The Committee may file a responsive brief, and any other interested person may seek leave of the Court to file and serve a brief, whether in support of or in opposition to the opinion. Oral argument will be allowed at the Court's discretion. The Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall otherwise govern the methods of filing, service, and argument. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court and shall state whether the Advisory Opinion is approved, modified, or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate. \n \n(4) If the Court declines to review the Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the Committee, the State Bar of Georgia, and the petitioner, and not on the Supreme Court, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Court grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Court approves or modifies the opinion, it shall constitute binding precedent and shall be published in the official Georgia Court and Bar Rules manual. The Supreme Court shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court. There shall be no further review of the opinion except as granted by the Supreme Court in its discretion, upon petition to the Supreme Court.","UrlName":"rule310","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77064c10-0dba-47c7-9b4e-d68ee2f5de83","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77064c10-0dba-47c7-9b4e-d68ee2f5de83","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ccb51ff1-618f-4719-bdde-26147d11da0d","Title":"14-10. IMMUNITY","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter42","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"2d6d6f6e-35d4-473c-895b-5f4a95f9eb1c","Title":"RULE 14-10.1 GENERALLY","Content":"The members of the Standing Committee and District Committees, as well as staff persons and appointed voluntary counsel assisting those committees, including, but not limited to, staff counsel, Counsel for the Bar and investigators; and the State Bar of Georgia, its officers and employees, members of the Executive Committee, and members of the Board of Governors, shall have absolute immunity from civil liability for all acts performed in the course of their official duties.","UrlName":"rule293","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ccb51ff1-618f-4719-bdde-26147d11da0d","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["ccb51ff1-618f-4719-bdde-26147d11da0d","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Title":"Unlicensed Practice of Law Advisory Opinions","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter77","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8db15645-d471-4636-b2d4-f6609e828222","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2012-1","Content":"Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on August 13, 2012.\nNote: This opinion is only an interpretation of the law, and does not constitute final action by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Unless the Court grants review under Bar Rule 14-9.1(g), this opinion shall be binding only on the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law, the State Bar of Georgia, and the petitioner, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.\n QUESTION PRESENTED \nA consulting forester represents a landowner in the sale of his timber. The consulting forester, in the past, had an attorney draft a timber contract for the sale of timber by a different landowner. The consulting forester wants to use the same timber contract for closing of the present timber sale, and not have an attorney involved in the sale and closing of the timber sale. He proposes to merely change name of landowner, name of timber company purchaser, sales price, timber being purchased and land description where the timber is located. All of this to be done so that the sale of timber can be accomplished without timber company employing an attorney to close the timber sale. Is the consulting forester engaging in the unauthorized practice of law?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \nTo the extent any questioned activity involves the preparation or execution of a deed of conveyance, one should look to prior opinions of the Committee and the Supreme Court of Georgia. If, however, a consulting forester’s actions do not extend beyond the use of a pre-existing contract, that activity would not by itself constitute the unlicensed practice of law.\n OPINION \nIn UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 , the Committee addressed issues surrounding the preparation and execution of deeds of conveyance. That opinion was approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia. In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. 472 (2003). To the extent any questioned activity related to a timber sale involves the preparation or execution of a deed of conveyance, one should consult those two opinions for guidance.\n In Georgia, the licensure of registered foresters is based upon statute. O.C.G.A. §12-6-40 et seq . Such licensees are regulated by the State Board of Registration for Foresters. O.C.G.A. §12-6-42. The Board issues licenses, has the authority to discipline licensees, and has the power to seek injunctive relief when it appears that an individual or other entity is falsely holding himself out as a registered forester. O.C.G.A. §§12-6-52, 12-6-57 and 12-6-60. It is illegal to engage in the unlicensed practice of professional forestry. O.C.G.A. §12-6-61. “‘Professional forestry’…means any professional service relating to forestry, such as investigation, evaluation, development of forest management plans or responsible supervision of forest management, forest protection, silviculture, forest utilization, forest economics, or other forestry activities in connection with any public or private lands….” O.C.G.A. §12-6-41(2).\n Registered foresters are sometimes used in connection with timber sales. To the extent the forester’s activity is analogous to that of a licensed Georgia real estate broker, the Committee is unconcerned. It notes that real estate brokerage law allows a real estate transaction broker to assist any party by “[p]roviding pre-printed real estate form contracts, leases, and related exhibits and addenda” and by “[a]cting as a scribe in the preparation of real estate form contracts, leases, and related exhibits and addenda.” O.C.G.A. §§ 10-6A-14(a)(3) and 10-6A-14(a)(4). Real estate brokers engaged by sellers, landlords and buyers have the authority to carry out the same acts. O.C.G.A. §§10-6A-5(c), 10-6A-6(c) and 10-6A-7(c). Furthermore, it is lawful for real estate brokers “to complete listing or sales contracts or leases whose form has been prepared by legal counsel and such conduct shall not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.” O.C.G.A. §43-40-25.1. A broker completing a written offer to buy, sell or lease real property “shall include a description of the property involved, a method of payment, any special stipulations or addenda the offer requires, and, such dates as may be necessary to determine whether the parties have acted timely in meeting their responsibilities under the lease, offer, or contract.” Id . The Committee finds that if a registered forester engages in similar activity in relation to a timber sale, that activity does not by itself amount to the unlicensed practice of law. \n ","UrlName":"rule548","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"86e4ee1d-8eb0-4bf6-9e51-1c5ca3359732","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2010-1","Content":" Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on June 4, 2010. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/committeesprogramssections/programs/upl/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=8061\%22>Approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia on September 12, 2011</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED \nAssuming no traverse has been filed by any party in a garnishment action, is the completion, execution and filing of an answer in the garnishment action by a non-attorney employee of the garnishee considered the unlicensed practice of law?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \nA nonlawyer who answers for a garnishee other than himself in a legal proceeding pending with a Georgia court of record is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.\n OPINION \n \"The summons of garnishment shall be directed to the garnishee, commanding him to file an answer stating what money or other property is subject to garnishment.\"O.C.G.A. § 18-4-62(a). The \"answer must be filed with the court issuing the summons,\"and \"if the garnishee fails to answer the summons, a judgment by default will be entered against the garnishee for the amount claimed by plaintiff against the defendant.\"Id.\n The summons of garnishment form set out in O.C.G.A. § 18-4-66(2) states that the garnishee is to file an \"answer in writing with the clerk of this court....\"The garnishee is warned that \"[s]hould you fail to answer this summons, a judgment will be rendered against you for the amount the plaintiff claims due by the defendant.\"Id. O.C.G.A. § 18-4-82 refers to the document prepared by the garnishee as an \"answer,\"as does O.C.G.A. § 18-4-97(a): \"The garnishee shall be entitled to his actual reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, in making a true answer of garnishment.\"\nA properly served garnishee is bound to file an answer with the appropriate court. If the answer is not filed, the garnishee faces a default judgment. The inescapable conclusion is that a garnishment action is a legal proceeding. That being the case, the Committee examines who is permitted to file an answer to a legal proceeding that is pending with a Georgia court.\n \"Georgia's citizens, of course, have a constitutionally protected right of self-representation.\"In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2002-1 , 277 Ga. 521, 522 n.3 (2004). A party to a legal action can also be represented by a duly licensed attorney at law. Ga. Const. (1983), Art. I, Sec. 1, Para. XII . As far as corporate self-representation, \"[i]n this state, only a licensed attorney is authorized to represent a corporation in a proceeding in a court of record, including any proceeding that may be transferred to a court of record from a court not of record.\"Eckles v. Atlanta Technology Group , 267 Ga. 801, 805 (1997). The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded \"that the rationale and holding of Eckles should, and does, apply to limited liability companies.\"Winzer v. EHCA Dunwoody, LLC , 277 Ga. App 710, 713 (2006). See also Sterling, Winchester &Long, LLC v. Loyd , 280 Ga. App. 416, 417 (2006).\nThe Committee concludes that a nonlawyer who answers for a garnishee other than himself in a proceeding pending in a Georgia court of record is engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.","UrlName":"rule537","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"e2e215e9-07b6-4668-8577-9e1b90f7b0e6","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2005-1","Content":"Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on June 10, 2005. Note: This opinion is only an interpretation of the law, and does not constitute final action by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Unless the Court grants review under Bar Rule 14-9.1(g), this opinion shall be binding only on the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law, the State Bar of Georgia, and the petitioner, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.\n QUESTION PRESENTED \n Does a nonlawyer engage in the unlicensed practice of law when he prepares, for another and for remuneration, articles of incorporation, bylaws or other documents relating to the establishment of a corporation?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \n Yes. The existence of a corporation depends entirely upon the law, and the documents that bring it into being secure legal rights. Consequently, the preparation of those documents involves the practice of law. A nonlawyer who prepares such documents for another in exchange for a fee engages in the unlicensed practice of law.\n OPINION \n A corporation is a legal person, having \"the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs....\"O.C.G.A. §14-2-302.  When properly formed and maintained, its existence is legally independent from those who created and own it. This independent status relative to the law is the raison d'être of the corporation, as the entity can insulate its shareholders, directors and officers from certain forms of liability. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§14-2-622(b), 14-2-830(d), and 14-2-842(d). The corporation owes its existence entirely to the operation of the law, as \"[a] corporation, considered in itself... is, in fact, a myth, a fiction, and has no existence but in the imagination of the law.\"Loudon v. Coleman , 59 Ga. 653, 655 (1877). Since a corporation's existence is utterly tied to and dependent upon the law, the documents that bring it into being and define its parameters are documents that serve to secure legal rights.\n The practice of law in Georgia is defined, in part, as \"[t]he preparation of legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured \"and \"[a]ny action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.\"O.C.G.A. §§15-19-50(3) and 15-19-50(6). See also Huber v. State , 234 Ga. 357, 358 (1975). The documents referenced in the question above are designed to bring a corporation into existence. Once they are filed with the Georgia Secretary of State, they confer rights and impose obligations under applicable state and federal law. In view of the foregoing, the preparation of the documents involves the practice of law. The Committee notes that its determination in this regard is consistent with the superior court orders entered into the record of the hearing conducted in this matter.\n The preceding analysis does not exhaust the issue. Individuals have the general right to pro se representation. Ga. Const. (1983), Art. 1, Sec. 1, Para. 12. This right to handle one's personal legal affairs extends beyond the narrow confines of court proceedings. See, e.g., In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. 472, 473 n.2 (2003). Under Georgia law, those who act on their own behalf are free to prepare those documents they deem necessary to effectuate a pro se incorporation. \nO.C.G.A. §15-19-52 states, in part, that no person shall \"be prohibited from drawing any legal instrument for another person, firm, or corporation, provided it is done without fee and solely at the solicitation and the request and under the direction of the person, firm, or corporation desiring to execute the instrument.\"Accordingly, a nonlawyer who assists another within the scope of O.C.G.A. §15-19-52 does not engage in the unlicensed practice of law.  Moreover, an employee of an attorney acting within the ambit of O.C.G.A. §15-19-54 does not engage in the unlicensed practice of law.\n During the hearing, the Committee heard testimony indicating that there are nonlawyers who, for third parties and in exchange for a fee, prepare documents relating to the establishment of Georgia corporations. The Committee finds that this activity does constitute the unlicensed practice of law. As noted above, O.C.G.A. §15-19-52 allows a nonlawyer to assist another with regard to the drawing of legal instruments. The permissible degree of assistance, however, is not unlimited, and is partially predicated upon the assistance being rendered on a noncommercial basis. The proponents of such activity have failed to direct the Committee to any provision of Georgia law authorizing nonlawyers to deliver commercial legal services to Georgia residents. They have also failed to explain why such activity is not prohibited by O.C.G.A. §§15-19-51(a)(3), 15-19-51(a)(4) or 15-19-51(a)(8). In contradistinction to this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia has, when discussing the delivery of legal services in another context, explicitly distinguished between delivering those services as part of \"a professional service,\"as opposed to their delivery though \"a purely commercial enterprise.\"In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. at 473-474 (2003). The Court has indicated that legal services are to be provided by duly licensed and regulated Georgia attorneys.\n\"The Secretary of State has the power reasonably necessary to perform the duties required of him \"regarding the administration of the laws relating to corporations. O.C.G.A. §14-2-130. This opinion does not, of course, in any way impinge upon the Secretary of State's prerogative to disseminate information under O.C.G.A. §14-2-121, or otherwise act in a way consistent with his legal duties as set out by statute, rule or applicable law.","UrlName":"rule539","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c1b4ef65-e95b-40ca-900f-295405dd7b75","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2004-1","Content":" Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on August 6, 2004. \nNote:  This opinion is only an interpretation of the law, and does not constitute final action by the Supreme Court of Georgia.  Unless the Court grants review under Bar Rule 14-9.1(g), this opinion shall be binding only on the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law, the State Bar of Georgia, and the petitioner, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.\n QUESTION PRESENTED \n Is the preparation or filing of a lien considered the unlicensed practice of law if it is done by someone other than the lienholder or a licensed Georgia attorney?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \n A nonlawyer's preparation of a lien for another in exchange for a fee is the unlicensed practice of law.  The ministerial act of physically filing a lien with a court is not the practice of law.\n OPINION \n There are two components to the question presented above, viz., the preparation of a lien and the filing of a lien.  With regard to the latter, the Committee is of the opinion that the mere ministerial act of physically filing a lien with a court does not in itself constitute the practice of law. \n As far as the preparation of a lien, the Committee looks in part to O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3), which states that the practice of law includes \"[t]he preparation of legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured.\"The Supreme Court of Georgia has recently indicated that O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3) continues to aid the judiciary in the performance of its functions with regard to defining the practice of law in this state.  In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. 472, 474 (2003).  See also In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2002-1 , 277 Ga. 521, 522 (2004).\n A lien is \"'a hold or claim which one person has on the property of another as a security for some debt or charge.'\"Waldroup v. State , 198 Ga. 144, 149 (1944).  See also Miller v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. , 105 Ga. App. 174, 176 (1961).  With regard to real estate, a lien encumbers title.  Lincoln Log Homes Mktg., Inc., v. Holbrook , 163 Ga. App. 592, 594 (1982).  There are a variety of liens available under Georgia law.  See, e.g. , O.C.G.A. §44-14-320.  They may vary as to the particulars of their operation, but all assert the perceived rights of the lienholder.  A lien affects the status of title as to the relevant property, and is an instrument designed to secure a legal right.  It follows that under O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3) the preparation of a lien constitutes the practice of law.\nDuring the public hearing regarding this matter, the Committee heard a presentation made by a nonlawyer business entity that prepares mechanics' and materialmen's liens for others.  The customer provides the company with relevant background information, and the company performs a title search, prepares a legal description of the property, and inserts the description into the lien document.  The company then prints the lien, files it with the appropriate court, and provides notice to the property owner.  According to the company, its employees do not provide legal advice to the customer.  The company claims that this activity is not the practice of law, notwithstanding the existence of O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3).\n The company first asserts that its activity is essentially tantamount to performing a title search and preparing an abstract of title, an activity allowed by O.C.G.A. §15-19-53.  An abstract of title \"should be a complete showing in more or less abbreviated form of all instruments appearing of record in any way affecting the title, either adversely or beneficially....\"3 Hinkel, Pindar's Georgia Real Estate Law and Procedure , §26-7, p. 44 (6th ed. 2004).  In the Committee's view, it is not proper to equate a title search or abstract of title with a lien.  As noted above, an abstract identifies a lien; it is not itself a lien.  Moreover, an abstract, being a history of the title to land, is at its core a neutral, informational document.  A lien, on the other hand, asserts a legal claim.  Given the foregoing, it would be unreasonable to read O.C.G.A. §15-19-53 as extending to the preparation of liens.\nIn the alternative, the company states that its activity is allowed under O.C.G.A. §15-19-52, which does not prohibit drafting a legal instrument for another \"provided it is done without fee and solely at solicitation and the request and under the direction of the person, firm, or corporation desiring to execute the instrument.\"The company claims that it collects a fee from its customer solely for preparing an abstract of title or providing a legal description of the property, and that it then prepares the lien free of charge.\nThe Committee views the latter contention as being disingenuous.  Accepting such a deconstruction of the transaction would effectively eviscerate O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3), because the nonlawyer preparer of a legal document could always claim to be charging the fee for something other than the preparation of the instrument.  An interpretation of O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3) that leads to such a result cannot be a correct one.  Rather, it seems more sensible to examine the reason the customer contacted the nonlawyer document preparer, the expectations of the customer, and the ultimate product of the transaction.  In the situation described above, the goal of the customer is to procure a lien, not a mere abstract of title or legal description of property.  The customer in fact obtains the lien, and pays the company for its services in this regard.  Under the circumstances, the transaction involves the practice of law as set out in O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3), and the consequent furnishing of legal services within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §15-19-51(a)(4).","UrlName":"rule541","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"e1782717-3729-4f76-9031-d6d6f10b59bf","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2","Content":" Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on April 22, 2003. Approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia on November 10, 2003. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/committeesprogramssections/programs/upl/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=8087\%22> In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, </a> 277 Ga. 472 (2003). \n QUESTION PRESENTED \nIs the preparation and execution of a deed of conveyance (including, but not limited to, a warranty deed, limited warranty deed, quitclaim deed, security deed, and deed to secure debt) considered the unlicensed practice of law if someone other than a duly licensed Georgia attorney prepares or facilitates the execution of said deed(s) for the benefit of the seller, borrower and lender?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \nYes. Under Georgia law, the preparation of a document that serves to secure a legal right is considered the practice of law. The execution of a deed of conveyance, because it is an integral part of the real estate closing process, is also the practice of law. As a general rule it would, therefore, be the unlicensed practice of law for a nonlawyer to prepare or facilitate the execution of such deeds.\n OPINION \nIn answering the above question, the Committee looks to the law as set out \"by statute, court rule, and case law of the State of Georgia.\"Bar Rule 14-2.1(a). \"Conveyancing,\"\"[t]he preparation of legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured,\"\"[t]he rendering of opinions as to the validity or invalidity of titles to real or personal property,\"\"[t]he giving of any legal advice \"and \"[a]ny action taken for others in any matter connected with the law \"is considered the practice of law in Georgia. O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. Moreover, it is illegal for a nonlawyer \"[t]o render or furnish legal services or advice.\"O.C.G.A. §15-19-51.\n There are certain exceptions to these statutory provisions. For example, \"no bank shall be prohibited from giving any advice to its customers in matters incidental to banks or banking....\"O.C.G.A. §15-19-52. A title insurance company \"may prepare such papers as it thinks proper or necessary in connection with a title which it proposes to insure, in order, in its opinion, for it to be willing to insure the title, where no charge is made by it for the papers.\"Id . Nonlawyers may examine records of title to real property, prepare abstracts of title, and issue related insurance. O.C.G.A. §15-19-53. O.C.G.A. §15-19-54 allows nonlawyers to provide attorneys with paralegal and clerical services, so long as \"at all times the attorney receiving the information or services shall maintain full professional and direct responsibility to his clients for the information and services received.\"\nIn addition to the acts of the Georgia legislature, the Supreme Court of Georgia has made it clear that the preparation of deeds constitutes the practice of law, and is to be undertaken on behalf of another only by a duly qualified and licensed Georgia attorney. For example, the Court has issued the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law in Georgia. Under Part E of those rules, an individual can be licensed as a \"foreign law consultant,\"and thereby be authorized to \"render legal services and give professional legal advice on, and only on, the law of the foreign country in which the foreign law consultant is admitted to practice....\"Since such an individual has not been regularly admitted to the State Bar of Georgia, the Court prohibits foreign law consultants from providing any other legal services to the public. For purposes of this discussion, it is noteworthy that Part E, §2(b) states that a foreign law consultant may not \"prepare any deed, mortgage, assignment, discharge, lease, trust instrument, or any other instrument affecting title to real estate located in the United States of America.\"\nThe Committee concludes that, with the limited exception of those activities expressly permitted by the Georgia legislature or courts, the preparation of deeds of conveyance on behalf of another within the state of Georgia by anyone other than a duly licensed attorney constitutes the unlicensed practice of law.\n The Committee turns its attention to the execution of deeds of conveyance. Pro se handling of one's own legal affairs is, of course, entirely permissible, and there is nothing in Georgia law to \"prevent any corporation, voluntary association, or individual from doing any act or acts set out in Code Section 15-19-50 to which the persons are a party....\"O.C.G.A. §15-19-52. The Committee instead focuses on \"notary closers,\"\"signing agents,\"and others who are not a party to the real estate closing, but nonetheless inject themselves into the closing process and conduct, for example, a \"witness only closing.\"A \"witness only closing \"is one in which an individual presides over the execution of deeds of conveyance and other closing documents, but purports to do so merely as a witness and notary, not as someone who is practicing law.\nThe Supreme Court of Georgia periodically issues advisory opinions relating to attorney conduct. Under Court rule, such opinions have \"the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court.\"Bar Rule 4-403(e). It would be proper, then, for the Committee to turn to any relevant advisory opinions for guidance.\nIn Formal Advisory Opinion 86-5, the Supreme Court of Georgia interpreted the word \"conveyancing \"as set out in O.C.G.A. §15-19-50, and considered what the term meant in relation to the closing of a real estate transaction. The Court viewed a real estate closing \"as the entire series of events through which title to the land is conveyed from one party to another party....\"That being the case, the Court concluded \"it would be ethically improper for a lawyer to aid nonlawyers to 'close' real estate transactions,\"or for a lawyer to \"delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to 'close' the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.\"\nIn Formal Advisory Opinion 00-3, the Court restated its view that the real estate closing is a continuous, interconnected series of events. The Court made it clear that, in order for an attorney to avoid possible disciplinary sanctions for aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law, \"[t]he lawyer must be in control of the closing process from beginning to end. The supervision of the paralegal must be direct and constant.\"The Court held that \"[e]ven though the paralegal may state that they are not a lawyer and is not there for the purpose of giving legal advice, circumstances may arise where one involved in this process as a purchaser, seller or lender would look to the paralegal for advice and/or explanations normally provided by a lawyer. This is not permissible.\"A lawyer who aids a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law can be disbarred. Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5.\nThe Committee finds that those who conduct witness only closings or otherwise facilitate the execution of deeds of conveyance on behalf of others are engaged in the practice of law. As noted above, \"conveyancing \"is deemed to be the practice of law, and the very purpose of a deed is to effectuate a conveyance of real property. In reviewing the foregoing opinions of the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Committee concludes that the execution of a deed of conveyance is so intimately interwoven with the other elements of the closing process so as to be inseparable from the closing as a whole. It is one of \"the entire series of events through which title to the land is conveyed from one party to another party.\"To view the execution of a deed of conveyance as something separate and distinct from the other phases of the closing process--and thus as something other than the practice of law--would not only be forced and artificial, it would run counter to the opinions of the Court. Such an interpretation would mean that a nonlawyer could lawfully preside over the execution of deeds of conveyance, yet an attorney who allowed an unsupervised paralegal to engage in precisely the same activity could be disbarred. An interpretation of Court opinions that leads to such an incongruous result cannot be proper. Rather, the view consistent with those opinions is that one who facilitates the execution of deeds of conveyance is practicing law.\nAccordingly, the Committee concludes that, subject to any relevant exceptions set out by the Georgia legislature or courts, one who facilitates the execution of a deed of conveyance on behalf of another within the state of Georgia is engaged in the practice of law. One does not become licensed to practice law simply by procuring a notary seal. A Georgia lawyer who conducts a witness only closing does not, of course, engage in the unlicensed practice of law. There may well exist, however, professional liability or disciplinary concerns that fall outside the scope of this opinion.\nRefinance closings, second mortgages, home equity loans, construction loans and other secured real estate loan transactions may differ in certain particulars from purchase transactions. Nevertheless, the centerpiece of these transactions is the conveyance of real property. Such transactions are, therefore, subject to the same analysis as set out above.","UrlName":"rule542","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"e400f1bb-9bf7-4615-aa46-b2a6a24485e9","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-1","Content":" Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on March 21, 2003. Approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia on November 21, 2005. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/committeesprogramssections/programs/upl/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=8103\%22>In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-1</a> , 280 Ga. 121 (2005).\n QUESTION PRESENTED \nAttorney representing the creditor on an account files a lawsuit against the debtor. The attorney receives a letter and agency power of attorney from a company stating that it has been authorized to act as the agent for the debtor in settlement negotiations. Is the company engaged in the unlicensed practice of law? Is the individual directing the company engaged in the unlicensed practice of law?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \nYes. Under the circumstances set out above, the company is representing one of the parties to a lawsuit in settlement negotiations. Since such representation can only be lawfully undertaken by an individual who is duly licensed to practice law, and cannot legitimately arise out of an agency power of attorney, the company and its personnel are engaged in the unlicensed practice of law.\n OPINION \nThe Committee conducted a public hearing concerning the question set out above. It heard testimony from the owner of one such company, who described his business operations. The company routinely obtains from Georgia court dockets the names and addresses of debtors against whom suit has been filed. The amount of the alleged indebtedness typically ranges from $500-$8,000. The company contacts the debtors by means of a direct mail solicitation, which contains the following introductory language: \"Dear ____: I may have some good news concerning your civil case. You will soon be served with a Court Summons [emphasis in original] and time is very important. Please contact me as soon as possible....\"When the debtor responds to the solicitation, he is informed that the company, if retained, will contact the plaintiff and attempt to negotiate a settlement of the outstanding indebtedness. If the debtor agrees to the representation, he executes a power of attorney in favor of the company, appointing it as the debtor's \"attorney-in-fact,\"with the stated authority \"[t]o mediate creditor's claim(s) and to effect a reasonable settlement with \"the plaintiff. Once the company obtains the power of attorney, its employee contacts the plaintiff or, if represented by counsel, the plaintiff's attorney. The company's employee provides a copy of the power of attorney to the plaintiff, then attempts to settle the lawsuit through negotiation. The company sometimes charges the debtor a fee for its negotiation services, while at other times provides its services free of charge. The decision as to whether to charge a fee is a matter of discretion, to be determined by the financial plight of the debtor. The company makes it clear to all involved that it is not a law firm, and that none of its employees are licensed Georgia attorneys. Because the company's employees are nonlawyers, they are not bound by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or otherwise subject to disciplinary regulation by the State Bar of Georgia.\nA company operating in the manner described above is engaging in the unlicensed practice of law. The company's activity necessarily involves the delivery of legal services, because it is advocating the legal position of another relative to a pending lawsuit. O.C.G.A. §10-6-5 states that \"[w]hatever one may do himself may be done by an agent, except such personal trusts in which special confidence is placed on the skill, discretion, or judgment of the person called in to act....\"The Committee finds that negotiating a settlement to a lawsuit on behalf of another involves precisely the \"special confidence \"and \"skill, discretion, or judgment \"that can only be lawfully exercised by a duly licensed attorney. An individual cannot confer upon another the right to practice law simply by entering into a private agreement that purports to allow the representation. Such agreements, if they had force and effect, would allow literally anyone to represent another in a legal matter, thereby circumventing the rigorous attorney licensing procedures established by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The potential for public harm under such circumstances is clear, and those inclined to enter into such agreements should keep in mind that \"[n]o rights shall arise to either party out of an agency created for an illegal purpose.\"O.C.G.A. §10-6-20.\n In addition to any unlicensed practice of law issues, the Committee notes, without further comment, that O.C.G.A. §18-5-1 et seq . generally prohibits \"the business of debt adjusting.\"","UrlName":"rule543","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"fca1e04d-1b9a-4e7d-af85-a47fa9260ac1","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2002-1","Content":" Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on July 1, 2002. Approved by the Supreme Court of Georgia on January 12, 2004. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/committeesprogramssections/programs/upl/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=8106\%22> In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2002-1 </a> , 277 Ga. 521 (2004). \n QUESTION PRESENTED \nDebtor incurs a debt with Dr. A, a sole proprietor. Dr. A transfers the account to Collector C by written \"assignment.\"However, the purported assignment states that the transfer is \"for the purpose of collection only.\"Collector C pays nothing for the account, but has an arrangement with Dr. A to receive a set fee or contingency fee upon collection. Collector C is not an attorney, but files suit on the account against Debtor as \"Dr. A by his transferee/assignee Collector C vs. Debtor.\"In the event the case is contested, Collector C also attempts to present the case in court. Is collector C engaged in the unauthorized practice of law?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \n Yes. Individuals normally have the right to represent themselves with regard to legal matters to which they are a party. In the scenario set out above, however, Collector C is not the true party in interest, but is instead taking legal action on behalf of another in exchange for a fee. The actions of Collector C violate O.C.G.A. §15-19-50 et seq ., the Georgia statute pertaining to the unauthorized practice of law.\n OPINION \nIndividuals have the right to self-representation. Georgia corporations have certain limited rights of self-representation. Eckles v. Atlanta Technology Group , 267 Ga. 801 (1997); Uniform Magistrate Court Rule 31. Under the circumstances set out above, Dr. A is always free to take action on his own behalf within the limits of the law.\nThe holder of a chose in action may assign his interest to another. O.C.G.A. §44-12-22. A creditor can, for example, sell an account receivable in exchange for a sum that is fixed and certain, such as a percentage of the indebtedness. If a claim were validly assigned in such a manner, the assignor would relinquish all right, title and interest to the claim, and such title and interest would vest solely in the assignee.\nO.C.G.A. §15-19-50 defines the practice of law, in part, as \"[r]epresenting litigants in court and preparing pleadings and other papers,\"\"[t]he preparation of legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured,\"and \"[a]ny action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.\"O.C.G.A. §15-19-52 states that under certain circumstances nonlawyers may draw legal instruments for others, \"provided it is done without fee and solely at the solicitation and the request and under the direction of the person, firm, or corporation desiring to execute the instrument.\"\nIn the situation set out above, there is not a true assignment of the debt, since there is no real transfer of title and interest to the claim. The putative assignment states that it exists \"for the purpose of collection only.\"The \"assignment \"under these circumstances is in actuality nothing more than a means through which Collector C is attempting to represent Dr. A. Collector C is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law not only because he is representing a third party, but also because he is preparing pleadings and other papers (presumably the complaint and summons) on behalf of Dr. A in exchange for a fee. Private agreements between individuals--no matter what their phraseology--cannot serve to undo acts of the legislature and decisions of Georgia courts.","UrlName":"rule544","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","Title":"Part XV - Georgia Bar Foundation","Content":"","UrlName":"part52","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"01d6ac53-34ae-4ad0-a68c-8c5ab88812bf","Title":"Preamble","Content":"The Georgia Bar Foundation (“the Foundation”) is a 501(c)(3) organization named by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1983 to receive and distribute Interest On Lawyer Trust Account (“IOLTA”) funds to support legal services for the poor, to improve the administration of justice, to provide legal education to Georgia’s children, to provide educational programs for adults in order to advance understanding of democracy and our system of government, to aid children involved in the justice system, and to promote professionalism in the practice of law.","UrlName":"chapter81","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Title":"CHAPTER 1 - IOLTA ACCOUNTS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter82","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"82e9bd5a-e42a-4175-aab0-4aab23929ea4","Title":"Rule 15-101. BANK ACCOUNTS.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether as a sole practitioner or as a member of a firm, association or professional corporation, who receives money or other property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary  capacity  shall  maintain  or  have  available  an  interest-bearing  trust  account  or accounts.</li> \n <li>An “IOLTA Account” is a trust account benefiting the Foundation. The interest generated by an IOLTA Account shall be paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation, Inc. as hereinafter provided.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule584","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"cf8edfa6-5430-4d96-beb0-3009541b2dff","Title":"Rule 15-102. DEFINITIONS.","Content":"(a)   An “IOLTA  Account”  means  a  trust  account  benefiting  the Foundation, established in an approved institution for the deposit of pooled nominal or short-term funds of clients or third persons, and meeting the requirements of the Foundation as further detailed below. The account product may be an interest-bearing checking account; a money market account with, or tied to, check writing; a sweep account, portions of which are regularly moved into a government money market fund or daily overnight financial institution repurchase agreement invested solely in, or fully collateralized by, United States government securities; or an open-end money market fund solely invested in, or fully collateralized by, United States government securities.\n \n(1)   “Nominal or short-term” describes funds of a client or third person that the lawyer has determined cannot provide a positive net return to the client or third person. \n \n(2)   “Open-end money market fund” is a fund that identifies itself as a money market fund as defined by applicable federal statutes and regulations under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and, at the time of the investment, having total assets of at least $250,000,000. \n \n(3)   “United  States  government  securities”  are  United  States Treasury obligations and obligations issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof.\n \n     (b)   An “approved institution” is a bank or savings and loan association which is an approved institution as defined in Rule 1.15(III)(c)(1) and which voluntarily chooses to offer IOLTA Accounts consistent with the additional requirements of this Rule, including:\n \n(1)  to remit to the Foundation interest or dividends, net of any allowable reasonable fees on the IOLTA Account, on the average \n  \nmonthly balance in that account, at least quarterly. Any allowable reasonable fees in excess of the interest earned on that account for any month, and any fees or charges that are not allowable reasonable fees, shall be charged to the lawyer or law firm in whose names such account appears, if not waived by the approved institution. \n \n(2)   to transmit with each remittance to the Foundation a statement showing the name of the lawyer or law firm for whom the remittance is sent, the applicable IOLTA Account number, the rate of interest applied, the average monthly account balance against which the interest rate is applied, the gross interest earned, the types and amounts of service charges or fees applied, and the amount of the net interest remittance. \n \n(3)   to transmit to the depositing lawyer or law firm periodic reports or statements in accordance with the approved institution’s normal procedures for reporting to depositors. \n \n(4)   to pay comparable interest rates on IOLTA Accounts, as defined below at Rule 15-103.\n \n     (c)   “Allowable reasonable fees” for IOLTA Accounts are per check charges, per deposit charges, a fee in lieu of a minimum balance, Federal deposit insurance fees, and sweep fees. (“Allowable reasonable fees” do not include check printing charges, NSF charges, overdraft interest charges, account reconciliation charges, stop payment charges, wire transfer fees, and courier fees. Such listing of excluded fees is not intended to be all inclusive.) All other fees are the responsibility of, and may be charged to, the lawyer maintaining the IOLTA Account. Fees or charges in excess of the earnings accrued on the account for any month or quarter shall not be taken from earnings accrued on other IOLTA Accounts. Approved financial institutions may elect to waive any or all fees on IOLTA Accounts. \n ","UrlName":"rule585","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"2f7c318c-2314-46ad-8c62-9e8cf9407fbc","Title":"Rule 15-103. IOLTA ACCOUNTS: INTEREST RATES.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> On any IOLTA Account, the rate of interest payable shall be: \n <ol> \n <li>not less than the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the approved institution to its non-IOLTA customers for each IOLTA Account that meets the same minimum balance or other eligibility qualifications, if any. In determining the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA customers, the institution may consider factors, in addition to the IOLTA Account balance, customarily considered by the institution when setting interest rates or dividends for its customers if such factors do not discriminate between IOLTA Accounts and accounts of non-IOLTA customers. The institution also shall consider all product option types that it offers to its non- IOLTA customers, as noted at Rule 15-102(a), for an IOLTA Account by either establishing the applicable product as an IOLTA Account or paying the comparable interest rate or dividend on the IOLTA Account in lieu of actually establishing the comparable highest interest rate or dividend product; or</li> \n <li>alternatively, if an approved institution so chooses, a rate equal to the greater of (A) 0.65% per annum or (B) a benchmark interest rate, net of allowable reasonable fees, set by the Foundation, which shall be expressed as a percentage (an “index”) of the federal funds target rate, as established from time to time by the Federal Reserve Board. In order to maintain an overall comparable rate, the Foundation will periodically, but not less than annually, publish its index.  The index shall initially be 65% of the federal funds target rate.</li> \n <li>Approved  institutions  may  choose  to  pay  rates  higher  than comparable rates discussed above.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule586","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"af4dc40f-3763-4ce4-90d3-b106fa7cb153","Title":"CHAPTER 2 - INTERNAL RULES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter83","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"0c9e04f6-71f6-48d8-9f32-73a7cd579329","Title":"RULE 15-201. MANAGEMENT AND DISBURSEMENT OF IOLTA FUNDS; INTERNAL PROCEDURES OF FOUNDATION.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Mandatory Grants. The Georgia Bar Foundation, Inc. (the “Foundation”), which is the charitable arm of the Supreme Court of Georgia, is the named recipient of IOLTA funds. The Foundation shall pay to the Georgia Civil Justice Foundation (“GCJF”) a grant of ten percent (10%) of all IOLTA revenues received, less administrative costs, during the immediately preceding calendar quarter. GCJF must maintain its tax-exempt charitable/educational status under Sections 115 and 170(c)(1) or under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and the purposes and activities of the organization must remain consistent with the exempt purposes of the Foundation. If GCJF is determined either by the Internal Revenue Service or by the Georgia Department of Revenue to be a taxable entity at any time, or its purposes and activities become inconsistent with the exempt purposes of the Foundation, then the Foundation shall retain all IOLTA funds which would have been granted to GCJF.</li> \n <li>Reporting by Organizations. As a condition to continued receipt of IOLTA funds, the Foundation and GCJF shall each present a report of its activities including an audit of its finances to the Supreme Court of Georgia annually. GCJF shall also send to the Foundation a copy of its annual report and audit.</li> \n <li>Discretionary Grants. The Foundation shall develop procedures for regularly soliciting, evaluating, and funding grant applications from worthy law- related organizations that seek to provide civil legal assistance to needful Georgians, to improve the working and the efficiency of the judicial system, to provide legal education to Georgia’s children, to provide assistance to children who are involved with the legal system, to provide educational programs for adults intended to promote a better understanding of our democratic system of government, or to foster professionalism in the practice of law.</li> \n <li>IOLTA Account Confidentiality. The Foundation will protect the confidentiality of information regarding a lawyer’s or law firm’s trust account obtained in the course of managing IOLTA operations.</li> \n <li>Report to the Office of the General Counsel. The Foundation will provide the Office of the General Counsel with a list of approved financial institutions which have agreed to abide by the requirements of this Part XV of the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia. Such list will be updated with such additions and deletions as necessary to maintain its accuracy.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule587","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"af4dc40f-3763-4ce4-90d3-b106fa7cb153","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["af4dc40f-3763-4ce4-90d3-b106fa7cb153","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Title":"Part XVI - Institute of Continuing Legal Education of the State Bar of Georgia","Content":"","UrlName":"part53","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"a3b55cf9-82b5-403d-a6e4-7762ec2932f0","Title":"Rule 16-101. PREAMBLE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Pursuant to an asset agreement executed on December 30, 2016, between the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia, an unincorporated Georgia nonprofit association, and the State Bar of Georgia Foundation, Inc., <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> a Georgia nonprofit corporation, the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of the State Bar of Georgia (“ICLE”) is hereby established as a program of the State Bar of Georgia. The purpose of ICLE is to promote a well-organized, properly planned, and adequately supported program of continuing legal education by which members of the legal profession may enhance their skills, keep abreast of developments in the law, ethics, and professionalism, engage in the study and research of the law, and disseminate the knowledge thus obtained. \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> These assets were subsequently transferred to the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of the State Bar of Georgia, LLC on December 31, 2018. The Institute for Continuing Legal Education of the State Bar of Georgia, LLC, is a not for profit limited liability company owned solely by the State Bar of Georgia and managed by a Board of Managers composed of the members of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule592","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"6d02af25-2039-4ab9-9c6e-c61a196c54e3","Title":"Rule 16-102. ICLE BOARD.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>ICLE shall be overseen by a Board composed of 13 members, all of whom shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia as follows: the Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia, seven members of the State Bar of Georgia appointed by the State Bar of Georgia President with the approval of the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors, and one member from each of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) accredited law schools operating in the State appointed by the dean of the respective law school. Each Board member shall serve for three years with the terms staggered so that the terms of approximately one-third of the members expire each year. No State Bar of Georgia member may serve more than two full terms except that such a member appointed to fill a vacancy may fill the unexpired term of the member replaced in addition to two full terms, if reappointed. There shall be no term limits for the ABA accredited law school members.</li> \n <li>All members of the predecessor ICLE Board of Trustees will be eligible for appointment to serve on the ICLE Board described herein. The State Bar of Georgia President shall appoint seven members to the ICLE Board in staggered terms. Each of the deans of the ABA accredited law schools operating in Georgia shall name one Board member to serve a three-year term. Each year thereafter, the incoming Bar President and the deans of the ABA accredited law schools shall appoint or reappoint members as necessary to fill the seats of those members with expiring terms. The Immediate Past President of the State Bar of Georgia shall serve a one-year term.</li> \n <li>The Board shall meet in conjunction with each regularly scheduled meeting of the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors. The Chair or any seven members of the Board, which must include at least one ABA accredited law school member, may call a special meeting of the Board at a time and place convenient to the Board and upon conditions described in the Internal Operating Procedures of the Board.</li> \n <li>At the first meeting after July 1 of each year, the Board shall elect a Chair, Vice-Chair, and such other officers, as it deems necessary. No Board member may serve as Chair for more than two consecutive terms.</li> \n <li>Seven Board members, including one ABA accredited law school member, shall constitute a quorum of the Board. The act of a majority of the members present at a meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the Board. The Director of ICLE shall attend meetings of the Board and shall serve as Secretary to the Board but shall have no vote.</li> \n <li>No compensation shall be paid to members of the ICLE Board for their service.</li> \n <li>A Board member may be removed from the Board for failure to attend meetings or for other good cause as defined in the Internal Operating Procedures of the Board. The vacancy shall be filled by the original appointing authority.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule593","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3de53089-13b7-498c-8865-d4bf01c01bee","Title":"Rule 16-103. POWER AND DUTIES OF THE ICLE BOARD.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The ICLE Board shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to prepare a proposed budget for the annual operation of ICLE;</li> \n <li>to develop policies and Internal Operating Procedures for the operation of the Board;</li> \n <li>to recommend topics and speakers to the Director for continuing legal education (CLE) programs to be sponsored by the State Bar of Georgia or its Sections;</li> \n <li>to review qualifications requirements for proposed speakers and provide recommendations for any proposed changes;</li> \n <li>to encourage CLE programming by the Sections of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to review evaluations from CLE programs and to make recommendations for improvements; and</li> \n <li>to submit an annual informational report to the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors describing ICLE’s activity for the year, including programs presented, attendance, and income generated from each program.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule594","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Revisions":[{"Id":"049b2451-fd78-4c39-9a94-daeb6bbbf876","ParentId":"3de53089-13b7-498c-8865-d4bf01c01bee","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The ICLE Board shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to prepare a proposed budget for the annual operation of ICLE;</li> \n <li>to develop policies and Internal Operating Procedures for the operation of the Board;</li> \n <li>to recommend topics and speakers to the Director for continuing legal education (“CLE”) programs to be sponsored by the State Bar of Georgia or its Sections;</li> \n <li>to review qualifications for proposed speakers;</li> \n <li>to encourage CLE programming by the Sections of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to review evaluations from CLE programs; and</li> \n <li> to submit an annual report to the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors describing ICLE’s activity for the year, including programs presented, attendance, and income generated from each program. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision262"}],"Ancestors":["d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3eca81d7-6912-440c-aac6-5a9f085a99c3","Title":"Rule 16-104. DIRECTOR.","Content":"The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, with the advice and consent of the ICLE Board, shall hire a Director for ICLE and shall serve as the immediate supervisor of the Director. The Director shall oversee the day-to-day operations of ICLE.","UrlName":"rule595","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"df4a4288-4bdf-41dc-9311-bca341bc82d3","Title":"Rule 16-105. FINANCES.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>ICLE shall fund its operations from the fees that it charges for CLE programs and may use any of the surplus funds held by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of the State Bar of Georgia, LLC, to fund the purpose of ICLE. Its funds and accounts shall be maintained by the State Bar of Georgia separately from other funds or accounts of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia, after consultation with the ICLE Board, may charge ICLE for its costs in housing and administering ICLE as determined by the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>The Board shall provide a financial report to the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors at each of its meetings and shall provide an audit report to the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors at the Annual Meeting each year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule596","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Revisions":[{"Id":"835aacaa-8f3a-42db-a33f-f8cdbc4f6bde","ParentId":"df4a4288-4bdf-41dc-9311-bca341bc82d3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>ICLE shall fund its operations from the fees that it charges for CLE programs and may use any of its surplus funds to fund the purpose of ICLE. Its funds and accounts shall be maintained by the State Bar of Georgia separately from other funds or accounts of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia, after consultation with the ICLE Board, may charge ICLE for its costs in housing and administering ICLE as determined by the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>The Board shall provide a financial report to the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors at each of its meetings and shall provide an audit report to the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors at the Annual Meeting each year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision264"}],"Ancestors":["d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"180fb6e6-1925-4cf2-973a-32b4f7f9d461","Title":"Rule 16-106. STAFF LIAISON.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Office of the General Counsel for the State Bar of Georgia shall serve as legal advisor for the Board and for the ICLE program.</div>","UrlName":"rule598","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":[]},{"Id":"3de53089-13b7-498c-8865-d4bf01c01bee","Title":"Rule 16-103. POWER AND DUTIES OF THE ICLE BOARD.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The ICLE Board shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to prepare a proposed budget for the annual operation of ICLE;</li> \n <li>to develop policies and Internal Operating Procedures for the operation of the Board;</li> \n <li>to recommend topics and speakers to the Director for continuing legal education (CLE) programs to be sponsored by the State Bar of Georgia or its Sections;</li> \n <li>to review qualifications requirements for proposed speakers and provide recommendations for any proposed changes;</li> \n <li>to encourage CLE programming by the Sections of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to review evaluations from CLE programs and to make recommendations for improvements; and</li> \n <li>to submit an annual informational report to the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors describing ICLE’s activity for the year, including programs presented, attendance, and income generated from each program.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule594","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Revisions":[{"Id":"049b2451-fd78-4c39-9a94-daeb6bbbf876","ParentId":"3de53089-13b7-498c-8865-d4bf01c01bee","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The ICLE Board shall have the following powers and duties: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>to prepare a proposed budget for the annual operation of ICLE;</li> \n <li>to develop policies and Internal Operating Procedures for the operation of the Board;</li> \n <li>to recommend topics and speakers to the Director for continuing legal education (“CLE”) programs to be sponsored by the State Bar of Georgia or its Sections;</li> \n <li>to review qualifications for proposed speakers;</li> \n <li>to encourage CLE programming by the Sections of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>to review evaluations from CLE programs; and</li> \n <li> to submit an annual report to the State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors describing ICLE’s activity for the year, including programs presented, attendance, and income generated from each program. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision262"}],"Ancestors":["d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"af4dc40f-3763-4ce4-90d3-b106fa7cb153","Title":"CHAPTER 2 - INTERNAL RULES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter83","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"0c9e04f6-71f6-48d8-9f32-73a7cd579329","Title":"RULE 15-201. MANAGEMENT AND DISBURSEMENT OF IOLTA FUNDS; INTERNAL PROCEDURES OF FOUNDATION.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Mandatory Grants. The Georgia Bar Foundation, Inc. (the “Foundation”), which is the charitable arm of the Supreme Court of Georgia, is the named recipient of IOLTA funds. The Foundation shall pay to the Georgia Civil Justice Foundation (“GCJF”) a grant of ten percent (10%) of all IOLTA revenues received, less administrative costs, during the immediately preceding calendar quarter. GCJF must maintain its tax-exempt charitable/educational status under Sections 115 and 170(c)(1) or under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and the purposes and activities of the organization must remain consistent with the exempt purposes of the Foundation. If GCJF is determined either by the Internal Revenue Service or by the Georgia Department of Revenue to be a taxable entity at any time, or its purposes and activities become inconsistent with the exempt purposes of the Foundation, then the Foundation shall retain all IOLTA funds which would have been granted to GCJF.</li> \n <li>Reporting by Organizations. As a condition to continued receipt of IOLTA funds, the Foundation and GCJF shall each present a report of its activities including an audit of its finances to the Supreme Court of Georgia annually. GCJF shall also send to the Foundation a copy of its annual report and audit.</li> \n <li>Discretionary Grants. The Foundation shall develop procedures for regularly soliciting, evaluating, and funding grant applications from worthy law- related organizations that seek to provide civil legal assistance to needful Georgians, to improve the working and the efficiency of the judicial system, to provide legal education to Georgia’s children, to provide assistance to children who are involved with the legal system, to provide educational programs for adults intended to promote a better understanding of our democratic system of government, or to foster professionalism in the practice of law.</li> \n <li>IOLTA Account Confidentiality. The Foundation will protect the confidentiality of information regarding a lawyer’s or law firm’s trust account obtained in the course of managing IOLTA operations.</li> \n <li>Report to the Office of the General Counsel. The Foundation will provide the Office of the General Counsel with a list of approved financial institutions which have agreed to abide by the requirements of this Part XV of the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia. Such list will be updated with such additions and deletions as necessary to maintain its accuracy.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule587","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"af4dc40f-3763-4ce4-90d3-b106fa7cb153","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["af4dc40f-3763-4ce4-90d3-b106fa7cb153","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"2f7c318c-2314-46ad-8c62-9e8cf9407fbc","Title":"Rule 15-103. IOLTA ACCOUNTS: INTEREST RATES.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> On any IOLTA Account, the rate of interest payable shall be: \n <ol> \n <li>not less than the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the approved institution to its non-IOLTA customers for each IOLTA Account that meets the same minimum balance or other eligibility qualifications, if any. In determining the highest interest rate or dividend generally available from the institution to its non-IOLTA customers, the institution may consider factors, in addition to the IOLTA Account balance, customarily considered by the institution when setting interest rates or dividends for its customers if such factors do not discriminate between IOLTA Accounts and accounts of non-IOLTA customers. The institution also shall consider all product option types that it offers to its non- IOLTA customers, as noted at Rule 15-102(a), for an IOLTA Account by either establishing the applicable product as an IOLTA Account or paying the comparable interest rate or dividend on the IOLTA Account in lieu of actually establishing the comparable highest interest rate or dividend product; or</li> \n <li>alternatively, if an approved institution so chooses, a rate equal to the greater of (A) 0.65% per annum or (B) a benchmark interest rate, net of allowable reasonable fees, set by the Foundation, which shall be expressed as a percentage (an “index”) of the federal funds target rate, as established from time to time by the Federal Reserve Board. In order to maintain an overall comparable rate, the Foundation will periodically, but not less than annually, publish its index.  The index shall initially be 65% of the federal funds target rate.</li> \n <li>Approved  institutions  may  choose  to  pay  rates  higher  than comparable rates discussed above.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule586","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abdb432c-e45d-4ba2-92d5-88ffd5622625","fa8339e6-da4d-4384-bfdb-38c25f42f6eb","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"e2e215e9-07b6-4668-8577-9e1b90f7b0e6","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2005-1","Content":"Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on June 10, 2005. Note: This opinion is only an interpretation of the law, and does not constitute final action by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Unless the Court grants review under Bar Rule 14-9.1(g), this opinion shall be binding only on the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law, the State Bar of Georgia, and the petitioner, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.\n QUESTION PRESENTED \n Does a nonlawyer engage in the unlicensed practice of law when he prepares, for another and for remuneration, articles of incorporation, bylaws or other documents relating to the establishment of a corporation?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \n Yes. The existence of a corporation depends entirely upon the law, and the documents that bring it into being secure legal rights. Consequently, the preparation of those documents involves the practice of law. A nonlawyer who prepares such documents for another in exchange for a fee engages in the unlicensed practice of law.\n OPINION \n A corporation is a legal person, having \"the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs....\"O.C.G.A. §14-2-302.  When properly formed and maintained, its existence is legally independent from those who created and own it. This independent status relative to the law is the raison d'être of the corporation, as the entity can insulate its shareholders, directors and officers from certain forms of liability. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§14-2-622(b), 14-2-830(d), and 14-2-842(d). The corporation owes its existence entirely to the operation of the law, as \"[a] corporation, considered in itself... is, in fact, a myth, a fiction, and has no existence but in the imagination of the law.\"Loudon v. Coleman , 59 Ga. 653, 655 (1877). Since a corporation's existence is utterly tied to and dependent upon the law, the documents that bring it into being and define its parameters are documents that serve to secure legal rights.\n The practice of law in Georgia is defined, in part, as \"[t]he preparation of legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured \"and \"[a]ny action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.\"O.C.G.A. §§15-19-50(3) and 15-19-50(6). See also Huber v. State , 234 Ga. 357, 358 (1975). The documents referenced in the question above are designed to bring a corporation into existence. Once they are filed with the Georgia Secretary of State, they confer rights and impose obligations under applicable state and federal law. In view of the foregoing, the preparation of the documents involves the practice of law. The Committee notes that its determination in this regard is consistent with the superior court orders entered into the record of the hearing conducted in this matter.\n The preceding analysis does not exhaust the issue. Individuals have the general right to pro se representation. Ga. Const. (1983), Art. 1, Sec. 1, Para. 12. This right to handle one's personal legal affairs extends beyond the narrow confines of court proceedings. See, e.g., In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. 472, 473 n.2 (2003). Under Georgia law, those who act on their own behalf are free to prepare those documents they deem necessary to effectuate a pro se incorporation. \nO.C.G.A. §15-19-52 states, in part, that no person shall \"be prohibited from drawing any legal instrument for another person, firm, or corporation, provided it is done without fee and solely at the solicitation and the request and under the direction of the person, firm, or corporation desiring to execute the instrument.\"Accordingly, a nonlawyer who assists another within the scope of O.C.G.A. §15-19-52 does not engage in the unlicensed practice of law.  Moreover, an employee of an attorney acting within the ambit of O.C.G.A. §15-19-54 does not engage in the unlicensed practice of law.\n During the hearing, the Committee heard testimony indicating that there are nonlawyers who, for third parties and in exchange for a fee, prepare documents relating to the establishment of Georgia corporations. The Committee finds that this activity does constitute the unlicensed practice of law. As noted above, O.C.G.A. §15-19-52 allows a nonlawyer to assist another with regard to the drawing of legal instruments. The permissible degree of assistance, however, is not unlimited, and is partially predicated upon the assistance being rendered on a noncommercial basis. The proponents of such activity have failed to direct the Committee to any provision of Georgia law authorizing nonlawyers to deliver commercial legal services to Georgia residents. They have also failed to explain why such activity is not prohibited by O.C.G.A. §§15-19-51(a)(3), 15-19-51(a)(4) or 15-19-51(a)(8). In contradistinction to this fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia has, when discussing the delivery of legal services in another context, explicitly distinguished between delivering those services as part of \"a professional service,\"as opposed to their delivery though \"a purely commercial enterprise.\"In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. at 473-474 (2003). The Court has indicated that legal services are to be provided by duly licensed and regulated Georgia attorneys.\n\"The Secretary of State has the power reasonably necessary to perform the duties required of him \"regarding the administration of the laws relating to corporations. O.C.G.A. §14-2-130. This opinion does not, of course, in any way impinge upon the Secretary of State's prerogative to disseminate information under O.C.G.A. §14-2-121, or otherwise act in a way consistent with his legal duties as set out by statute, rule or applicable law.","UrlName":"rule539","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3772e718-9509-4f18-b01a-d198a16d543b","Title":"RULE 14-6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>District Committee Action. Upon concluding its investigation, the District Committee shall forward a report to staff counsel regarding the disposition of those cases closed, those cases where a cease and desist affidavit has been accepted, and those cases where litigation is recommended. A majority of those present is required for all District Committee recommendations; however, the vote may be taken by mail, telephone, fax, e-mail or other means rather than at a formal meeting. All recommendations for litigation under these rules shall be reviewed by the Standing Committee for final approval prior to initiating litigation.</li> \n <li>Action by Staff Counsel. Staff counsel shall review the disposition reports of the District Committee. If staff counsel objects to any action taken by the District Committee, staff counsel shall forward such objection to the District Committee within 10 business days of receipt of the District Committee report. Staff counsel shall place the action and objection before the Standing Committee for review at its next scheduled meeting. The Standing Committee shall review the District Committee action and the objection, and shall vote on the final disposition of the case. Once a case is closed or a cease and desist affidavit is accepted by the District Committee or by the Standing Committee, staff counsel shall inform the complainant and, if contacted, the respondent of the disposition of the complaint.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule305","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cbfd0061-89d0-48c2-a247-c2dcc1d5426d","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","Title":"14-3. STANDING COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter35","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"703c2df9-4e6f-4c72-ab6a-ecda60d8e363","Title":"RULE 14-3.1 GENERALLY","Content":"(a) Appointment and Terms. The Standing Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, and shall consist of 23 members, 12 of whom shall be nonlawyers and 11 of whom shall be lawyers and members in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. The nonlawyer members should be geographically representative of the State. The lawyer members shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall include at least one member from each judicial district. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall appoint a chair and at least one vice-chair of the Standing Committee. Eight of the members of the Standing Committee shall constitute a quorum. All appointments to the Standing Committee shall be for a term of three years, except that it shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually. The members who initially serve terms of less than three years shall be eligible for immediate reappointment. No member shall be appointed to more than two full consecutive terms.\n(b) Duties. It shall be the duty of the Standing Committee to receive and evaluate District Committee reports and to determine whether litigation should be instituted in Superior Court against any alleged offender. The Standing Committee may approve civil injunctive proceedings, civil or criminal contempt proceedings, a combination of injunctive and contempt proceedings, or such other action as may be appropriate. In addition, the duties of the Standing Committee shall include, but not be limited to:\n(1) consideration and investigation of activities that may, or do, constitute the unlicensed practice of law;\n(2) supervision of the District Committees, which shall include, but not be limited to:\n (A) prescribing rules of procedure for District Committees; \n(B) assigning reports of unlicensed practice of law for investigation; \n(C) reassigning or withdrawing matters previously assigned, exercising final authority to close cases not deemed by the Standing Committee to then warrant further action by the State Bar of Georgia for unlicensed practice of law, and closing cases proposed to be resolved by a cease and desist affidavit where staff counsel objects to the closing of the case or the acceptance of a cease and desist affidavit by the District Committee; \n(D) joining with a District Committee in a particular investigation; \n(E) requesting staff investigators, staff counsel, and voluntary bar counsel to conduct investigations on behalf of or in concert with the District Committees; and \n(F) suspending District Committee members and chairs for cause and appointing a temporary District Committee chair where there has been a suspension, resignation, or removal, pending the appointment of a replacement chair by the Supreme Court of Georgia;\n(3) initiation and supervision of litigation, including the delegation of responsibility to staff, or counsel for the State Bar of Georgia to prosecute such litigation;\n(4) giving advice regarding the unlicensed practice of law policy to the officers, Board of Governors, staff, sections, or committees of the State Bar of Georgia as requested; and\n(5) furnishing any and all information, confidential records, and files regarding pending or closed investigations of unlicensed practice of law to any state or federal law enforcement or regulatory agency, United States Attorney, District Attorney, Solicitor, the Georgia Office of Bar Admissions and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions where there is or may be a violation of state or federal law or the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Georgia, or when required by law or court order.\n","UrlName":"rule295","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","Revisions":[{"Id":"75a98a82-5349-4b8a-9ca1-ef2d7faa1625","ParentId":"703c2df9-4e6f-4c72-ab6a-ecda60d8e363","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Appointment and Terms. The Standing Committee shall be appointed by the Court, and shall consist of 23 members, 11 of whom shall be nonlawyers. The nonlawyer members should be geographically representative of the State. The lawyer members shall be appointed by the Court and shall include at least one member from each judicial district. The Court shall appoint a chair and at least 1 vice-chair of the Standing Committee, both of whom may be nonlawyers. Eight of the members of the Standing Committee shall constitute a quorum. All appointments to the Standing Committee shall be for a term of 3 years, except that it shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third (1/3) of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually. The members who initially serve terms of less than 3 years shall be eligible for immediate reappointment. No member shall be appointed to more than 2 full consecutive terms.\n(b) Duties. It shall be the duty of the Standing Committee to receive and evaluate District Committee reports and to determine whether litigation should be instituted in Superior Court against any alleged offender. The Standing Committee may approve civil injunctive proceedings, civil or criminal contempt proceedings, a combination of injunctive and contempt proceedings, or such other action as may be appropriate. In addition, the duties of the Standing Committee shall include, but not be limited to:\n(1) the consideration and investigation of activities that may, or do, constitute the unlicensed practice of law;\n(2) the supervision of the District Committees, which shall include, but not be limited to:\n \n(A) prescribing rules of procedure for District Committees; \n(B) assigning reports of unlicensed practice of law for investigation; \n(C) reassigning or withdrawing matters previously assigned, exercising final authority to close cases not deemed by the Standing Committee to then warrant further action by the State Bar of Georgia for unlicensed practice of law, and closing cases proposed to be resolved by a cease and desist affidavit where staff counsel objects to the closing of the case or the acceptance of a cease and desist affidavit by the District Committee; \n(D) joining with a District Committee in a particular investigation; and \n(E) request staff investigators, staff counsel, and voluntary bar counsel to conduct investigations on behalf of or in concert with the District Committees; and \n(F) suspending District Committee members and chairs for cause and appointing a temporary District Committee chair where there has been a suspension, resignation, or removal, pending the appointment of a replacement chair by the Court;\n(3) the initiation and supervision of litigation, including the delegation of responsibility to staff, or Counsel for the Bar to prosecute such litigation;\n(4) the giving of advice regarding the unlicensed practice of law policy to the officers, Board of Governors, staff, sections, or committees of the State Bar of Georgia as requested; and\n(5) furnishing any and all information, confidential records, and files regarding pending or closed investigations of unlicensed practice of law to any state or federal law enforcement or regulatory agency, United States Attorney, District Attorney, Solicitor, the Georgia Office of Bar Admissions and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia and equivalent entities in other jurisdictions where there is or may be a violation of state or federal law or the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Georgia, or when required by law or court order.\n","UrlName":"revision266"}],"Ancestors":["e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"784c7c9f-b763-470f-8489-cf00b6ff4b7d","Title":"RULE 14-3.2 STAFF COUNSEL AND COUNSEL FOR THE BAR","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> Staff Counsel. The State Bar of Georgia shall provide staff counsel and other employees sufficient to assist the Standing Committee and the District Committee in carrying out their responsibilities as prescribed elsewhere in these rules. \n </li> \n <li> Appointment of Counsel for the Bar. The President of the State Bar of Georgia may appoint one or more Counsel for the Bar to assist the State Bar of Georgia in meeting its duties as prescribed in (a) above. </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule297","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e2e40fad-ba30-4c13-a179-676d8f1435d3","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"82a998d1-4e27-4565-9e16-bd032e85e54f","Title":"Rule 12-102. Supervision.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Client Assistance Program shall operate under the supervision of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. Program staff may be used to help clients understand their rights, obligations, and options.</div>","UrlName":"rule277","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","Revisions":[{"Id":"85ae109e-5559-410d-b962-00d7271a647f","ParentId":"82a998d1-4e27-4565-9e16-bd032e85e54f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) The Committee shall consist of eight members including seven State Bar members and one public member. At least two-thirds of the State Bar members shall be members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar at the time of their appointment. Committee members shall serve staggered three-year terms. The number of members shall be subject to change by a majority vote of the Board of Governors but shall never be less than five.\n(b) The public member shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a three year term. All other Committee members shall be appointed by the President of the Bar for three year terms except, initially, two Committee members shall be appointed for one-year terms, two members shall be appointed for two-year terms, and two members shall be appointed for a three-year term. Committee terms shall begin with the operational year of the State Bar. Should additional members be approved, their three-year terms shall be assigned in such fashion as to best maintain uniformity in the number of members to be appointed each year.\n(c) The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deemed appropriate.\n(d) Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.","UrlName":"revision128"},{"Id":"8542a508-2193-4cc2-b380-6dabcd0a8d4a","ParentId":"82a998d1-4e27-4565-9e16-bd032e85e54f","Title":"Version 4","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Committee shall consist of eight members including seven State Bar of Georgia members and one public member. At least two-thirds of the State Bar of Georgia members shall be members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at the time of their appointment. Committee members shall serve staggered three-year terms. The number of members shall be subject to change by a majority vote of the Board of Governors but shall never be less than five.</li> \n <li>The public member shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia for a three-year term. All other Committee members shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia for three-year terms except, initially, two Committee members shall be appointed for one-year terms, two members shall be appointed for two-year terms, and two members shall be appointed for three-year terms. Committee terms shall begin with the operational year of the State Bar of Georgia. Should additional members be approved, their three-year terms shall be assigned in such fashion as to best maintain uniformity in the number of members to be appointed each year.</li> \n <li>The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deem appropriate.</li> \n <li>Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar of Georgia for any unexpired term.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision236"},{"Id":"32fadb17-b279-49ac-a372-bda21e9dd338","ParentId":"82a998d1-4e27-4565-9e16-bd032e85e54f","Title":"Version 3","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Committee shall consist of eight members including seven State Bar members and one public member. At least two-thirds of the State Bar members shall be members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar at the time of their appointment. Committee members shall serve staggered three-year terms. The number of members shall be subject to change by a majority vote of the Board of Governors but shall never be less than five.</li> \n <li>The public member shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a three year term. All other Committee members shall be appointed by the President of the Bar for three year terms except, initially, two Committee members shall be appointed for one-year terms, two members shall be appointed for two-year terms, and two members shall be appointed for a three-year term. Committee terms shall begin with the operational year of the State Bar. Should additional members be approved, their three-year terms shall be assigned in such fashion as to best maintain uniformity in the number of members to be appointed each year.</li> \n <li>The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deemed appropriate.</li> \n <li>Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision134"}],"Ancestors":["b9baf0ba-b5ee-4cd4-86d8-c105853b6a20","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"b441399a-b21a-4bfe-a88a-82409ca36fe4","Title":"Rule 11-203. Terms.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Initially, three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the Immediate Past President for one-year terms; three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President for two-year terms; and three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President-elect for three-year terms. The President of the State Bar shall appoint the chairperson of the Committee during the initial year from among the members. These appointments shall become effective July 1, 1995, and shall be made by those serving at that time in the offices of Immediate Past President, President and President-elect.</li> \n <li>In each year following the initial year, the President-elect shall appoint three members, at least one of whom shall be a member of the Board of Governors at the time of their appointment, to three-year terms.</li> \n <li>The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deem appropriate.</li> \n <li>Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule268","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[{"Id":"54e77533-6267-4ddb-85d7-64ebaf8b841f","ParentId":"b441399a-b21a-4bfe-a88a-82409ca36fe4","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Initially, three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the Immediate Past President for one-year terms; three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President for two-year terms; and three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President-elect for three-year terms. The President of the State Bar shall appoint the chairperson of the Committee during the initial year from among the members. These appointments shall become effective July 1, 1995, and shall be made by those serving at that time in the offices of Immediate Past President, President and President-elect.\n(b) In each year following the initial year, the President-elect shall appoint three members, at least one of whom shall be a member of the Board of Governors at the time of their appointment, to three-year terms.\n(c) The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deem appropriate.\n(d) Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.","UrlName":"revision126"}],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Title":"CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter31","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"78774bbc-595d-42cb-a538-66726783ea27","Title":"Rule 11-201. Committee.","Content":"The advisory and oversight responsibility for this program will be vested in the Law Practice Management Committee (\"Committee \").","UrlName":"rule265","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ba0b308b-9123-4ebf-9d90-19cf49fb8189","Title":"Rule 11-202. Membership.","Content":" The Committee shall consist of nine members, at least three of whom shall be members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar at the time of their appointment. The Director of the Law Practice Management Program, the Executive Director of the State Bar, or his or her designee, and the Executive Director of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar shall be non-voting, ex-officio members of the Committee. ","UrlName":"rule266","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"b441399a-b21a-4bfe-a88a-82409ca36fe4","Title":"Rule 11-203. Terms.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Initially, three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the Immediate Past President for one-year terms; three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President for two-year terms; and three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President-elect for three-year terms. The President of the State Bar shall appoint the chairperson of the Committee during the initial year from among the members. These appointments shall become effective July 1, 1995, and shall be made by those serving at that time in the offices of Immediate Past President, President and President-elect.</li> \n <li>In each year following the initial year, the President-elect shall appoint three members, at least one of whom shall be a member of the Board of Governors at the time of their appointment, to three-year terms.</li> \n <li>The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deem appropriate.</li> \n <li>Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule268","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[{"Id":"54e77533-6267-4ddb-85d7-64ebaf8b841f","ParentId":"b441399a-b21a-4bfe-a88a-82409ca36fe4","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Initially, three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the Immediate Past President for one-year terms; three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President for two-year terms; and three members of the Committee, including at least one member of the Board of Governors, shall be appointed by the President-elect for three-year terms. The President of the State Bar shall appoint the chairperson of the Committee during the initial year from among the members. These appointments shall become effective July 1, 1995, and shall be made by those serving at that time in the offices of Immediate Past President, President and President-elect.\n(b) In each year following the initial year, the President-elect shall appoint three members, at least one of whom shall be a member of the Board of Governors at the time of their appointment, to three-year terms.\n(c) The Committee shall elect a chairperson and such other officers as the Committee members deem appropriate.\n(d) Vacancies shall be filled by appointment of the President of the State Bar for any unexpired term.","UrlName":"revision126"}],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"f6785d30-3572-45d2-b973-8afaf7e89dde","Title":"Rule 11-204. Purpose and Responsibility.","Content":"The Committee shall meet for the purposes of oversight of the Law Practice Management Program, coordination of the Program's goals, and implementation of directives and resolutions from the Board of Governors. Additionally, the Committee will from time to time develop recommendations for submission to the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors with regard to the funding, staffing, administration, and operation of the program, which may include proposed changes to Bylaws or Rules of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule270","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"94d7f5cf-90c2-48cd-9262-316e84caf0ce","Title":"Rule 11-205. Staff and Funding.","Content":" The State Bar may provide such staff as it deems necessary, including a Director and support staff. The work of the Director and staff shall be funded through the general budget of the State Bar or through donations and grants from foundations or other public or private sources. The income generated by this program through consultation fees, sales of materials, and other means shall be remitted directly to the State Bar by the Director and staff. ","UrlName":"rule271","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5c397aff-c206-4808-a6f5-eb8f35bece4d","Title":"Rule 11-206. Consultation Fees.","Content":" The Committee shall be authorized to charge consultation fees and costs for materials in conjunction with law practice management services. ","UrlName":"rule273","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"36993efd-527e-458e-97da-2d20ae0afe76","Title":"Rule 11-207. Immunity.","Content":" The State Bar, its employees, and members of the Committee shall be absolutely immune from civil liability for all acts in the course of their official duties. ","UrlName":"rule274","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c4488ddb-bf7d-4d36-9b41-196101a279bb","Title":"Rule 10-102. Definitions.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> For this Rule, the terms shall have the following meanings: \n <ol> \n <li>\"Board \"means the Clients' Security Fund Board of Trustees.</li> \n <li>\"Client \"means one who files a claim for reimbursement with the Board of Trustees.</li> \n <li>\"Fund \"means the Clients' Security Fund of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>\"Lawyer \"or \"attorney \"means one who, at the time of the commencement of his or her handling of the matter in which the loss arose, was a member of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule244","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"58edf3c5-f552-42ea-8380-54bba954d82f","Title":"A Lawyer's Creed","Content":" To my clients, I offer faithfulness, competence, diligence, and good judgment. I will strive to represent you as I would want to be represented and to be worthy of your trust. \n \nTo the opposing parties and their counsel, I offer fairness, integrity, and civility. I will seek reconciliation and, if we fail, I will strive to make our dispute a dignified one. \n \nTo the courts, and other tribunals, and to those who assist them, I offer respect, candor, and courtesy. I will strive to do honor to the search for justice. \n \nTo my colleagues in the practice of law, I offer concern for your welfare. I will strive to make our association a professional friendship. \n \nTo the profession, I offer assistance. I will strive to keep our business a profession and our profession a calling in the spirit of public service. \n \nTo the public and our systems of justice, I offer service. I will strive to improve the law and our legal system, to make the law and our legal system available to all, and to seek the common good through the representation of my clients. ","UrlName":"rule420","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"6f28e2b3-d8e4-4921-8603-7376b4054e6d","Title":"Rule 8-103. Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.","Content":"(A) Membership, Appointment and Terms:\nThere is established a permanent commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.  The Commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and six (6) by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be designated by the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, one (1) shall be designated by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and one (1) shall be designated by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia. Members shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia. Members of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and by the Board of Governors of the State Bar shall be appointed for staggered three (3) year terms and until their successors are appointed, except that the initial appointed members of the Commission shall consist of four (4) members appointed for a term of one (1) year, four (4) members appointed for a term of two (2) years, and four (4) members appointed for a term of three (3) years. The appointed members of the initial Commission shall be appointed half by the Supreme Court and half by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. No member appointed by the Supreme Court or the Board of Governors may serve more than two (2) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be reappointed otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years. Members of the Commission designated by the Executive Committee, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the President of the Young Lawyers Division shall each serve for a term of one (1) year. No person so designated to the Commission may serve more than three (3) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be redesignated otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years.\nThe Commission shall designate each year one of its members to serve as Chairperson. The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as ex-officio members of the Commission, but shall have no vote. The Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as Secretary of the Commission.\n Regulations \n (1)Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quorum of the CCLC. \n (2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calendar year. \n (3) Vice Chair . The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each calendar year. \n (4) Executive Committee . The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary business of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC. \n (5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission. \n (6) Other Committees . The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable. \n (7) Vacancy . A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected. \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Board:\n(1) The Commission shall have general supervisory authority to administer these Rules.\n(2) The Commission shall have specific duties and responsibilities:\n(a) To approve all or portions of individual courses and programs of a sponsor which satisfy the educational requirements of Rule 8-106;\n(b) To determine the number of credit hours allowed for each course or educational activity;\n(c) To encourage courses and programs by established organizations, whether offered within or without the State;\n(d) To educate the public about the legal profession;\n(e) To adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with these Rules;\n(f) To establish an office or offices and to employ such persons as the Commission deems necessary for the proper administration of these Rules and to delegate to them appropriate authority, subject to the review of the Commission;\n(g) To report at least annually to the State Bar and to the Supreme Court the activities and recommendations of the Commission and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these Rules;\n(h) To report promptly to the Supreme Court any violation of these Rules.\n Regulations \n (1) Appeals . The CCLC is the final authority on all matters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal. \n (2) Amendments . The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation. \n (3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call. \n(C) Finances:\n(1) Purpose. The Commission should be adequately funded to enable it to perform its duties in a financially independent manner.\n(2) Sources. Costs of administration of the Commission shall be derived from charges to members of the State Bar for continuing legal education activities.\n(a) Sponsors of CLE programs to be held within the State of Georgia shall, as a condition of accreditation, agree to remit a list of Georgia attendees and to pay a fee for each active State Bar member who attends the program. This sponsor's fee shall be based on each day of attendance, with a proportional fee for programs lasting less than a whole day. The rate shall be set by the Commission.\n(b) The Commission shall fix a reasonably comparable fee to be paid by individual attorneys who either (a) attend approved CLE programs outside the State of Georgia or (b) attend un-approved CLE programs within the State of Georgia that would have been approved for credit except for the failure of the sponsor to pay the fee described in the preceding paragraph. Such fee shall accompany the attorney's annual report.\n(3) Uses. Funds may be expended for the proper administration of the Commission. However, the members of the Commission shall serve on a voluntary basis without expense reimbursement or compensation.\n Regulations \n (1) Sponsor Fee. The sponsor fee, a charge paid directly by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia and for distance learning programs attended by Georgia attorneys. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list showing the names and Georgia Bar membership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"420\" height=\"109\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour per attendee CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by total approved CLE hours </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by number of Georgia attorney attendees </td> \n <td> x 10 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total sponsor fee due \n </td> \n <td> $120.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no sponsor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee for courses taken in the current year, by March 31 of the following year. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"348\" height=\"98\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by hours taken by attendee </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total attendee fee due </td> \n <td> $12.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (3) Fee Review . The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner. \n (4) Uniform Application . The fee shall be applied uniformly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee. \n (5) Professionalism Fee . All active members of the State Bar of Georgia currently are assessed a $11 surcharge annually on their dues notice. The surcharge is determined each year by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism. This surcharge will allow for unlimited professionalism courses taken during that calendar year for CLE credit. The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit including professionalism. ","UrlName":"rule226","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"50a9d8d6-c3a3-48a4-b863-40809dd99622","ParentId":"6f28e2b3-d8e4-4921-8603-7376b4054e6d","Title":"Version 3","Content":"(A) Membership, Appointment and Terms:\nThere is established a permanent commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.  The Commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and six (6) by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be designated by the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, one (1) shall be designated by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and one (1) shall be designated by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia. Members shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia. Members of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and by the Board of Governors of the State Bar shall be appointed for staggered three (3) year terms and until their successors are appointed, except that the initial appointed members of the Commission shall consist of four (4) members appointed for a term of one (1) year, four (4) members appointed for a term of two (2) years, and four (4) members appointed for a term of three (3) years. The appointed members of the initial Commission shall be appointed half by the Supreme Court and half by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. No member appointed by the Supreme Court or the Board of Governors may serve more than two (2) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be reappointed otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years. Members of the Commission designated by the Executive Committee, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the President of the Young Lawyers Division shall each serve for a term of one (1) year. No person so designated to the Commission may serve more than three (3) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be redesignated otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years.\nThe Commission shall designate each year one of its members to serve as Chairperson. The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as ex-officio members of the Commission, but shall have no vote. The Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as Secretary of the Commission.\n Regulations \n (1)Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quorum of the CCLC. \n (2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calendar year. \n (3) Vice Chair . The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each calendar year. \n (4) Executive Committee . The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary business of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC. \n (5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission. \n (6) Other Committees . The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable. \n (7) Vacancy . A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected. \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Board:\n(1) The Commission shall have general supervisory authority to administer these Rules.\n(2) The Commission shall have specific duties and responsibilities:\n(a) To approve all or portions of individual courses and programs of a sponsor which satisfy the educational requirements of Rule 8-106;\n(b) To determine the number of credit hours allowed for each course or educational activity;\n(c) To encourage courses and programs by established organizations, whether offered within or without the State;\n(d) To educate the public about the legal profession;\n(e) To adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with these Rules;\n(f) To establish an office or offices and to employ such persons as the Commission deems necessary for the proper administration of these Rules and to delegate to them appropriate authority, subject to the review of the Commission;\n(g) To report at least annually to the State Bar and to the Supreme Court the activities and recommendations of the Commission and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these Rules;\n(h) To report promptly to the Supreme Court any violation of these Rules.\n Regulations \n (1) Appeals . The CCLC is the final authority on all matters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal. \n (2) Amendments . The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation. \n (3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call. \n(C) Finances:\n(1) Purpose. The Commission should be adequately funded to enable it to perform its duties in a financially independent manner.\n(2) Sources. Costs of administration of the Commission shall be derived from charges to members of the State Bar for continuing legal education activities.\n(a) Sponsors of CLE programs to be held within the State of Georgia shall, as a condition of accreditation, agree to remit a list of Georgia attendees and to pay a fee for each active State Bar member who attends the program. This sponsor's fee shall be based on each day of attendance, with a proportional fee for programs lasting less than a whole day. The rate shall be set by the Commission.\n(b) The Commission shall fix a reasonably comparable fee to be paid by individual attorneys who either (a) attend approved CLE programs outside the State of Georgia or (b) attend un-approved CLE programs within the State of Georgia that would have been approved for credit except for the failure of the sponsor to pay the fee described in the preceding paragraph. Such fee shall accompany the attorney's annual report.\n(3) Uses. Funds may be expended for the proper administration of the Commission. However, the members of the Commission shall serve on a voluntary basis without expense reimbursement or compensation.\n Regulations \n (1) Sponsor Fee. The sponsor fee, a charge paid directly by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia and for distance learning programs attended by Georgia attorneys. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list showing the names and Georgia Bar membership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"420\" height=\"109\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour per attendee CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by total approved CLE hours </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by number of Georgia attorney attendees </td> \n <td> x 10 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total sponsor fee due \n </td> \n <td> $120.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no sponsor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee for courses taken in the current year, by March 31 of the following year. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"348\" height=\"98\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by hours taken by attendee </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total attendee fee due </td> \n <td> $12.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (3) Fee Review . The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner. \n (4) Uniform Application . The fee shall be applied uniformly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee. \n (5) Professionalism Fee . Effective July 1, 2018, all active members of the State Bar of Georgia will be assessed a $15 surcharge annually on their dues notice. This surcharge will allow for unlimited professionalism courses taken during that calendar year for CLE credit. The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit including professionalism. ","UrlName":"revision335"},{"Id":"b25f504f-c0b7-433d-9e60-a48d98de1d71","ParentId":"6f28e2b3-d8e4-4921-8603-7376b4054e6d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(A) Membership, Appointment and Terms:\nThere is established a permanent commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.  The Commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and six (6) by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be designated by the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, one (1) shall be designated by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and one (1) shall be designated by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia. Members shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia. Members of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and by the Board of Governors of the State Bar shall be appointed for staggered three (3) year terms and until their successors are appointed, except that the initial appointed members of the Commission shall consist of four (4) members appointed for a term of one (1) year, four (4) members appointed for a term of two (2) years, and four (4) members appointed for a term of three (3) years. The appointed members of the initial Commission shall be appointed half by the Supreme Court and half by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. No member appointed by the Supreme Court or the Board of Governors may serve more than two (2) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be reappointed otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years. Members of the Commission designated by the Executive Committee, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the President of the Young Lawyers Division shall each serve for a term of one (1) year. No person so designated to the Commission may serve more than three (3) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be redesignated otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years.\nThe Commission shall designate each year one of its members to serve as Chairperson. The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as ex-officio members of the Commission, but shall have no vote. The Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as Secretary of the Commission.\n Regulations \n (1)Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quorum of the CCLC. \n (2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calendar year. \n (3) Vice Chair . The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each calendar year. \n (4) Executive Committee . The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary business of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC. \n (5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission. \n (6) Other Committees . The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable. \n (7) Vacancy . A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected. \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Board:\n(1) The Commission shall have general supervisory authority to administer these Rules.\n(2) The Commission shall have specific duties and responsibilities:\n(a) To approve all or portions of individual courses and programs of a sponsor which satisfy the educational requirements of Rule 8-106;\n(b) To determine the number of credit hours allowed for each course or educational activity;\n(c) To encourage courses and programs by established organizations, whether offered within or without the State;\n(d) To educate the public about the legal profession;\n(e) To adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with these Rules;\n(f) To establish an office or offices and to employ such persons as the Commission deems necessary for the proper administration of these Rules and to delegate to them appropriate authority, subject to the review of the Commission;\n(g) To report at least annually to the State Bar and to the Supreme Court the activities and recommendations of the Commission and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these Rules;\n(h) To report promptly to the Supreme Court any violation of these Rules.\n Regulations \n (1) Appeals . The CCLC is the final authority on all matters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal. \n (2) Amendments . The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation. \n (3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call. \n(C) Finances:\n(1) Purpose. The Commission should be adequately funded to enable it to perform its duties in a financially independent manner.\n(2) Sources. Costs of administration of the Commission shall be derived from charges to members of the State Bar for continuing legal education activities.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n(a) Sponsors of CLE programs to be held within the State of Georgia shall, as a condition of accreditation, agree to remit a list of Georgia attendees and to pay a fee for each active State Bar member who attends the program. This sponsor's fee shall be based on each day of attendance, with a proportional fee for programs lasting less than a whole day. The rate shall be set by the Commission. \n(b) The Commission shall fix a reasonably comparable fee to be paid by individual attorneys who either (a) attend approved CLE programs outside the State of Georgia or (b) attend un-approved CLE programs within the State of Georgia that would have been approved for credit except for the failure of the sponsor to pay the fee described in the preceding paragraph. Such fee shall accompany the attorney's annual report. \n</blockquote>\n(3) Uses. Funds may be expended for the proper administration of the Commission. However, the members of the Commission shall serve on a voluntary basis without expense reimbursement or compensation.\n Regulations \n (1) Sponsor Fee. The Sponsor fee, a charge paid directly by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list in alphabetical order showing the names and Georgia Bar membership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. The amount of the fee is set at $5.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following formula and example: \n<table style=\"width: 440px; height: 102px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Formula </td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Fee </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by total approved CLE hours </td> \n <td> x ? </td> \n <td> x 5.4 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by number of Georgia attendees </td> \n <td> x ? </td> \n <td> x 129 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total sponsor fee </td> \n <td> $ ? </td> \n <td> $3483.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no sponsor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee along with their annual report before January 31st following the calendar year for which the report is being submitted. The amount of the fee is set at $5.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following formula and example: \n<table style=\"width: 432px; height: 98px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Formula </td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Fee </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by the total approved CLE hours for which the attorney seeks credit but for which sponsor fee was paid. </td> \n <td> x ? </td> \n <td> x 3.3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total attendee fee </td> \n <td> $ ? </td> \n <td> $16.50 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (3) Fee Review . The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner. \n (4) Uniform Application . The fee shall be applied uniformly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee. \n (5)  Professionalism Fee. The charge for professionalism credit is $15.00 per professionalism hour per attendee. This is in addition to the $5.00 per credit hour per attendee required by the CCLC. Each professionalism hour thus carries a charge per attendee of $20.00. The sponsor shall remit payment for CLE credit as follows: \n A check for $5.00 per total CLE hour (including professionalism) per attendee should be made payable to CCLC and mailed with the attendance list to the CCLC at the State Bar address.\n A check for $15.00 per professionalism CLE hour per attendee should be made payable to CJCP (Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism) and mailed to the CJCP at the State Bar address.\n For example, if the sponsor is paying for 5 attendees who attended a 6-hour seminar including 1 hour of ethics and 1 hour of professionalism, payment should be as follows:\n $5 per hour x 6 hours of CLE x 5 attendees = $150 (payable to CCLC)\n $15 per Professionalism hour x 5 attendees = $75 (payable to CJCP)\n The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit including professionalism. ","UrlName":"revision118"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","Title":"Part VIII - Continuing Legal Education","Content":"","UrlName":"part16","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Title":"CHAPTER 1 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter29","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"1d102211-07ba-4ccd-8e93-650241a83304","Title":"Rule 8-101. Purpose.","Content":"It is of utmost importance to members of the Bar and to the public that attorneys maintain their professional competence throughout their active practice of law. To that end, these rules establish the minimum requirements for continuing legal education.","UrlName":"rule222","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d5906dc3-8e74-4e63-ba85-0e2f4c5082bb","Title":"Rule 8-102. Definition.","Content":"(a) \"Accredited sponsor \"shall mean an organization whose entire continuing legal education program has been accredited by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. A specific, individual continuing legal education activity presented by such a sponsor constitutes an approved legal education activity.\n(b) \"Active member \"shall include any person who is licensed to practice law in the State of Georgia and who is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, but shall not include the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, other Constitutional Executive Officers elected statewide, members of the Georgia Senate and the Georgia House of Representatives, United States Senators and Representatives, and shall not include judges who are prohibited by law, statute, or ordinance from engaging in the practice of law.\n(c) \"Commission \"shall mean the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (CCLC).\n(d) \"Inactive member \"shall mean a member of the State Bar who is on inactive status.\n(e) \"Supreme Court \"shall mean the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(f) \"Year \"shall mean the calendar year.","UrlName":"rule224","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"6f28e2b3-d8e4-4921-8603-7376b4054e6d","Title":"Rule 8-103. Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.","Content":"(A) Membership, Appointment and Terms:\nThere is established a permanent commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.  The Commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and six (6) by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be designated by the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, one (1) shall be designated by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and one (1) shall be designated by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia. Members shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia. Members of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and by the Board of Governors of the State Bar shall be appointed for staggered three (3) year terms and until their successors are appointed, except that the initial appointed members of the Commission shall consist of four (4) members appointed for a term of one (1) year, four (4) members appointed for a term of two (2) years, and four (4) members appointed for a term of three (3) years. The appointed members of the initial Commission shall be appointed half by the Supreme Court and half by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. No member appointed by the Supreme Court or the Board of Governors may serve more than two (2) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be reappointed otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years. Members of the Commission designated by the Executive Committee, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the President of the Young Lawyers Division shall each serve for a term of one (1) year. No person so designated to the Commission may serve more than three (3) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be redesignated otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years.\nThe Commission shall designate each year one of its members to serve as Chairperson. The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as ex-officio members of the Commission, but shall have no vote. The Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as Secretary of the Commission.\n Regulations \n (1)Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quorum of the CCLC. \n (2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calendar year. \n (3) Vice Chair . The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each calendar year. \n (4) Executive Committee . The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary business of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC. \n (5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission. \n (6) Other Committees . The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable. \n (7) Vacancy . A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected. \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Board:\n(1) The Commission shall have general supervisory authority to administer these Rules.\n(2) The Commission shall have specific duties and responsibilities:\n(a) To approve all or portions of individual courses and programs of a sponsor which satisfy the educational requirements of Rule 8-106;\n(b) To determine the number of credit hours allowed for each course or educational activity;\n(c) To encourage courses and programs by established organizations, whether offered within or without the State;\n(d) To educate the public about the legal profession;\n(e) To adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with these Rules;\n(f) To establish an office or offices and to employ such persons as the Commission deems necessary for the proper administration of these Rules and to delegate to them appropriate authority, subject to the review of the Commission;\n(g) To report at least annually to the State Bar and to the Supreme Court the activities and recommendations of the Commission and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these Rules;\n(h) To report promptly to the Supreme Court any violation of these Rules.\n Regulations \n (1) Appeals . The CCLC is the final authority on all matters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal. \n (2) Amendments . The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation. \n (3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call. \n(C) Finances:\n(1) Purpose. The Commission should be adequately funded to enable it to perform its duties in a financially independent manner.\n(2) Sources. Costs of administration of the Commission shall be derived from charges to members of the State Bar for continuing legal education activities.\n(a) Sponsors of CLE programs to be held within the State of Georgia shall, as a condition of accreditation, agree to remit a list of Georgia attendees and to pay a fee for each active State Bar member who attends the program. This sponsor's fee shall be based on each day of attendance, with a proportional fee for programs lasting less than a whole day. The rate shall be set by the Commission.\n(b) The Commission shall fix a reasonably comparable fee to be paid by individual attorneys who either (a) attend approved CLE programs outside the State of Georgia or (b) attend un-approved CLE programs within the State of Georgia that would have been approved for credit except for the failure of the sponsor to pay the fee described in the preceding paragraph. Such fee shall accompany the attorney's annual report.\n(3) Uses. Funds may be expended for the proper administration of the Commission. However, the members of the Commission shall serve on a voluntary basis without expense reimbursement or compensation.\n Regulations \n (1) Sponsor Fee. The sponsor fee, a charge paid directly by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia and for distance learning programs attended by Georgia attorneys. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list showing the names and Georgia Bar membership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"420\" height=\"109\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour per attendee CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by total approved CLE hours </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by number of Georgia attorney attendees </td> \n <td> x 10 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total sponsor fee due \n </td> \n <td> $120.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no sponsor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee for courses taken in the current year, by March 31 of the following year. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"348\" height=\"98\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by hours taken by attendee </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total attendee fee due </td> \n <td> $12.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (3) Fee Review . The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner. \n (4) Uniform Application . The fee shall be applied uniformly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee. \n (5) Professionalism Fee . All active members of the State Bar of Georgia currently are assessed a $11 surcharge annually on their dues notice. The surcharge is determined each year by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism. This surcharge will allow for unlimited professionalism courses taken during that calendar year for CLE credit. The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit including professionalism. ","UrlName":"rule226","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"50a9d8d6-c3a3-48a4-b863-40809dd99622","ParentId":"6f28e2b3-d8e4-4921-8603-7376b4054e6d","Title":"Version 3","Content":"(A) Membership, Appointment and Terms:\nThere is established a permanent commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.  The Commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and six (6) by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be designated by the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, one (1) shall be designated by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and one (1) shall be designated by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia. Members shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia. Members of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and by the Board of Governors of the State Bar shall be appointed for staggered three (3) year terms and until their successors are appointed, except that the initial appointed members of the Commission shall consist of four (4) members appointed for a term of one (1) year, four (4) members appointed for a term of two (2) years, and four (4) members appointed for a term of three (3) years. The appointed members of the initial Commission shall be appointed half by the Supreme Court and half by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. No member appointed by the Supreme Court or the Board of Governors may serve more than two (2) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be reappointed otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years. Members of the Commission designated by the Executive Committee, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the President of the Young Lawyers Division shall each serve for a term of one (1) year. No person so designated to the Commission may serve more than three (3) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be redesignated otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years.\nThe Commission shall designate each year one of its members to serve as Chairperson. The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as ex-officio members of the Commission, but shall have no vote. The Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as Secretary of the Commission.\n Regulations \n (1)Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quorum of the CCLC. \n (2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calendar year. \n (3) Vice Chair . The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each calendar year. \n (4) Executive Committee . The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary business of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC. \n (5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission. \n (6) Other Committees . The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable. \n (7) Vacancy . A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected. \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Board:\n(1) The Commission shall have general supervisory authority to administer these Rules.\n(2) The Commission shall have specific duties and responsibilities:\n(a) To approve all or portions of individual courses and programs of a sponsor which satisfy the educational requirements of Rule 8-106;\n(b) To determine the number of credit hours allowed for each course or educational activity;\n(c) To encourage courses and programs by established organizations, whether offered within or without the State;\n(d) To educate the public about the legal profession;\n(e) To adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with these Rules;\n(f) To establish an office or offices and to employ such persons as the Commission deems necessary for the proper administration of these Rules and to delegate to them appropriate authority, subject to the review of the Commission;\n(g) To report at least annually to the State Bar and to the Supreme Court the activities and recommendations of the Commission and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these Rules;\n(h) To report promptly to the Supreme Court any violation of these Rules.\n Regulations \n (1) Appeals . The CCLC is the final authority on all matters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal. \n (2) Amendments . The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation. \n (3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call. \n(C) Finances:\n(1) Purpose. The Commission should be adequately funded to enable it to perform its duties in a financially independent manner.\n(2) Sources. Costs of administration of the Commission shall be derived from charges to members of the State Bar for continuing legal education activities.\n(a) Sponsors of CLE programs to be held within the State of Georgia shall, as a condition of accreditation, agree to remit a list of Georgia attendees and to pay a fee for each active State Bar member who attends the program. This sponsor's fee shall be based on each day of attendance, with a proportional fee for programs lasting less than a whole day. The rate shall be set by the Commission.\n(b) The Commission shall fix a reasonably comparable fee to be paid by individual attorneys who either (a) attend approved CLE programs outside the State of Georgia or (b) attend un-approved CLE programs within the State of Georgia that would have been approved for credit except for the failure of the sponsor to pay the fee described in the preceding paragraph. Such fee shall accompany the attorney's annual report.\n(3) Uses. Funds may be expended for the proper administration of the Commission. However, the members of the Commission shall serve on a voluntary basis without expense reimbursement or compensation.\n Regulations \n (1) Sponsor Fee. The sponsor fee, a charge paid directly by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia and for distance learning programs attended by Georgia attorneys. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list showing the names and Georgia Bar membership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"420\" height=\"109\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour per attendee CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by total approved CLE hours </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by number of Georgia attorney attendees </td> \n <td> x 10 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total sponsor fee due \n </td> \n <td> $120.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no sponsor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee for courses taken in the current year, by March 31 of the following year. For courses held after June 30, 2019, the fee is set at $4.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following example: \n<table width=\"348\" height=\"98\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Georgia per hour CLE fee </td> \n <td> $4.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by hours taken by attendee </td> \n <td> x 3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total attendee fee due </td> \n <td> $12.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n (3) Fee Review . The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner. \n (4) Uniform Application . The fee shall be applied uniformly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee. \n (5) Professionalism Fee . Effective July 1, 2018, all active members of the State Bar of Georgia will be assessed a $15 surcharge annually on their dues notice. This surcharge will allow for unlimited professionalism courses taken during that calendar year for CLE credit. The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit including professionalism. ","UrlName":"revision335"},{"Id":"b25f504f-c0b7-433d-9e60-a48d98de1d71","ParentId":"6f28e2b3-d8e4-4921-8603-7376b4054e6d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(A) Membership, Appointment and Terms:\nThere is established a permanent commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency.  The Commission shall consist of sixteen (16) members, six (6) of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and six (6) by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be designated by the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, one (1) shall be the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, one (1) shall be designated by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and one (1) shall be designated by the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia. Members shall be members of the State Bar of Georgia. Members of the Commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and by the Board of Governors of the State Bar shall be appointed for staggered three (3) year terms and until their successors are appointed, except that the initial appointed members of the Commission shall consist of four (4) members appointed for a term of one (1) year, four (4) members appointed for a term of two (2) years, and four (4) members appointed for a term of three (3) years. The appointed members of the initial Commission shall be appointed half by the Supreme Court and half by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. No member appointed by the Supreme Court or the Board of Governors may serve more than two (2) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be reappointed otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years. Members of the Commission designated by the Executive Committee, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the President of the Young Lawyers Division shall each serve for a term of one (1) year. No person so designated to the Commission may serve more than three (3) consecutive terms as a member of the Commission, and no such member may be redesignated otherwise to the Commission until he or she has been inactive as a Commission member for three (3) consecutive years.\nThe Commission shall designate each year one of its members to serve as Chairperson. The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education of Georgia, the Executive Director of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as ex-officio members of the Commission, but shall have no vote. The Executive Director of the Commission shall serve as Secretary of the Commission.\n Regulations \n (1)Quorum. Eight voting members shall constitute a quorum of the CCLC. \n (2) Chair. The Chair of the CCLC shall be elected by majority vote during the first meeting of CCLC in each calendar year. \n (3) Vice Chair . The CCLC shall elect a Vice Chair by majority vote during the first meeting of the CCLC in each calendar year. \n (4) Executive Committee . The Executive Committee of the CCLC shall be comprised of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and a voting member to be appointed by the Chairperson. Its purpose is to conduct all necessary business of the CCLC that may arise between meetings of the full Commission. In such matters it shall have complete authority to act for the CCLC. \n (5) Standards of the Profession Committee. The Chair of the CCLC shall appoint a chair of the Standards of the Profession Committee which shall devise and recommend policy to the Commission for the operation of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Standards of the Profession Committee shall be composed of the designee of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, the chair of the Board of Trustees of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia or his or her designee, the designee of the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the designee of the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, and any other member of the State Bar of Georgia appointed to the Standards of the Profession Committee by the Chairperson of the Commission. In addition, the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission shall initially be composed of the members of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the State Bar of Georgia, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Chair of the Commission. \n (6) Other Committees . The Chairperson may appoint from time to time any committees deemed advisable. \n (7) Vacancy . A vacancy on the CCLC, in its officers, or on its committees, occurring for whatever reason, shall be filled as soon as practical in the same manner as the original holder of the position was selected. \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Board:\n(1) The Commission shall have general supervisory authority to administer these Rules.\n(2) The Commission shall have specific duties and responsibilities:\n(a) To approve all or portions of individual courses and programs of a sponsor which satisfy the educational requirements of Rule 8-106;\n(b) To determine the number of credit hours allowed for each course or educational activity;\n(c) To encourage courses and programs by established organizations, whether offered within or without the State;\n(d) To educate the public about the legal profession;\n(e) To adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with these Rules;\n(f) To establish an office or offices and to employ such persons as the Commission deems necessary for the proper administration of these Rules and to delegate to them appropriate authority, subject to the review of the Commission;\n(g) To report at least annually to the State Bar and to the Supreme Court the activities and recommendations of the Commission and the effectiveness of the enforcement of these Rules;\n(h) To report promptly to the Supreme Court any violation of these Rules.\n Regulations \n (1) Appeals . The CCLC is the final authority on all matters entrusted to it under these rules. Therefore, any decision made by a committee of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may be appealed to the full CCLC. A decision made by the staff of the CCLC pursuant to a delegation of authority may also be reviewed by the full CCLC, but should first be appealed to the Committee of the CCLC having jurisdiction on the subject involved. All appeals shall be in writing. The CCLC has the discretion to, but is not obligated to, grant a hearing in connection with any appeal. \n (2) Amendments . The CCLC may on its own motion, or on the motion of any interested party, amend, delete, or add to the foregoing Regulations. All motions in this regard should (1) be typed, (2) describe the amendment, (3) explain the reasons for the amendment, and (4) include a draft of the suggested new regulation. \n (3) All parties are welcomed to appear before the Commission in writing. If the Commission determines that further information is needed, the parties may be invited to present their position or appeal in person or by telephone conference call. \n(C) Finances:\n(1) Purpose. The Commission should be adequately funded to enable it to perform its duties in a financially independent manner.\n(2) Sources. Costs of administration of the Commission shall be derived from charges to members of the State Bar for continuing legal education activities.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n(a) Sponsors of CLE programs to be held within the State of Georgia shall, as a condition of accreditation, agree to remit a list of Georgia attendees and to pay a fee for each active State Bar member who attends the program. This sponsor's fee shall be based on each day of attendance, with a proportional fee for programs lasting less than a whole day. The rate shall be set by the Commission. \n(b) The Commission shall fix a reasonably comparable fee to be paid by individual attorneys who either (a) attend approved CLE programs outside the State of Georgia or (b) attend un-approved CLE programs within the State of Georgia that would have been approved for credit except for the failure of the sponsor to pay the fee described in the preceding paragraph. Such fee shall accompany the attorney's annual report. \n</blockquote>\n(3) Uses. Funds may be expended for the proper administration of the Commission. However, the members of the Commission shall serve on a voluntary basis without expense reimbursement or compensation.\n Regulations \n (1) Sponsor Fee. The Sponsor fee, a charge paid directly by the sponsor, is required for all approved programs held within Georgia. It is optional for approved programs held elsewhere. Sponsors shall remit the fee, together with a list in alphabetical order showing the names and Georgia Bar membership numbers of all Georgia attendees, within thirty (30) days after the program is held. The amount of the fee is set at $5.00 per approved CLE hour per active State Bar of Georgia member in attendance. It is computed as shown in the following formula and example: \n<table style=\"width: 440px; height: 102px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Formula </td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Fee </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by total approved CLE hours </td> \n <td> x ? </td> \n <td> x 5.4 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by number of Georgia attendees </td> \n <td> x ? </td> \n <td> x 129 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total sponsor fee </td> \n <td> $ ? </td> \n <td> $3483.00 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2) Attendee Fee. The attendee fee is paid by the Georgia attorney who requests credit for a program for which no sponsor fee was paid. Attorneys should remit the fee along with their annual report before January 31st following the calendar year for which the report is being submitted. The amount of the fee is set at $5.00 per approved CLE hour for which the attorney claims credit. It is computed as shown in the following formula and example: \n<table style=\"width: 432px; height: 98px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td></td> \n <td> Formula </td> \n <td> Example </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Fee </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n <td> $5.00 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Multiplied by the total approved CLE hours for which the attorney seeks credit but for which sponsor fee was paid. </td> \n <td> x ? </td> \n <td> x 3.3 </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td> Equals the total attendee fee </td> \n <td> $ ? </td> \n <td> $16.50 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (3) Fee Review . The Commission will review the level of the fee at least annually and adjust it as necessary to maintain adequate finances for prudent operation of the Commission in a non-profit manner. \n (4) Uniform Application . The fee shall be applied uniformly without exceptions or other preferential treatment for any sponsor or attendee. \n (5)  Professionalism Fee. The charge for professionalism credit is $15.00 per professionalism hour per attendee. This is in addition to the $5.00 per credit hour per attendee required by the CCLC. Each professionalism hour thus carries a charge per attendee of $20.00. The sponsor shall remit payment for CLE credit as follows: \n A check for $5.00 per total CLE hour (including professionalism) per attendee should be made payable to CCLC and mailed with the attendance list to the CCLC at the State Bar address.\n A check for $15.00 per professionalism CLE hour per attendee should be made payable to CJCP (Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism) and mailed to the CJCP at the State Bar address.\n For example, if the sponsor is paying for 5 attendees who attended a 6-hour seminar including 1 hour of ethics and 1 hour of professionalism, payment should be as follows:\n $5 per hour x 6 hours of CLE x 5 attendees = $150 (payable to CCLC)\n $15 per Professionalism hour x 5 attendees = $75 (payable to CJCP)\n The CCLC is responsible for entering all CLE credit including professionalism. ","UrlName":"revision118"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Rule 8-104. Education Requirements and Exemptions.","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Approval of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status. Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice. Have been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia for not less than five years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation. Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action. Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand; State Disciplinary Board Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action. During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor. \n \n </ul> \n</ul>\n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"rule227","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"db934e62-2bbb-4245-8c8d-2ae03a5332eb","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 4","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"></blockquote>\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand; State Disciplinary Board Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n \n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision327"},{"Id":"b1a82c24-91d5-46f9-8604-88e8f775e64c","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 5","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"></blockquote>\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia for not less than five years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand; State Disciplinary Board Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n \n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision407"},{"Id":"bb484df1-773b-4421-ac38-9cf0fdbb97bd","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 3","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"></blockquote>\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; Review Panel Reprimand; Investigative Panel Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n \n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision298"},{"Id":"23f48cdd-629e-4093-b77f-be7f614a24a3","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year. \n <blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year. \n </blockquote> \n (2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years. \n \n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years. \n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings. \n <blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating. \n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules. \n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order. \n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records. \n </blockquote></blockquote> Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div> \n</blockquote>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics includes instruction on professional responsibility and malpractice. It does not include such topics as attorney fees, client development, law office economics, and practice systems except to the extent that professional responsibility is directly discussed in connection with these topics. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; Review Panel Reprimand; Investigative Panel Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n\n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n \n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n v. An actual or simulated mediation. \n</blockquote>Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision120"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"234876e2-c895-4b7a-914d-459926995947","Title":"Rule 8-105. Annual Report.","Content":"The Commission shall provide at the end of each year to all non-exempt active members an Annual Report of their CLE record in such form as the Commission shall prescribe.\nA member whose record contains credit for unearned hours shall report corrections on or before January 31st. A member whose record fails to include credit for earned hours may report corrections on or before January 31st.","UrlName":"rule229","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Rule 8-106. Hours and Accreditation.","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = CLE hours (round down to \n    nearest half hour ) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Lawyer Wellness. Wellness and mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104(A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life and law practice topics. To receive CLE credit these wellness topics must be discussed in the context of the legal profession and the effects on the quality of the legal services the lawyer is able to provide. Presentations approved may include stress management in the context of work/life balance in the practice of law, signs of substance abuse or mental health issues in oneself or a colleague within the legal community, lawyer assistance programs and other topics that are focused on the impact of substance abuse, mental health issues or stress management on lawyers and judges. CLE credit will not be given to presentations which solely focus on personal stress reduction techniques such as breathing exercises, meditation and yoga. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.  \n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest half hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $4 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys.\nThese In-House CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions:\n a. All In-House CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters.\ne. Attorneys can earn all or any portion of their CLE requirement through approved In-House CLE activities.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) Distance Learning CLE . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; computer-based CLE activities, on demand CLE programs, teleconference CLE programs and live CLE webcasts/webinars. Attorneys can earn all or any portion of their CLE requirement through Distance Learning CLE programs.\n (16)Interactivity Requirement for Approval of Distance Learning CLE. (Effective January 2022) CLE sponsors are reminded that CCLC emphasizes the importance of engagement in distance learning programming. The CCLC recognizes high levels of interaction that can be achieved through ubiquitous video streaming services and encourages the use of these technologies to maximum the educational experience.\nCourses must provide mechanisms to ensure interactivity and permit the attendee to interact with the presenter, other attendees or with the educational software itself based on responses by the participant. The following methods are provided as examples of course monitoring: Periodic Quizzing, Response Tracking, Web Logs, Video Monitoring, Time Recorders, Final Tests, User Navigation Monitoring and User Prompts.\nThe CCLC does not undertake the indeterminate task of issuing precise definitions of interactivity. Specific implementation of all of the above is not required, but incorporation of technology to ensure a positive and interactive educational experience is required.\nCLE Sponsors should provide high quality written instructional materials. These materials may be available for download or otherwise furnished so attendees will have the ability to refer to such material during and subsequent to the program.","UrlName":"rule231","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"19f67b1c-65a4-4673-8100-2dfc2cc8b047","ParentId":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Version 5","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = CLE hours (round down to \n    nearest half hour ) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Lawyer Wellness. Wellness and mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104(A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life and law practice topics. To receive CLE credit these wellness topics must be discussed in the context of the legal profession and the effects on the quality of the legal services the lawyer is able to provide. Presentations approved may include stress management in the context of work/life balance in the practice of law, signs of substance abuse or mental health issues in oneself or a colleague within the legal community, lawyer assistance programs and other topics that are focused on the impact of substance abuse, mental health issues or stress management on lawyers and judges. CLE credit will not be given to presentations which solely focus on personal stress reduction techniques such as breathing exercises, meditation and yoga. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.  \n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest half hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $4 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys. \nThese In-House CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions:\n a. All In-House CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters.\ne. Attorneys can earn all or any portion of their CLE requirement through approved In-House CLE activities.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) Distance Learning CLE . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; computer-based CLE activities, on demand CLE programs, teleconference CLE programs and live CLE webcasts/webinars. Attorneys can earn all or any portion of their CLE requirement through Distance Learning CLE programs.","UrlName":"revision337"},{"Id":"30480843-e0d7-4b44-89f1-351acf5dc9f1","ParentId":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE and ethics hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = total hours (round to the \n nearest 1/10th of an hour) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Mental Health.  Mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104 (A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life topics. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.\n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest tenth of an hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $5 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n (8) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE affidavit, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia.\n (9) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House/Self-Study CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys. However, it is also educational and beneficial for attorneys to meet and learn from colleagues who practice in other firms, corporate legal departments, or similar entities including sole practitioners.\nThe Commission recognizes that active member attorneys on an individual basis may participate in distance learning CLE activities, which constitutes Self-Study.\n These In-House/Self-Study CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions: \n \n a. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House/Self-Study CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters. \n \ne. Up to six (6) CLE hours may be earned by an attorney in a calendar year through any combination of approved In-House/Self-Study activities. In addition, up to six hours of In-House/Self-Study credit may be carried forward and applied to In-House/Self-Study CLE for the next calendar year or carried back to the previous year to satisfy a CLE deficiency as long as the In-House/Self-Study limit for that year has not been met. While In-House credits count toward this six (6) CLE hour annual limit for all members of the sponsoring law firm or legal department, non-member attorneys who attend those In-House CLE programs will receive regular credit that does not count toward the six (6) CLE hour annual limit. For example, if a law firm conducts a seminar attended both by its partners or associates and by in-house counsel of its corporate client or other invited attorney guests, these credits would count toward the six (6) hour limit for the firm's partners and associates, but not for the non-member guests.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) CLE Delivery Formats . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. These distance learning CLE activities may be attended by an individual attorney with no minimum number of attendees needed to receive approved MCLE credit, but must comply with the In-House/Self-Study CLE Regulation 8 to Rule 8-106(B). Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; on-line computer CLE activities, CD-ROM and DVD interactive CLE activities; and written correspondence CLE courses. When attended by an individual attorney, the distance learning activity constitutes Self-Study CLE. Examples of non-qualifying educational activities that are encouraged on a non-MCLE approved credit basis include: reading cases and advance sheets, legal research, internet chat groups and jury duty.","UrlName":"revision232"},{"Id":"b3d2ff93-39f2-4f01-9942-9c79d3076c72","ParentId":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Version 3","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = CLE hours (round down to \n    nearest half hour ) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Lawyer Wellness. Wellness and mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104(A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life and law practice topics. To receive CLE credit these wellness topics must be discussed in the context of the legal profession and the effects on the quality of the legal services the lawyer is able to provide. Presentations approved may include stress management in the context of work/life balance in the practice of law, signs of substance abuse or mental health issues in oneself or a colleague within the legal community, lawyer assistance programs and other topics that are focused on the impact of substance abuse, mental health issues or stress management on lawyers and judges. CLE credit will not be given to presentations which solely focus on personal stress reduction techniques such as breathing exercises, meditation and yoga. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.  \n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest tenth of an hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $5 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House/Self-Study CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys. However, it is also educational and beneficial for attorneys to meet and learn from colleagues who practice in other firms, corporate legal departments, or similar entities including sole practitioners.\nThe Commission recognizes that active member attorneys on an individual basis may participate in distance learning CLE activities, which constitutes Self-Study.\n These In-House/Self-Study CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions: \n \n a. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House/Self-Study CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters. \n \ne. Up to six (6) CLE hours may be earned by an attorney in a calendar year through any combination of approved In-House/Self-Study activities. In addition, up to six hours of In-House/Self-Study credit may be carried forward and applied to In-House/Self-Study CLE for the next calendar year or carried back to the previous year to satisfy a CLE deficiency as long as the In-House/Self-Study limit for that year has not been met. While In-House credits count toward this six (6) CLE hour annual limit for all members of the sponsoring law firm or legal department, non-member attorneys who attend those In-House CLE programs will receive regular credit that does not count toward the six (6) CLE hour annual limit. For example, if a law firm conducts a seminar attended both by its partners or associates and by in-house counsel of its corporate client or other invited attorney guests, these credits would count toward the six (6) hour limit for the firm's partners and associates, but not for the non-member guests.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) CLE Delivery Formats . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. These distance learning CLE activities may be attended by an individual attorney with no minimum number of attendees needed to receive approved MCLE credit, but must comply with the In-House/Self-Study CLE Regulation 8 to Rule 8-106(B). Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; on-line computer CLE activities, CD-ROM and DVD interactive CLE activities; and written correspondence CLE courses. When attended by an individual attorney, the distance learning activity constitutes Self-Study CLE. Examples of non-qualifying educational activities that are encouraged on a non-MCLE approved credit basis include: reading cases and advance sheets, legal research, internet chat groups and jury duty.","UrlName":"revision284"},{"Id":"04fad5b2-f9de-44c5-9dd3-dbc30cf2c95b","ParentId":"f2711e33-2350-409d-91b0-15948e5e68d3","Title":"Version 4","Content":" (A) Hours. The Commission shall designate the number of hours to be earned by participation, including, but not limited to, teaching in continuing legal education activities approved by the Commission. \n \nRegulations \n \n(1) Computation Formula . CLE hours shall be computed by the following formula: \n \n<table style=\"width: 379px; height: 54px\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> Sum of total minutes \n of actual instruction \n 60 </div> \n </td> \n <td> \n <div style=\"text-align: center\"> = CLE hours (round down to \n    nearest half hour ) </div> \n </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n (2)Actual Instruction . Only legal education shall be included in computing the total hours of actual instruction. The following shall not be included: (a) introductory remarks, (b) breaks, (c) business meetings, (d) questions and answer sessions at a ratio in excess of 10 minutes per CLE hour, (e) programs of less than 60 minutes in length.\n (3) Teaching . For their contribution to the legal profession, attorneys may earn credit for non-paid teaching in an approved continuing legal education activity. Presentations accompanied by thorough, high quality, readable, and carefully prepared written materials will qualify for CLE credit on the basis of three (3) credits for each hour of presentation. Repeat presentations qualify for one-half of the credits available for the initial presentation. A speaker may elect to split the teaching credit with another attorney who, under the speaker's supervision, prepares the written materials. If the intended speaker prepares the written materials and cannot speak due to health problems, emergency or required court appearance, the teaching credit will be split between the speaker and the substituted speaker at the request of either. Should neither make such request, the credit will be given to the actual speaker.\n (4) Author . The CCLC may award up to a maximum of (6) hours of CLE credit for the authoring of legal articles upon the written certification by the attorney to the CCLC of (a) the amount of time expended in researching and writing the article and (b) the submission of a copy thereof to the CCLC for review, provided that (1) the article or treatise's content and quality are consistent with the purposes of CLE, (2) it is published in a recognized publication which is primarily directed at lawyers, and (3) the project was not done in the ordinary course of the practice of law, the performance of judicial duties, or other regular employment. If co-authors are involved, the credit may be divided on the basis of each attorney's contribution. An attorney requesting author credit shall pay the normal attendee fee.\n (5) Organizer . The chairperson who organizes an approved CLE activity and who does not make a formal oral presentation therein shall qualify for CLE credit as if he or she had made a one hour presentation. If co-chairpersons are involved, the credit shall be divided on the basis of each attorneys' contribution. An attorney requesting this type of credit should pay, or arrange for the sponsor to pay, the normal attendee fee.\n (6) Lawyer Wellness. Wellness and mental health issues, including stress, anxiety, substance abuse, depression and suicide, materially affect lawyers’ competency to practice law and their lives. CLE credit as required under Rule 8-104(A) is available for seminars on these and similar quality of life and law practice topics. To receive CLE credit these wellness topics must be discussed in the context of the legal profession and the effects on the quality of the legal services the lawyer is able to provide. Presentations approved may include stress management in the context of work/life balance in the practice of law, signs of substance abuse or mental health issues in oneself or a colleague within the legal community, lawyer assistance programs and other topics that are focused on the impact of substance abuse, mental health issues or stress management on lawyers and judges. CLE credit will not be given to presentations which solely focus on personal stress reduction techniques such as breathing exercises, meditation and yoga. In addition, professionalism CLE credit is available when these topics are presented in a professionalism program approved by the Chief Justice’s Commission on Professionalism.  \n (7) Trial Observation . Every trial encompasses many aspects of the practice of law that are consistently taught in both law school and continuing legal education seminars. Observing how this education is applied into actual practice in the form of a current trial is, in and of itself, very educational. Its importance in achieving competency as a lawyer cannot be emphasized enough. To encourage this, CLE credit for observing trials is available under the following guidelines\na. Jury trials, bench trials, motion hearings and appellate court arguments in any Federal or State court are eligible.  Administrative hearings, trials and probate court, and mediations/arbitrations are also eligible.\nb. Proceedings in magistrate court and pro se matters are not eligible.\nc.  Credit is not available for trials in which the member takes an active role in the trial or any phase thereof.\nd. The credit shall be treated as In-House and subject to the limitations of Regulation 8e under Rule 8-106 (B).\ne. The credit is not eligible for ethics or professionalism CLE.\nf. The credit is self-reported to the CCLC and must include:\n<ul> \n <li> \n member's name and bar number \n </li> \n <li> \n the name of the court, parties, date of trial and type of trial \n </li> \n <li> \n the credit applicable (actual time rounded to nearest half hour) \n </li> \n <li> \n the administrative fee required by Rule 8-103(C)(2) (currently $4 per credit hour) \n </li> \n</ul>\n(B) Accreditation Standards: The Commission shall approve continuing legal education activities consistent with the following standards: \n (1) They shall have significant intellectual or practical content, and the primary objective shall be to increase the participant's professional competence as a lawyer; \n \n(2) They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility or ethical obligations of lawyers; \n \n(3) Credit may be given for continuing legal education activities where (a) live instruction is used or (b) mechanically or electronically recorded or reproduced material is used if a qualified instructor is available to comment and answer questions; \n \n(4) Continuing legal education materials are to be prepared, and activities conducted, by an individual or group qualified by practical or academic experience in a setting physically suitable to the educational activity of the program; \n \n(5) Thorough, high quality, and carefully prepared written materials should be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the course is presented. It is recognized that written materials are not suitable or readily available for some types of subjects; the absence of written materials for distribution, should, however, be the exception and not the rule; \n \n(6) The Commission may issue from time to time a list of approved accredited sponsors deemed by it to meet the requirements set forth in this Rule. Any other sponsor desiring to be approved for accredited sponsor status must file an application with the Commission with such program material and information as the Commission may require; \n \n(7) Any accredited sponsor must keep and maintain attendance records of each continuing legal education program sponsored by it, which shall be furnished to the Commission upon its request.\n Regulations\n (1) Continuing Legal Education . The CCLC shall determine those matters which directly relate to the practice of law so as to be eligible for CLE credit. They shall constitute an organized program of learning dealing with matters directly related to the practice of law, professional responsibility, or ethical obligations of lawyers.\n (2) Law School Courses . Courses offered by an ABA accredited law school shall receive credit on the basis of one-half (1/2) hour of CLE credit for each 60 minutes of actual instruction. No more than twenty-four (24) CLE hours in any calendar year may be earned by law school courses. Success on an examination is not required for credit and the course may be attended on an audit (not for academic credit) basis. No credit is available for law school courses attended prior to becoming an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. Law courses in schools other than law schools will not qualify.\n (3) Bar Review/Refresher Course . Courses designed to review or refresh recent law school graduates or other attorneys in preparation for any bar exam shall not be approved for CLE credit.\n (4) Approval . CLE activities may be approved upon the written application of sponsors on an individual program basis, sponsors on an accredited sponsor basis, or attorneys on an individual program basis. In addition, the CCLC may approve both CLE activities and accredited sponsors on its own motion, on either an individual program or accredited sponsor basis. All applications for CLE course approval shall:\n a. Be submitted at least thirty (30) days, and preferably longer, in advance of the course, although the CCLC may grant retroactive approval; \n \nb. Be submitted on forms furnished by the CCLC; \n \nc. Contain all information requested on the form; \n \nd. Be accompanied by a course outline or brochure that describes the course content, identifies the teachers, lists the time devoted to each topic, and shows each date and location at which the program will be offered; \n \ne. Include a detailed calculation of the total CLE hours and of the ethics hours.\nIn addition to the foregoing, sponsors shall within thirty (30) days after the course is concluded:\n a. Furnish to the CCLC a list in alphabetical order of the name and State Bar number of each Georgia attendee; \n \nb. Remit to the CCLC the appropriate sponsor fee. Sponsors who have advance approval for courses may include in their brochures or other course descriptions the information contained in the following illustration:\nThis course (or seminar, etc.) has been approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the State Bar of Georgia for mandatory continuing legal education credit in the amount of _____hours, of which ______hours will also apply in the area of ethics. The reporting of your attendance at this course will be done for you by (name of sponsor). To assure proper credit, please be sure to furnish us with your correct Georgia Bar number. (If applicable: The administrative fee for this course will be paid for you by (name of sponsor) directly to the Commission.)\n Sponsors not having advance approval shall make no representation concerning the approval of a course for CLE credit by the CCLC. \n \nThe CCLC will mail a notice of its decision on all CLE activity approval requests within ninety days of their receipt. Approval thereof will be deemed if the notice is not timely mailed. This automatic approval will not operate if the sponsor contributes to the delay by failing to provide the complete information requested by the CCLC, or if the CCLC timely notifies the sponsor that the matter has been tabled and the reason therefore.\n (5) Approval of Accredited Sponsors . CCLC may, at its sole discretion, approve the accredited sponsors. Accredited sponsors shall\na. Complete such application as the CCLC requires;\nb. Comply with all the CLE rules and regulations, including any amendments thereto;\nc. Upon request by the CCLC, submit, on forms to be furnished by the CCLC, all future CLE activities for confirmation of the approved total number of CLE hours, ethics hours, trial hours and professionalism hours\nd. Conduct all CLE activities substantially as advertised and represented to the CCLC;\ne. Furnish to the CCLC, within 30 days after each CLE activity, the following:\ni. A list of the name and State Bar membership number of each Georgia attendee; and\nii. The required sponsor fee for the CLE activity;\nf. Allow in-person observation of all CLE activities by the Justices of the Supreme Court, officers of the State Bar of Georgia, members of the Overview Committee, members of the CCLC and the CCLC staff;\ng. Comply with any and all requirements or representations which may be contained in any form required by the CCLC for the confirmation of the number of approved hours, and\nh. Submit such other forms as the CCLC may from time to time require, and reply to any and all inquiries from the CCLC.\n (6) Restrictions on Accredited Sponsors . Accredited sponsors shall not use any name which may cause confusion with the State Bar or any of its entities or with the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, or with ICLE in Georgia. At the sole discretion of the CCLC, an accredited sponsor may be required to place a disclaimer upon any communication with members of the State Bar which disclaims the accredited sponsor from any connection with the State Bar or CCLC. Such disclaimer, if required, shall be approved by the CCLC. An accredited sponsor shall not link to any web page on the State Bar of Georgia without the written approval of the State Bar of Georgia and subject to any requirements and restriction that may be placed upon such approval.\n (7) Revocation of Accredited Sponsor Status . The CCLC may, with or without cause, at its sole discretion, revoke the accredited sponsor status of any CLE provider. \n \n(8) In-House/Self-Study CLE. The Commission recognizes that law firms, corporate legal departments and similar entities, either alone or in conjunction with each other, will develop and present In-House continuing legal education activities to assist their member attorneys in maintaining their professional competence. The Commission further recognizes that these In-House CLE activities often are designed to address matters most relevant to a firm's own attorneys. However, it is also educational and beneficial for attorneys to meet and learn from colleagues who practice in other firms, corporate legal departments, or similar entities including sole practitioners.\nThe Commission recognizes that active member attorneys on an individual basis may participate in distance learning CLE activities, which constitutes Self-Study.\n These In-House/Self-Study CLE activities may be approved for credit under these Rules and Regulations plus the following additional conditions: \n \n a. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities shall be designed specifically as an organized program of learning. \n \nb. All In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be open to observation by members of the CCLC and its staff; \n \nc. Experienced attorneys must substantially contribute to the development and presentation of all In-House/Self-Study CLE activities; \n \nd. In-House/Self-Study CLE activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free of interruptions from telephone calls and other office matters. \n \ne. Up to six (6) CLE hours may be earned by an attorney in a calendar year through any combination of approved In-House/Self-Study activities. In addition, up to six hours of In-House/Self-Study credit may be carried forward and applied to In-House/Self-Study CLE for the next calendar year or carried back to the previous year to satisfy a CLE deficiency as long as the In-House/Self-Study limit for that year has not been met. While In-House credits count toward this six (6) CLE hour annual limit for all members of the sponsoring law firm or legal department, non-member attorneys who attend those In-House CLE programs will receive regular credit that does not count toward the six (6) CLE hour annual limit. For example, if a law firm conducts a seminar attended both by its partners or associates and by in-house counsel of its corporate client or other invited attorney guests, these credits would count toward the six (6) hour limit for the firm's partners and associates, but not for the non-member guests.\n (9) Facilities . Sponsors ordinarily must provide a facility with adequate lighting, temperature controlled ventilation, and a designated non-smoking area. For a non-clinical CLE activity, the facility should be set up in classroom or similar style to provide a writing surface for each pre-registered attendee, to provide a minimum of two linear feet of table space per chair, and should provide sufficient space behind the chairs in each row to permit easy access and exit to each seat. Crowding in the facility detracts from the learning process and will not be permitted.\n (10) Written Materials . Qualifying written materials shall specifically address each of the topics of the seminar. These materials must be prepared by the speaker (or someone acting under his or her direct supervision) and shall be distributed to all attendees at or before the time the seminar is held. There are essentially three rationales for these requirements. First, they ensure speaker organization and preparation. Second, they alleviate the need for attendees to take notes and allow them to concentrate on the oral presentations. Finally, they provide a valuable reference tool for the attendees after they leave the seminar.\nExamples of written materials which alone would not qualify include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) topical outlines; (2) topical outlines with case citations; (3) copies of statutes or cases; (4) copies of leases, contracts, wills and other legal instruments (unless accompanied by qualifying explanatory text); (5) hornbooks (unless speaker prepared and on point); (6) casebooks; (7) subsequently prepared transcripts.\nThe quality of oral presentations and the overall educational value of the seminar will not excuse the written materials accreditation requirement.\nIt is recognized that on rare occasions, or for unique topics, preparation of written materials may not be possible or appropriate. Thus, for example, where the particular law which is the topic of a seminar changes dramatically immediately before the seminar is given, the prepared materials may be rendered obsolete. Likewise, written materials may not always be suitable for a clinical program on oral advocacy. In these exceptional circumstances, the requirements of this regulation may not apply. If there is any question as to whether written materials are required for a given topic, the sponsor is advised to contact the Commission in advance of the seminar.\n (11) Sponsor Records . In addition to the required attendance records, sponsors are encouraged, though not required, to solicit written evaluations of each sponsored program from its attendees and to maintain for at least two years after the program all such evaluations received, both for the sponsor's benefit and for furnishing to the Commission upon its request. A sponsor's policy either to solicit and maintain such evaluations or not to do so may be considered by the Commission as a factor bearing on the sponsor's accreditation.\n (12) Primary Objective Test. The primary objective of CLE shall be to increase the attendee's professional competence as a lawyer. Worthwhile professional activities which have other primary objectives are encouraged, but do not meet the accreditation standards for CLE credit. Bar meetings, service on committees, jury duty, and client development or marketing seminars are examples of activities which do not meet the primary objective test.\n (13) ADR CLE . CLE activities which train attorneys in the generally accepted processes of alternative dispute resolution are consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein\n (14) Practice Management CLE . (CLE activities relating to the development and management of a law practice including client relations) Practice Management CLE includes, but is not limited to, those activities which (1) teach lawyers how to organize and manage their law practices so as to promote the efficient, economical and competent delivery of legal services; and (2) teach lawyers how to create and maintain good client relations consistent with existing ethical and professional guidelines so as to eliminate malpractice claims and bar grievances while improving service to the client and the public image of the profession. Practice Management CLE is consistent with Accreditation Standards 1 and 2 where such programs meet the other criteria set forth herein.\n (15) Distance Learning CLE . In addition to traditional approved continuing legal education activities attended live and in-person by groups of attorneys, distance learning delivery formats are acceptable provided they are designed specifically as organized programs of learning and meet the other accreditation standards set out in these Rules and Regulations. These distance learning CLE activities may be attended by an individual attorney with no minimum number of attendees needed to receive approved MCLE credit, but must comply with the In-House/Self-Study CLE Regulation 8 to Rule 8-106(B). Examples of qualifying distance learning formats include: live CLE activities presented via video or audio replays of live CLE activities; computer based CLE activities, on demand CLE programs, teleconference CLE programs and live CLE webcasts/webinars. When attended by an individual attorney on a computer, telephone or other electronic device, the distance learning activity constitutes self-study CLE and is subject to the 6-hour per year limit. Examples of non-qualifying education activities that are encouraged on a non-MCLE approved credit basis include: reading cases and advance sheets, legal research, internet chat groups and jury duty.","UrlName":"revision333"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"266c6b45-1a94-400a-863a-b6418b115455","Title":"Rule 8-107. Grace Period and Noncompliance.","Content":"(A) Grace Period\n(1) Members who are deficient in their CLE, fees, or other requirements at the end of a calendar year are entitled to an automatic grace period until March 31st of the succeeding year to make up their deficiency.  This does not change the requirement that members file their annual report by January 31st.\n(2) Members who remain deficient on April 1st of the succeeding year shall pay a late CLE fee in an amount to be set by the Commission.\n(B) Noncompliance\n(1) Notice.  Members who remain deficient in their CLE, annual report filing, fees, or other requirements on April 1st of the succeeding year are in noncompliance.  The Commission shall so notify the members by first class mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia.  Service or actual receipt is not a prerequisite to actions authorized by these Rules.\n(2) Hearing.  Members may contest their noncompliance by requesting a hearing before the Commission.  The request should be in writing, contain the reasons for their contest, and be made within 60 days of the date of the notice of noncompliance mailed by the Commission.  The Commission shall hear the matter at its next meeting.  No action will be taken while hearings are pending.\n(3) Report.  The Commission shall report to the Supreme Court those members who remain in noncompliance after the time to request hearings has expired or any requested hearings have been held.\n(4) Supreme Court of Georgia Action.  Upon receipt from the Commission of a report of noncompliance, the Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an order it deems appropriate including an allowance of additional time for compliance or summary suspension from the practice of law until further order of the Court.\n Regulation \n (1) Late CLE Fee: An attorney who does not complete the annual, minimum CLE requirement until after March 31st of the following year shall pay a $100 late CLE fee. This fee shall be due April 1st. Thereafter, if the attorney's CLE deficiency is not corrected by September 30th of the same year, or if the $100 late CLE fee remains unpaid on that September 30th, an additional $150 late fee shall be due immediately. ","UrlName":"rule233","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"e8bac0ec-f8e9-4bf9-a681-0e6c37bb1e16","ParentId":"266c6b45-1a94-400a-863a-b6418b115455","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(A) Grace Period\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(1) Members who are deficient in their CLE, fees, or other requirements at the end of a calendar year are entitled to an automatic grace period until March 31st of the succeeding year to make up their deficiency.  This does not change the requirement that members file their annual report by January 31st. \n(2) Members who remain deficient on April 1st of the succeeding year shall pay a late CLE fee in an amount to be set by the Commission. \n</blockquote>\n(B) Noncompliance\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(1) Notice.  Members who remain deficient in their CLE, annual report filing, fees, or other requirements on April 1st of the succeeding year are in noncompliance.  The Commission shall so notify the members by first class mail to the member's current address contained in the membership records of the State Bar of Georgia.  Service or actual receipt is not a prerequisite to actions authorized by these Rules. \n(2) Hearing.  Members may contest their noncompliance by requesting a hearing before the Commission.  The request should be in writing, contain the reasons for their contest, and be made within 60 days of the date of the notice of noncompliance mailed by the Commission.  The Commission shall hear the matter at its next meeting.  No action will be taken while hearings are pending. \n(3) Report.  The Commission shall report to the Supreme Court those members who remain in noncompliance after the time to request hearings has expired or any requested hearings have been held. \n(4) Supreme Court of Georgia Action.  Upon receipt from the Commission of a report of noncompliance, the Supreme Court of Georgia shall enter an order it deems appropriate including an allowance of additional time for compliance or summary suspension from the practice of law until further order of the Court. \n</blockquote>\n Regulation \n (1) Late CLE Fee: An attorney who does not complete the annual, minimum CLE requirement until after March 31st of the following year shall pay a $100 late CLE fee. This fee shall be due April 1st. Thereafter, if the attorney's CLE deficiency is not corrected by September 30th of the same year, or if the $100 late CLE fee remains unpaid on that September 30th, an additional $150 late fee shall be due immediately. ","UrlName":"revision122"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"4e777d00-7e87-4b74-9e57-1b3035be1b91","Title":"Rule 8-108. Reinstatement.","Content":"An active member suspended under the provisions of these rules may be reinstated by the Court upon motion of the Commission and upon a showing that the delinquency has been corrected and payment to the Commission of a uniform reinstatement fee fixed by the Commission.\n Regulations\n\n (1) Reinstatement Fee . The uniform reinstatement fee is $500 for a member's first reinstatement, $1,000 for a second reinstatement by the same member, and $2,000 for all subsequent reinstatements by the same member. This fee must accompany the reinstatement motion. It shall not be waived and is non-refundable in the event reinstatement is not granted. \n \n (2) Policy . Reinstatement will be granted only upon a showing that the member has attended sufficient approved CLE activity to make-up the deficiencies causing the suspension and all deficiencies in subsequent years. Also, the member's progress toward meeting MCLE requirements in the calendar year in which the reinstatement is requested will be included as information in the CCLC's motion to the Supreme Court. \n (3) Motion . The motion for reinstatement shall list the CLE activities by course number, sponsor, location, dates and hours. It shall be accompanied by proof of attendance, any attendee fee that may be due, and the reinstatement fee. \n (4) CCLC Action . If the suspended member is found to be in compliance, the CCLC will file a motion with the Supreme Court of Georgia setting forth the facts along with its recommendation which may or may not be that reinstatement be granted. The Supreme Court will make the final decision on reinstatement. If the suspended member is found to not be in compliance, the CCLC will inform him of the curative actions necessary to cure his deficiencies. \n","UrlName":"rule235","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"fe21c281-665f-4fe6-8be4-3c1b916559bd","Title":"Rule 8-109. Confidentiality.","Content":" Records of the Commission are not confidential. ","UrlName":"rule236","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"fd93ea26-48d3-4c8f-a64e-9744cf85d1a1","Title":"Rule 8-110. Immunity.","Content":"The State Bar, its employees, the Standards of the Profession Committee members and advisory, the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, its employees, members and advisory, the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, its employees, members, and advisors shall be absolutely immune from civil liability of all acts in the course of their official duties.","UrlName":"rule238","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"15aa377a-5ae9-43b7-a0d7-86e81483c7bb","Title":"Rule 8-112. Foreign Law Consultants.","Content":" Foreign law consultant members of the State Bar of Georgia shall be subject to and shall comply with the provisions of this Part VIII in the same manner and to the extent as active members of the State Bar of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule239","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"265273d2-e7a2-40ad-9608-2305521f7b94","Title":"Rule 7-303. Reports.","Content":"The Committee shall implement and design such reports and documentation on an annual basis or as requested by the President of the State Bar of Georgia for reporting purposes to the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 7-302. Recognizing that disclosure of the identity of members of the State Bar of Georgia who have sought LAP assistance would be contrary to the purposes for which the Committee was established, neither the Committee, peer support volunteers, nor any health care provider selected under Rule 7-301 shall be required to provide confidential information concerning any such person to any private or government entity except by court order or as provided in Rule 7-302.","UrlName":"rule267","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"d3a1733d-1a6e-43d8-b308-ab3fb9d1946d","ParentId":"265273d2-e7a2-40ad-9608-2305521f7b94","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except as provided in this Rule and in Rule 4-104 (b), Rule 4-104 (c), Rule 7-203 and Rule 7-305, all proceedings and records of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation its contractor for clinical services) and other designees, including any information provided to any of them, shall be confidential unless the attorney who has provided the information or caused the record to be created otherwise elects, except that any such person may reveal (i) to police or emergency responders, or any person in imminent danger, information needed to avoid or prevent death or substantial bodily harm, and (ii) information: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>which is mandated by statute to be reported;</li> \n <li>to respond in any proceeding to allegations of misfeasance concerning the assistance he or she has provided to an impaired attorney as part of a volunteer network established pursuant to Rule 7-202; and</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about his or her compliance with these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision257"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Title":"CHAPTER 3 PROCEDURES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter26","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"f2cb6b1f-2931-480b-bea0-2d433d04dab8","Title":"Rule 7-301. Outsourcing of Clinical Services.","Content":"In carrying out its duties, the Committee, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee, is authorized to outsource the clinical portion(s) of the LAP to private sector health care providers.","UrlName":"rule262","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"e8926b20-cd90-4425-b6ca-6aaf692fdcae","ParentId":"f2cb6b1f-2931-480b-bea0-2d433d04dab8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall be authorized to establish and implement procedures to handle all contacts from or concerning impaired or potentially impaired attorneys, either through its chosen health care professional source, the statewide network established pursuant to Rule 7-202, or by any other procedure through which appropriate counseling or assistance to such attorneys may be provided.","UrlName":"revision255"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"16602d5a-7789-4890-b5c5-baa7c707d48f","Title":"Rule 7-302. Confidentiality.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except as provided in this Rule or by court order, all information in the possession or control of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301), or any peer support volunteer or other designee, concerning any person who has sought, has been identified as a potential recipient of, or has received assistance from the LAP, or has volunteered to serve as a peer support volunteer, shall be maintained in confidence unless the person who is the subject of the information otherwise elects, except that any person may reveal: \n <ol> \n <li>to police or emergency responders, or any person in imminent danger, information needed to avoid or prevent death or substantial bodily harm, and</li> \n <li> information that is:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>mandated by statute to be reported;</li> \n <li>necessary to respond in any proceeding to allegation of malfeasance concerning actions taken by such person as a member or designee of the Committee pursuant to any LAP program, including any assistance he or she provided to a lawyer as part of a volunteer network established pursuant to Rule 7-102; or</li> \n <li>necessary for disclosure to counsel in order to secure legal advice about his or her compliance with these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n Confidential information in the possession of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301) or any peer support volunteer or other designee, also may be privileged under OCGA § 24-5-501 (a) (5), (a) (6), (a) (7) or (a) (8). Communications that are needed to carry out the LAP’s purposes are authorized between or among members of the Committee, its staff, any peer support volunteers, and/or the employees, staff or agents of any health care provider selected under Rule 7-301. Such communications shall not constitute breaches of the confidentiality required under this Rule, provided that the identity of any lawyer who has sought assistance directly from a health care provider selected under Rule 7-301 shall not be disclosed to the Committee, its members, staff, or designees, unless said member of the State Bar of Georgia has consented to such disclosure. Statements by a lawyer seeking or receiving assistance from the LAP to the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation any health care provider selected pursuant to Rule 7-301), or any peer support volunteer or other designee shall not be admissible against the lawyer in any disciplinary proceeding under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule264","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"5e944b86-4f41-45be-a95d-aab96e2d5526","ParentId":"16602d5a-7789-4890-b5c5-baa7c707d48f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Upon the referral of any case to the Committee by the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, the Committee shall provide assistance to the impaired attorney referred by the Disciplinary Board as otherwise authorized by these rules. The Committee shall report to the Board, from time to time, the progress or lack of progress of the attorney so referred.","UrlName":"revision260"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"265273d2-e7a2-40ad-9608-2305521f7b94","Title":"Rule 7-303. Reports.","Content":"The Committee shall implement and design such reports and documentation on an annual basis or as requested by the President of the State Bar of Georgia for reporting purposes to the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 7-302. Recognizing that disclosure of the identity of members of the State Bar of Georgia who have sought LAP assistance would be contrary to the purposes for which the Committee was established, neither the Committee, peer support volunteers, nor any health care provider selected under Rule 7-301 shall be required to provide confidential information concerning any such person to any private or government entity except by court order or as provided in Rule 7-302.","UrlName":"rule267","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"d3a1733d-1a6e-43d8-b308-ab3fb9d1946d","ParentId":"265273d2-e7a2-40ad-9608-2305521f7b94","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except as provided in this Rule and in Rule 4-104 (b), Rule 4-104 (c), Rule 7-203 and Rule 7-305, all proceedings and records of the Committee, its members, staff, consultants (including without limitation its contractor for clinical services) and other designees, including any information provided to any of them, shall be confidential unless the attorney who has provided the information or caused the record to be created otherwise elects, except that any such person may reveal (i) to police or emergency responders, or any person in imminent danger, information needed to avoid or prevent death or substantial bodily harm, and (ii) information: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>which is mandated by statute to be reported;</li> \n <li>to respond in any proceeding to allegations of misfeasance concerning the assistance he or she has provided to an impaired attorney as part of a volunteer network established pursuant to Rule 7-202; and</li> \n <li>to secure legal advice about his or her compliance with these Rules.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision257"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ffceaf66-d6c8-42c8-8028-cf63d43bb8b3","Title":"Rule 7-304. Immunity.","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia, its employees, and members of the Committee and its selected clinical outsource private health care professionals shall be absolutely immune from civil liability for all acts taken in the course of their official duties pursuant to these Rules.","UrlName":"rule269","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"b7cecee4-4602-4186-b714-413b40ffb2f7","ParentId":"ffceaf66-d6c8-42c8-8028-cf63d43bb8b3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall implement and design such reports and documentation as it deems necessary or as is requested by the president of the State Bar, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 7-303.","UrlName":"revision259"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"28532539-dfc4-468c-b730-9c3f6d3b099c","Title":"Rule 7-203. Procedures for Receiving and Action on Information Concerning Request for Assistance.","Content":"The Committee shall establish, design and implement procedures necessary for a health care provider to directly and confidentially receive information concerning lawyers requesting assistance with mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related issues. All such procedures shall be approved by the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule256","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"7d02711e-9a3f-493f-a9be-09e71a1a8646","ParentId":"28532539-dfc4-468c-b730-9c3f6d3b099c","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The members of the Committee shall establish, design and implement all procedures necessary to receive information concerning impaired attorneys. Upon a determination that an attorney is impaired, the Committee shall implement such resources as to the Committee appear appropriate in each individual case. In carrying out its duties under this rule, the Committee, subject to the approval of the Executive Committee, is authorized to outsource the clinical portion of the Lawyer Assistance Program to private sector health care professionals. Such health care professionals and their related staff, consultants and other designees shall be authorized to communicate with each other and with the Committee regarding the program or persons referred to the program by the Committee. Said communications shall not constitute a violation of the confidentiality rules established herein.","UrlName":"revision252"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"13a9ac41-b84b-4415-8fe5-3c5e64e8928d","Title":"Rule 7-102. Membership.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Committee members shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia for a three-year term in accordance with Article VIII, Section 1 of the bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.  In addition, the President shall appoint four non-lawyers to serve on the Committee, provided that such non-lawyers are licensed, certified addiction counselors, certified employee assistance professionals, licensed therapists, or other licensed mental/behavioral health professionals or other persons who have experience in conducting alcohol and drug rehabilitation intervention programs or mental health assistance programs. The term of such non-lawyer appointment shall be three years. Any member of the Committee with a previously identified chemical or alcohol dependence or other addiction must have a period of sobriety of at least five years prior to becoming a member of the Committee. Any member of the Committee who has received inpatient treatment for mental illness must have been released from the facility at which such treatment was provided at least two years prior to becoming a member of the Committee. The Committee may also appoint peer support volunteers as volunteer members in accordance with its rules.  Peer support volunteers must comply with this Rule concerning substance abuse and mental illness. Any Committee member or peer support volunteer with a previously identified chemical or alcohol dependence or other addiction or who has received inpatient treatment for mental illness must certify their recovery, sobriety, or satisfactory completion of medical treatment and release from treatment as provided in the internal rules of the Committee.</li> \n <li>Any Committee member or peer volunteer who suffers a relapse related to a substance use disorder and/or experiences challenges related to a diagnosed mental illness of any type to the degree to which significantly impairs his or her ability to serve shall be removed as a member of the Committee and/or as a peer volunteer pursuant to its internal rules.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule237","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"6349932c-e941-4f2f-b5ba-513e6cbc9845","ParentId":"13a9ac41-b84b-4415-8fe5-3c5e64e8928d","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar in accordance with Article VIII, Section 1, of the bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. In addition, the President, at his or her discretion, may appoint up to four non-lawyers to serve on the Committee, provided that such non-lawyers are licensed, certified addiction counselors, certified employee assistance professionals, licensed therapists, or other persons who have experience in conducting alcohol and drug rehabilitation intervention programs or mental health assistance programs. The term of such non-lawyer appointment shall be one year. Any member of the Committee who is a recovered chemical or alcohol dependent person must have a period of sobriety of at least five years.","UrlName":"revision242"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"586f5f38-e08a-4af0-b679-25c9b10631bc","Title":"Rule 6-603. Immunity.","Content":"The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes the Fee Arbitration Program of the State Bar of Georgia to be judicial and quasi-judicial in nature and within the Court’s regulatory function, and in connection with such arbitration proceedings, members of the Fee Arbitration Committee, volunteer arbitrators, appointed voluntary counsel assisting the program and State Bar of Georgia Fee Arbitration staff are entitled to those immunities customarily afforded to persons so participating in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings or engaged in such arbitration activities.","UrlName":"rule556","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","Revisions":[{"Id":"d921256b-a2e8-4d6b-83b3-131c2dcc637c","ParentId":"586f5f38-e08a-4af0-b679-25c9b10631bc","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Committee members, arbitrators, staff, and appointed voluntary counsel assisting the program shall be immune from suit for any conduct in the course and scope of their official duties under this program. Parties and witnesses shall have such immunity as is applicable in a civil action in Georgia.","UrlName":"revision383"}],"Ancestors":["3aa9dadc-b9ba-4260-9042-d876291778f1","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"cb46df7c-4172-4cc3-ade3-ad17921cc071","Title":"Rule 6-503. Procedure Where Lawyer Refuses to be Bound.","Content":"All arbitration awards under these rules are enforceable under the Georgia Arbitration Code, OCGA § 9-9-1 et seq.\nUpon the written request of a client, the Committee may provide a lawyer to represent the client in post-award proceedings at no cost to the client other than court filing fees and litigation expenses. Alternatively, the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia may represent, assist, or advise a client in post-award proceedings, provided the client shall be responsible for all court filing fees and litigation expenses.","UrlName":"rule554","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","Revisions":[{"Id":"eb170cfc-de72-4945-8a97-e432a253a214","ParentId":"cb46df7c-4172-4cc3-ade3-ad17921cc071","Title":"Version 2","Content":"In cases where an attorney refuses to be bound by the result of an arbitration and an award in favor of a client remains unsatisfied three months after service of the award upon the parties, the State Bar of Georgia, upon the written request of the client, may provide a lawyer to represent the client in post-award proceedings at no cost to the client other than court filing fees and litigation expenses. Alternatively, the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia may represent, assist, or advise a client in post-award proceedings, provided the client shall be responsible for all court filing fees and litigation expenses.\nAn award rendered in favor of a client in a case in which the attorney refused to be bound by the result of the arbitration will be considered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the award, and the burden of proof shall shift to the lawyer to prove otherwise.","UrlName":"revision379"}],"Ancestors":["402add7e-03be-4bd0-b13d-fa0a71226277","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"65b02520-e02c-4413-a445-3ff54639f0d5","Title":"Rule 6-403. Attendance and Participation at Hearing.","Content":"The parties shall have the right to attend and participate in the arbitration hearing at their own expense. It shall be discretionary with the arbitrators whether to allow the attendance of any persons who are not parties, witnesses, or counsel to one of the parties. \nAt the discretion of the arbitrators, a party may be permitted to appear or present witness testimony at the hearing by telephone conference call, video conference, computer-facilitated conference, or similar telecommunications equipment, provided all persons participating in the hearing can simultaneously hear each other during the hearing. \n","UrlName":"rule189","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"4ac30ef0-882a-4203-9baf-dd794ef07068","Title":"Rule 6-303. Selection of Arbitrators.","Content":"The arbitration panel shall be selected by the Committee or its staff. Except as provided below, the arbitration panel shall consist of two lawyer members who have practiced law actively for at least five years and one nonlawyer public member.\nIn cases involving disputed amounts not exceeding $2,500, the Committee in its sole discretion may appoint an arbitration panel consisting of one lawyer who has practiced law actively for at least five years.\nPetitioner and respondent by mutual agreement shall have the right to select the three arbitrators. They also may mutually agree to have the dispute determined by a sole arbitrator jointly selected by them, provided any such sole arbitrator shall be one of the persons on the roster of arbitrators or shall have been approved in advance by the Committee upon the joint request of petitioner and respondent.","UrlName":"rule183","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[{"Id":"f73558d0-6378-4352-a982-582b853de4ce","ParentId":"4ac30ef0-882a-4203-9baf-dd794ef07068","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The arbitrator panel shall be selected by the Committee or its staff.  Except as provided below,  the arbitration panel shall consist of two attorney members who have practiced law actively for at least five years and one nonlawyer public member.\nIn cases involving disputed amounts greater than $750 but not exceeding $2,500, the Committee in its sole discretion may appoint an arbitration panel consisting of one lawyer who has practiced law actively for at least five years.\nPetitioner and respondent by mutual agreement shall have the right to select the three arbitrators. They also may mutually agree to have the dispute determined by a sole arbitrator jointly selected by them, provided any such sole arbitrator shall be one of the persons on the roster of arbitrators or shall have been approved in advance by the Committee upon the joint request of petitioner and respondent.","UrlName":"revision371"}],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"48a54110-ea1d-4783-8deb-3924cb6387bf","Title":"Rule 6-203. Answer.","Content":"Each respondent shall have 20 calendar days after service of a petition to file an answer with the Committee. Staff, in its discretion, may grant appropriate extensions of time for the filing of an answer.\nThe answer shall be filed on or with the Fee Arbitration Answer Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) If the respondent is the client and/or payer, a statement as to whether the respondent agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(b) The respondent’s statement of facts. The statement must be double-spaced, typed in a 12-point font or handwritten, and the submission is limited to 50 pages including exhibits. The page limit may be increased by the Fee Arbitration staff for good cause;\n(c) Any defenses the respondent intends to assert;\n(d) The date of the answer; and\n(e) Each respondent’s signature.\nCommittee staff shall serve a copy of the answer upon each petitioner by first class mail, addressed to such party’s last known address.\n The failure to file an answer shall not deprive the Committee of jurisdiction and shall not result in a default judgment against the respondent. \n \n","UrlName":"rule179","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"6a4dda32-6b9f-4864-8070-e7664c2b9fcb","ParentId":"48a54110-ea1d-4783-8deb-3924cb6387bf","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Each respondent shall have 20 calendar days after service of a petition to file an answer with the Committee. Staff, in its discretion, may grant appropriate extensions of time for the filing of an answer.\nThe answer shall be filed on or with the Fee Arbitration Answer Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) A statement as to whether the respondent agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(b) The respondent’s statement of facts;\n(c) Any defenses the respondent intends to assert;\n(d) The date of the answer; and\n(e) Each respondent’s signature.\nCommittee staff shall serve a copy of the answer upon each petitioner by first class mail, addressed to such party’s last known address.\n The failure to file an answer shall not deprive the Committee of jurisdiction and shall not result in a default judgment against the respondent. \n \n","UrlName":"revision363"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Title":"CHAPTER 2 JURISDICTIONAL GUIDELINES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter17","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"3fb4159c-c10f-4b1f-8aa0-e9cb1e7dc1c2","Title":"Rule 6-201. Petition.","Content":"A request for arbitration of a fee dispute is initiated by the filing of a petition with the Committee. Each petition shall be filed on the Fee Arbitration Petition Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) A statement of the nature of the dispute and the petitioner’s statement of facts, including relevant exhibits and dates. The statement must be double-spaced, typed in a 12-point font or handwritten and is limited to 50 pages, including exhibits. The page limit may be increased by the Fee Arbitration staff for good cause shown;\n(b) The names and addresses of the client(s) and the lawyer(s);\n(c) A statement as to whether or not the petitioner has made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute;\n(d) A statement that by filing the petition, the petitioner has agreed to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(e) The date of the petition; and\n (f) Each petitioner’s signature. \n ","UrlName":"rule177","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"ef060a7a-5f9b-4270-9963-dc8231b9c971","ParentId":"3fb4159c-c10f-4b1f-8aa0-e9cb1e7dc1c2","Title":"Version 2","Content":"A request for arbitration of a fee dispute is initiated by the filing of a petition with the Committee. Each petition shall be filed on the Fee Arbitration Petition Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) A statement of the nature of the dispute and the petitioner’s statement of facts, including relevant dates;\n(b) The names and addresses of the client(s) and the attorney(s);\n(c) A statement that the petitioner has made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute and the details of that effort;\n(d) A statement that the petitioner agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(e) The date of the petition; and\n (f) Each petitioner’s signature. \n ","UrlName":"revision359"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a7affb39-3c1e-480a-b1e2-bc8eb86219a0","Title":"Rule 6-202. Service of Petition.","Content":"If a petition has been properly completed and appears to have merit, Committee staff shall serve a copy of the petition, along with a Fee Arbitration Answer Form and an acknowledgment of service form, upon the respondent by first class mail addressed to such party’s last known address. A signed acknowledgment of service form or a written answer from the respondent or respondent’s counsel shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.\nIn the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent's counsel, service shall be certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to such party’s last known address.\nIn unusual circumstances as determined by the Committee or its staff, when service has not been accomplished by other less costly measures, service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or a court-approved agent for service of process.\n If service is not accomplished, the Committee shall not accept jurisdiction of the case. \n \n","UrlName":"rule178","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"da76d6ca-f51b-4f59-8c4b-ecab17268315","ParentId":"a7affb39-3c1e-480a-b1e2-bc8eb86219a0","Title":"Version 2","Content":"If a petition has been properly completed and appears to have merit, Committee staff shall serve a copy of the petition, along with a Fee Arbitration Answer Form and an acknowledgment of service form, upon the respondent by first class mail addressed to such party’s last known address. A signed acknowledgment of service form or a written answer from the respondent or respondent’s attorney shall constitute conclusive proof of service and shall eliminate the need to utilize any other form of service.\nIn the absence of an acknowledgment of service or a written response from the respondent or respondent's counsel, service shall be certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to such party’s last known address.\nIn unusual circumstances as determined by the Committee or its staff, when service has not been accomplished by other less costly measures, service may be accomplished by the Sheriff or a court-approved agent for service of process.\n If service is not accomplished, the Committee shall not accept jurisdiction of the case. \n \n","UrlName":"revision361"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"48a54110-ea1d-4783-8deb-3924cb6387bf","Title":"Rule 6-203. Answer.","Content":"Each respondent shall have 20 calendar days after service of a petition to file an answer with the Committee. Staff, in its discretion, may grant appropriate extensions of time for the filing of an answer.\nThe answer shall be filed on or with the Fee Arbitration Answer Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) If the respondent is the client and/or payer, a statement as to whether the respondent agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(b) The respondent’s statement of facts. The statement must be double-spaced, typed in a 12-point font or handwritten, and the submission is limited to 50 pages including exhibits. The page limit may be increased by the Fee Arbitration staff for good cause;\n(c) Any defenses the respondent intends to assert;\n(d) The date of the answer; and\n(e) Each respondent’s signature.\nCommittee staff shall serve a copy of the answer upon each petitioner by first class mail, addressed to such party’s last known address.\n The failure to file an answer shall not deprive the Committee of jurisdiction and shall not result in a default judgment against the respondent. \n \n","UrlName":"rule179","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"6a4dda32-6b9f-4864-8070-e7664c2b9fcb","ParentId":"48a54110-ea1d-4783-8deb-3924cb6387bf","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Each respondent shall have 20 calendar days after service of a petition to file an answer with the Committee. Staff, in its discretion, may grant appropriate extensions of time for the filing of an answer.\nThe answer shall be filed on or with the Fee Arbitration Answer Form supplied by Committee staff and shall contain the following elements:\n(a) A statement as to whether the respondent agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration;\n(b) The respondent’s statement of facts;\n(c) Any defenses the respondent intends to assert;\n(d) The date of the answer; and\n(e) Each respondent’s signature.\nCommittee staff shall serve a copy of the answer upon each petitioner by first class mail, addressed to such party’s last known address.\n The failure to file an answer shall not deprive the Committee of jurisdiction and shall not result in a default judgment against the respondent. \n \n","UrlName":"revision363"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"13d790b3-03e5-48b3-bccc-2d96f5e50433","Title":"Rule 6-204. Accepting Jurisdiction.","Content":"The Committee or its designee may accept jurisdiction over a fee dispute only if the following requirements are considered satisfied:\n(a) The fee in question, whether paid or unpaid, was for legal services rendered by a lawyer who is, or was at the time the services were rendered, a member of the State Bar of Georgia or otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia.\n(b) The legal services in question were performed:\n(1) in the State of Georgia; or\n(2) from an office located in the State of Georgia; or\n(3) by a lawyer who is not admitted to the practice of law in any United States jurisdiction other than Georgia, and the circumstances are such that if the State Bar of Georgia does not accept jurisdiction, no other United States jurisdiction will be available to a client who has filed a petition under this program.\n(c) The disputed fee exceeds $1,000;\n(d) The amount of the disputed fee is not governed by statute or other law, nor has any court fixed or approved the full amount or all terms of the disputed fee. \n(e) The fee dispute is not the subject of litigation in court at the time the petition for arbitration is filed or when the Committee determines jurisdiction.\n(f) The petition seeking arbitration of the fee dispute is filed with the Committee no more than two years following the date on which the controversy arose.  If this date is disputed, it shall be determined in the same manner as the commencement of a cause of action on the underlying contract.\n(g) In the case of disputes between lawyers and clients, a lawyer/client relationship existed between the petitioner and the respondent at the time the legal services in question were performed.  A relative or other person paying the legal fees of the client may request arbitration of disputes over those fees, provided both the client and the other person payor join as co-petitioners or co-respondents and both agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\n(h) The client, whether petitioner or respondent, agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration. If the respondent lawyer does not agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration, the Committee will not accept the matter for arbitration.\n(i) In disputes between lawyers, the lawyers who are parties to the dispute are all members of the State Bar of Georgia and have all agreed to arbitrate the dispute under this program and to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\n(j) Where the parties to a fee dispute have signed a written agreement to submit fee disputes to binding arbitration with the State Bar of Georgia’s Attorney Fee Arbitration Program, the Committee will consider the agreement enforceable if it is:\n(1) set out in a separate paragraph;\n(2) written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract; and\n(3) separately initialed by the client and the lawyer.\n(k) In deciding whether to accept jurisdiction, the Committee shall review available evidence, including the recommendations of the staff, and make a determination whether to accept or decline jurisdiction. The Committee’s decisions on jurisdiction are final, except that such decisions are subject to reconsideration by the Committee upon the request of either party made within 30 days of the initial decision. Staff shall notify the parties of the Committee’s decision on jurisdiction by first class mail.","UrlName":"rule549","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"27c60fa8-a43f-4f2d-a0f6-00ca04c76bf5","ParentId":"13d790b3-03e5-48b3-bccc-2d96f5e50433","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee or its designee may accept jurisdiction over a fee dispute only if the following requirements are satisfied:\n(a) The fee in question, whether paid or unpaid, was for legal services rendered by a lawyer who is, or was at the time the services were rendered, a member of the State Bar of Georgia or otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia.\n(b) The legal services in question were performed:\n(1) in the State of Georgia; or\n(2) from an office located in the State of Georgia; or\n(3) by a lawyer who is not admitted to the practice of law in any United States jurisdiction other than Georgia, and the circumstances are such that if the State Bar of Georgia does not accept jurisdiction, no other United States jurisdiction will be available to a client who has filed a petition under this program.\n(c) The disputed fee exceeds $750.\n(d) The amount of the disputed fee is not governed by statute or other law, nor has any court fixed or approved the full amount or all terms of the disputed fee. \n(e) The fee dispute is not the subject of litigation in court at the time the petition for arbitration is filed or when the Committee determines jurisdiction.\n(f) The petition seeking arbitration of the fee dispute is filed with the Committee no more than two years following the date on which the controversy arose.  If this date is disputed, it shall be determined in the same manner as the commencement of a cause of action on the underlying contract.\n(g) In the case of disputes between lawyers and clients, a lawyer/client relationship existed between the petitioner and the respondent at the time the legal services in question were performed.  A relative or other person paying the legal fees of the client may request arbitration of disputes over those fees, provided both the client and the other person payor join as co-petitioners or co-respondents and both agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\n(h) The client, whether petitioner or respondent, agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration.  If the respondent attorney does not agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration, the Committee in its discretion may determine that it is in the best interest of the public and the legal profession to accept jurisdiction.  When the Committee accepts jurisdiction under these circumstances, the nonconsenting lawyer shall be considered a “party” for purposes of these rules.\n(i) In disputes between lawyers, the lawyers who are parties to the dispute are all members of the State Bar of Georgia and have all agreed to arbitrate the dispute under this program and to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\nAdditionally, where the parties to a fee dispute have signed  a written agreement to submit fee disputes to binding arbitration with the State Bar of Georgia’s Attorney Fee Arbitration Program, the Committee will consider the agreement enforceable if it is:\n(1) set out in a separate paragraph;\n(2) written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract; and\n(3) separately initialed by the client and the attorney.\nIn deciding whether to accept jurisdiction, the Committee shall review available evidence, including the recommendations of the staff, and make a determination whether to accept or decline jurisdiction. The Committee’s decisions on jurisdiction are final, except that such decisions are subject to reconsideration by the Committee upon the request of either party made within 30 days of the initial decision. Staff shall notify the parties of the Committee’s decision on jurisdiction by first class mail.","UrlName":"revision365"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"8123bb59-247d-435f-bea0-859a90d06ffa","Title":"Rule 6-205. Termination or Suspension of Proceedings.","Content":"The Committee may suspend or terminate arbitration proceedings or may decline or terminate jurisdiction if the client, in addition to pursuing arbitration of a fee dispute under these rules, asserts a claim against the lawyer in any court arising out of the same set of circumstances, including any claim of malpractice. Any claim or evidence of professional misconduct within the meaning of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility may be reported by the arbitrators or the Committee to the Office of the General Counsel for consideration under its normal procedures.","UrlName":"rule550","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"f8255db1-a6cd-4071-a0a1-c7e81913363b","ParentId":"8123bb59-247d-435f-bea0-859a90d06ffa","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee may suspend or terminate arbitration proceedings or may decline or terminate jurisdiction if the client, in addition to pursuing arbitration of a fee dispute under these rules, asserts a claim against the lawyer in any court arising out of the same set of circumstances, including any claim of malpractice. Any claim or evidence of professional misconduct within the meaning of the Code of Professional Responsibility may be reported by the arbitrators or the Committee to the Office of the General Counsel for consideration under its normal procedures.","UrlName":"revision367"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"f8dac68a-526f-47ad-8e34-e42a22f77a1a","Title":"Rule 6-206. Revocation.","Content":"After jurisdiction has been accepted by the Committee, the submission to arbitration shall be irrevocable except by consent of all parties or by action of the Committee or the arbitration panel for good cause shown.","UrlName":"rule551","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"9079abb2-ccbb-451c-b864-b8988ddc8c07","ParentId":"f8dac68a-526f-47ad-8e34-e42a22f77a1a","Title":"Version 2","Content":"After jurisdiction has been accepted by the Committee and the other party has agreed in writing to be bound by the award, the submission to arbitration shall be irrevocable except by consent of all parties or by action of the Committee or the arbitration panel for good cause shown.","UrlName":"revision369"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a36635da-b8cb-4b17-b5cd-e12e05e7593a","Title":"Rule 6-103. Terms.","Content":"Initially, two members of the Committee, including one of the public members, shall be appointed for a period of three years; two members, including the remaining public members, for a period of two years; and one member for a period of one year. As each member's term of office on the Committee expires, his or her successor shall be appointed for a period of three years. The President of the State Bar shall appoint the chair of the Committee each year from among the members. Vacancies in unexpired terms shall be filled by their respective appointing authorities.","UrlName":"rule172","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"976f93a8-d22a-4926-be94-dd55f7f3e26c","Title":"Advisory Opinion 17","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 17 \nJanuary 18, 1974 \n Duty of an Attorney Representing a Fugitive Upon Warrants for Probation Violation\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, this State Disciplinary Board, upon request made therefor, renders this its opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia as applied to a given state of facts.\nAn advisory opinion has been requested as to the ethical duty of an attorney who, during a professional consultation, learns that his client is a fugitive upon warrants for violation of his probation. The request was made in two parts,as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"When a person who is a fugitive upon warrants for probation violation approaches an attorney and requests that the attorney represent him in any hearings concerning his violation of probation and when the fugitive thus discloses his violations and whereabouts, must the attorney disclose the whereabouts of his client to the proper authorities? If the attorney advises the fugitive to surrender to the authorities and the fugitive refuses to do so, what is the proper course of action of the attorney?\" \n</div>\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are Rule 3-102 (Canon 2); EC 2-32, and DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) are included in that Rule; Rule 3-104(Canon 4); EC 4-1, EC 4-4, DR 4-101(A), DR 4-101(B)(1) and DR 4-101(C)(2) and (3) are all included in that Rule; and Rule 3-107 (Canon 7); EC 7-1, EC 7-5 and DR 7-102(A)(3), (7)and (8) are included under that Rule.\nCanon II provides \"A lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession. Ethical considerations under Canon II which are relevant to the question propounded are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 2-32 A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of compelling circumstances... A lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to minimize the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client and the possibility of prejudice to his client as the result of his withdrawal. Even though he justifiably withdraws a lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by giving due notice of his withdrawal, suggesting employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, cooperating with counsel subsequently employed, and otherwise endeavoring to minimize the possibility of harm... \n</div>\nDR 2-110(C) states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(C) Permissive withdrawal. If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a Tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawals is because: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(1) His client \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (a) ... \n(b) personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct \n</div>\nCanon IV provides \"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.\"Relevant ethical considerations under this Canon are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 4-1 Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. \nEC 4-4 The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to whom the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an obligation to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely assert the privilege unless it is waived by the client. \n</div>\nDR 4-101 states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nDR 4-101 Preservation of Confidence and Secrets of a client \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(A) \"Confidence \"refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law and \"Secret \"refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. \n(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C) a lawyer shall not knowingly \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client \n(2) ... \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(C) A lawyer may reveal: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (1) ... \n(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order; \n(3) the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime; \n</div>\nCanon VII provides \"A lawyer should represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.\"\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 7-1 The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations. The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law, to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means, and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue or defense. \nEC 7-5 A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision. He may continue in the representation of his client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or take a frivolous legal position. A lawyer should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor. \n</div>\nDR 7-102(A) states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) ... \n(2) ... \n(3) conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal;... \n(7) counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent \n(8) knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule. \n</div>\nIn this problem the attorney's duty of loyalty to his client and his duty to the legal system, of which he is an important part, come into direct conflict. The State Disciplinary Board has been asked to resolve this conflict and the applicable rules and advisory opinions of Georgia and of the American Bar Association reflect his conflict as they, too, are in conflict.\nAlthough A.B.A. Formal Opinions 155 and 156 advise of the duty of the attorney to reveal the whereabouts of his fugitive client, the State Disciplinary Board believes that there is no legal or ethical consistency in the rationale of those opinions which would require an attorney whose client is a fugitive from a misdemeanor conviction to notify the authorities while allowing the attorney of a murderer to keep the confession of the murderer secret and confidential.\nThe language of Canon IV is strong and clear, and the importance of the confidentiality between attorney and client in their communications is paramount in our system of justice. EC 4-1, EC 4-4. The exceptions as to revelation of secrets and confidences mentioned in DR 4-101(C), above, would not seem to apply in this situation since the information about the fugitive's whereabouts is privileged in Georgia and the attorney's failure to report the fugitive would not, by itself, be a crime. Of course, the attorney has a duty to report any non-privileged information he knows to the proper authorities, and DR 7-102(A)(7), and (8) indicate clearly that he cannot counsel the client to break the law nor may he take any overt action to aid the fugitive in his flight.\nIn light of the historical importance of the concepts embodied in Canon IV to individuals in our society, the State Disciplinary Board has determined that the attorney of a fugitive has no ethical duty to inform the authorities of the whereabouts of the fugitive. However, once that difficult determination is made, it must be quickly pointed that in the stated situation there is a countervailing duty to our system of law which dictates that the attorney cannot counsel the fugitive to remain in violation of the law. The attorney should, therefore, advise the client to surrender to the authorities at an early date so that the charges against the fugitive may be heard in a fair hearing. By taking such a course of action the attorney observes the spirit of the confidentiality rule while demonstrating the confidence in, and loyalty to, our system of law.\nThe second part of the inquiry asks what should be done if the client refuses the attorney's advice to surrender to the authorities. The ethical considerations and rules under Canon II, stated above, clearly show that in a situation in which a fugitive client refuses to surrender himself, and thus insists on an illegal course of conduct, the attorney should immediately withdraw from the case, taking the precautions he deems necessary to protect his client's interests.","UrlName":"rule465","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f7a69edf-8162-48d1-9068-7d8c6c7ed6c5","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion Rules Index","Content":"CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule223\"> Rule 1.0 - Terminology</a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1 - Competence</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule50\">Rule 1.2 - Scope of Representation</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3 - Diligence</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule54\">Rule 1.4 - Communication</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5 - Fees</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule479\">SDB No. 36</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule480\">SDB No. 37</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule482\">SDB No. 39</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule487\">SDB No. 45</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule489\">SDB No. 47</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule521\">FAO No. 91-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1  </a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule57\">Rule 1.6 - Confidentiality of Information</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule474\">SDB No. 27</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule485\">SDB No. 41</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule486\">SDB No. 42</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule535\">FAO No. 07-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule588\"> </a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a>   <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7 - Conflict of Interest: General Rule</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No.16</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule475\">SDB No. 29</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule520\">FAO No. 91-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule450\">FAO No. 05-11</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule590\">FAO No. 16-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8 - Conflict of Interest:  Prohibited Transactions</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule506\">FAO No. 86-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule453\">FAO No. 05-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule457\">FAO No. 05-5</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule459\">FAO No. 05-7</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule460\">FAO No. 05-8</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">Rule 1.9 - Conflict of Interest:  Former Client</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10 - Imputed Disqualification</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule452\">FAO No. 05-13</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule90\">Rule 1.11 - Successive Government and Private Employment</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule93\">Rule 1.12 - Former Judge or Arbitrator</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule481\">SDB No. 38</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule97\">Rule 1.13 - Organization as Client</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule107\">Rule 1.14 - Client under a Disability</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule42\">Rule 1.15(I) - Safekeeping Property: General Rule</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule512\">FAO No. 98-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule45\">Rule 1.15(II) - Safekeeping Property: Trust Account and IOLTA</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule47\">Rule 1.15(III) - Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records </a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16 - Declining or Terminating Representation</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule465\">SDB No. 17</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule508\">FAO No. 87-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule493\">FAO No. 93-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule499\">FAO No. 96-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule532\">FAO No. 03-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2 </a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule49\">Rule 1.17 - Sale of Law Practice</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a> Lawyer As A Counselor<a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule62\">Rule 2.1 - Advisor</a>        <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2 - Intermediary</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule504\">FAO No. 86-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule557\">FAO No. 10-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule66\">Rule 2.3 - Evaluation for Use by Third Persons</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule68\">Rule 2.4 – Lawyer Serving as a Third-Party Neutral</a> Advocate <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1 - Meritorious Claims and Contentions</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule71\">Rule 3.2 - Expediting Litigation</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule72\">Rule 3.3 - Candor toward the Tribunal</a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule77\"> Rule 3.4 - Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel </a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule473\">SDB No. 26</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule478\">SDB No. 35</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule488\">SDB No. 46</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule490\">SDB No. 48</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule78\">Rule 3.5 - Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule518\">FAO No. 89-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule455\">FAO No. 05-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule451\">FAO No. 05-12</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule80\"> Rule 3.6 - Trial Publicity </a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule82\">Rule 3.7 - Lawyer as Witness</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule600\">FAO No. 16-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule83\">Rule 3.8 - Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule85\">Rule 3.9 - Advocate in Non-adjudicative Proceedings</a> Transactions With Persons Other Than Clients <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule289\">Rule 4.1 - Truthfulness in Statements to Others</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\">Rule 4.2 - Communication with Person Represented by Counsel</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule463\">FAO No. 86-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule514\">FAO No. 98-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10 </a>    <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule298\">Rule 4.3 - Dealing with Unrepresented Person</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule515\">FAO No. 88-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10 </a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule300\">Rule 4.4 - Respect for Rights of Third Persons</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule610\">FAO No. 20-1</a>Law Firms And Associations <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule302\"> Rule 5.1 - Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyer </a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule111\">Rule 5.2 - Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3 - Responsibilities Regarding Non-Lawyer Assistants</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4 - Professional Independence of a Lawyer</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule476\">SDB No. 30</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule513\">FAO No. 88-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule497\">FAO No. 95-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule456\">FAO No. 05-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule461\">FAO No. 05-9</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule536\">FAO No. 11-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5 - Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule490\">SDB No. 48</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule491\">SDB No. 49</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule505\">FAO No. 86-5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule519\">FAO No. 99-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule447\">FAO No. 00-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule448\">FAO No. 04-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule135\">Rule 5.6 - Restrictions on Right to Practice</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule139\">Rule 5.7 - Restrictions Regarding Law-related Services</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule477\">SDB No. 31</a> Public Service <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule140\">Rule 6.1 - Voluntary Pro Bono Public Service</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule141\">Rule 6.2 - Accepting Appointments</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule142\"> Rule 6.3 - Membership in Legal Service Organization </a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule144\">Rule 6.4 - Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests</a><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule559\">Rule 6.5 - Nonprofit &Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs</a> Information About Legal Services <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1 - Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Service</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule467\">FAO No. 01-1</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule147\">Rule 7.2 - Advertising</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule149\">Rule 7.3 - Direct Contact with Prospective Clients</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule494\">FAO No. 94-1</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>       <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule151\">Rule 7.4 - Communication of Fields of Practice</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule471\">SDB No. 22</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5 - Firm Names and Letterheads</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule492\">SDB No. 5</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule468\">SDB No. 19</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule469\">SDB No. 21</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule472\">SDB No. 23</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule510\">FAO No. 97-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule516\">FAO No. 98-4</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule458\">FAO No. 05-6</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule591\">FAO No. 16-3</a> Maintaining The Integrity Of The Profession <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule154\">Rule 8.1 - Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule155\">Rule 8.2 - Judicial and Legal Officials</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule157\">Rule 8.3 - Reporting Professional Misconduct</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4 - Misconduct</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule484\">SDB No. 40</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule507\">FAO No. 87-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule511\">FAO No. 97-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule466\">FAO No. 00-2</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule534\">FAO No. 03-3</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule449\">FAO No. 05-10</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule572\">FAO No. 13-1</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule569\">FAO No. 13-2</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule163\">Rule 8.5 - Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law</a>     <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule648\">FAO No. 22-1</a> Miscellaneous <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule166\">Rule 9.1 - Reporting Requirements</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule182\">Rule 9.2 – Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule196\">Rule 9.3 - Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule203\">Rule 9.4 – Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline</a> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule207\">Rule 9.5 - Lawyer as a Public Official</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule454\">SDB No. 16</a>      <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule524\">FAO No. 93-3</a>  ","UrlName":"part9","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fa6bc53e-105d-41e9-ad2c-eb8cb682cc1d","Title":"Internal Rules - State Disciplinary Board","Content":"RULES OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE OF THE STATE DISCIPLINARY BOARD\nPursuant to Rule 4-203 (6) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia establishes the following rules of conduct and procedure (“Internal Rules”):\n Rule 1. Powers and Duties.\nThe State Disciplinary Board shall have the powers and perform the duties set forth in Part IV of the Bar Rules.\n Rule 2. Meetings.\nThe Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall establish a meeting schedule for the Board in consultation with the Office of the General Counsel and the members of the Board. The Board may also meet at other times at the request of a majority of its members. Ten members present and voting constitute a quorum. Ex officio members are counted in determining whether a quorum is present at a meeting. The Board may issue reprimands in the absence of a quorum but may not otherwise decide any disciplinary matter unless a quorum is present.\nBoard meetings are generally conducted informally but in accordance with the requirements of Part IV of the Bar Rules. Robert’s Rules of Order govern any procedural matters that are not addressed in the Bar Rules.\n Rule 3. Election of Officers; Powers and Duties.\nPursuant to Bar Rule 4-201 (b) (5), the State Disciplinary Board shall elect a chair and a vice-chair each Bar year at the first meeting after the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia.\nThe chair shall exercise such powers and assume such duties as provided herein and at Bar Rule 4-203. In case of the absence, disqualification or incapacity of the chair, the vice-chair shall assume the duties and powers of the chair. If both the chair and vice-chair are disqualified from consideration of a matter while a meeting is in session, the remaining members of the Board shall vote upon a member to preside over consideration of the matter at issue. In case of disqualification of both the chair and vice-chair when the Panel is not in session, the president-elect of the State Bar of Georgia shall designate another member of the Board to preside over consideration of the matter at issue.\n Rule 4. Initiation of Grievances; Duties and Powers of the Office of the General Counsel.\n \t (a)\t All grievances against members of the State Bar of Georgia shall be in written memorandum form. Grievances other than those initiated by the State Disciplinary Board shall be signed by the complainant. The State Disciplinary Board shall annually approve the Memorandum of Grievance form.\n \t (b)\t The Office of the General Counsel shall review and screen each Memorandum of Grievance pursuant to Bar Rule 4-202 and shall report to the Board at each meeting the number of grievances it has dismissed since the previous meeting. The Office of the General Counsel shall maintain the file of each dismissed grievance until it is expunged pursuant to Bar Rule 4-224 (a) (1) or (2).\n Rule 5. Evaluation of Grievances; Selection of Investigating Member.\nPursuant to Rule 4-204 (a) the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall assign cases for investigation by individual lawyer members of the Board. Such assignment shall be in the sound discretion of the Clerk, except that no assignment shall be made to the president-elect of the State Bar of Georgia, the president-elect of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, or the chair of the Board without that member’s prior approval.\n Rule 6. Investigation by the State Disciplinary Board.\n \t (a)\t The investigation of a grievance assigned to a member of the State Disciplinary Board shall be within that member’s exclusive jurisdiction. No other member of the Board shall enter the investigation of the case or engage either the complainant or respondent in communication concerning the investigation without the express prior authorization of the investigating member.\n \t (b)\t The investigating member is encouraged to attempt communication with both the respondent and the complainant as part of the investigation.\n \t (c)\t The investigating member should complete investigation of a matter within 180 days of service of the Notice of Investigation in the case. A member is expected to request an extension and provide an explanation to the rest of the Board when an investigation will take more than 180 days.\n \t (d)\t The investigating Board member is encouraged to report to the full Board when a respondent’s answer is more than 30 days past due so that the matter may be considered for imposition of an interim suspension pursuant to Rule 4-204.3.\n \t (e)\t The Office of the General Counsel will assign each Board member an investigator to assist with the investigation. Board members may also request assistance from other staff of the Office of the General Counsel when investigating files.\n Rule 7. Report of the Investigating Member.\nAt each meeting of the State Disciplinary Board members shall report those cases in which the investigation is complete. The investigating member shall describe his or her findings and make a recommendation regarding disposition of the case. Board members who are not able to attend a meeting may provide a written report and recommendation to be presented to the Board in their absence.\nThe Office of the General Counsel shall provide a copy of the entire investigative file or any portion thereof to any Board member upon request.\n Rule 8. Investigation of Petitions for Voluntary Discipline.\n \t (a)\t If a respondent files a petition seeking confidential discipline in a matter pending at the screening stage, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board shall assign the matter to a member of the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 4-227. The Office of the General Counsel may file a response to the petition with the investigating member.\n \t (b)\t If a respondent files a petition seeking confidential discipline in a matter pending before the State Disciplinary Board, the petition shall be served on both the investigating Board member and the Office of the General Counsel. The member may continue the investigation and the Office of the General Counsel may file a response to the petition with the investigating member.\n \t (c)\t The investigating member shall report to the State Disciplinary Board on the petition for voluntary discipline and the Office of the General Counsel’s response, and make a recommendation regarding acceptance or rejection of the petition for voluntary discipline.\n Rule 9. Original Documents.\nOriginal documents and other information obtained during the investigation shall be delivered to the Office of the General Counsel following the completion of the member’s investigation.\n Rule 10. Expedited Treatment for Certain Cases.\nAfter the State Disciplinary Board has found probable cause for filing a formal complaint, any member may move that the case be given expedited treatment under the circumstances outlined at Rule 4-108 regarding emergency suspensions.\n Rule 11. Challenges to the Competency, Qualifications or Objectivity of State Disciplinary Board Members.\n \t (a)\t A respondent lawyer shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Board. Within 10 days after service of the Notice of Investigation pursuant to Rule 4-204.1, the respondent lawyer shall deliver to the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards written objection to the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member of the State Disciplinary Board. The objection shall set forth the factual basis for the challenge. The challenged member may answer the respondent lawyer’s objection in writing and shall deliver the answer to the respondent lawyer and the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards. At a regularly scheduled meeting prior to consideration of the case the Board shall consider the objection. The affirmative vote of three members shall be sufficient to sustain the objection.\n \t (b)\t Any member of the Board may decline to participate when the Board considers a grievance.\n Rule 12. Notification to Complainants.\nThe State Disciplinary Board shall notify the complainant or complainants of the disposition of all grievances considered by the Board.\n Rule 13. Violation of Criminal Statute.\nIf the charge against a respondent lawyer amounts to a possible violation of a criminal statute, the State Disciplinary Board may direct the Office of the General Counsel to refer the matter to the appropriate authority for criminal prosecution and the Board may defer any further action to await the disposition of any criminal charges.\n Rule 14. Appearances Before the State Disciplinary Board.\nThe State Disciplinary Board does not permit personal appearances before the Board at meetings, except as otherwise specifically provided in these Rules. Any presentations to the Board should be by brief, memorandum or in other written form unless otherwise decided by a majority vote of the Board members present at a meeting at which a personal appearance is requested.\n Rule 15. Chair’s Review of Screening Decisions.\nWhen requested to do so by the complainant, the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board shall have discretionary authority to review a decision of the Office of the General Counsel to dismiss a grievance. If the Chair agrees with the decision to dismiss the grievance, the complainant shall be notified of that decision in writing. If the Chair disagrees with the decision to dismiss the grievance, the grievance shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for further investigation pursuant to Rules 4-204 ff.\n Rule 16. Reconsideration.\nThe Office of the General Counsel, the complainant or the respondent may request reconsideration of the Board’s decision in a matter at any time before a Formal Complaint is filed in the Supreme Court. The investigating member may review the request and decide if the matter should be presented to the entire Board. If the investigating member is no longer on the Board, the Chair may review the request.\n Rule 17. Removal of Board Members.\n \t (a)\t Any State Disciplinary Board member who is absent from either three consecutive meetings or any four meetings in a bar year shall be considered for removal from the Board. The Board shall take the matter up in Executive Session and shall remove the member unless the Board determines, by majority vote, that bona fide, unavoidable reasons exist for some or all of the absences, and that such Board member is not in violation of the case time limits set forth in sub-paragraph (b).\n \t (b)\t Any Board member who fails to meet the deadlines for reporting a case or obtaining an extension as outlined at Rule 6 (c) may be considered for removal from the Board. At the next meeting following said occurrence, the Board may consider the matter in Executive Session to determine whether bona fide, unavoidable reasons exist for the delay and whether the member has met the attendance requirements set forth in subparagraph (a). Cases in which the Supreme Court of Georgia has entered an order imposing an Interim Suspension are excluded from this rule.\n \t (c)\t The Board member being considered for removal shall not vote on the issue of removal and shall not be present during the Board’s deliberation and vote. The Board member under consideration may address the Board in writing, or personally, prior to the Board’s deliberation and vote.\n \t (d)\t The failure of a Board member to comply with any of the provisions of this Rule shall not affect the resolution of any case by the Board and shall not operate as a defense to the Board’s ruling.\n \t (e)\t The vacancy created by any Board member who is removed from the State Disciplinary Board under the provisions of this Rule shall be filled as outlined at Rule 4-201 (b) (3).\n Rule 18. Pending Litigation.\nIn those grievances where there is related litigation pending, the Board may, in its discretion, defer action on the matter until the litigation is completed.\n Rule 19. Disqualification.\nNo member of the State Disciplinary Board shall represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding. If a Board member’s partners or associates represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding, then the Board member is automatically recused from any participation in the investigation, discussion or determination of the disciplinary proceeding.\n Rule 20. Reimbursement of Expenses\nMembers of the State Disciplinary Board may be reimbursed for expenses as follows:\n \t (a)\t Transportation. Members may be reimbursed at the maximum tax free rate permitted by the IRS for automobile travel (currently $0.545) to and from meetings of the Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will calculate the appropriate amount for each meeting using the Board member’s home or work address (as designated by the Board member) and the address of the meeting location, and will submit a request for reimbursement at the member’s request. Although members are encouraged to carpool, only the member providing the vehicle will be approved for reimbursement.\nOther forms of transportation (including flights and rental car expenses) will not be reimbursed, but a member who elects to rent a car or fly to a meeting may receive the mileage reimbursement that would have been due had the member driven a personal vehicle. \nTolls and any cost for parking at a meeting site may be reimbursed at the actual rate. Valet parking expenses will only be reimbursed when self-parking is not available.\nTransportation rates may be adjusted or capped for meetings that take place outside of Georgia. At least 20 days before any out-of-state meeting the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will notify members of the mileage reimbursement for the meeting.\n \t (b)\t Meals. If meals are not provided during the meeting at the Bar’s expense, the State Bar of Georgia will provide a per diem at the same rate as the federal per diem rate for the location where the meeting is held. See https://www.gsa.gov/travel/plan-book/per-diem-rates/meals-and-incidental-expenses-mie-breakdown for a current list of reimbursement amounts for meals and incidentals. The Clerk will advise members of the applicable per diem before each meeting. Section (d) below contains special rules for the meal expenses of lay members of the Board who attend the Bar’s Annual Meeting.\n \t (c)\t Lodging. The Bar shall reimburse the actual cost of hotel sleeping rooms at the group rate obtained by the Bar. The maximum reimbursement to a Board member who elects to stay at a facility other than the designated hotel is the Bar rate. Reimbursement is limited to one night before the meeting, except for meetings that occur in conjunction with a State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors meeting, which shall qualify for two nights’ reimbursement. Members will not be reimbursed if they obtain lodging at no cost to themselves; i.e., for stays with friends or at the expense of others.\n \t (d)\t Annual Meeting – Special Rules for Lay Members. Lay members may receive a total of four nights of per diem and lodging reimbursement for the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. Lay members may receive two tickets for the group dinner events held as part of the meeting, including the Opening Reception, YLD Dinner, and the Presidential Gala. The usual per diem described in Section 2 will otherwise apply to lay member meals during the Annual Meeting. \n \t (e)\t Other expenses. Members may request reimbursement for copying, postage or other expenses related to their investigation with prior notice to the Clerk. Receipts are required for expenditures over $25.\n \t (f)\t Procedure for reimbursement. After each meeting, the Clerk of the Boards will send an email to every Board member asking whether the member will request reimbursement for the meeting. In order to receive reimbursement, a member must respond to the Clerk’s email and make a request within 30 days of the date of the meeting. The Clerk will provide forms for requesting reimbursement via email.\n \t (g)\t Waivers. The General Counsel may waive the requirements of this Rule for good cause.\n<div></div>","UrlName":"part5","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Rule 4-403. Formal Advisory Opinions","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct.</li> \n <li>When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate.</li> \n <li>If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court.</li> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule248","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"174b3a3d-b53f-4ed3-ade3-857d1d6801c6","ParentId":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(b) When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct. \n \n(c) When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(d) After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notificaiton by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate. \n \n(e) If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court. \n \n(f) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions. \n \n(g) The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.","UrlName":"revision110"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bafec039-e06f-478e-9b11-41d0c6c75154","Title":"Rule 4-303","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule221","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Title":"CHAPTER 3 This Chapter is Reserved","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter27","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"9352c34c-e065-400d-b993-906e86f9970a","Title":"Rule 4-301","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule218","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"30447727-9b59-4979-909e-06676d7b0368","Title":"Rule 4-302","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule219","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bafec039-e06f-478e-9b11-41d0c6c75154","Title":"Rule 4-303","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule221","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e12e2da1-f716-48af-aa0b-7b06c5ad2041","Title":"Rule 4-304","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule225","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"795a5e24-8385-4369-885c-ceeb0b68ae0c","Title":"Rule 4-305","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule228","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"96205185-2293-4cab-b827-3b0d1b523ee4","Title":"Rule 4-306","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule234","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Rule 4-202. Receipt of Grievances; Initial Review by Bar Counsel","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of a Memorandum of Grievance, an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program, or credible information from any source. If the investigation is based upon receipt of credible information, the Office of the General Counsel must first notify the respondent lawyer and provide a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may also deliver the information from any source to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any matter under investigation. The screening process may include forwarding information received to the respondent so that the respondent may respond.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring the respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided in Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a matter, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those matters that do not present sufficient merit to proceed.</li> \n <li>Those matters that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule106","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[{"Id":"4d838131-f92a-4eb5-9a08-5517ba7ed783","ParentId":"2ba5d034-03f6-4fae-9141-0cc10767f9f3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Grievances shall be filed in writing with the Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia. In lieu of a Memorandum of Grievance the Office of the General Counsel may begin an investigation upon receipt of an Intake Form from the Client Assistance Program. All grievances must include the name of the complainant and must be signed by the complainant.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may investigate conduct upon receipt of credible information from any source after notifying the respondent lawyer and providing a written description of the information that serves as the basis for the investigation. The Office of the General Counsel may deliver the information it obtains to the State Disciplinary Board for initiation of a grievance under Rule 4-203 (2).</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to collect evidence and information concerning any grievance. The screening process may include forwarding a copy of the grievance to the respondent in order that the respondent may respond to the grievance.</li> \n <li>The Office of the General Counsel may request the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board to issue a subpoena as provided by OCGA § 24-13-23 requiring a respondent or a third party to produce documents relevant to the matter under investigation. Subpoenas shall be enforced in the manner provided at Rule 4-221 (c).</li> \n <li>Upon completion of its screening of a grievance, the Office of the General Counsel shall be empowered to dismiss those grievances that do not present sufficient merit to proceed. Rejection of such grievances by the Office of the General Counsel shall not deprive the complaining party of any right of action he might otherwise have at law or in equity against the respondent.</li> \n <li>Those grievances that appear to allege a violation of Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct may be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board pursuant to Bar Rule 4-204. In lieu of forwarding a matter to the State Disciplinary Board, the Office of the General Counsel may refer a matter to the Client Assistance Program so that it may direct the complaining party to appropriate resources.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision397"}],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7daabdf1-451a-49d1-9f0f-ad03812aabe1","Title":"Contents","Content":" Rules: Client-Lawyer Relationship \n \n1.0 Terminology and Definitions \n1.1 Competence \n1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer \n1.3 Diligence \n1.4 Communication \n1.5 Fees \n1.6 Confidentiality of Information \n1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule \n1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions \n1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client \n1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule \n1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment \n1.12 Former Judge or Arbitrator \n1.13 Organization as Client \n1.14 Client under a Disability \n1.15(I) Safekeeping Property - General \n1.15(II) Safekeeping Property - Trust Account and IOLTA \n1.15(III) Record Keeping; Trust Account Overdraft Notification; Examination of Records \n1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation \n1.17 Sale of Law Practice \n1.18 Duties to Prospective Client \n \nCounselor \n \n2.1 Advisor \n2.2 (This rule is reserved.) \n2.3 Evaluation for Use by Third Persons \n \nAdvocate \n \n3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions \n3.2 Expediting Litigation \n3.3 Candor toward the Tribunal \n3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel \n3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal \n3.6 Trial Publicity \n3.7 Lawyer as Witness \n3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor \n3.9 Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings \n \nTransactions with Persons Other Than Clients \n \n4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others \n4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel \n4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person \n4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons \n \nLaw Firms and Associations \n \n5.1 Responsibilities of Partners, Managers and Supervisory Lawyers \n5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer \n5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants \n5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer \n5.5 Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-Jurisdictional Practice of Law \n5.6 Restrictions on Right to Practice \n5.7 Responsibilities Regarding Law-related Services \n \nPublic Service \n \n6.1 Voluntary Pro Bono Public Service \n6.2 Accepting Appointments \n6.3 Membership in Legal Services Organization \n6.4 Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests \n6.5 Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs\n Information About Legal Services \n \n7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services \n7.2 Advertising \n7.3 Direct Contact with Prospective Clients \n7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice \n7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads \n \nMaintaining the Integrity of the Profession \n \n8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters \n8.2 Judicial and Legal Officials \n8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct \n8.4 Misconduct \n8.5 Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law \n \nMiscellaneous \n \n9.1 Reporting Requirements \n9.2 Restrictions on Filing Disciplinary Complaints \n9.3 Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities \n9.4 Jurisdiction and Reciprocal Discipline \n9.5 Lawyer as a Public Official","UrlName":"rule70","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7b32ec7a-2ec6-46b0-b9ac-83ff215caf88","Title":"Section 3. Requirements for a Special or Called Meeting.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Ten members of the Center present at any Annual, Special, or Called meeting shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. Only members physically or virtually present at an Annual, Special, or Called meeting of the Center count towards a quorum.</div>","UrlName":"rule627","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6a04d2b4-2d0d-4e6f-9c29-197604f78621","Title":"Section 3. Other Committees.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Chairperson shall appoint members to all other committees as needed. Members of the Executive Committee, other than the Officers, and any other members of the Center may serve as Chairperson of appointed committees.</div>","UrlName":"rule622","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Title":"ARTICLE III CENTER EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter87","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"bc27f1f0-2dd6-459b-ad47-0f635ded8d77","Title":"Section 1. Composition of the Center Executive Committee. Terms of Office.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Center Executive Committee shall consist of the Officers of the Center and three other members of the Center elected by the members. Center officers shall serve for one Bar year. Other members of the Center Executive Committee shall serve two-year terms that coincide with the Bar year. The initial appointments shall be staggered so that the terms of the non-officer members do not all expire in the same year.</div>","UrlName":"rule620","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"7f42beef-8fa3-46c5-bedb-57885b70ecb6","Title":"Section 2. Authority.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Except for actions requiring a vote from the members of the Center, the Executive Committee shall have full authority to act for the Center in any way the Center membership itself would be authorized to act. Any such action taken by the Executive Committee under this provision shall be reported to the members of the Center at its next meeting, by email, or by the publication of a newsletter.</div>","UrlName":"rule621","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6a04d2b4-2d0d-4e6f-9c29-197604f78621","Title":"Section 3. Other Committees.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Chairperson shall appoint members to all other committees as needed. Members of the Executive Committee, other than the Officers, and any other members of the Center may serve as Chairperson of appointed committees.</div>","UrlName":"rule622","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["77dfdb10-a6f8-4daf-8c1e-eae6f8e8cac0","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"5d1d5240-fc31-44f8-ab4c-1022d2678d1e","Title":"Section 3. Duties of the Chairperson.","Content":"The Chairperson shall preside at all meetings of the Center and all meetings of the Center Executive Committee, appoint appropriate committees of the Center to serve during the Chairperson’s term, plan and supervise the programs of the Center at its annual meeting, and perform all other executive and administrative duties necessary or proper to the organization and functioning of the Center, including any duty as from time to time may be prescribed by the members of the Center or by the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule616","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"821e8e69-07ac-4e36-a4ef-055484baa2dd","Title":"Section 3. Termination of Affiliation","Content":"Any YLD member may at any time submit a motion in writing to the President or Secretary, moving that an entity cease to be an Affiliate Unit. Such motion shall be presented for consideration at the meeting of the YLD membership next following the submission of the motion. If such motion is approved by a majority of the YLD members present and voting at such meeting, the entity shall immediately cease to be an Affiliate Unit.","UrlName":"rule583","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["65bb1652-6357-498d-ae37-d3f235001c47","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a2b18236-51ef-4925-9474-e71936d3e956","Title":"Section 3. Executive Committee Meetings","Content":" (a) The Executive Committee shall meet upon the call of the President or upon the written request addressed to the President of a majority of the voting members of the Executive Committee. \n \n(b) Unless otherwise modified by majority vote of the Executive Committee, or if such provision is waived or suspended by a majority vote of the Executive Committee, each member of the Executive Committee shall be required to attend at least three (3) of the meetings set forth in Section 1 of this Article. \n ","UrlName":"rule417","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1443028e-922c-4f1c-9709-af6463d8f7c8","Title":"Section 3. Committee Chairpersons","Content":" All “Committee Chairpersons ” (other than those mandated by the terms of these bylaws) shall be appointed by the President for a term concurrent with that of the President and shall serve at the pleasure of the President. Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their appointment shall be eligible to serve as a Committee Chairperson. No person shall serve as the Committee Chairperson of any one (1) committee of the Young Lawyers Division for more than two (2) consecutive Bar Years, or any portion of two (2) consecutive Bar Years; provided, however, such person may serve as a Committee Chairperson of any other committee of the Young Lawyers Division. The President reserves the power to remove any Committee Chairperson or committee member. ","UrlName":"rule566","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"4b2e2d9d-29ed-4add-ac8f-29e15aaecad2","Title":"Section 3. Vacancies","Content":"Vacancies occurring in any office shall be filled as follows:\n(a) Any vacancy arising in the office of President shall be filled by the President-Elect who shall continue to hold the office of President-Elect until the expiration of the unexpired term and shall continue to serve as President for the term during which he or she would regularly have served as President. \n(b) Any vacancy arising in the office of President-Elect (except pursuant to Section 3(a) of this Article) shall remain unfilled for the unexpired term. An election for the office of President shall be held at the next election held pursuant to Article VII, Section 6 of these bylaws. \n(c) Any vacancy arising in the office of Secretary or Treasurer shall be filled for the unexpired term by such person elected at the next meeting of the YLD membership by majority vote of those present and qualified to vote and voting.\n(d) Any vacancy arising in the office of Editor(s) shall be filled for the unexpired term by appointment by the President.\n(e) Any vacancy arising in the office of Committee Chairperson (other than those fixed by the terms of these bylaws) shall be filled for the unexpired term by appointment by the President, or the President may delegate the appointment to the members of said committee.\n(f) Any vacancy arising in the office of Director shall be filled for the unexpired term by appointment by the President.\n(g) Any vacancy arising in the office of member of the Representative Council representing a specific Federal Judicial District shall be filled by appointment by the President for the unexpired term, provided that the appointee shall be a resident of the same Federal Judicial District as the member whose position he or she fills.\n(h) Any vacancy arising in the office of member of the Representative Council at large shall be filled by appointment by the President for the unexpired term.\n(i) Any vacancy arising in the office of a nonresident member of the Representative Council shall be filled by appointment by the President for the unexpired term, provided that the appointee shall not be a resident of any Federal Judicial District in the State of Georgia.\n","UrlName":"rule415","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c2746353-885f-4c14-a8c3-66b5b6cfaed5","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"76bd060b-00a9-4a81-bc7b-939a94b77aef","Title":"Section 3. Notification of Elections","Content":"The Secretary shall cause to be performed the following in connection with elections:\n(a) Officers. The Secretary shall cause to be published a notice distributed to all YLD members not less than seventy-five (75) days prior to the date upon which the State Bar of Georgia’s election is schedule to commence or as provided by these bylaws or any standing policy created hereunder (as such, “Election Commencement Date”), setting forth:\n(1) that the positions of President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary shall be filled by election;\n(2) the eligibility requirements for such positions;\n(3) the nomination and election procedure; and\n(4) the names and addresses of members of the Nominating Committee and the Election Committee.\n(b) Representative Council. The Secretary shall cause to be published a notice distributed to all YLD members not less than sixty (60) days prior to the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting, setting forth:\n(1) the positions on the Representative Council which shall be filled by election at such Annual Meeting;\n(2) the eligibility requirements for such positions;\n(3) the nomination and election procedure; and\n(4) the names and addresses of members of the Nominating Committee and the Election Committee.\n","UrlName":"rule411","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"41f0e6e6-03a5-4ff3-b972-f1d6442e3f63","Title":"Section 3. Eligibility","Content":"Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election or appointment shall be eligible to serve on the Representative Council; provided, however, the any representative serving on the Representative Council pursuant to Section 2(f) of this Article shall be eligible to serve in that capacity without being a YLD Member.","UrlName":"rule546","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48c7d7c2-a515-43a9-9bc4-53bbf914f970","Title":"Section 3. Directors","Content":"(a) Appointment. A minimum of four (4) Directors shall be appointed by the President to serve at the pleasure of the President and to be directly responsible to the President.\n (b) Duties. The Directors shall assist the President during his or her term in office and shall perform such duties and responsibilities as designated by the President. The Directors shall also oversee the activities of and advise one or more of the YLD Special Committees as designated by the President. \n ","UrlName":"rule416","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ecc2160f-5a68-4595-ad4c-7d08dc658472","Title":"Section 3. President","Content":"The President shall be responsible for carrying out the purposes of the Young Lawyers Division. The duties of the President shall include, but not be limited to, presiding at all meetings of the Executive Committee, the Representative Council, and the YLD membership, as well as duties assigned by the membership at any regular meeting or by the Representative Council. The President shall be responsible for the preparation and submission of an annual report of the activities of the Young Lawyers Division at the regular Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia. The President shall be an ex officio member of all Standing Committees.","UrlName":"rule413","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Title":"ARTICLE III OFFICERS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter69","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"4a5386ce-6a0d-48c8-905a-d3217380c7be","Title":"Section 1. Officers","Content":" The “Officers ” of the Young Lawyers Division shall consist of: (a) President, (b) President-Elect, (c) Treasurer, (d) Secretary, (e) Immediate Past-President, and (f) Newsletter Editor(s).","UrlName":"rule382","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"120c5f38-9b7f-4df4-aca4-fdba3d21b88e","Title":"Section 2. Eligibility","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election shall be eligible to serve as an Officer of the Young Lawyers Division.</li> \n <li>The President-Elect position may be filled by any YLD Member who is also an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia without regard to the location of his or her residence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule397","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[{"Id":"03f84c3b-8fa1-4dbe-a938-a14fc386f9db","ParentId":"120c5f38-9b7f-4df4-aca4-fdba3d21b88e","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election shall be eligible to serve as an Officer of the Young Lawyers Division.</li> \n <li>The President-Elect position may be filled by any YLD Member who is also an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia without regard to the location of his or her residence.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision43"}],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ecc2160f-5a68-4595-ad4c-7d08dc658472","Title":"Section 3. President","Content":"The President shall be responsible for carrying out the purposes of the Young Lawyers Division. The duties of the President shall include, but not be limited to, presiding at all meetings of the Executive Committee, the Representative Council, and the YLD membership, as well as duties assigned by the membership at any regular meeting or by the Representative Council. The President shall be responsible for the preparation and submission of an annual report of the activities of the Young Lawyers Division at the regular Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia. The President shall be an ex officio member of all Standing Committees.","UrlName":"rule413","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"81316aa7-22f7-4e63-8e3f-8533699755b4","Title":"Section 4. President-Elect","Content":"The President-Elect shall perform such duties as may be assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or by the Executive Committee or Representative Council. During any period in which the President is unable to act, the President-Elect shall perform the duties of President.\nThe President-Elect shall also plan for the year in which he or she shall act as President, and make needed arrangements for the prompt inauguration of the program for that year upon assuming office and to prevent interruption in the continuing program then being carried on by the Young Lawyers Division.","UrlName":"rule421","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"23293288-d260-40aa-9df7-4e5d2507c2fc","Title":"Section 5. Treasurer","Content":"The Treasurer shall have general supervision of the finances of the Young Lawyers Division. The Treasurer shall cause to be kept full and accurate records and accounts showing the transactions of the Young Lawyers Division. The Treasurer shall provide a financial report to the YLD membership annually and more frequently if required by the President. The Treasurer shall perform all other duties as may be assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or by the Executive Committee or Representative Council.","UrlName":"rule431","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d2865f6c-90b1-4662-9b19-59a0f5bcfe1e","Title":"Section 6. Secretary","Content":"The Secretary shall keep full minutes of all meetings, including meetings of the the Executive Committee, the Representative Council, and the YLD membership; shall publish such minutes at the proper subsequent meetings; shall give notice of meetings; and shall perform all other duties as may be incidental to the office of Secretary or as assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or by the Executive Committee or Representative Council.\n","UrlName":"rule437","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"afadbf9c-9a06-415f-9b3e-0f232775bfc9","Title":"Section 7. Editor of the Young Lawyers Division Newsletter","Content":" The Editor or Co-Editors of the Young Lawyers Division Newsletter (the “Editor(s) ”) shall cause to be published a quarterly newsletter of the activities and programs of the Young Lawyers Division and shall perform all other duties as may be incidental to said office or assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or the Executive Committee or Representative Council.","UrlName":"rule440","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"37714839-51d5-4b1f-9106-dc023e622fdf","Title":"Section 8. Immediate Past President","Content":"The Immediate Past-President shall be a member of all Standing Committees and shall have such other responsibilities as are assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or the Executive Committee or Representative Council.","UrlName":"rule560","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"e05eabff-65b6-4e23-a757-80b09b2fc786","Title":"Section 9. Election or Appointment of Officers","Content":"The President-Elect,  Treasurer and Secretary shall be elected in the manner and shall take office at the time provided for in Article VII of these Bylaws. The Editor(s) shall be appointed by the President to serve at the pleasure of the President. The offices of President and Immediate Past-President shall be filled by the person who was President-Elect and President, respectively, in the immediately preceding Bar Year.","UrlName":"rule561","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"15ea5159-640c-4e3c-9824-c4f58c5e98b3","Title":"Section 10. Terms of Office","Content":"The terms of office of President, President-Elect,  Treasurer, Secretary, and Immediate Past-President shall be for the period beginning immediately upon the adjournment of the Annual Meeting and ending at the adjournment of the next succeeding Annual Meeting or until such officer’s successor is elected or appointed and qualified. The term of office of the Editor(s) shall be concurrent with the term of office of the President who appointed such Editor(s).","UrlName":"rule562","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c6675b8f-15c6-4d43-be20-d9be0c719677","Title":"Section 3. Associate Membership","Content":" The Young Lawyers Division may recognize, as an “Affiliate Member ,” any person who is licensed to practice law, who has not yet reached either of the thresholds for termination of membership in the YLD as set forth in Section 4(a) of this Article, and who is not authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia, but who is (a) employed in Georgia by the government or a governmental agency, the armed services, or a private or commercial institution, or (b) a third-year law student or LLM student attending a law school in the State of Georgia that is approved by the American Bar Association or the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners. Any individual desiring to become an Affiliate Member shall be considered for membership after submitting a letter of interest in the manner provided for and consistent with Article I, Section 6 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. Such letter of interest shall be considered by and approved by the Young Lawyers Division in the manner provided for and consistent with the consideration and approval of Affiliate Membership to the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule412","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b5200cd2-cd07-4d78-bf49-71e7b08f5f6f","Title":"Section 3. Fiscal Year.","Content":"The fiscal year of the State Bar shall begin on July 1 of each year and end on June 30 of the succeeding year.","UrlName":"rule315","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["dab26f96-033c-4f96-9ebd-bde3b6602761","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"746f6c6e-ea82-4e0e-9208-0a88718df777","Title":"Section 3. Vacancies in Committees.","Content":"A vacancy in any committee, except for the Executive Committee unless otherwise provided for by the Rules or the Bylaws, shall be filled by Presidential appointment, and the appointee shall hold office for the unexpired term or until his or her successor is chosen. ","UrlName":"rule370","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["61a45be3-c99f-4ce7-a14c-46db712597c2","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d6c4e749-7137-438d-8a4c-5c0bb029b822","Title":"Section 3. Alternate Appointments.","Content":"If for any reason, an appointed or elected delegate is unable to attend any meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association during the delegate's term of office, the President may appoint a member in good standing of the State Bar and the American Bar Association as an alternate delegate to attend such a single meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association. The alternate delegate shall have the same rights and privileges for the single meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association as the appointed or elected delegate for whom he or she has been substituted.","UrlName":"rule313","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de4a0887-aa83-4a76-a97d-0ea1598e913f","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b6082bc5-48aa-4916-abdc-1e87d7875ee8","Title":"Section 3. Other Sections - Purposes.","Content":"Other sections may be created for members of the State Bar of Georgia interested in a specialized area of law or practice. Each section must be created per this Article and shall have powers and duties consistent with the Rules and Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia, subject to the approval of the Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule366","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","Revisions":[{"Id":"63badc1d-4c96-468a-9f48-794ee8a97d82","ParentId":"b6082bc5-48aa-4916-abdc-1e87d7875ee8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Other sections may be created for members of the bar interested in a specialized area of law or practice. Each section shall have powers and duties consistent with the Rules and Bylaws of the State Bar, subject to the approval of the Board of Governors.","UrlName":"revision314"}],"Ancestors":["e5c93d2b-e3b1-41fa-baac-e2c36b85d8da","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"123bc32e-a970-4645-9979-534d335f4330","Title":"Section 3. Program Committees and Boards ","Content":"Committees and Boards created by Part IV and Parts VI through XIV of these rules to oversee Programs of the State Bar shall have such terms and members as set out in said rules. Members of such committees and boards shall be appointed according to the rules establishing such committees and boards.","UrlName":"rule367","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["859b2c04-d996-4e02-8803-b9c9042e28e9","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ee91fe95-4b3d-4f1c-ab0c-9e399b00a332","Title":"Section 3. Circuits Having More Than One Member of Board of Governors.","Content":"In circuits having more than one member of the Board of Governors, the positions shall be designated consecutively as \"Post No. 1,\"\"Post No. 2,\"etc. The numbering shall be solely for nominations and elections. Nominating petitions shall designate the number of the post for which the candidate is nominated. No person shall be nominated for more than one post. A separate nominating petition shall be filed for each post. Members of the State Bar from a circuit electing more than one member of the Board of Governors in any year shall be entitled to cast one vote for a candidate for each post. ","UrlName":"rule363","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["50b673be-eb51-414f-b152-13cdebe4c15c","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"6b691bbc-17e8-4e7a-8d32-20a6242656b3","Title":"Section 3. Duties.","Content":"The Executive Director shall perform the duties prescribed by the Board of Governors and those delegated by the President, Secretary, and Treasurer.","UrlName":"rule314","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9019a98f-fee2-4a13-b65e-e44bfba1e147","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0feb626d-4e02-44a5-ac10-d4918584a202","Title":"Section 3. The President-Elect.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The President-Elect shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>perform duties delegated to him or her by the President, prescribed by the Board of Governors and as otherwise provided in the Bar Rules and Bylaws;</li> \n <li>upon the absence, death, disability, or resignation of the President, the President-Elect shall preside at all meetings of the State Bar of Georgia and the Board, and shall perform all other duties of the President;</li> \n <li>plan the program for the year in which he or she shall act as President, including activities associated with the inaugural event during the Annual Meeting;</li> \n <li>in planning his or her year, ensure continuity in the program of the State Bar of Georgia for the benefit of the legal profession and the public, and make needed arrangements for the prompt implementation of the program upon taking office as President; and</li> \n <li>serve as an ex-officio member of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule369","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","Revisions":[{"Id":"41f890a6-8768-44f4-a5c2-85b325ff7b9d","ParentId":"0feb626d-4e02-44a5-ac10-d4918584a202","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The President-Elect shall: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>perform duties delegated to him or her by the President, prescribed by the Board of Governors and as otherwise provided in the Bar Rules and Bylaws;</li> \n <li>upon the absence, death, disability, or resignation of the President, the President-Elect shall preside at all meetings of the State Bar of Georgia and the Board, and shall perform all other duties of the President;</li> \n <li>plan the program for the year in which he or she shall act as President, including activities associated with the inaugural event during the Annual Meeting;</li> \n <li>in planning his or her year, ensure continuity in the program of the State Bar of Georgia for the benefit of the legal profession and the public, and make needed arrangements for the prompt implementation of the program upon taking office as President; and</li> \n <li>serve as an ex-officio member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision301"}],"Ancestors":["3d4d89f0-ba3f-47ef-9cee-ba2545bebbd0","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ede95347-4710-4e40-a1b4-7b6dbc3c88e1","Title":"Section 3. Term of Office.","Content":"The term of office of the circuit members, nonresident members, and the appointed members of the Board of Governors shall be two years; the word “year” as used here shall mean the period from the adjournment of an annual meeting until the adjournment of the next annual meeting of the members. Each circuit member, nonresident member, and appointed member shall continue to serve (a) until the term for which the member was elected or appointed has expired, and (b) until a successor has been elected or appointed. Notwithstanding the above, the Board may adopt attendance requirements which condition or terminate the term of a Board member for failure to attend Board meetings.","UrlName":"rule368","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Title":"ARTICLE III BOARD OF GOVERNORS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter47","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"2dd13fb9-fd5d-4e8d-92bd-3d22cc49b7de","Title":"Section 1.","Content":"This Article is restated to conform to an amendment to Rule 1-302 as adopted by the Supreme Court on Nov. 7, 2001.","UrlName":"rule312","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"35ca45b6-8020-4bcf-b7ed-8d77b0b66c11","Title":"Section 2.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Officer Members. The Officer Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of the President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, and the Attorney General.</li> \n <li>Circuit Members. The Circuit Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of a number of members from each Judicial Circuit equal to the number of members as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governors members to be elected from the Atlanta Judicial Circuit. Each Judicial Circuit may gain an additional member for each additional 500 active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. Every judicial circuit shall be entitled to elect at least one member of the Board.</li> \n <li>Nonresident Members. There shall be two nonresident members of the Board of Governors who shall be an active members of the State Bar in good standing residing outside of Georgia. The nonresident members shall be from different states. One nonresident member seat shall be an \"odd \"seat and the other an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below.</li> \n <li>Appointed Members. The President-elect in office when this Bylaw becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. The first two positions will be considered \"odd \"seats, and the third will be considered an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint two members in years when the \"odd \"seats expire and one member in the years \"even \"seats expire. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>The number of the circuit members, plus the nonresident members, plus the appointed members of the Board of Governors shall not exceed 150, except as set out in Section 6(a) below.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule337","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"a59adb57-f942-45ff-8497-173c151b86a0","ParentId":"35ca45b6-8020-4bcf-b7ed-8d77b0b66c11","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>Officer Members. The Officer Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of the President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, and the Attorney General.</li> \n <li>Circuit Members. The Circuit Members of the Board of Governors shall consist of a number of members from each Judicial Circuit equal to the number of members as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governors members to be elected from the Atlanta Judicial Circuit. Each Judicial Circuit may gain an additional member for each additional 500 active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. Every judicial circuit shall be entitled to elect at least one member of the Board.</li> \n <li>Nonresident Members. There shall be two nonresident members of the Board of Governors who shall be an active members of the State Bar in good standing residing outside of Georgia. The nonresident members shall be from different states. One nonresident member seat shall be an \"odd \"seat and the other an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below.</li> \n <li>Appointed Members. The President-elect in office when this Bylaw becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. The first two positions will be considered \"odd \"seats, and the third will be considered an \"even \"seat as provided in Section 4 below. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint two members in years when the \"odd \"seats expire and one member in the years \"even \"seats expire. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors.</li> \n <li>The number of the circuit members, plus the nonresident members, plus the appointed members of the Board of Governors shall not exceed 150, except as set out in Section 6(a) below.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision26"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ede95347-4710-4e40-a1b4-7b6dbc3c88e1","Title":"Section 3. Term of Office.","Content":"The term of office of the circuit members, nonresident members, and the appointed members of the Board of Governors shall be two years; the word “year” as used here shall mean the period from the adjournment of an annual meeting until the adjournment of the next annual meeting of the members. Each circuit member, nonresident member, and appointed member shall continue to serve (a) until the term for which the member was elected or appointed has expired, and (b) until a successor has been elected or appointed. Notwithstanding the above, the Board may adopt attendance requirements which condition or terminate the term of a Board member for failure to attend Board meetings.","UrlName":"rule368","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ab1aaad4-1ce9-4ed2-84e3-35dc4ed3dc2e","Title":"Section 4.","Content":"The terms of the circuit members, nonresident members, and appointed members of the Board shall be staggered so that those designated \"odd \"will expire at the annual meeting in odd-numbered years and those designated \"even \"will expire in even-numbered years. ","UrlName":"rule371","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"591411de-4ca5-431e-8b20-f9906f4ca26d","Title":"Section 5.","Content":"The current circuit membership, with the \"odd \"and \"even \"posts now in existence, is as follows:\n<table style=\"\" width=\"100%\" border=\"1\" align=\"center\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td colspan=\"4\" style=\"\" width=\"100%\"> \n ODD \n </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Alapaha #1 \n Alcovy #1 \n Appalachian \n Atlanta #1 \n Atlanta #3 \n Atlanta #5 \n Atlanta #7 \n Atlanta #9 \n Atlanta #11 \n Atlanta #13 \n Atlanta #15 \n Atlanta #17 \n Atlanta #19 \n Atlanta #21 \n Atlanta #23 \n Atlanta #25 \n Atlanta #27 \n Atlanta #29 \n Atlanta #30 </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Atlanta #32 \n Atlanta #34 \n Atlanta #36 \n Atlanta #39 \n Atlantic #2 \n Augusta #1 \n Augusta #3 \n Blue Ridge #2 \n Brunswick #1 \n Chattahoochee #2 \n Chattahoochee #4 \n Cherokee #2 \n Clayton #1 \n Clayton #3 \n Cobb #2 \n Cobb #4 \n Cobb #6 \n Conasauga #2 \n Cordele \n Coweta #2 \n Dougherty #2 </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> \n Dublin \n Eastern #2 \n Eastern #4 \n Flint #1 \n Griffin #2 \n Gwinnett #1 \n Gwinnett #3 \n Lookout Mtn. #2 \n Macon #1 \n Macon #3 \n Member-at-Large #1 \n Member-at-Large #2 \n Middle #2 \n Mountain \n Northeastern #2 \n Northern #1 \n Ocmulgee #2 \n Oconee #2 \n Ogeechee #2 \n </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Pataula \n Piedmont \n Rome #1 \n South Georgia #2 \n Southern #2 \n Southwestern \n Stone Mountain #2 \n Stone Mountain #4 \n Stone Mountain #6 \n Stone Mountain #8 \n Stone Mountain #10 \n Tallapoosa #1 \n Toombs \n Towaliga \n Waycross #2 \n Western #1 \n Out of State #1 \n   </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>\n\n<table style=\"\" width=\"100%\" border=\"1\" align=\"center\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td colspan=\"4\" style=\"\" width=\"100%\"> \n EVEN \n </td> \n </tr> \n <tr> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Alapaha #2 \n Alcovy #2 \n Atlanta #2 \n Atlanta #4 \n Atlanta #6 \n Atlanta #8 \n Atlanta #10 \n Atlanta #12 \n Atlanta #14 \n Atlanta #16 \n Atlanta #18 \n Atlanta #20 \n Atlanta #22 \n Atlanta #24 \n Atlanta #26 \n Atlanta #28 \n Atlanta #31 \n Atlanta #33 </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> \n Atlanta #35 \n Atlanta #37 \n Atlanta #38 \n Atlanta #40 \n Atlantic #1 \n Augusta #2 \n Augusta #4 \n Bell Forsyth \n Blue Ridge #1 \n Brunswick #2 \n Chattahoochee #1 \n Chattahoochee #3 \n Cherokee #1 \n Clayton #2 \n Cobb #1 \n Cobb #3 \n Cobb #5 \n Cobb #7 \n Conasauga #1 \n Coweta #1 \n Dougherty #1 \n Douglas \n Eastern #1 \n </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Eastern #3 \n Enotah \n Flint #2 \n Griffin #1 \n Gwinnett #2 \n Gwinnett #4 \n Houston \n Lookout Mtn. #1 \n Lookout Mtn. #3 \n Macon #2 \n Member-at-Large #3 \n Middle #1 \n Northeastern #1 \n Northern #2 \n Ocmulgee #1 \n Ocmulgee #3 \n Oconee #1 \n Ogeechee #1 \n Paulding </td> \n <td style=\"\" width=\"25%\" valign=\"top\" align=\"left\"> Rockdale \n Rome #2 \n South Georgia #1 \n Southern #1 \n Southern #3 \n Stone Mountain #1 \n Stone Mountain #3 \n Stone Mountain #5 \n Stone Mountain #7 \n Stone Mountain #9 \n Tallapoosa #2 \n Tifton \n Waycross #1 \n Western #2 \n Out of State #2 </td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n</table>","UrlName":"rule392","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"42c36d46-4cd8-4adf-a5aa-5a0e58d0b986","Title":"Section 6. Alterations of Positions on Board of Governors.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> After the organization of the Board of Governors as provided for in Section 5 above, when alterations in positions on the Board occur because of additional circuit members of the State Bar as referred to in Section 2 above or because of the creation or abolition of circuits or when the terms of members are terminated because of a change in geographical limits of circuits the terms of the members affected shall be determined as follows: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> When additional positions are created in existing circuits because of additional members of the State Bar in such circuits, the position or post on the Board thus created shall be given the next higher number after the last existing post (the member in a circuit having theretofore only one member being considered as occupying Post No. 1) and the new post shall have a term expiring one year after that of the highest numbered existing post. The newly created post(s) shall be inserted in the appropriate column in Section 5 above. If a circuit is abolished, the name of the circuit and all post(s) therein shall be stricken from the appropriate column(s) in Section 5 above. Upon the creation of a new judicial circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to at least one membership on the Board even if the cap of 150 members set out in Section 2(d) above has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to additional members depending on the number of active members of the State Bar residing in the circuit, according to the formula set forth in Section 2 of this Article. Likewise, the terms of office and method of designating \"odd \"or \"even \"posts shall be in accordance with the provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 5 of this Article. \n \n If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges to which that circuit was entitled to on July 1, 1979, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board representing that circuit if there were more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event of a reduction, the last-created post will be the first post eliminated. If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board as it had on July 1, 1979. The terms of office of said members of the Board shall remain as they were prior to the change in the geographical limits of the circuit. \n \n Additional members of the circuit which has experienced a change in geographical limits, if the cap has not been reached, will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar residing in that circuit as provided in Section 2 of this Article. \n A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon the circuit's Board's representatives, except as otherwise provided. </li> \n <li>When the geographical limits of circuits are altered, the term(s) of the member(s) from the new circuit with the same name as the former circuit shall be the same as the term(s) of the member(s) from the former circuit. The term of the first member from the new circuit with a new name shall be determined by adding the name of that circuit to the column in Section 5 above containing the least number of positions.</li> \n <li>If two or more of the events referred to in this Section occur in the same year, the terms of members affected shall be determined by performing the steps in subparagraphs (a) and (b) in that order, and as between two or more alterations of geographical limits, in the order of their effective dates or if they have the same effective date, in order of the introduction of the legislation making the alteration.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Section, legislation shall be deemed effective on the date of its enactment and elections shall be held accordingly, notwithstanding that by its terms the legislation is not effective until a later date. However, a person elected to a position on the Board of Governors as a result of legislation shall not become a member until the actual effective date of the legislation.</li> \n <li>Whenever, under subparagraphs (a) and (b) hereof, it is directed that a circuit or post be added or stricken from the columns in Section 5 above, the section is automatically amended accordingly.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule316","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"f459b600-6dfa-4377-866b-30526ea7fe5e","ParentId":"42c36d46-4cd8-4adf-a5aa-5a0e58d0b986","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> After the organization of the Board of Governors as provided for in Section 5 above, when alterations in positions on the Board occur because of additional circuit members of the State Bar as referred to in Section 2 above or because of the creation or abolition of circuits or when the terms of members are terminated because of a change in geographical limits of circuits the terms of the members affected shall be determined as follows: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> When additional positions are created in existing circuits because of additional members of the State Bar in such circuits, the position or post on the Board thus created shall be given the next higher number after the last existing post (the member in a circuit having theretofore only one member being considered as occupying Post No. 1) and the new post shall have a term expiring one year after that of the highest numbered existing post. The newly created post(s) shall be inserted in the appropriate column in Section 5 above. If a circuit is abolished, the name of the circuit and all post(s) therein shall be stricken from the appropriate column(s) in Section 5 above. Upon the creation of a new judicial circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to at least one membership on the Board even if the cap of 150 members set out in Section 2(d) above has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to additional members depending on the number of active members of the State Bar residing in the circuit, according to the formula set forth in Section 2 of this Article. Likewise, the terms of office and method of designating \"odd \"or \"even \"posts shall be in accordance with the provisions of Sections 3, 4, and 5 of this Article. \n \n If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges to which that circuit was entitled to on July 1, 1979, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board representing that circuit if there were more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event of a reduction, the last-created post will be the first post eliminated. If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board as it had on July 1, 1979. The terms of office of said members of the Board shall remain as they were prior to the change in the geographical limits of the circuit. \n \n Additional members of the circuit which has experienced a change in geographical limits, if the cap has not been reached, will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar residing in that circuit as provided in Section 2 of this Article.A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon the circuit's Board's representatives, except as otherwise provided. </li> \n <li>When the geographical limits of circuits are altered, the term(s) of the member(s) from the new circuit with the same name as the former circuit shall be the same as the term(s) of the member(s) from the former circuit. The term of the first member from the new circuit with a new name shall be determined by adding the name of that circuit to the column in Section 5 above containing the least number of positions.</li> \n <li>If two or more of the events referred to in this Section occur in the same year, the terms of members affected shall be determined by performing the steps in subparagraphs (a) and (b) in that order, and as between two or more alterations of geographical limits, in the order of their effective dates or if they have the same effective date, in order of the introduction of the legislation making the alteration.</li> \n <li>For the purposes of this Section, legislation shall be deemed effective on the date of its enactment and elections shall be held accordingly, notwithstanding that by its terms the legislation is not effective until a later date. However, a person elected to a position on the Board of Governors as a result of legislation shall not become a member until the actual effective date of the legislation.</li> \n <li>Whenever, under subparagraphs (a) and (b) hereof, it is directed that a circuit or post be added or stricken from the columns in Section 5 above, the section is automatically amended accordingly.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision27"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"aedffa90-4cb0-4b10-8490-bbb935622a12","Title":"Section 7. Honorary Members.","Content":"All past Presidents of the Georgia Bar Association, all past Presidents of the State Bar, except the Immediate Past President, and all past Presidents of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar shall be honorary members of the Board of Governors, provided they are members in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. Honorary members may attend all meetings of the Board and participate in its proceedings but shall not bring forward or vote on any question arising in the meetings of the Board, nor be counted in ascertaining a quorum; however, honorary members may nominate or second a member of the Bar to serve as an officer of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule351","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"086d1fa2-cd6d-43ef-aaec-08703438d8a4","ParentId":"aedffa90-4cb0-4b10-8490-bbb935622a12","Title":"Version 2","Content":"All past Presidents of the Georgia Bar Association, all past Presidents of the State Bar, except the Immediate Past President, and all past Presidents of the Younger Lawyers Section of the State Bar shall be honorary members of the Board of Governors, provided they are members of the State Bar. Honorary members may attend all meetings of the Board and participate in its proceedings, but shall not vote on any question arising in the meetings of the Board, nor be counted in ascertaining a quorum.","UrlName":"revision349"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fda99865-b889-4ac6-9844-066ab5518b30","Title":"Section 8. New Positions, Unfilled Positions, Vacancies, and Lost Positions.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>If any new position is created in a circuit because of an increase in membership of such circuit, or if any new position is created as a result of legislation establishing a new judicial circuit, the President shall appoint an active member of the State Bar in such circuit to hold office for the remaining term.</li> \n <li>If no successor is elected as provided for in Section 3 of this Article III, the President shall, at the annual meeting or within thirty days thereafter, appoint a successor to the Board from the circuit so failing to elect, or in the case of a nonresident member, from the active nonresident members of the State Bar.</li> \n <li>If any other vacancy on the Board of Governors occurs at or between annual meetings of the State Bar, the President shall appoint an active member of the circuit in which the vacancy occurs to hold office for the unexpired term.</li> \n <li>In the event a position is eliminated for any reason under this Article III, the representative filling the post to be eliminated shall serve for the remainder of the term for which said representative was elected.</li> \n <li>If as a result of a change in the geographical boundaries of any judicial circuit a board member is no longer located within the geographic boundaries of the post to which the member was elected, the president shall appoint such representative to the circuit in which the member is actually located if a vacancy is created or exists in such circuit. If no vacancy exists in the circuit, the board member shall serve out the remainder of his or her term as described in subsection (d) above.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule359","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"07f1a40c-8caa-49af-b2a6-a03379d9c59b","ParentId":"fda99865-b889-4ac6-9844-066ab5518b30","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>If any new position is created in a circuit because of an increase in membership of such circuit, or if any new position is created as a result of legislation establishing a new judicial circuit, the President shall appoint an active member of the State Bar in such circuit to hold office for the remaining term.</li> \n <li>If no successor is elected as provided for in Section 3 of this Article III, the President shall, at the annual meeting or within thirty days thereafter, appoint a successor to the Board from the circuit so failing to elect, or in the case of a nonresident member, from the active nonresident members of the State Bar.</li> \n <li>If any other vacancy on the Board of Governors occurs at or between annual meetings of the State Bar, the President shall appoint an active member of the circuit in which the vacancy occurs to hold office for the unexpired term.</li> \n <li>In the event a position is eliminated for any reason under this Article III, the representative filling the post to be eliminated shall serve for the remainder of the term for which said representative was elected.</li> \n <li>If as a result of a change in the geographical boundaries of any judicial circuit a board member is no longer located within the geographic boundaries of the post to which the member was elected, the president shall appoint such representative to the circuit in which the member is actually located if a vacancy is created or exists in such circuit. If no vacancy exists in the circuit, the board member shall serve out the remainder of his or her term as described in subsection (d) above.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision28"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"631d0e0e-fa95-421e-8f73-cc44920a6866","Title":"Section 9. Quorum.","Content":"Forty members of the Board of Governors representing at least five judicial circuits shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at any Board meeting.","UrlName":"rule362","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"804ef735-3d4e-4a2d-9692-12483c54dd61","Title":"Section 10. Powers and Duties.","Content":"The government of the State Bar shall be vested in the Board of Governors. The Board shall control and administer the affairs of the State Bar and shall have the power to do all things and take all actions which in its judgment may be necessary or desirable to carry out the purposes of the State Bar in keeping with the Rules and these Bylaws. It shall keep a record of its proceedings and shall report at the annual meeting of the members of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule327","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"76b66f5e-a3e5-443a-9a2b-d984d25fbdf2","Title":"Section 11. Meetings.","Content":"(a) The Board of Governors shall meet during or immediately after the adjournment of the the annual and midyear meetings of the members or on the following day, as the incoming President may direct. There shall be at least one additional regular meeting of the Board in the Spring of each year, at such times and places as may be fixed by the Board or its President.\n(b) Special meetings may be called by the President. Upon the request of 20 members of the Board of Governors, the President or the Executive Director shall give notice of a special meeting not less than 10 nor more than 20 days after such request is received. Each member of the Board shall receive at least 10 days notice by email of each meeting of the Board of Governors, other than a meeting held in conjunction with the annual or midyear meetings.\n(c) If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct any meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.","UrlName":"rule328","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[{"Id":"47e3bed4-f00a-47fc-b0f9-0cf052e05b20","ParentId":"76b66f5e-a3e5-443a-9a2b-d984d25fbdf2","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Board of Governors shall meet during or immediately after the adjournment of the annual meeting of the members or on the following day, as the incoming President may direct. There shall be at least three additional regular meetings of the Board each year at such times and places as may be fixed by the Board or its President. Special meetings may be called by the President. Upon the request of twenty members of the Board, the President or the Executive Director shall give notice of a meeting not less than ten nor more than twenty days after such request is received. Each member of the Board shall have at least ten days' notice by mail of each meeting of the Board of Governors, other than the meeting held in conjunction with the annual meeting.","UrlName":"revision312"}],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a7fefe24-e085-41ef-966d-503aaa70268f","Title":"Section 12. Budget.","Content":"The Board of Governors shall, at its meeting held in conjunction with the spring meeting, adopt a budget for the following fiscal year showing the anticipated income and tentative appropriations to cover estimated expenses of the State Bar, which budget the Board shall have authority from time to time to amend. In no event shall the officers have authority to spend money or incur indebtedness except as provided for in the budget fixed by the Board.","UrlName":"rule331","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8c0a2527-1d37-4860-88f0-bf33989e919b","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"579d8fb2-4528-4651-8eb1-5f825d1225e2","Title":"Section 3. Order of Business.","Content":"At each meeting of the members of the State Bar, the order of business may be prescribed by the Board of Governors, except as provided in these Bylaws. The order of business may be changed by majority vote of the members present. ","UrlName":"rule365","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["6c56eeb8-c425-480c-ac99-611495eddd71","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fd7d3544-95ba-4007-b042-5b85fcb69600","Title":"Section 3. Inactive Members Status.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive members shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>pay annual dues as set forth in Bar Rule 1-502;</li> \n <li>be exempt from continuing legal education requirements, subject to the requirements in (b);</li> \n <li>affirmatively represent their status as inactive members of the State Bar of Georgia when any statement of State Bar membership is made;</li> \n <li>not hold themselves out as being able to practice law in Georgia or render advice on matters of Georgia law;</li> \n <li>not hold any position that requires the person to be a licensed Georgia lawyer;</li> \n <li>inactive members shall not nominate a member for office, hold any office, serve on a Standing or Special Committee, or as an officer of a Section. An inactive member shall not vote in a State Bar of Georgia election, or on any matter or proposal pending before an entity of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li> not receive State Bar of Georgia publications, including theGeorgia Bar Journal , unless the inactive member so requests; </li> \n <li>keep the membership department advised of their current name, address and phone number as provided in Bar Rule 1-207.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An inactive member in good standing may return to Active Member Status by contacting the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia and requesting a membership status change. Before being returned to Active Member Status, the Inactive Status Member shall pay the difference between inactive and active member dues for the year returned to active status, including any applicable fees and costs. An inactive member shall complete all unfulfilled continuing legal education requirements owed during the Bar year of being returned to Active Member Status.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule364","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","Revisions":[{"Id":"e676ef05-4a80-4666-959c-141e1b9085ab","ParentId":"fd7d3544-95ba-4007-b042-5b85fcb69600","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> Inactive members shall:\n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li>pay annual dues as set forth in Bar Rule 1-502;</li> \n <li>be exempt from continuing legal education requirements (except for years in which the member is on active membership status for any part of the calendar year);</li> \n <li>affirmatively represent their status as inactive members of the State Bar of Georgia when any statement of State Bar membership is made;</li> \n <li>not hold themselves out as being able to practice law in Georgia or render advice on matters of Georgia law;</li> \n <li>not hold any position that requires the person to be a licensed Georgia attorney;</li> \n <li>not nominate a member for office, hold a State Bar office, hold a section or committee office, or vote on any candidate or proposal concerning the State Bar;</li> \n <li>not receive State Bar publications, including the State Bar Directory and State Bar Journal, unless the inactive member so requests;</li> \n <li>keep the membership department advised of their current name, address and phone number as provided in Bar Rule 1-207.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>An inactive member in good standing may on application become an active member. The application shall be accompanied by payment of the dues of an active member for the year in which the change is made, less dues paid by the member for that year as an inactive member. In addition, the member must satisfy the continuing legal education requirements for the calendar year in which the member is on active status.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision24"}],"Ancestors":["5f9c3925-2227-475f-8a70-bf5c82bf2b18","70bffb92-4bef-4487-acdf-5972903d9b23","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"aa1de930-30e2-4985-b0fc-72efb20a3d5e","Title":"Rule 5-103. Oral Argument.","Content":" The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant or refuse the objecting member's request for oral argument on the State Bar of Georgia's proposed amendment to these rules at its sole discretion. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall notify the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia and the objecting member of the date of any oral argument granted by the Supreme Court of Georgia under the provisions of Rule 23 (b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule169","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","Title":"Part V - Amendment & Effective Date","Content":"","UrlName":"part23","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Title":"CHAPTER 1 AMENDMENT","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter15","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"bb6b0b77-e980-439b-8eda-01f15008d55c","Title":"Rule 5-101. Amendment; Filing, Notice.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Supreme Court of Georgia may, on motion of the State Bar of Georgia, amend the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia at any time; provided, however, that no motion to amend these rules may be filed until 30 days after a notice setting forth the proposed amendment has been published in the Georgia Bar Journal or on the official website of the State Bar of Georgia. The said notice shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the date after which the motion to amend these rules shall be filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the verbatim text of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a statement that the publication of the proposal to amend these rules is intended to comply with the notice requirement of this rule;</li> \n <li>a statement that any objection to the proposed amendment shall be made only in accordance with Bar Rule 5-102.</li> \n </ol> \nAt the same time that notice is published to its membership, the State Bar of Georgia shall file a copy of such notice with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule167","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"c9996385-c078-48a5-a447-cc8ef863b6f0","ParentId":"bb6b0b77-e980-439b-8eda-01f15008d55c","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Supreme Court of Georgia may, on motion of the State Bar of Georgia, amend the rules of the State Bar of Georgia at any time; provided, however, that no motion to amend these rules may be filed until thirty (30) days after a notice setting forth the proposed amendment has been published in the Georgia Bar Journal or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia. The said notice shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the date upon which the motion to amend these rules shall be filed in the Supreme Court of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the verbatim text of the said motion as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a statement that the publication of the said motion to amend these rules is intended to comply with the notice requirement of this rule;</li> \n <li>a statement that any objection to the proposed amendment shall be made only in accordance with Rule 5-102.</li> \n </ol> \nAt the same time that notice is sent to its membership, the State Bar of Georgia shall file a copy of such a notice with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"revision21"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9e6fd451-bd43-48ad-a02d-9da3806827d9","Title":"Rule 5-102. Objection to Amendment.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall be entitled to file a written objection to any motion to amend these rules by the State Bar of Georgia. Each objection shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the grounds on which the objection is based;</li> \n <li>a request for oral argument on the proposed amendment if such argument is desired by the objecting member.</li> \n </ol> \nAll written objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia before the date which the State Bar of Georgia has designated for filing its said motion to amend these rules under Bar Rule 5-101. Any member filing a written objection shall serve the State Bar of Georgia with a copy thereof by mailing the same to the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the address of its headquarters.</div>","UrlName":"rule168","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"0863f3ed-29f9-4771-9797-6b0a9a5737db","ParentId":"9e6fd451-bd43-48ad-a02d-9da3806827d9","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall be entitled to file a written objection to any motion to amend these rules by the State Bar of Georgia. Each objection shall contain the following: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the grounds on which the objection is based;</li> \n <li>a request for oral argument on the proposed amendment if such argument is desired by the objecting member.</li> \n </ol> \nAll written objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia before the date which the State Bar of Georgia has designated for filing its said motion to amend these rules under Rule 5-101. Any member filing a written objection shall serve the State Bar of Georgia with a copy thereof by mailing the same to the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia at the address of its headquarters.</div>","UrlName":"revision22"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"aa1de930-30e2-4985-b0fc-72efb20a3d5e","Title":"Rule 5-103. Oral Argument.","Content":" The Supreme Court of Georgia may grant or refuse the objecting member's request for oral argument on the State Bar of Georgia's proposed amendment to these rules at its sole discretion. The Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia shall notify the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia and the objecting member of the date of any oral argument granted by the Supreme Court of Georgia under the provisions of Rule 23 (b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia. ","UrlName":"rule169","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48e67660-4f39-4365-8c8c-36998b4395dd","Title":"Rule 5-104. Dues Increase or Decrease; Special Procedure.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In addition to the procedures described in Bar Rules 5-101 through 5-103, at least 30 days notice shall be given to the membership of the State Bar of Georgia in the Georgia State Bar Journal, the Georgia State Bar News or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia of any meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which amendment of Bar Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) will be considered and acted upon. The notice to the general membership of the State Bar of Georgia shall contain: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a statement that the amendment of Bar Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) shall be considered by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a verbatim copy of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the date, time and location of the meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which such amendment will be considered;</li> \n <li>a statement that each member of the State Bar of Georgia has a right to present his views concerning the proposed amendment either through his circuit representative to the Board of Governors or in person before such Board; and</li> \n <li>the address to which all written objections to the proposed amendment may be sent.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule170","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","Revisions":[{"Id":"3b270332-51e2-44fe-afa4-00de51a41155","ParentId":"48e67660-4f39-4365-8c8c-36998b4395dd","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> In addition to the procedures described in Rules 5-101 through 5-103, at least thirty (30) days notice shall be given to the membership of the State Bar of Georgia in the Georgia State Bar Journal, the Georgia State Bar News or any other document of the State Bar of Georgia of any meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which amendment of Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) will be considered and acted upon. The notice to the general membership of the State Bar of Georgia shall contain: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>a statement that the amendment of Rule 1-502 (Amount of License Fees) shall be considered by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>a verbatim copy of the proposed amendment as certified by the Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia;</li> \n <li>the date, time and location of the meeting of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia at which such amendment will be considered;</li> \n <li>a statement that each member of the State Bar of Georgia has a right to present his views concerning the proposed amendment either through his circuit representative to the Board of Governors or in person before such Board; and</li> \n <li>the address to which all written objections to the proposed amendment may be sent.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision23"}],"Ancestors":["8f4e5ec6-ca34-46ea-baba-3efe2c741ffb","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","Title":"CHAPTER 2 EFFECTIVE DATE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter16","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"8144b7fa-6279-4729-b8ff-3208b55c7a21","Title":"Rule 5-201. Effective Date","Content":" These rules, as recodified, shall be effective January 1, 1977 except that Part IV, Chapter 2, Disciplinary Proceedings, shall be effective April 1, 1977; provided, however, any complaints pending before grievance tribunals on such date shall be handled to conclusion under the disciplinary proceedings now in effect. ","UrlName":"rule171","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["9ce3a48d-b921-4a3c-85b0-902fd0a8ede8","629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["629fd8b3-2115-4ff5-be56-2df06ebb6122","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"99126ab7-b8e6-42a1-9320-be9a25565762","Title":"Rule 1-802. Special Meetings","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Special meetings of the State Bar of Georgia may be held at such times and places as may be determined by the Board of Governors or the President.</li> \n <li>The Secretary shall call a special meeting of the State Bar of Georgia upon petition signed by not less than ten percent of the active members in good standing, and such special meetings shall be specified in the call. hall be held within 60 days after the petition is filed with the Secretary. The business to be transacted at special meetings shall be specified in the call.</li> \n <li>If deemed prudent and necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct a special meeting by an electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule33","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","Revisions":[{"Id":"d662b639-fe2a-41d5-bdc6-cf5df7a34184","ParentId":"99126ab7-b8e6-42a1-9320-be9a25565762","Title":"Version 2","Content":"Special meetings of the State Bar of Georgia may be held at such times and places as may be determined by the Board of Governors. The Secretary shall call a special meeting of the State Bar of Georgia upon petition signed by not less than ten percent of the active members and such special meetings shall be held within 60 days after the petition is filed with the Secretary. The business to be transacted at special meetings shall be specified in the call.","UrlName":"revision345"}],"Ancestors":["ffb97aff-ab2e-4f42-bb22-138dfca44541","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"486fa268-ec1e-479f-9454-eedf8ba16777","Title":"Rule 1-703. Young Lawyers Division","Content":"There shall be a division of the State Bar of Georgia composed of (1) all members of the State Bar who have not reached their 36th birthday prior to the close of the preceding Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia and (2) all members of the State Bar of Georgia who have been admitted to their first bar less than five years. All persons holding an elective office or post in the Young Lawyers Division who are qualified by age to assume such office or post on the date of his or her election shall remain members of the Young Lawyers Division for the duration of their offices or posts. In the case of a President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division who is qualified by age to assume such office on the date of such person's election, such person shall remain a member of the Young Lawyers Division for the duration of the terms of President and Immediate Past President to which he or she succeeds.\nThe Young Lawyers Division shall have such organization, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by the Bylaws of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule27","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["a2738d37-cdee-4d5a-a9dd-38ff803e7707","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"86b568a8-63c4-404f-b916-d1fec0ebe1da","Title":"Rule 1-502. Amount of License Fees","Content":"The amount of such license fees for active members shall not exceed $350.00, and shall annually be fixed by the Board of Governors for the ensuing year; provided, however, that except in the case of an emergency, such annual dues shall not be increased in any one year by more than $25 over those set for the next preceding year. The annual license fees for inactive members shall be in an amount not to exceed one-half of those set for active members. Subject to the above limitations, license fees may be fixed in differing amounts for different classifications of active and inactive membership, as may be established in the bylaws. ","UrlName":"rule59","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f11d1b7e-7190-4eb1-ae79-1a8ef7c03b28","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"f66b6cd2-b7b7-47f3-8741-baf4bd91f4a6","Title":"Rule 1-403. Vacancies; Ties","Content":"The bylaws shall provide for filling vacancies in any office and for deciding the outcome of tie votes.","UrlName":"rule41","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["cf8d5046-ae91-4e2b-88d8-c61b21750880","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"da944fcb-8a47-40ef-b66e-b279d64bef46","Title":"Rule 1-303. Meetings","Content":"(a) The Board of Governors shall hold at least three regular meetings in each Bar year at such times and places as may be determined in accordance with the bylaws and upon such call and notice as may be set forth in the bylaws.\n(b) If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct any meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.\n","UrlName":"rule22","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"8cdb6c27-0508-489c-a576-396dde63cc8b","ParentId":"da944fcb-8a47-40ef-b66e-b279d64bef46","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Board of Governors shall hold at least three regular meetings in each year at such times and places as may be determined in accordance with the bylaws and upon such call and notice as may be set forth in the bylaws.","UrlName":"revision339"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Title":"CHAPTER 3 BOARD OF GOVERNORS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter6","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"a8836307-7cb1-4e2a-8f72-17deed13e04c","Title":"Rule 1-301. Government by the Board of Governors","Content":"The government of the State Bar of Georgia shall be vested in a Board of Governors.","UrlName":"rule23","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"db94abe0-413c-469f-88ed-67188923c732","Title":"Rule 1-302. Composition","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> The President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and the Attorney General of Georgia; \n   </li> \n <li> the number of Board of Governors members for each Judicial Circuit as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governor members to be elected from the Atlanta Circuit. \n \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> Each Judicial Circuit shall have an additional member for each additional five hundred active members of the State Bar of Georgia added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. The size of the Board of Governors, excluding those designated in subsection (a)(1) above, shall not exceed 150, except as set out in subsection (b) below. \n   </li> \n <li> If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of superior court judges to which that circuit was entitled on July 1, 1979, then and in that event, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board of Governors representing that circuit provided there was more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event that there is such a reduction, the last created post will be the first post eliminated. \n   </li> \n <li> If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of superior court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board of Governors as it had on July 1, 1979. Additional Board representation will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing in that circuit as provided above. A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon that circuit's Board of Governors' representatives, except as otherwise provided. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> two representatives of the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state of Georgia, who themselves must be residents of different states of the United States. The nonresident representative shall be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing residing outside of the state of Georgia. \n   </li> \n <li> three members appointed as follows: The President-elect in office when this rule becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint the number of such members whose term expired at the annual meeting at which the President-elect assumed office. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Upon the creation of a new circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to elect one member to the Board of Governors even if the cap of 150 Board of Governors members has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to elect additional members depending on the number of active members of the state of Georgia residing in the circuit as provided above. \n   </li> \n <li> A member of the Board of Governors must be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. A member representing a judicial circuit shall be a member of the bar of that circuit. \n   </li> \n <li>Members of the Board of Governors shall receive no compensation for their services.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule21","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"3b61d104-26c7-4e13-8f9f-50ad90ec8de1","ParentId":"db94abe0-413c-469f-88ed-67188923c732","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> The Board of Governors shall be composed of the following: \n \n <ol type=\"1\"> \n <li> The President, the President-elect, the Immediate Past President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the President of the Young Lawyers Division, the President-elect of the Young Lawyers Division, the Immediate Past President of the Young Lawyers Division and the Attorney General of Georgia; \n   </li> \n <li> the number of Board of Governors members for each Judicial Circuit as existed on January 1, 2001, plus an additional 7 Board of Governor members to be elected from the Atlanta Circuit. \n \n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li> Each Judicial Circuit shall have an additional member for each additional five hundred active members of the State Bar added to that circuit after January 1, 2001. The size of the Board of Governors, excluding those designated in subsection (a)(1) above, shall not exceed 150, except as set out in subsection (b) below. \n   </li> \n <li> If the geographical limits of a judicial circuit are changed, and by reason of said change there is a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges to which that circuit was entitled on July 1, 1979, then and in that event, there shall be a corresponding reduction in the number of members of the Board of Governors representing that circuit provided there was more than one Board member representing that circuit. In the event that there is such a reduction, the last created post will be the first post eliminated. \n   </li> \n <li> If the change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit does not result in a reduction in the number of Superior Court judges in such circuit, then such circuit shall retain at least as many members of the Board of Governors as it had on July 1, 1979. Additional Board representation will be determined by the number of active members of the State Bar residing in that circuit as provided above. A change in the name of a judicial circuit shall have no effect upon that circuit's Board of Governors' representatives, except as otherwise provided. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> two representatives of the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State of Georgia, who themselves must be residents of different states of the United States. The nonresident representative shall be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing residing outside of the State of Georgia. \n   </li> \n <li> three members appointed as follows: The President-elect in office when this rule becomes effective shall appoint three members to the Board of Governors. Thereafter, the President-elect shall appoint the number of such members whose term expired at the annual meeting at which the President-elect assumed office. The appointed members shall be chosen in such a manner as to promote diversity within the Board of Governors. \n   </li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> Upon the creation of a new circuit, such circuit shall be entitled to elect one member to the Board of Governors even if the cap of 150 Board of Governors members has been reached, and if the cap has not been reached, may be entitled to elect additional members depending on the number of active members of the State of Georgia residing in the circuit as provided above. \n   </li> \n <li> A member of the Board of Governors must be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing. A member representing a judicial circuit shall be a member of the bar of that circuit. \n   </li> \n <li>Members of the Board of Governors shall receive no compensation for their services.</li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision16"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"da944fcb-8a47-40ef-b66e-b279d64bef46","Title":"Rule 1-303. Meetings","Content":"(a) The Board of Governors shall hold at least three regular meetings in each Bar year at such times and places as may be determined in accordance with the bylaws and upon such call and notice as may be set forth in the bylaws.\n(b) If deemed prudent or necessary, the Board of Governors may conduct any meeting by any electronic means that allows for discussion, debate, and voting.\n","UrlName":"rule22","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"8cdb6c27-0508-489c-a576-396dde63cc8b","ParentId":"da944fcb-8a47-40ef-b66e-b279d64bef46","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Board of Governors shall hold at least three regular meetings in each year at such times and places as may be determined in accordance with the bylaws and upon such call and notice as may be set forth in the bylaws.","UrlName":"revision339"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"d80125b1-bc60-466b-b06e-d4e8d52081a3","Title":"Rule 1-304. Election of Members of Board of Governors","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Bar of Georgia shall, in its bylaws, establish the term of office and the method of election of the members of the Board of Governors representing judicial circuits and nonresident members. Such method of election shall ensure that: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the election will be by secret written or secure electronic ballot;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in conjunction with a specified number of other active members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from his judicial circuit (or candidates in circuits electing more than one member of the Board of Governors in such election) whose name will be placed on the ballot for his circuit;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state, in conjunction with a specified number of other active nonresident members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the state.</li> \n <li>any nominating petition shall bear or be accompanied by a statement signed by the nominee indicating his willingness to serve if elected;</li> \n <li>a ballot for his judicial circuit will be mailed to each active resident member and a ballot will be mailed to each active nonresident member in the case of election of nonresident board member, having printed thereon the names of all qualified nominees for such circuit or nonresident post and space for a write-in vote in ample time for the member to cast the ballot before the time fixed for the election. In lieu of a written ballot, a secure electronic ballot, which meets the requirements above, may be provided to members;</li> \n <li>each nominee shall be entitled to have at least one observer present at the counting of the ballots from his judicial circuit; and</li> \n <li>any change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit or circuits shall automatically terminate the terms of all members elected to the Board of Governors, accordingly in such manners as the bylaws may provide. In the event the geographical limits of a circuit are changed after the notices of election have been distributed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, then and in that event, the terms of the members of the Board of Governors from such circuits will remain as they were before the change in geographical limits until the election of the Board of Governors to be held the following year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule26","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[{"Id":"3c46fa2b-a530-4755-a8f8-878db3edb823","ParentId":"d80125b1-bc60-466b-b06e-d4e8d52081a3","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The State Bar of Georgia shall, in its bylaws, establish the term of office and the method of election of the members of the Board of Governors representing judicial circuits and nonresident members. Such method of election shall ensure that: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li>the election will be by secret written or secure electronic ballot;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in conjunction with a specified number of other active members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from his judicial circuit (or candidates in circuits electing more than one member of the Board of Governors in such election) whose name will be placed on the ballot for his circuit;</li> \n <li>each active member of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State, in conjunction with a specified number of other active nonresident members, will have the right, upon compliance with reasonable conditions, to nominate a candidate from the active members of the State Bar of Georgia residing outside of the State.</li> \n <li>any nominating petition shall bear or be accompanied by a statement signed by the nominee indicating his willingness to serve if elected;</li> \n <li>a ballot for his judicial circuit will be mailed to each active resident member and a ballot will be mailed to each active nonresident member in the case of election of nonresident board member, having printed thereon the names of all qualified nominees for such circuit or nonresident post and space for a write-in vote in ample time for the member to cast the ballot before the time fixed for the election. In lieu of a written ballot, a secure electronic ballot, which meets the requirements above, may be provided to members;</li> \n <li>each nominee shall be entitled to have at least one observer present at the counting of the ballots from his judicial circuit; and</li> \n <li>any change in the geographical limits of a judicial circuit or circuits shall automatically terminate the terms of all members elected to the Board of Governors, accordingly in such manners as the bylaws may provide. In the event the geographical limits of a circuit are changed after the notices of election have been distributed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, then and in that event, the terms of the members of the Board of Governors from such circuits will remain as they were before the change in geographical limits until the election of the Board of Governors to be held the following year.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision17"}],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3db9a742-501a-49b5-a4f9-c2702f7f7d22","Title":"Rule 1-305. Change in Geographical limits of Judicial Circuits","Content":"The number and terms of members of the Board of Governors from judicial circuits that have experienced a change in geographical limits shall be determined according to provisions of Bar Rules 1-302 (b), 1-304 and as hereinafter provided by Bar Rule 1-701 and the bylaws.","UrlName":"rule29","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c58fe53f-969f-42eb-9240-29d054268f0d","Title":"Rule 1-306. Vacancies; Ties","Content":"The bylaws shall provide for filling vacancies in the Board of Governors and for deciding the outcome of tie votes.","UrlName":"rule34","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["c51136e4-22ae-4fd2-83fb-98c39a654362","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"fba14cfd-a73b-4163-84c9-18a132c4f63f","Title":"Rule 1-203. Practice by Active Members; Nonresidents","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> No person shall practice law in this state unless such person is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing; except as provided below: \n <ol> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state in isolated cases in the discretion of the judge of such court; or</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state if such person:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>is enrolled in a full time graduate degree program at an accredited law school in this state; and</li> \n <li>is under the supervision of a resident attorney; and</li> \n <li>limits his or her practice to the appearance in the courts of this state to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities of such graduate degree program.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li> A person who is admitted to the State Bar of Georgia as a foreign law consultant pursuant to Part E of the Rules Governing the Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gasupreme.us/">www.gasupreme.us , may render legal services in the state of Georgia solely with respect to the laws of the foreign country (i.e., a country other than the United States of America, its possessions and territories) where such person is admitted to practice, to the extent provided by and in strict compliance with the provisions of Part D of the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law, but shall not otherwise render legal services in this state. </li> \n <li> Persons who are authorized to practice law in this state are hereby authorized to practice law as sole proprietorships or as partners, shareholders, or members of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>partnerships under OCGA § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability partnerships under OCGA § 14-8-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional corporations under OCGA § 14-7-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional associations under OCGA § 14-10-1 et seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability companies under OGCA § 14-11-100 et seq.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XV, Rules 91-95, Student Practice Rule.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XVI, Rules 97-103, Law School Graduates, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XX, Rules 114-120, Extended Public Service Program, may provide legal services in this state to the extent allowed by said Rules.</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is allowed to practice law in Georgia on a limited basis pursuant to Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Part XXI, Rule 121, Provision of Legal Services Following Determination of Major Disaster. \n   </li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule13","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","Revisions":[{"Id":"67da6646-3933-45cf-a9f3-5bd64ddcff21","ParentId":"fba14cfd-a73b-4163-84c9-18a132c4f63f","Title":"Version 2","Content":"No person shall practice law in this State unless such person is an active member of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing; except as provided below:\n<ol> \n <li>A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state in isolated cases in the discretion of the judge of such court; or</li> \n <li> A person who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, but who is licensed to practice in a state or states other than Georgia, and is in good standing in all states in which such person is licensed, may be permitted to appear in the courts of this state if such person:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>is enrolled in a full time graduate degree program at an accredited law school in this state; and</li> \n <li>is under the supervision of a resident attorney; and</li> \n <li>limits his or her practice to the appearance in the courts of this state to the extent necessary to carry out the responsibilities of such graduate degree program.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n <li>A person who is admitted to the Bar as a foreign law consultant pursuant to Part E of the Rules Governing the Admission to the Practice of Law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Georgia, Ga. Ct. &Bar Rules, p. 12-1 et seq., may render legal services in the state of Georgia solely with respect to the laws of the foreign country (i.e., a country other than the United States of America, its possessions and territories) where such person is admitted to practice, to the extent provided by and in strict compliance with the provisions of Part D of the Rules Governing Admission to Practice, but shall not otherwise render legal services in this State.</li> \n <li> Persons who are authorized to practice law in this State are hereby authorized to practice law as sole proprietorships or as partners, shareholders, or members of:\n <ol type=\"i\"> \n <li>partnerships under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability partnerships under O.C.G.A. § 14-8-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional corporations under O.C.G.A. § 14-7-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>professional associations under O.C.G.A. § 14-10-1 et. seq.; or</li> \n <li>limited liability companies under O.C.G.A. § 14-11-100 et. seq.</li> \n </ol> \n </li> \n</ol>\n","UrlName":"revision8"}],"Ancestors":["021ada46-8c97-4319-a48c-6d8c53348343","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"127c5c68-7426-4f25-9d59-939a522a49c4","Title":"Rule 1-103. Purposes","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the State Bar of Georgia shall be: \n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>to foster among the members of the bar of this State the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to improve the administration of justice; and</li> \n <li>to advance the science of law.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule8","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","Revisions":[{"Id":"9fb13d29-239c-42e5-b02d-b83b1c3ae11e","ParentId":"127c5c68-7426-4f25-9d59-939a522a49c4","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The purposes of the State Bar of Georgia shall be: \n <ol style=\"list-style: lower-alpha outside none\"> \n <li>to foster among the members of the bar of this State the principles of duty and service to the public;</li> \n <li>to improve the administration of justice; and</li> \n <li>to advance the science of law.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision9"}],"Ancestors":["a7044cdd-c457-4d86-98f9-de3cabc17d70","6d1f4663-4d4b-480e-a1ff-2e1fe257e668","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"3eca81d7-6912-440c-aac6-5a9f085a99c3","Title":"Rule 16-104. DIRECTOR.","Content":"The Executive Director of the State Bar of Georgia, with the advice and consent of the ICLE Board, shall hire a Director for ICLE and shall serve as the immediate supervisor of the Director. The Director shall oversee the day-to-day operations of ICLE.","UrlName":"rule595","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d9fc60c0-1e80-415c-b880-080d204f8935","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c1b4ef65-e95b-40ca-900f-295405dd7b75","Title":"UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2004-1","Content":" Issued by the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law on August 6, 2004. \nNote:  This opinion is only an interpretation of the law, and does not constitute final action by the Supreme Court of Georgia.  Unless the Court grants review under Bar Rule 14-9.1(g), this opinion shall be binding only on the Standing Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law, the State Bar of Georgia, and the petitioner, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.\n QUESTION PRESENTED \n Is the preparation or filing of a lien considered the unlicensed practice of law if it is done by someone other than the lienholder or a licensed Georgia attorney?\n SUMMARY ANSWER \n A nonlawyer's preparation of a lien for another in exchange for a fee is the unlicensed practice of law.  The ministerial act of physically filing a lien with a court is not the practice of law.\n OPINION \n There are two components to the question presented above, viz., the preparation of a lien and the filing of a lien.  With regard to the latter, the Committee is of the opinion that the mere ministerial act of physically filing a lien with a court does not in itself constitute the practice of law. \n As far as the preparation of a lien, the Committee looks in part to O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3), which states that the practice of law includes \"[t]he preparation of legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured.\"The Supreme Court of Georgia has recently indicated that O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3) continues to aid the judiciary in the performance of its functions with regard to defining the practice of law in this state.  In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. 472, 474 (2003).  See also In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2002-1 , 277 Ga. 521, 522 (2004).\n A lien is \"'a hold or claim which one person has on the property of another as a security for some debt or charge.'\"Waldroup v. State , 198 Ga. 144, 149 (1944).  See also Miller v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. , 105 Ga. App. 174, 176 (1961).  With regard to real estate, a lien encumbers title.  Lincoln Log Homes Mktg., Inc., v. Holbrook , 163 Ga. App. 592, 594 (1982).  There are a variety of liens available under Georgia law.  See, e.g. , O.C.G.A. §44-14-320.  They may vary as to the particulars of their operation, but all assert the perceived rights of the lienholder.  A lien affects the status of title as to the relevant property, and is an instrument designed to secure a legal right.  It follows that under O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3) the preparation of a lien constitutes the practice of law.\nDuring the public hearing regarding this matter, the Committee heard a presentation made by a nonlawyer business entity that prepares mechanics' and materialmen's liens for others.  The customer provides the company with relevant background information, and the company performs a title search, prepares a legal description of the property, and inserts the description into the lien document.  The company then prints the lien, files it with the appropriate court, and provides notice to the property owner.  According to the company, its employees do not provide legal advice to the customer.  The company claims that this activity is not the practice of law, notwithstanding the existence of O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3).\n The company first asserts that its activity is essentially tantamount to performing a title search and preparing an abstract of title, an activity allowed by O.C.G.A. §15-19-53.  An abstract of title \"should be a complete showing in more or less abbreviated form of all instruments appearing of record in any way affecting the title, either adversely or beneficially....\"3 Hinkel, Pindar's Georgia Real Estate Law and Procedure , §26-7, p. 44 (6th ed. 2004).  In the Committee's view, it is not proper to equate a title search or abstract of title with a lien.  As noted above, an abstract identifies a lien; it is not itself a lien.  Moreover, an abstract, being a history of the title to land, is at its core a neutral, informational document.  A lien, on the other hand, asserts a legal claim.  Given the foregoing, it would be unreasonable to read O.C.G.A. §15-19-53 as extending to the preparation of liens.\nIn the alternative, the company states that its activity is allowed under O.C.G.A. §15-19-52, which does not prohibit drafting a legal instrument for another \"provided it is done without fee and solely at solicitation and the request and under the direction of the person, firm, or corporation desiring to execute the instrument.\"The company claims that it collects a fee from its customer solely for preparing an abstract of title or providing a legal description of the property, and that it then prepares the lien free of charge.\nThe Committee views the latter contention as being disingenuous.  Accepting such a deconstruction of the transaction would effectively eviscerate O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3), because the nonlawyer preparer of a legal document could always claim to be charging the fee for something other than the preparation of the instrument.  An interpretation of O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3) that leads to such a result cannot be a correct one.  Rather, it seems more sensible to examine the reason the customer contacted the nonlawyer document preparer, the expectations of the customer, and the ultimate product of the transaction.  In the situation described above, the goal of the customer is to procure a lien, not a mere abstract of title or legal description of property.  The customer in fact obtains the lien, and pays the company for its services in this regard.  Under the circumstances, the transaction involves the practice of law as set out in O.C.G.A. §15-19-50(3), and the consequent furnishing of legal services within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §15-19-51(a)(4).","UrlName":"rule541","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["865eb76b-7af4-4163-85ca-add37da00b55","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"23e5bb25-854c-4e86-9d27-7b002e764d24","Title":"14-4. DISTRICT COMMITTEES","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter36","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"d1f6c3e4-a6cf-4bac-b342-73354c06cda8","Title":"RULE 14-4.1 GENERALLY","Content":"(a) Appointment and Terms. Each District Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall consist of not fewer than three members, no more than 49 percent of whom shall be lawyers and members in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia. All appointees shall be residents of the judicial district or have their principal office in the district. The terms of the members of District Committees shall be for three years from the date of appointment by the Supreme Court of Georgia or until such time as their successors are appointed, except that it shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually. The members who initially serve terms of less than two years shall be eligible for immediate reappointment. Continuous service of a member shall not exceed six years. The expiration of the term of any member shall not disqualify that member from concluding any investigations pending before that member. Any member of a District Committee may be removed from office by the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n(b) Committee Chair. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall designate a chair for each District Committee. The chair of each District Committee may designate a vice-chair and secretary. The chair shall be a nonlawyer member or a lawyer member in good standing with the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) Quorum. Three members of the District Committee or a majority of the members, whichever is less, shall constitute a quorum.\n(d) Panels. The chair of a District Committee may divide that committee into panels of not fewer than three members, one of whom must be a lawyer member in good standing with the State Bar of Georgia. The three-member panel shall elect one of its members to preside over the panel's actions. If the chair or vice-chair of the District Committee is a member of a three-member panel, the chair or vice-chair shall be the presiding officer.\n(e) Duties. It shall be the duty of each District Committee to investigate, with dispatch, all reports of unlicensed practice of law and to make prompt written report of its investigation and findings to staff counsel. In addition, the duties of the District Committee shall include, but not be limited to:\n (1) closing cases not deemed by the District Committee to warrant further action by the State Bar of Georgia; \n(2) closing cases proposed to be resolved by a cease and desist affidavit; and \n(3) forwarding to staff counsel recommendations for litigation to be reviewed by the Standing Committee.\n(f) District Committee Meetings. District Committees should meet at regularly scheduled times. Either the chair or vice-chair may call special meetings. District Committees should meet as often as necessary during any period when the committee has one or more pending cases assigned for investigation and report. The time, date and place of scheduled meetings should be set in advance by agreement between each committee and staff counsel. Meetings may be conducted by telephone conference or by any other technology available and agreed upon by the committee. Any participant, including staff counsel, may participate in the meeting by telephone conference or any other technology agreed upon by the committee.","UrlName":"rule299","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23e5bb25-854c-4e86-9d27-7b002e764d24","Revisions":[{"Id":"2fdbcddc-4d9a-41e2-956c-62f6f847b2d6","ParentId":"d1f6c3e4-a6cf-4bac-b342-73354c06cda8","Title":"Version 2","Content":"(a) Appointment and Terms. Each District Committee shall be appointed by the Court and shall consist of not fewer than 3 members, at least one-third of whom shall be nonlawyers. All appointees shall be residents of the judicial district or have their principal office in the district. The terms of the members of District Committees shall be for 3 years from the date of appointment by the Court or until such time as their successors are appointed, except that it shall be the goal of the initial appointments that one-third (1/3) of the terms of the members appointed will expire annually. The members who initially serve terms of less than 2 years shall be eligible for immediate reappointment. Continuous service of a member shall not exceed 6 years. The expiration of the term of any member shall not disqualify that member from concluding any investigations pending before that member. Any member of a District Committee may be removed from office by the Court.\n(b) Committee Chair. For each District Committee there shall be a chair designated by the Court. A vice-chair and secretary may be designated by the chair of each District Committee. The chair shall be a member of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) Quorum. Three members of the District Committee or a majority of the members, whichever is less, shall constitute a quorum.\n(d) Panels. The Chair of a District Committee may divide that Committee into panels of not fewer than 3 members, 1 of whom must be a nonlawyer. The 3-member panel shall elect 1 of its members to preside over the panel's actions. If the chair or vice-chair of the District Committee is a member of a 3-member panel, the chair or vice- chair shall be the presiding officer.\n(e) Duties. It shall be the duty of each District Committee to investigate, with dispatch, all reports of unlicensed practice of law and to make prompt written report of its investigation and findings to staff counsel. In addition, the duties of the District Committee shall include, but not be limited to:\n (1) closing cases not deemed by the District Committee to warrant further action by the State Bar of Georgia; \n(2) closing cases proposed to be resolved by a cease and desist affidavit; and \n(3) forwarding to staff counsel recommendations for litigation to be reviewed by the Standing Committee.\n(f) District Committee Meetings. District Committees should meet at regularly scheduled times. Either the chair or vice chair may call special meetings. District Committees should meet as often as necessary during any period when the Committee has 1 or more pending cases assigned for investigation and report. The time, date and place of scheduled meetings should be set in advance by agreement between each Committee and staff counsel. Meetings may be conducted by telephone conference or by any other technology available and agreed upon by the Committee. Any participant, including staff counsel, may participate in the meeting by telephone conference or any other technology agreed upon by the Committee.","UrlName":"revision268"}],"Ancestors":["23e5bb25-854c-4e86-9d27-7b002e764d24","ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["ef075f84-7a76-4456-b4e8-075efecc3723","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"f6785d30-3572-45d2-b973-8afaf7e89dde","Title":"Rule 11-204. Purpose and Responsibility.","Content":"The Committee shall meet for the purposes of oversight of the Law Practice Management Program, coordination of the Program's goals, and implementation of directives and resolutions from the Board of Governors. Additionally, the Committee will from time to time develop recommendations for submission to the Executive Committee and the Board of Governors with regard to the funding, staffing, administration, and operation of the program, which may include proposed changes to Bylaws or Rules of the State Bar.","UrlName":"rule270","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["abd921af-8709-45f2-98c2-4a6bb3eb4950","3d107147-eada-44cf-97f2-ab5309fccf12","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5136b95b-6421-4adb-a38e-198afee9d553","Title":"Rule 10-103. Funding.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The State Bar of Georgia shall provide funding for the payment of claims and the costs of administering the Fund. Funding shall be through an annual assessment of $15 per dues-paying lawyer. The Trustees shall not spend more than received through the annual assessment in a single year. The Board of Governors may from time to time adjust the Fund's maximum annual assessment to advance the purposes of the Fund or to preserve the fiscal integrity of the Fund.</li> \n <li>All monies or other assets of the Fund shall constitute a trust and shall be held in the name of the Fund, subject to the direction of the Board.</li> \n <li>Only the Board of Trustees may authorize the payment of money from the Fund.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule245","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","Revisions":[{"Id":"13338ad5-1181-44a7-ad6a-62c6a4fe85a4","ParentId":"5136b95b-6421-4adb-a38e-198afee9d553","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li> The State Bar of Georgia shall provide funding for the payment of claims and the costs of administering the Fund. In any year following a year in which the gross aggregate balance of the Fund falls below $1,000,000, the State Bar of Georgia shall assess and collect from each dues-paying member a pro rata share of the difference between the actual Fund balance and $1,000,000, provided that such assessments shall not exceed $25 in any single year. The aggregate amount paid to claimants from the Fund in any year shall not exceed $500,000. The Board of Governors may from time to time adjust the Fund's minimum aggregate balance, maximum annual payout, or maximum annual assessment to advance the purposes of the Fund or to preserve the fiscal integrity of the Fund. </li> \n <li>All monies or other assets of the Fund shall constitute a trust and shall be held in the name of the Fund, subject to the direction of the Board.</li> \n <li>Only the Board of Trustees may authorize the payment of money from the Fund.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision355"}],"Ancestors":["96d970af-488e-43fe-b50c-71941c7f453c","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d96bbaad-bb59-4029-a036-5dd4774dfe02","Title":"Aspirational Statements","Content":"The Court believes there are unfortunate trends of commercialization and loss of professional community in the current practice of law. These trends are manifested in an undue emphasis on the financial rewards of practice, a lack of courtesy and civility among members of our profession, a lack of respect for the judiciary and for our systems of justice, and a lack of regard for others and for the common good. As a community of professionals, we should strive to make the internal rewards of service, craft, and character, and not the external reward of financial gain, the primary rewards of the practice of law. In our practices we should remember that the primary justification for who we are and what we do is the common good we can achieve through the faithful representation of people who desire to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner and to prevent future disputes. We should remember, and we should help our clients remember, that the way in which our clients resolve their disputes defines part of the character of our society and we should act accordingly.\nAs professionals, we need aspirational ideals to help bind us together in a professional community. Accordingly, the Court issues the following Aspirational Statement setting forth general and specific aspirational ideals of our profession. This statement is a beginning list of the ideals of our profession. It is primarily illustrative. Our purpose is not to regulate, and certainly not to provide a basis for discipline, but rather to assist the Bar’s efforts to maintain a professionalism that can stand against the negative trends of commercialization and loss of community. It is the Court’s hope that Georgia’s lawyers, judges, and legal educators will use the following aspirational ideals to reexamine the justifications of the practice of law in our society and to consider the implications of those justifications for their conduct. The Court feels that enhancement of professionalism can be best brought about by the cooperative efforts of the organized bar, the courts, and the law schools with each group working independently, but also jointly in that effort.\n\n GENERAL ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As a lawyer , I will aspire:\n(a) To put fidelity to clients and, through clients, to the common good, before selfish interests.\n(b) To model for others, and particularly for my clients, the respect due to those we call upon to resolve our disputes and the regard due to all participants in our dispute resolution processes.\n(c) To avoid all forms of wrongful discrimination in all of my activities including discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, handicap, veteran status, or national origin. The social goals of equality and fairness will be personal goals for me.\n(d) To preserve and improve the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes as instruments for the common good.\n(e) To make the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes available to all.\n(f) To practice with a personal commitment to the rules governing our profession and to encourage others to do the same.\n(g) To preserve the dignity and the integrity of our profession by my conduct. The dignity and the integrity of our profession is an inheritance that must be maintained by each successive generation of lawyers.\n(h) To achieve the excellence of our craft, especially those that permit me to be the moral voice of clients to the public in advocacy while being the moral voice of the public to clients in counseling. Good lawyering should be a moral achievement for both the lawyer and the client.\n (i) To practice law not as a business, but as a calling in the spirit of public service. \n \n SPECIFIC ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As to clients , I will aspire:\n(a)  To expeditious and economical achievement of all client objectives.\n(b)  To fully informed client decision-making. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Counsel clients about all forms of dispute resolution;\n(2) Counsel clients about the value of cooperation as a means toward the productive resolution of disputes;\n(3) Maintain the sympathetic detachment that permits objective and independent advice to clients;\n(4) Communicate promptly and clearly with clients; and\n(5) Reach clear agreements with clients concerning the nature of the representation.\n\n(c)  To fair and equitable fee agreements. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Discuss alternative methods of charging fees with all clients;\n(2) Offer fee arrangements that reflect the true value of the services rendered;\n(3) Reach agreements with clients as early in the relationship as possible;\n(4) Determine the amount of fees by consideration of many factors and not just time spent by the attorney;\n(5) Provide written agreements as to all fee arrangements; and\n(6) Resolve all fee disputes through the arbitration methods provided by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(d)  To comply with the obligations of confidentiality and the avoidance of conflicting loyalties in a manner designed to achieve the fidelity to clients that is the purpose of these obligations.\n As to opposing parties and their counsel , I will aspire:\n(a)  To cooperate with opposing counsel in a manner consistent with the competent representation of all parties. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Notify opposing counsel in a timely fashion of any canceled appearance;\n(2) Grant reasonable requests for extensions or scheduling changes; and\n(3) Consult with opposing counsel in the scheduling of appearances, meetings, and depositions.\n(b)  To treat opposing counsel in a manner consistent with his or her professional obligations and consistent with the dignity of the search for justice. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Not serve motions or pleadings in such a manner or at such a time as to preclude opportunity for a competent response;\n(2) Be courteous and civil in all communications;\n(3) Respond promptly to all requests by opposing counsel;\n(4) Avoid rudeness and other acts of disrespect in all meetings including depositions and negotiations;\n(5) Prepare documents that accurately reflect the agreement of all parties; and\n (6) Clearly identify all changes made in documents submitted by opposing counsel for review. \n \n As to the courts, other tribunals, and to those who assist them , I will aspire:\n(a)  To represent my clients in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of a fair, efficient, and humane system of justice. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Avoid non-essential litigation and non-essential pleading in litigation;\n(2) Explore the possibilities of settlement of all litigated matters;\n(3) Seek non-coerced agreement between the parties on procedural and discovery matters;\n(4) Avoid all delays not dictated by a competent presentation of a client’s claims;\n(5) Prevent misuses of court time by verifying the availability of key participants for scheduled appearances before the court and by being punctual; and\n(6) Advise clients about the obligations of civility, courtesy, fairness, cooperation, and other proper behavior expected of those who use our systems of justice.\n(b)  To model for others the respect due to our courts. As a professional I should:\n(1) Act with complete honesty;\n(2) Know court rules and procedures;\n(3) Give appropriate deference to court rulings;\n(4) Avoid undue familiarity with members of the judiciary;\n(5) Avoid unfounded, unsubstantiated, or unjustified public criticism of members of the judiciary;\n(6) Show respect by attire and demeanor;\n(7) Assist the judiciary in determining the applicable law; and\n(8) Seek to understand the judiciary’s obligations of informed and impartial decision making.\n As to my colleagues in the practice of law , I will aspire:\n(a)  To recognize and to develop our interdependence;\n(b)  To respect the needs of others, especially the need to develop as a whole person; and,\n(c)  To assist my colleagues become better people in the practice of law and to accept their assistance offered to me.\n As to our profession , I will aspire:\n(a)  To improve the practice of law. As a professional, I should:\n(1)  Assist in continuing legal education efforts;\n(2)  Assist in organized bar activities; and,\n(3)  Assist law schools in the education of our future lawyers.\n(b)  To protect the public from incompetent or other wrongful lawyering. As a professional, I should:\n(1)  Assist in bar admissions activities;\n(2)  Report violations of ethical regulations by fellow lawyers; and,\n(3)  Assist in the enforcement of the legal and ethical standards imposed upon all lawyers.\n As to the public and our systems of justice , I will aspire:\n(a) To counsel clients about the moral and social consequences of their conduct.\n(b) To consider the effect of my conduct on the image of our systems of justice including the social effect of advertising methods. As a professional, I should ensure that any advertisement of my services:\n(1) Is consistent with the dignity of the justice system and a learned profession;\n(2) Provides a beneficial service to the public by providing accurate information about the availability of legal services;\n(3) Educates the public about the law and the legal system;\n(4) Provides completely honest and straightforward information about my qualifications, fees, and costs; and\n(5) Does not imply that clients’ legal needs can be met only through aggressive tactics.\n(c) To provide the pro bono representation that is necessary to make our system of justice available to all.\n(d) To support organizations that provide pro bono representation to indigent clients.\n (e) To improve our laws and legal system by, for example: \n \n(1) Serving as a public official;\n(2) Assisting in the education of the public concerning our laws and legal system;\n(3) Commenting publicly upon our laws; and\n(4) Using other appropriate methods of effecting positive change in our laws and legal system.\n","UrlName":"rule422","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[{"Id":"a0014544-e522-4d87-9bb3-c28985efe1ce","ParentId":"d96bbaad-bb59-4029-a036-5dd4774dfe02","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Court believes there are unfortunate trends of commercialization and loss of professional community in the current practice of law. These trends are manifested in an undue emphasis on the financial rewards of practice, a lack of courtesy and civility among members of our profession, a lack of respect for the judiciary and for our systems of justice, and a lack of regard for others and for the common good. As a community of professionals, we should strive to make the internal rewards of service, craft, and character, and not the external reward of financial gain, the primary rewards of the practice of law. In our practices we should remember that the primary justification for who we are and what we do is the common good we can achieve through the faithful representation of people who desire to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner and to prevent future disputes. We should remember, and we should help our clients remember, that the way in which our clients resolve their disputes defines part of the character of our society and we should act accordingly.\nAs professionals, we need aspirational ideals to help bind us together in a professional community. Accordingly, the Court issues the following Aspirational Statement setting forth general and specific aspirational ideals of our profession. This statement is a beginning list of the ideals of our profession. It is primarily illustrative. Our purpose is not to regulate, and certainly not to provide a basis for discipline, but rather to assist the Bar’s efforts to maintain a professionalism that can stand against the negative trends of commercialization and loss of community. It is the Court’s hope that Georgia’s lawyers, judges, and legal educators will use the following aspirational ideals to reexamine the justifications of the practice of law in our society and to consider the implications of those justifications for their conduct. The Court feels that enhancement of professionalism can be best brought about by the cooperative efforts of the organized bar, the courts, and the law schools with each group working independently, but also jointly in that effort.\n\n GENERAL ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As a lawyer , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a) To put fidelity to clients and, through clients, to the common good, before selfish interests. \n(b) To model for others, and particularly for my clients, the respect due to those we call upon to resolve our disputes and the regard due to all participants in our dispute resolution processes. \n(c) To avoid all forms of wrongful discrimination in all of my activities including discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, handicap, veteran status, or national origin. The social goals of equality and fairness will be personal goals for me. \n(d) To preserve and improve the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes as instruments for the common good. \n(e) To make the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes available to all. \n(f) To practice with a personal commitment to the rules governing our profession and to encourage others to do the same. \n(g) To preserve the dignity and the integrity of our profession by my conduct. The dignity and the integrity of our profession is an inheritance that must be maintained by each successive generation of lawyers. \n(h) To achieve the excellence of our craft, especially those that permit me to be the moral voice of clients to the public in advocacy while being the moral voice of the public to clients in counseling. Good lawyering should be a moral achievement for both the lawyer and the client. \n (i) To practice law not as a business, but as a calling in the spirit of public service. \n  \n</blockquote>\n SPECIFIC ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As to clients , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To expeditious and economical achievement of all client objectives. \n(b)  To fully informed client decision-making. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Counsel clients about all forms of dispute resolution; \n(2) Counsel clients about the value of cooperation as a means toward the productive resolution of disputes; \n(3) Maintain the sympathetic detachment that permits objective and independent advice to clients; \n(4) Communicate promptly and clearly with clients; and \n(5) Reach clear agreements with clients concerning the nature of the representation. \n </blockquote> \n(c)  To fair and equitable fee agreements. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Discuss alternative methods of charging fees with all clients; \n(2) Offer fee arrangements that reflect the true value of the services rendered; \n(3) Reach agreements with clients as early in the relationship as possible; \n(4) Determine the amount of fees by consideration of many factors and not just time spent by the attorney; \n(5) Provide written agreements as to all fee arrangements; and \n(6) Resolve all fee disputes through the arbitration methods provided by the State Bar of Georgia. \n </blockquote> \n(d)  To comply with the obligations of confidentiality and the avoidance of conflicting loyalties in a manner designed to achieve the fidelity to clients that is the purpose of these obligations. \n</blockquote>\n As to opposing parties and their counsel , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To cooperate with opposing counsel in a manner consistent with the competent representation of all parties. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Notify opposing counsel in a timely fashion of any canceled appearance; \n(2) Grant reasonable requests for extensions or scheduling changes; and \n(3) Consult with opposing counsel in the scheduling of appearances, meetings, and depositions. \n </blockquote> \n(b)  To treat opposing counsel in a manner consistent with his or her professional obligations and consistent with the dignity of the search for justice. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Not serve motions or pleadings in such a manner or at such a time as to preclude opportunity for a competent response; \n(2) Be courteous and civil in all communications; \n(3) Respond promptly to all requests by opposing counsel; \n(4) Avoid rudeness and other acts of disrespect in all meetings including depositions and negotiations; \n(5) Prepare documents that accurately reflect the agreement of all parties; and \n(6) Clearly identify all changes made in documents submitted by opposing counsel for review. \n \n </blockquote></blockquote>\n As to the courts, other tribunals, and to those who assist them , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To represent my clients in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of a fair, efficient, and humane system of justice. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Avoid non-essential litigation and non-essential pleading in litigation; \n(2) Explore the possibilities of settlement of all litigated matters; \n(3) Seek non-coerced agreement between the parties on procedural and discovery matters; \n(4) Avoid all delays not dictated by a competent presentation of a client’s claims; \n(5) Prevent misuses of court time by verifying the availability of key participants for scheduled appearances before the court and by being punctual; and \n(6) Advise clients about the obligations of civility, courtesy, fairness, cooperation, and other proper behavior expected of those who use our systems of justice. \n </blockquote> \n(b)  To model for others the respect due to our courts. As a professional I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Act with complete honesty; \n(2) Know court rules and procedures; \n(3) Give appropriate deference to court rulings; \n(4) Avoid undue familiarity with members of the judiciary; \n(5) Avoid unfounded, unsubstantiated, or unjustified public criticism of members of the judiciary; \n(6) Show respect by attire and demeanor; \n(7) Assist the judiciary in determining the applicable law; and \n(8) Seek to understand the judiciary’s obligations of informed and impartial decision making. \n </blockquote></blockquote>\n As to my colleagues in the practice of law , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To recognize and to develop our interdependence; \n(b)  To respect the needs of others, especially the need to develop as a whole person; and, \n(c)  To assist my colleagues become better people in the practice of law and to accept their assistance offered to me. \n</blockquote>\n As to our profession , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To improve the practice of law. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1)  Assist in continuing legal education efforts; \n(2)  Assist in organized bar activities; and, \n(3)  Assist law schools in the education of our future lawyers. \n </blockquote> \n(b)  To protect the public from incompetent or other wrongful lawyering. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1)  Assist in bar admissions activities; \n(2)  Report violations of ethical regulations by fellow lawyers; and, \n(3)  Assist in the enforcement of the legal and ethical standards imposed upon all lawyers. \n </blockquote></blockquote>\n As to the public and our systems of justice , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a) To counsel clients about the moral and social consequences of their conduct. \n(b) To consider the effect of my conduct on the image of our systems of justice including the social effect of advertising methods. As a professional, I should ensure that any advertisement of my services: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Is consistent with the dignity of the justice system and a learned profession; \n(2) Provides a beneficial service to the public by providing accurate information about the availability of legal services; \n(3) Educates the public about the law and the legal system; \n(4) Provides completely honest and straightforward information about my qualifications, fees, and costs; and \n(5) Does not imply that clients’ legal needs can be met only through aggressive tactics. \n </blockquote> \n(c) To provide the pro bono representation that is necessary to make our system of justice available to all. \n(d) To support organizations that provide pro bono representation to indigent clients. \n (e) To improve our laws and legal system by, for example: \n  \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Serving as a public official; \n(2) Assisting in the education of the public concerning our laws and legal system; \n(3) Commenting publicly upon our laws; and \n(4) Using other appropriate methods of effecting positive change in our laws and legal system. \n </blockquote> <blockquote></blockquote> \n \n<blockquote></blockquote></blockquote>","UrlName":"revision124"}],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Title":"Part IX - Professionalism","Content":"","UrlName":"part17","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"74e37760-4769-4c30-b3c6-35245b8965ac","Title":"Rule 9-101. Purpose.","Content":" This Part of the State Bar Rules is adopted in recognition of the importance of professionalism as the ultimate hallmark of the practice of law. The purpose of this Part is to create within the State Bar a Commission to identify, enunciate and encourage adherence to non-mandatory standards of professional conduct. These standards should involve aspirations higher than those required by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct in Part IV. ","UrlName":"rule162","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"b91acfb8-11a5-4905-99ea-884b1f9bc906","Title":"Rule 9-102. Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism","Content":" (A) Membership, Appointment and Terms \n \nThere is established a permanent Commission of the State Bar of Georgia known as the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism. The Commission shall consist of twenty-two (22) members as follows: (1) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia or his or her designee, who shall serve as Chair of the Commission; (2) The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals or his or her designee; (3) one superior court judge designated by the Council of Superior Court Judges; (4) one state court judge designated by the Council of State Court Judges; (5) five law school faculty members designated by the deans of the accredited law schools in the State of Georgia, one of whom must be a member of the State Bar Committee on Professionalism; provided, however, such faculty members shall not be from the same law school; (6) two non-lawyer citizens from the public at large; (7) the President of the State Bar of Georgia; (8) the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; (9) one Federal District Judge; and (10) eight members of the State Bar of Georgia actively engaged in the practice of law, one of whom must be employed by a unit of federal state, or local government, one must be engaged primarily in criminal defense practice, one must be a federal or state prosecutor, and one must be in-house counsel. \n \nThree of the practicing lawyers and one of the non-lawyer citizens from the public at large shall be appointed by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. The remaining members of the Commission, with the exception of the President of the State Bar of Georgia, the President of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia, the superior court judge, and the state court judge, shall be appointed by the Supreme Court. The terms of the members of the Commission shall be staggered and that shall be accomplished by the initial appointments being as follows: two of the practicing lawyer members appointed by the Board of Governors shall serve until the conclusion of the State Bar Annual Meeting in 1990; the non-lawyer general public member shall serve until the conclusion of the State Bar Annual Meeting in 1990; the superior court judge member, one practicing lawyer member appointed by the Board of Governors and one law faculty member shall serve until the conclusion of the State Bar Annual Meeting in 1991. The remaining members of the Commission shall serve until the conclusion of the Annual Meeting of the State Bar in 1992. Thereafter, the superior court judge member shall serve for a two year term as designated by the Council of Superior Court Judges, the state court judge member shall serve for a two year term as designated by the Council of State Court Judges, and all other members of the Commission shall serve for three (3) year terms, and no member (except the Chief Justice, that member appointed by the Court of Appeals, and the law school representatives) may serve more than two (2) terms on the Commission. \n \n(B) Powers and Duties of the Commission: \n \nThe Commission's major responsibilities shall be: \n \n    (1) To consider efforts by lawyers and judges to improve the administration of justice; \n \n    (2) To examine ways of making the system of justice more accessible to the public; \n \n    (3) To monitor and coordinate Georgia's professionalism efforts in such institutional settings as its bar, courts, law schools and law firms; \n \n    (4) To monitor professionalism efforts in jurisdictions outside Georgia; \n \n    (5) To conduct a study and issue a report on the present state of professionalism within Georgia; \n \n    (6) To plan the yearly Convocation on Professionalism; \n \n    (7) To promote various regional convocations on professionalism; \n \n    (8) To provide guidance and support to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency in its implementation and execution of the continuing legal education professionalism requirement; \n \n    (9) To help implement a professionalism component in the Bridge-the-Gap program; \n \n    (10) To make recommendations to the Supreme Court and the State Bar concerning additional means by which professionalism can be enhanced; \n \n    (11) To receive and administer gifts and grants; and \n \n    (12) The Commission shall have no authority to impose sanctions of any kind upon any member of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(C) Finances \n \nFunding for the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism shall be provided by an additional surcharge for each active State Bar member who attends a course in professionalism sponsored by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education (ICLE) or by any other sponsor approved by the Commission. The rate shall be set annually by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, and the surcharge shall be remitted directly to it by ICLE, by any other such sponsor, or, in an appropriate case, by the individual State Bar member who attended a course in professionalism approved by the Commission.","UrlName":"rule164","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"58edf3c5-f552-42ea-8380-54bba954d82f","Title":"A Lawyer's Creed","Content":" To my clients, I offer faithfulness, competence, diligence, and good judgment. I will strive to represent you as I would want to be represented and to be worthy of your trust. \n \nTo the opposing parties and their counsel, I offer fairness, integrity, and civility. I will seek reconciliation and, if we fail, I will strive to make our dispute a dignified one. \n \nTo the courts, and other tribunals, and to those who assist them, I offer respect, candor, and courtesy. I will strive to do honor to the search for justice. \n \nTo my colleagues in the practice of law, I offer concern for your welfare. I will strive to make our association a professional friendship. \n \nTo the profession, I offer assistance. I will strive to keep our business a profession and our profession a calling in the spirit of public service. \n \nTo the public and our systems of justice, I offer service. I will strive to improve the law and our legal system, to make the law and our legal system available to all, and to seek the common good through the representation of my clients. ","UrlName":"rule420","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d96bbaad-bb59-4029-a036-5dd4774dfe02","Title":"Aspirational Statements","Content":"The Court believes there are unfortunate trends of commercialization and loss of professional community in the current practice of law. These trends are manifested in an undue emphasis on the financial rewards of practice, a lack of courtesy and civility among members of our profession, a lack of respect for the judiciary and for our systems of justice, and a lack of regard for others and for the common good. As a community of professionals, we should strive to make the internal rewards of service, craft, and character, and not the external reward of financial gain, the primary rewards of the practice of law. In our practices we should remember that the primary justification for who we are and what we do is the common good we can achieve through the faithful representation of people who desire to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner and to prevent future disputes. We should remember, and we should help our clients remember, that the way in which our clients resolve their disputes defines part of the character of our society and we should act accordingly.\nAs professionals, we need aspirational ideals to help bind us together in a professional community. Accordingly, the Court issues the following Aspirational Statement setting forth general and specific aspirational ideals of our profession. This statement is a beginning list of the ideals of our profession. It is primarily illustrative. Our purpose is not to regulate, and certainly not to provide a basis for discipline, but rather to assist the Bar’s efforts to maintain a professionalism that can stand against the negative trends of commercialization and loss of community. It is the Court’s hope that Georgia’s lawyers, judges, and legal educators will use the following aspirational ideals to reexamine the justifications of the practice of law in our society and to consider the implications of those justifications for their conduct. The Court feels that enhancement of professionalism can be best brought about by the cooperative efforts of the organized bar, the courts, and the law schools with each group working independently, but also jointly in that effort.\n\n GENERAL ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As a lawyer , I will aspire:\n(a) To put fidelity to clients and, through clients, to the common good, before selfish interests.\n(b) To model for others, and particularly for my clients, the respect due to those we call upon to resolve our disputes and the regard due to all participants in our dispute resolution processes.\n(c) To avoid all forms of wrongful discrimination in all of my activities including discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, handicap, veteran status, or national origin. The social goals of equality and fairness will be personal goals for me.\n(d) To preserve and improve the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes as instruments for the common good.\n(e) To make the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes available to all.\n(f) To practice with a personal commitment to the rules governing our profession and to encourage others to do the same.\n(g) To preserve the dignity and the integrity of our profession by my conduct. The dignity and the integrity of our profession is an inheritance that must be maintained by each successive generation of lawyers.\n(h) To achieve the excellence of our craft, especially those that permit me to be the moral voice of clients to the public in advocacy while being the moral voice of the public to clients in counseling. Good lawyering should be a moral achievement for both the lawyer and the client.\n (i) To practice law not as a business, but as a calling in the spirit of public service. \n \n SPECIFIC ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As to clients , I will aspire:\n(a)  To expeditious and economical achievement of all client objectives.\n(b)  To fully informed client decision-making. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Counsel clients about all forms of dispute resolution;\n(2) Counsel clients about the value of cooperation as a means toward the productive resolution of disputes;\n(3) Maintain the sympathetic detachment that permits objective and independent advice to clients;\n(4) Communicate promptly and clearly with clients; and\n(5) Reach clear agreements with clients concerning the nature of the representation.\n\n(c)  To fair and equitable fee agreements. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Discuss alternative methods of charging fees with all clients;\n(2) Offer fee arrangements that reflect the true value of the services rendered;\n(3) Reach agreements with clients as early in the relationship as possible;\n(4) Determine the amount of fees by consideration of many factors and not just time spent by the attorney;\n(5) Provide written agreements as to all fee arrangements; and\n(6) Resolve all fee disputes through the arbitration methods provided by the State Bar of Georgia.\n(d)  To comply with the obligations of confidentiality and the avoidance of conflicting loyalties in a manner designed to achieve the fidelity to clients that is the purpose of these obligations.\n As to opposing parties and their counsel , I will aspire:\n(a)  To cooperate with opposing counsel in a manner consistent with the competent representation of all parties. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Notify opposing counsel in a timely fashion of any canceled appearance;\n(2) Grant reasonable requests for extensions or scheduling changes; and\n(3) Consult with opposing counsel in the scheduling of appearances, meetings, and depositions.\n(b)  To treat opposing counsel in a manner consistent with his or her professional obligations and consistent with the dignity of the search for justice. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Not serve motions or pleadings in such a manner or at such a time as to preclude opportunity for a competent response;\n(2) Be courteous and civil in all communications;\n(3) Respond promptly to all requests by opposing counsel;\n(4) Avoid rudeness and other acts of disrespect in all meetings including depositions and negotiations;\n(5) Prepare documents that accurately reflect the agreement of all parties; and\n (6) Clearly identify all changes made in documents submitted by opposing counsel for review. \n \n As to the courts, other tribunals, and to those who assist them , I will aspire:\n(a)  To represent my clients in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of a fair, efficient, and humane system of justice. As a professional, I should:\n(1) Avoid non-essential litigation and non-essential pleading in litigation;\n(2) Explore the possibilities of settlement of all litigated matters;\n(3) Seek non-coerced agreement between the parties on procedural and discovery matters;\n(4) Avoid all delays not dictated by a competent presentation of a client’s claims;\n(5) Prevent misuses of court time by verifying the availability of key participants for scheduled appearances before the court and by being punctual; and\n(6) Advise clients about the obligations of civility, courtesy, fairness, cooperation, and other proper behavior expected of those who use our systems of justice.\n(b)  To model for others the respect due to our courts. As a professional I should:\n(1) Act with complete honesty;\n(2) Know court rules and procedures;\n(3) Give appropriate deference to court rulings;\n(4) Avoid undue familiarity with members of the judiciary;\n(5) Avoid unfounded, unsubstantiated, or unjustified public criticism of members of the judiciary;\n(6) Show respect by attire and demeanor;\n(7) Assist the judiciary in determining the applicable law; and\n(8) Seek to understand the judiciary’s obligations of informed and impartial decision making.\n As to my colleagues in the practice of law , I will aspire:\n(a)  To recognize and to develop our interdependence;\n(b)  To respect the needs of others, especially the need to develop as a whole person; and,\n(c)  To assist my colleagues become better people in the practice of law and to accept their assistance offered to me.\n As to our profession , I will aspire:\n(a)  To improve the practice of law. As a professional, I should:\n(1)  Assist in continuing legal education efforts;\n(2)  Assist in organized bar activities; and,\n(3)  Assist law schools in the education of our future lawyers.\n(b)  To protect the public from incompetent or other wrongful lawyering. As a professional, I should:\n(1)  Assist in bar admissions activities;\n(2)  Report violations of ethical regulations by fellow lawyers; and,\n(3)  Assist in the enforcement of the legal and ethical standards imposed upon all lawyers.\n As to the public and our systems of justice , I will aspire:\n(a) To counsel clients about the moral and social consequences of their conduct.\n(b) To consider the effect of my conduct on the image of our systems of justice including the social effect of advertising methods. As a professional, I should ensure that any advertisement of my services:\n(1) Is consistent with the dignity of the justice system and a learned profession;\n(2) Provides a beneficial service to the public by providing accurate information about the availability of legal services;\n(3) Educates the public about the law and the legal system;\n(4) Provides completely honest and straightforward information about my qualifications, fees, and costs; and\n(5) Does not imply that clients’ legal needs can be met only through aggressive tactics.\n(c) To provide the pro bono representation that is necessary to make our system of justice available to all.\n(d) To support organizations that provide pro bono representation to indigent clients.\n (e) To improve our laws and legal system by, for example: \n \n(1) Serving as a public official;\n(2) Assisting in the education of the public concerning our laws and legal system;\n(3) Commenting publicly upon our laws; and\n(4) Using other appropriate methods of effecting positive change in our laws and legal system.\n","UrlName":"rule422","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","Revisions":[{"Id":"a0014544-e522-4d87-9bb3-c28985efe1ce","ParentId":"d96bbaad-bb59-4029-a036-5dd4774dfe02","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Court believes there are unfortunate trends of commercialization and loss of professional community in the current practice of law. These trends are manifested in an undue emphasis on the financial rewards of practice, a lack of courtesy and civility among members of our profession, a lack of respect for the judiciary and for our systems of justice, and a lack of regard for others and for the common good. As a community of professionals, we should strive to make the internal rewards of service, craft, and character, and not the external reward of financial gain, the primary rewards of the practice of law. In our practices we should remember that the primary justification for who we are and what we do is the common good we can achieve through the faithful representation of people who desire to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner and to prevent future disputes. We should remember, and we should help our clients remember, that the way in which our clients resolve their disputes defines part of the character of our society and we should act accordingly.\nAs professionals, we need aspirational ideals to help bind us together in a professional community. Accordingly, the Court issues the following Aspirational Statement setting forth general and specific aspirational ideals of our profession. This statement is a beginning list of the ideals of our profession. It is primarily illustrative. Our purpose is not to regulate, and certainly not to provide a basis for discipline, but rather to assist the Bar’s efforts to maintain a professionalism that can stand against the negative trends of commercialization and loss of community. It is the Court’s hope that Georgia’s lawyers, judges, and legal educators will use the following aspirational ideals to reexamine the justifications of the practice of law in our society and to consider the implications of those justifications for their conduct. The Court feels that enhancement of professionalism can be best brought about by the cooperative efforts of the organized bar, the courts, and the law schools with each group working independently, but also jointly in that effort.\n\n GENERAL ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As a lawyer , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a) To put fidelity to clients and, through clients, to the common good, before selfish interests. \n(b) To model for others, and particularly for my clients, the respect due to those we call upon to resolve our disputes and the regard due to all participants in our dispute resolution processes. \n(c) To avoid all forms of wrongful discrimination in all of my activities including discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, handicap, veteran status, or national origin. The social goals of equality and fairness will be personal goals for me. \n(d) To preserve and improve the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes as instruments for the common good. \n(e) To make the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution processes available to all. \n(f) To practice with a personal commitment to the rules governing our profession and to encourage others to do the same. \n(g) To preserve the dignity and the integrity of our profession by my conduct. The dignity and the integrity of our profession is an inheritance that must be maintained by each successive generation of lawyers. \n(h) To achieve the excellence of our craft, especially those that permit me to be the moral voice of clients to the public in advocacy while being the moral voice of the public to clients in counseling. Good lawyering should be a moral achievement for both the lawyer and the client. \n (i) To practice law not as a business, but as a calling in the spirit of public service. \n  \n</blockquote>\n SPECIFIC ASPIRATIONAL IDEALS\n As to clients , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To expeditious and economical achievement of all client objectives. \n(b)  To fully informed client decision-making. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Counsel clients about all forms of dispute resolution; \n(2) Counsel clients about the value of cooperation as a means toward the productive resolution of disputes; \n(3) Maintain the sympathetic detachment that permits objective and independent advice to clients; \n(4) Communicate promptly and clearly with clients; and \n(5) Reach clear agreements with clients concerning the nature of the representation. \n </blockquote> \n(c)  To fair and equitable fee agreements. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Discuss alternative methods of charging fees with all clients; \n(2) Offer fee arrangements that reflect the true value of the services rendered; \n(3) Reach agreements with clients as early in the relationship as possible; \n(4) Determine the amount of fees by consideration of many factors and not just time spent by the attorney; \n(5) Provide written agreements as to all fee arrangements; and \n(6) Resolve all fee disputes through the arbitration methods provided by the State Bar of Georgia. \n </blockquote> \n(d)  To comply with the obligations of confidentiality and the avoidance of conflicting loyalties in a manner designed to achieve the fidelity to clients that is the purpose of these obligations. \n</blockquote>\n As to opposing parties and their counsel , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To cooperate with opposing counsel in a manner consistent with the competent representation of all parties. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Notify opposing counsel in a timely fashion of any canceled appearance; \n(2) Grant reasonable requests for extensions or scheduling changes; and \n(3) Consult with opposing counsel in the scheduling of appearances, meetings, and depositions. \n </blockquote> \n(b)  To treat opposing counsel in a manner consistent with his or her professional obligations and consistent with the dignity of the search for justice. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Not serve motions or pleadings in such a manner or at such a time as to preclude opportunity for a competent response; \n(2) Be courteous and civil in all communications; \n(3) Respond promptly to all requests by opposing counsel; \n(4) Avoid rudeness and other acts of disrespect in all meetings including depositions and negotiations; \n(5) Prepare documents that accurately reflect the agreement of all parties; and \n(6) Clearly identify all changes made in documents submitted by opposing counsel for review. \n \n </blockquote></blockquote>\n As to the courts, other tribunals, and to those who assist them , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To represent my clients in a manner consistent with the proper functioning of a fair, efficient, and humane system of justice. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Avoid non-essential litigation and non-essential pleading in litigation; \n(2) Explore the possibilities of settlement of all litigated matters; \n(3) Seek non-coerced agreement between the parties on procedural and discovery matters; \n(4) Avoid all delays not dictated by a competent presentation of a client’s claims; \n(5) Prevent misuses of court time by verifying the availability of key participants for scheduled appearances before the court and by being punctual; and \n(6) Advise clients about the obligations of civility, courtesy, fairness, cooperation, and other proper behavior expected of those who use our systems of justice. \n </blockquote> \n(b)  To model for others the respect due to our courts. As a professional I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Act with complete honesty; \n(2) Know court rules and procedures; \n(3) Give appropriate deference to court rulings; \n(4) Avoid undue familiarity with members of the judiciary; \n(5) Avoid unfounded, unsubstantiated, or unjustified public criticism of members of the judiciary; \n(6) Show respect by attire and demeanor; \n(7) Assist the judiciary in determining the applicable law; and \n(8) Seek to understand the judiciary’s obligations of informed and impartial decision making. \n </blockquote></blockquote>\n As to my colleagues in the practice of law , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To recognize and to develop our interdependence; \n(b)  To respect the needs of others, especially the need to develop as a whole person; and, \n(c)  To assist my colleagues become better people in the practice of law and to accept their assistance offered to me. \n</blockquote>\n As to our profession , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a)  To improve the practice of law. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1)  Assist in continuing legal education efforts; \n(2)  Assist in organized bar activities; and, \n(3)  Assist law schools in the education of our future lawyers. \n </blockquote> \n(b)  To protect the public from incompetent or other wrongful lawyering. As a professional, I should: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1)  Assist in bar admissions activities; \n(2)  Report violations of ethical regulations by fellow lawyers; and, \n(3)  Assist in the enforcement of the legal and ethical standards imposed upon all lawyers. \n </blockquote></blockquote>\n As to the public and our systems of justice , I will aspire:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n(a) To counsel clients about the moral and social consequences of their conduct. \n(b) To consider the effect of my conduct on the image of our systems of justice including the social effect of advertising methods. As a professional, I should ensure that any advertisement of my services: \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Is consistent with the dignity of the justice system and a learned profession; \n(2) Provides a beneficial service to the public by providing accurate information about the availability of legal services; \n(3) Educates the public about the law and the legal system; \n(4) Provides completely honest and straightforward information about my qualifications, fees, and costs; and \n(5) Does not imply that clients’ legal needs can be met only through aggressive tactics. \n </blockquote> \n(c) To provide the pro bono representation that is necessary to make our system of justice available to all. \n(d) To support organizations that provide pro bono representation to indigent clients. \n (e) To improve our laws and legal system by, for example: \n  \n <blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n (1) Serving as a public official; \n(2) Assisting in the education of the public concerning our laws and legal system; \n(3) Commenting publicly upon our laws; and \n(4) Using other appropriate methods of effecting positive change in our laws and legal system. \n </blockquote> <blockquote></blockquote> \n \n<blockquote></blockquote></blockquote>","UrlName":"revision124"}],"Ancestors":["14169133-e014-492b-9fb0-14b01b28a0e9","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Rule 8-104. Education Requirements and Exemptions.","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Approval of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status. Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice. Have been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia for not less than five years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation. Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action. Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand; State Disciplinary Board Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action. During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor. \n \n </ul> \n</ul>\n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"rule227","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","Revisions":[{"Id":"db934e62-2bbb-4245-8c8d-2ae03a5332eb","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 4","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"></blockquote>\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand; State Disciplinary Board Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n \n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision327"},{"Id":"b1a82c24-91d5-46f9-8604-88e8f775e64c","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 5","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"></blockquote>\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice of law in Georgia for not less than five years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; State Disciplinary Review Board Reprimand; State Disciplinary Board Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n \n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision407"},{"Id":"bb484df1-773b-4421-ac38-9cf0fdbb97bd","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 3","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year.\n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year.\n(2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years.\n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"></blockquote>\n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings.\n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating.\n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules.\n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order.\n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records.\n Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics refers to the mandatory standards set by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Ethics programming instructs attorneys on requirements of the rules, provides attorneys with resources to avoid violations and helps attorneys understand how the rules protect the public. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; Review Panel Reprimand; Investigative Panel Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n \n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n (3) Active Non-Resident . Active non-Georgia members residing in other mandatory CLE states may satisfy all Georgia requirements by (1) meeting the CLE requirements of the resident state, (2) so reporting annually on their Georgia MCLE Annual Report, and (3) paying the Georgia CLE, professionalism, and late fees normally paid by active members residing in Georgia. \n (4) Active Military Duty . Active members serving on active duty with the United States Armed Forces shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Ru le.\n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n \n v. An actual or simulated mediation.\n Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision298"},{"Id":"23f48cdd-629e-4093-b77f-be7f614a24a3","ParentId":"78e1ebb7-45d8-417d-a1c3-a606902cf16c","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (A) Minimum Continuing Legal Education Requirement. \n \nEach active member shall complete a minimum of twelve (12) hours of actual instruction in an approved continuing legal education activity during each year. If a member completes more than twelve (12) hours in a year, the excess credit may be carried forward and applied to the education requirement for the succeeding year only.\n(B) Basic Legal Skills Requirement.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n(1) Except as set out in subsections (a) and (b) below, any newly admitted active member admitted after June 30, 2005, must complete in the year of his or her admission or in the next calendar year the State Bar of Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, and such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such newly admitted active member for both the year of admission and the next succeeding year. \n <blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n (a) Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United States jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state, may be exempted from completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program upon the submission, within three months of admission, of an affidavit to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. The affidavit shall provide the date or dates of admission in every other state in which the member is admitted to practice and a declaration that the newly admitted member has been actively engaged in the practice of law for two or more years immediately prior to admission in this state. Upon submission of a satisfactory affidavit, the newly admitted active member shall be required to complete the annual twelve hours of instruction in approved continuing legal education activity beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Any newly admitted active member, who has practiced law in another United State jurisdiction other than Georgia for two or more years immediately prior to admission to practice in this state and who does not timely file the required affidavit, shall be required to complete the Transition Into Law Practice Program as set out above. \n(b) Any newly admitted active member, who is a judicial law clerk or who begins a clerkship within three months of admission, shall not be subject to the requirement of completing the Transition Into Law Practice Program during the period of the judicial clerkship. Within thirty days of admission to the State Bar or within thirty days of the beginning of the clerkship if said clerkship begins within three months after admission, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of entry into the clerkship position. Judicial law clerks are required to complete the annual twelve hours of regular instruction in approved continuing legal education courses beginning at the start of the first full calendar year after the date of admission. Within thirty days of the completion of the clerkship, the member shall provide written notice to the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency of the date of such completion. The member must complete, in the year the clerkship was concluded, or the next calendar year, the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program. Such completion of the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall satisfy the mandatory continuing legal education requirements for such member for both the year of completion of the clerkship and the next succeeding calendar year. \n </blockquote> \n (2) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in the area of ethics. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in ethics during the calendar year, the excess ethics credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the ethics requirement for succeeding years. \n \n(3) Each active member, except those participating in the Georgia Transition Into Law Practice Program, shall complete a minimum of one (1) hour of continuing legal education during each year in an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. This hour is to be included in, and not in addition to, the twelve-hour (12) requirement. If a member completes more than one (1) hour in professionalism during the calendar year, the excess professionalism credit may be carried forward up to a maximum of two (2) hours and applied to the professionalism requirement for succeeding years. \n(4) Confidentiality of Proceedings. \n <blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n(a) The confidentiality of all inquiries to, decisions of, and proceedings by the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be respected.  No disclosure of said inquiries, decisions and proceedings shall be made in the absence of the agreement of all participating. \n(b) Except as expressly permitted by these rules, no person connected with the Transitions Into law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency shall disclose any information concerning or comments on any proceeding under these rules. \n(c) The Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency may reveal private records when require by law, court rule, or court order. \n(d) Any records maintained by the Transition Into Law Practice Program operated under the auspices of the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency, as provided herein, shall be available to Counsel for the State Bar only in the event the State Bar or any department thereof receives a discovery request or properly executed subpoena requesting such records. \n </blockquote></blockquote> Regulations \n \n(1) Definitions . \n \n\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (a) Newly Admitted Active Member. A \"newly admitted active member \"is one who becomes an active member of the State Bar of Georgia for the first time. \n \n(b) Bridge-the-Gap. \"Bridge-the-Gap \"is a program organized and defined by ICLE. Currently, the Bridge-the-Gap program consists of two days of instruction: the first day being a seminar called Bridge-the-Gap and the second day being any other approved six hour seminar to be selected by each lawyer. This program will be replaced by the Transition Into Law Practice Program after October 1, 2005. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (c) Transition Into Law Practice Program. \"Transition Into Law Practice Program \"is a program organized and defined by the Standards of the Profession Committee of the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency. Currently, the Transition Into Law Practice Program consists of two components:</div>\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (i) Attendance at the Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap program, or the Fundamentals of Law Practice program of the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, or a comparable program approved by the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency; and \n(ii) Completion of a Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. </div> \n</blockquote>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (d) Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap. \"Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap,\"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in large group settings. Enhanced Bridge-the-Gap consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (e) Fundamentals of Law Practice. \"Fundamentals of Law Practice \"is the continuing legal education program of the Transition Into Law Practice Program that is delivered by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education in small group settings to foster close interaction between newly admitted active lawyers and instructors. Fundamentals of Law Practice consists of two consecutive days of course work that inform and facilitate further discussion in the mentoring context. </div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"></div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (f) Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences. The \"Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences \"is the plan that structures and guides the mentoring component of the Transition Into Law Practice Program. The Plan shall be submitted to the Program in the year of admission or early in the next calendar year by the newly admitted active member and his or her mentor. The Plan must be completed in the year of admission or the next calendar year.</div>\n \n (2) Transition Application. Except as set out in Sections (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(b) above, the Transition Into Law Practice Program shall be required of all newly admitted active members admitted after June 30, 2005. The ICLE Bridge-the-Gap program shall be required of all newly admitted active members who are admitted prior to July 1, 2005. \n \n(3)Legal Ethics . Legal ethics includes instruction on professional responsibility and malpractice. It does not include such topics as attorney fees, client development, law office economics, and practice systems except to the extent that professional responsibility is directly discussed in connection with these topics. \n \n(4) Professionalism. The professionalism CLE requirement is distinct from, and in addition to, the ethics CLE requirement. The one-hour professionalism requirement is satisfied only by attending an activity of any sponsor approved by the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism in the area of professionalism. Legal ethics sets forth the minimal standards of professional conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism encompasses what is more broadly expected of lawyers to serve both client and public good. Professionalism refers to the intersecting values of competence, civility, integrity, and commitment to the rule of law, justice, and the public good. The general goal of the professionalism CLE requirement is to create a forum in which lawyers, judges, and legal educators can explore and reflect upon the meaning and goals of professionalism in contemporary legal practice. The professionalism CLE sessions should encourage lawyers toward conduct that preserves and strengthens the dignity, honor, and integrity of the legal profession. Professionalism CLE includes, but is not limited to, courses on (a) the duties of lawyers to the systems of justice, courts, public, clients, other lawyers, and the profession, (b) the roles of lawyers as advocates, counselors, negotiators, problem solvers, and consensus builders, (c) various forms of dispute resolution, (d) pro bono service, (e) the concept of a profession, (f) history of the legal profession, (g) comparison of the legal profession in different nations' systems of advocacy, and (h) jurisprudence or philosophy of law. \n (5) Deadlines. The normal MCLE deadlines (December 31 and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the Transition Into Law Practice Program. \n (6) Appointment of Mentors ; Minimum Qualifications. \n<ul> \n (a) Appointment of Mentors. The Supreme Court of Georgia has the sole authority to appoint Mentors. \n (b) Nomination of Mentors. The Standards of the Profession Committee may nominate individuals satisfying the Minimum Qualifications to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment consideration; provided however, that the Supreme Court of Georgia retains the authority to appoint Mentors upon its own recommendation and/or motion. \n (c) Minimum Qualifications for Mentors. A volunteer shall meet the following Minimum Qualifications to be eligible for nomination to the Supreme Court of Georgia for appointment as Mentor: \n <ul> \n (i) Active Status.  Be an active member of the State Bar of Georgia, in good standing; and, \n (ii) 5 Years of Practice.  Have been admitted to the practice law for not less than five (5) years; and, \n (iii) Professional Reputation.  Maintain a professional reputation in his or her local legal community for competence, ethical and professional conduct; and, \n (iv) Disciplinary Action.  Never have received the sanction of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, nor have voluntarily surrendered his or her license to practice law for the purpose of disposing with a pending disciplinary proceeding in any jurisdiction.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been otherwise sanctioned by the pertinent entity governing the admission and practice of law in any jurisdiction. The term \"sanctioned \"means subjected to disciplinary action.  (For example, in Georgia, \"sanctioned \"currently means any of the levels of discipline whether public or confidential listed in State Bar of Georgia Rule 4-102(b) (i.e., Disbarment; Suspension; Public Reprimand; Review Panel Reprimand; Investigative Panel Reprimand; Formal Admonition); Rule 8-107 (C) (i.e., Administrative Suspension for deficiency in continuing legal education hours); or State Bar Bylaws Article I, Section 4, Item 2 (i.e., Failure to Register with State Bar of Georgia within one year upon eligibility)). Nominations of individuals having formal complaint (s) pending before the Supreme Court of Georgia will be deferred until the final disposition of the formal complaint (s); and, \n (v) Court-ordered Disciplinary Action.  During the ten (10) years preceding the nomination as mentor, the prospective mentor shall not have been the subject of a written order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that prohibits or otherwise limits the prospective mentor from practicing before that court or class of courts.  A directive, request or order by a judge of a court requesting or directing that an attorney employed by an agency of government or a legal aid organization who is assigned to handle cases before that judge be transferred or reassigned to other duties or another courtroom does not constitute court-ordered disciplinary action under this part.  A prospective mentor who is or has within the preceding ten (10) years been the subject of such a written order may petition the Commission on Continuing Lawyer Competency (the \"Commission \") for a waiver of this requirement.  After review of the facts and circumstances which led to the entry of such order, the Commission may, upon good cause shown, grant such waiver if the prospective mentor is otherwise qualified to be a mentor; and \n (vi) Professional Liability Insurance or Equivalent. Be covered under a professional liability insurance policy with minimum limits of $250,000.00/$500,000.00, or, if applicable, the equivalent to such coverage through the legal status of his or her employer. \n </ul> \n</ul>\n\n (7) Status. While CLE and TILPP mentoring activities may be completed while on inactive status, TILPP completion certification will be issued only after a member changes to active status. \n (C) Exemptions. \n \n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> (1) An inactive member shall be exempt from the continuing legal education and the reporting requirements of this Rule. \n \n(2) The Commission may exempt an active member from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule for a period of not more than one (1) year upon a finding by the Commission of special circumstances unique to that member constituting undue hardship. \n \n(3) Any active member over the age of seventy (70) shall be exempt from the continuing legal education requirements of this rule, including the reporting requirements, unless the member notifies the Commission in writing that the member wishes to continue to be covered by the continuing legal education requirements of this rule. \n \n(4) Any active member residing outside of Georgia who neither practices in Georgia nor represents Georgia clients shall be exempt, upon written application to the Commission, from the continuing legal education, but not the reporting, requirements of this rule during the year for which the written application is made. This application shall be filed with the annual report. \n \n(5) Any active member of the Board of Bar Examiners shall be exempt from the continuing legal education but not the reporting requirement of this Rule.</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n </div>\n Regulations \n \n (1) Inactive . To be fully exempt, the member must be inactive during the entire year. An active attorney who changes to inactive status is not exempt during the year in which the status change occurs. An inactive attorney who changes to active status must comply with the full 12 CLE hour requirement. \n \n(2) Undue Hardship . Requests for undue hardship exemptions on physical disability or other grounds may be granted. The CCLC shall review and approve or disapprove such requests on an individual basis. \n \n(D) Requirements for Participation in Litigation.\n(1) Prior to appearing as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, any participant in the Transition Into Law Practice Program admitted to practice after June 30, 2005, shall complete the mandatory Advocacy Experiences of the Transition Into Law Practice Program set forth in Regulation (5) hereunder. The mandatory Advocacy Experiences shall be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences, except that up to three (3) of the five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences may be obtained after completion of 60% of the credit hours required for law school graduation and prior to admission to practice. At least two (2) of the mandatory Advocacy Experiences must be completed as part of the Mentoring Plan of Activities and Experiences.\n(2) Each active member who appears as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case in 1990 or in any subsequent calendar year, shall complete for such year a minimum of three (3) hours of continuing legal education activity in the area of trial practice. A trial practice CLE activity is one exclusively limited to one or more of the following subjects: evidence, civil practice and procedure, criminal practice and procedure, ethics and professionalism in litigation, or trial advocacy. These hours are to be included in, and not in addition to, the 12-hour (twelve) requirement. If a member completes more than three (3) trial practice hours, the excess trial practice credit may be carried forward and applied to the trial practice requirement for the succeeding year only.\n \nRegulations \n \n Trial MCLE \n \n(1)  Lead Counsel is defined as the attorney who has primary responsibility for making all professional decisions in the handling of the case. \n \n(2) The trial MCLE rule applies to all members who appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case. As a segment of the 12-hour (twelve) total MCLE requirement, the MCLE exemptions are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. Likewise, the normal MCLE deadlines (December 31st and approved deficiency plan extensions) are applicable to the trial MCLE rule. \n \n (3) Due to the \"exclusively limited \"requirement, trial CLE must be (a) clearly segregated and identified (b) a minimum of one (1) hour in length, and (c) limited to one or more of the five (5) listed subjects in order to receive trial CLE credit. The \"exclusively limited \"requirement does not prohibit credit for a seminar that deals with one or more of the subjects stated in the Rule in the context of a particular field of trial practice, such as medical malpractice, personal injury defense, criminal cases, construction law, etc. \n \n(4) MCLE transcripts will reflect trial CLE in addition to ethics and total CLE. However, the certification of compliance is made by the members when they make the court appearance described in the Rules. The sanctions for false certification or other non-compliance lie with the Court in which the lawyer appeared and with the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia. If the Commission receives allegations or evidence of a false certification or other non-compliance, a report thereof shall be forwarded to the State Disciplinary Board for any action it deems necessary. \n (5) For participants in the Transition Into Law Practice Program who wish to appear as sole or lead counsel in the Superior or State Courts of Georgia in any contested civil case or in the trial of a criminal case, the mentors and beginning lawyers shall devise five (5) mandatory Advocacy Experiences tailored to the practices of the beginning lawyers.  The following are examples:\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \n i. An actual or simulated deposition of a witness or adverse party in a civil action; \n ii. An actual or simulated jury trial in a civil or criminal case in either a state or federal court; \n iii. An actual or simulated nonjury trial or evidentiary hearing in a state or federal court; \n iv. An actual or webcast of an appellate argument in the Supreme Court of Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, or a United States Circuit Court of Appeals; and \n v. An actual or simulated mediation. \n</blockquote>Other advocacy experiences may be selected by Mentors to comply with Rule 8-104(D).","UrlName":"revision120"}],"Ancestors":["8e69115a-0802-4190-93a6-b3dad01c9e4e","9c67c26d-6e41-409a-9d99-541e8947a0ce","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"ffceaf66-d6c8-42c8-8028-cf63d43bb8b3","Title":"Rule 7-304. Immunity.","Content":"The State Bar of Georgia, its employees, and members of the Committee and its selected clinical outsource private health care professionals shall be absolutely immune from civil liability for all acts taken in the course of their official duties pursuant to these Rules.","UrlName":"rule269","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","Revisions":[{"Id":"b7cecee4-4602-4186-b714-413b40ffb2f7","ParentId":"ffceaf66-d6c8-42c8-8028-cf63d43bb8b3","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall implement and design such reports and documentation as it deems necessary or as is requested by the president of the State Bar, subject to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 7-303.","UrlName":"revision259"}],"Ancestors":["5c1e97e1-1d5c-4b6a-8f8a-39cce11abc8f","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"5b7f375a-f3c9-429d-ac6e-ec4df5fe7745","Title":"Rule 7-204. Definitions.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>Lawyer. A lawyer, for the purposes of this Rule, is a member of the State Bar of Georgia as defined in Part I, Chapter 2, Rule 1-202 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>Health Care Provider. A person authorized by the State of Georgia to practice a health care discipline and performing within the scope of his or her practice as defined by State law or an entity under Georgia law to employ such person.</li> \n <li>Peer Support Volunteers. Lawyers who have been approved by the Committee to serve as volunteer members by offering empathy and validation to a lawyer who may be suffering from a mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related problem, generally by providing practical, social, and emotional support, potentially based on their own experiences with a similar illness, stress or condition.</li> \n <li>Professional Clinical Services. Services provided by licensed mental health and substance abuse counselors in connection with the diagnosis, assessment, evaluation, treatment or prevention of psychological, emotional, psychophysiological and behavioral problems and addiction. These services include procedures for understanding, predicting, and alleviating intellectual, emotional, physical, and psychological distress, social and behavioral maladjustment, mental illness and addiction, as well as other forms of discomfort.</li> \n <li>Substance Abuse. A dependence on an addictive substance, especially alcohol or drugs.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule260","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","Revisions":[{"Id":"98e009e3-e914-4a2a-a16b-21f4b87b9111","ParentId":"5b7f375a-f3c9-429d-ac6e-ec4df5fe7745","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> \n <ol> \n <li>Attorney, as used in this Part VII, shall include active, inactive, emeritus and foreign law consultant members of the State Bar of Georgia.</li> \n <li>An impaired attorney is an attorney who, in the opinion of the members of the Committee, the State Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court of Georgia, or the members of the professional health care provider selected in accordance with Rule 7-203 above, who suffers from a medical, psychological, emotional, or stress-related disease or problem, or who is actively abusing alcohol or other chemical substances, or has become dependent upon alcohol or such substances, such that the attorney poses a substantial threat of harm to the attorney or the attorney's clients, or the public.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"revision253"}],"Ancestors":["94908439-089b-40cd-a93e-a86283dcc4b2","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"c1bbc00d-3d22-43b9-a931-47f6c3bb75a5","Title":"Rule 7-103. Responsibility.","Content":"The Committee shall be responsible for implementing programs within the scope of these Rules to assist State Bar of Georgia members who request help from the LAP for mental, emotional, substance abuse, behavioral addiction, or stress-related issues. Such programs shall provide for education, support, and/or professional clinical services through a LAP health care provider or referral for other counseling or treatment where appropriate. All programs shall require approval of the Executive Committee prior to implementation.","UrlName":"rule240","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","Revisions":[{"Id":"397fe879-f8ee-4b8a-8b75-c65181c535b5","ParentId":"c1bbc00d-3d22-43b9-a931-47f6c3bb75a5","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee shall be responsible for implementing an impairment program that provides education, referral and intervention.","UrlName":"revision244"}],"Ancestors":["63dd61dc-06eb-4690-9dd7-063a26c96fe5","8599721b-c645-4f02-9a29-3910b7298e15","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"49ef6373-fb5c-4517-94f8-165b1ef56f0f","Title":"Rule 6-404. Stenographic Record.","Content":"Any party may ask the Committee to arrange for the taking of a stenographic record of the proceeding. If a party orders a transcript, that party shall acquire and provide a certified copy of the transcript for the record at no cost to the panel. Other parties are entitled at their own expense to acquire a copy of the transcript by making arrangements directly with the court reporter. However, it shall not be necessary to have a stenographic record of the hearing.","UrlName":"rule190","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["64347480-7d64-4949-8f3d-7d439cb7c2db","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d57de479-547d-46d6-a5b5-e7e9cb582eca","Title":"Rule 6-304. Qualifications of Lawyer Arbitrators.","Content":"In addition to being impartial, lawyer arbitrators shall:\n(a) Have practiced law actively for at least five years; and\n(b) Be an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule185","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Title":"CHAPTER 3 SELECTION OF ARBITRATORS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter18","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"49642da5-76db-4c3e-a55c-54962c92493b","Title":"Rule 6-301. Roster of Arbitrators.","Content":"The Committee shall maintain a roster of lawyers available to serve as arbitrators on an “as needed” basis in appropriate geographical areas throughout the state. To the extent possible, the arbitration should take place in the same geographical area where the services in question were performed; however, the final decision as to the location of the arbitration remains with the Committee.\nThe Committee shall likewise maintain a roster of nonlawyer public members selected by the Supreme Court of Georgia.\n","UrlName":"rule180","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"a4d46334-9f7d-45fd-b7d1-433a746e77cc","Title":"Rule 6-302. Neutrality of Arbitrators.","Content":"No person shall serve as an arbitrator in any matter in which that person has any financial or personal interest. Upon appointment to a particular arbitration, each arbitrator shall disclose to the Committee any circumstance that may affect his or her neutrality in regard to the dispute in question.\nIf an arbitrator becomes aware of any circumstances that might preclude that arbitrator from rendering an objective and impartial determination of the proceeding, the arbitrator must disclose that potential conflict as soon as practicable. If the arbitrator becomes aware of the potential conflict prior to the hearing, the disclosure shall be made to the Committee, which shall forward the disclosure to the parties. If the potential conflict becomes apparent during the hearing, the disclosure shall be made directly to the parties.\nIf a party believes that an arbitrator has a potential conflict of interest and should withdraw or be disqualified, and the arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw, the party shall promptly notify the Committee so that the issue may be addressed and resolved as early in the arbitration process as possible.","UrlName":"rule181","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"4ac30ef0-882a-4203-9baf-dd794ef07068","Title":"Rule 6-303. Selection of Arbitrators.","Content":"The arbitration panel shall be selected by the Committee or its staff. Except as provided below, the arbitration panel shall consist of two lawyer members who have practiced law actively for at least five years and one nonlawyer public member.\nIn cases involving disputed amounts not exceeding $2,500, the Committee in its sole discretion may appoint an arbitration panel consisting of one lawyer who has practiced law actively for at least five years.\nPetitioner and respondent by mutual agreement shall have the right to select the three arbitrators. They also may mutually agree to have the dispute determined by a sole arbitrator jointly selected by them, provided any such sole arbitrator shall be one of the persons on the roster of arbitrators or shall have been approved in advance by the Committee upon the joint request of petitioner and respondent.","UrlName":"rule183","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[{"Id":"f73558d0-6378-4352-a982-582b853de4ce","ParentId":"4ac30ef0-882a-4203-9baf-dd794ef07068","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The arbitrator panel shall be selected by the Committee or its staff.  Except as provided below,  the arbitration panel shall consist of two attorney members who have practiced law actively for at least five years and one nonlawyer public member.\nIn cases involving disputed amounts greater than $750 but not exceeding $2,500, the Committee in its sole discretion may appoint an arbitration panel consisting of one lawyer who has practiced law actively for at least five years.\nPetitioner and respondent by mutual agreement shall have the right to select the three arbitrators. They also may mutually agree to have the dispute determined by a sole arbitrator jointly selected by them, provided any such sole arbitrator shall be one of the persons on the roster of arbitrators or shall have been approved in advance by the Committee upon the joint request of petitioner and respondent.","UrlName":"revision371"}],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"d57de479-547d-46d6-a5b5-e7e9cb582eca","Title":"Rule 6-304. Qualifications of Lawyer Arbitrators.","Content":"In addition to being impartial, lawyer arbitrators shall:\n(a) Have practiced law actively for at least five years; and\n(b) Be an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia.","UrlName":"rule185","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"3e661f11-40e6-4182-aa13-7dd5e7857e8b","Title":"Rule 6-305. Powers and Duties of Arbitration Panel.","Content":"The panel of arbitrators shall have the following powers and duties:\n(a) To compel by subpoena the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and things; \n(b) To decide the extent and method of any discovery;\n(c) To administer oaths and affirmations;\n(d) To take and hear evidence pertaining to the proceeding;\n(e) To rule on the admissibility of evidence;\n(f) To interpret and apply these rules insofar as they relate to the arbitrators’ powers and duties; and\n (g) To perform all acts necessary to conduct an effective arbitration hearing. \n ","UrlName":"rule186","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"26bdffc6-e867-429c-a54c-d7ad1be29212","Title":"Rule 6-306. Compensation.","Content":"All arbitrators shall serve voluntarily and without fee or expense reimbursement; provided, however, that arbitrators selected to serve in disputes in which all the parties are lawyers may at the discretion of the Committee be compensated, with such compensation to be paid by the lawyer parties as directed by the Committee.","UrlName":"rule553","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23dd67a7-1292-421a-869a-39f457ab3e66","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]}],"ParentId":"cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"13d790b3-03e5-48b3-bccc-2d96f5e50433","Title":"Rule 6-204. Accepting Jurisdiction.","Content":"The Committee or its designee may accept jurisdiction over a fee dispute only if the following requirements are considered satisfied:\n(a) The fee in question, whether paid or unpaid, was for legal services rendered by a lawyer who is, or was at the time the services were rendered, a member of the State Bar of Georgia or otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia.\n(b) The legal services in question were performed:\n(1) in the State of Georgia; or\n(2) from an office located in the State of Georgia; or\n(3) by a lawyer who is not admitted to the practice of law in any United States jurisdiction other than Georgia, and the circumstances are such that if the State Bar of Georgia does not accept jurisdiction, no other United States jurisdiction will be available to a client who has filed a petition under this program.\n(c) The disputed fee exceeds $1,000;\n(d) The amount of the disputed fee is not governed by statute or other law, nor has any court fixed or approved the full amount or all terms of the disputed fee. \n(e) The fee dispute is not the subject of litigation in court at the time the petition for arbitration is filed or when the Committee determines jurisdiction.\n(f) The petition seeking arbitration of the fee dispute is filed with the Committee no more than two years following the date on which the controversy arose.  If this date is disputed, it shall be determined in the same manner as the commencement of a cause of action on the underlying contract.\n(g) In the case of disputes between lawyers and clients, a lawyer/client relationship existed between the petitioner and the respondent at the time the legal services in question were performed.  A relative or other person paying the legal fees of the client may request arbitration of disputes over those fees, provided both the client and the other person payor join as co-petitioners or co-respondents and both agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\n(h) The client, whether petitioner or respondent, agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration. If the respondent lawyer does not agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration, the Committee will not accept the matter for arbitration.\n(i) In disputes between lawyers, the lawyers who are parties to the dispute are all members of the State Bar of Georgia and have all agreed to arbitrate the dispute under this program and to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\n(j) Where the parties to a fee dispute have signed a written agreement to submit fee disputes to binding arbitration with the State Bar of Georgia’s Attorney Fee Arbitration Program, the Committee will consider the agreement enforceable if it is:\n(1) set out in a separate paragraph;\n(2) written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract; and\n(3) separately initialed by the client and the lawyer.\n(k) In deciding whether to accept jurisdiction, the Committee shall review available evidence, including the recommendations of the staff, and make a determination whether to accept or decline jurisdiction. The Committee’s decisions on jurisdiction are final, except that such decisions are subject to reconsideration by the Committee upon the request of either party made within 30 days of the initial decision. Staff shall notify the parties of the Committee’s decision on jurisdiction by first class mail.","UrlName":"rule549","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","Revisions":[{"Id":"27c60fa8-a43f-4f2d-a0f6-00ca04c76bf5","ParentId":"13d790b3-03e5-48b3-bccc-2d96f5e50433","Title":"Version 2","Content":"The Committee or its designee may accept jurisdiction over a fee dispute only if the following requirements are satisfied:\n(a) The fee in question, whether paid or unpaid, was for legal services rendered by a lawyer who is, or was at the time the services were rendered, a member of the State Bar of Georgia or otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia.\n(b) The legal services in question were performed:\n(1) in the State of Georgia; or\n(2) from an office located in the State of Georgia; or\n(3) by a lawyer who is not admitted to the practice of law in any United States jurisdiction other than Georgia, and the circumstances are such that if the State Bar of Georgia does not accept jurisdiction, no other United States jurisdiction will be available to a client who has filed a petition under this program.\n(c) The disputed fee exceeds $750.\n(d) The amount of the disputed fee is not governed by statute or other law, nor has any court fixed or approved the full amount or all terms of the disputed fee. \n(e) The fee dispute is not the subject of litigation in court at the time the petition for arbitration is filed or when the Committee determines jurisdiction.\n(f) The petition seeking arbitration of the fee dispute is filed with the Committee no more than two years following the date on which the controversy arose.  If this date is disputed, it shall be determined in the same manner as the commencement of a cause of action on the underlying contract.\n(g) In the case of disputes between lawyers and clients, a lawyer/client relationship existed between the petitioner and the respondent at the time the legal services in question were performed.  A relative or other person paying the legal fees of the client may request arbitration of disputes over those fees, provided both the client and the other person payor join as co-petitioners or co-respondents and both agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\n(h) The client, whether petitioner or respondent, agrees to be bound by the result of the arbitration.  If the respondent attorney does not agree to be bound by the result of the arbitration, the Committee in its discretion may determine that it is in the best interest of the public and the legal profession to accept jurisdiction.  When the Committee accepts jurisdiction under these circumstances, the nonconsenting lawyer shall be considered a “party” for purposes of these rules.\n(i) In disputes between lawyers, the lawyers who are parties to the dispute are all members of the State Bar of Georgia and have all agreed to arbitrate the dispute under this program and to be bound by the result of the arbitration.\nAdditionally, where the parties to a fee dispute have signed  a written agreement to submit fee disputes to binding arbitration with the State Bar of Georgia’s Attorney Fee Arbitration Program, the Committee will consider the agreement enforceable if it is:\n(1) set out in a separate paragraph;\n(2) written in a font size at least as large as the rest of the contract; and\n(3) separately initialed by the client and the attorney.\nIn deciding whether to accept jurisdiction, the Committee shall review available evidence, including the recommendations of the staff, and make a determination whether to accept or decline jurisdiction. The Committee’s decisions on jurisdiction are final, except that such decisions are subject to reconsideration by the Committee upon the request of either party made within 30 days of the initial decision. Staff shall notify the parties of the Committee’s decision on jurisdiction by first class mail.","UrlName":"revision365"}],"Ancestors":["fc169305-606c-45be-826b-976ce6e4e0eb","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"255e70a0-1276-4d24-8aa1-0d397fa52545","Title":"Rule 6-104. Powers and Duties of Committee.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Committee shall have the following powers and duties: \n(a) To determine whether to accept jurisdiction over a dispute; \n(b) To appoint and remove lawyer and nonlawyer arbitrators and panels of arbitrators; \n(c) To oversee the operation of the arbitration process; \n(d) To develop and implement fee arbitration procedures; \n(e) To interpret these rules and to decide any disputes regarding the interpretation and application of these rules; \n(f) To determine challenges to, and rule on, the neutrality of an arbitrator where the arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw; \n(g) To maintain the records of the State Bar of Georgia’s Fee Arbitration Program; and \n (h) To perform all other acts necessary for the effective operation of the Fee Arbitration Program. \n  </div>","UrlName":"rule173","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","Revisions":[{"Id":"64c1f09c-e527-429e-9eb0-8d007bc8ab57","ParentId":"255e70a0-1276-4d24-8aa1-0d397fa52545","Title":"Version 2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Committee shall have the following powers and duties: \n(a) To determine whether to accept jurisdiction over a dispute; \n(b) To appoint and remove lawyer and nonlawyer arbitrators and panels of arbitrators; \n(c) To oversee the operation of the arbitration process; \n(d) To develop and implement fee arbitration procedures; \n(e) To interpret these rules and to decide any disputes regarding the interpretation and application of these rules; \n(f) To determine challenges to the neutrality of an arbitrator where the arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw; \n(g) To maintain the records of the State Bar of Georgia’s Fee Arbitration Program; and \n (h) To perform all other acts necessary for the effective operation of the Fee Arbitration Program. \n  </div>","UrlName":"revision357"}],"Ancestors":["c7b789c0-2093-4ab3-b004-629196cc59c9","cf1bd201-574c-4d95-9951-d9f289cb4370","7f7bb06f-781f-4666-9fcf-afe55b1ee4bb"]},{"Id":"063d68ad-914c-4a5e-b12c-0de2c5de26db","Title":"Advisory Opinion 19","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 19 \nJuly 18, 1975 \n Propriety of a member of the State Bar permitting a paralegal in his employ to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm letterhead under his own signature.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia and the applicable statutes and case law as applied to a specific fact situation.\nAn opinion has been requested concerning the propriety of a member of the State Bar permitting a paralegal in his employ to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm letterhead under his own signature.\n The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia which is applicable to this inquiry is Huber v. State , 234 Ga. at 358, 216 S.E.2d 73 (1975)which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n \"'(W)e are of the opinion that the practice of law...(is) not confined to practice in the courts of this State, but (is) of larger scope, including the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to any action or special proceeding in any court or other judicial body, conveyancing, the preparation of all legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured, the rendering of opinions as to the validity or invalidity of the title to real or personal property, the giving of any legal advice, and any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.' Boykin v. Hopkins , 174 Ga. 511, 519 (162 S.E. 796).\" \n</div>\n Cf. Ga. L. 1931, P. 191 as amended by Ga. L. 1937, p. 753 (Ga.Code Ann. § 9-401).\nThe ethical consideration applicable to this inquiry is State Bar Rule 3-103, EC 3-6 which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries, and other lay persons. Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the delegated work, and has complete professional responsibility for the work product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal services more economically and efficiently.\" \n</div>\nThis disciplinary rule which is applicable to this inquiry is State Bar Rule 4-102.1, DR 3-101(A) which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\" \n</div>\n\"Paralegals,\"\"legal assistants,\"\"law clerks,\"\"paraprofessionals,\"\"litigation assistants,\"etc., are laymen who are not entitled to practice law and who are not entitled to membership in the State Bar of Georgia. Although the State Bar may intercede in a paralegal's activities to the extent that those activities might involve the unauthorized practice of law1, it has not power to discipline paralegals in that its disciplinary jurisdiction is expressly limited to its membership.\nThe State Bar is authorized to advise its members concerning the activities in which their employees, including paralegals, should be allowed to engage. Further, if a member of the State Bar allows a paralegal in his employ to perform functions that amount to the unauthorized practice of law, the Bar is authorized to discipline the member under DR 3-101(A) of State Bar Rule 4-102.1.\nA member of the State Bar may allow a paralegal, as he may allow any other layman, to assist him in such a manner or to perform such tasks on his behalf as do not constitute the practice of law. Therefore, our inquiry must concern:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n (1) The definition of the practice of law in Georgia, and \n(2) Whether the conduct which is the subject of this inquiry transgresses the definition. \n The Supreme Court has defined the practice of law in the Huber case, supra. Does correspondence by a paralegal on his firm's letterhead bearing his own signature and concerning \"legal matters \"fall within the Supreme Court's definition? The answer depends upon the party to whom the correspondence is written and the substance of the correspondence. \n</div>\nWe are of the opinion that the phrase \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law \"in the above quoted definition is intended to comprehend communication connected with any legally enforceable right or remedy without regard to whether a suit is actually pending before a court in this State. Therefore, even pre-litigation communication falls within the definition if it is directed to a potentially adverse party, his agents, assigns, or beneficiaries and if it attempts to suggest or assert an actual or potential claim of right to legal or equitable relief for another upon the condition, either expressed or implied, that a failure to satisfy such suggestion or assertion may result in litigation. Any such correspondence written on a law firm letterhead, by its very nature, implicitly suggests subsequent legal proceedings and thus constitutes the practice of law. To that extent, if a member of the State Bar allows a paralegal in his employ to sign correspondence on the law firm letterhead, he aids the paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law and opens himself to discipline.\nWe specifically restrict the foregoing opinion to letters directed to adverse or potentially adverse parties, their agents, assigns or beneficiaries. Under EC 3-6 of State Bar Rule 3-103, a member may ethically utilize the services of paralegals in a wide range of circumstances such as investigating potential claims and pending cases, taking statements from clients and witnesses, engaging in legal research, preparing legal documents and pleadings under direct supervision of the member, performing administrative duties within and on behalf of the law firm, and performing secretarial or clerical duties. To the extent necessary to perform these functions and to the extent that these functions do not fall within the above-cited definition of the practice of law, a paralegal may correspond on the law firm letterhead in his own name.\nWhen a paralegal in the employ of a member of the State Bar is permitted by the member to correspond on the law firm letterhead, the member must be sure that the paralegal clearly identifies his status by the use of an appropriate designation such as \"paralegal,\"\"legal assistant,\"or \"law clerk.\"The failure to do so could easily mislead the recipient of the correspondence and might constitute a representation on the part of the member that the paralegal in his employ is a member of the State Bar and authorized to practice law in this State.\n 1 Ga. L. 1946, p. 171 (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-306 through 9-411).","UrlName":"rule468","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinions","Content":"","UrlName":"part46","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"bb655803-b398-4d53-b4ab-9877370f1631","Title":"Advisory Opinion 5","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/opinion-history/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion. State Disciplinary Board September 20, 1968 Amended by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board March 1993 Propriety of an attorney permitting the use of his or her letterhead stationery by a retainer client who is writing as a creditor or as a collection agency seeking to collect an account or debt from the recipient.The question submitted is actually in five differing forms, but each question involves certain ingredients which result in the advisory opinion being the same as to each. DR 3-101(a) provides: \"A lawyer shall not aid a non lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\"See also Standard 24. It may well be that under this rule the varying factual situations may be productive or varying conclusions. The determination of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia is a matter of statutory interpretation, O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50 et.seq., and this opinion is not based on either the above standard or statutes.Standard 4 requires that \"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation.\"In light of these admonitions, it is professionally improper for a lawyer to furnish his or her letterhead to a client for the purpose stated. A lawyer is an officer of the court. As such, the lawyer assumes certain responsibilities, is under certain obligations and the lawyer's conduct is subject to certain restrictions and limitations. The lawyer is obligated to uphold the honor and dignity of the profession. See EC 9-6. The lawyer's participation in conduct contemplated purely and simply to deceive is incompatible with those responsibilities and obligations.In addition, a lawyer has been given certain privileges by the State. Because of these privileges, letters of the character stated in the question purporting to be written by lawyers have a greater weight than those written by laymen. It is obvious that the sole reason for the practice is to give the letter the weight that lawyers alone can contribute. That end can be gained only through the deception which is manifestly out of harmony with the Code of Professional Responsibility. See EC 3-3. The lawyer cannot, therefore, delegate to a nonlawyer.The practice described is violative of both the letter and the spirit of the ethical canons and constitutes unethical practice.","UrlName":"rule492","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1cb4a506-933a-4671-8f87-c92840b06c94","Title":"Advisory Opinion 16","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 16 \nSeptember 21, 1973 \n Propriety of An Attorney Who is a County Commissioner in a Rural County Appointing His Own Firm as County Attorney.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, this State Disciplinary Board, upon request made therefore, renders this its opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State of Georgia as applied to a given state of facts.\nAn advisory opinion has been requested upon the following inquiry:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nA partner in a three-member law firm has been elected Commissioner in a small county. The new Commissioner, who at times in the past has served as County Attorney and who intends to remain active in the law firm, wishes to appoint his law firm as County Attorneys. May he do so consistent with the applicable ethical rules? Would the result be different if the Commissioner's partner were appointed County Attorney in his individual capacity and all legal fees paid by the County were paid directly to this partner rather than into the law firm's general account? There is only one other active law firm in the County; and its members were closely associated politically with the candidate who was defeated in the last election by the present Commissioner. \n</div>\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are Rule 3-108 (Canon 8): EC 8-8, and Rule 3-109 (Canon 9): EC 9-1 and EC 9-2.\nCanon 8 provides \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System.\"The ethical considerations under this Canon relevant to the question presented are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n EC 8-8 Lawyers often serve as legislators or as holders of other public offices. This is highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant contributions to the improvement of the legal system. A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties. \n</div>\nDR 8-101(A)(1) states as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall not: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(1) use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious that such action is not in the public interest; \n</div>\nCanon 9 provides \"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety \". The relevant ethical considerations under this Canon are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 9-1 Continuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in the legal profession. \nEC 9-2 Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to be unethical. In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in the matters being handled for the client. While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that has a tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or in the legal profession, his duty to clients or to the public should never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his obligations may be understood or may tend to subject him or the legal profession to criticism. When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal profession. \n</div>\nThere are numerous Formal and Informal Opinions of the American Bar Association on the subject of the attorney as public official, but these opinions seem to be largely useless to the present inquiry as they consistently address themselves to factual situations in which the duty of the attorney as government official comes into conflict with his duty as counselor or advocate for his non-governmental client. The question here presented is much more subtle than the conflict-of-interest cases and the authorities provide little guidance.\nPutting the first inquiry in its simplest form, the State Disciplinary Board must answer the question:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nWould the proposed employment of the Commissioner's law firm present such a danger of public suspicion of self-dealing that public confidence in attorneys, and in our legal governmental system, would be unnecessarily eroded? \n</div>\nIt is obvious that public confidence in the institution of local government would be damaged if the public came to view local politics as merely a battle between law firms for \"the largest client in the County \". Strong support for this view is found in American Bar Association Formal Opinion No. 192 which states:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n Many opinions have been written by this committee applying each of these Canons. Opinions 16, 30, 34, 77, 118 and 134 relate to Canon 6, and pass on questions concerning the propriety of the conduct of an attorney who is a public officer, in representing private interests adverse to those of the public body which he represents. The principle applied in these opinions is that an attorney holding public office should avoid all conduct which might lead the layman to conclude that the attorney is utilizing his public position to further his professional success or personal interests .\"(emphasis ours) \n</div>\n This language has been carried into EC 8-8 of the present Code of Professional Responsibility, which ethical rule was cited above. The mere fact that there is an opportunity for a County Commissioner to allow his firm to charge excessively or to create legal business for himself and for his law firm acting as County Attorney,does not, of course, imply that such impropriety would necessarily follow. However, it is vitally important that no situation be allowed to exist which might tempt the public to conclude that the County's interest has been subordinated to that of any law firm or attorney. It has long been the law in Georgia that one who is entrusted with the business of others will not be allowed to make out of the same a pecuniary profit to himself however honest and fair the circumstances of employment, and that the citizens of Georgia are entitled to have their officials exercise close and totally objective scrutiny of the performance of those doing the work of government. Montgomery v. City of Atlanta 162 Ga. 534 (1926); Mayor of Macon v. Huff , 60 Ga. 221 (1878); Trainer v. City of Covington , 183 Ga. 759 (1937): Opinions of the Attorney General (unofficial), 1971,p. 286. Numerous statutes which regulate the actions of officers and employees of government have as their goal the prevention of any situation in which the official's personal interest and his public duty may conflict. Ga. Code Annotated Â§ Â§ 2-5606,23-1713, 23-1714, 26-2306, 26-2307, 23-2308, 69-201, 89-103, 89-904, and 89-913 to 918.The statutes and cases cited are grounded in strong public policy which provides a dependable guide in the premises. In light of the public policy favoring avoidance of any actual or imagined conflict-of-interest situation by government officials, we conclude that the only effective way to avoid the possibility of public suspicion of self-dealing and conflicts of interest is for the County Commissioner-attorney to refrain from employing himself as County Attorney. A.B.A. Formal Opinions 33, 49, 50, 72, 103 and 128indicate that no partner or associate of a law firm may undertake any professional relationship which any one of the partners or associates, because of adverse influence and conflicting interests, could not undertake. Consequently, employment of the Commissioner's own firm as County Attorney would be inappropriate. The A.B.A. Formal Opinions cited of knowledge and financial resources and the personal and professional closeness which exists in the legal partnership. It must be remembered, too, that public opinion and appearance of propriety are important considerations in this area, and it is highly probable that employment of the attorney-commissioner's own firm would have the same basic deleterious impact on public opinion and public confidence as would his individual employment as County Attorney. Therefore, the State Disciplinary Board holds that the Attorney-Commissioner may not employ himself or his law firm as County Attorney.\n The second part of the question before the Board has to do with the propriety of the hiring of the Commissioner-Attorney's partner as County Attorney on an individual basis. Again, the public policy considerations discussed in Montgomery ,Trainer , and Mayor of Macon provide guidance. The two evils arising from an official's self-employment outlined in these cases are:\n (1) the temptation to be dishonest in the collection of monies from the government, \n(2) the inability of the official to honestly, objectively, and forcefully exercise control over himself, if a way could be found to avoid these dual evils, then the County Commission or the attorney-commissioner might freely employ the attorney-commissioner's partner on an individual basis. Employment of the partner in his individual capacity and use of contract terms stipulating that the attorney-commissioner shall not benefit in any way from the County Attorney's income would destroy objections based on the first evil, but would not avoid those based on the second.It is true that the Commission and attorney-commissioner will always employ a friend and that, consequently, they and he would always be less than totally objective in judging the work of the County Attorney, but it is also true that an attorney-commissioner who would be the Commissioner best qualified to judge the quality of legal work, would be less likely to expose and criticize poor work on the part of one who is his law partner than one who was merely a good friend.\n The temptation to overlook or conceal the faults of professional or business partner is one with which no attorney or other person charged with public duty should be faced. The Board, in answering the second part of the inquiry,seeks to avoid the possibility of such temptation and answers part two of the inquiry in the negative.","UrlName":"rule454","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"976f93a8-d22a-4926-be94-dd55f7f3e26c","Title":"Advisory Opinion 17","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 17 \nJanuary 18, 1974 \n Duty of an Attorney Representing a Fugitive Upon Warrants for Probation Violation\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, this State Disciplinary Board, upon request made therefor, renders this its opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia as applied to a given state of facts.\nAn advisory opinion has been requested as to the ethical duty of an attorney who, during a professional consultation, learns that his client is a fugitive upon warrants for violation of his probation. The request was made in two parts,as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"When a person who is a fugitive upon warrants for probation violation approaches an attorney and requests that the attorney represent him in any hearings concerning his violation of probation and when the fugitive thus discloses his violations and whereabouts, must the attorney disclose the whereabouts of his client to the proper authorities? If the attorney advises the fugitive to surrender to the authorities and the fugitive refuses to do so, what is the proper course of action of the attorney?\" \n</div>\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are Rule 3-102 (Canon 2); EC 2-32, and DR 2-110(C)(1)(b) are included in that Rule; Rule 3-104(Canon 4); EC 4-1, EC 4-4, DR 4-101(A), DR 4-101(B)(1) and DR 4-101(C)(2) and (3) are all included in that Rule; and Rule 3-107 (Canon 7); EC 7-1, EC 7-5 and DR 7-102(A)(3), (7)and (8) are included under that Rule.\nCanon II provides \"A lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profession. Ethical considerations under Canon II which are relevant to the question propounded are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 2-32 A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of compelling circumstances... A lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to minimize the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client and the possibility of prejudice to his client as the result of his withdrawal. Even though he justifiably withdraws a lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by giving due notice of his withdrawal, suggesting employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, cooperating with counsel subsequently employed, and otherwise endeavoring to minimize the possibility of harm... \n</div>\nDR 2-110(C) states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(C) Permissive withdrawal. If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a Tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawals is because: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(1) His client \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (a) ... \n(b) personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct \n</div>\nCanon IV provides \"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.\"Relevant ethical considerations under this Canon are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 4-1 Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. \nEC 4-4 The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to whom the privilege does not extend. A lawyer owes an obligation to advise the client of the attorney-client privilege and timely assert the privilege unless it is waived by the client. \n</div>\nDR 4-101 states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nDR 4-101 Preservation of Confidence and Secrets of a client \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(A) \"Confidence \"refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law and \"Secret \"refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. \n(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C) a lawyer shall not knowingly \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client \n(2) ... \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(C) A lawyer may reveal: \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 60px\"> \n (1) ... \n(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order; \n(3) the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime; \n</div>\nCanon VII provides \"A lawyer should represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.\"\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \nEC 7-1 The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations. The professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits. In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law, to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means, and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue or defense. \nEC 7-5 A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such decision. He may continue in the representation of his client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or take a frivolous legal position. A lawyer should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid punishment therefor. \n</div>\nDR 7-102(A) states, in part, as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not \n</div>\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) ... \n(2) ... \n(3) conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal;... \n(7) counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent \n(8) knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule. \n</div>\nIn this problem the attorney's duty of loyalty to his client and his duty to the legal system, of which he is an important part, come into direct conflict. The State Disciplinary Board has been asked to resolve this conflict and the applicable rules and advisory opinions of Georgia and of the American Bar Association reflect his conflict as they, too, are in conflict.\nAlthough A.B.A. Formal Opinions 155 and 156 advise of the duty of the attorney to reveal the whereabouts of his fugitive client, the State Disciplinary Board believes that there is no legal or ethical consistency in the rationale of those opinions which would require an attorney whose client is a fugitive from a misdemeanor conviction to notify the authorities while allowing the attorney of a murderer to keep the confession of the murderer secret and confidential.\nThe language of Canon IV is strong and clear, and the importance of the confidentiality between attorney and client in their communications is paramount in our system of justice. EC 4-1, EC 4-4. The exceptions as to revelation of secrets and confidences mentioned in DR 4-101(C), above, would not seem to apply in this situation since the information about the fugitive's whereabouts is privileged in Georgia and the attorney's failure to report the fugitive would not, by itself, be a crime. Of course, the attorney has a duty to report any non-privileged information he knows to the proper authorities, and DR 7-102(A)(7), and (8) indicate clearly that he cannot counsel the client to break the law nor may he take any overt action to aid the fugitive in his flight.\nIn light of the historical importance of the concepts embodied in Canon IV to individuals in our society, the State Disciplinary Board has determined that the attorney of a fugitive has no ethical duty to inform the authorities of the whereabouts of the fugitive. However, once that difficult determination is made, it must be quickly pointed that in the stated situation there is a countervailing duty to our system of law which dictates that the attorney cannot counsel the fugitive to remain in violation of the law. The attorney should, therefore, advise the client to surrender to the authorities at an early date so that the charges against the fugitive may be heard in a fair hearing. By taking such a course of action the attorney observes the spirit of the confidentiality rule while demonstrating the confidence in, and loyalty to, our system of law.\nThe second part of the inquiry asks what should be done if the client refuses the attorney's advice to surrender to the authorities. The ethical considerations and rules under Canon II, stated above, clearly show that in a situation in which a fugitive client refuses to surrender himself, and thus insists on an illegal course of conduct, the attorney should immediately withdraw from the case, taking the precautions he deems necessary to protect his client's interests.","UrlName":"rule465","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"063d68ad-914c-4a5e-b12c-0de2c5de26db","Title":"Advisory Opinion 19","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 19 \nJuly 18, 1975 \n Propriety of a member of the State Bar permitting a paralegal in his employ to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm letterhead under his own signature.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia and the applicable statutes and case law as applied to a specific fact situation.\nAn opinion has been requested concerning the propriety of a member of the State Bar permitting a paralegal in his employ to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm letterhead under his own signature.\n The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia which is applicable to this inquiry is Huber v. State , 234 Ga. at 358, 216 S.E.2d 73 (1975)which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n \"'(W)e are of the opinion that the practice of law...(is) not confined to practice in the courts of this State, but (is) of larger scope, including the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to any action or special proceeding in any court or other judicial body, conveyancing, the preparation of all legal instruments of all kinds whereby a legal right is secured, the rendering of opinions as to the validity or invalidity of the title to real or personal property, the giving of any legal advice, and any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.' Boykin v. Hopkins , 174 Ga. 511, 519 (162 S.E. 796).\" \n</div>\n Cf. Ga. L. 1931, P. 191 as amended by Ga. L. 1937, p. 753 (Ga.Code Ann. § 9-401).\nThe ethical consideration applicable to this inquiry is State Bar Rule 3-103, EC 3-6 which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries, and other lay persons. Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the delegated work, and has complete professional responsibility for the work product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal services more economically and efficiently.\" \n</div>\nThis disciplinary rule which is applicable to this inquiry is State Bar Rule 4-102.1, DR 3-101(A) which provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\" \n</div>\n\"Paralegals,\"\"legal assistants,\"\"law clerks,\"\"paraprofessionals,\"\"litigation assistants,\"etc., are laymen who are not entitled to practice law and who are not entitled to membership in the State Bar of Georgia. Although the State Bar may intercede in a paralegal's activities to the extent that those activities might involve the unauthorized practice of law1, it has not power to discipline paralegals in that its disciplinary jurisdiction is expressly limited to its membership.\nThe State Bar is authorized to advise its members concerning the activities in which their employees, including paralegals, should be allowed to engage. Further, if a member of the State Bar allows a paralegal in his employ to perform functions that amount to the unauthorized practice of law, the Bar is authorized to discipline the member under DR 3-101(A) of State Bar Rule 4-102.1.\nA member of the State Bar may allow a paralegal, as he may allow any other layman, to assist him in such a manner or to perform such tasks on his behalf as do not constitute the practice of law. Therefore, our inquiry must concern:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n (1) The definition of the practice of law in Georgia, and \n(2) Whether the conduct which is the subject of this inquiry transgresses the definition. \n The Supreme Court has defined the practice of law in the Huber case, supra. Does correspondence by a paralegal on his firm's letterhead bearing his own signature and concerning \"legal matters \"fall within the Supreme Court's definition? The answer depends upon the party to whom the correspondence is written and the substance of the correspondence. \n</div>\nWe are of the opinion that the phrase \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law \"in the above quoted definition is intended to comprehend communication connected with any legally enforceable right or remedy without regard to whether a suit is actually pending before a court in this State. Therefore, even pre-litigation communication falls within the definition if it is directed to a potentially adverse party, his agents, assigns, or beneficiaries and if it attempts to suggest or assert an actual or potential claim of right to legal or equitable relief for another upon the condition, either expressed or implied, that a failure to satisfy such suggestion or assertion may result in litigation. Any such correspondence written on a law firm letterhead, by its very nature, implicitly suggests subsequent legal proceedings and thus constitutes the practice of law. To that extent, if a member of the State Bar allows a paralegal in his employ to sign correspondence on the law firm letterhead, he aids the paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law and opens himself to discipline.\nWe specifically restrict the foregoing opinion to letters directed to adverse or potentially adverse parties, their agents, assigns or beneficiaries. Under EC 3-6 of State Bar Rule 3-103, a member may ethically utilize the services of paralegals in a wide range of circumstances such as investigating potential claims and pending cases, taking statements from clients and witnesses, engaging in legal research, preparing legal documents and pleadings under direct supervision of the member, performing administrative duties within and on behalf of the law firm, and performing secretarial or clerical duties. To the extent necessary to perform these functions and to the extent that these functions do not fall within the above-cited definition of the practice of law, a paralegal may correspond on the law firm letterhead in his own name.\nWhen a paralegal in the employ of a member of the State Bar is permitted by the member to correspond on the law firm letterhead, the member must be sure that the paralegal clearly identifies his status by the use of an appropriate designation such as \"paralegal,\"\"legal assistant,\"or \"law clerk.\"The failure to do so could easily mislead the recipient of the correspondence and might constitute a representation on the part of the member that the paralegal in his employ is a member of the State Bar and authorized to practice law in this State.\n 1 Ga. L. 1946, p. 171 (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-306 through 9-411).","UrlName":"rule468","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b4d1ac85-398b-4a45-b8dd-39cbe70d0b0b","Title":"Advisory Opinion 21","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 21 \nSeptember 16, 1977 \n \n \nGuidelines for Attorneys Utilizing Paralegals. \nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government. of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented:\nWhat are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legal assistants or paraprofessionals and permit them to deal with other lawyers, clients and the public?\nThe ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is Rule 3-103 (Canon III): EC 3-1, EC 3-2, ES 3-6, DR 3-101(A) and DR 3-103 are all included in that Rule. It is also noted that the provisions of Canon III appear as Disciplinary Standards 24, 25 and 26 in Part IV (discipline) of the Rules of the State Bar.\nCanon III provides:\n\"A lawyer should assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of law.\"\nEthical Considerations under this Canon relevant to the question propounded are:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n\"EC 3-1 The prohibition against the practice of law by  a layman is grounded in the need of the public for integrity and competence of those who undertake to render legal services. Because of the fiduciary and personal character of  the lawyer-client relationship and the inherently complex nature of our legal system, the public can better be assured of the requisite responsibility and competence if the  practice of law is confined to those who are subject to the requirements and regulations imposed upon members of the legal profession.\" \n\"EC 3-2 The sensitive variations in the considerations that bear on legal determinations often make it difficult even for a lawyer to exercise appropriate professional judgment, and it is therefore essential that  the personal nature of the relationship of client and lawyer be preserved. Competent professional judgment is the product of a trained familiarity with law and legal processes, a disciplined, analytical approach to legal problems, and a firm ethical  commitment.\" \n\"EC 3-6 A lawyer often delegates tasks to clerks, secretaries and other lay persons. Such delegation is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the delegated work and has complete professional responsibility for the work product. This delegation enables a lawyer to render legal service more economically and efficiently.\" \n</div>\n\"DR 3-101 Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law. \n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.: \n</div>\n\"DR 3-102 Dividing Legal Fees with a Nonlawyer. \n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that: \n <div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n (1) ... \n    (2) ... \n    (3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.\" \n </div> \n</div>\n\"DR 3-103 Forming a Partnership with a Nonlawyer. \n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n(A) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of  law.\" \n</div>\nFor purposes of this opinion the terms \"legal assistant \", \"paraprofessional \"and \"paralegal \"are defined as any lay person, not admitted to the practice of law in this State, who is an employee of, or an assistant to, an active member of the State Bar of Georgia or to a partnership or professional corporation comprised of active members of the State Bar of Georgia and who renders services relating to the law to such member, partnership or professional corporation under the direct control, supervision and compensation of a member of the State Bar of Georgia.\nThe overriding consideration in this opinion will be that the definition of the practice of law is very wide in the State of Georgia and that strict adherence to a program of supervision and direction of a paralegal is required in order to avoid any charges that the attorney is aiding his paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law. Ga. Code Ann. 9-401, 9-402. Avoidance of charges that the paralegal is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law may be achieved only by strict observance of the direction found in EC 3-6, quoted above, indicating that delegation of activities which ordinarily comprise the practice of law is proper only if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with the client involved, supervises and directs the work delegated to the paralegal and assumes complete ultimate professional responsibility for the work product produced by the paralegal. Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.\nIt is the opinion of this Board that the following may be delegated to nonlawyer paralegals, provided that proper and effective supervision and control by the attorney exists:\n(1) The interview of clients, witnesses and other persons with information pertinent to any cause being handled by the attorney.\n(2) Legal research and drafting of pleadings, briefs of law and other legal documents for the attorney's review, approval and use.\n(3) Drafting and signing of routine correspondence with the clients of the attorney when such correspondence does not require the application of legal knowledge or the rendering of legal advice to the client.\n(4) Investigation of facts relating to the cause of a client of the attorney, including examinations of land records and reporting of his findings to the attorney.\n(5) Scheduling of the attorney's activities in the law office and scheduling of his appearance before courts, tribunals and administrative agencies.\n(6) Billing of clients and general management of the lawfirm's office and nonlegal staff.\n(7) Routine contacts with opposing counsel on topics not effecting the merits of the cause of action at issue between the attorneys or requiring the use or application of legal knowledge.\n(8) Rendering of specialized advice to the clients of the attorney on scientific and technical topics, provided that such advice does not require the application of legal judgment or knowledge to the facts or opinions to be discussed with the client.\nIt is the opinion of the Board that the following duties should not be delegated to paralegals:\n(1) Any contact with clients or opposite counsel requiring the rendering of legal advice of any type.\n(2) Any appearance as a lawyer at depositions, hearings,calendar calls or trials or before any administrative Tribunal unless otherwise preempted by Federal law or regulation.\n(3) Responsibility for making final decisions as to the ethics of activities of paralegal employees of an attorney.\n(4) Drafting, without review and approval by a member of the Bar, of any pleading or legal document.\n(5) Negotiation with opposing parties or their counsel on substantive issues in expected or pending litigation.\n(6) Contacting an opposite party or his counsel in a situation in which legal rights of the firm's client will be asserted or negotiated.\n(7) Signature of pleadings, briefs or other legal documents for presentation to any court or explanation of legal document s to the client of the lawyer or to the opposite party in any negotiation or litigation.\nIt is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that there are other duties incumbent upon lawyers supervising the work of paralegals as follows:\n(1)     (a) In order to avoid any appearance that the lawyer is aiding the paralegal in the unauthorized practice of law,including unauthorized practice by way of \"holding out as an attorney \"(see Ga.Code Ann. 9-402), any letters or documents signed by the paralegal should clearly indicate the status of the paralegal and such status should be made clear by the nature of the typed signature or by express language in the text of the letter or document. See Advisory Opinion No. 19.\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> (b) The name of the paralegal should not appear on the letterhead or on the office door of any lawyer engaged in private practice. The paralegal may have a business card containing the name of the firm by which he or she is employed, but the card must contain the word \"paralegal \"to clearly convey  that the paralegal is not a lawyer. \n(c) In oral communications, either face-to-face or on the  telephone, the paralegal should begin the conversation with a clear statement that he or she is speaking as a paralegal employee of the lawyer or the law firm. Such  communication concerning the status of the paralegal should be given prior to all oral communications with clients, opposite parties, and other attorneys unless previous contacts with such persons would justify the paralegal in believing that their status  was clearly known to such persons. \n</div>\n(2) A paralegal may not be a partner in a law firm nor have a financial interest that amounts to a partnership interest in such firm other than participation in a profit sharing plan allowed under Bar ethics rules. [DR 2-102 (A) ]\n(3) As the paralegal is the agent of the attorney, the paralegal has a duty to protect and preserve the confidences and secrets of the firm's clients. [EC 4-2 and DR 4-102 ]\n(4) As the paralegal is an agent of the lawyer or law firm, it is the duty of the supervising lawyer to carefully instruct the paralegal so that the paralegal will avoid taking any action which the attorney himself is prohibited from taking, including avoidance of solicitation of cases or clients for the lawyer or the lawfirm and avoiding any other activity which would be improper activity if performed by the supervising lawyer or his firm.","UrlName":"rule469","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4aec2d84-6b6f-406d-bb03-6688acfb2fce","Title":"Advisory Opinion 22","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 22 \nMarch 31, 1978 \nAmended by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board \nJanuary 14, 1993 \n \nEthical propriety of a lawyer communicating to other lawyers his or her availability to act as a consultant in particular areas of the law. \nThe question presented is whether it is unethical for a lawyer to communicate to other lawyers his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law without running afoul of the requirements of Standard 6 and the provisions set forth in EC 2-6, 2-7, and 2-8, Section of a Lawyer: Professional Notices and Listings.\nThe policy considerations upon which Standard 6 and the other advertising and solicitation rules are based are the result of a concern that the public should be protected from misrepresentation, fraud, intimidation , undue influence, and overreaching in the selection of a lawyer. These concerns would not be applicable to a lawyer communicating with another lawyer.\nAn attorney making contact with other members of the profession for the purpose of advising his or her availability to act as a consultant in a particular area of the law is not in anyway relieved from making certain that all representations are both accurate and not in anyway misleading. Such communication is not in violation of Standard 6.","UrlName":"rule471","Order":5,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de595ba8-201d-4582-b5db-f6909521b3f2","Title":"Advisory Opinion 23","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 23 \nMay 19, 1978 \n \nMulti-State Law Firm Office Within the State of Georgia.\nPursuant to Bar Rule 4-223, the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia renders the following advisory opinion concerning a proper interpretation of the Canons of Ethics as applied to the following state of facts:\nMay an out-of-state law firm open and maintain an office in the State of Georgia under the direction of a full-time associate of that firm, said associate being a full-time Georgia resident and a member of the State Bar of Georgia? Relevant ethics DR 2-102(A)(4); DR 2-102(C) and (D), and DR 3-101(B).\nDR 2-102 (D) [Disciplinary Standard 11] reads as follows:\n\"A partnership shall not be formed or continued between or among lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the members and associates of the firm on its letterhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations of those members and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions. However, the same firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.\"\nThe provision of DR 2-102(D) clearly indicates that it is appropriate for multi-state firms to maintain home or branch offices within the State of Georgia under the same firm name as is used in other jurisdictions. However, an examination of the various ethics rules applicable to such an office indicates that a Georgia attorney practicing in such an office is under an affirmative responsibility to take steps to fully inform the public of limitations on the ability and qualifications of out-of-state attorneys to practice within the State of Georgia and to prevent the unauthorized practice of law within this State.1 The provisions of DR 2-102(A)(4) and of DR 2-102(D) clearly require that the letterhead of the multi-state firm make absolutely clear the jurisdictional limitations on the legal practice of members and associates of the firm who are not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions.\nDR 2-102(C) reads as follows:\n\"A lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in fact partners.\"\nEC 2-13 reads as follows:\n\"In order to avoid the possibility of misleading persons with whom he deals, a lawyer should be scrupulous in the representation of his professional status. He should not hold himself out as being a partner or associate of a law firm if he is not one in fact, and thus should not hold himself out as a partner or association if he only shares offices with another lawyer.\"The provisions of EC 2-13 and DR 2-102(C) clearly indicates that any partner, associate or member of a firm, whether fully within the State of Georgia or part of a multi-state firm, must deal honestly with the Bar and the public with respect to his status with the firm.\nDR 3-101 reads as follows:\nAiding Unauthorized Practice of Law \"(A) A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. (B) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction.\"\nEC 3-9 reads, in part, as follows:\n \"Regulation of the practice of law is accomplished principally by the respective states. Authority to engage in the practice of law conferred in any jurisdiction is not per se, a grant of the right to practice elsewhere and it is improper for a lawyer to engage in practice where he is not permitted by law or by court order to do so...\"The provisions of DR 3-101 and EC 3-9 indicates that although a local attorney may be a member of a multi-state law firm, he may not aid lawyers not properly licensed in the State of Georgia to engage in the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. Additionally,\nDR 3-101(B) clearly indicates that practice by nonlicensed lawyers in Georgia will subject them to discipline in Georgia and, possibly, in their home state as well. Consequently, with the exception of those areas of law which fall within federal preemption, only those attorneys who are licensed within the State of Georgia may be based in, and may perform daily services amounting to the practice of law in, Georgia branch offices of multi-state law firms. This does not, however, mean that an out-of-state member of the firm may not cooperate with fully licensed local firm members to advise firm clients on legal problems which involve the law of more than one state or the law of Georgia and any other jurisdiction.\n The establishment of a thorough examination requirement by the Supreme Court of Georgia properly seeks to protect the citizens of the State of Georgia by assuring them that any persons undertaking to perform legal services within this State has met high standards of character and education. The definition of the practice of law found in Ga. Code Ann. § 9-401, et seq ., is quite broad and the resident associate of the out-of-state firm would be responsible for making sure that no improper practice of law results from the presence of his branch office within the State of Georgia.\nSpecial care should be taken by the local associate to insure that, where appropriate, fiduciary funds are placed in Georgia bank accounts as required by DR 9-102(A).\nThe authorities having been reviewed, the Board answers the inquiry in the affirmative, but notes that certain other requirements must also be met by the local associate of the out-of-state firm.","UrlName":"rule472","Order":6,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d14bd42c-e9c6-48d9-965a-9c36d718da6f","Title":"Advisory Opinion 26","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 26 \nNovember 21, 1980 \n \nEthical Propriety of a Lawyer Sending Statutory Notice to Drawer of Bad Check Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and \"Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\nQuestion Presented:\nIs it ethically improper for a lawyer to send a statutory notice to the drawer of a bad check that states that unless said drawer pays the amount of the check in full within a specified period he will be subject to criminal prosecution?\nThe ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is Rule 3-107 (Canon &), EC-21 and DR 7-105(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Standard 49 of Rule 4-102 of the Georgia Bar Rules).\nDR 7-105(A) (Standard 49) provides as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"> \n\"DR 7-105 - Threatening Criminal Prosecution \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n(A) a lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter \". \n </div> \n</div>\nThe ethical consideration under this section states the following:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \nEC 7-21 The civil adjudicative process is primarily designed for the settlement of disputes between parties, while the criminal process is designed for the protection of society as a whole. Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process to coerce adjustment or private civil claims or controversies is a subversion of that process; further, the person against whom the criminal process is so misused may be deterred from asserting his legal rights and thus the usefulness of the civil process in settling private disputes is impaired. As in all cases of abuse of judicial process, the improper use of criminal process tends to diminish public confidence in our legal system \"Also applicable to this inquiry is Section 26-1704(a) of the Georgia Code Annotated, which provides as follows: \n</div>\n\"Bad Checks \"\n(a) A person commits criminal issuance of a bad check when he makes, draws, utters, or delivers a check, draft, or order for the payment of money on any bank or other depository in exchange for a present consideration or wages, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee. For the purposes of this section, it is prima facie evidence that the accused knew the instrument would not be honored if:\n(1) The accused had no account with the drawee at the time the instrument was made, drawn, uttered, or delivered; or,\n(2) Payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon presentation within 30 days after the delivery and the accused, or someone for him shall not have paid the holder thereof the amount due thereon, together with a service charge not to exceed $5 or five percent of the face amount of the instrument, whichever is greater, within 10 days after receiving written notice that payment was refused upon such instrument. For purposes of of this subsection (2):\n(A) Notice mailed by certified or registered mail, evidenced by return receipt, to the address printed on the instrument or given at the time of issuance shall be deemed sufficient and equivalent to notice having been received by the person making, drawing, uttering, or delivering said instrument whether such notice shall be returned undelivered or not.\n(B) The form of notice shall be substantially as follows:\n\"You are hereby notified that a check or instrument numbered _____, issued by you on _____ (date), drawn upon _____, (name of bank), and payable to _____, has been dishonored. Pursuant to Georgia Law, you have 10 days from receipt of this notice to tender payment of the full amount of such check or instrument plus a service charge of $5.00 or 5 percent (of the face amount of the check), whichever is greater, the total amount due being $_____ and _____ cents. Unless this amount is paid in full within the specified time above, the holder of such check or instrument may turn over the dishonored check or instrument and all other available information relating to this incident to the District Attorney or Solicitor for criminal prosecution.'\n(C) Any party holding a worthless check or instrument and giving notice in substantially similar form the that provided in subparagraph (B) shall be immune from civil liability for the giving of such notice and for proceeding under the forms of such notice.\"\n It should be noted that the State Bar directory rule and disciplinary standard provide that a lawyer should not threaten criminal prosecution solely to gain advantage in a civil matter (emphasis added). Before the drawer of a bad check drawn on his bank can be found in violation of Section26-1704 of the Criminal Code, he must be given written notice that payment of the check was refused by the bank. He must then fail to make payment to the holder of the bad check within ten days of the date he received written notice. Thus, notice sent pursuant to Section 26-1704 of the Georgia Code Annotated does not constitute an abuse of the criminal process in order to gain advantage in a civil matter. Rather, the notice allows the drawer of the bad check to avoid criminal liability by making the check good within ten days of the date he receives notice that the check was not honored by the bank. The notice is sent to the issuer of the bad check to make him aware that the instrument had not been honored by the bank and to allow him a reasonable time to correct what could be a valid mistake in accounting made by the drawer himself or by the bank.\nAccordingly, it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that it is not ethically improper for a lawyer to send notice to the drawer of a bad check pursuant to the provisions of Section 26-1704 of the Georgia Code Annotated.","UrlName":"rule473","Order":7,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ce234b2f-f812-4354-b267-ebfbdd4d4056","Title":"Advisory Opinion 27","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 27 \nNovember 21, 1980 \n \nEthical Propriety of Revealing Confidences and Secrets Necessary to Defend Against Charges of Professional Misconduct \nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and \"Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Facts: An attorney represented two defendants who are each charged with criminal offenses arising out of the same incident. Both defendants were later found guilty of crimes in this matter. Subsequently, each defendant filed a Motion for new trial based on, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel. At the hearing on the Motion for new trial the issue of the attorney's professional misconduct is raised. Later the attorney is charged by the state Bar with violations of disciplinary standards arising out of the same events.\n Question presented: Would it be ethically proper for the lawyer to reveal confidences or secrets of these clients which may be necessary to the lawyer's defense against the charges of professional misconduct?\nThe ethics authority applicable to this inquiry is RD 4-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Standard 28 of Rule 4-102 of the Georgia Bar Rules). DR 4-101 provides as follows:\nPreservation of Confidences and Secrets of Client\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (A) \"Confidence \"refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and \"secrets \"refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. \n \n(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 \n \n(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) reveal a confidence or secret of his client: \n(2) use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client; \n(3) use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure. \n </div> \n</div>\n(C) A lawyer may reveal:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected; \n(2) confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required law or court order; \n(3) the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime; \n(4) confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct. \n </div> \n(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal the information allowed by DR 4-101 (C) through an employee. \n</div>\nAnother relevant consideration to this inquiry is the evidentiary rule known as the attorney-client privilege. This rule is stated at Georgia Code Annotated 38-419:\n\"38-419 Communications to Attorney by Client\nCommunication to any attorney, or his clerk, to be transmitted to the attorney pending his employment, or in anticipation thereof, shall never be heard by the court. So the attorney shall not disclose the advice or counsel he may give to his client, nor produce or deliver up title deeds or other papers, except evidences of debt left in his possession by his client. This rule will not exclude the attorney as a witness to any facts which may transpire in connection with his employment.\"\nAlso it should be noted that EC 4-4 recognizes that \"the attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client.\"\n With these rules in mind it appears that DR 4-101 (C) (4) specifically controls the situation presented by this inquiry. This rule holds that \"a lawyer may reveal the confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.\"(emphasis added)\n The policy considerations applicable to this situation are stated in Hyde v. State, 70 Ga App. 823, at 827:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n\"Where an attorney's fidelity as to a transaction has been attacked, with the imputation that he has been unfaithful to the interest of his client, it would be a harsh rule to permit testimony by the client in a cause, spread upon the public record, of this character, and not to permit the attorney to explain. The rule is settled by all the authorities that in litigation between the client and his attorney, the attorney, of course, has the right to make a full disclosure bearing upon the litigation, for the purpose of defending his property rights; the defense of character, where publicly attacked is just as important, and to some more so, than property rights; it would violate a principal of natural justice and inherent equity to say that the right of the attorney's defense is merged in a privileged communication when the client himself makes a public accusation (the relationship between client and attorney, having been private as to that particular matter, has become public by the act of the client) the spirit of the rule ceases when the client charges fraud. By making the attack in his unsworn statement upon the character and professional conduct of the attorney, the defendant waived his right to have their transactions considered as privileged (Code, 38-419), and the attorney was competent to give testimony to show that he did not act basely in the transaction, as his one-time client claimed. And it was not error to permit the attorney to testify to facts so far as necessary to defend his character, notwithstanding the rule against the disclosure of confidential communications between attorney and client.\" \n</div>\nAccordingly, the State Disciplinary Board is of the opinion that it would be ethically proper for the lawyer to reveal the confidences or secrets of these clients in any proceedings in which they may be necessary to defend the lawyer against charges of professional misconduct.","UrlName":"rule474","Order":8,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5ab4c155-ef55-4395-a579-65fff5f4c2f8","Title":"Advisory Opinion 29","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 29 \n November 20, 1981\n Guidelines for Disputes with Attorneys' Fees Set by Workman's Compensation Board\nPursuant to the provisions of the Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Factual Background:\nThe State Board of Workers' Compensation is authorized by Georgia Law to approve the fee of attorneys who represent workers' compensation claimants. Occasionally, the Workers' Compensation Board may approve an attorney's fee, which it has determined is reasonable, but which is less than the amount the attorney and client (workers' compensation claimant) have agreed upon in the fee contract. The lawyer may then appeal the determination of the Workers' Compensation Board concerning his fee to the Superior Court. In such an appeal, the only issue before the Superior Court is the decision of the Superior Court in favor of the attorney is to reduce the client's/claimant's share of the workers' compensation award while increasing proportionately the lawyer's share of the award.\n Question Presented:\nDoes a lawyer who has represented a claimant in a workers' compensation case have an ethical obligation to advise his client of his right to obtain independent counsel to represent the client when the lawyer decides to appeal the amount the Workers' Compensation Board has approved as the lawyer's fee?\nA lawyer has a duty to exercise his independent professional judgment at all times on behalf of and for the protection of his client. Whenever the lawyer's personal interests or the interests of others cause him to compromise his loyalty and objectivity to his client, a conflict of interest exists, and it is improper for the lawyer to undertake or continue representation of the client under these circumstances.\nAn association marked by trust and intimacy develops between a client and a lawyer who has represented that client throughout vigorous workers' compensation litigation, and who has obtained a satisfactory workers' compensation award for the client. If a lawyer decides that he will appeal the attorney's fee award of the workers' Compensation Board to the Superior Court, the client may not understand that suddenly he and the lawyer are adversaries, and the lawyer will no longer be acting his best interest. The lawyer should, therefore, explain to the client that since he is appealing the amount of fees the Board has approved, he is seeking to reduce the amount of money the client will receive in order to increase the amount he will receive. For that reason, the lawyer should take care to make a full disclosure to the client of their respective positions during the appeal and advise the client of his right to obtain independent counsel to advise him during this stage of the litigation.\n The Georgia Supreme Court indicated in Arey v. Davis, 233 Ga. 951 (1975), that even when the original attorney-client relationship has ended, if a fiduciary relationship continues to exist between a lawyer and client, the lawyer is required to advise the client to seek independent legal advice from another lawyer before pursuing a course of conduct to protect the interest of the lawyer at the expense of the client.\nIt should be noted that there is no conflict of interest in those cases in which the claimant's attorney seeks an assessment of punitive attorney's fees under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 114-712 (b). In these instances, the employer-insurer will be responsible for the additional fees rather than the client/claimant.\n Conclusion:\nIn workers' compensation cases in which the employee-claimant's attorney seeks to increase his fee by appealing the Board's fee determination to the Superior Court, the lawyer is involved in a conflict of interest if he does not give the client a full explanation concerning their conflicting positions in the appeal and advise the client of his right to obtain independent legal counsel to protect the client's interests during this stage of litigation.","UrlName":"rule475","Order":9,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"fdc1d4eb-86b0-4daf-b413-a2a9ebaf8552","Title":"Advisory Opinion 30","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 30 \n November 17, 1982\n Ethical Propriety of Agreement by Which Attorney's Fees are Paid by Opposing Party\n Question : A is the plaintiff in a lawsuit against B which is pending in the Northern District of Georgia. B is the debtor in a proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Texas. In addition, there is pending in the same Bankruptcy Court in Texas an action in which B is the plaintiff and C, D, and E are defendants. E is also a full-time employee of A. B contends that C, D, and E are or may be liable to B for all or part of the claims being asserted against B by A in the Georgia litigation.\nA and B have agreed upon a complete settlement of all matters in controversy between them in a settlement agreement which must be approved by the Bankruptcy Court.\nThe settlement agreement provides that the Georgia litigation will be dismissed with prejudice. B will ask the Bankruptcy Court to dismiss E as a defendant in that Court, without prejudice to further proceedings by B against C and D, and will give E a covenant not to sue. however, the parties recognize that there is a possibility that C and/or D will assert claims against E and/or A, seeking contribution from either or both of them, either in the pending action in the Bankruptcy Court or in some other action. In order to protect both E and A, B has agreed to indemnify and hold them harmless from \"expenses and costs of defending such claims, including reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees,\"subject to obtaining a written opinion from the State Bar of Georgia that such agreement is ethical and is not a violation of the Canons of Ethics.\n Opinion : It is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia that the foregoing agreement is ethical and is not a violation of the Canons of Ethics, provided that a full disclosure of all pertinent facts has been made to all parties who may be affected by such agreement, give their written consent to it; and, provided further, that the attorneys at all times exercise their independent professional judgment for their respective clients regardless of who is responsible for paying the fees of the attorneys.","UrlName":"rule476","Order":10,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a3bad30b-fb21-4d48-9502-6ddfeaa79f95","Title":"Advisory Opinion 31","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 31 \nNovember 19, 1982 \n Dual Occupations: Ethical considerations applicable to a Lawyer who is engaged both in the practice of law and another profession or business.\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and the Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Questions presented:\n(1) Should a Georgia attorney, also possessing a Georgia real estate salesperson's license, who arranges a real estate transaction in his or her capacity as a real estate salesperson decline to perform any title work or other legal work in order to avoid an appearance of professional impropriety?\n(2) If, in the course of representing a client in an unrelated legal matter, the client requests the attorney (also possessing a real estate salesperson's license) to locate a buyer or seller for the client's real estate, is it proper for the attorney to accept?\nThe American Bar Association stated in Formal Opinion No. 328, June 1972, that it is not necessarily improper for a lawyer simultaneously to hold himself out as a lawyer and as a member of another profession or business. However, the American Bar Association concluded that a lawyer that is engaged in the practice of law and another profession which is closely related to law, must govern his conduct according to the professional standards of the legal profession while engaged in the non-legal profession or business.\nFollowing the rationale of the American Bar Association, it is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that a Georgia attorney who is also engaged in the real estate business should conform his behavior to the standards of conduct of the State Bar of Georgia while engaged in both professions. Accordingly, it would not be improper for the attorney to perform the work requested in both of your inquiries provided the attorney complies with the provisions of DR 2-103, DR 2-104, and DR 2-105 of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility (Standards 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 of Rule 4-102 of the Georgia Bar Rules).\nWhen an attorney, who is actively practicing law in the State of Georgia, is also engaged in a second profession or business closely related to the practice of law, all of the provisions of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable to the lawyer's conduct in both professions.","UrlName":"rule477","Order":11,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"24ef30af-01cf-4b5c-b5cf-d2841117e5e8","Title":"Advisory Opinion 35","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 35 \nJuly 15, 1983 \n Attorney's Responsibilities with Respect to the Payment of Witness Fees\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations of the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request of such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Attorney (A) represents Client (C), the plaintiff in a civil suit for damages. In the course of preparation for C's case, A uses the services of an expert witness (W); nothing specific is mentioned concerning compensation of W.\nC has no substantial asset other than the claim that is the subject of the suit, and will be able to pay the witness fees only if he is successful in securing a recovery. By the same token, if A advances the fees to W, A will have little or no chance of being reimbursed by C, if C loses his case.\n(1) Would it be proper for A to pay the costs, realizing that he might never be reimbursed by C?\n(2) Would it be proper for A to say nothing and keep W waiting for payment until some recovery has been had?\n(3) Generally, should the State Bar reconsider the ethical prohibition against contingency fees for expert witnesses in light of the practicalities involved?\n Opinion: Standard 58 of Bar Rule 4-102 and DR 7-109 (c) expressly prohibit payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the outcome of a case. Standard 58 does not, however, prohibit an attorney from advancing, guaranteeing or acquiescing in the payment of expenses reasonably incurred by a witness.\nStandard 32 of Bar Rule 4-102 requires that the client must remain ultimately liable for any expenses advanced or guaranteed by the attorney. Ethical Consideration 5-8 (Canon 5) explains that it is not proper for an attorney to have a financial interest in the outcome of his client's case, as such an interest might affect his independent professional judgment; thus, the client must remain ultimately liable for the expenses of litigation.\nA (the attorney in the set of facts above) is not sure what he is ethically required to do in light of Standards 32 and 58. If A pays the fees to W and C loses his case, C will not be able to repay A. Is this, in fact, a violation of Standard 32?\nThe Board's answer to this question must be that such a situation does not violate Standard 32. While it is true that A may never be paid by C for the expenses advanced to W, C is still ultimately liable to A for his expenses. A can pursue legal remedy against C and might be reimbursed at some point in the future. Thus, A's liability to W is at most penultimate.\n It should be noted that in Brown and Huseby, Inc. v. Chrietzberg, 242 Ga. 232, 248 S.E. 2d 631 (1978), the Supreme Court of Georgia held an attorney may be liable for court reporter's fees if he personally guarantees payment therefor and the reporter reasonably relies upon the attorney for their payments. The Court stated that such a holding did not force the attorney to violate Standard 32, as the client would remain ultimately liable to the attorney.\nA also wonders if he can simply make W wait until the final outcome of the case, realizing that, in effect, W can only collect from C if C is successful. A fears that such a course of action (or inaction) might violate Standard 58's prohibition against contingency fees for witnesses.\n The Board, once again, finds no violation of a disciplinary standard here. First, there is no actual contingency. The term contingency implies that no liability will arise without the happening of a certain event. In this case, C will have a legal obligation to pay W even if he cannot, in fact, pay him. Secondly, A might be required to pay W under the doctrine of Brown and Huseby. In either event, W will not be required to await the outcome of the case to have a claim against C and/or A for recovery of the services he has rendered.\nFinally, A thinks that the prohibition against contingency fees for witnesses is impractical and ought to be reconsidered.\n It should be noted that rules substantially similar to Rule 58 have met constitutional challenges (e.g. Pearson v. Association of Bar of City of New York, cert. den. 434 US 924 (1978) ). The Board finds that the problem in A's case does not stem from any impracticality inherent in rule 58. Rather, A's problem arose when he failed to discuss the details of compensation with W, before he used W's services. Witnesses should know who to look to for payment for their services from the outset. An attorney's failure to appraise the witness of such details might put him in A's seemingly no-win (financial, rather than ethical) situation.","UrlName":"rule478","Order":12,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"99a17efa-1ad2-4b79-b3fb-0c795e3ce6f0","Title":"Advisory Opinion 36","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 36 \nSeptember 23, 1983 \n Contingent Fees in Divorce Cases\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented:\nWhether it is ethically proper for an attorney to enter into a contingency-fee arrangement in a divorce case.\n The question presented for resolution by this Board involves questions of law as well as ethics. It should be noted that the Georgia Appellate Courts have consistently held that contingency fee arrangements in divorce cases are void as against public policy, Evans v. Hartley , 57 Ga. App. 598 (1938); Fleming v. Phinizy , 35 Ga. App. 792 (1926); and that similar arrangements in cases to collect future child support are likewise invalid, Thomas v. Holt , 209 Ga. 133 (1952). The courts in Georgia have not considered the question of whether contingency fees are proper in an action to enforce past due alimony or child support.\nThe ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are DR 5-103, EC 5-7 and DR 2-106 and EC 2-20.\nCanon 5, DR 5-103 and EC 5-7 pertain to the ethical propriety of contingency fees in general. These ethical guidelines discourage lawyers from accepting cases on a contingency fee basis to avoid the possibility of an adverse effect on the lawyer's independent professional judgment. While recognizing that a contingency-fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, EC 5-7 states that \"a reasonable contingency fee is permissible in civil cases because it may be the only means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice.\"This Rule, however, cautions a lawyer to enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those instances where the arrangement will be beneficial to the client.\nThe question presented by this inquiry is directly addressed by EC 2-20. In pertinent part, this Ethical Consideration provides that contingent-fee arrangements in domestic relation cases, are rarely justified \"because of the human relationships involved and the unique character of the proceedings.\"\nApplying the above-cited authorities to the question presented, it is the opinion of this Board that a contingent fee arrangement in a divorce case is against public policy and is therefore improper. It should be noted that this opinion is limited to the type of fee arrangements prohibited by the Georgia courts in the cases cited above, and does not address the ethical propriety of a contingency arrangement where the matter is limited solely to the collection of a liquidated amount.","UrlName":"rule479","Order":13,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ca62537e-c6f2-4350-aade-b31ec2a4b3af","Title":"Advisory Opinion 37","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 37 \nJanuary 20, 1984 \n Attorney's Fees for Collecting PIP Benefits\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented:\nIs it ethically proper for an attorney to take a contingent fee from a client's PIP benefits?\n Opinion:\nThe applicable ethical rules are DR 2-106 and Standard 31(b) of Bar Rule 4-102. Directory Rule 2-106 provides in part:\nDR 2-106--Fees for Legal Services.\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. \n(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: \n <div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; \n(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; \n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; \n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; \n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; \n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; \n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer, or lawyers performing the services; (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. \n </div> \n</div>\n Standard 31(b) allow an attorney to \"contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case \"(emphasis added).\nUnder the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (O.C.G.A. §§ 33-34-1 through 13) all insurance policies must provide for compensation to injured persons, without regard to fault, for medical expenses, loss of wages, some expenses and burial expenses. This insurance coverage is generally known as PIP coverage. Payments of PIP benefits are required to be made within thirty (30) days after the insurance carrier receives reasonable proof of the fact and the amount of loss. All that is needed to file for PIP benefits is a simple, factual claim form.\nThe basis on which attorneys are allowed to take contingency fees is that the claim on which the attorney represents the client is itself contingent. Blacks Law Dictionary defines contingent as \"possible, but not assured.\"\nExcept in unusual circumstances, the benefits paid under PIP coverage are assured. It is the opinion of this Board that the taking of a contingency fee for the filling out of routine, undisputed PIP claim forms is unreasonable and a violation of DR 2-106(B)(1) and Standard 31(b). An attorney may charge a reasonable fee for the attorney's time spent in processing a PIP claim.\nIn those unusual circumstances when the payment of PIP benefits is not assured, this Board does not wish to prohibit contingency fees in general. However, the attorney should examine the factors set out in DR 2-106(B) to determine whether a contingent fee arrangement would be reasonable.","UrlName":"rule480","Order":14,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"53c376e7-f51d-4714-aca7-e9d14a5be5ae","Title":"Advisory Opinion 38","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 38 \nJuly 20, 1984 \n Law Clerks Preparing Appellate Briefs\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: May a Law Clerk for a Superior Court Judge prepare appellate briefs on behalf of defendants in criminal cases where the death penalty has been imposed under the following circumstances?\n 1) The cases would be from other judicial circuits; \n3) The work would be performed in the Law Clerk's spare time and he would receive no compensation; \n2) Both the prisoner and judge consent to the Law Clerk's representation after full disclosure; \n4) No county or state materials would be used; \n5) The Law Clerk is paid by the county and serves at the judge's pleasure.\n Opinion: The applicable ethical rules are Canons 5 and 9; ECs 5-14, 5-15, 9-1 and 9-2; DR 5-105; and Standards 35 and 37.\nThe Law Clerk for a Superior Court Judge occupies a unique position. The \"client \"of the Law Clerk is the State of Georgia through the Judge who supervises the Clerk's activities. While a Law Clerk is not specifically subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Clerk is in a close relationship with the Judge who is subject to that code. Lawyers and members of the public view a Law Clerk as an extension of the Judge for whom the Clerk works.\nFor a Law Clerk to take a position against the State representing a prisoner who has been convicted in the State of Georgia, the Clerk will be in a conflict of interest situation. On one hand, the Clerk is representing the person against the State while on the other hand, the Clerk represents the State in the administration of justice through the Superior Court Judge.\nCanon 9 states that:\n\"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of a Professional Impropriety.\"\nIt is the opinion of this Board that a Law Clerk representing criminal defendants would give rise to the appearance of professional impropriety under Canon 9 and ECs 9-1 and 9-2. Additionally, Standard 37 (and DR 5-105) allows a lawyer to represent multiple clients in a conflict of interest situation only if \"it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each \". It is the opinion this Board that a Law Clerk cannot adequately represent the interest of the State of Georgia in death penalty cases and the interest of other prisoners in other death penalty cases.\nThe State Disciplinary Board does not reach the question of whether or not the Law Clerk is subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct as that is a proper question for the Judicial Qualifications Commission.","UrlName":"rule481","Order":15,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5900d6f6-52be-4831-8e0c-04216eeffa05","Title":"Advisory Opinion 39","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 39 \nJuly 20, 1984 \n Propriety of Defendant's Tender of Lump Sum Settlement Offers to Plaintiffs in Federal Civil Rights Actions Wherein Statutory Attorney Fees are Provided for Successful Plaintiffs\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations of the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Questions Presented : In the U.S. District Court, plaintiff files his claim alleging a violation of first and fourteenth amendments as well as 42 USC §1983, etc. Plaintiff's counsel is typically a corresponding attorney with the American Civil liberties Union. The defendant is typically a private physician, private hospital or drug rehabilitation facility.\nRelated state claims are frequently also raised in such cases, including charges of false imprisonment, battery, medical negligence and violation of state laws regarding involuntary hospitalization, etc. In addition to amounts sought for compensatory and punitive damages, there is also a prayer if not expressly contained in the complaint then, implicitly under the U.S. Code, for statutory attorney's fees under 42 USC §1988.\nIf it is determined during the course of the pre-trial discovery process that an offer to settle the case should be extended to the plaintiffs, such an offer would typically be in the form of a lump sum which would represent the total amount to be paid by the insurance carrier for compensatory and punitive damages as well as any attorney's fees. Neither the defendant nor the insurance carrier would have any interest as to how that lump sum would be divided between the plaintiff and his attorney, the only interest therein being that it represented the maximum extent of their exposure.\nIn a case involving alleged violations of Federal civil rights statutes pending the U.S. District Court in Georgia where the prevailing party would be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as expenses of the litigation, is it unethical or in any way improper for the defendant, in an attempt to settle the case prior to trial, to offer a dollar amount representing the total of compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees which would be received by the plaintiff and his counsel?\nIf the answer to the foregoing is yes, could the ethical violation be cured by entering into an agreement between plaintiff, his attorneys and the defendant, agreeing upon an amount representing compensatory and punitive damages to be received by the plaintiff himself and a separate amount representing compensation for legal services?\n Opinion: It should be first noted that to the extent that the foregoing questions involve interpretations of federal or other law, that the State Disciplinary Board is without authority to consider those aspects of this matter. This opinion will, therefore, address only the ethical aspects of the conduct in question according to the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility. Furthermore, the State Disciplinary Board recognizes that since this inquiry arises in a federal setting, a separate body of federal ethical rules may apply and in responding, the State Disciplinary Board will not undertake to interpret any federal ethical rules.\n The State Disciplinary Board is aware of at least one other Bar Association which has issued a written opinion concerning a similar, if not identical, fact situation. Having read and considered Opinion Nos. 80-94 and 82-80 of the Ethics Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York , which opinions hold that it is unethical for a defendant's counsel to demand a waiver of statutory attorney fees from plaintiff as a condition for settlement in federal civil rights cases involving statutory attorney fees, we decline to adopt the position taken by the majority of that Committee in both of those two opinions. Briefly stated, those opinions held that defendant's demands for waiver of the statutory attorney fees \"had the effect of placing the plaintiff's lawyers in conflict with their clients and undercutting the policies of the civil rights statutes which provided for fees and that accordingly the demands were prejudicial to the administration of justice.\"Opinion No. 82-80 . We are instead, more persuaded by the position taken by the dissent in Opinion No. 82-80 , which cited with approval the following language from the United States Supreme Court in White v. New Hampshire , 455 U.S. 445, 71 L. Ed. 2d 325, 332, n. 15 (1982), a case where the issue of the ethical propriety of simultaneous negotiation of attorney fees in federal civil rights actions was raised, but not actually decided:\n\"In considering whether to enter a negotiated settlement, a defendant may have good reason to demand to know his total liability from both damages and fees. Although such situations may raise difficult ethical issues for a plaintiff's attorney, we are reluctant to hold that no resolution is ever available to ethical counsel.\"\nAlthough no provisions of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility appear to address this issue directly, Standard 45(f) of Bar Rule 4-102 states, in pertinent part, that a lawyer shall not \"settle a legal proceeding or claim without obtaining proper authorization from his client.\"Implicit in this rule is the notion that attorneys must communicate with their clients concerning possible settlement of a cause of action, and offer the benefit of their professional advice and judgment so that the client's decision to make a settlement offer is as informed and intelligent a choice as is reasonably possible.\nClearly, in appropriate cases, the question of a defendant's liability for plaintiff's attorney fees, where so provided by statute, can be a significant factor in reaching a decision as to whether to make an offer of settlement. To force a defendant into proposing a settlement offer wherein plaintiffs statutory attorney fees are not negotiated and incorporated into the final settlement offer leaves a defendant in a position of exposure that is at best, uncertain, and at worst so tenuous that meaningful settlement proposals might never be made. Such a situation undeniably impedes the settlement process and is inimical to the resolution of disputes between parties. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Board that it is not unethical for defendant's counsel to offer to plaintiff, under the facts presented, a lump sum settlement offer prior to trial for a dollar amount representing the total amount of damages and attorney fees for plaintiff's counsel.\nOur resolution of this first question appears to make an answer the second question unnecessary.","UrlName":"rule482","Order":16,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e6164aab-18be-4105-9bf9-dcd212735ac6","Title":"Advisory Opinion 40","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 40 \nSeptember 21, 1984 \n Misuse of Subpoenas\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-217 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Standards of Conduct of the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Whether or not it is a violation of Standard 4 of the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Georgia for an attorney to issue a subpoena for the Production of Documents pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a), directing the witness to appear at a lawyer's office or some other location, when in fact no hearing or trial is taking place and no notice of such subpoena is served upon opposing counsel?\nWhether or not it is a violation of Standard 4 of the Disciplinary Rules of the State Bar of Georgia for an attorney to issue a subpoena pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-45 when no notice of deposition has been filed and served upon all parties and when no deposition has in fact been scheduled?\n Discussion: Disciplinary Standard 4 of the State Bar of Georgia provides as follows:\nA lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation. A violation of this Standard may be punished by disbarment.\n A subpoena is a judicial writ issued in the name of the court by the clerk when attendance is required at court. (See Agnor's Georgia Evidence § 2-3). In the case of White v. Gulf States Paper , 119 Ga. App. 271, 273 (1969), it was stated that our subpoena statutes were limited only to producing documentary evidence at a hearing or trial. In the White decision, the court noted that the old Georgia Code Section 38-8 and 38-9 dealt only with the production of documentary evidence at a hearing or trial and that the new Act (1966 which constitutes our present subpoena law) did not enlarge the provisions of the repealed law to allow use of a Notice to Produce at depositions. This particular case brought about the amendment to Rule 45 of the Civil Practice Act.\nO.C.G.A. § 9-11-45 provides that a subpoena shall issue for persons sought to be deposed and may command the person to produce documents. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-30(b)(1) requires notice to every other party of all depositions. Reading Rule 30 and Rule 45 together, it is obvious that before a subpoena can be issued, notice of the deposition must be given to all parties.\nIn consideration of the above, a subpoena issued pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a) should only be issued for actual hearings and trials and should not be requested when in fact no hearing or trial has been scheduled. Likewise, a subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 45 of the Civil Practice Act should be requested and issued only for depositions which have been actually scheduled by agreement between parties or where a notice of deposition has been filed and served upon all parties, and should not be issued when no deposition has been scheduled.\nThe Board is concerned with the misuse of subpoenas as presented in the two situations discussed because subpoenas are court documents. Non-party witnesses would be misled by such court process into releasing confidential or privileged material without the party having a chance to contest the relevancy, confidentiality or privilege of the material contained in the file because the subpoena is sent without notice to any other party or their counsel. Notice is a concept embraced by the Civil Practice Act. There is no need for notice of a subpoena issue pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-10-22(a) because all parties receive notice of hearings and trials, so long as they are real hearings and real trials.\n Conclusion: In the opinion of the Board, the use of subpoenas as described herein is a willful misrepresentation to and fraud upon:\n (1) The issuing court; \n(2) The issuing clerk: \n(3) The person or entities to whom the subpoena is directed; and, \n(4) The opposing party and counsel, with the purview of Disciplinary Standard 4.","UrlName":"rule484","Order":17,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d056c887-3e39-4cb9-97b0-abb52d8d7909","Title":"Advisory Opinion 41","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 41 \nSeptember 24, 1984, \nas amended November 15, 1985 \n \nClient Confidentiality \nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations of the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia starting with Rules and Regulations (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request of such, rendered its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Lawyer X has received cash fees from clients in excess of $10,000 several times in the past three years. All of these fees were for representation in criminal matters. Each time, X has deposited the money in either his operating account or escrow account, when appropriate, and filed a Currency Transaction Report, as required by 31 C.F.R. § 103.22. Subsequently, X received a telephone inquiry from a revenue agent with the Georgia Department of Revenue inquiring into the source of the funds recorded on the currency transaction report. Lawyer X refused to divulge the names of his clients.\nThe State of Georgia then issued a Notice to Produce, requiring production of \"...all books, records, papers and/or documents pertaining to [Lawyer X's personal Corporate Georgia Income Tax] For the periods indicated [1981-1983].\"The Notice to Produce did not name a specific person as a client for an investigation, but Lawyer X was verbally advised by the revenue agent that in fact, the purpose of this Notice to Produce was to discover, at random, the names of the client, and to audit the lawyer.\n(1) Will Lawyer X violate the confidences and secrets provision of the Code of Ethics by complying with the Notice to Produce in revealing the identity of the client in those transactions in excess of $10,000?\n(2) Additionally, will Lawyer X violate the confidences and secrets provision of the Code of Ethics by complying with the Notice to Produce in revealing the identity of all of his clients and the amount of fees paid, whether by case, check, or any amount above or less than $10,000?\n Opinion : The applicable ethical rules are Canon 4; EC's 4-1 through 4-6; and Standard 28.\nIt should be first noted that the questions addressed in this opinion pertain only to a general Notice to Produce seeking information from an attorney's file. The dollar amount involved in the hypothetical is not controlling; rather it is the fact that the Notice to Produce is not addressed to a particular client or clients that is of concern to the Board.\nCanon 4 states: \"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.\"As EC 4-1 explains, the observance of the lawyer's ethical obligation to hold inviolate confidences and secrets of his client encourages laymen to seek legal assistance and facilitates full development of the facts essential to proper representation of the client. EC 4-5 directs that a lawyer should not use secrets acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client. This obligation continues even after the termination of the lawyer's employment. (EC 4-6)\nThese principles are incorporated in the Director Rules and Disciplinary Standards. DR 4-101 and Standard 28 prohibit a lawyer from revealing the confidences and secrets of a client. A violation of this Standard is punishable by disbarment. A lawyer may reveal confidences and secrets of a client only (1) if the clients consents after full disclosure; (2) where the confidences or secrets are permitted to be disclosed under the Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order; (3) where the client intends to commit a crime and information is necessary to prevent the crime; or (4) where it is necessary for the lawyer to establish and collect his fee, or defend himself against the accusation of wrongful conduct.\n The ethical and disciplinary rules distinguish between \"confidences \"and \"secrets.\"The former is information protected by the attorney/client privilege as determined by applicable law, and is more limited than the ethical obligation of the lawyer to guard the secrets of his client. A secret, on the other hand, refers to \"other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which could be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client .\"(emphasis supplied) [DR 4-101(a) and Standard 28(c)].\nIt is the opinion of the State Disciplinary Board that in responding to a general Notice to Produce Lawyer X must not voluntarily reveal the name/identity of his clients to the Georgia Department of Revenue unless he obtains the consent of the client or clients affected after a full disclosure. [Standard 28(b)(1)] Further, Lawyer X must resist disclosure until a court orders disclosure [Standard 28(b)(2)] and thereafter he may pursue all reasonable avenues of appeal.\nThis decision finds support in the opinions of at least four other Bar Associations which have issued opinions concerning a similar, if not identical, factual situation. Briefly stated, these opinions hold that an attorney must resist disclosure of the name/identity of his client. The District of Columbia, Philadelphia and Birmingham Opinions go further and require an attorney to utilize all appellate avenues before making disclosure.\n Opinion No. 124 of the Committee on Legal Ethics the District of Columbia Bar Association (March 22, 1983); Opinion No. 81-95 of the Professional Guidance Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association (undated); Opinion of Professional Ethics of the Birmingham Bar Association (unnumbered) (January 9, 1981); and Informal Opinion No. 81-3 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Connecticut Bar Association (October 9, 1980).","UrlName":"rule485","Order":18,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"1f82c57c-2110-4fac-bd3d-bac1613e6045","Title":"Advisory Opinion 42","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 42 \nNovember 16, 1984 \n Attorney's Disclosure of Client's Possible Intent to Commit Suicide\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. as amended) the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Attorney (A) represents client (C), who is facing a multiple felony indictment and substantial possibility of conviction thereon. C has sought advice from A concerning matters one would normally expect to be consulted about by a terminally ill person trying to put his affairs in order prior to death. Although C has never directly so stated to A, by his actions and conduct, C has led A to believe that C intends to commit suicide prior to his criminal trial.\nA has inquired whether Informal Opinion No. 83-1500 of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (June 24, 1983), which authorized a lawyer to disclose to other persons the definite threat of his client to take his own life would apply to a situation where the client has not definitely expressed such an intention, but, by his actions, has given his attorney reason to believe that he intends to take his own life.\n Opinion: For the same reasons set forth in ABA Informal Opinion No. 83-1500 (A copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference), the Board is of the opinion that when an attorney reasonably believes his client is contemplating suicide, he should be permitted to disclose such information as a last resort in a life-or-death situation when the lawyer's efforts to counsel the client have apparently failed.\n Standing Committee on Ethics \nand Professional Responsibility\n<div align=\"left\"> \n <table width=\"75%\"> \n <tbody> \n <tr> \n <td valign=\"top\"> Informal Op. 83-1500  \n         Disclosure of Client's Intent \n         to Commit Suicide </td> \n <td valign=\"top\">June 24, 1983</td> \n </tr> \n </tbody> \n </table> \n</div>\nThis inquiry involves the situation in which a client who has retained a lawyer to draft her will confides to the lawyer that she intends to take her own life. The client also disclosed that she has been hospitalized for mental exhaustion on at least one occasion after a previous suicide attempt. Neither suicide nor attempted suicide is a crime in the jurisdiction. The lawyer asks whether the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits the lawyer from disclosing to a third person the intention of his client to take her own life.\nDR 4-101(B) of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from revealing a confidence or secret of his client. An exception is provided in DR 4-101(C)(3), which permits a lawyer to reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. A literal reading of \"crime \"in this provision renders the exception inapplicable in the inquiring lawyer's jurisdiction. The same conclusion would be reached under proposed Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), which provides that a lawyer may reveal information relating to representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act the lawyer believes likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.\n Ethics committees in two states have dealt with his problem. In Opinion 486 (1978), the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar Association concluded that while suicide had been decriminalized in New York and DR4-101(C)(3) did not literally apply, the overriding social concern for the preservation of human life permitted the lawyer to disclose the information. The New York committee pointed out that the decriminalization of suicide in the state was not intended to effect any basic change in underlying common law and statutory provisions reflecting deep concern for the preservation of human life and the prevention of suicide. Accordingly, the committee analyzed an announced intention to commit suicide in the same manner as proposed criminal conduct under DR 4-101(C)(3). Addressing the same issue in Opinion 79-61 (1979),the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar Association determined that although neither suicide nor attempted suicide is in itself punishable under the criminal law of Massachusetts, both have in other respects been deemed to be malum in se and treated as unlawful and criminal.\nThat committee cited the New York State Bar Association Opinion 486 and reached the same conclusion.\nWe believe that in light of the following language of EC7-12 relating to proper conduct in dealing with the client with a disability, these Committees reached the proper conclusion:\n<blockquote> \nAny mental or physical condition of a client that renders  him incapable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf, casts additional  responsibilities on his lawyer... If the disability of a client, in the lack of a legal  representative compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should  consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance  the interest of his client.... \n</blockquote>\nThis concept is also recognized in the ABA proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct:\n<blockquote> \nA lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take  other protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably  believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest. \n</blockquote>\nThe inquirer may justifiably conclude that his client is unable to make a considered judgment on this ultimate life or death question and should be permitted to disclose the information as a last resort when the lawyer's efforts to counsel the client have apparently failed. This interpretation is limited to the circumstance of this particular opinion request and should not be relied upon to permit the disclosure of any other information in any other situation.","UrlName":"rule486","Order":19,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"183aad70-d7cd-4ada-9b59-ecb93c8bc202","Title":"Advisory Opinion 45","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 45 \nMarch 15, 1985, \nas amended November 15, 1985 \n Charging Interest on Clients' Overdue Bills\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Questions Presented:\n<div>1. A client is billed for service rendered and fails to pay after thirty (30) days have elapsed. Is it permissible to notify the client, by letter, that unless his account is paid in full, interest will be charged on the next bill on the unpaid balance?</div>\n2. A client signs a fee contract with an attorney providing for the charging of interest on any unpaid balance. Is it permissible for the attorney to charge interest?\n 3. An attorney notifies his or her client by letter that interest will be charged unless their accounts are paid in full. If the conduct described in question 1 is impermissible, can the attorney rectify the situation by rebilling the clients with any interest charged deducted, or if interest was paid returned? \n \n Opinion: The State Disciplinary Board is of the opinion that an attorney may ethically unilaterally charge interest on client's overdue bills. A lawyer may ethically do so provided that he or she complies with all applicable law, specifically O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts contained in Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act as amended (15 USC 1601 et seq.) and EC 2-19, which states: As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been employed, it is desirable that he reach a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made. Such a course will not only prevent later misunderstanding but will also work for good relations between the lawyer and the client. It is usually beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent. A lawyer should be mindful that many persons who desire to employ him may have had little or no experience with fee charges of lawyers, and for this reason he should explain fully to such persons the reasons for the particular fee arrangement he proposes. The Board is of the opinion that an attorney can comply with EC 2-19 and unilaterally charge interest without a prior specific agreement with a client if notice is given to the client in advance that interest will be charged on fee bills which become delinquent after a stated period of time, but not less than 30 days. The Board recommends that notice be provided on the bill at the time it is sent and that the notice be conspicuous and printed in type size no smaller than the largest type size used in the body of the bill. The notice must specify the amount of interest to be charged and the period of time after which it will be imposed.\n Attorneys should be aware that additional notice and disclosure requirements may be imposed by law, including the specific requirements of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 and the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts, supra . This opinion relates only to those instances where a charge of interest is imposed on a client's overdue bill and has no applicability to the extension of credit or the obtaining of security by an attorney.\nTherefore, the questions presented are answered as follows:\n<div> 1. Yes. An attorney may charge his clients interest provided the attorney complies with EC 2-19 and all applicable law, specifically O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 and the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts, supra .</div>\n2. See the answer to question 1.\n3. Due to the Board's answer to question 1, this question need not be addressed.","UrlName":"rule487","Order":20,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a84f55f1-df09-45e3-afdf-f116e9ecc1f4","Title":"Advisory Opinion 46","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 46 \nMarch 15, 1985 \n Third Party Advancing or Reimbursing an Insured (Policyholder) for the Latter's Purchase of Optional PIP Coverage\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Factual Background: Attorney (A) represents Client (C) whose spouse was struck and killed by a van as he crossed the street. The deceased spouse had no automobile insurance, while the van driver was insured and his policy provided only basic PIP benefits. These basic benefits extended to the deceased's family and were paid out by the driver's insurance.\nEventually, a settlement of the liability claim was reached. A approached the attorney (X) who represented the driver (Y) and inquired as to whether or not his client would be willing to apply for and tender the premium for optional PIP coverage available under former O.C.g.A. § 33-34-5(B) (Ga. Code Ann. § 56-34046). X consulted with Y and advised that Y would be willing to do so but only on condition that C advance Y the amount for the additional premium and pay Y for his time in making the application for the optional coverage.\n According to a recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Bailey v. Georgia Mutual Ins. Co. , 168 Ga. App. 706, 309 S.E. 2d 870 (1983), \"a demand for increased coverage by the policyholder is necessary before those who would be incidental or third-party beneficiaries as 'other insureds' can seek optional benefits.\"Thus, C and the child of the deceased pedestrian, who was not a direct policyholder, would not have legal standing to apply for and obtain those optional benefits according to the Court of Appeals' ruling.\n Questions Presented:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n 1. May C or A advance to Y the premium amount for the optional PIP coverage? \n2. May A or C compensate Y for his time in applying for and obtaining this coverage? \n3. If the insurer refuses to pay the benefits and litigation results, would C be barred from compensating Y for his time and effort in pursuing the claim in court, in addition to witness and mileage fees allowed by statute? Opinion: The ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are EC 5-8, EC 7-28, DR 5-103(B), DR 7-109(C), and Standards 32 and 58. \n</div>\nThe State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia answers the questions presented as follows:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n1. C or A may ethically advance to Y the premium amount of optional PIP coverage as long as A's conduct is otherwise in accordance with the requirements of Standard 32. Standard 32 provides: \n</div>\nWhile presenting a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examinations, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses. A violation of this standard may be punished by a public reprimand.\n2. A or C may ethically compensate Y for his time in applying for and obtaining the optional PIP coverage, as long as A's conduct is otherwise in accordance with the requirements of Standard 32 cited above.\n3. If the insurer refuses to pay the benefits and litigation results, C is not ethically barred from compensating Y for his time and effort in pursuing the claim in court, provided that the requirements of Standard 58 are observed. Standard 58 provides:\nA lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:\n(a) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying;\n(b) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or testifying;\n(c) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.\nA violation of this standard may be punished by disbarment.","UrlName":"rule488","Order":21,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"33a5434e-7c81-4023-8874-318faac1e449","Title":"Advisory Opinion 47","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 47 \nJuly 26, 1985 \n Contingency Fees to Collect Past Due Alimony and/or Child Support\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Question Presented: Is it ethical to charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony and/or child support payments?\n Opinion: The ethical rules presently applicable to this inquiry are EC 2-23, EC 2-20, DR 2-106, EC 5-7, DR 5-103 and Disciplinary Standard 31.\nThe question presented for resolution by this Board is the question specifically left unanswered in Formal Advisory Opinion 36, which held that contingent fee arrangements in divorce cases and in cases to collect future child support are against public policy and are therefore improper.\n It is the opinion of the Board that it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony or child support for the following reasons: Collection of these amounts occurs after the divorce, i.e. it is a post-judgment proceeding; a suit for execution of a judgment on such arrearages is neither a \"domestic relations \"nor a \"divorce \"case; the human relationships involved and the unique character of domestic relations proceedings which generally prohibit contingent fees are not present and do not apply in these cases; and, most importantly, in many circumstances, a contingent fee arrangement may be the only means by which these vital legal rights can be enforced. Canon 2, EC 2-20 and EC 5-7.\nAlthough it is ethically proper to charge a contingent fee to collect past due alimony or child support, the lawyer should strive to meet the following criteria:\n<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\"> \n1. A contingent fee arrangement must be the only practical means by which one having a claim for past due alimony or child support can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute the claim (EC's 2-20 and 5-7); \n2. The contingent fee must be reasonable. Guidelines for determining the reasonableness of a fee are set forth in DR 2-106. \n</div>\n DR 2-106 - Fees for Legal Services.\n(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.\n(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:\n(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;\n(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;\n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;\n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;\n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;\n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;\n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer, or lawyers performing the services;\n(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.\n(C) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.\n3. Any court-awarded fees must be credited against the contingent fee. EC 2-23. These criteria should be carefully followed, particularly in cases seeking to collect past due child support.\n This decision finds support in the opinions of at least eleven other Bar Associations. Opinion 1982-4 , Legal Ethics Committee of the Dallas Bar Association (11/22/82); Opinion 80-34 , Committee on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. (undated); Opinion CI-828 and CI-1050U , Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Michigan (9/2/82) (10/30/84); Opinion 88 , Ethics Committee of the Mississippi State Bar (9/23/83); Opinion 405 , approved by the Virginia State Bar Council (9/8/83); Opinion 82-1 , Legal Ethics Committee of the West Virginia State Bar (6/18/82); Opinion 660 , New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics (5/4/84); Formal Ethics Opinion No. 82-F-26 , Ethics Committee of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee (2/22/82); Opinion 1983-4/2 , New Hampshire Bar Association Ethics Committee (9/20/83); Opinion 67 , Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee (undated).","UrlName":"rule489","Order":22,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0044f666-ad1a-473b-ab90-6d63b2df6094","Title":"Advisory Opinion 48","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 48 \nJuly 26, 1985 \n Expert Witness Consulting Services\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873,as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Facts: A client asks an attorney to investigate a possible medical malpractice claim. An appropriate expert is located and the attorney advises the client that the expert requires an hourly fee of X dollars per hour to review the records and that the first hour must be paid in advance.\nThe client tells the attorney that the client cannot pay the expert's fee and asks whether there are any possible alternatives. The attorney is aware of one alternative whereby the client contracts with an expert witness consulting service to locate the services of an appropriate medical expert to review the records to determine whether a cause of action exists. If the expert determines that no cause of action exists, then the client would be so advised and no fee would be owed. If, on the other hand, there appears to be a cause of action, the client would agree to compensate the consulting service on a contingent fee basis from any recovery generated.\nThe consulting service would contract directly with the client, rather than the attorney, and would agree to pay the expert on an hourly basis for time spent by the expert in case preparation, including research, depositions and trial.The expert is not an employee of this organization, however, and would work directly with the attorney on the client's behalf.\nUpon successful completion of the case, the consulting service would receive approximately 7% of the recovery plus reimbursement for any fees paid to the expert by the service according to the rate specified in the contract. The attorney would also sign the contract to guarantee payment of the consulting service on behalf of the client from the proceeds in the attorney's possession. If no recovery is obtained, the the client would only be required by the contract to reimburse the service for any hourly fees paid to the expert.\n Question: Does the proposed use of such an expert witness consulting service violate Bar Rules?\n Opinion: The Board first recognizes the existence of several such services and that for some clients, an arrangement similar to that proposed may be the only means available to retain the services of an expert to pursue a cause of action. Since there is substantial uncertainty about the existence of a cause of action until an appropriate expert offers a favorable opinion, a lawyer may be unwilling or unable to assume the risk of personally advancing the necessary expenses to the client, particularly where it appears likely that the client will not reimburse the attorney if the expert's investigation reveals that there is no cause of action.\n<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\"> \n Standard 58 of Bar Rule 4-102 states as follows:  \n \"A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce  in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony  or the outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the  payment of:  \n (a) expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in  attending or testifying; \n(b) reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or  testifying; \n(c) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.  \nA violation of this standard may be punished by  disbarment.\" \n</div>\n Under the proposed arrangement, the lawyer would acquiesce in the payment of a contingent fee to the organization that locates the expert witness, but only in the payment of a fixed fee to the expert. Provided the fee paid to the expert by the consulting service is reasonable, Standard 58 does not appear to be violated. It is very important, however, that the attorney determine that the expert has absolutely no connection with the consulting service, since the reason for the prohibition on contingency compensation to witnesses is to promote truthful testimony uncolored by an financial interest of the witness in the proceedings. See Person v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York , 554 F. 2d 534 (2nd Cir.), cert. den. , 434U.S. 924 (1977). Such impermissible interests could range from significant evidence of interest by the particular expert in future repeated referrals by the consulting service in exchange for a demonstrated willingness to provide favorable opinions, to some type of financial interest of the expert in the service as a director, officer, shareholder or some other form of profit-sharing. The lawyer also cannot permit the consulting service or its employees to provide any testimony or evidence either directly or indirectly through substantial technical assistance to the expert which might somehow fundamentally affect the expert's opinion and transform him into a mere \"mouthpiece \"for the service.In summary, the expert and his opinion must be completely neutral, detached and independent from the consulting service.\nStandard 26 prohibits an attorney from aiding a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. In this regard, the lawyer should insure that the contract with the consulting service does not impair the lawyer's strategic and tactical responsibility to decide which witnesses to call and what evidence and testimony to present on behalf of the client. So long as the participation of the consulting service in the case is confined to locating an appropriate expert and assuming a portion of the risk of prosecuting the cause of action, it would not appear that the lawyer has aided the consulting service in the unauthorized practice of law.\nFinally, the contract in question provides for the payment of a portion of any proceeds recovered by the lawyer to the consulting service which raises the issue of fee splitting with a lay organization. With certain inapplicable exceptions, Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. In this case, however, the contract does not split attorney fees with the organization since it is the client that contracts with the organization to pay a specific share of the client's recovery to the organization in exchange for its services. The attorney is obligated only to guarantee the client's reimbursement of expenses advanced by the organization and, where appropriate, the payment of the consulting service's share of any recovery. Fees charged by the attorney, however, should be computed and paid without reduction by the fee paid to the consulting service. Otherwise, the contract becomes a mere subterfuge for fee splitting between the attorney and a lay organization. Provided the attorney insures the client is fully advised of these consequences of the contract and the client freely agrees to be so bound, there appears to be no fee splitting involved in the proposed arrangement.\nThis opinion finds support in similar opinions issued by the following organizations:\n Informal Opinion 1375 of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (1976);\n Opinion Nos. 55 and 56 of the Committee on Legal Ethics of the District of Columbia Bar (1978);\n Formal Opinion 1984-79 of the California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct (1984).","UrlName":"rule490","Order":23,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cd62708d-7e7a-477f-b187-c8e01ee2faa4","Title":"Advisory Opinion 49","Content":" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/opinion-history.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history and the binding authority of this opinion.\n State Disciplinary Board \nAdvisory Opinion No. 49 \nJuly 26, 1985 \n Lawyer's Use of a Lay Collection Agency to Collect Overdue Accounts for Legal Services\nPursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-223 of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia (219 Ga. 873, as amended), the State Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of Georgia, after a proper request for such, renders its opinion concerning the proper interpretation of the code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Facts: Lawyer L has represented a number of clients whose cases have been completed. The fees in these cases have not been fully paid. Lawyer L has on a monthly basis submitted bills to the clients requesting payment. After thirty (30) days, Lawyer L has sent a letter demanding that immediate payment be made or that arrangements for weekly payments be made. There is no effort to pay in full or to make payments by Client C.\nWhen the account is sixty (60) days old, Lawyer L desires to turn the unpaid bill of Client C over to a commercial collection agency for collection of the account on a contingency fee basis. The commercial collection agency will be calling the client and demanding payment and failing voluntary payment, will employ Georgia counsel at their expenses to file a lawsuit to collect the account. The fee is 45% for accounts less than or equal to 120 days delinquent and 50% for accounts over 120 days delinquent.\n Question Presented: May Lawyer L ethically retain the collection agency on the terms stated?\n Opinion: The aspirational guidance of EC 2-23 suggest that \"[a] lawyer should be zealous in his efforts to avoid controversies over fees with clients and should attempt to resolve amicably any differences on the subject.\"Referral to a collection agency, however, much like filing suit against one's client, is a measure of last resort and should be undertaken only after the lawyer is sure that all reasonable alternatives have been pursued, including an offer by the lawyer to voluntarily submit the matter to the Fee Arbitration Program sponsored by the State Bar. See Part IV--Arbitration of Fee Disputes--Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia . Unfortunately, the good faith efforts of an attorney are not always successful, and, this Board recognizes that on occasion, a client will absolutely refuse to pay an attorney's bill despite all reasonable attempts at compromise. Under such circumstances, its would appear to be unfair to deprive an attorney of a lawful means available to other professions and businesses through which compensation properly earned can be collected. While the Board is of the opinion that the proposed arrangement is ethically permissible, discussion of certain additional considerations is required.\nSince a client's non-payment often stems from a belief that the lawyer's bill is excessive, a lawyer should first, before referral, satisfy himself that the unpaid bill is reasonable. In this regard, the guidelines of DR 2-106 are most instructive and should be carefully considered by the lawyer. It should also be pointed out that although it appears from these facts that Lawyer L has made a reasonable attempt to collect these overdue fees through his personal efforts before referral, an arbitrary deadline of 60 days past due may not, in all cases be appropriate. In reaching a decision of whether or not referral is appropriate, a lawyer should individually consider each case and not apply an arbitrary deadline for the sake of administrative efficiency. Where it is clear, however, the the client's refusal is due to willful indifference and not to an inability to pay or to circumstances beyond the client's control, and the lawyer is satisfied that the non-payment constitutes, in essence, a fraud or gross imposition by the client, then referral to a reputable collection agency is proper.\nWhile Standard 28(b)(4) of Bar Rule 4-102 permits a lawyer to reveal \"confidences and secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee \", a lawyer should exercise this option with considerable caution. Specifically, Lawyer L should reveal to the collection agency only such minimal background information about the client as is absolutely necessary for the agency to properly perform its job. Additionally, just as with any of his employees, the lawyer needs to exercise reasonable care to insure that the agency employees disclose only such client confidences or secrets as are permitted under Standard 28 since a failure in this regard subjects the lawyer to potential disbarment under Standard 29 of Bar Rule 4-102.\nFinally, brief clarification of a possible problem with fee splitting is necessary. With certain inapplicable exceptions, Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. While the fees sought to be collected on behalf of Lawyer L by the collection agency represent legal fees earned by the lawyer, the fees have already been completely earned when referred and the collection agency has not participated in the actual earning of the fees in violation of the prohibition against a lawyer aiding the unauthorized practice of law. See Standard 24. Accordingly, the Board is of the opinion that under the given facts, the fees referred to the collection agency are more in the nature of accounts receivable, the splitting of which Standard 26 is not intended to prevent.\nThe Board finds support for its conclusion that provided the foregoing considerations are satisfied, the conduct in question is ethically proper in similar opinions issued by the following jurisdictions:\n Opinion 82-24 of the Committee on Ethics of the Maryland Bar Association (1982);\n Opinion 82-2 of the Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Arizona (1982);\n Opinion 81-3 of the Ethics Committee of the Florida Bar (1981);\n Opinion No. 225 of the Oregon State Bar (1972);\n Opinion No. 20 of the Colorado Bar Association (1961).\n<hr align=\"left\" width=\"50%\">\n 1 Ga. L. 1946, p. 171 (Ga. Code Ann. §§ 9-306 through 9-411). 2 Ga. Code Ann § 26-1704 recodified as O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20.","UrlName":"rule491","Order":24,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f11f9977-b716-4737-964c-231658b7d25c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On August 23, 1989 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2 The adoption of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct does not require a change in this opinion, which is based on the Code of Judicial Conduct and Georgia law.  However, the Code of Judicial Conduct and Georgia law may have been revised since this opinion was issued. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. QUESTION PRESENTED: Ethical propriety of a part-time judge also serving as a criminal defense counsel. OPINION: The Supreme Court of Georgia approves, as amended, Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2 requesting an Advisory Opinion as to the ethical propriety of a part-time judge serving in a judicial capacity while also serving as a criminal defense counsel. Georgia law authorizes part-time Judges to practice law, subject to certain restrictions. OCGA § 15-7-21 provides that part-time State Court Judges may engage in the private practice of law in other courts, but prohibits practice in the Judge's own court or appearances in any matter as to which the Judge has exercised any jurisdiction. OCGA § 15-10-22 (b) provides that Magistrates who are attorneys may practice in other courts, but not in their own courts, nor may they appear in any matter as to which their court has exercised any jurisdiction. In addition, the Compliance section of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:A. Part-time Judges. A part-time judge is a judge who serves on a continuing or periodic basis, but who is permitted by law to devote time to some other profession or occupation and whose compensation for that reason is less than that of a full-time judge. Part-time judges: . . . . . (2) should not practice law in the court on which they serve or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the courts on which they serve, or act as lawyers in proceedings in which they have served as judges or in any other proceeding related thereto. From this, it is clear that both the statutes and the Canons authorize the practice of law by part-time Judges and spell out the restrictions on such practice. For that reason, representation of a defendant in a criminal case by a part-time judge cannot be said to be per se inappropriate or unethical. At the same time, Canon 2 admonishes that:Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. For that reason, although such representation is not in and of itself inappropriate, the regular or exclusive representation of such defendants by a Judge whose responsibilities include the issuance of criminal warrants or the trial of criminal cases might destroy the appearance of impartiality and integrity essential to the administration of justice and, therefore, be inappropriate. In reaching this conclusion, we have been aware of the holding in Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, et al. , 249 Ga. 543 (291 SE2d 524) (1982); however, in Hudson v. State , 250 Ga. 479 (299 SE2d 531) (1983), this Court declined to adopt a rule which would require disqualification of any part-time Judge serving as an attorney in a criminal defense action. As Judge Gregory stated at Page 482 of the Hudson opinion:Further, we decline to adopt the broad rule proposed by defendant which would require automatic disqualification of every attorney in a criminal defense action where the attorney is simultaneously employed as either a state court solicitor or probate judge. We therefore concluded that part-time Judges are not prohibited from representing defendants in criminal cases, subject to the reservations spelled out in the statutes and the Canons as above set forth.","UrlName":"rule502","Order":25,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ada8ae14-da3a-4fec-800d-cfc72f209e71","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On December 17, 1987 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-3 For references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . For references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rules 1.7(a)</a> , and <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">2.2(a)</a> . For references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of County Attorneys Representing Criminal Defendants. There is no basis for a per se ethical disqualification of county attorneys from the representation of criminal defendants, unless the defendant is charged with a violation of a county ordinance. Any conflict of interest raised by a county attorney's representation of clients other than the county should be analyzed in the same fashion as any other conflict arising from the representation of differing or potentially differing interests. County attorneys must be especially sensitive to the possibility of conflict created by their role, if any, as prosecutor. Correspondent requests guidance as to whether county attorneys or their partners or associates may represent criminal defendants. The primary issue is potential conflict of interest. The position of county attorney obviously creates a lawyer-client relationship between the attorney and the county governmental unit. The county attorney is not called upon by election or oath of office to enforce the laws of the State. The county attorney is, however, authorized to prosecute violations of county ordinances on behalf of the county. When he or she is acting in such a capacity the duty to the county is similar to that of a solicitor to the state. Based on the reasoning of Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-2, it would be ethically improper for a county attorney to represent a criminal defendant charged with a violation of a county ordinance. More generally, the county attorney's obligation is zealous representation of the best interests of his or her client. Any conflict of interest created by a county attorney's representation of clients other than the county should be analyzed like any other conflict arising from the representation of differing or potentially differing interests. There is, therefore, no basis for a per se ethical disqualification of a county attorney or partners or associates from the representation of criminal defendants. In those specific situations in which such representation would violate Standards No. 35 or 36, the representation is obviously prohibited. When representation is prohibited by Standard No. 35 or Standard No. 36, Standard No. 38, as amended, would impute the disqualification of the attorney to all members of the firm. While no per se disqualification bars county attorneys unless the defendant is charged with a violation of a county ordinance, a given county attorney may nevertheless be ethically disqualified from the representation of criminal defendants in the county. Legal representation of county prosecution or law enforcement agencies may affect adversely the attorney's independent professional judgment. All county attorneys need to be sensitive to the possibility of such potential conflict. This advisory opinion is necessarily limited to the ethical propriety of the conduct in question. We offer no opinion on either the constitutional issues of ineffective assistance of counsel or statutory issues of disqualification. ","UrlName":"rule504","Order":26,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2e4e03ed-ea51-4ef9-8868-7e2a20277106","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-4","Content":"State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On December 17, 1987 Formal Advisory Opinion No 86-4 This opinion relies on both Directory Rules and Standards of Conduct that bear upon matters addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">Rule 4.2</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of the Plaintiff's Attorney in a Personal Injury Case Writing a Letter to the Insured Defendant Which May Contain Legal Advice. It is ethically improper for the plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which contains legal advice. The plaintiff's lawyer can properly write a letter to the attorney for the insured and the insurer making an offer of settlement. The letter may properly request the lawyer to provide this information to the insured as well as the insurer. If the plaintiff's lawyer needs information as to the name of the insured's insurer, he or she may properly write the insured requesting this information. But the contents of the letter shall be limited to a request for the necessary information. The plaintiff's attorney may not render legal advice to the insured. It is ethically improper for the plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case to write a letter to the insured defendant which may contain legal advice. The problem is raised by letter to insureds notifying them of the potential liability of their insurers for failure to settle within policy limits. It is important first to state the applicable rules of law. An insurer is normally liable only for any judgment within the policy limits. The insured is normally liable for any judgment in excess of the policy limits. An insurer has a good faith duty to the insured, however, to settle a claim within the policy limits under the \"equal consideration \"rule. National Emblem Insurance Co. v. Pritchard, 140 Ga. App. 350, 231 S.E. 2d 126 (1976); United States Fidelity &Guaranty Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E. 2d 809, aff'd, 223 Ga. 789, 158 S.E. 2d 243(1967). The failure of the insurer to fulfill this good faith duty may cause the insurer to be liable for any excess judgment. State Farm Insurance Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d331 (5th Cir. 1967). These legal rules make apparent the reason a plaintiff's attorney may wish to write the insured directly. The letter will lay the basis for seeking recovery against the insurer for the portion of a judgment rendered in excess of the policy limits. Attorneys for plaintiffs may also perceive an advantage in having the insurer know that the insured is fully aware of his or her rights. That is, the communication with the insured is a helpful pressure tactic. Such a letter is impermissible, regardless of whether it is sent before or after the insured is represented by counsel. A lawyer is precluded from contacting a person represented by a lawyer as to matters relevant to the representation without the written consent of that person's lawyer. Ga. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104(A)(1), Standard 47. Georgia Advisory Opinion No. 10 (July 18,1969), held that such contact with an insured defendant is not improper if undertaken before the defendant is represented by a lawyer and before an action is filed. Opinion 10, however, was written prior to the adoption of our current Code of Professional Responsibility and Standards of Conduct and was based upon former Bar Rule 3-109 which is very similar to our current DR 7-104(A)(1) and Standard 47. Apparently there was no counterpart to DR 7-104(A)(2) and Standard 49, which now prohibit a lawyer from giving legal advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, whenever the interests of the recipient are or may be in conflict with the interests of the lawyer's client. Advisory Opinion No. 10 was implicitly overruled upon the adoption of DR 7-104(A)(2) and Standard 48, and is now expressly overruled to the extent it conflicts with that Standard. Under Standard 48, a plaintiff's attorney may communicate with the unrepresented potential defendant, but is precluded from rendering legal advice. This is consistent with ABA Informal Opinion 1034 (May 30, 1968); which held that advising the insured of the effect of the insurer's refusal to settle within policy limits constitutes \"legal advice.\"The ABA then quotes an earlier opinion, which involved a complaint about two collection letters, but the language is nonetheless relevant and applicable.       The adroit wording of the questioned paragraphs avoids any direct statement or advice as to what the final results of seeking the threatened remedies will be, and no lawyer would be likely to be misled by it. In each case, however, the overall effect upon lay recipients of such letters probably will be, and probably was intended by the writer to be, that they had better \"pay up or else.\"Rather than state simply that if payment is not made as demanded, his clients will pursue all legal remedies available to them to enforce payment, the writer chooses to describe in legal terms the collection suits that will be filed and then to threaten, in addition, the proceedings [which will be pursued]. The only purpose of threatening such additional proceedings, which would have no direct connection with actions to collect debts, appears to have been to coerce and frighten the alleged debtors. ABA Informal Opinion 1034 at 219 citing ABA Informal Opinion 734. Under Standard 48, a lawyer may communicate by letter with an adverse unrepresented person informing him of a demand on his insurance carrier and that suit will be filed if the demand is not met by a certain date, and that he should seek counsel, but no more. Under Standard 47, no communication with a represented adverse party is written consent without permission of adverse counsel. It is obvious that the letter to the insured is meant for the insurer. It is equally obvious that the insured has a right to information not only as to his own legal rights, but also the legal duties of the insurer to him. It is not, however, obvious that the plaintiff's attorney is the proper person to inform the insured of these rights and duties. The appropriate attorney for this purpose is the insured's attorney. The problem here, of course, is that the attorney for the insured is also the attorney for the insurer. And given the context of the representation, it seems clear that the insurer would prefer that the insured not be made aware of its duty to settle theclaim in good faith. The lawyer representing the insured and the insurer thus faces an apparent dilemma. But the dilemma is only apparent. He or she represents the insured as a client and has a duty to keep the insured fully informed by virtue of the rules of ethics. See Proposed Georgia Rules and Disciplinary Standards of Conduct, Rule 1.4; Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund &Belom, 81 Ill. 2d 201, 40 Ill. Dec. 816, 407 N.E. 2d 47 (1980). The lawyer for the insurer has a duty to inform the insured not only of any offer of settlement; See Proposed Georgia Rules and Disciplinary Standards of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2(c), but also of the potential liability of the insurer for a bad faith refusal to accept any reasonable offer within the policy limits. Id. Rule 1.4(b). To recognize that the plaintiff's lawyer has a right to communicate directly with the insured as to his or her rights would create new problems. Apart from the rules of ethics, to recognize that the plaintiff's lawyer has a right so to advise the insured may well create a duty on the part of the lawyer to do so. For if the lawyer can advise the adversary client for the purpose of laying a predicate for the insurer's liability for an excess judgment, but fails to do so, he or she may be liable to the client for malpractice. The plaintiff's lawyer can properly write a letter to the attorney for the insured and the insurer making the offer of settlement. The letter may properly request the lawyer to provide this information to the insured as well as the insurer. The failure of the insured's lawyer to do so would be breach of the lawyer's duty to keep the client informed and may well subject the lawyer to liability. If the plaintiff's lawyer needs information as to the name of the insured's insurer, he or she may properly write the insured requesting this information. But the contents of the letter shall be limited to no more than a demand, a request for the necessary information and a suggestion to seek counsel. The plaintiff's attorney may not render legal advice to the insured. Ga. Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104(A)(2) and Standard 48.","UrlName":"rule463","Order":27,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"92f36050-992d-4193-a891-fe7da3894f6f","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On May 12, 1989 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a>. For references to Rule 3-103 (Canon III) please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a>. For references to EC 3-1, please see Comment 2 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a>. For references to EC 3-2, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a> and Comment 5 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a>. For references to EC 3-6, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3(b)</a> and Comment 1 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a>. For references to DR 3-101(A), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a>. For references to DR 3-102(A), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a>. For references to DR 3-103, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(b)</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of Lawyer's Delegating to Nonlawyers the Closing of Real Estate Transactions.The closing of real estate transaction constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A § 15-19-50. Accordingly, it would be ethically improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. Certain tasks can be delegated to nonlawyers, subject to the type of supervision and control outlined in State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21. The lawyer cannot, however, delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to \"close \"the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.Correspondent asks whether it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to delegate to a nonlawyer the closing of real estate transactions. This question involves, among other things, an interpretation of Standard 24, Rule 3-103 (Canon III), EC 3-1, EC 3-2, EC 3-6, DR 3-101 (A), DR 3-102 (A), and DR 3-103. With the exception of Standard 24, all of the foregoing Ethical Considerations and Directory Rules are cited and quoted in State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21 (attached hereto).Standard 24 provides as follows: A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. A violation of this Standard may be punished by a public reprimand.As the role of nonlawyers (particularly paralegals and legal secretaries) in the closing of real estate transactions has expanded in recent years, questions have arisen as to the scope of duties which can be delegated to nonlawyers. A general discussion of duties which may ethically be delegated to nonlawyers can be found in State Bar Advisory Opinion Nos. 19 and 21. In short, those Advisory Opinions stress thatAvoidance of charges that the paralegal is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law may be achieved only by strict observance of the direction found in EC 3-6, quoted above, indicating that delegation of activities which ordinarily comprise the practice of law is proper only if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with the client involved, supervises and directs the work delegated to the paralegal and assumes complete ultimate professional responsibility for the work product produced by the paralegal. Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law. State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21 .The question to be addressed in this opinion is whether the closing of a real estate transaction constitutes \"the practice of law.\" This in turn depends upon what it means to \"close \"a real estate transaction. If the \"closing\" is defined as the entire series of events through which title to the land is conveyed from one party to another party, it would be ethically improper for a nonlawyer to \"close \"a real estate transaction. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-50 states that the \"practice of law \"includes \"conveyancing,\" \"the giving of any legal advice,\" and \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law.\" In Georgia Bar Association v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 222 Ga. 657 (1966), the Georgia Supreme Court characterizes the \"closing of real estate transactions between applicants for title insurance and third persons \"as the rendering of legal services and advice. Moreover, to the extent that any legal advice is given during any part of the closing, this would constitute \"the practice of law \"by definition and could not be ethically delegated to nonlawyers. In light of all of the foregoing, it appears that the closing of real estate transactions constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A. 15-19-50. Accordingly, pursuant to Standard 24, Canon III, and the Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules cited above, it would be ethically improper for a lawyer to aid nonlawyers to \"close \"real estate transactions. This does not mean that certain tasks cannot be delegated to nonlawyers, subject to the type of supervision and control outlined in State Bar Advisory Opinion No. 21. The lawyer cannot, however, delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to \"close \"the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney.","UrlName":"rule505","Order":28,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"75986703-9764-4c87-ae04-faba35fed32e","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-7","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On December 17, 1987 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-7 For references to Standard of Conduct 31, please see Rules <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">1.5(a)</a> and <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(j)</a>. For references to Standard of Conduct 30, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a>. For references to Standard of Conduct 33, please see Rule <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(a)</a>. This opinion also relies on the Canons of Ethics, specifically Ethical Consideration 5.7 that bears upon matters addressed by Comment 10 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of a Lawyer's Acquisition of a Security Interest in Marital Property to Secure Attorney's Fees in a Domestic Relations Case. An attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property to secure reasonable attorney's fees in a domestic relations case if the security agreement is fully disclosed and consented to by the client in writing, and does not violate any court order. The security interest may serve no other purpose. Correspondent asks whether it is ethically proper for a lawyer to take a security interest in marital property<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\">1 </a> to secure his or her fee in a domestic relations case. The question presented involves an interpretation of Standard No. 31. A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client, except that he may: (a) acquire a lien granted by law to secure his fee or expenses. Standard No. 31's roots are in the common law crime of champerty. It is designed to prevent attorneys from acquiring financial interests in the outcome of litigation other than an attorney's interests in reasonable attorneys fees.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\">2 </a> Standard No. 31 excepts \"acquir/ing/ a lien granted by law to secure . . . fee/s/ or expenses. Standard No. 31 is taken from Directory Rule 5-103. Interpretative guidance for Directory Rule 5-103 is found in the aspirational statement of Ethical Consideration 5-7.The possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment by a lawyer on behalf of his client during litigation generally makes it undesirable for the lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of his client or otherwise to become financially interested in the outcome of the litigation. However, it is not improper for a lawyer to protect his right to collect a fee for his services by the assertion of legally permissible liens, even though by doing so he may acquire an interest in the outcome of litigation.The guidance of Ethical Consideration 5-7 is that \"liens granted by law\" should be read broadly as the equivalent of \"legally permissible liens rather than narrowly as statutory charging liens and retaining liens for the benefit of attorneys.\" Such an interpretation is consistent with the champerty concerns underlying Standard No. 31, in that legally permissible liens used to secure attorneys fees do not create any financial motive for the attorney beyond that of collecting reasonable attorneys fees. A security interest in marital property used to secure attorneys fees in a domestic relations case is therefore permitted by Standard No. 31. It would be improper to use such an arrangement to secure fees if it created an impermissible financial conflict in violation of Standard No. 30. Standard No. 30 would be violated if the attorney's security interest in the marital property would, or reasonably could, affect the exercise of the attorney's independent professional judgment on behalf of the client. An exception is provided under Standard No. 30 when the client gives written consent after full disclosure of the conflict's potential for affecting the attorney's independent professional judgment. Accordingly, an attorney may acquire a security interest in marital property to secure his or her fee in a domestic relations case if the client consents in writing after full disclosure, so long as the lawyer does not violate a court order.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\">3 </a> Consistent with the requirements of this opinion, the interest acquired by the attorney must be a security interest to secure reasonable attorneys fees. Any interest acquired in the subject matter of litigation beyond that necessary to secure fees would be in violation of Standard No. 31 and could violate Standard No. 33 as well. The Bar is cautioned that there are ethical opinions in other jurisdictions finding violation of DR 5-103 in situations in which the interest acquired by the attorney in the subject matter of litigation was not a security interest.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\">4 </a><hr> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"1\"> 1</a>Marital property is defined in Georgia as \"that property acquired as a direct result of the labor and investment of the /parties/during the marriage. . . .\"Courtney v. Courtney , 256 Ga. 97, 98 (1986), citing White v. White , 253 Ga. 267, 269 (1984). See also Moore v. Moore , 249 Ga. 27 (l982). The legal issues raised by using marital property as security for attorney fees in a domestic relations case are not addressed in this advisory opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"2\"> 2</a>Proprietary interests are prohibited under Standard No. 31. It is possible to interpret the term \"proprietary\" to exclude interests which serve only as security for fees. See, for example, Oklahoma Bar Association Advisory Opinion No. 297, May 16, 1980. It is, however, not necessary to attempt a definition of \"proprietary\" here. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"3\"> 3</a>In accord, Greater Cleveland Bar Association, Advisory Opinion No. 151 (May 11, 1983). See, also, Giles v. Russell , 222 Kan. 629, 567 P.2d 845 (1977). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"4\"> 4</a>See, for example, ABA Informal Opinion No. 1397.","UrlName":"rule506","Order":29,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2e662b0d-a5f1-44d6-b050-3afc2312eade","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On January 11, 1989 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-1 For references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> and Comments 1 and 3 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4</a> For references to Standard of Conduct 44, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3</a> and Comments 1, 2 and 3 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3</a>. For references to DR 7-102(a)(2), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1(b)</a>. For references to EC 7-4, please see Comment 2 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1</a>. For references to EC 7-5, please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule50\">Rule 1.2(d)</a> and Comment 6 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule50\">Rule 1.2</a> , Comment 3 of <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule69\">Rule 3.1</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Ethical Propriety of Filing a Lawsuit in Order to be Within the Statute of Limitations, But Before Sufficient Information is Acquired to Determine if a Legitimate Cause of Action Exists. It is not ethically improper for an attorney to file a lawsuit before complete factual support for the claim has been established provided that the attorney determines that a reasonable attorney would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim; and provided further that the attorney is not required by rules of procedure, or otherwise to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis. If after filing it is discovered that the lawsuit has no merit, the attorney will dismiss the lawsuit or in the alternative withdraw. QUESTION PRESENTED: Are there ethical prohibitions against filing suit when the lawyer does not know whether facts exist which would constitute a cause of action, and the information needed to make that determination cannot be acquired prior to the expiration of the pertinent statute of limitations? OPINION: It cannot be determined from these facts whether filing of the suit would constitute a violation of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, or of the requirements of Yost v. Torok, 256 Ga. 92 (1986); nor is such determination within the scope of an ethical opinion. This opinion considers only whether the applicable ethical regulations proscribe filing suit in the situation described by correspondent. There is no Standard of Conduct directly applicable. Specifically, no Standard of Conduct speaks to the situation in which the facts presented by a client suggest a cause of action, but additional facts are necessary for the attorney to make a clear assessment of the claim. Accordingly, the filing of the claim alone cannot be the basis for discipline in Georgia under the present Standards of Conduct. If, however, the attorney is required, by rules of procedure or otherwise, to represent that the cause of action has an adequate factual basis, the attorney cannot make that representation in the situation in question. To make such a representation in this situation would constitute a violation of Standard 4 and would subject the attorney to discipline. If such a representation is required, the effect of the proscription may be to postpone the filing of the suit to beyond the date of the applicable statute of limitations. That is a matter for ethical regulation only if the delay in the investigation prior to the filing was caused by the attorney's \"willful neglect\" (constituting a violation of Standard 44 for which discipline is sanctioned). The absence of Standards of Conduct does not, however, leave the lawyer without a source of guidance. The canons, ethical considerations, and directory rules are helpful in dealing with the question presented. This guidance is found in the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility:     DR 7-102 -- Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.         (A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:             (2) knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law DR 7-102(A)(2) creates a subjective test by use of the term \"knowingly.\" It is violated when the attorney knows that the proposed claim is unwarranted. Such knowledge is not present in the situation in question. EC 7-4 and EC 7-5 advise the attorney to avoid \"frivolous\" claims. Claims may be frivolous because the legal arguments for a cause of action are frivolous, or because factual support is clearly lacking for any cause of action. Only the second form of frivolousness is in question here. Consistent with the overall structure of the Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-4 creates an objective standard for the attorney which is more demanding than the subjective standard of DR 7-102(A)(2). A claim is frivolous under EC 7-4 when there is no reasonable possibility of the existence of the factual basis for the cause of action. EC 7-4 does not require complete factual support for the cause of action prior to the filing, but does require that a reasonable attorney would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the claim can be established after the claim is filed. EC 7-4 permits, for example, the use of discovery to determine if the factual basis of a claim exists if there is a reasonable possibility that is does. This use is consistent with part of the purpose of discovery, i.e., to reveal facts which require dismissal of a claim. In the situation in question, the attorney is acting consistent with ethical guidance if he or she determines that a reasonable attorney would conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that facts supporting the cause of action can be established after the filing of the claim.","UrlName":"rule507","Order":30,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"02a13dc9-48f2-4e53-8bdc-1960fd653f00","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5","Content":" State Bar of Georgia Issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia On September 26, 1988 Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5 For references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a>. For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/general-counsel/advisory-opinions/headnote-explanation/">click here</a>. Assertion of Attorneys' Retaining Liens. An attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. QUESTION PRESENTED: What are the ethical duties of a lawyer under Standard 22(b) with respect to the return of a client's papers and property when the lawyer has not been paid in view of the statutory retaining lien authorized by O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(a) (Conflict between Standard 22(b) and Attorneys' Holding Lien)? SUMMARY ANSWER: An attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute.  Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees. OPINION: Section 15-19-14(a) of the Georgia Code gives attorneys a lien for services rendered on their clients' papers and moneys in their possession. Specifically, that statute provides as follows: Attorneys at law shall have a lien on all papers and money of their clients in their possession for services rendered to them. They may retain the papers until the claims are satisfied and may apply the money to the satisfaction of the claims. [T]he lien attaches to the fruits of the labor and skill of the attorney, whether realized by judgment or decree, or by virtue of an award, or in any other way, so long as they are the results of his exertions. Brotherton v. Stone,197 Ga. 74, 74-75(3) (1943) quoting Middleton v. Westmoreland, 164 Ga. 324(1-b),329 (1927). This definition suggests that anything the attorney prepared or attains for the client can be subject to the statutory lien if the client fails to pay the attorney's fee. By way of illustration and not limitation, the following items are examples of client papers to which a lien may attach: Anything which the client gives to the attorney to use or consider in the representation; Evidence, including demonstrative evidence, photographs, statements of witnesses, affidavits, deposition and hearing transcripts, exhibits and physical evidence; Expert evidence, including tests, opinions and reports; Agreements, contracts, instruments, notes and other documents used or to be used in transactions of any kind; Corporate records, minute books and records of organizations; Wills, trusts and other estate planning documents; and Legal memoranda and analyses. The power to exercise this statutory right is not without limitation, however, in view of Standard 22(b) of the Standards of Conduct of the Rules of the State Bar of Georgia which mandates as follows:A lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including . . . delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled and complying with applicable laws and rules.Due to the facial conflict between the grant of power in the lien statute and the limitation that Standard 22(b) imposes on that power, this opinion will address whether and when an attorney ethically may exercise his or her statutory lien rights upon withdrawal of representation. As a general rule, an attorney cannot exercise statutory lien rights to the foreseeable prejudice of the client. Such ethical considerations maintain preeminence over legislative grants of power to attorneys. For example, First Bank &Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E. 2d 676 (1983), held inapplicable in cases of attorney malpractice the liability shield legislatively afforded by the professional corporate statute. The Supreme Court \"has the authority and in fact the duty to regulate the law practice. . . .\"Id. at 845, 302 S.E. 2d at 675. Although recognizing the right of the legislature to enact technical rules governing corporations, Zagoria cautioned that the legislature \"cannot constitutionally cross the gulf separating the branches of government by imposing regulations upon the practice of law.\" Id. at 845-46, 302 S.E. 2d at 675. Despite the existence of the lien statute, and because \"[a] lawyer's relationship to his client is a very special one,\" id. at 846, 302 S.E. 2d at 675, the power of attorneys to exercise their rights under the lien statute must give way to their ethical obligation not to cause their clients prejudice. The majority of jurisdictions that have considered this question are in accord. Standard 22(b) prohibits attorneys from holding their clients' papers if such an action foreseeably will cause them prejudice. The right to claim a lien in such papers under the statute will not protect the attorney in the case of prejudice to the client. Because it would be only in the rarest of circumstances that a client could be deprived of his or her files without eventually suffering some prejudice, the better practice is for attorneys to forgo retention of client papers in all but the clearest cases. This practice would avoid the necessity of speculating whether an attorney's action might cause some future harm. In accord with certain other jurisdictions, however, we limit the duty to turn over client files and papers to those for which the client has been or will be charged, that is, all work products created during \"billable time.\"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\">1 </a> For matters that are handled under arrangements other than hourly charges, any work product intended for use in the case would be included in those documents that should be returned to the client.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\">2 </a> For example, because attorneys do not bill clients for the creation of time records and they would not be used in the case (absent a claim for fees), these records would probably be retained. Despite the obligation to return original documents to their clients, attorneys are entitled to keep copies of their clients' files.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\">3 </a> Absent a prior agreement that the client will be responsible for copying charges, however, the attorney bears the cost of copying.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\">4 </a> Notably, even if such an agreement exists, in the event that the client refuses to pay, the attorney must advance the cost and then add the charge to the client's outstanding bill.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\">5 </a> We do not endorse the practice of some jurisdictions of allowing the attorney to require the client to post comparable security before releasing the papers.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#6\">6 </a> To allow an attorney to require security in a bona fide fee dispute would be unfair to the client because it may require him or her to encumber property without justification. However, if the client offers to post security for the attorneys' fees and expenses pending resolution of a dispute, the attorney must release the papers. Similarly, we do not unequivocably approve the practice of some jurisdictions of holding summary hearings because this is likely to result in duplicative proceedings.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#7\">7 </a> Therefore, we conclude that an attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.<hr> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"1\"> 1</a>See, e.g., San Francisco Comm. Opin. No. 1984-1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"2\"> 2</a>See also Michigan Opin. No. CI-926. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"3\"> 3</a>See id. See also New Jersey Sup. Ct. Advis. Comm. Opin. No. 554 (May 23, 1985). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"4\"> 4</a>See San Francisco Comm. Opin. No. 1984-1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"5\"> 5</a>See id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"6\"> 6</a>See Foor v. Huntington National Bank, No. 85AP-167, slip op. (Feb. 11, 1986); Michigan Op. No. CI-930 (May 4, 1983). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"7\"> 7</a>See Foor v. Huntington National Bank, No. 85AP-167, slip op. (Feb. 11, 1986).","UrlName":"rule508","Order":31,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d61a86be-a78b-4975-92a6-005c5e62635e","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 88-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn November 10, 1988 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 88-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 26, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical Propriety of an Attorney-Employee Sharing Attorney's Fees With a Lay Organization-Employer.\n \nIt is ethically permissible for an attorney-employee to collect attorney's fees on a note or loan which fees accrue to the benefit of the attorney's employer, where the attorney's fees are regarded as stipulated liquidated damages under Georgia law.\n \nCorrespondent asks if it is ethically permissible for an attorney to collect attorney's fees which would accrue to the benefit of the attorney's employer, a lay organization, in the following situation: A bank employs a full time, licensed, attorney to handle collections, foreclosures and bankruptcies. Contracts signed by the bank's customers provide for 15 percent of the unpaid balance as attorney's fees if the loan goes into default and has to be collected by or through an attorney. \n \nStandard No. 26 provides, in part, that \"a lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer. . . .\" \n \nThe policy behind this prohibition against fee sharing between a lawyer and a layman is the preservation of a lawyer's independent professional judgment. It is feared that laymen, or lay organizations, sharing a financial interest in the representation and not being under professional obligations, may influence the attorney's judgment against the client's welfare. \n \nThe conduct in question here is not in violation of this policy. The lay organization, with whom the fees are shared, is the client. No influence on independent professional judgment contrary to the interests of the client is present. This situation is clearly distinguishable from the numerous advisory opinions and cases prohibiting fee sharing with a nonlawyer other than the client. Curran v. Department of the Treasury , 805 F.2d 1406 (1986); National Treasury Employees Union v. United States , 656 F.2d 848 (1981). <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> \n \nThe Committee concludes that fee sharing with the employer bank is not prohibited under Standard No. 26. The Committee also notes that the conduct described by correspondent is not fee sharing in the sense of that term in Standard No. 26. In correspondent's situation, statutory attorney's fees are regarded as stipulated liquidated damages for collection costs, belonging to the client. The attorney is then free to contract with the client for the agreed upon fee or any other fee. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a> Rylee v. Bank of Statham , 7 Ga. App. 489 (1918). \n \nThe requirements of O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11, that collection efforts must be made \"by and through an attorney \"in order to enforce this statutory attorney's fees provision, have been met. See, United States v. Allen , 699 F.2d 1117 (1983); In re East Side Investors , 694 F.2d 242 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Village Apartment Associates , 9 B.R. 211 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ga. 1981).\n<hr>\n\n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> See, also, MASSACHUSETTS BAR OPINION 84-1 (1984). \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> See, also ABA FORMAL OPINION NO 157.","UrlName":"rule513","Order":32,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"63344d77-a55d-4911-9c94-1b8cdaa01551","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 88-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn November 29, 1988 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 88-3 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 48, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule298\">Rule 4.3(a)</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule298\">4.3(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 47, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\">Rule 4.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical Propriety of Sending Notice Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 to an Unrepresented Party. \n \nIt is ethically permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 to an unrepresented party. An attorney sending the required notice, however, must do so in such a manner as to inform the unrepresented opposing party that the notice is sent merely to establish a claim for interest, that it is not to be construed as legal advice, and that the attorney sending the notice represents the opposing interests in the dispute.\n \nCorrespondent asks if it is a violation of Standard 48 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia for correspondent to comply with the notice requirement of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 by sending a demand notice to an unrepresented party. That statute requires that written notice of the demand for unliquidated damages be sent to the person \"against whom the claim is made \"in order to entitle the claimant to receive twelve (12) percent interest on judgments in excess of unliquidated damages. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> \n \nStandard 48 provides:\n \nDuring the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.\n \nIn interpreting Standard 48, Formal Opinion No. 86-4 (86-R7), concluded that it was ethically improper for a plaintiff's attorney to send a letter directly to an insured defendant which would notify the defendant about the potential liability of his or her insurer for failure to settle within policy limits. The letter would be considered \"legal advice \"in that plaintiff's attorney impliedly would be advising settlement within policy limits. Accord, ABA Informal Opinion 734 (June 16, 1964). The Opinion correctly focused upon the policy behind Standard 48 which is to avoid creating in an unrepresented party a false impression that the attorney is advising inaccordance with the unrepresented party's interests or is neutral in the dispute. The present situation is distinguishable. Where an attorney sends a formal notice which is required by law, there is much less concern that a false impression will be created. \n \nIt is ethically permissible to send the notice required by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14, stating specifically that it is a notice rather than advice. An attorney sending the required notice, however, must do so in such a manner as to inform the unrepresented opposing party that the notice is sent merely to establish a claim for interest, that it is not to be construed as legal advice, that the recipient may seek his independent legal advice and that the attorney sending the notice represents the opposing interests in the dispute. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> The full text of O.C.G.A.§ 51-12-14 is as follows:\n \"Procedure for demand of unliquidated damages in tort actions; when interest may be recovered. \n          (a)    Where a claimant has given written notice by registered or certified mail to a person against whom claim is made for unliquidated damages in a tort action and the person against whom such claim is made fails to pay such amount within 30 days from the mailing of the notice, the claimant shall be  entitled to receive interest on the claimed sum if, upon trial of the case in which the claim is made, the judgment is for an amount not less than the sum claimed. \n          (b)    The written notice referred to in subsection (a) of this Code section may be given on only one occasion and shall specify that it is being given pursuant to this Code section. \n          (c)    The interest provided for by this Code section  shall be at the rate of 12 percent per annum and shall begin to run from the thirtieth day following the date of the mailing of the written notice until the date of judgment. \n          (d)    Evidence or discussion of interest on liquidated damages, as well as evidence of the offer, shall not be submitted to the jury. Interest shall be made a part of the judgment upon presentation of evidence to the satisfaction of the court that this Code section has been complied with and that the verdict of the jury or the award by the judge trying the case without a jury is equal to or exceeds the amount claimed in the notice. \n          (e)    This Code section shall be known and may be cited as the \"Unliquidated Damages Interest Act.\"(Ga. L. 1968, p. 1156, § 1,  Ga. L. 1975, p. 395, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 681, § 1.)\"\n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> If the adverse party isrepresented, the statutory notice need not contain the disclaimers here described, but must be sent to the adverse party's attorney rather than the party. Standard 47.","UrlName":"rule515","Order":33,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2103ee5e-58dc-4434-b3df-550b3c594488","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 89-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn February 9, 1989 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 89-2 \n \nThis opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including both Directory Rules and Ethical Considerations that bear upon matters directly addressed by Comment 2 of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule78\">Rule 3.5</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical propriety of an attorney/city council member's representing private clients before city council-appointed Judges of the Recorder's Court if the attorney abstains from voting on the appointment.\n \nAn attorney, who is also a member of the city council, should avoid representing private clients before the Recorder's Court when the city council appoints the judges of the Recorders Court, and should not abstain from voting on judicial appointments.\n \nCorrespondent asks if it is ethically proper for an attorney, who is also a member of the city council, to represent private clients before the Recorder's Court, when the city council appoints the Judges of the Recorder's Court, if the attorney abstains from voting on judicial appointments. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> Correspondent also asks if other members of his or her law firm would be prohibited from such representation by imputed disqualification. \n \nA full response to this inquiry would go beyond the ethical regulations and requires interpretation of Young v. Champion , 142 Ga. App. 687 (1977), in which the Court upheld the disqualification of a Commissioner from representation before a Recorder's Court judge who was appointed by the Commission. The Advisory Opinion Board, however, is without authority to interpret court opinions. \n \nThere are no Georgia Standards of Conduct applicable to this particular situation. An advisory opinion is not, however, limited to disciplinary issues in its interpretations of the ethical regulations of the State Bar of Georgia. This Advisory Opinion therefore offers ethical advice based on the applicable ethical regulations.\n \nDirectory Rule 8-101(a)(2) provides:\n\"A lawyer who holds public office shall not use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or a client.\"The city council is, in the situation in question, in the position of employer of the Judge of the Recorder's Court. There is inherent influence in such a position. An attorney/council member who appears before that Judge exercises that influence however unintentional the \"use \"of it may be and however determined both the Judge and the attorney may be to avoid its effect. Even the effort to avoid the effect changes the nature of the relationship between the Judge and the attorney. As a matter of ethical advice, we believe that the attorney/council member should avoid representation before the Judge of the Recorder's Court.\n \nCorrespondent's question seeks to avoid the inherent influence of his or her position by abstaining from all voting on the appointment of the Judges of the Recorder's Court. We cannot advise abstention as a remedy. The attorney, as noted in Ethical Consideration 8-6, is uniquely qualified to evaluate the qualifications of those seeking appointment to the bench. Lawyers have a \"special responsibility to aid in the selection of only those who are qualified.\"EC 8-6. The attorney/council member should not avoid that public responsibility for private gain. To do so would be counter to the ethical advice of Ethical Consideration 8-8, \"A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties.\" \n \nIf correspondent follows the advice of this Opinion he will disqualify himself from representation before the Judges of the Recorder's Court. That disqualification is personal and is not imputed to the other members of the firm. In this case there are no concerns of conflicts of interest of confidentiality requiring imputed disqualification. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> This opinion would not apply where city council members do not participate in appointing city judges. \n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> The Board notes that its opinion in this case, and the holding of Young v. Champion, appear to be contrary to the following Advisory Opinions from other jurisdictions:  Adv. Opin. #5 (New Hampshire, 10/23/81);  Adv. Opin. #84-18 (South Carolina, undated);  Adv. Opin. CI #990 (Michigan 12/13/83).","UrlName":"rule518","Order":34,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e03a86bc-50c0-4e1f-95c8-5dd8674a2920","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 90-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule525","Order":35,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a2f3d2c0-230e-4d16-9110-f62c3ff3ad17","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 90-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule526","Order":36,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"95073992-e622-4976-ab26-2e53c62ea65c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 13, 1991 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 91-1 \n \nThis opinion relies on Standard of Conduct 30 and Ethical Consideration 5-6 that bear upon matters directly addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> . <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. \n \nThe Form Notification and Consent Letter , which is an addendum to this opinion, continues to be useful and valid. \n \nEthical propriety of drafter of will serving as executor. \nIt is not ethically improper for a lawyer to be named executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared when the lawyer does not consciously influence the client in the decision to name him or her executor or trustee, so long as he or she obtains the client's written consent in some form or gives the client written notice in some form after a full disclosure of all the possible conflicts of interest. In addition, the total combined attorney's fee and executor or trustee fee or commission must be reasonable and procedures used in obtaining this fee should be in accord with Georgia law.\n \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n Is it ethically proper for a lawyer to be named executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared? \n \nOPINION: \n \nDisciplinary Standard of Conduct No. 30 provides:\n \nExcept with the written consent or written notice to his client after full disclosure a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interests.\n \nThe financial interests of an executor or trustee reasonably may affect an attorney's independent professional judgment on behalf of the client. The conduct in question falls clearly within the coverage of Standard No. 30. Standard No. 30, however, provides exceptions for this type of conflict. These exceptions to a conflict of interest are the client's written consent or written notice to the client after full disclosure. These exceptions are in question here. \n \nThere is no limitation on client consent in Standard No. 30 unless the \"appearance of impropriety \"prohibition of Canon 9 of the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility creates an implied limitation. It is our opinion that the conduct in question does not necessarily create an \"appearance of impropriety,\"and we note that the \"appearance of impropriety \"prohibition is not included in the Standards of Conduct. \n \nThis opinion finds support in the interpretive guidance of the aspirational statement in Ethical Consideration 5-6.\n \nEC 5-6 - A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.\n \nThe implication of Ethical Consideration 5-6 is that the naming of an attorney as executor or trustee in a will or trust he or she has prepared does not per se create an appearance of impropriety, but that such an arrangement creates a risk of appearing to be improper, which must be guarded against by the attorney. \n \nA testator's or settlor's freedom to select an executor or trustee is an important freedom, and it should not be restricted absent strong justification. For a variety of reasons, the attorney may be the most appropriate choice of fiduciary for the client. The risk that some lawyers may take advantage of a lawyer-client relationship to benefit themselves in a manner not in the client's best interest should not outweigh that freedom. \n \nThis risk of self-dealing instead creates the need for restrictions that offer assurance that the naming of the lawyer as executor or trustee is the informed decision of the testator or settlor. An attorney's full disclosure is essential to the client's informed decision and consent. Disclosure requires notification of the attorney's potential interest in the arrangement; i.e., the ability to collect an executor's or trustee's fee and possibly attorneys fees. Unlike a real estate transaction where an attorney has a personal interest in the property, being named as executor or trustee does not give the attorney any personal interest in the estate or trust assets other than the fee charged. Waiver of State law fiduciary requirements in the document is permissible as long as waiver is ordinary and customary in similar documents for similar clients that do not name the attorney as fiduciary. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a>\nIn the light of the above, full disclosure in this context should include an explanation of the following:\n \n1. All potential choices of executor or trustee, their relative abilities, competence, safety and integrity, and their fee structure; \n2. The nature of the representation and service that will result if  the client wishes to name the attorney as executor or trustee (i.e., what the exact role of the lawyer as fiduciary will be, what the lawyer's fee structure will be as a lawyer/fiduciary, etc.); \n3. The potential for the attorney executor or trustee hiring him or herself or his or her firm to represent the estate or trust, and the fee arrangement anticipated; and \n4. An explanation of the potential advantages to the client of seeking independent legal advice.\n \nThese disclosures may be made orally or in writing, but the client's consent or the attorney's notice to the client should be in writing. \n \nThe client's consent could be obtained by having the client sign a consent form that outlines the information described above. \n \nConsistent with other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue and the Standards and Rules of the Georgia Bar, it our opinion that it is ethically permissible for testator or settlor to name as executor in a will or trustee of a trust the lawyer who has prepared the instrument when the lawyer: (a) does not promote himself or herself or consciously influence the client in the decision; (b) fully discloses the conflict as described above, and (c) either obtains client consent in some form of writing or notifies the client in writing. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a> \n \nAny executor or trustee is allowed by Georgia law to hire legal counsel, according to the needs of the estate or trust he represents, and pay reasonable fees for their services. O.C.G.A. §53-7-10. An attorney who has ethically named himself or herself as executor or trustee in an instrument he or she has prepared may act as an attorney for the estate or hire a member of his or her firm as attorney. The fiduciary and the attorney, however, must exercise caution to avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest in this circumstance. \n \nWhen a lawyer has ethically named himself or herself as executor or trustee in an instrument he or she has prepared, the lawyer can receive fees for performing both services. If, however, any costs of preparation or execution overlap, the attorney must see that these costs are charged only once. He or she may not charge both the client and the estate or trust for a single task. \n \nAs a lawyer prepares a will or trust instrument, he or she is performing services for the client-testator/settlor as a lawyer. It is the lawyer's task at this time to make sure the client's wishes for the later disposition and distribution of the client's property are integrated into a plan acceptable to the client. \n \nThe lawyer acting in his or her capacity as an executor or trustee is performing a different function altogether. It is the lawyer's task as executor or trustee to effectively implement the integrated plan for disposition and distribution of the testator's or settlor's property. Not only is the lawyer's function different, the tasks are different. The lawyer should still be appropriately and reasonably compensated whether the compensation is provided in the instrument or by statute, but an attorney acting as a fiduciary should not double dip fees charged to the client or estate. \n \nGeorgia law provides that an attorney serving as an administrator cannot double dip in fees. See McDow v. Corley 154 Ga. App. 575 (1980); and Davidson v. Story , 106 Ga. 799, 32 S.E. 867 (1899). It is recognized that if the attorney is serving as both executor or trustee and as legal counsel, it maybe difficult to sort out each task performed as one performed clearly in one capacity or the other. Any fees above Georgia's statutory provisions for compensating executors that an attorney may incur in a dual role as lawyer and fiduciary must be collected by filing an application for extra compensation with the Probate Court under O.C.G.A. §53-6-150. McDow , 154 Ga. App. at 576; and Davidson , 106 Ga. at 801. In keeping with both Georgia law and ethical considerations, the total fees charged by an attorney in such a dual role should be reasonable. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a>\n \n Addendum to Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-R1 \nForm Notification and Consent Letter \n \n[MR. OR MS. FULL NAME] \n[ADDRESS] \n[CITY, STATE ZIP] \n \nDear [MR. OR MS. LAST NAME]: \n \n     Because you have asked me to serve as Executor and Trustee under your will, I must explain certain ethical considerations to you and obtain your written consent to the potential conflicts of interests that could develop. The purpose of this letter is to summarize our discussions about your naming me as fiduciary in your will. \n \n     A lawyer cannot prepare a will or trust in which the client names that lawyer as fiduciary unless that decision originates with the client. The lawyer should never suggest that he/she be named or promote himself/herself to serve in that capacity. \n \n     Others who might serve as your fiduciaries include your spouse, one or more of your children, a relative, a personal friend, a business associate, a bank with trust powers, your accountant, or an investment advisor. \n \n     I can serve as executor and trustee if that is your desire. The potential conflict arises primarily from the probability that I will hire this firm to serve as attorneys for the estate and trust. An attorney is entitled to compensation for legal services performed on behalf of the estate and trust, and the executor and trustee are also entitled to compensation for services in that capacity. When a lawyer has been named as executor and trustee pursuant to the ethical requirements of the State Bar, he/she can receive fees for performing services both as executor and trustee and as attorney as long as he/she charges only once for any single service. Further, the total compensation for serving as both fiduciary and attorney must be reasonable. If you name me as executor and trustee in your will, I and the other lawyers in my firm will charge at our normal hourly rates for all services performed. [NOTE: Modify the preceding sentence as appropriate.] \n \n     I must also point out to you that a lawyer's independence is compromised when he/she acts as both fiduciary and as lawyer for the fiduciary. Some of the potential conflicts in this regard are:\n\n1.  The question whether a particular task is \"legal \"or \"fiduciary \"in nature;\n2.  The question whether services being performed are really necessary in the  circumstances;\n3.  The propriety of giving the fiduciary broad disrectionary powers and exemption from bond;\n4.  The lack of independent review of the document by an attorney other than the one who drafted it; and\n5.  There may be other potential conflicts that have not occurred to me.\n \n     In accordance with the ethical requirements of the State Bar of Georgia, it is necessary for me to obtain your statement that the potential conflicts of interests have been explained to you. In that regard, please review the statement of consent below. If it is satisfactory to you, please sign and return the enclosed copy to me. If you want to discuss any point further, please call. If you decide not to execute the consent, please advise me whom you would like to serve as executor and trustee instead of me. \n \n     If you have any doubt concerning the information contained in this letter or the effect of signing the consent, you should discuss it with another lawyer of your choice. \n \n                                                                Sincerely, \n        \n \n                                                                ________________________ \n                                                                Attorney\n \nCONSENT \n \n     I, ______________________ (Client) _______________, have voluntarily named as executor and trustee in my will and trust, ______________________(Attorney) _________________, who prepared the instrument in his/her capacity as my attorney. Mr./Ms. ________________ (Attorney) ______________ did not promote himself/herself or consciously influence me in the decision to name him/her as executorand trustee. In addition, Mr./Ms. _____________ (Attorney) ______________ has disclosed the potential conflicts which he/she thinks might arise as a result of his/her serving as both executor and trustee and as attorney for the estate and trust. An explanation of the different roles as fiduciary and attorney, an explanation of the risks and disadvantages of this dual representation, an explanation of the manner in which his/her compensation will be determined, and an opportunity to seek independent legal advice were provided to me prior to my signing this consent. \n \nDate__________________                    _________________________________\n(Signature)\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> For example, granting broad powers to a fiduciary or relieving the fiduciary of return or bond requirements is a common practice, can substantially reduce the expense of administration of an estate or trust, and does not relieve the fiduciary of the duty to administer the estate properly in or reduce substantially the rights of the beneficiaries to enforce that duty. On the other hand, a provision that attempted to relieve the fiduciary of negligence would probably not be ordinary and customary and would be improper. \n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2  </a> In Pennsylvania, an attorney ethically may act as co-executor in a will that he or she prepares as long as the attorney advises the client (in a way never specified) of the potential problem that the attorney may be required to testify regarding the will if it is challenged. Professional Guidance Opinion 80-2 of the Philadelphia Bar Association. The attorney also may not take advantage of his position as draftsman to promote himself or herself or \"sell \"the ideas to the client. See also Professional Guidance Opinion 8-17 of the Philadelphia Bar Association (concerning an attorney naming himself successor-trustee in a will he drafted). \n \n <a name=\"3\"> 3 </a> In accord . Okl. Opin. No. 298 (Feb. 28, 1991) (attorney serving as executor of estate and as attorney for the estate may charge reasonable fees for each so long as charges do not overlap.); Ala. Opin. No. 81-503 (undated) (attorney may serve as administrator of estate and as attorney for the estate and may charge reasonable fees for each); Wis. Opin. No. E-80-14 (Dec. 1980) (a lawyer, appointed as guardian, may serve as attorney for the guardian, and may charge reasonable fees for performing in both capacities).","UrlName":"rule520","Order":37,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ef91d436-d7b1-4547-9817-70a6d7e729ca","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 20, 1991 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 91-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 31, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(a)</a> . \n \nThis opinion also relies on the Canons of Ethics, specifically Ethical Considerations EC 2-19 and 2-23, that bear upon matters directly addressed by Comments 2 and 9 of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://www.gabar.org/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5</a> .\n ADVANCE FEE PAYMENTS \n \nA lawyer need not place any fees into a trust account absent special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of the client. Such circumstances may be the agreement of the parties, the size and amount of the fee, and the length of time contemplated for the undertaking.\n \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nWhether a lawyer may deposit into a general operating account a retainer that represents payment of fees yet to be earned. \n \n OPINION: \n \nThe question posed by correspondent is not clear. \"Fees yet to be earned \"are prepaid fees. \"Prepaid fees \"also include \"fixed \"or \"flat fees,\"which are not earned until the task is completed. The terms \"retainer \"and \"prepaid fees \"have different meanings. For purposes of clarity, the terms are defined as here used. \n \nA retainer is \"...the fee which the client pays when he retains the attorney to act for him, and thereby prevents him from acting for his adversary.\"Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). Thus, retainer fees are earned by the attorney by agreeing to be \"on call \"for the client and by not accepting employment from the client's adversaries. McNulty, George &Hall v. Pruden , 62 Ga. 135, 141 (1878). \n \nA \"flat \"or \"fixed \"fee is one charged by an attorney to perform a task to completion, for example, to draw a contract, prepare a will, or represent the client in court, as in an uncontested divorce or a criminal case. Such a fee may be paid before or after the task is completed. \n \nA \"prepaid fee \"is a fee paid by the client with the understanding that the attorney will earn the fee as he or she performs the task agreed upon. \n \nUnder these various definitions, one can reasonably take the position that \"retainers \"and \"flat fees \"may be placed in the general operating account when paid. Prepaid fees may be placed in a trust account until earned. \n \nTerminology as to the various types of fee arrangements does not alter the fact that the lawyer is a fiduciary. Therefore, the lawyer's duties as to fees should be uniform and governed by the same rules regardless of the particular fee arrangement. Those duties are as follows:\n 1.  To have a clear understanding with the client as to the details of the fee arrangement prior to undertaking the representation, preferably in writing. \n2.  To return to the client any unearned portion of a fee. \n3.  To accept the client's dismissal of him or her (with or without cause) without imposing any penalty on the client for the dismissal. \n4.  Comply with the provisions of Standard 31 as to reasonableness of the fee.\n \nThe law is well settled that a client can dismiss a lawyer for any reason or for no reason, and the lawyer has a duty to return any unearned portion of the fee. In the Matter of Collins , 246 Ga. 325, 271 S.E.2d 473 (1980).\nThe exercise of the right to discharge an attorney with or without cause does not constitute a breach of contract because it is a basic term of the contract, implied by law into it by reason of the nature of the attorney-client relationship, that the client may terminate that contract at any time.\n Henry, Walden &Davis v. Goodman , 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W. 2d 233 (1987). \n \nThe client, of course, may not be penalized for exercising the right to dismiss the lawyer. Id . In view of these duties, a lawyer need not place any fees into a trust account absent special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of the client. Such circumstances may be the agreement of the parties, the size and amount of the fee, and the length of time contemplated for the undertaking. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a>\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> A fee paid for retainer of the attorney, as narrowly defined in this opinion, illustrates the importance of an agreement or understanding in writing outlining, among other things: geographic area involved, duration, scope of proposed legal services, fees and expenses for legal services rendered, and due date of future retainer fees covered by the retainer agreement. The agreement should also contain specific terms as to refunds of any portion of the fee should the agreement be terminated prior to its expiration date. See Ethical Considerations 2-19 and 2-23.","UrlName":"rule521","Order":38,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"30cda581-2c94-4c74-9631-35c49e6e1705","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-3","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule527","Order":39,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bc8cdcc5-d2a7-4fa3-b010-ec92ba3f0b94","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 92-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule528","Order":40,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2f1e7d3d-e2e0-4017-92f4-5641db555d63","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 92-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule529","Order":41,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bdfa90bd-93a1-49af-9f47-e6bca8ffd4d0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule530","Order":42,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"cd42c0f8-57d8-48cf-b273-d4d851d38f12","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule531","Order":43,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"44debefd-6424-4f86-9611-83a86779ae21","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court \nOn September 17, 1993 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 93-3 \n \nThis opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including both Directory Rules and Ethical Considerations, that bear upon matters addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule83\">Rules 3.8(b)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">1.7(a)</a> (see especially Comments 6 and 10), <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">1.1</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">1.5(a)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(d)</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(f)(2)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">5.4(c)</a> and<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule207\">9.5</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical propriety of a prosecutor conditioning a plea agreement in a criminal case on the waiver of defense counsel's fee. \n \nThe question presented is whether it is unethical for a prosecutor to condition a plea agreement on an appointed or pro bono counsel's waiver of any claims for attorneys' fees. \n \nIn order to answer this inquiry, we must consider the unique nature of the American adversarial system, especially in criminal litigation. Lawyers typically occupy the three key roles in our system, as prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge. Each participant has a distinct role to play, and it is the carefully crafted balance of the public, ethical and professional responsibilities of the players that makes the system operate in accordance with Constitutional guarantees and the rightful expectations of the populace. As the Preamble to our Code of Professional Responsibility states:\n \n[I] It is peculiarly essential that the system for  establishing and dispensing justice be so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration... It cannot be so  maintained unless the conduct and motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit approval of all just men.\n \nThe first participant, the prosecutor, is an advocate like all lawyers, but he or she also has a unique responsibility as lawyer for the sovereign. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> \"The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a> While operating within the adversarial system, the prosecutor's obligation is to protect the innocent as well as convict the guilty, and to guard the rights of the accused as well as enforce the rights of the public. Thus, the prosecutor acts almost as a \"minister of justice,\"occupying a quasi-judicial position. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a> \n \nThe EC's seek to balance a prosecutor's duty to act in the best interests of the client (the state) with the duty to avoid an unjust result. For instance, the prosecutor:\n \nshould make timely disclosure to the defense of available evidence... that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid  pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\"> 4 </a>\n \nBecause of the prosecutor's unique position and responsibilities, conduct that is tolerable on the part of a private person may be intolerable when done by the prosecutor on behalf of the state. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\"> 5 </a> \n \nThe second participant in the system, the defense attorney, plays another role with markedly different responsibilities. The defense attorney's primary allegiance is to the client, the overriding goal being the achievement of that which is in the client's best interests, as the client perceives them. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#6\"> 6 </a> The principal duty the defense attorney owes to the administration of justice is \"to serve as the accused's counselor and advocate with courage, devotion, and to the utmost of his or her learning and ability and according to the law.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#7\"> 7 </a> \n \nThese duties devolve upon the defense attorney both as a member of the legal profession and as a party with a contractual relationship with the defendant. Even more importantly, however, these responsibilities are an outgrowth of the defendant's right to \"effective assistance of counsel \"guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 8 the Fourteenth Amendment to the Georgia Constitution 9 and court rule. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#10\"> 10 </a> \n \nThe third participant in the adversarial system is the judge. As stated in the Code of Judicial Conduct:\n \nOur legal system is based on the principle that an  independent, fair and competent judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and  the rule of law . . . The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of  disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under the rule of law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#11\"> 11 </a>\n \nAs arbiter, the judge must of course remain neutral and impartial. At the same time, however, judges are also responsible for guaranteeing that defendants receive fair trials and effective representation. \n \nThe prosecutor who conditions a plea agreement in a criminal case on waiver of attorneys' fees upsets the delicate balance of the adversarial system by interfering with both the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and the people's right to maintain a fair system of justice, and by sullying the judicial system's reputation for fair and ethical treatment of all persons. It does this in several important ways. \n \nFirst, such a condition creates a conflict of interest for the defense attorney, who is torn between the need to receive compensation for his or her work and the duty to protect the freedom, sometimes even the life, of the client. This conflict substantially interferes with the right, guaranteed by Constitutional mandate and court rules, to be assisted by competent, conflict-free counsel. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#12\"> 12 </a>\n Standard 30 provides: \n \nExcept with the written consent of his client after full  disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his  professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#13\"> 13 </a>\n \nA prosecutor's condition such as the one discussed here creates such a conflict. \"[A]dequate compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity of the profession.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#14\"> 14 </a> \"When members of the Bar are induced to render legal services for inadequate compensation, as a consequence the quality of the service rendered may be lowered, the welfare of the profession injured and the administration of justice made less efficient.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#15\"> 15 </a> The defense attorney in the situation posited here would not receive adequate, or even any, compensation when the prosecutor confronts him with a plea agreement based on the waiver of his fees. \n \nThe risk of inadequate representation exists not only in cases where individual lawyers are unpaid or are unsure about the prospects of payment. The potential risk will pervade every criminal prosecution unless a clear signal is sent that this sort of bargain is unacceptable in any circumstance. Thus, the prosecutor puts the defense attorney, and through him the defendant, in an impossible position. Certainty regarding payment in representation of the defendant is needed so that defense counsel can properly balance his workload. With uncertainty in the process, defense counsel may do that which is only human - devote less time and energy to that which is less likely to result in adequate remuneration. \n \nStandard 30 does permit an attorney to accept or continue representation in the face of personal conflict with written consent or notice to the client after full disclosure. Despite the literal language of the Standard, a client's written consent cannot waive this kind of personal conflict. This is true for at least two reasons. First, conflicts should be resolved before representation begins. This avoids harmful uncertainty, and prevents a late withdrawal of counsel that would be detrimental to both the client and the cause of justice. Second, as long as this tool remains an option, it is never clear when the prosecutor may use it. The fear that a prosecutor will use it may cause defense attorneys to stop taking the cases altogether <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#16\"> 16 </a> or to jealously guard their time while representing a defendant in the fear that they will ultimately have to yield their fees. \n \nIt should be noted that blanket proscriptions aimed at preventing conflicts in criminal cases are nothing new. Standard 34, which is sandwiched between other Standards dealing with impermissible conflicts, states:\n \nPrior to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in publication  rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed employment. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#17\"> 17 </a>\n \nThe reasoning behind this Standard, for which there is no consent exception, is obvious actions which are appropriate or necessary in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of a description of the representation. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#18\"> 18 </a> Thus, there is precedent for adoption of prophylactic rules limiting both the lawyer's and client's options, in order to protect the client's interest in competent and zealous representation. \n \nThe second reason why the prosecutor's condition is improper is that it jeopardizes the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant. The Constitution demands that \"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#19\"> 19 </a> This amendment guarantees effective and conflict free representation. The Courts have already held that some conflicts may not be waived under any circumstances, especially in death penalty cases. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#20\"> 20 </a> Creating conflicts of interest and interfering with effective assistance of counsel is inconsistent with the prosecutor's duty as a \"minister of justice \" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://21/"> 21 </a> to seek justice, and not merely convict. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#22\"> 22 </a> \n \nThird, the prosecutor's condition imperils the interest of the people in maintaining a system that operates fairly and in the state's best interests. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#23\"> 23 </a> Justice is imperiled in several ways: first, the mere possibility that counsel will not be paid will decrease the likelihood that competent counsel will come forward to represent the defendant; second, counsel who does come forward cannot safely devote his undivided loyalty to the best interests of the defendant, for fear that uncompensated work will divert attention from paying work; third, the conflict created by the prosecutor's actual or possible conditioning of the reduced sentence on the waiver of fees will increase the likelihood that defendants will later seek to set aside convictions or guilty pleas on the ground that they were not represented by conflict-free counsel; and fourth, if the crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted really should carry a particular sentence under state law, it is inappropriate for that interest to be ignored solely for the purpose of saving money. \n \nFinally, the actions of the prosecutor conflict with his obligation to \"avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#24\"> 24 </a> As the EC's in Canon 9 provide:\n \nContinuation of the American concept that we are to be  governed by rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be  obtained through our legal system. A lawyer should promote public confidence in our  system and in the legal profession . . . Public confidence in law and lawyers may be  eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer . . . . When explicit ethical  guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner  that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and  the legal profession. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#25\"> 25 </a>\n \nAll of this is especially true, of course, of a prosecutor. Public confidence in the legal system is certainly not promoted by actions which have the effect of discouraging competent counsel from representing criminal defendants,interfering with rights guaranteed by the state and Federal constitutions, and sacrificing the best interests of the state for purely monetary reasons. \n \nFor these reasons, we conclude that it is unethical for a prosecutor to condition a plea agreement in a criminal case on appointed or pro bono counsel's waiver of any claims for attorneys' fees.\n<hr>\n \n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> The prosecutor is bound by the Standards of Conduct (hereinafter \"Standards \") and the aspirational Directory Rules (hereinafter \"DR \") and Ethical Considerations (hereinafter \"EC \"). See Standard 70(a). \n \n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> EC 7-13. \n \n <a name=\"3\"> 3 </a> See DR 7-103 and EC's 7-13 and 7-14; Model Rule 3.8; and ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (hereinafter \"Justice Standards \") 3-1.1. \n \n <a name=\"4\"> 4 </a> EC 7-13. \n \n <a name=\"5\"> 5 </a> Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 214 (1990). \n \n <a name=\"6\"> 6 </a> See The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Rule 3.1 (1982). \n \n <a name=\"7\"> 7 </a> Criminal Justice Standard 4-1.1(b); See EC 7-19, stating that \"The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law.\"See also DR7-101; Model Rule 1.3 (Diligence), comment. Also see The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, Rule 3.1, which states, \"A lawyer shall use all legal means that are consistent with the retainer agreement, and reasonable available, to advance a client's interests as the client perceives them.\" \n \n <a name=\"8\"> 8 </a> See United States Constitution, amend. VI, which provides, \"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.\"Also see Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984). \n \n <a name=\"9\"> 9 </a> See Georgia Constitution, Art. 1, § 1, ~ 14 of the Georgia Constitution, stating \"Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel . . . . \"Also see Austin v. Carter, 248 Ga. 774 (1982). \n \n <a name=\"10\"> 10 </a> See Uniform Superior Court Rule 29.8(C), which provides that \"More difficult cases shall be assigned to attorneys with sufficient levels of experience and competence to afford adequate representation.\"Also see Rules 29.8(D), providing that \"Less experienced attorneys should be assigned cases which are within their capabilities. ..\"and 29.8(E) providing, \"Cases in which the death penalty is sought shall be assigned only to attorneys of sufficient experience, skill, and competence to render effective assistance of counsel to defendants. . . .\" \n \n <a name=\"11\"> 11 </a> ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble (1990). \n \n <a name=\"12\"> 12 </a> See Cuylerv. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) and Wilson v. State, 257 Ga. 352 (1987). \n \n <a name=\"13\"> 13 </a> (emphasis supplied). DR 5-101 states essentially the same rule, but in aspirational form. The DR, however, does not require that the consent of a client be written. \n \n <a name=\"14\"> 14 </a> EC 2-17. \n \n <a name=\"15\"> 15 </a> ABA Opinion 302(1961). \n \n <a name=\"16\"> 16 </a> The EC's encourage lawyers to do pro bono work (See EC 2-25, stating \"[E]very lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged . . . \"\"When a lawyer is appointed by a court or requested by a bar association to undertake representation of a person unable to obtain counsel, . . .he should not seek to be excused from undertaking the representation except for compelling reasons.\"EC 2-29. \n          At the same time, lawyers are not expected to unselfishly offer unlimited time for inadequate pay. In Opinion 87-3, the Nebraska State Bar Committee on Ethics found that a \"compelling reason \"to decline appointment to represent an indigent in a criminal defense matter is that \"[a]cceptance would impose unreasonable financial hardship on the lawyer.\" \n \n <a name=\"17\"> 17 </a> DR 5-104(B) states the same rule, but in aspirational form. \n \n <a name=\"18\"> 18 </a> See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981), in which the Court noted that the publication agreement affected counsel's tactical choices. To enhance the sensationalism of the trial, he failed to adequately investigate, seek a continuance, or request a change of venue; he also put defendant on the stand. \n \n <a name=\"19\"> 19 </a> U.S. Const. amend.VI. \n \n <a name=\"20\"> 20 </a> Fleming v. State,246 Ga. 90 (1980) (death penalty appeal invoking the State Supreme Court's \"supervisory role of the bar \"). \n \n <a name=\"21\"> 21 </a> Criminal Justice Standards, supra. \n \n <a name=\"22\"> 22 </a> See EC 7-13. \n \n <a name=\"23\"> 23 </a> EC 7-13 states,\"[H]is duty is to seek justice . . . during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all . . . .\"In criminal litigation, it is the prosecutor who stands in the shoes of the people, and it is his responsibility to make sure that both fairness and justice are pursued. \n \n <a name=\"24\"> 24 </a> Canon 9 provides, \"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.\" \n <a name=\"25\"> \n25 </a> EC 9-1, 9-2.","UrlName":"rule524","Order":44,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9dbbe297-9392-4abb-950b-e9f9ff39dc02","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-4","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn November 10, 1993 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 93-4 \n For references to Standard of Conduct 21, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(a)</a> .\n For references to Standards of Conduct 22, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n Ethical obligation of criminal defense lawyers to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies.\nStandard 22(b) requires a criminal defense attorney to provide copies of transcripts to indigent clients, without cost to the clients, whenever that is necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the clients upon termination of the representation of the clients by the defense attorney.\nCorrespondent asks if public defenders are ethically obligated to provide indigent clients with copies of transcripts needed to pursue collateral post-conviction remedies. Apparently, the public defender office does not provide representation on collateral post-conviction remedies yet wishes to retain the paupered transcript in its file for its own purposes. Making additional copies of transcripts for indigent clients will impose a financial burden upon the public defender.\nStandard 22(b) requires the public defender or any criminal defense attorney to provide copies of transcripts to indigent clients, without cost to the clients, whenever that is necessary to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client upon termination of the representation of the client by the public defender. Standard 22(b), in its pertinent part, provides:\n A lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including . . . delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled. While, by its own terms, Standard 22(b) applies only upon withdrawal, the purpose of Standard 22(b) is invoked whenever there is a termination of a lawyer-client relationship. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a>\n A paupered transcript is a \"paper . . . to which the client is entitled.\"That phrase must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the Standard which is to avoid prejudice to a client's rights. There can be no doubt that the lack of a transcript can prejudice the assertion of rights by the client in a collateral post-conviction relief matter. In addition, the attorney obtained the paupered transcript under a claim of right which belongs to the client -- not to the attorney. Standard 22(b) obligates attorneys to deliver transcripts and any other court documents which would be useful in the client's pursuit of rights. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\nThe obligation created by Standard 22 is limited to those situations in which the client would be prejudiced by the failure to deliver the transcript. If an additional copy of a paupered transcript is available to the client from the court for use in collateral post-conviction proceedings, the client may not be prejudiced by a refusal to deliver the transcript. Whether additional copies of paupered transcripts are or should be available from the court is not a matter for this opinion.\n As we stated in Advisory Opinion 87-5, attorneys are entitled to keep copies of papers in their client files, but, absent a prior agreement as to costs, a situation inapplicable here, the attorney bears the cost of copying. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a> It would be completely inconsistent with the nature of the relationship between the public defender or other defense counsel and the indigent criminal defendant to condition release of documents essential to further appeals upon the payment of costs of copying.\nIn cases where the criminal defense lawyer does not have the transcript available through no fault of his own, he has no obligation to provide it.\n <a name=\"1\"> 1 </a> Standard 21 makes the withdrawal rules applicable to cases of discharge by the client as well: \n \"A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment and a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment, if he is discharged by his client.\"\n <a name=\"2\"> 2 </a> In accord, ABA Informal Opinion 1376.\n <a name=\"3\"> 3 </a> In accord, Michigan Opin. No. CI-926.","UrlName":"rule493","Order":45,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"bbfafeeb-e7ee-496f-a711-95698670b72b","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 94-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 9, 1994 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 94-1 \n \nOn June 9, 2004, the Supreme Court of Georgia amended Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3. As a result, this formal advisory opinion no longer provides an accurate interpretation of the ethical rules. Please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule149\">Rule 7.3 (c)(2)</a> which adequately addresses the issue discussed in this opinion. \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nEthical Propriety of Lawyer Referral Service Collecting a Percentage of Fees in Certain Cases Referred to Participating Attorneys by the Service\nAny division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service constitutes the sharing of fees with a nonlawyer in violation of Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102.\n Correspondent represents a local bar association that operates a non-profit lawyer referral service. The inquiry concerns the ethical propriety of the lawyer referral service collecting a percentage of fees in certain cases referred to participating attorneys by the service. \n \nStandard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102 provides in pertinent part that a lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer. \n \nWhile the membership of the local bar association is composed of lawyers who are licensed to practice law in the state, the local bar association, in and of itself, has no authority to engage in the practice of law.  Therefore, any division of attorney's fees with a lawyer referral service would constitute the sharing of fees with a nonlawyer in violation of Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102. \n \nMoreover, \"[a] lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization...as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in his [or her] employment by a client.\"The lawyer may pay only \"the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bona fide lawyer referral service operated by an organization authorized by law....\"Standard 13(b). \n ","UrlName":"rule494","Order":46,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"310bbc9a-b051-4601-ad7b-9bcc928207e9","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 95-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn October 4, 1995 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 95-1 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 23, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 26, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 28, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule57\">Rules 1.6</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 30, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http:// /Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 31(a), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 40, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(f)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay a lawyer practicing law in Georgia ethically participate in a fee collection program which purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client? To participate in the program, the lawyer must enroll and pay a fee; and agree to assign the client's fees bills and share information about the client and the client's case with the program. \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nBecause the lawyer's participation will result in a violation of one or more disciplinary Standards, members of the State Bar of Georgia cannot ethically participate in the program. \n \nOPINION: \n \nI. Introduction and Background \n \nA fee collection program purchases client fee bills from lawyers and collects the fees from the client. To participate in the program, the lawyer must enroll and pay a fee; and agree to assign the client's fees bills and share information about the client and the client's case with the program. \n \nIf the client is credit worthy, the program will pay the client's bill and then proceed to collect the fees from the client on an installment basis, charging interest according to the credit worthiness of the client; if the client is not credit worthy, the program will proceed to collect the fees for the lawyer, but without any advance payment, remitting only 80% of the amount of the fees collected. \n \nThe lawyer is required by the program's Participation Agreement to grade clients according to their legal needs and ability to pay. The Participation Agreement contains the following provisions: \n \nThe lawyer must \"disclose events or circumstances materially affecting...credit worthiness \"of the client. The lawyer is required to warrant and covenant, among other terms, the following: that the application, credit agreement and voucher \"have been signed by either the Client, a person authorized to sign on the Client's behalf, or the person who will be responsible for repaying the credit extended under the Program, and such Client or person has been identified by a valid driver's license or state identification card;\"\"the Voucher accurately describes and evidences the type of service which has been provided to the Client;\"\"the Client is not in default with respect to any agreement between Client and Participant (lawyer), other than regarding accounts receivable;\"and \"Participant has no knowledge of any facts which may result in the uncollectability and/or unenforceability of the Credit Agreement.\" \n \nThus to participate in the program, the lawyer must provide information about the client that may well violate the client's right of confidentiality. Moreover, the client must sign the lawyer's voucher warranting the satisfactory nature of the lawyer's services, acknowledging that the fees are reasonable, and agreeing to pay finance charges in addition to the reasonable fee. \n \nII. The Ethical and Legal Considerations in the Program\nPreliminarily, it should be noted that a client's use of a program voucher is not analogous to a client's use of all-purpose credit cards to pay for services of a lawyer. Rather, the program is essentially a finance company designed to provide a service exclusively for lawyers and clients.\n In Georgia, lawyers are officers of the Court, Platen v. Byck , 50 Ga. 245, 248 (1873); Bibb County v. Hancock , 211 Ga. 429, 438 (1955); Sams v. Olah , 225 Ga. 497, 504 (1969), and, as members of the State Bar, are members of the administrative arm of the Georgia Supreme Court engaged in the administration of justice.\n<blockquote style=\"margin-right: 0\" dir=\"ltr\"> \nThe office of attorney is indispensable to the administration of justice and is intimate and peculiar in its relation to, and vital to the well-being of, the court. \n</blockquote>\n Sams v. Olah , supra, at 504. Thus, the lawyer is \"an officer of the state, with an obligation to the courts and to the public no less significant than his obligation to his client,\"id., and the legal profession \"[d]emands adherence to the public interest as the foremost obligation of the practitioner.\"First Bank &Trust Co. v. Zagoria , 250 Ga. 844, 845 (1983).\n The basic vice of the program is that it violates both the spirit and the letter of these precepts by requiring the lawyer to dilute his or her role as fiduciary. For example, the lawyer requires the client to sign a warranty as to the services rendered, which purports to contract away the client's legal right to complain or to dismiss the lawyer. A fundamental rule applicable to the lawyer as fiduciary is that \"a client has the absolute right to discharge the attorney and terminate the relation at any time, even without cause.\"White v. Aiken , 197 Ga. 29 (1943). (See also Standard 26).\n The dilution of the lawyer's fiduciary role is further indicated by the fact that a lawyer's participation in the program entails the possible violation of at least six standards of the State Bar of Georgia: Standards 23, 26, 28, 30, 31(a), and 40.\nStandard 23 requires a lawyer who withdraws from employment to refund any unearned fees. Standard 26 prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer. Standard 28 prohibits a lawyer from revealing the confidences or secrets of a client. Standard 30 prohibits representation where the lawyer's exercise of professional judgment on behalf of a client may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interest. Standard 31(a) prohibits the lawyer from charging a clearly excessive fee. And Standard 40 prohibits a lawyer from accepting compensation from one other than the client for representation of the client without the consent of the client.\nBecause the lawyer's participation will result in a violation of one or more of these Standards, members of the State Bar of Georgia cannot ethically participate in the program.\n","UrlName":"rule497","Order":47,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e6be1456-c2e5-4c7e-8a30-90b9f1b623ec","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 96-1","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn January 25, 1996 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 96-1 \n \nThis opinion relies on the Canons of Ethics, including both Directory Rules and Ethical Considerations, that bear upon matters directly addressed by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> . The conduct, which is the subject of this Formal Advisory Opinion, is now specifically and clearly prohibited by <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 22(b), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nThe question presented is whether an attorney may require a client, who desires to discharge the lawyer, to enter into an agreement releasing the lawyer for all claims by the client against the lawyer, including any disciplinary complaint with the State Bar, in order to obtain the client's files from the lawyer and a waiver of any claim of lien by the lawyer against such files. \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nA lawyer should represent a client competently and should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client by putting the interests of a client ahead of the lawyer's own personal interests. Therefore, a lawyer should not condition the return of a former client's files upon the execution of a release of claims and a release of State Bar disciplinary complaints by the client against the lawyer. \n \nOPINION:\nIt has been brought to the attention of the State Bar's Disciplinary Board that lawyers are following a practice of requiring a client, who desires to discharge the lawyer, to execute an agreement releasing the lawyer from any liability for claims relating to the lawyer's representation of the client in order for the client to obtain the papers and documents that constitute the client's file. One such agreement includes the following provision:\n \n...it is hereby agreed that [the client] hereby releases and forever discharges [the lawyers]...from all...claims,...including any disciplinary complaint with the State Bar of Georgia...which [the client] ever had or may have [against the lawyers] including but not limited to [the lawyers] representation of [the client] in the above stated matter. ...\n[The lawyers]...waive any claim of lien that they have in said matter.\nIt is apparent from reviewing this provision that the lawyer being discharged is attempting to condition the release of the client's files upon the waiver of any claims, including claims for malpractice and State Bar disciplinary complaints, by the client against the lawyer. This attempt by the lawyer to limit his or her liability for malpractice constitutes a failure to comply with Canon 6 of the Canon of Ethics, which provides that a lawyer should represent a client competently. As clearly explained in Ethical Consideration 6-6:\n \nA lawyer should not seek, by contract or other means, to limit his individual liability to his client for his malpractice. A lawyer who handles the affairs of his client properly has no need to attempt to limit his liability for his professional activities and one who does not handle the affairs of his client properly should not [be] permitted to do so.\nThe provisions of this Ethical Consideration are emphasized by Directory Rule 6-102:\n \n(A) A lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his personal malpractice.\nClearly, the practice of requiring a client, who desires to discharge the lawyer, to execute an agreement as described herein before releasing the client's files is an attempt to exonerate the lawyer from individual liability to his or her client. As such, this practice constitutes a violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Ethics.\nFurthermore, Canon 5 of the Canons of Ethics provides that a \"a lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client.\"As explained in Ethical Consideration 5-1:\n \nThe professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of uncompromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.\nBy attempting to limit his or her liability for malpractice as a condition of releasing the client's files, the lawyer puts himself or herself into an adversarial relationship with the client. By purposefully withholding papers, documents, and evidence in the client's file until the client agrees to execute an agreement releasing the lawyer from any liability for claims or malpractice, the lawyer's personal interests are placed ahead of the interests of the client. This conduct amounts to a failure to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client in violation of Canon 5 of the State Bar of Georgia's Canons of Ethics.\nIn addition, by conditioning the return of a client's files and the waiver of any lien that the lawyer might have against such files upon the execution of a release of claims for malpractice and complaints to the State Disciplinary Board, the lawyer has potentially caused prejudice to the client in violation of Standard 22(b) of the Standards of Conduct for the State Bar of Georgia which provides as follows:\n \nA lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled and complying with applicable laws and rules.\nBy such conduct, the lawyer has also potentially caused prejudice to the client in violation of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 87-5 which provides as follows:\n \nAn attorney's ethical obligation not to cause prejudice to his or her client is paramount over rights under the lien statute. Accordingly, an attorney may not to the prejudice of a client withhold the client's papers or properties upon withdrawal as security for unpaid fees.\nIn summary, the practice of requiring a client, that desires to discharge a lawyer, to execute an agreement, such as described herein, is an attempt by the lawyer to either exonerate himself or herself from claims for malpractice or limit his or her liability to the client for acts of malpractice, and such conduct is improper.\n","UrlName":"rule499","Order":48,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"63202f2d-83ee-40bd-800d-bdca8d755ce9","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 96-2","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule501","Order":49,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71867a07-e1b4-41ac-98ca-7d95ebce8c0d","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule503","Order":50,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"290106da-aa32-4732-a959-855c97f91929","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn February 13, 1997 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 97-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(c), please see Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> Comments. \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (trade names), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (lawyers practicing together under firm name), please see Comments [1] and [6] of<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor reference to Standard of Conduct 9(b) (use of name of lawyer-pubic official in firm name), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(c)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 35-38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rules 1.7</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(c)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">1.9</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">2.2</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay an attorney practice in more than one law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nAn attorney may practice simultaneously in more than one firm so long as those firms represent different ownership, the public and individual clients are clearly informed, and each firm adheres to all requirements of the Standards governing conflicts of interest and client confidences and secrets. \n \nOPINION: \n \nCorrespondent asks whether an attorney may practice in more than one law firm. Correspondent suggests several possible variations, including firms with overlapping partners, firms with different associates, and firms formed for different clients or different purposes. Each potential structure raises different problems under the Georgia Standards of Conduct. In addition to the structural concerns raised by Correspondent, overlapping firms create special problems of conflict of interest and client confidentiality. \n \nStandard 9(c) speaks to multiple structures: \"A law firm shall not simultaneously practice law under more than one name.\"Thus firms composed of the same principals may not form parallel firms for the practice of law, whether by using different associates, or for different practice areas or different clients. Standard 9(c) prohibits only multiple practices by the same \"law firm,\"however. Thus it does not forbid a member of one firm from joining with different principals simultaneously in a different practice or practices. Other Standards recognize and accept nontraditional practice forms. Standard 10 recognizes that \"[a] partnership for the practice of law may be composed of one or more individual professional corporations.\"Standard 11 deals with interstate law firms in which personnel and admissions to practice are distinct from state to state. \n \nThe principal problem created by distinct but overlapping practice firms is actual or potential client confusion. The Georgia Standards uniformly protect against any firm structure or designation which creates that possibility. Standard 8 (firm names, printing and publications) and Standard 9(a) (trade names) forbid any \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"usage. Standard 9(a) ties these concerns to client understandings \"as to the lawyer or lawyers practicing under that name or to the type of practice in which the lawyer or lawyers are engaged.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general). Standard 10 adds that \"[a] lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are ... partners.\"See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (\"special counsel \"relationship \"must be ... identified correctly so that clients and potential clients are fully aware \"). In addition, Standard 9(b) prohibits using the name of a lawyer-public official \"not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general); Advisory Opinion No. 23 (disclosure requirements for office of multistate firm). \n \nIn short, a lawyer's engaging in multiple practices with distinct ownership is not prohibited by the Standards, so long as neither the general public nor any individual client is or may be misled thereby. \n \nThe precise steps which each firm must take to avoid being \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"are beyond the scope of this opinion. If a lawyer practices in more than one active firm, he or she may be required to identify those firms in all communications to the general public, together with appropriate distinctions between or among them; and may need to explain to each client or potential client at the outset how that client will or would be served. The client needs to understand who is offering to perform or will perform services, and to whom the client should look for answers or redress in case of any problem. \n \nParticipation in simultaneous practices also raises concerns for conflict of interest and client confidences or secrets, arising from the overlapping lawyer's or lawyers' work in another firm or firms. The relevant Standards apply with full force to interrelated practices. Confidences and secrets must be protected regardless of where they were obtained. Individual lawyers are disqualified equally wherever they go. Standard 38 vicariously disqualifies each firm in case of any individual disqualification under Standards 35-37, regardless of which firm's work gives rise to individual disqualification. See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (vicarious disqualification in the similar context of \"special counsel \").","UrlName":"rule510","Order":51,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[{"Id":"5fcb0eb2-9077-4634-a325-aae0d50cfaae","ParentId":"290106da-aa32-4732-a959-855c97f91929","Title":"Version 2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn February 13, 1997 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 97-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(c), please see Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> Comments. \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (trade names), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9(a) (lawyers practicing together under firm name), please see Comments [1] and [6] of<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(e)</a> . \n \nFor reference to Standard of Conduct 9(b) (use of name of lawyer-pubic official in firm name), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(c)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 10, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 35-38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rules 1.7</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">1.8(c)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">1.9</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">2.2</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay an attorney practice in more than one law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nAn attorney may practice simultaneously in more than one firm so long as those firms represent different ownership, the public and individual clients are clearly informed, and each firm adheres to all requirements of the Standards governing conflicts of interest and client confidences and secrets. \n \nOPINION: \n \nCorrespondent asks whether an attorney may practice in more than one law firm. Correspondent suggests several possible variations, including firms with overlapping partners, firms with different associates, and firms formed for different clients or different purposes. Each potential structure raises different problems under the Georgia Standards of Conduct. In addition to the structural concerns raised by Correspondent, overlapping firms create special problems of conflict of interest and client confidentiality. \n \nStandard 9(c) speaks to multiple structures: \"A law firm shall not simultaneously practice law under more than one name.\"Thus firms composed of the same principals may not form parallel firms for the practice of law, whether by using different associates, or for different practice areas or different clients. Standard 9(c) prohibits only multiple practices by the same \"law firm,\"however. Thus it does not forbid a member of one firm from joining with different principals simultaneously in a different practice or practices. Other Standards recognize and accept nontraditional practice forms. Standard 10 recognizes that \"[a] partnership for the practice of law may be composed of one or more individual professional corporations.\"Standard 11 deals with interstate law firms in which personnel and admissions to practice are distinct from state to state. \n \nThe principal problem created by distinct but overlapping practice firms is actual or potential client confusion. The Georgia Standards uniformly protect against any firm structure or designation which creates that possibility. Standard 8 (firm names, printing and publications) and Standard 9(a) (trade names) forbid any \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"usage. Standard 9(a) ties these concerns to client understandings \"as to the lawyer or lawyers practicing under that name or to the type of practice in which the lawyer or lawyers are engaged.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general). Standard 10 adds that \"[a] lawyer shall not hold himself out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are ... partners.\"See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (\"special counsel \"relationship \"must be ... identified correctly so that clients and potential clients are fully aware \"). In addition, Standard 9(b) prohibits using the name of a lawyer-public official \"not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.\"See also EC 2-11 (same concern more general); Advisory Opinion No. 23 (disclosure requirements for office of multistate firm). \n \nIn short, a lawyer's engaging in multiple practices with distinct ownership is not prohibited by the Standards, so long as neither the general public nor any individual client is or may be misled thereby. \n \nThe precise steps which each firm must take to avoid being \"false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading \"are beyond the scope of this opinion. If a lawyer practices in more than one active firm, he or she may be required to identify those firms in all communications to the general public, together with appropriate distinctions between or among them; and may need to explain to each client or potential client at the outset how that client will or would be served. The client needs to understand who is offering to perform or will perform services, and to whom the client should look for answers or redress in case of any problem. \n \nParticipation in simultaneous practices also raises concerns for conflict of interest and client confidences or secrets, arising from the overlapping lawyer's or lawyers' work in another firm or firms. The relevant Standards apply with full force to interrelated practices. Confidences and secrets must be protected regardless of where they were obtained. Individual lawyers are disqualified equally wherever they go. Standard 38 vicariously disqualifies each firm in case of any individual disqualification under Standards 35-37, regardless of which firm's work gives rise to individual disqualification. See also Formal Advisory Opinion No. 93-1 (vicarious disqualification in the similar context of \"special counsel \").","UrlName":"revision329"}],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2cec141b-260d-471a-8871-f253d226bc46","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 97-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn September 4, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 97-3 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 6, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule149\">Rule 7.3(b)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 22, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule48\">Rule 1.16(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standards of Conduct 44, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule52\">Rule 1.3</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 45(b), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1(a)(1)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nWhether it is ethically permissible for a departing attorney to send a communication to clients of the former law firm? \n \nOPINION: \n \nNo Standard prohibits a departing attorney from contacting those clients with whom the attorney personally worked while at the law firm. A client is not the property of a certain attorney. The main consideration underlying our Canons of Ethics is the best interest and protection of the client. \n \nAn attorney has a duty to keep a client informed. This duty flows in part from Standard 22 which provides that a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until that lawyer has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client including giving due notice to the client of the lawyer's withdrawal, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules. Furthermore, Standard 44 prohibits an attorney's willful abandonment or disregard of a legal matter to the client's detriment. Therefore, to the extent that a lawyer's departure from the firm affects the client's legal matters, this client should be informed of the attorney's departure. The fact or circumstances of an attorney's departure from a law firm should not be misrepresented to the firm's clients. See Standard 4 (which prohibits an attorney from engaging in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation); and Standard 45(b) (which prohibits an attorney from knowingly making a false statement of law or fact in his representation of a client). \n \nIf the departing attorney either had significant contact with or actively represented a client on the client's legal matters, the attorney may communicate with the client, in either written or oral form, to advise the client of the attorney's departure from the firm. An appropriate communication may advise the client of the fact of the attorney's departure, the attorney's new location, the attorney's willingness to provide legal services to the client, and the client's right to select who handles the client's future legal representation. \n \nAssuming the departing attorney either had significant contact with or actively represented the client, the written communication to the client does not need to comply with the provisions governing advertisements contained in Standard 6, because it would not constitute \"a written communication to a prospective client for the purposes of obtaining professional employment \"as contemplated by Standard 6 (i.e. the written communication is not required to be labeled an \"advertisement \"). Of course, any written communication regarding a lawyer's services must also comply with Standard 5, which prohibits any false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading communications; and with any other applicable standards of conduct. \n \nA similar analysis should also apply to an oral communication by the departing attorney to a client with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation on legal matters while at the firm. If the departing attorney contacts such a client orally, that attorney should only provide information that is deemed appropriate in a written communication as set forth above. \n \nWith respect to the timing of the disclosure of the attorney's departure to the client, the ultimate consideration is the client's best interest. To the extent practical, a joint notification by the law firm and the departing attorney to the affected clients of the change is the preferred course of action for safeguarding the client's best interests. However, the appropriate timing of a notification to the client is determined on a case by case basis. Depending on the nature of the departing attorney's work for the client, the client may need advance notification of the departure to make a determination as to future representation. \n \nThe departing attorney may also owe certain duties to the firm which may require that the departing attorney should advise the firm of the attorney's intention to leave the firm and the attorney's intention to notify clients of his or her impending departure, prior to informing the clients of the situation. Specifically, the departing attorney should not engage in professional conduct which involves \"dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or willful misrepresentation \"with respect to the attorney's dealings with the firm as set forth in Standard 4. \n \nIn conclusion, as long as the departing attorney complies with the Standards governing advertisements, solicitation, and general professional conduct, the attorney may ethically contact those clients with whom the attorney had significant contact or active representation at the former law firm, so as to advise the clients of the attorney's departure as well as the client's right to select his or her legal counsel. Legal issues which may arise from a particular set of facts involving a departing attorney including, but not limited to, contract or tortious interference with contract, are beyond the scope of this formal advisory opinion.","UrlName":"rule511","Order":52,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"761858ac-f617-4774-af9c-1a3463724b8a","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule462","Order":53,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"25cb30ff-9539-4f82-a2f3-ebfd4fd3216d","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn June 1, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-2 \n \nThis opinion relies on Standards of Conduct 61, 62, 63, and 65 that bear upon matters directly addressed by Rule <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule42\">1.15(I)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nWhen a lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity is unable to locate the rightful recipient of such funds after exhausting all reasonable efforts, may that lawyer remove the unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nA lawyer holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity may remove unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and deliver the funds to the custody of the State of Georgia in accordance with the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act only if the lawyer, prior to delivery, has exhausted all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient. \n \nOPINION: \n \nMany members of the Bar have contacted the State Bar of Georgia for guidance on how to manage client funds and/or other funds held in a fiduciary capacity in the lawyer's escrow trust account when the lawyer is unable to locate the rightful recipient of the funds and the rightful recipient fails to claim the funds. More specifically, the lawyers have asked whether they could ethically remove the unclaimed funds from the lawyer's escrow trust account and disburse the funds in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq., the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. \n \nIn those cases where a lawyer is holding client funds and/or other funds in a fiduciary capacity, the lawyer must do so in compliance with Standards 61, 62, 63 and 65. When the funds become payable or distributable, Standard 61 speaks to the lawyer's duty to deliver funds: \"A lawyer shall promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities or other properties and shall promptly deliver such funds, securities or other properties to the client.\"Implicit both in this Standard, and the lawyer's responsibility to zealously represent the client, is the lawyer's duty to exhaust all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient in order to ensure delivery. \n \nWhen a lawyer holding funds attempts to deliver those funds in compliance with Standard 61 but is unable to locate the rightful recipient, the lawyer has a duty to exhaust all reasonable efforts to locate the rightful recipient. After exhausting all reasonable efforts and the expiration of the five year period discussed in the Act, if the lawyer is still unable to locate the rightful recipient and the rightful recipient fails to claim the funds, the funds are no longer considered client funds or funds held in a fiduciary capacity, but rather, the funds are presumed to be abandoned as a matter of law, except as otherwise provided by the Act, and the lawyer may then deliver the unclaimed funds to the State of Georgia in accordance with O.C.G.A. §§ 44-12-190 et seq., the Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. A lawyer who disburses the unclaimed funds as discussed above shall not be in violation of the Standards.","UrlName":"rule512","Order":54,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"4da258c4-e1db-411a-8ab9-783ceb32a90c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-3","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn June 1, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-3 \n For reference to Standard of Conduct 47, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule296\">Rule 4.2(b)(1)</a> .\n For reference to Standard of Conduct 48, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> .\n For reference to DR 7-103, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule83\">Rule 3.8(a)</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nMay a staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of non-clients?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \nA staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group may contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of non-clients and clients alike because such communication is authorized by law and because the State is not an adverse party in that situation.\n OPINION: \nI. Factual Scenario:\nA staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group (hereinafter \"lawyer \") receives information that a state prison inmate is denied a constitutionally protected right by the housing institution. The lawyer contacts the Warden of the institution in writing, notifying the Warden of the situation from the perspective of the inmate. In addition, the writing cites legal authority and argues that the institution has denied the inmate's constitutionally protected rights. In conclusion, the letter asks the Warden to conform to the inmate's demands in light of the legal authority cited in the letter.\nThe lawyer knows that the Warden is a state official with managerial responsibilities. The lawyer also knows that the State is represented by the Attorney General of the State. The lawyer does not seek approval from the Attorney General's office prior to his correspondence.\nII. Ethical and Legal Considerations\n The factual scenario raises questions about the application of Standard 47. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> More particularly, the questions at issue are whether the government is a \"party \"as contemplated by Standard 47 and whether the communication described falls within the \"authorized by law \"exception to Standard 47.\n Standard 47 \nDuring the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior written consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so. A violation of this standard may be punished by a public reprimand.\n The factual scenario describes a lawyer's communication with a government agency he knows to be represented by a lawyer, without the prior written consent of the lawyer representing the government agency. While the question presented refers to a \"non-client,\"the factual scenario describes a situation where the lawyer is offering legal assistance on behalf of a person who presumably requested the assistance. See Huddleston v. State , 259 Ga. 45 (1989) and Legacy Homes v. Cole , 205 Ga. App. 34 (1992) for a description of the formation of the attorney-client relationship. Thus, the communication is the subject of the lawyer's representation of a client.\n Because the government is not an adverse party in this situation and because the communication described is authorized by law, Standard 47 does not apply to the factual scenario presented. The communication prohibited by Standard 47 protects an adverse party from overreaching by opposing counsel, protects the attorney-client relationship, and reduces the likelihood that clients will disclose privileged information that could harm their interests. See , ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 95-396 for a description of the history and purpose of similar rules prohibiting such communication.\n Standard 47 contemplates a situation where a party might take advantage of another with an adverse interest , through unauthorized communication. However, the factual scenario described above is not such a situation. The purpose of the government is to protect its people, including those it has taken into custody. This fundamental concept is well represented in our laws, including our Bar Rules.\nThe petition clause of the First Amendment is directly on point in this regard: Congress shall make no law...abridging...the right of the people...to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The government has a duty to make itself available to those who have legitimate grievances.\nThe government has a duty to make itself available to those who have legitimate grievances. If a person, even a lawyer representing a person incarcerated by the State, has reason to believe that the State is acting in an oppressive manner, that person has a right to communicate this grievance directly to the government agency involved. To do so is a Constitutionally protected right and thus falls within the \"authorized by law \"exception to Standard 47.\nEven where State officials initiate a clearly adversarial proceeding, lawyers for the State are obligated to protect the interests of the accused. This concept is reflected in Directory Rule DR 7-103:\n(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.\nWhile the First Amendment and DR 7-103 contemplate different situations, they both incorporate the notion that the government has an interest in protecting its citizens that is a paramount to any interests it has in being protected from them. In the factual scenario provided, the government agency has an interest in addressing the concerns raised by the lawyer. While the government may have competing interests, that alone does not make the government an adverse party.\n In summary, a staff lawyer for a non-profit legal services group may contact State officials to express concerns about the legality of treatment of clients because such communication is authorized by law and because the State is not an adverse party in that situation. Regardless of the adversarial nature of the situation, a lawyer should always strive to maintain the integrity of the profession (Canon 1 ) while representing the best interest of his client, and should consider providing copies of the communication to the State lawyer.\n <a name=\"1\">1</a> This opinion does not address Standard 48 which prohibits a lawyers advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer where the interests of the person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client. In the factual scenario described in this opinion, the lawyer knows that the state institution is represented by the Attorney General for the State.","UrlName":"rule514","Order":55,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"98088e98-4d7c-4bbb-b291-7a762393dfa0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn October 29, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> ; (incorporating <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ). \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 37, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> (incorporating <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ) and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-13, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(B), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(C), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(b)</a> , which includes additional procedural requirements.\n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(D), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nIs it ethically proper for a lawyer to represent a criminal defendant when a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution is represented by a second attorney who is listed on letterhead as \"of counsel \"to the same law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nBecause an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, regular, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the standards of conduct applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel \"attorneys. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. \n \nOPINION: \n \nI. Use of the Term \"Of Counsel \"on Materials Intended for Public Distribution. \n \nThe use of the term \"of counsel \"to denote relationships between attorneys and law firms has increased in recent years. Traditionally the term was used to designate semi-retired lawyers who desired to maintain a regular association with a law firm for which they were previously a full-time attorney. Today, the term \"of counsel \"is used to describe a wide range of associations and relationships including lateral hires or attorneys who are in-between associate and partnership classifications. While the primary purpose of this opinion is not to limit or define the terms of such relationships, the Board does believe that some clarification is necessary to protect members of the public who may rely upon the \"of counsel \"designation in selecting legal representation. \n \nAlthough the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility does not define the term \"of counsel \", the American Bar Association has issued a formal opinion which describes the core characteristics of the term as follows:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n ... A close, regular, personal relationship ; but a relationship which is neither that of a partner (or its equivalent, a principal of a professional corporation), with the shared liability and/or managerial responsibility implied by that term; nor, on the other hand, the status ordinarily conveyed by the term 'associate', which is to say a junior non-partner lawyer, regularly employed by the firm. \n</blockquote>\n (Emphasis added). ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 90-357 (1990). The ABA also continues to adhere to aspects of its earlier opinion which prohibited the use of the term \"of counsel \"to designate the following relationships: (1) a relationship involving only a single case, (2) a relationship of forwarder or receiver of legal business, (3) a relationship involving only occasional collaborative efforts, and (4) relationship of an outside consultant. See ABA Formal Opinion 90-357 (1990) (reaffirming in part ABA Formal Opinion 330 (1972)). Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have adhered to the ABA's description of the \"of counsel \"relationships. See Florida Professional Ethics Committee Opinion Nos. 94-7 (1995); State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Opinion No. 1993-129 and the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 262 (1972). \n \nThe Board is of the opinion that the use of the term \"of counsel \"on letterhead, placards, advertisements and other materials intended for public distribution should denote more than casual contact such as mere office-sharing arrangements and that requiring a close, regular, personal relationship between the \"of counsel \"attorney and the principal firm is in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the consuming public. Requiring attorneys who are held out to the public as \"of counsel \"to have a close, regular, personal relationship with the principal firm is also in keeping with well-established standards of conduct requiring lawyers to be scrupulous in the representation of their professional status and prohibiting attorneys from practicing under trade names which are false, fraudulent, deceptive or that would tend to mislead laypersons as to the identity of lawyers actually practicing in the firm. See Standards of Conduct 8 and 9 and EC 2-11 and EC 2-13. \n \nII. Conflicts Analysis for \"Of Counsel \"Relationships. \n \nThe issue as to whether or not a member of a law firm may represent a defendant who potentially has an adverse interest to a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution and who is simultaneously being represented by an \"of counsel \"attorney to the same firm must be analyzed in light of the requirement that such an \"of counsel \"relationship be \"close, regular and personal.\"The Board believes that the prudent and ethical course is for the attorneys involved to apply the same standards in analyzing this potential for conflict of representation as would be applied in more traditional relationships existing between associates and partners with other attorneys in their law firms. \n \nUnder these long-standing rules, an attorney is prohibited from continuing multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be, or is likely to be, adversely affected by his representation of another client. See Standards of Conduct 35 and 36 and DR 5-105(B). If the lawyer is required to decline or withdraw from employment due to the reasons stated in Standards 35 and 36, then no partner or associate of his firm may accept or continue such employment. See Standard of Conduct 38 and DR 5-105(D). The standards do provide for an exception if it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent the interest of each of the clients and each client consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of each client. See Standard of Conduct 37 and DR 5-105(C). \n \nIn addition to associates and partners of law firms, the Board believes that these are sound principles for \"of counsel \"attorneys to follow as well. This is especially true, given the requirement that attorneys listed as \"of counsel \"on letterhead and other materials distributed to the public have a close, regular, personal, relationship with the principal firm. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then, under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. This opinion is consistent with those reached by other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue. See State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 1993-129; Florida Professional Ethics Committee, Opinion 94-7 (1995); and Opinion 72-41 (1973)","UrlName":"rule516","Order":56,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[{"Id":"662c582a-4db3-4868-8e82-12d27bd91e69","ParentId":"98088e98-4d7c-4bbb-b291-7a762393dfa0","Title":"Version 2","Content":" State Bar of Georgia \nIssued by the Supreme Court of Georgia \nOn October 29, 1998 \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 98-4 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> ; (incorporating <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ). \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 9, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(a)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)(1)</a> , and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">7.5(e)(2)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 37, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 38, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-11, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(a)</a> (incorporating<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rule 7.1</a> ), <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(e)(1)</a> and Comment [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 2-13, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5(d)</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule153\">Rule 7.5</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(B), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(C), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(b)</a> , which includes additional procedural requirements.\n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. \n \nFor references to DR 5-105(D), please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule86\">Rule 1.10(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nIs it ethically proper for a lawyer to represent a criminal defendant when a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution is represented by a second attorney who is listed on letterhead as \"of counsel \"to the same law firm? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nBecause an attorney who is held out to the public as \"of counsel \"should have a close, regular, personal relationship with the affiliated firm, the standards of conduct applicable to multiple representations by partners and associates of law firms, should also apply to \"of counsel \"attorneys. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. \n \nOPINION: \n \nI. Use of the Term \"Of Counsel \"on Materials Intended for Public Distribution. \n \nThe use of the term \"of counsel \"to denote relationships between attorneys and law firms has increased in recent years. Traditionally the term was used to designate semi-retired lawyers who desired to maintain a regular association with a law firm for which they were previously a full-time attorney. Today, the term \"of counsel \"is used to describe a wide range of associations and relationships including lateral hires or attorneys who are in-between associate and partnership classifications. While the primary purpose of this opinion is not to limit or define the terms of such relationships, the Board does believe that some clarification is necessary to protect members of the public who may rely upon the \"of counsel \"designation in selecting legal representation. \n \nAlthough the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility does not define the term \"of counsel \", the American Bar Association has issued a formal opinion which describes the core characteristics of the term as follows:\n<blockquote dir=\"ltr\" style=\"margin-right: 0\"> \n ... A close, regular, personal relationship ; but a relationship which is neither that of a partner (or its equivalent, a principal of a professional corporation), with the shared liability and/or managerial responsibility implied by that term; nor, on the other hand, the status ordinarily conveyed by the term 'associate', which is to say a junior non-partner lawyer, regularly employed by the firm. \n</blockquote>\n (Emphasis added). ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 90-357 (1990). The ABA also continues to adhere to aspects of its earlier opinion which prohibited the use of the term \"of counsel \"to designate the following relationships: (1) a relationship involving only a single case, (2) a relationship of forwarder or receiver of legal business, (3) a relationship involving only occasional collaborative efforts, and (4) relationship of an outside consultant. See ABA Formal Opinion 90-357 (1990) (reaffirming in part ABA Formal Opinion 330 (1972)). Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have adhered to the ABA's description of the \"of counsel \"relationships. See Florida Professional Ethics Committee Opinion Nos. 94-7 (1995); State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Opinion No. 1993-129 and the New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion No. 262 (1972). \n \nThe Board is of the opinion that the use of the term \"of counsel \"on letterhead, placards, advertisements and other materials intended for public distribution should denote more than casual contact such as mere office-sharing arrangements and that requiring a close, regular, personal relationship between the \"of counsel \"attorney and the principal firm is in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the consuming public. Requiring attorneys who are held out to the public as \"of counsel \"to have a close, regular, personal relationship with the principal firm is also in keeping with well-established standards of conduct requiring lawyers to be scrupulous in the representation of their professional status and prohibiting attorneys from practicing under trade names which are false, fraudulent, deceptive or that would tend to mislead laypersons as to the identity of lawyers actually practicing in the firm. See Standards of Conduct 8 and 9 and EC 2-11 and EC 2-13. \n \nII. Conflicts Analysis for \"Of Counsel \"Relationships. \n \nThe issue as to whether or not a member of a law firm may represent a defendant who potentially has an adverse interest to a co-defendant in the same criminal prosecution and who is simultaneously being represented by an \"of counsel \"attorney to the same firm must be analyzed in light of the requirement that such an \"of counsel \"relationship be \"close, regular and personal.\"The Board believes that the prudent and ethical course is for the attorneys involved to apply the same standards in analyzing this potential for conflict of representation as would be applied in more traditional relationships existing between associates and partners with other attorneys in their law firms. \n \nUnder these long-standing rules, an attorney is prohibited from continuing multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be, or is likely to be, adversely affected by his representation of another client. See Standards of Conduct 35 and 36 and DR 5-105(B). If the lawyer is required to decline or withdraw from employment due to the reasons stated in Standards 35 and 36, then no partner or associate of his firm may accept or continue such employment. See Standard of Conduct 38 and DR 5-105(D). The standards do provide for an exception if it is obvious that the lawyer can adequately represent the interest of each of the clients and each client consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of each client. See Standard of Conduct 37 and DR 5-105(C). \n \nIn addition to associates and partners of law firms, the Board believes that these are sound principles for \"of counsel \"attorneys to follow as well. This is especially true, given the requirement that attorneys listed as \"of counsel \"on letterhead and other materials distributed to the public have a close, regular, personal, relationship with the principal firm. Accordingly, when an \"of counsel \"attorney would be required to decline or withdraw from multiple representations under Standards 35, 36 and 37, then, under Standard 38, no partner, associate or other \"of counsel \"attorney of the principal firm may accept or continue such employment. This opinion is consistent with those reached by other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue. See State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct Formal Opinion No. 1993-129; Florida Professional Ethics Committee, Opinion 94-7 (1995); and Opinion 72-41 (1973)","UrlName":"revision331"}],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"08e11fad-a1e2-4fb1-9414-08306ff815b0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 99-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule517","Order":57,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"55a23b3f-e03d-4462-b7c8-b177bf7efd80","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 99-2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON OCTOBER 18, 1999 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 99-2 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 35, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 36, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to Canon 3, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 3-1, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 3-8, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">Rule 5.4(a)</a> , <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">5.4(b)</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule120\">5.4(d)</a> . \n \nFor references to DR 3-101, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> . \n \nFor references to Canon 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> and <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 5-14, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7(a)</a> . \n \nFor references to EC 5-20, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule65\">Rule 2.2.</a> \n \nFor references to DR 5-105, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nIn a transaction involving a real estate lending institution and its customer, may the in-house counsel for the institution provide legal services to the customer relative to the transaction? May the real estate lending institution charge the customer a fee for any legal services rendered relative to the transaction? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nThe answer to both questions is \"no.\"An in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution assists that entity in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, if he or she provides legal services to its customers which are in any way related to the existing relationship between the institution and its customer. Such conduct would also constitute an impermissible conflict of interest under Standards 35 and 36. This prohibition does not, however, prevent in-house counsel from attending closings as attorney for the institution and preparing the documents necessary to effectuate the closing including those documents that must be signed by the customer and that may benefit both the institution and the customer. Nor does the prohibition prevent the institution from seeking reimbursement for the legal expenses incurred in the transaction by including them in the cost of doing business when determining its charge to its customer. The charge, however, may not be denominated as a legal or attorney fee but must be included in the charge being made by the institution. There is inherent risk of confusion on the part of the customer regarding the role of in-house counsel. Prudent lawyers will act on the assumption that courts will honor the customer's reasonable expectation of in-house counsel's duties created by the closing attorney's conduct at the closing. \n \nOPINION: \n \nStandard 24, proscribing assistance in the unauthorized practice of law, prohibits in-house counsel for a real estate lending institution from providing legal services to its customers. See also, Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 3; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Considerations 3-1 &3-8; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Directory Rule 3-101, and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 5.4(d). Standards 35 and 36 prohibit such conduct if the ability to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of one client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the obligation to another client. See also, Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 5-14 - 5-20; Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, Directory Rule 5-105, and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Model Rule 1.7. Specifically, in-house counsel may not provide legal services at a closing or elsewhere to a customer borrowing from the lending institution and arising out of the existing relationship between the customer and the institution. This is true whether or not the customer is charged for these services. The role of employee renders the actions of in-house counsel the action of the employer. The employer, not being a lawyer, is thus being assisted in and is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The in-house counsel by virtue of the existing employer/employee relationship and its accompanying obligation of loyalty to the employer cannot exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the customer. \n \nThis prohibition does not, however, prevent in-house counsel from attending the closing as the institution's legal representative and preparing those documents necessary to effectuate the closing. This includes those documents that must be signed by the customer. In such a situation, in-house counsel is providing legal services directly to the institution even though others, including the customer, may benefit from them. \n \nThe prohibition on assisting in the unauthorized practice of law does not prevent the lending institution from including the expense of in-house counsel in the cost of doing business when determining the fee to charge its customer. The lending institution may, in other words, recoup the expenses of the transaction including the cost of legal services. This conduct does not in and of itself, create a duty to the customer on the part of the in-house counsel nor does it constitute a violation of the prohibition against the sharing of legal fees with a non-lawyer. On the other hand, charging the cost of legal services to the customer (1) is likely to create an unintended expectation in the mind of the customer, (2) constitutes a non-lawyer receiving the fee for legal services rather than an attorney, (3) constitutes a lawyer splitting a fee with a non-lawyer, or (4) directly invites the unauthorized practice of law. It is accordingly prohibited even if limited to actual costs. The customer cannot be made a part of the attorney/client, employer/employee relationship. \n \nThe situation in which in-house counsel attends closings as attorney for the lending institution and prepares the documents necessary to effectuate the closing is fraught with both legal and ethical risks beyond assistance in the unauthorized practice of law and conflict of interests. Even though the above analysis (1) requires that in-house counsel's lawyer-client relationship be restricted to the lending institution, and (2) prohibits the direct billing for legal services by the institution, the fact remains that the customer may benefit from the actions of in-house counsel. Thus the risk of confusion about the role of in-house counsel at the closing will be high. Prudent in-house counsel should anticipate that courts may treat the reasonable customer expectations regarding these legal services as creating duties even in the absence of a lawyer-client relationship. The Restatement (Second) of Torts reports that an attorney who represents only the lender may still be held liable in negligence to a borrower. See, e.g., Seigle v. Jasper, 867 S.W. 2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). A similar result may obtain under traditional contract or agency principles regarding third party beneficiaries. This position is supported by the Restatement of the Law of Lawyering. While declaring the current state of Georgia law on this issue would be inappropriate and beyond the scope of this Formal Advisory Opinion, it is clear that prudent in-house counsel will not ignore these risks both in advising the lending institution and in his or her conduct toward the customer as a matter of good lawyering.","UrlName":"rule519","Order":58,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"7bc27240-327a-4d4c-9816-05a91687ed94","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-1","Content":"If you have any questions regarding the replaced opinion or would like to obtain a copy of the replaced opinion, please contact the State Bar of Georgia at (404) 527-8771.","UrlName":"rule464","Order":59,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"a1dae58c-d3c7-4e94-aa69-a190cd06e723","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 00-2 \n For references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1(a) and (c)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a> and Comments [1] and [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> .\n For references to EC 3-2, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule62\">Rule 2.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-6, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nIs a lawyer aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n Yes, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. Generally, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer effectively substitutes the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, a lawyer should never place a nonlawyer in situations in which he or she is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nothing in this limitation precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\nIn order to enforce this limitation in the public interest, it is necessary to find a violation of the provisions prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own in the representation of the lawyer's client.\nAs applied to the specific questions presented, a lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to give legal advice to the lawyer's client based on the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer rather than the lawyer, would be in clear violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because doing so creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\n OPINION:\n This request for a Formal Advisory Opinion was submitted by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board along with examples of numerous grievances regarding this issue recently considered by the Panel. Essentially, the request prompts the Formal Advisory Opinion Board to return to previously issued advisory opinions on the subject of the use of nonlawyers to see if the guidance of those previous opinions remains valid for current practice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a>\nThe primary disciplinary standard involved in answering the question presented is: Standard 24, (\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\") As will become clear in this Opinion, however, Standard 4 (\"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation.\") and Standard 5 (\"A lawyer shall not make any false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.\") are also involved.\nIn interpreting these disciplinary standards as applied to the question presented, we are guided by Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law,\"and, more specifically, the following Ethical Considerations: Ethical Consideration 3-2, Ethical Consideration 3-5, and Ethical Consideration 3-6.\n In Advisory Opinion No. 19, an Opinion issued before the creation of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and the issuance of advisory opinions by the Supreme Court, the State Disciplinary Board addressed the propriety of Georgia lawyers permitting nonlawyer employees to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm's letterhead under the nonlawyer's signature. The Board said that in determining the propriety of this conduct it must first define the practice of law in Georgia. In doing so, it relied upon the very broad language of a then recent Georgia Supreme Court opinion, Huber v. State , 234 Ga. 458 (1975), which included within the definition of the practice \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law,\"to conclude that the conduct in question, regardless of whether a law suit was pending, constituted the practice of law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\"> 4 </a> Any lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to engage in this conduct would be assisting in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, the Board said. The Board specifically limited this prohibition, however, to letters addressed to adverse or potentially adverse parties that, in essence, threatened or implied a threat of litigation. Furthermore, the Board noted that there was a broad range of activities, including investigating, taking statements from clients and other witnesses, conducting legal research, preparing legal documents (under \"direct supervision of the member \"), and performing administrative, secretarial, or clerical duties that were appropriate for nonlawyers. In the course of performing these activities, nonlawyers could correspond on the firm's letterhead under their own signature. This was permitted as long as the nonlawyer clearly identified his or her status as a nonlawyer in a manner that would avoid misleading the recipient into thinking that the nonlawyer was authorized to practice law.\nWhatever the merits of the answer to the particular question presented, this Opinion's general approach to the issue, i.e., does the conduct of the nonlawyer, considered outside of the context of supervision by a licensed lawyer, appear to fit the broad legal definition of the practice of law, would have severely limited the role of lawyer-supervised nonlawyers to what might be described as in-house and investigatory functions. This Opinion was followed two years later, however, by Advisory Opinion No. 21, an Opinion in which the State Disciplinary Board adopted a different approach.\nThe specific question presented in Advisory Opinion No. 21 was: \"What are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legal assistants or paraprofessionals and permit them to deal with other lawyers, clients, and the public?\"After noting the very broad legal definition of the practice of law in Georgia, the Board said that the issue was instead one of \"strict adherence to a program of supervision and direction of a nonlawyer.\"\nThis insight, an insight we reaffirm in this Opinion, was that the legal issue of what constitutes the practice of law should be separated from the issue of when does the practice of law by an attorney become the practice of law by a nonlawyer because of a lack of involvement by the lawyer in the representation. Under this analysis, it is clear that while most activities conducted by nonlawyers for lawyers are within the legal definition of the practice of law, in that these activities are \"action[s] taken for others in . . . matter[s] connected with the law,\"lawyers are assisting in the unauthorized practice of law only when they inappropriately delegate tasks to a nonlawyer or inadequately supervise appropriately delegated tasks.\nImplicitly suggesting that whether or not a particular task should be delegated to a nonlawyer was too contextual a matter both for effective discipline and for guidance, the Disciplinary Board provided a list of specific tasks that could be safely delegated to nonlawyers \"provided that proper and effective supervision and control by the attorney exists.\"The Board also provided a list of tasks that should not be delegated, apparently without regard to the potential for supervision and control that existed.\nWere we to determine that the lists of delegable and non-delegable tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 fully governed the question presented here, it would be clear that a lawyer would be aiding the unauthorized practice if the lawyer permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to clients providing legal advice (because it would be \"contact with clients . . . requiring the rendering of legal advice) or permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons threatening legal action (because it would be \"contacting an opposite party or his counsel in a situation in which legal rights of the firm's clients will be asserted or negotiated \"). It is our opinion, however, that applying the lists of tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 in a categorical manner runs risks of both over regulation and under regulation of the use of nonlawyers and, thereby, risks both the loss of the efficiency nonlawyers can provide and the loss of adequate protection of the public from unauthorized practice. Rather than being applied categorically, these lists should instead be considered good general guidance for the more particular determination of whether the representation of the client has been turned over, effectively, to the nonlawyer by the lawyer permitting a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own. If such substitution has occurred then the lawyer is aiding the nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whether or not the conduct is proscribed by any list.\nThe question of whether the lawyer has permitted a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own is adequate, we believe, for guidance to attorneys in determining what can and cannot be delegated to nonlawyers. Our task, here, however, is broader than just giving guidance. We must also be concerned in issuing this opinion with the protection of the public interest in avoiding unauthorized practice, and we must be aware of the use of this opinions by various bar organizations, such as the State Disciplinary Board, for determining when there has been a violation of a Standard of Conduct.\nFor the purposes of enforcement, as opposed to guidance, it is not adequate to say that substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own constitutes a violation of the applicable Standards. The information for determining what supervision was given to the nonlawyer, that is, what was and was not a substitution of legal knowledge and judgment, will always be within the control of the attorney alleged to have violated the applicable Standards. To render this guidance enforceable, therefore, it is necessary to find a violation of the Standards prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own.\n Thus, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer creates a reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, lawyers should never place nonlawyers in situations in which the nonlawyer is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nor should a nonlawyer be placed in situations in which decisions must be made for the lawyer's client or advice given to the lawyer's client based on the nonlawyer's legal knowledge, rather than that of the lawyer. Finally, nonlawyers should not be placed in situations in which the nonlawyer, rather than the lawyer, is called upon to argue the client's position. Nothing in these limitations precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\"> 5 </a>\nIn addition to assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by creating the reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer was substituting a nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for his or her own, a lawyer permitting this would also be misrepresenting the nature of the services provided and the nature of the representation in violation of Standards of Conduct 4 and 5. In those circumstances where nonlawyer representation is specifically authorized by regulation, statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, it must be made clear to the client that they will be receiving nonlawyer representation and not representation by a lawyer.\nApplying this analysis to the question presented, if by \"prepare and sign \"it is meant that the legal advice to be given to the client is advice based upon the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer, it is clear that the representation would effectively be representation by a nonlawyer rather than by the retained lawyer. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to do this would be in violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would also be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because by doing so he or she creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\nFor public policy reasons it is important that the legal profession restrict its use of nonlawyers to those uses that would improve the quality, including the efficiency and cost-efficiency, of legal representation rather than using nonlawyers as substitutes for legal representation. Lawyers, as professionals, are ultimately responsible for maintaining the quality of the legal conversation in both the prevention and the resolution of disputes. This professional responsibility cannot be delegated to others without jeopardizing the good work that lawyers have done throughout history in meeting this responsibility.\n Footnotes \n<a name=\"1\">1.</a> The term \"nonlawyer \"includes paralegals. \n<a name=\"2\">2.</a> See footnote 5 infra. \n<a name=\"3\">3.</a> In addition to those opinions discussed in this opinion, there are two other Advisory Opinions concerning the prohibition on assisting the unauthorized practice of law. In Advisory Opinion No. 23, the State Disciplinary Board was asked if an out-of-state law firm could open and maintain an office in the State of Georgia under the direction of a full-time associate of that firm who was a member of the State Bar of Georgia. In determining that it could, the Board warned about the possibility that the local attorney would be assisting the nonlicensed lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. In Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5, an Opinion issued by the Supreme Court, the Board was asked if it would be improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. The Board determined that it would be if the responsibility for \"closing \"was delegated to the nonlawyer without participation by the attorney. We view the holding of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 as consistent with the Opinion issued here. \n<a name=\"4\">4.</a> The language relied upon from Huber v. State was later codified in O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. \n<a name=\"5\">5.</a> For example, it is perfectly permissible for a nonlawyer, employed as a paralegal by a law firm or by a non-profit corporation, such as the Georgia Legal Service Program, doing business as a law firm, to represent his or her own clients whenever paralegal representation is permitted by law, as it would be if the representation were on a food stamp problem at an administrative hearing, or before the Social Security Administration, or in other circumstances where a statute or the authorized rules of the adjudicatory body specifically allow for and regulate representation or counsel by persons other than a lawyer. It must be made clear to the clients, of course, that what they will be receiving is paralegal representation and not representation by a lawyer. Nothing in this opinion is intended to conflict with regulation, by statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, of use of nonlawyers in such authorized roles.","UrlName":"rule466","Order":60,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[{"Id":"eaaaecc8-1e76-4e5a-9526-a3cbadc0ad19","ParentId":"a1dae58c-d3c7-4e94-aa69-a190cd06e723","Title":"Version 2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 00-2 \n For references to Standard of Conduct 4, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule160\">Rule 8.4(a)(4)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule145\">Rules 7.1(a) and (c)</a> .\n For references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a> and Comments [1] and [2] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5</a> .\n For references to EC 3-2, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule79\">Rule 1.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-5, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule62\">Rule 2.1</a> .\n For references to EC 3-6, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> and Comment [1] of <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule115\">Rule 5.3</a> .\n For an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> .\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nIs a lawyer aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n Yes, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#1\"> 1 </a> in the unauthorized practice of law when the lawyer allows a nonlawyer member of his or her staff to prepare and sign correspondence which threatens legal action or provides legal advice or both. Generally, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer effectively substitutes the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, a lawyer should never place a nonlawyer in situations in which he or she is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nothing in this limitation precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#2\"> 2 </a>\nIn order to enforce this limitation in the public interest, it is necessary to find a violation of the provisions prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own in the representation of the lawyer's client.\nAs applied to the specific questions presented, a lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to give legal advice to the lawyer's client based on the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer rather than the lawyer, would be in clear violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because doing so creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\n OPINION:\n This request for a Formal Advisory Opinion was submitted by the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board along with examples of numerous grievances regarding this issue recently considered by the Panel. Essentially, the request prompts the Formal Advisory Opinion Board to return to previously issued advisory opinions on the subject of the use of nonlawyers to see if the guidance of those previous opinions remains valid for current practice. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#3\"> 3 </a>\nThe primary disciplinary standard involved in answering the question presented is: Standard 24, (\"A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.\") As will become clear in this Opinion, however, Standard 4 (\"A lawyer shall not engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or willful misrepresentation.\") and Standard 5 (\"A lawyer shall not make any false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.\") are also involved.\nIn interpreting these disciplinary standards as applied to the question presented, we are guided by Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, \"A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law,\"and, more specifically, the following Ethical Considerations: Ethical Consideration 3-2, Ethical Consideration 3-5, and Ethical Consideration 3-6.\n In Advisory Opinion No. 19, an Opinion issued before the creation of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and the issuance of advisory opinions by the Supreme Court, the State Disciplinary Board addressed the propriety of Georgia lawyers permitting nonlawyer employees to correspond concerning \"legal matters \"on the law firm's letterhead under the nonlawyer's signature. The Board said that in determining the propriety of this conduct it must first define the practice of law in Georgia. In doing so, it relied upon the very broad language of a then recent Georgia Supreme Court opinion, Huber v. State , 234 Ga. 458 (1975), which included within the definition of the practice \"any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law,\"to conclude that the conduct in question, regardless of whether a law suit was pending, constituted the practice of law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#4\"> 4 </a> Any lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to engage in this conduct would be assisting in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Standard 24, the Board said. The Board specifically limited this prohibition, however, to letters addressed to adverse or potentially adverse parties that, in essence, threatened or implied a threat of litigation. Furthermore, the Board noted that there was a broad range of activities, including investigating, taking statements from clients and other witnesses, conducting legal research, preparing legal documents (under \"direct supervision of the member \"), and performing administrative, secretarial, or clerical duties that were appropriate for nonlawyers. In the course of performing these activities, nonlawyers could correspond on the firm's letterhead under their own signature. This was permitted as long as the nonlawyer clearly identified his or her status as a nonlawyer in a manner that would avoid misleading the recipient into thinking that the nonlawyer was authorized to practice law.\nWhatever the merits of the answer to the particular question presented, this Opinion's general approach to the issue, i.e., does the conduct of the nonlawyer, considered outside of the context of supervision by a licensed lawyer, appear to fit the broad legal definition of the practice of law, would have severely limited the role of lawyer-supervised nonlawyers to what might be described as in-house and investigatory functions. This Opinion was followed two years later, however, by Advisory Opinion No. 21, an Opinion in which the State Disciplinary Board adopted a different approach.\nThe specific question presented in Advisory Opinion No. 21 was: \"What are the ethical responsibilities of attorneys who employ legal assistants or paraprofessionals and permit them to deal with other lawyers, clients, and the public?\"After noting the very broad legal definition of the practice of law in Georgia, the Board said that the issue was instead one of \"strict adherence to a program of supervision and direction of a nonlawyer.\"\nThis insight, an insight we reaffirm in this Opinion, was that the legal issue of what constitutes the practice of law should be separated from the issue of when does the practice of law by an attorney become the practice of law by a nonlawyer because of a lack of involvement by the lawyer in the representation. Under this analysis, it is clear that while most activities conducted by nonlawyers for lawyers are within the legal definition of the practice of law, in that these activities are \"action[s] taken for others in . . . matter[s] connected with the law,\"lawyers are assisting in the unauthorized practice of law only when they inappropriately delegate tasks to a nonlawyer or inadequately supervise appropriately delegated tasks.\nImplicitly suggesting that whether or not a particular task should be delegated to a nonlawyer was too contextual a matter both for effective discipline and for guidance, the Disciplinary Board provided a list of specific tasks that could be safely delegated to nonlawyers \"provided that proper and effective supervision and control by the attorney exists.\"The Board also provided a list of tasks that should not be delegated, apparently without regard to the potential for supervision and control that existed.\nWere we to determine that the lists of delegable and non-delegable tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 fully governed the question presented here, it would be clear that a lawyer would be aiding the unauthorized practice if the lawyer permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to clients providing legal advice (because it would be \"contact with clients . . . requiring the rendering of legal advice) or permitted the nonlawyer to prepare and sign correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons threatening legal action (because it would be \"contacting an opposite party or his counsel in a situation in which legal rights of the firm's clients will be asserted or negotiated \"). It is our opinion, however, that applying the lists of tasks in Advisory Opinion No. 21 in a categorical manner runs risks of both over regulation and under regulation of the use of nonlawyers and, thereby, risks both the loss of the efficiency nonlawyers can provide and the loss of adequate protection of the public from unauthorized practice. Rather than being applied categorically, these lists should instead be considered good general guidance for the more particular determination of whether the representation of the client has been turned over, effectively, to the nonlawyer by the lawyer permitting a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own. If such substitution has occurred then the lawyer is aiding the nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whether or not the conduct is proscribed by any list.\nThe question of whether the lawyer has permitted a substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own is adequate, we believe, for guidance to attorneys in determining what can and cannot be delegated to nonlawyers. Our task, here, however, is broader than just giving guidance. We must also be concerned in issuing this opinion with the protection of the public interest in avoiding unauthorized practice, and we must be aware of the use of this opinions by various bar organizations, such as the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board, for determining when there has been a violation of a Standard of Conduct.\nFor the purposes of enforcement, as opposed to guidance, it is not adequate to say that substitution of the nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for that of his or her own constitutes a violation of the applicable Standards. The information for determining what supervision was given to the nonlawyer, that is, what was and was not a substitution of legal knowledge and judgment, will always be within the control of the attorney alleged to have violated the applicable Standards. To render this guidance enforceable, therefore, it is necessary to find a violation of the Standards prohibiting aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever a lawyer creates the reasonable appearance to others that he or she has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own.\n Thus, a lawyer is aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law whenever the lawyer creates a reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer has effectively substituted the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer for his or her own. Regardless of the task in question, lawyers should never place nonlawyers in situations in which the nonlawyer is called upon to exercise what would amount to independent professional judgment for the lawyer's client. Nor should a nonlawyer be placed in situations in which decisions must be made for the lawyer's client or advice given to the lawyer's client based on the nonlawyer's legal knowledge, rather than that of the lawyer. Finally, nonlawyers should not be placed in situations in which the nonlawyer, rather than the lawyer, is called upon to argue the client's position. Nothing in these limitations precludes paralegal representation of clients with legal problems whenever such is expressly authorized by law. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#5\"> 5 </a>\nIn addition to assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by creating the reasonable appearance to others that the lawyer was substituting a nonlawyer's legal knowledge and judgment for his or her own, a lawyer permitting this would also be misrepresenting the nature of the services provided and the nature of the representation in violation of Standards of Conduct 4 and 5. In those circumstances where nonlawyer representation is specifically authorized by regulation, statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, it must be made clear to the client that they will be receiving nonlawyer representation and not representation by a lawyer.\nApplying this analysis to the question presented, if by \"prepare and sign \"it is meant that the legal advice to be given to the client is advice based upon the legal knowledge and judgment of the nonlawyer, it is clear that the representation would effectively be representation by a nonlawyer rather than by the retained lawyer. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to do this would be in violation of Standards of Conduct 24, 4, and 5. A lawyer permitting a nonlawyer to prepare and sign threatening correspondence to opposing counsel or unrepresented persons would also be in violation of these Standards of Conduct because by doing so he or she creates the reasonable appearance to others that the nonlawyer is exercising his or her legal knowledge and professional judgment in the matter.\nFor public policy reasons it is important that the legal profession restrict its use of nonlawyers to those uses that would improve the quality, including the efficiency and cost-efficiency, of legal representation rather than using nonlawyers as substitutes for legal representation. Lawyers, as professionals, are ultimately responsible for maintaining the quality of the legal conversation in both the prevention and the resolution of disputes. This professional responsibility cannot be delegated to others without jeopardizing the good work that lawyers have done throughout history in meeting this responsibility.\n Footnotes \n<a name=\"1\">1.</a> The term \"nonlawyer \"includes paralegals. \n<a name=\"2\">2.</a> See footnote 5 infra. \n<a name=\"3\">3.</a> In addition to those opinions discussed in this opinion, there are two other Advisory Opinions concerning the prohibition on assisting the unauthorized practice of law. In Advisory Opinion No. 23, the State Disciplinary Board was asked if an out-of-state law firm could open and maintain an office in the State of Georgia under the direction of a full-time associate of that firm who was a member of the State Bar of Georgia. In determining that it could, the Board warned about the possibility that the local attorney would be assisting the nonlicensed lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law in Georgia. In Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5, an Opinion issued by the Supreme Court, the Board was asked if it would be improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. The Board determined that it would be if the responsibility for \"closing \"was delegated to the nonlawyer without participation by the attorney. We view the holding of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 as consistent with the Opinion issued here. \n<a name=\"4\">4.</a> The language relied upon from Huber v. State was later codified in O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. \n<a name=\"5\">5.</a> For example, it is perfectly permissible for a nonlawyer, employed as a paralegal by a law firm or by a non-profit corporation, such as the Georgia Legal Service Program, doing business as a law firm, to represent his or her own clients whenever paralegal representation is permitted by law, as it would be if the representation were on a food stamp problem at an administrative hearing, or before the Social Security Administration, or in other circumstances where a statute or the authorized rules of the adjudicatory body specifically allow for and regulate representation or counsel by persons other than a lawyer. It must be made clear to the clients, of course, that what they will be receiving is paralegal representation and not representation by a lawyer. Nothing in this opinion is intended to conflict with regulation, by statute or rule of an adjudicatory body, of use of nonlawyers in such authorized roles.","UrlName":"revision304"}],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c57a6dbd-832f-47f2-bf00-9921847be770","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-3","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA \nON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 00-3 \n \nFor references to Standard of Conduct 24, please see <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule129\">Rule 5.5(a)</a> . \n \nFor an explanation regarding the addition of headnotes to the opinion, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/headnote-explanation.cfm/">click here</a> . \n \nQUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nEthical propriety of lawyers telephonically participating in real estate closings from remote sites. \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 explains that a lawyer cannot delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to \"close \"the real estate transaction without the participation of an attorney. Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 also provides that \"Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.\"The lawyer's physical presence at a closing will assure that there is supervision of the work of the paralegal which is direct and constant. \n \nOPINION: \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 (86-R9) issued by the Supreme Court states that the closing of real estate transactions constitutes the practice of law as defined by O.C.G.A. §15-19-50. Therefore, it is ethically improper for lawyers to permit nonlawyers to close real estate transactions. Correspondent inquires whether it is ethically permissible to allow a paralegal to be physically present at a remote site for the purpose of witnessing signatures and assuring that documents are signed properly. The paralegal announces to the borrower that they are there to assist the attorney in the closing process. The lawyer is contacted by telephone by the paralegal during the closing to discuss the legal aspects of the closing. \n \nThe critical issue in this inquiry is what constitutes the participation of the attorney in the closing transaction. The lawyer must be in control of the closing process from beginning to end. The supervision of the paralegal must be direct and constant. \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 states that \"If the 'closing' is defined as the entire series of events through which title to the land is conveyed from one party to another party, it would be ethically improper for a nonlawyer to 'close' a real estate transaction.\"Under the circumstances described by the correspondent, the participation of the lawyer is less than meaningful. The lawyer is not in control of the actual closing processing from beginning to end. The lawyer is brought into the closing process after it has already begun. Even though the paralegal may state that they are not a lawyer and is not there for the purpose of giving legal advice, circumstances may arise where one involved in this process as a purchaser, seller or lender would look to the paralegal for advice and/or explanations normally provided by a lawyer. This is not permissible. \n \nFormal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5 provides that \"Supervision of the work of the paralegal by the attorney must be direct and constant to avoid any charges of aiding the unauthorized practice of law.\"By allowing a paralegal to appear at closings at remote sites at which lawyers are present only by telephone conference will obviously increase the likelihood that the paralegal may be placed in circumstances where the paralegal is actually providing legal advice or explanations, or exercising independent judgement as to whether legal advice or explanation is required. \n \nStandard 24 is not met by the lawyer being called on the telephone during the course of the closing process for the purpose of responding to questions or reviewing documents. The lawyer's physical presence at a closing will assure that there is supervision of the work of the paralegal which is direct and constant.","UrlName":"rule447","Order":61,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ac45d0cc-215b-4970-b298-1548b9c16986","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 01-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA ON MAY 3, 2001 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 01-1 \n \n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(b)</a> is recited in this opinion; however, on November 3, 2011, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule55\">Rule 1.5(b)</a> was amended by the Supreme Court of Georgia and now reads as follows:\n“The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.”\nThe amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion.\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \n    Is it ethically permissible for an attorney, with or without notice to a client, to charge for a standard time unit without regard to how much time is actually expended? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \n    A lawyer may charge for standard time units so long as this does not result in a fee that is unreasonable, and so long as the lawyer communicates to the client the method of billing the lawyer is using so that the client can understand the basis for the fee. \n \n OPINION: \n \n    Given the proper resources, equipment and effort, time can be measured with infinitesimal precision. As a practical matter, however, clients routinely require only sufficient precision in attorney billings to determine reasonableness and fairness, and this would not normally necessitate a level of precision in recording the time expended by an attorney that would require hair-splitting accuracy. It is the practice of many attorneys to bill on a time-expended basis, and to bill for time expended by rounding to standard units of from 6 to 15 minutes. This gives rise to the possibility that a lawyer could spend one minute on a client matter, and bill the client for 15 minutes. While \"rounding up \"is permissible, see, e.g., ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 (December 6, 1993), repeatedly rounding up from one minute to fifteen minutes is questionable at best and would raise substantial issues as to whether the fee was reasonable under Rule 1.5(a), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See also Rule 1.5(a) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer could avoid a challenge to rounded up fees as excessive by using a smaller minimum unit (a six minute unit is preferable), and only rounding up if more than half that time was actually expended. See Ross, The Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time-Based Billing by Attorneys (Carolina Academic Press: 1996), p. 169. \n \n    It must be noted that even this practice, billing in six minute units but only billing a unit if more than three minutes was expended, results in the attorney billing for time not actually expended on the client matter. Rule 1.5(b), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, provides:\nWhen the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.\n In order to comply with Rule 1.5(b), the lawyer must take care to clarify to the client the basis for the billing. To simply inform a client that the lawyer would bill on a time expended basis, without explaining any standard unit billing practice, would not be a clear communication of the basis for the fee. \n \n    In addition, we note that Rule 7.1(a)(1), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, governs \"Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services \", and provides: \n \n    [A] communication is false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading it if:\n(1) ...omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.\n Comment 1 to Rule 7.1 provides that Rule 7.1 to applies to \"all communications about a lawyer's services....\" \n \n    To simply inform a client that the lawyer would bill on a time expended basis, without explaining any standard unit billing practice, would omit a fact necessary to make the statement as a whole not materially misleading, and would violate Rule 7.1 (a). \n \n    To insure a clear understanding between the attorney and the client, the attorney should provide the client with an explanation in writing of the basis for the fee. Rule 1.5(b), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See also Rule 1.5(b) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In order to comply with Rule 1.5(b), the attorney must communicate the basis for the fee to the client, and in order to comply with Rule 7.1(a), the communication must include an explanation of any standard unit billing practice.","UrlName":"rule467","Order":62,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"2e2e3b18-70d9-4bec-8e51-fbb7027d87a4","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 03-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \n PURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2003 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 03-1 \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \nMay a Georgia attorney contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer?\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \nA Georgia attorney may contract with a client for a non-refundable special retainer so long as:  1) the contract is not a contract to violate the attorney's obligation under Rule 1.16(d) to refund \"any advance payment of fee that has not been earned \"upon termination of the representation by the attorney or by the client; and 2) the contracted for fee, as well as any resulting fee upon termination, does not violate Rule 1.5(a)'s requirement of reasonableness.\n OPINION: \nThis issue is governed primarily by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(d) which provides:  \"Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests such as . . . refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.\"\n A special retainer is a contract for representation obligating a client to pay fees in advance for specified services to be provided by an attorney.  This definition applies regardless of the manner of determining the amount of the fee or the terminology used to designate the fee, e.g., hourly fee, percentage fee, flat fee, fixed fees, or minimum fees.  Generally, fees paid in advance under a special retainer are earned as the specified services are provided.  Some services, for example, the services of the attorney's commitment to the client's case and acceptance of potential disqualification from other representations, are provided as soon as the contract is signed <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> .  The portion of the fee reasonably allocated to these services is, therefore, earned immediately.  These fees, and any other fees that have been earned by providing specified services to the client, need not be refunded to the client.  In this sense, a special retainer can be made non-refundable.\nIn Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2 (FAO 91-2), we said:\n\"Terminology as to the various types of fee arrangements does not alter the fact that the lawyer is a fiduciary.  Therefore, the lawyer's duties as to fees should be uniform and governed by the same rules regardless of the particular fee arrangement.  Those duties are . . . :  1) To have a clear understanding with the client as to the details of the fee arrangement prior to undertaking the representation, preferably in writing.  2) To return to the client any unearned portion of a fee.  3) To accept the client's dismissal of him or her (with or without cause) without imposing any penalty on the client for the dismissal.  4) To comply with the provisions of Standard 31 as to reasonableness of the fee.\"\nThe same Formal Advisory Opinion citing In the Matter of Collins, 246 Ga. 325 (1980), states:\n \"The law is well settled that a client can dismiss a lawyer for any reason or for no reason, and the lawyer has a duty to return any unearned portion of the fee.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a>\nContracts to violate the ethical requirements upon which FAO 91-2 was based are not permitted, because those requirements are now expressed in Rule 1.16(d) and Rule 1.5(a).  Moreover, attorneys should take care to avoid misrepresentation concerning their obligation to return unearned fees upon termination.\nThe ethical obligation to refund unearned fees, however, does not prohibit an attorney from designating by contract points in a representation at which specific advance fees payments under a special retainer will have been earned, so long as this is done in good faith and not as an attempt to penalize a client for termination of the representation by refusing to refund unearned fees or otherwise avoid the requirements of Rule 1.16(d), and the resulting fee is reasonable.  Nor does this obligation call in to question the use of flat fees, minimum fees, or any other form of advance fee payment so long as such fees when unearned are refunded to the client upon termination of the representation by the client or by the attorney.  It also does not require that fees be determined on an hourly basis.  Nor need an attorney place any fees into a trust account absent special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of the client.  See Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2.  Additionally, this obligation does not restrict the non-refundability of fees for any reason other than whether they have been earned upon termination.  Finally, there is nothing in this obligation that prohibits an attorney from contracting for large fees for excellent work done quickly.  When the contracted for work is done, however quickly it may have been done, the fees have been earned and there is no issue as to their non-refundability.  Of course, such fees, like all fee agreements, are subject to Rule 1.5, which provides that the reasonableness of a fee shall be determined by the following factors:\n(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;\n(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;\n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;\n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;\n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;\n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.\n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and\n(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.\n The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2003 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on August 7, 2003.  The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August 21, 2003.  No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion.  In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. \n <a name=\"ftn1\"> [1] </a> The \"likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer \"is a factor the attorney must consider in determining the reasonableness of a fee under Rule 1.5.  This preclusion, therefore, should be considered part of the service the attorney is providing to the client by agreeing to enter into the representation.\n <a name=\"ftn2\"> [2] </a> Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion 91-2.         \n","UrlName":"rule532","Order":63,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"584715c9-9860-4b38-a411-02ff8b2244d6","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 03-3","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON JANUARY 6, 2004 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 03-3 \n \n <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. The amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion.\n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \n    Is it ethically permissible for an attorney to enter into a \"solicitation agreement \"with a financial investment adviser under which the attorney, in return for referring a client to the adviser, receives fees based on a percentage of gross fees paid by the client to the adviser? \n \nSUMMARY ANSWER: \n \n    While it may be possible to structure a solicitation agreement to comply with ethical requirements, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to attempt to do so.  In addition to numerous other ethical concerns, Rule 1.7 Conflicts of Interest: General Rule, would require at a minimum that a \"solicitation agreement \"providing referral fees to the attorney be disclosed to the client in writing in a manner sufficient to permit the client to give informed consent to the personal interest conflict created by the agreement after having the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.  Comment 6 to Rule 1.7 provides: \"A lawyer may not allow related business interest to affect representation by, for example, referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed business interest.\"Additionally, the terms of the \"solicitation agreement \"must be such that the lawyer will exercise his or her independent professional judgment in deciding whether or not to refer a particular client to the financial investment adviser.  Prudentially, this would require the lawyer to document each referral in such a way as to be able to demonstrate that the referral choice was not dictated by the lawyer's financial interests but by the merits of the institution to whom the client was referred.  The agreement must not obligate the attorney to reveal confidential information to the adviser absent the consent of the client; the fees paid to the attorney under the agreement must not be structured in such a way as to create a financial interest adverse to the client or otherwise adversely affect the client, and the agreement must itself be in compliance with other laws the violation of which would be a violation of Rule 8.4 Misconduct, especially those laws concerning the regulation of securities enforceable by criminal sanctions.  This is not an exhaustive list of ethical requirements in that the terms of particular agreements may generate other ethical concerns. \n \nOPINION: \n \n    \"Anytime a lawyer's financial or property interests could be affected by advice the lawyer gives a client, the lawyer had better watch out.\"ABA/BNA Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct 51:405.  In the circumstances described in the Question Presented, a lawyer, obligated to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client in deciding if a referral is appropriate and deciding to whom to make the referral, would be in a situation in which his or her financial interests would be affected by the advice given.  This conflict between the obligation of independent professional judgment and the lawyer's financial interest is governed by Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 which provides, in relevant part, that:\n (A) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests . . . will materially or adversely affect the representation of the client . . . . \n \n    The Committee is guided in its interpretation of this provision in these circumstances by Comment 6 to Rule 1.7: \n \nA lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.\n \n    Under Rule 1.7, client consent to such a personal interest conflict is permissible after: \"(1) consultation with the lawyer, (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the materials risks of the representation, and (3) having been given an opportunity to consult with independent counsel.\"Thus, at a minimum, a \"solicitation agreement \"providing referral fees to the attorney would have to be disclosed to the client in writing in a manner sufficient to permit the client to give informed consent to the personal interest conflict created by the agreement after having the opportunity to consult with independent counsel. \n \n     In addition to this minimum requirement, there are numerous other ethical obligations that would dictate the permitted terms of such an agreement.  The following obligations are offered as a non-exhaustive list of examples for the terms of particular agreements may generate other ethical concerns. \n \n    1)  The agreement must not bind the attorney to make referrals or to make referrals only to the adviser for such an obligation would be inconsistent with the attorney's obligation to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client in determining whether a referral is appropriate and to whom the client should be referred.  Both determinations must always be  made only in consideration of the client's best interests.  Prudentially, this would require the lawyer to document each referral in such a way as to be able to demonstrate that the referral choice was not dictated by the lawyer's financial interests but by the merits of the institution to whom the client was referred.  In order to be able to do this well the lawyer would need to stay abreast of the quality and cost of services provided by other similar financial institutions. \n \n    2)  The agreement cannot restrict the information the attorney can provide the client concerning a referral by requiring, for example, the attorney to use only materials prepared or approved by the adviser.  Such a restriction is not only inconsistent with the attorney's obligations to exercise independent professional judgment but also with the attorney's obligations under Rule 1.4 Communications concerning the attorney's obligation to provide information to clients sufficient for informed decision making. \n \n    3)  The agreement cannot obligate the attorney to provide confidential information, as defined in Rule 1.6 Confidentiality, to the adviser absent client consent. \n \n    4)  The fees paid to the attorney for the referral cannot be structured in such a way as to create a financial interest or other interest adverse to the client.  Rule 1.8 Conflicts of Interest: Prohibited Transactions provides \". . . nor shall the lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client . . .\" \n \n    5)  Finally, any such agreement would have to be in compliance with other laws the violations of which could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4 Misconduct.  For example, the agreement may not violate any of the legal or administrative regulations governing trading in securities enforceable by criminal sanctions. \n \n    Thus, while it may be possible to structure a solicitation agreement to comply with ethical requirements, it would be both ethically and legally perilous to attempt to do so. \n \n \n    The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2003 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on August 7, 2003. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August 21, 2003. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. ","UrlName":"rule534","Order":64,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"45c117b6-5506-46bb-964e-9d539032442c","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1","Content":"FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 04-1 Approved And Issued On February 13, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia With Comments <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-041.pdf?sfvrsn=c065786b_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S05U1720</a> COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIAWe grant a petition for discretionary review brought by the State Bar of Georgia to consider the proposed opinion of the Formal Advisory Board1 (hereinafter \"Board \") that, if an attorney supervises the closing of a real estate transaction conducted by a non-lawyer entity, the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and the closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with the trust account and IOLTA provisions of Rule 1.15(II) of Bar Rule 4-102(d) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.  Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1 (August 6, 2004).  See State Bar Rule 4-403(d) (authorizing this Court to grant a petition for discretionary review).2 For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Board that a lawyer directing the closing of a real estate transaction holds money which belongs to another (either a client or a third-party) as an incident to that practice, and must keep that money in an IOLTA account.  We further add that if the proceeds are not subject to the rules of IOLTA subsection (c)(2), then the funds must be deposited in an interest-bearing account for the client's benefit.  Rule 1.15(II)(c)(1).  Under no circumstances may the closing proceeds be commingled with funds belonging to the lawyer, the law office, or any entity other than as explicitly provided in the Rule.The matter came before the Board pursuant to a request for an advisory opinion on the following question:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">May a lawyer participate in a non-lawyer entity created by the lawyer for the purpose of conducting residential real estate closings where the closing proceeds received by the entity are deposited in a non-IOLTA interest bearing bank trust account rather than an IOLTA account?</div>The opinion first appeared in the June 2004 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal.  In response, the Board received comments both in support of and in opposition to the opinion.  The modified opinion appeared in the October 2004 Georgia Bar Journal, and the State Bar thereafter sought discretionary review.The closing of a real estate transaction in this State constitutes the practice of law, and, if performed by someone other than a duly-licensed Georgia attorney, results in the prohibited unlicensed practice of law.  In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2, 277 Ga. 472 (588 SE2d 741) (2003).  The attorney participating in the closing is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds, which must be handled in accordance with the trust account and IOLTA provisions in Rule 1.15(II).3 Specifically, when a lawyer holds client funds in trust, the lawyer must make an initial determination whether the funds are eligible for the IOLTA program.  Closing proceeds from a real estate transaction which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time (i.e., funds that cannot otherwise generate net earnings for the client) must be deposited into an Interest on Lawyer's Trust Account (IOLTA Account).  Funds that are not nominal in amount or funds, no matter what amount, that are not to be held for a short period of time, are ineligible for placement in an IOLTA account and must be placed in an interest-bearing account, with the net interest generated paid to the client.  Rule 1.15(II)(c).  See also Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (155 LE2d 376, 123 SC 1406) (2003).  Under either circumstance, Rule 1.15(II) instructs that a lawyer involved in a closing has a strict fiduciary duty to deposit a client's real estate closing proceeds in a separate IOLTA or non-IOLTA interest bearing trust account.The Board's recognition that, under all circumstances, the interest generated on the client's closing funds is governed by Rule 1.15(II), ensures full compliance where real estate closings are involved.  Accordingly, we adopt Formal Advisory Opinion 04-1 to the extent it is in accord with the rule that attorneys must place client closing proceeds that are nominal or held for a short period of time in an IOLTA account.  We clarify that closing proceeds that are more than nominal in amount or that will be deposited for more than a short period of time must be placed in a non-IOLTA interest bearing account with interest payable to the client.  Rule 1.15(II)(c)(1).Formal Advisory Opinion approved, as modified.  All the Justices concur.<hr align=\"left\" width=\"33%\" size=\"1\">1. State Bar Rule 4-403(a) authorizes the Formal Advisory Opinion Board to draft proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning the proper interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.2. Formal Advisory Opinion Board opinions, which are approved or modified by this Court, are \"binding on all members of the State Bar.\"State Bar Rule 4-403(e).3. The sole issue addressed in the proposed opinion is whether an attorney may participate in a non-lawyer entity which the attorney created for the purpose of conducting residential real estate closings without depositing the closing proceeds in an IOLTA account.FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 04-1Question Presented: May a lawyer participate in a non-lawyer entity created by the lawyer for the purpose of conducting residential real estate closings where the closing proceeds received by the entity are deposited in a non-IOLTA interest bearing bank trust account rather than an IOLTA account?Summary Answer: The closing of a real estate transaction constitutes the practice of law.  If an attorney supervises the closing conducted by the non-lawyer entity, then the attorney is a fiduciary with respect to the closing proceeds and closing proceeds must be handled in accordance with Rule 1.15 (II).  If the attorney does not supervise the closings, then, under the facts set forth above, the lawyer is assisting a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.Opinion: The closing of a real estate transaction in the state of Georgia constitutes the practice of law.  See, In re UPL Advisory Opinion 2003-2 , 277 Ga. 472, 588 S.E. 2d 741 (Nov. 10, 2003), O.C.G.A. §15-19-50 and Formal Advisory Opinions Nos. 86-5 and 00-3.  Thus, to the extent that a non-lawyer entity is conducting residential real estate closings not under the supervision of a lawyer, the non-lawyer entity is engaged in the practice of law.  If an attorney supervises the residential closing <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\"> [1] </a> , then that attorney is a fiduciary with respects to the closing proceeds.  If the attorney participates in but does not supervise the closings, then the non-lawyer entity is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  In such event, the attorney assisting the non-lawyer entity would be doing so in violation of Rule 5.5 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\"> [2] </a>When a lawyer is supervising a real estate closing, the lawyer is professionally responsible for such closings.  Any closing funds received by the lawyer or by persons or entities supervised by the lawyer are held by the lawyer as a fiduciary.  The lawyer's responsibility with regard to such funds is addressed by Rule 1.15 (II) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct which states in relevant part:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY - GENERAL <div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(a) Every lawyer who practices law in Georgia, whether said lawyer practices as a sole practitioner, or as a member of a firm, association, or professional corporation, and who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity, shall maintain or have available a trust account as required by these Rules.  All funds held by a lawyer for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall be deposited in and administered from such account.* * * * *(c) All client's funds shall be placed in either an interest-bearing account with the interest being paid to the client or an interest-bearing (IOLTA) account with the interest being paid to the Georgia Bar Foundation as hereinafter provided.<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(1) With respect to funds which are not nominal in amount, or are not to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with notice to the clients, create and maintain an interest-bearing trust account in an approved institution as defined by Rule 1.15(III)(c)(1), with the interest to be paid to the client.  No earnings from such an account shall be made available to a lawyer or law firm.(2) With respect to funds which are nominal in amount or are to be held for a short period of time, a lawyer shall, with or without notice to the client, create and maintain an interest-bearing, government insured trust account (IOLTA) in compliance with the following provisions:* * * * *</div></div></div>As set out in Subsection (c)(2) above, this Rule applies to all client funds which are nominal or are to be held for a short period of time.  As closing proceeds are not nominal in amount, but are to be held for only a short period of time, they are subject to the IOLTA provisions.  Therefore, the funds received in connection with the real estate closing conducted by the lawyer or the non-lawyer entity in the circumstances described above must be deposited into an IOLTA compliant account.<hr align=\"left\" width=\"33%\" size=\"1\"><a name=\"_ftn1\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">1.</a> Adequate supervision would require the lawyer to be present at the closing.  See FAO . . . .etc.<a name=\"_ftn2\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">2.</a> Rule 5.5 states in relevant part that:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW  A lawyer shall not: * * * * * *(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.</div> ","UrlName":"rule448","Order":65,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"17c4efaa-3729-4d7d-8769-425ee4dc9b18","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-2","Content":"<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-2 Approved And Issued On April 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule525\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">FAO No. 90-1</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-052.pdf?sfvrsn=bbd66b45_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0791</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     \"Hold Harmless \"Agreements Between Employers and Their In-House Counsel.     Whether an attorney employed in-house by a corporation may enter into an agreement by which his or her employer shall hold the attorney harmless for malpractice committed in the course of his employment. SUMMARY ANSWER:     \"Hold harmless \"agreements between employers and attorneys employed in-house are ethical if the employer is exercising an informed business judgment in utilizing the \"hold harmless \"agreement in lieu of malpractice insurance on the advice of counsel and the agreement is permitted by law. OPINION:\n     Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h) offers the following direction:     \"A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement . . . .\"\nThis rule seeks to prevent attorneys from taking advantage of clients and avoiding the removal of negative consequences for malpractice. See, Opinion 193 (D.C. 1989). Neither of these policies would be well served by prohibiting the use of \"hold harmless \"agreements between employers and attorneys employed in house if the employer is exercising an informed business judgment in utilizing the \"hold harmless \"agreement in lieu of malpractice insurance and doing so on the advise of any counsel other than the counsel being employed.  Consultation with in-house counsel satisfies the requirement of the rule.  First, the position of the client as employer, and the sophistication of those who employ in house counsel, eliminates almost all overreaching concerns. Secondly, the lawyer as employee does not avoid the negative consequences of malpractice because he or she is subject to being discharged by the employer. Apparently, discharge is preferred by employers of in house counsel to malpractice suits as a remedy for negligent performance. See, Opinion 193 (D.C. 1989).     Accordingly, we conclude that \"hold harmless \"agreements are ethical when an employer of in house counsel makes an informed business judgment that such an agreement is preferable to employee malpractice insurance, is done on the advice of counsel, and is permitted by law.  The determination of whether such agreements are permitted by law is not within the scope of  this Opinion.  Finally, we note that the proposed \"hold harmless \"agreement does not limit liability to third parties affected by in house counsel representation.  Instead, the agreement shifts the responsibility for employee conduct from an insurance carrier to the organization as a self insurer.\n","UrlName":"rule453","Order":66,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f2f84f41-0470-4657-aa2e-22cd66687968","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-3","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-3 Approved And Issued On April 26, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule526\">FAO No. 90-2</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-053.pdf?sfvrsn=9f662036_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0795</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     Ethical propriety of a part-time law clerk appearing as an attorney before his or her present employer-judge. SUMMARY ANSWER:     The representation of clients by a law clerk before a present employer-judge is a violation of Rule 1.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. OPINION:     This question involves an application of Rule 1.7 governing personal interest conflicts.  Rule 1.7 provides:(a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b). (b) If client consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected or former client consents, preferably in writing, to the representation after: (1) consultation with the lawyer, (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation, and (3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel. (c) Client consent is not permissible if the representation: (1) is prohibited by law or these rules;  . . . (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.     There are two threats to professional judgment posed when  a law clerk undertakes to represent a client before the judge by whom the law clerk is also currently employed.  The first is that the lawyer will be unduly restrained in client representation before the employer-judge.  Comment [6] to Rule 1.7 states that \"the lawyer's personal or economic interest should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.\"And Comment [4] explains that: \"loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interest.  The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.\"     Because of this risk, the representation of clients by a law clerk before an employer-judge is a violation of  Rule 1.7.  Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled that for a full-time law clerk concurrently to serve as appointed co-counsel for a criminal defendant before one of the judges by whom the law clerk is employed constitutes an actual conflict of interest depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right of counsel. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a>     Rule 1.7 permits client waiver of personal interest conflicts through client consultation with the lawyer, providing reasonable and adequate written information about the material risks of the representation to the client, and giving the client the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.  This waiver provision must be read consistently with other guidance from the profession.  Because of a second threat to professional judgment, client waiver is impermissible in this situation.  Client waiver is inconsistent with the guidance of Rule 3.5(a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits a lawyer from seeking to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law.  (There is an implication of improper influence in the very fact of the employment of the attorney for one of the parties as the judge's current law clerk. It is also inconsistent with the guidance of Rule 3.5(a) Comment [2] which states,\"If we are to maintain integrity of the judicial process, it is imperative that an advocate's function be limited to the presentation of evidence and argument, to allow a cause to be decided according to law.  The exertion of improper influence is detrimental to that process.  Regardless of an advocate's innocent intention, actions which give the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality are to be avoided.  The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety.Accordingly, a part-time law clerk should not seek client waiver of the conflict of interest created by representation of clients before the employer-judge. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\"> [2] </a>A related rule is found in Rule 1.12(b), which states:A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or arbitrator.  A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator.  In addition, the law clerk shall promptly provide written notice of acceptance of employment to all counsel of record in all such matters in which the prospective employer is involved.Rule 1.12(b) allows a law clerk for a judge to accept employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially with the approval of the judge and prompt written notice to all counsel of record in matters in which the prospective employer of the law clerk is involved.  Rule 1.12 (b) addresses future employment by a judge's law clerk and should not be read to allow a law clerk to represent a party before the judge whom he is currently employed.  Rule 3.5 (a) and Comment [2] to that Rule would prohibit the appearance of tampering with judicial impartiality that the close employment relationship between judge and current law clerk would inevitably raise.     This opinion addresses the propriety of the lawyer's conduct under the Georgia Rules of Professional Responsibility.  It does not address the ethical propriety of the same conduct in his or her capacity as part-time clerk.  We do note, however, that many courts have prevented the conduct in question here as a matter of court rules in accord with this opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn3\"> [3] </a> We also note that judicial clerks are often treated as \"other judicial officers \"for the purpose of determining disqualifications and other ethical concerns. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn4\"> [4] </a> Under that treatment, the conduct in question here would be analogous to a request by a part-time judge to practice before his or her own court in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and statutory provisions. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn5\"> [5] </a> See O.C.G.A. § 15-7-21. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn6\">[6]</a> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> 269 Ga. 446, 499 S.E. 2d 897 (1998). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn2\">2.</a> In accord, Advisory Opinion CI-951 (Michigan) (1983).  (Part-time law clerk may not work in any capacity as private counsel on any case pending in employer-judge's circuit and must give notice to clients of his inability to appear in the circuit.) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn3\">3.</a> Sup. Ct. R. 7.  (An employee of the Supreme Court shall not practice as an attorney in any court while employed by the Court.) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn4\">4.</a> See, eg., ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 91:4503 and cases cited therein; see, also, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.12 (1984); and Opinion 38 (Georgia 1984) (\"Lawyers and members of the public view a Law Clerk as an extension of the Judge for whom the Clerk works \"). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn5\">5.</a> Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct.  (Part-time judges: (2) should not practice law in the court on which they serve, or in any court subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the court on which they serve, or act as lawyers in proceedings in which they have served as judges or in any other proceeding related thereto.) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn6\">6.</a> O.C.G.A. § 15-7-21(b).  A part-time judge of the state court may engage in the private practice of law in other courts but may not practice in his own court or appear in any matter as to which that judge has exercised any jurisdiction.","UrlName":"rule455","Order":67,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"5a8729aa-cd15-4ad1-982a-0d67bed33fce","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-4","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-4 Approved And Issued On March 19, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia With Comments Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule527\">FAO No. 91-3</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-054.pdf?sfvrsn=a3362275_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0797</a> COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA     We granted a petition for discretionary review brought by the State Bar of Georgia asking the Court to adopt an opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (\"Board \").  At issue is Formal Advisory Opinion (\"FAO \") 05-4, which is a redrafted version of FAO 91-3.  Although both FAO 91-3 and FAO 05-4 address the ethical propriety of a lawyer paying nonlawyer employees a monthly bonus from the gross proceeds of the lawyer's firm, the board reached contrary conclusions in these opinions based on ethical rules in place at the time.  For the reasons which follow, we agree with the board that under current Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4, the payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his or her law office in addition to the nonlawyer employees' regular monthly salary is permissible; and that it is ethically proper to compensate nonlawyer employees pursuant to a plan that is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.     In 1990 this Court issued FAO 91-3 addressing the same issue under former Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102 (and identical Directory Rule 3-102), which, in pertinent part, prohibited a lawyer from sharing fees with a nonlawyer except that \"a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing agreement.\"Former Standard 26 (c).  In 2000 the Court issued the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 2001, to replace the former Standards of Conduct.  Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 supercedes Standard 26 (c) and enlarges the circumstances under which a lawyer or law firm may share legal fees with a nonlawyer. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a> In pertinent part, Rule 5.4 (a) (3) provides:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that . . . . <div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit- sharing arrangement.</div></div> The Board reviewed FAO 91-3 to determine what impact, if any, application of the Rules of Professional Conduct would have on the opinion and concluded that the substance and conclusions reached in FAO 91-3 are no longer in compliance with current ethical considerations. As a result, the board drafted FAO 05-4.  That opinion was published in the April and October 2005 issues of the Georgia Bar Journal; no comments were received in response to the publications, see Rule of Professional Conduct 4-403 (c); and the State Bar sought and was granted discretionary review by this Court.  Rule of Professional Conduct 4-403 (d). The distinction between Rule 5.4 (a) (3) and Standard 26 (c) is that the former permits a nonlawyer employee to participate in both a compensation and retirement plan, whereas the latter permitted nonlawyer compensation only in the context of a retirement plan.  We agree with the board that the support for FAO 91-3 has changed due to the adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct and that FA0 91-3 no longer provides an accurate interpretation of the applicable rules of ethics.  In contrast, FAO 05-4 is consistent with current Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 (a) (3) in that it allows compensation to a nonlawyer employee in the form of a monthly bonus paid from the gross receipts of the law firm under the rule that a nonlawyer employee may participate in a compensation plan, even though based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.  Accordingly, we adopt proposed FAO 05-4 and retract FAO 91-3.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\"> [2] </a>Formal Advisory Opinion 05-4 approved. All the Justices concur. <div style=\"text-align: center\">FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-4</div> Question Presented: Ethical propriety of a lawyer paying his nonlawyer employees a monthly bonus from the gross receipts of his law office. Summary Answer: The payment of a monthly bonus by a lawyer to his nonlawyer employees based on the gross receipts of his law office in addition to their regular monthly salary is permissible under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.  It is ethically proper for a lawyer to compensate his nonlawyer employees based upon a plan that is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement. Opinion: Correspondent asks whether a lawyer may pay nonlawyer employees a monthly bonus which is a percentage of gross receipts of the law office.Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 necessitates the modification of Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-3, which was based largely on Standard No. 26 of Georgia Bar Rule 4-102.  Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 replaces the former standard and provides as follows:<div style=\"margin-left: 40px\">(a)    A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:</div><div style=\"margin-left: 80px\"></div><div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after his death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;</div> <div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(2) a lawyer or law firm who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;</div> <div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and</div> <div style=\"margin-left: 80px\">(4) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer.</div>     Georgia's Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4 is analogous to its counterpart in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. In 1980, the ABA amended DR 3-102(A) to add an additional exception regarding the sharing of fees with nonlawyer employees: \"A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit sharing arrangement.\"(emphasis added). ABA DR 3-102(A)(3).  The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct are consistent with the ABA's principles of fee sharing with non-attorneys.As the Comment to the Model Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, the policy underlying the limitation on the sharing of fees between lawyer and layperson seeks to protect the lawyer's independent professional judgment. The Comment cautions that if a layperson, not guided by professional obligations, shares an interest in the outcome of the representation of a client, the possibility exists that he or she may influence the attorney's judgment.In light of all of the foregoing, we conclude that the payment of a monthly bonus payable to nonlawyer employees based upon a plan that is in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement does not constitute a sharing of legal fees in violation of Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.<hr> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> Rule 5.4 is now analogous to its counterpart in the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA DR 3-102 (A) (3). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn2\">2.</a> By our approval of FA0 05-4, it becomes \"binding on all members of the State Bar [of Georgia].\"Rules of Professional Conduct 4-403 (e). ","UrlName":"rule456","Order":68,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"165c44b4-73cc-445c-972f-2aa61b908729","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-5","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-5 Approved And Issued On February 13, 2007 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule528\"> FAO No. 92-1 </a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-055.pdf?sfvrsn=6659a864_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0798</a>  QUESTION PRESENTED: 1) Ethical propriety of a law firm obtaining a loan to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses;2) Ethical considerations applicable to payment of interest charged on loan obtained by law firm to cover advances to clients for litigation expenses. OPINION: Correspondent law firm asks if it is ethically permissible to employ the following system for payment of certain costs and expenses in contingent fee cases. The law firm would set up a draw account with a bank, with the account secured by a note from the firm's individual lawyers. When it becomes necessary to pay court costs, deposition expenses, expert witness fees, or other out-of-pocket litigation expenses, the law firm would obtain an advance under the note. The firm would pay the interest charged by the bank as it is incurred on a monthly or quarterly basis. When a client makes a payment toward expenses incurred in his or her case, the amount of that payment would be paid to the bank to pay down the balance owed on his or her share of expenses advanced under the note. When a case is settled or verdict paid, the firm would pay off the client's share of the money advanced on the loan. If no verdict or settlement is obtained, the firm would pay the balance owed to the bank and bill the client. Some portion of the interest costs incurred in this arrangement would be charged to the client. The contingent fee contract would specify the client's obligations to pay reasonable expenses and interest fees incurred in this arrangement.The first issue is whether it is ethically permissible for lawyers to borrow funds for the purpose of advancing reasonable expenses on their clients' behalf. If so, we must then determine the propriety of charging clients interest to defray part of the expense of the loan.In addressing the first issue, lawyers are generally discouraged from providing financial assistance to their clients. Rule 1.8(e) states:A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or(2) a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.</div>Despite that general admonition, contingent fee arrangements are permitted by Rule 1.5(c), which states:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.(2) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(i) the outcome of the matter; and,(ii) if there is a recovery, showing the:<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">(A) remittance to the client; (B) the method of its determination; (C) the amount of the attorney fee; and (D) if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined. </div></div></div>The correspondent's proposed arrangement covers only those expenses which are permitted under Rule 1.8(e). Paragraph (e) of Rule 1.8 eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer and further limits permitted assistance to cover costs and expenses directly related to litigation. See Comment (4) to Rule 1.8.The arrangement also provides that when any recovery is made on the client's behalf, the recovery would first be debited by the advances made under the note, with payment for those advances being made by the firm directly to the bank. The client thus receives only that recovery which remains after expenses have been paid. The client is informed of this in correspondent's contingent fee contract, which states that \"all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in the representation of said claims shall be deducted after division as herein provided to compensate attorney for his fee.\"In the case where recovery is not obtained, however, the lawyers themselves are contractually obligated to pay the amount owed directly to the bank. Correspondent's proposed contract as outlined in the request for this opinion does not inform the client as to possible responsibility for such expenses where there is no recovery. It is the opinion of this Board that Rules 1.5(c) and 1.8(e), taken together, require that the contingent fee contract inform the client whether he is or is not responsible for these expenses, even if there is no recovery.Although the client may remain \"responsible for all or a portion of these expenses,\"decisions regarding the appropriate actions to be taken to deal with such liability are entirely within the discretion of the lawyers. Since this discretion has always existed, the fact that the lawyers have originally borrowed the money instead of advancing it out-of-pocket would seem to be irrelevant, and the arrangement is thus not impermissible.The bank's involvement would be relevant, however, were it allowed to affect the attorney-client relationship, such as if the bank were made privy to clients' confidences or secrets (including client identity) or permitted to affect the lawyer's judgment in representing his or her client. See generally, Rule 1.6. Thus, the lawyer must be careful to make sure that the bank understands that its contractual arrangement can in no way affect or compromise the lawyer's obligations to his or her individual clients.The remaining issue is whether it is ethically permissible for lawyers to charge clients interest on the expenses and costs advanced via this arrangement with the bank. As in the first issue, the fact that the expenses originated with a bank instead of the law firm itself is irrelevant, unless the relationship between lawyer and bank interferes with the relationship between lawyer and client. Assuming it does not, the question is whether lawyers should be permitted to charge their clients interest on advances.In Advisory Opinion No. 45 (March 15, 1985, as amended November 15, 1985), the State Disciplinary Board held that a lawyer may ethically charge interest on clients' overdue bills \"without a prior specific agreement with a client if notice is given to the client in advance that interest will be charged on fee bills which become delinquent after a stated period of time, but not less than 30 days.\"Thus, the Board found no general impropriety in charging interest on overdue bills. There is no apparent reason why advanced expenses for which a client may be responsible under a contingent fee agreement (whether they are billed to the client or deducted from a recovery) should be treated any differently. Thus, we find no ethical impropriety in charging lawful interest on such amounts advanced on the client's behalf. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a>In approving the practice of charging interest on overdue bills, the Board held that a lawyer must comply with \"all applicable law <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\"> [1] </a> . . . and ethical considerations.\"The obvious intent of Rule 1.5(c) is to ensure that clients are adequately informed of all relevant aspects of contingent fee arrangements, including all factors taken into account in determining the amount of their ultimate recovery. Since any interest charged on advances could affect the ultimate recovery as much as other factors mentioned in Rule 1.5(c), it would be inconsistent to permit lawyers to charge interest on these advances without revealing the intent to do so in the fee contract. Thus, we conclude that it is permissible to charge interest on such advances only if (i) the client is notified in the contingent fee contract of the maximum rate of interest the lawyer will or may charge on such advances; and (ii) the written statement given to the client upon conclusion of the matter reflects the interest charged on the expenses advanced in the matter.<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> The opinion makes specific mention of O.C.G.A. 7-4-16, the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts in Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act as amended (15 USC 1601 et seq.). We state no opinion as to the applicability of these acts or others to the matter at hand.","UrlName":"rule457","Order":69,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d3aa0fac-a8e9-447d-b4ff-50a72bfd7734","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-6","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-6 Approved and Issued On May 3, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule529\"> FAO No. 92-2 </a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-056.pdf?sfvrsn=5bf532e5_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0799</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     Ethical propriety of a lawyer advertising for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement. SUMMARY ANSWER:     It is ethically improper for a lawyer to advertise for legal business with the intention of referring a majority of that business out to other lawyers without disclosing that intent in the advertisement and without complying with the disciplinary standards of conduct applicable to lawyer referral services. OPINION:     Correspondent seeks ethical advice for a practicing attorney who advertises legal services but whose ads do not disclose that a majority of the responding callers will be referred to other lawyers.  The issue is whether the failure to include information about the lawyers referral practices in the ad is misleading in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.  Rule 7.1 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct governing the dissemination of legal services permits a lawyer to \"advertise through all forms of public media...so long as the communication is not a false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.\"A communication is false or misleading if it \"[c]ontains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading,\"Rule 7.1(a)(1).The advertisement of legal services is protected commercial speech under the First Amendment.  Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).  Commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature and prices of products and services.  In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decision-making.  Id. at 364.  Thus, the Court has held that truthful ads including areas of practice which did not conform to the bar's approved list were informative and not misleading and could not be restricted by the state bar.  In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).Although actually or inherently misleading advertisements may be prohibited, potentially misleading ads cannot be prohibited if the information in the ad can be presented in a way that is not deceiving.  Gary E. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 2287-2289 (1990). Requiring additional information so as to clarify a potentially misleading communication does not infringe on the attorney's First Amendment.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct balance the lawyer's First Amendment rights with the consumer's interest in accurate information.  In general, the intrusion on the First Amendment right of commercial speech resulting from rationally based affirmative disclosure requirements is minimal.A true statement which omits relevant information is as misleading as a false statement. So, for example, when contingency fees are mentioned in the communication, the fees must be explained.  Rule 7.1(a)(5).  The Rules prohibit communications which are likely to create an unjustified explanation about results the lawyer can achieve or comparison of service unless the comparison can be substantiated.  Rule 7.1(a)(2), (3).The Rules evidence a policy of full disclosure enabling the client to investigate the attorney(s) and the services offered.  Any advertisement must be clearly marked as an ad, unless it is otherwise apparent from the context that it is such a communication and at least one responsible attorney's name must be included.  Rule 7.1(a)(4), (6)(b).  Law firms practicing under a trade name must include names of practicing attorneys.  The firm's trade name cannot imply connections to an organization with which it has no connection.  Rule 7.5(a)(2).  An attorney is prohibited from implying associations with other attorneys when an association does not exist and may state or imply practice in a partnership or other organizations only when that is the fact.  Rule 7.5(d).  These disclosure requirements assure that the public receives accurate information on which to base decisions.Similarly, other jurisdictions have required disclosure of attorney names and professional associations in the advertisement of either legal services or referral services.  A group of attorneys and law firms in the Washington, D.C. area planned to create a private lawyer referral service.  The referral service's advertising campaign was to be handled by a corporation entitled \"The Litigation Group.\"Ads would state that lawyers in the group were willing to represent clients in personal injury matters.  The person answering the telephone calls generated by the ad would refer the caller to one of the member law firms or lawyers.The Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics found the name misleading because it implied the entity was a law firm rather than simply a referral service.  The Committee required the ad include a disclaimer explaining that \"The Litigation Group \"was not a law firm.  Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on legal Ethics, Opinion 1029, 2/1/88.The Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics was presented with facts identical to those presented in Virginia.  The Maryland Committee also required additional information in the ad to indicate the group was not a law firm or single entity providing legal services.  Maryland State Bar Association Committee on Ethics, Opinion 88-65, 2/24/88.Similarly, an opinion by the New York Bar Association prohibited an attorney from using an advertising service which published ads for generic legal services.  Ads for legal services were required to include the names and addresses of participating lawyers and disclose the relationship between the lawyers.  New York Bar Association, Opinion 597, 1/23/89.The situations presented to the Virginia, Maryland and New York committees are analogous to the facts presented here.  The advertiser in all these cases refers a majority of the business generated by the ad, without disclosure.  The ad here does not disclose any association with other attorneys.The advertisement at issue conveys only the offer of legal services by the advertising attorney and no other service or attorney.  The ad does not accurately reflect the attorney's business.  The ad conveys incomplete information regarding referrals, and the omitted information is important to those clients selecting an attorney rather than an attorney referral service.Furthermore, the attorney making the referrals may be circumventing the regulations governing lawyer referral services.  Attorneys may subscribe to and accept referrals from a \"a bona fide lawyer referral service operated by an organization authorized and qualified to do business in this state; provided, however, such organization has filed with the State Disciplinary Board, at least annually a report showing its terms, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of lawyers participating, and the names and addresses of lawyers participating in the service.\"Rule 7.3(c)(1).  These regulations help clients select competent counsel.  If the attorney is not operating a bona fide lawyer referral in accordance with the Rules, the client is deprived of all of this information.  The attorneys accepting the referrals also violate Rule 7.3(c) by participating in the illicit service and paying for the referrals.Assuming that the advertisements at issue offers only the advertising attorneys services and that the attorney accepts cases from the callers, the ad is not false or inherently misleading. However, where a majority of the responding callers are referred out, this becomes a lawyer referral service.  The Rules require disclosure of the referral as well as compliance with the Rules applicable to referral services.","UrlName":"rule458","Order":70,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b2d78f9a-f1d9-40e7-bb3c-4469eafbf541","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-7","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-7 Approved And Issued On November 26, 2007 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule531\"> FAO No. 93-2 </a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-057.pdf?sfvrsn=260f7e4_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S08U0023</a> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=58\%22>Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, Rule 1.7 was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. The amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion. QUESTION PRESENTED: Ethical considerations of an attorney representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim and simultaneously representing the insured. SUMMARY ANSWER: A lawyer representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim should not undertake the simultaneous representation of the insured on related claims, unless it is reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to both clients, and only if both the insurance company and the insured have consented to the representation after consultation with the lawyer, have received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation, and have been given the opportunity to consult with the independent counsel.  Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule. OPINION: This inquiry addresses several questions as to ethical propriety and possible conflicts between the representation of the client, the insurance company, and its insured.Hypothetical Fact SituationThe insurance company makes a payment to its insured under a provision of an insurance policy which provides that such payment is contingent upon the transfer and assignment of subrogation of the insured's rights to a third party for recovery with respect to such payment.Question 1: May the attorney institute suit against the tortfeasor in the insured's name without getting the insured's permission?Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.2(a), a lawyer may not institute a legal proceeding without obtaining proper authorization from his client.  The ordinary provision in an insurance policy giving the insurance company the right of subrogation does not give the lawyer the right to institute a lawsuit in the name of the insured without specific authority from the insured.  The normal subrogation agreements, trust agreements or loan receipts which are executed at the time of the payment by the insurer usually give the insurance company the right to pursue the claim in the insured's name and depending upon the language may grant proper authorization from the insured to proceed in such fashion.  Appropriate authorization to bring the suit in the insured's name should be obtained and the insured should be kept advised with respect to developments in the case.Question 2: Does the attorney represent both the insured and the insurance company, and, if so, would he then have a duty to inform the insured of his potential causes of action such as for diminution of value and personal injury?The insurance policy does not create an attorney/client relationship between the lawyer and the insured.  If the lawyer undertakes to represent the insured, the lawyer has duties to the insured, which must be respected with respect to advising the insured as to other potential causes of action such as diminution of value and personal injury.  Rule 1.7(b); see also, Comment 10 (assuring independence of counsel) and Comment 12 (common representations permissible even with some differences in interests).Question 3: Is there a conflict of interest in representing the insured as to other potential causes of action?In most instances no problem would be presented with representing the insured as to his deductible, diminution of value, etc.  Generally an insurance company retains the right to compromise the claim, which would reasonably result in a pro-rata payment to the insurance carrier and the insured.  The attorney representing the insured must be cautious to avoid taking any action, which would preclude the insured from any recovery to which the insured might otherwise be entitled.  Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule, (b); see also, Comment 10 (assuring independence of counsel) and Comment 12 (common representations permissible even with some differences in interest.) to Rule 1.7.A much more difficult problem is presented in the event an attorney attempts to represent both an insurance company's subrogation interest in property damage and an insured's personal injury claim.  In most cases the possibility of settlement must be considered.  Any aggregate settlement would necessarily have to be allocated between the liquidated damages of the subrogated property loss and the unliquidated damages of the personal injury claim.  Any aggregate settlement would require each client's consent after consultation, and this requirement cannot be met by blanket consent prior to settlement negotiations.  Rule 1.8(g); see also Comment 6 to Rule 1.8.  Only the most sophisticated of insureds could intelligently waive such a conflict, and therefore in almost all cases an attorney would be precluded from representing both the insurer and the insured in such cases.In conclusion, a lawyer representing an insurance company on a subrogation claim should not undertake the simultaneous representation of the insured on related claims, unless it is reasonably likely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to both clients, and only if both the insurance company and the insured have consented to the representation after consultation with the lawyer, have received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation, and have been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.  Rule 1.7(a) and (b).","UrlName":"rule459","Order":71,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0ae1e8f5-517c-4259-8e2c-723c20267185","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-8","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD NO. 05-8 Approved And Issued On April 4, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule501\">FAO No. 96-2</a> (Modified to Correct Error Pursuant to Supreme Court Order on April 11, 2008) <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-058.pdf?sfvrsn=5a0cb79a_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0800</a> Please note that in the reference to <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> in this opinion, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule60\">Rule 1.8(h)</a> is only quoted in pertinent part. QUESTION PRESENTED: The question presented is whether an attorney may stamp client correspondence with a notice stating that the client has a particular period of time to notify the lawyer if he/she is dissatisfied with the lawyer and that if the client did not notify the lawyer of his/her dissatisfaction within that period of time, the client would waive any claim for malpractice. SUMMARY ANSWER: A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement.  Therefore, in the absence of independent representation of the client, the lawyer should not condition the representation of a client upon the waiver of any claim for malpractice and should not attempt to cause the waiver of any claim for malpractice by the inclusion of language amounting to such a waiver in correspondence with a client. OPINION: A member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board has brought to the attention of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board a practice by lawyers of adding the following language (by rubber stamp) to correspondence with clients:Important Message If you disagree with anything set forth in this communication or the way I have represented you to date, please notify me by certified mail at the address set forth herein immediately. If I do not hear from you, it shall be an acknowledgment by you per our agreement that you are satisfied with my representation of you to date and you agree with my statements in this communication.The intended effect of this \"message \"is to create a short period of time within which the client must decide whether he or she is satisfied with the representation, and if not satisfied, the client must notify the lawyer \"immediately.\"If such notification is not provided \"immediately,\"the client will have acknowledged an \"agreement \"that the client is satisfied with the representation.It is apparent from reviewing this \"message \"that the lawyer is attempting to exonerate himself or herself from any claim of malpractice or to cause a waiver of any claim for malpractice by the client against the lawyer.  By attempting to limit his or her liability for malpractice or to cause a waiver of any claim for malpractice, the lawyer is putting himself or herself into an adversarial relationship with the client.  While providing advice to the client on the one hand, the lawyer is attempting to limit or excuse his or her liability for claims of malpractice resulting from the provision of such advice on the other hand.  Such conduct places the lawyer's personal interests ahead of the interests of the client.  This conduct is expressly forbidden by Rule 1.8(h), which provides that \"A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement.\"In summary, the use of a message or notice, such as described herein, is a violation of Rule 1.8(h), and subjects an attorney to discipline, for which the maximum penalty is a public reprimand.","UrlName":"rule460","Order":72,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"410020ea-d24b-4223-b6c4-3c43b3cf6cb6","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-9","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-9 Approved And Issued On April 13, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule503\"> FAO No. 97-1 </a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-059.pdf?sfvrsn=2a5783e9_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06R0802</a> See Comments [4] through [9] to <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule61\">Rule 1.9</a> for additional ethical guidance applicable to lawyers moving between firms. QUESTION PRESENTED: Is it ethically proper to work on a temporary basis for other attorneys?  Is it ethically proper for a lawyer, law firm, or corporate law department to hire other attorneys on a temporary basis? SUMMARY ANSWER: Yes.  While a temporary lawyer and the employing firm or corporate law department must be sensitive to the unique problems of conflicts of interest, confidentiality, imputed disqualification, client participation, use of placement agencies and fee division produced by the use of temporary lawyers, there is nothing in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct that prohibits the use of temporary lawyers. OPINION: I.  Conflicts of InterestAn attorney is ethically obligated to avoid conflicts of interest with respect to that attorney's client.  A temporary lawyer represents the client of a firm when that lawyer works on a matter for a client.  Thus, a temporary lawyer employed to represent clients or assist in representation of clients enters into an attorney/client relationship with those particular clients as an associate of the firm.  Accordingly, the general rules pertaining to all attorneys regarding conflicts of interest are applicable to the temporary lawyer.  Specifically, the temporary lawyer and the employing law firm or corporate law department must comply with Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10 governing personal interests, simultaneous representation, and subsequent representation conflicts of interest, and imputed disqualification.  Generally, a temporary lawyer should not represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation without obtaining the consent of the affected clients in accordance with the consent requirement of Rule 1.7.The opportunity for conflicts of interest is heightened in the context of the employment of temporary lawyers.  The very nature of a temporary lawyer invokes conflict of interest issues.  Obviously, a temporary lawyer is likely to be employed by many different firms or legal departments during the course of his or her practice.  Therefore, the potential for conflicts of interest is great.  As a practical matter, this potential for conflict imposes upon temporary lawyers and employing law firms or corporate law departments an obligation of great care in both record keeping and screening for conflicts.  In fact, the potential for conflict is so high that law firms or corporate law departments that employ temporary lawyers would be acting unethically if they did not carefully evaluate each proposed employment for actual conflicting interests and potentially conflicting interests.  Additionally, the temporary lawyer should maintain a record of clients and matters worked on in order to evaluate possible conflicts of interest should they arise.  All firms employing temporary lawyers should also maintain a complete and accurate record of all matters on which each temporary lawyer works.One of the most difficult issues involving conflict of interest in the employment of temporary lawyers is imputed disqualification issues.  In other words, when would the firm or legal department be vicariously disqualified due to conflict of interest with respect to the temporary lawyer? Since a temporary attorney is considered to be an associate of the particular firm or corporate law department for which he or she is temporarily working, the normal rules governing imputed disqualification apply.  Specifically, Rule 1.10(a) provides that if any attorney is individually precluded from undertaking representation by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2, then a firm with whom the attorney is associated is also precluded from undertaking that representation.  Also, and most importantly in the temporary lawyer context, Rule 1.9(b) says that a lawyer \"shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previous represented a client: (1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and (2) about whom the lawyer had acquired [confidential] information . . . , unless the client consents after consultation.\"The effect of these rules working in conjunction is that a firm employing a temporary lawyer would be disqualified by imputed disqualification from any unconsented to representation materially adverse to a former client of the former firms of the temporary lawyer in the same or a substantially related matter if the temporary lawyer had acquired confidential information about the former representation.II. ConfidentialityIn addition to avoiding conflicts of interest, an attorney also is obligated to protect the client's confidences.  As noted above, a temporary lawyer who is involved in the representation of clients or who provides assistance in the representation of clients enters into an attorney/client relationship with those clients.  Therefore, the temporary attorney is obligated not to disclose client confidences.  A temporary attorney is required to keep all information gained in the professional relationship with a client confidential in accordance with Rule 1.6.<div style=\"margin-left: 20px\">Furthermore, Rule 5.1 requires:(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable effort to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</div>This Rule obligates the employing firm or corporate law department to impose upon temporary lawyers obligations of confidentiality identical to those requirements imposed on an associate or any other employee.  This obligation of confidentiality includes all information regarding the representation of all clients of the firm or departments when the temporary lawyer acquires that information during his or her engagement.To protect confidentiality and to avoid excessive risks of imputed disqualification it is a prudent practice for all law firms and corporate law departments, to the extent practicable, to screen each temporary lawyer from access to any information relating to clients that is not related to the temporary lawyer's assignment.  Moreover, a temporary lawyer working for several firms shall make every effort to avoid exposure within those firms to any information relating to clients on matters not assigned to the temporary attorney.III.  Use of Placement Agency for Temporary AttorneysPlacement agencies participate in a business that furnishes law firms and corporate departments with the services of lawyers desiring to obtain part-time or temporary employment.  Firms and corporate legal departments look to these agencies to find temporary attorneys.  In accordance with ABA Formal Opinion 88-356 (1988), a firm does not violate ethical regulations by utilizing a placement agency.  However, there are certain guidelines that should be followed to ensure that no ethical violations occur.  First of all, the firm or corporate legal department must prevent any third party from exerting any control as to the client representation.  Such control would be a violation of Rule 5.4(c).  For example, an agency may have an interest in an attorney's taking additional time on a project so that it will result in higher fees.  The solution is to prevent any control by the agency of the attorney's time.Furthermore, there is an increased risk of disclosure of confidential information even though there must be compliance with the Rules relating to confidential information and conflicts of interest.  This risk of disclosure may be lessened by the screening of temporary attorneys by the firm that, as discussed above, insures the temporary lawyers do not obtain unnecessary information.  Moreover, a client is entitled to be informed that a temporary attorney is being used.  A client reasonably assumes that only attorneys within the firm are doing work on that client's case, and thus, a client should be informed that the firm is using a temporary attorney to do the firm's work.  Because there is some risk of third party interference with the representation, the client should be advised of that risk.  Compliance with Rule 5.4(c), which prohibits third party control of the client representation requires full disclosure to the client of the arrangement.IV.  Fee ArrangementsThe last consideration that needs to be addressed is the appropriate manner in which to handle the fee arrangement.  In accordance with the rationale contained in ABA Formal Opinion 88-356, a fee division with a temporary attorney is allowed.  If a temporary attorney is directly supervised by an attorney in a law firm, that arrangement is analogous to fee splitting with an associate in a law firm, which is allowed by Rule 1.5(e). Thus, in that situation there is no requirement of consent by the client regarding the fee.  Nevertheless, the ethically proper and prudent course is to seek consent of a client under all circumstances in which the temporary lawyer's assistance will be a material component of the representation.  The fee division with a temporary attorney is also allowed even if there is no direct supervision if three criteria are met: (1) the fee is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer; (2) the client is advised of the fee splitting situation and consents; and (3) the total fee is reasonable.   Rule 1.5(e).In that the agency providing the temporary lawyer is not authorized to practice law, any sharing of fees with such an agency would be in violation of Rule 5.4(a).  Therefore, while it is perfectly permissible to compensate an agency for providing a temporary lawyer, such compensation must not be based on a portion of client fees collected by the firm or the temporary lawyer.In summary, employment as a temporary lawyer and use of temporary lawyers are proper when adequate measures, consistent with the guidance offered in this opinion, are employed by the temporary lawyer and the employing firm or corporate law department.  These measures respond to the unique problems created by the use of temporary lawyers, including conflicts of interest, imputed disqualification, confidentiality, fee arrangements, use of placement agencies, and client participation.  Generally, firms employing temporary lawyers should: (1) carefully evaluate each proposed employment for conflicting interests and potentially conflicting interests; (2) if conflicting or potentially conflicting interests exist, then determine if imputed disqualification rules will impute the conflict to the firm; (3) screen each temporary lawyer from all information relating to clients for which a temporary lawyer does not work, to the extent practicable; (4) make sure the client is fully informed as to all matters relating to the temporary lawyer's representation; and (5) maintain complete records on all matters upon which each temporary lawyer works.","UrlName":"rule461","Order":73,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"920b6f2f-60e1-43db-8db3-867ad4c24b5f","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-10","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/"> Click here </a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-10 Approved And Issued On April 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule462\">FAO No. 98-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0510.pdf?sfvrsn=97d84043_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U0803</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     Can a Georgia attorney, who has agreed to serve as local counsel, be disciplined for discovery abuses committed by an in-house or other out-of-state counsel who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia? SUMMARY ANSWER:     A Georgia attorney, serving as local counsel, can be disciplined under Rule 5.1(c) for discovery abuses committed by an out-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel when the local counsel knows of the abuse and ratifies it by his or her conduct.  Knowledge in this situation includes \"willful blindness \"by the local counsel.  Local counsel can also be disciplined for discovery abuse committed by an out-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel when the local counsel has supervisory authority over the out-of-state counsel also in accordance with Rule 5.1(c).  Finally, the role of local counsel, as defined by the parties and understood by the court, may carry with it affirmative ethical obligations. OPINION:     A client has asked in-house or other out-of-state counsel, who is not a member of the State Bar of Georgia, to represent him as lead counsel in a case venued in Georgia.  Lead counsel associates local counsel, who is a member of the State Bar of Georgia, to assist in the handling of the case.  Local counsel moves the admission of lead counsel pro hac vice, and the motion is granted.  During discovery, lead counsel engages in some form of discovery abuse.     Discipline of local counsel for the discovery abuse of lead counsel would, in all cases, be limited to discovery abuse that is in violation of a particular Rule of Professional Conduct.  If the discovery abuse is a violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct, for example, the destruction of documents subject to a motion to produce, Rules 5.1(c) and 3.4(a) defines local counsel's responsibility for the abuse.  Because Rule 5.1(c) is entitled \"Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer \"it may not be obvious to all attorneys that the language of this statute applies to the questions regarding ethical responsibilities between lead and local counsel.  Nevertheless, the language of the Rule clearly applies and is in accord with common principles of accessory culpability:     A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct if:  (1) The . . . supervisory lawyer orders, or with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; . . . .     Under this Rule the extent of local counsel's accessory culpability for lead counsel's discovery abuse is determined by the answers to two questions:  (1) What constitutes knowledge of the abuse by local counsel?  (2) What constitutes ratification of the violative conduct by local counsel?     Actual knowledge, of course, would always be sufficient to meet the knowledge requirement of this Rule.  Consistent with the doctrine of \"willful blindness \"applied in other legal contexts, however, sufficient knowledge could be imputed to local counsel if he or she, suspicious that lead counsel was engaging in or was about to engage in a violation of ethical requirements, sought to avoid acquiring actual knowledge of the conduct.  The doctrine of \"willful blindness \"applies in these circumstances because local counsel's conduct in avoiding actual knowledge displays the same level of culpability as actual knowledge.     Thus, if local counsel was suspicious that lead counsel was \"engag[ing] in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation \"in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4), local counsel would meet the knowledge requirement of accessory culpability if he or she purposely avoided further inquiry.  What would be sufficient suspicion, of course, is difficult to determine in the abstract.  To avoid the risk of the effect of the doctrine of willful blindness, a prudent attorney should treat any reasonable suspicion as sufficient to prompt inquiry of the in-house or other out-of-state counsel.     What constitutes ratification is also difficult to determine in the abstract.  Consistent with the definition of accessory culpability in other legal contexts, however, an attorney should avoid any conduct that does not actively oppose the violation.  The specific conduct required may include withdrawal from the representation or, in some cases, disclosure of the violation to the court.  Which measures are appropriate will depend upon the particular circumstances and consideration of other ethical requirements.  In all circumstances, however, we would expect local counsel to remonstrate with lead counsel and to warn lead counsel of local counsel's ethical obligations under Rule 5.1(c).     Other than accessory culpability, and depending upon how the parties and the court have defined it in the particular representation, the role of local counsel itself may include an affirmative duty to inquire into the conduct of lead counsel and other affirmative ethical obligations.  This is true, for example, if the court understands the role of local counsel as carrying with it any direct supervisory authority over out-of-state in-house counsel or other out-of-state counsel.  In such circumstances, Rule 5.1(c) provides:     A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of Rules of Professional Conduct if:  (2) the lawyer . . . has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.     Furthermore, at times lead and local counsel may have defined the relationship so that it is indistinguishable from that of co-counsel.  In such cases the usual principles of ethical responsibility apply.  Even short of this co-counsel role, however, typical acts required of local counsel such as moving of admission pro hac vice or the signing of pleadings, always carry with them affirmative ethical obligations.  For example, in this, as in all circumstances, the signing of pleadings by an attorney constitutes a good faith representation regarding the pleadings and the conduct of the discovery procedure of which the pleadings are a part.  There is nothing in the role of local counsel that changes this basic ethical responsibility.  Local counsel, if he or she signs the pleadings, must be familiar with them and investigate them to the extent required by this good faith requirement.     Finally, there is nothing in the role of local counsel that excuses an attorney from the usual ethical requirements applicable to his or her own conduct in the representation, either individually or in conjunction with lead counsel.  If local counsel engages in any unethical conduct, it is no defense to a violation that the conduct was suggested, initiated, or required by lead counsel.     Generally, Rules 1.2(a) and (d); 1.6; 3.3(a)(1) and (4); 3.3(c); 3.4(a), (b) and (f); 3.5(b); 4.1(a); 4.2(a); 4.3(a) and (b); 5.1(c); 5.3; 5.4(c); 8.4(a)(1) and (4) may apply to the conduct of local counsel depending upon the degree of local counsel's involvement in the discovery process.  While all these Rules might not be applicable in a given case, taken together they cover the range of conduct that may be involved.","UrlName":"rule449","Order":74,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"de27d0c5-6cfb-402d-a735-cb573cdcf915","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-11","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-11 Approved and Issued On September 22, 2008 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule517\">FAO No. 99-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0511.pdf?sfvrsn=5fdb84f6_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U1854</a> <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/handbookdetail.cfm?what=rule&id=58\%22> </a> <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> is recited in this opinion; however, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule58\">Rule 1.7</a> was amended on November 3, 2011, and now indicates that consent to representation of two clients with potentially conflicting interests must be “informed” and “confirmed in writing,” and be preceded by a separate writing that also advises the clients of “reasonably available alternatives” to the representation. The amendment does not impact the analysis or conclusion reached in this opinion. COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA PER CURIAM.     We granted a petition for discretionary review brought by the State Bar of Georgia asking this Court to adopt an opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board (\"Board \") and retract an earlier version of the Formal Advisory Opinion (\"FAO \"). At issue is Proposed Opinion 05-11, which is a re-drafted version of FAO 99-1.1 Both opinions address the ethical propriety of an attorney defending a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents a company in an unrelated matter and that company claims a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client. Having examined FAO 99-1 in light of the issuance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, we agree that the new Rules require a different result than that reached in FAO 99-1 and that Proposed Opinion 05-11 should be adopted and FAO 99-1 retracted.     In FAO 99-1, issued on May 27, 1999, the Board applied Standards 30, 35 and 36 and Ethical Considerations 5-14 and 5-15 to the question presented and concludedan attorney may not simultaneously represent clients that have directly adverse interests in litigation that is the subject matter of either one of the representations. Whether or not this is the case ... depends upon the nature of the representation of the insurance company.     If it is, in fact, the insurance company that is the true client in the unrelated matter, then the interests of the simultaneously represented clients in the litigation against the insured client are directly adverse even though the insurance company is not a party to the litigation and the representations are unrelated. The consent by the clients provided for in Standard 37 is not available in these circumstances because it is not obvious that the attorney can adequately represent the interests of each client. This is true because adequate representation includes a requirement of an appearance of trustworthiness that is inconsistent with the conflict of interest between these simultaneously represented clients.     If, however, as is far more typically the case, it is not the insurance company that is the true client in the unrelated matter, but an insured of the insurance company, then there is no simultaneous representation of directly adverse interests in litigation and these Standards do not apply. Instead, the attorney may have a personal interest conflict under Standard 30 in that the attorney has a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the insurance company. This personal interest conflict may be consented to by the insured client after full disclosure of the potential conflict and careful consideration. The Standard 37 limitation on consent to conflicts does not apply to Standard 30 conflicts. Such consent, however, should not be sought by an attorney when the attorney believes that the representation of the insured will be adversely affected by his or her personal interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the insurance company for to do so would be to violate the attorney's general obligation of zealous representation to the insured client.In its 2006 re-examination of the question presented in FAO 99-1, the Board applied Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Comment 8 thereto and concluded that the attorney's representation of the insured would be an impermissible conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a) if the insurance company is the client in the unrelated matter, and that consent of both clients would not be available to cure the impermissible conflict because the conflict necessarily \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\"Rule 1.7(c)(3). This was the same result as was reached when Standards 35 and 36 were applied in FAO 99-1, though Proposed Opinion 05-11 clarifies that the attorney's successful representation of the insured client would reduce or eliminate the potential subrogation claim of the insurance company client, making advocacy on behalf of one client in these circumstances advocacy against a simultaneously represented client.     In addressing the far more typical case of the client in the unrelated matter being an insured of the insurance company rather than the insurance company itself, the Board in Proposed Opinion 05-11 again echoed FAO 99-1 in its finding that there would be no impermissible advocacy against a simultaneous representation client, but the attorney might have a conflict with the attorney's own interests under Rule 1.7(a), since the attorney would have a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the non-client insurance company. In a departure from FAO 99-1, the Board in Proposed Opinion 05-11 opines that \"the likelihood that the representation [of the insured] will be harmed by this financial interest makes this a risky situation for the attorney,\"noting that while Rule 1.7(b) permits the personal conflict to be cured by consent of all affected clients under some circumstances, consent is not available to cure the conflict if the conflict triggers Rule 1.7(c)(3), i.e., the conflict \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer [would] be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\"Thus, Proposed Opinion 05-11 corrects an error in FAO 99-1, which had required only the consent of the insured client to the personal interest conflict, and replaces the \"warning \"contained in FAO 99-1 (\"No attorney, however, should seek such consent [to an attorney's personal interest conflict] if he or she believes that his or her business interest will, in fact, adversely affect the quality of the representation with the insured client \") with the ethical requirement of Rule 1.7(c).     Inasmuch as FAO 99-1 no longer provides the most current ethical guidance to the members of the State Bar of Georgia since it is not based on the current ethical rules, and Proposed Opinion 05-11 interprets the current ethical rules, clarifies a point made in FAO 99-1, corrects an error in FAO 99-1, and recognizes the conversion of the warning contained in FAO 99-1 into an ethical requirement, we conclude that it is appropriate to adopt Proposed Opinion 05-11 and retract FAO 99-1.2 Formal Advisory Opinion 05-11 approved. All the Justices concur. 1-With the issuance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, the Standards of Conduct were replaced and the Canons of Ethics, including Ethical Considerations and Directory Rules, were deleted. At the request of the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia, the Board undertook a review of the FAOs issued by this Court that were based on the Standards of Conduct and Canons of Ethics to determine the impact, if any, of the issuance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. 2-Our approval of FAO 05-11 makes it \"binding on all members of the State Bar [of Georgia].\"Rule 4-403(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.   FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-11 QUESTION PRESENTED:     May an attorney ethically defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents, in an unrelated matter, the insurance company with a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client? SUMMARY ANSWER:     In this hypothetical, the attorney's successful representation of the insured would reduce or eliminate the potential subrogation claim of the insurance company that is a client of the same attorney in an unrelated matter. Thus, essentially, advocacy on behalf of one client in these circumstances constitutes advocacy against a simultaneously represented client. \"Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as an advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated.\"See, Rule 1.7, Comment 8. This is true because adequate representation of any client includes a requirement of an appearance of trustworthiness that is inconsistent with advocacy against that client.     Thus, if the insurance company, as opposed to an insured of that company, is in fact the client of the attorney in the unrelated matter, then this representation would be an impermissible conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a) and consent of both clients, as sometimes permitted under Rule 1.7 to cure an impermissible conflict, would not be available. See, Rule 1.7(c)(3).     If, however, as is far more typically the case, it is not the insurance company that is the client in the unrelated matter, but an insured of the insurance company, then there is no advocacy against a simultaneous representation client and the representation is not prohibited for that reason. Instead, in such circumstances, the attorney may have a conflict with the attorney's own interests under Rule 1.7 (a) in that the attorney has a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the non-client insurance company. The likelihood that the representation will be harmed by this financial interest makes this a risky situation for the attorney. Nevertheless, under some circumstances the rules permit this personal interest conflict to be cured by consent of all affected clients after compliance with the requirements for consent found in Rule 1.7(b). Consent would not be available to cure the conflict, however, if the conflict \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer [would] be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affect clients.\"See, Rule 1.7(c). The question this asks is not the subjective one of whether or not the attorney thinks he or she will be able to provide adequate representation despite the conflict, but whether others would reasonably view the situation as such. The attorney makes this determination at his or her own peril. OPINION:     Correspondent asks whether an attorney may ethically defend a client pursuant to an insurance contract when the attorney simultaneously represents, in an unrelated matter, the insurance company with a subrogation right in any recovery against the defendant client. In this hypothetical, the attorney's successful representation of the insured would reduce or eliminate the potential subrogation claim of the insurance company that is a client of the same attorney in an unrelated matter.     This situation is governed by Rule 1.7, which provides:     (a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).     (b) If client consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected or former client consents, preferably in writing, to the representation after:         (1) consultation with the lawyer;         (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of the representation; and         (3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.     (c) Client consent is not permissible if the representation:         (1) is prohibited by law or these rules;         (2) includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or substantially related proceeding; or         (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.     If the representation of the insurance company in the unrelated matter is, in fact, representation of the insurance company, and not representation of an insured of the company, then we get additional assistance in interpreting Rule 1.7 from Comment 8 which states that: \"Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as an advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated.\"This is true because adequate representation of any client includes a requirement of an appearance of trustworthiness that is inconsistent with advocacy against that client. This prohibition is not because Georgia lawyers are not sufficiently trustworthy to act professionally in these circumstances by providing independent professional judgment for each client unfettered by the interests of the other client. It is, instead, a reflection of the reality that reasonable client concerns with the appearance created by such conflicts could, by themselves, adversely affect the quality of the representation.     Thus, in this situation there is an impermissible conflict of interest between simultaneously represented clients under Rule 1.7(a) and consent to cure this conflict is not available under Rule 1.7(c) because it necessarily \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\"See, generally, ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 51:104-105 and cases and advisory opinions cited therein. See, also, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495 (1982) (lawyer may not accept employment adverse to existing client even in unrelated matter; prohibition applies even when present client employs most lawyers in immediate geographical area, thereby making it difficult for adversary to retain equivalent counsel).     If, however, as is far more typically the case, it is not the insurance company that is the client in the unrelated matter, but an insured of the insurance company, then there is no advocacy against a simultaneous representation client and the representation is not prohibited for that reason. Instead, in such circumstances, the attorney may have a conflict with the attorney's own interests under Rule 1.7 (a) in that the attorney has a financial interest in maintaining a good business relationship with the non-client insurance company. The likelihood that the representation will be harmed by this financial interest makes this a risky situation for the attorney. Nevertheless, under some circumstances the rules permit this personal interest conflict to be cured by consent of all affected clients after compliance with the requirements for consent found in Rule 1.7(b). Consent would not be available to cure the conflict, however, if the conflict \"involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer [would] be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affect clients.\"See, Rule 1.7(c). The question this asks is not the subjective one of whether or not the attorney thinks he or she will be able to provide adequate representation despite the conflict, but whether others would reasonably view the situation as such. The attorney makes this determination at his or her own peril.  ","UrlName":"rule450","Order":75,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"71f6c658-da8f-4a6f-9144-290755e07eb8","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-12","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-12 Approved And Issued On July 25, 2006 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule464\">FAO No. 00-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0512.pdf?sfvrsn=41d1bdd3_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S06U1489</a> QUESTION PRESENTED:     When the City Council controls the salary and benefits of the members of the Police Department, may a councilperson, who is an attorney, represent criminal defendants in matters where the police exercise discretion in determining the charges? SUMMARY ANSWER:     Representation of a criminal defendant in municipal court by a member of the City Council where the City Council controls salary and benefits for the police implicates Rule 3.5(a), which prohibits attorneys from seeking to influence officials by means prohibited by law.  In any circumstance where the representation may create an appearance of impropriety it should be avoided. OPINION:     This opinion addresses itself to a situation where the City Council member votes on salary and benefits for the police.  Particularly in small municipalities, this situation could give rise to a perception that a police officer's judgment might be affected.  For example, a police officer might be reluctant to oppose a request that he recommend lesser charges or the dismissal of charges when the request comes from a council member representing the accused.  Situations like the one at hand give rise to inherent influence which is present even if the attorney who is also a City Council member attempts to avoid using that position to influence the proceedings.     Rule 3.5 provides that \"A lawyer shall not, without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter:  (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law....\"As a general matter, a police officer is a public official. See White v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 233 Ga. 919 (1975); Sauls v. State, 220 Ga. App. 115 (1996).  But see O.C.G.A. §45-5-6.  Where a police officer exercises discretion as to the prosecution of criminal charges, the police officer is a public official within the meaning of Rule 3.5(a).  By its express terms, Rule 3.5(a) applies only when an attorney seeks to influence, that is where an attorney has the intent to influence, an official by means prohibited by law.  If an attorney were to indicate to an officer that as a result of the attorney's position as a member of the City Council a favorable recommendation as to one of the attorney's clients would result in benefits flowing to the officer, or that an unfavorable recommendation would result in harm, the attorney would have committed the offense of bribery, OCGA §16-10-2 (a)(1), or extortion, OCGA §16-8-16(a)(4).  The attorney would also have violated Rule 3.5(a).     The mere fact of representation of a criminal defendant by an attorney who is a member of the City Council, when the City Council controls the salary and benefits of the members of the Police Department, and when the police exercise discretion in determining the charges does not, by itself, establish a violation of Rule 3.5(a).  To establish a violation, there must be a showing that the attorney sought to exercise influence in a manner prohibited by law.  We note, however, that Comment 2 to Rule 3.5 provides that \"The activity proscribed by this Rule should be observed by the advocate in such a careful manner that there be no appearance of impropriety.\"Pursuant to Rule 3.5, therefore, an attorney should not represent a criminal defendant where an inference of improper influence can reasonably be drawn.","UrlName":"rule451","Order":76,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3465bd6d-ed00-45d1-b591-ca67726e53d2","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 05-13","Content":"<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/approved-redrafted-opinion.cfm/">Click here</a> for an explanation regarding the history of this opinion. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 05-13 Approved And Issued On June 21, 2007 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia Thereby Replacing <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule530\">FAO No. 93-1</a> <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-0513.pdf?sfvrsn=46b5264d_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S07U1159</a>             QUESTION PRESENTED:     (1) Whether the designation \"Special Counsel \"may be used to describe an attorney and/or law firm affiliated with another law firm for the specific purpose of providing consultation and advice to the other firm in specialized legal areas:  (2) and whether the ethical rules governing conflict of interest apply as if the firm, the affiliated attorney and the affiliated firm constitute a single firm. SUMMARY ANSWER:     It is not improper for a law firm to associate another lawyer or law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters and to identify that lawyer or law firm as \"special counsel \"for that specialized area of the law.  The relationship between the law firm and special counsel must be a bona fide relationship.  The vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer does apply to the outside associated lawyer or law firm. OPINION:     This opinion deals with the following questions:<ol><li>May a law firm which associates a lawyer for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters identify that lawyer as being, for example, \"Special Counsel for Trust and Estate and Industrial Tax Matters \"?</li><li>May a law firm which associates another law firm for providing consultation and advice to the firm's clients on specialized matters identify that law firm as being, for example, \"Special Counsel for Tax and ERISA Matters \"?</li><li>Should Rule 1.10, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn1\">[1]</a> the vicarious disqualification rule requiring the additional disqualification of a partner or associate of a disqualified lawyer, apply to outside associated lawyers and law firms? </li></ol>     The problem should be viewed from the standpoint of clients.  Can the law firm render better service to its clients if it establishes such relationships?  If the answer is yes, there is no reason such relationships cannot be created and publicized.     There is no Rule which would prohibit a law firm from associating either an individual lawyer or law firm as special counsel and such association may be required by Rule 1.1.; <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn2\">[2]</a> While the American Bar Association has concluded that one firm may not serve as counsel for another (Formal Opinion No. 330, August 1972) this court declines to follow that precedent.  Moreover, a subsequent ABA opinion recognized that one firm may be associated or affiliated with another without being designated \"of counsel.\"(Formal Opinion No. 84-351, October 20, 1984).  In the view of this court, it is not improper to establish the type of relationship proposed.  If established, it must be identified and identified correctly so that clients and potential clients are fully aware of the nature of the relationship.     Finally, the relationship between the law firm and special counsel (whether an individual lawyer or a law firm) must be a bona fide relationship that entails the use of special counsel's expertise.  The relationship cannot be established merely to serve as a referral source.  Any fees charged between special counsel and the law firm, of course, must be divided in accordance with the requirements of Rule 1.5. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn3\">[3]</a>     The first two questions are answered in the affirmative.     The third question presents a more complex issue.     The Georgia vicarious disqualification rule is founded on the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client.  This duty is expressed in the obligations to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client, and to decline representation or withdraw if the ability to do so is adversely affected by the representation of another client.  Recognizing that the client is the client of the firm and that the duty of loyalty extends to all firm members, it follows that the duty to decline or withdraw extends to all firm members.  Rule 1.10.     Identifying an associated firm or lawyer is calculated to raise the expectation in the mind of the client that the relationship is something more than casual.  Indeed it is calculated to convey to the client that the client's matter is being handled by a unit made up of the associating and associated firm or lawyer, so that the expertise of all can be brought to bear on the problem.  Accordingly, in the situation presupposed in the hypothetical, the clients of the associating firm become, for the purposes of Rule 1.10, the clients of the associated firm or lawyer and vice versa.  The unit as a whole has a duty of loyalty to the client and must exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the client as an entirety.     Reference should be made to Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.10, imputed disqualification; General Rule.  Rule 1.10 discusses when an imputed disqualification can bar all attorneys at a firm or office from representing a particular client.     Rule 1.10 and Comment 1 of the Rule make affiliations among lawyers or law firms less complex.  Rule 1.10 applies to entities other than associated lawyers and law firms to include in addition to lawyers in a private firm, lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in legal services organizations.     As set forth in Comment 1, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#_ftn4\">[4]</a> two practitioners who share office space and who occasionally assist each other in representation of clients, may not regard themselves as a law firm.  However, if they present themselves to the public suggesting that they are indeed a firm, they may be regarded as a firm for purposes of these Rules.  Factors such as formal agreements between associated lawyers, as well as maintenance of mutual access to information concerning clients, may be relevant in determining whether practitioners who are sharing space may be considered a firm under the Rule.     The third question is answered in the affirmative.  In light of the adoption of Rule 1.1, ethical rules governing conflict of interest apply to entities and affiliations of lawyers in a broader sense than what has traditionally been considered a \"law firm.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn1\">1.</a> Rule 1.10     (a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary.     (b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:     (1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and     (2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6: Confidentiality of Information and 1.9(c): Conflict of Interest: Former Client that is material to the matter.     (c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn2\">2.</a> Rule 1.1     A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation as used in this Rule means that a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should know to be beyond the lawyer's level of competence without associating another lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the matter in question. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn3\">3.</a> Rule 1.5     (a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:     (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;     (2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;     (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;     (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;     (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;     (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;     (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and     (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.     (b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.     (c) (1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. (2) Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating the following:     (i) the outcome of the matter; and,     (ii) if there is a recovery, showing the:         (A) remittance to the client;         (B) the method of its determination;         (C) the amount of the attorney fee; and         (D) if the attorney's fee is divided with another lawyer who is not a partner in or an associate of the lawyer's firm or law office, the amount of fee received by each and the manner in which the division is determined.     (d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:     (1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or     (2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.     (e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:     (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;     (2) the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and     (3) the total fee is reasonable. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"_ftn4\">4.</a> Comment 1 of Rule 1.10     [1] For purposes of these Rules, the term \"firm \"includes lawyers in a private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a legal services organization. Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other.","UrlName":"rule452","Order":77,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"020d144f-0976-45a8-9c93-e61d8d9bbcc7","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 07-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON SEPTEMBER 5, 2007 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 07-1 \n             \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nMay a lawyer ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and his client to a third party in an effort to collect a fee from the client? \n \n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n \nA lawyer may ethically disclose information concerning the financial relationship between himself and his client in direct efforts to collect a fee, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency.  Otherwise, a lawyer may not report the failure of a client to pay the lawyer's bill to third parties, including major credit reporting services, in an effort to collect a fee. \n \n OPINION: \n \n    This issue is governed primarily by Rule 1.6 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.6 provides, in pertinent part:\n \n    (a) A lawyer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client, including information which the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order of the Court. \n \n    Comment 5 to Rule 1.6 provides further guidance: \n \n    Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.  A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.\n \n    Former Standard 28 limited confidentiality to \"confidences and secrets of a client.\"However, Rule 1.6 expands the obligations by requiring a lawyer to \"maintain in confidence all information gained in the professional relationship \"including the client's secrets and confidences. \n \n    An attorney's ethical duty to maintain confidentiality of client information is distinguishable from the attorney-client evidentiary privilege of O.C.G.A. §§24-9-21, 24-9-24 and 24-9-25.  Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Louisiana Forum Corp., 273 Ga. 206, 209-10 (2000).  Thus, Rule 1.6 applies not only to matters governed by the attorney-client privilege, but also to non-privileged information arising from the course of representation.  Information concerning the financial relationship between the lawyer and client, including the amount of fees that the lawyer contends the client owes, may not be disclosed, except as permitted by the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, other law, order of the court or if the client consents.\n \n    Rule 1.6 authorizes disclosure in the following circumstances: \n \n    (b)(1) A lawyer may reveal information covered by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: \n    . . . \n    (iii) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil action against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.\n \n    The comments to Rule 1.6 clarify that such disclosures should be made only in limited circumstances.  While Comment 17 to Rule 1.6 provides that a lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted to prove the services rendered in an action to collect that fee, it cautions that a lawyer must make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary disclosure of information related to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the risk of disclosure.  Further caution is found in Comment 12, which provides that \"[i]n any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's interest should be no greater than a lawyer reasonably believes necessary to the purpose.\" \n \n    In Georgia, it is ethically permissible for a lawyer to retain a collection agency as a measure of last resort in order to collect a fee that has been properly earned.  Advisory Opinion No. 49 issued by the State Disciplinary Board.  Advisory Opinion 49, however, only applies to a referral to a \"reputable collection agency \".  Advisory Opinion 49 further states that a lawyer should exercise the option of revealing confidences and secrets necessary to establish or collect a fee with considerable caution.  Thus, while use of a reputable collection agency to collect a fee is ethically proper, disclosures to other third parties may not be ethically permissible. Formal Advisory Opinion 95-1 provides that limitations exist on a lawyer's efforts to collect a fee from his client even through a fee collection program. \n \n    Other jurisdictions that have considered similar issues  have distinguished between direct efforts to collect an unpaid fee, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency, from indirect methods in which information is disclosed to third parties in an effort to collect unpaid fees.  In these cases, the direct methods have generally been found to be ethical, while more indirect methods, such as reporting non-paying clients to credit bureaus, have been found to be unethical.  South Carolina Bar Advisory Opinion 94-11 concluded that a lawyer may ethically use a collection agency to collect past due accounts for legal services rendered but cannot report past due accounts to a credit bureau.  The Opinion advises against reporting non-paying clients to credit bureaus because (1) it is not necessary for establishing the lawyer's claim for compensation, (2) it risks disclosure of confidential information, and (3) it smacks of punishment in trying to lower the client's credit rating.  S.C. Ethics Op. 94-11 (1994).  See also South Dakota Ethics Op. 95-3 (1995) and Mass. Ethics Op. 00-3 (2000) \n \n    The Alaska Bar Association reached a similar conclusion when it determined that \"an attorney who lists a client with a credit agency has revealed confidential information about the client for a purpose not permitted by ARPC 1.6 (b) (2) since such a referral is at most an indirect attempt to pressure the client to pay the fee.\"Alaska Ethics Op. No. 2000-3 (2000).  The Alaska Bar Ethics Opinion is based on the notion that listing an unpaid fee with a credit bureau is likely to create pressure on the client to pay the unpaid fee more from an in terrorem effect of a bad credit rating than from any merit to the claim. \n \n    The State Bar of Montana Ethics Committee concluded that an attorney may not report and disclose unpaid fees to a credit bureau because such reporting \"is not necessary to collect a fee because a delinquent fee can be collected without it.\"Mont. Ethics Op. 001027 (2000).  The Montana Opinion further concluded, \"The effect of a negative report is primarily punitive [and] it risks disclosure of confidential information about the former client which the lawyer is not permitted to reveal under Rule 1.6.\"See also New York State Ethics Opinion 684 (1996)  (reporting client's delinquent account to credit bureau does not qualify as an action \"to establish or collect the lawyer's fee \"within the meaning of the exception to the prohibition on disclosure of client information).  But see Florida Ethics Opinion 90-2 (1991) (it is ethically permissible for an attorney to report a delinquent former client to a credit reporting service, provided that confidential information unrelated to the collection of the debt was not disclosed and the debt was not in dispute). \n \n    While recognizing that in collecting a fee a lawyer may use collection agencies or retain counsel, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers concludes that a lawyer may not disclose or threaten to disclose information to non-clients not involved in the suit in order to coerce the client into settling and may not use or threaten tactics, such as personal harassment or asserting frivolous claims, in an effort to collect fees.  Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 41, comment d (2000).  The Restatement has determined that collection methods must preserve the client's right to contest the lawyer's position on the merits.  Id.  The direct methods that have been found to be ethical in other jurisdictions, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency, allow the client to contest the lawyer's position on the merits.  Indirect efforts, such as reporting a client to a credit bureau or disclosing client financial information to other creditors of a client or to individuals or entities with whom the client may do business, are in the nature of personal harassment and are not ethically permissible.  Accordingly, a lawyer may not disclose information concerning the financial relationship between himself and his client to third parties, other than through direct efforts to collect a fee, such as bringing suit or using a collection agency.\n The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2007 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about August 7, 2007.  The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on August15, 2007.  No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion.  In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.","UrlName":"rule535","Order":78,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"b190b9c0-1a52-4f28-910d-d3949f312ad5","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 10-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 10-1 Approved and Issued On July 11, 2013 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court of Georgia With Comments <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-101.pdf?sfvrsn=ca230921_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S10U1679</a> COMPLETE TEXT FROM THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA Responding to a letter from the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council (GPDSC), the State Bar Formal Advisory Opinion Board (Board) issued Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1 (FAO 10-1), in which the Board concluded that the standard for the imputation of conflicts of interest under Rule 1.10 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct applies to the office of a circuit public defender as it would to a private law firm. FAO 10-1 was published in the June 2010 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal and was filed in this Court on June 15, 2010. On July 5, 2010, the GPDSC filed a petition for discretionary review which this Court granted on January 18, 2011. The Court heard oral argument on January 10, 2012. For reasons set forth below, we conclude, as did the Board, that Rule 1.10 (a) applies to a circuit public defender office as it would to a private law firm, and pursuant to State Bar Rule 4.403 (d), we hereby approve FAO 10-1 to the extent it so holds.1 1. At the heart of FAO 10-1 is the constitutional right to conflict-free counsel and the construction of Rule 1.10 (a) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. “Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.” Wood v. Georgia , 450 U.S. 261, 271 ( 101 SC 1097, 67 LE2d 220) (2008). Indeed, this Court has stated in no uncertain terms that, “Effective counsel is counsel free from conflicts of interest.” Garland v. State , 283 Ga. 201 (657 SE2d 842) (2008). In keeping with this unequivocal right to conflict-free representation, Rule 1.10 (a) provides as follows:While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule, 1.8(c): Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions, 1.9: Former Client or 2.2: Intermediary .(Emphasis in original.) Comment [1] concerning Rule 1.10 defines “firm” to include “lawyers . . . in a legal services organization.” Comment [3] further provides “Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, . . . .”Under a plain reading of Rule 1.10 (a) and the comments thereto, circuit public defenders working in the circuit public defender office of the same judicial circuit are akin to lawyers working in the same unit of a legal services organization and each judicial circuit’s public defender’s office2 is a “firm” as the term is used in the rule. This construction is in keeping with our past jurisprudence. Cf. Hung v. State , 282 Ga. 684 (2) (653 SE2d 48) (2007) (attorney who filed motion for new trial was not considered to be “new” counsel for the purpose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where he and trial counsel were from the same public defender’s office); Kennebrew v. State , 267 Ga. 400 (480 SE2d 1) (1996) (appellate counsel who was from the same public defender office as appellant’s trial lawyer could not represent appellant on appeal where appellant had an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Ryan v. Thomas , 261 Ga. 661 (409 SE2d 507) (1991) (for the purpose of raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “attorneys in a public defender’s office are to be treated as members of a law firm...”); Love v. State , 293 Ga. App. 499, 501 at fn. 1 (667 SE2d 656) (2008). See also Reynolds v. Chapman , 253 F3d 1337, 1343-1344 (11th Cir. 2001) (“While public defenders’ offices have certain characteristics that distinguish them from typical law firms, our cases have not drawn a distinction between the two.”). Accordingly, FAO 10-1 is correct inasmuch is it concludes that public defenders working in the same judicial circuit are “firms” subject to the prohibition set forth in Rule 1.10 (a) when a conflict exists pursuant to the conflict of interest rules listed therein, including in particular Rule 1.7.3 That is, if it is determined that a single public defender in the circuit public defender’s office of a particular judicial circuit has an impermissible conflict of interest concerning the representation of co-defendants, then that conflict of interest is imputed to all of the public defenders working in the circuit public defender office of that particular judicial circuit. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §123 (d)(iv) (“The rules on imputed conflicts ...apply to a public-defender organization as they do to a law firm in private practice...”).2. Despite the unambiguous application of Rule 1.10 (a) to circuit public defenders, GPDSC complains that FAO 10-1 creates a per se or automatic rule of disqualification of a circuit public defender office. We disagree. This Court has stated that “[g]iven that multiple representation alone does not amount to a conflict of interest when one attorney is involved, it follows that counsel from the same [public defender office] are not automatically disqualified from representing multiple defendants charged with offenses arising from the same conduct.” Burns v. State , 281 Ga. 338, 340 (638 SE2d 299) (2006) (emphasis in the original). Here, Rule 1.10 does not become relevant or applicable until after an impermissible conflict of interest has been found to exist. It is only when it is decided that a public defender has an impermissible conflict in representing multiple defendants that the conflict is imputed to the other attorneys in that public defender’s office. Even then, multiple representations still may be permissible in some circumstances. See, e.g., Rule 1.10 (c) (“A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: General Rule.) Thus, FAO 10-1 does not create a per se rule of disqualification of a circuit public defender’s office prior to the determination that an impermissible conflict of interest exists and cannot be waived or otherwise overcome.Although a lawyer (and by imputation his law firm, including his circuit public defender office) may not always have an impermissible conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case, this should not be read as suggesting that such multiple representation can routinely occur. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct explain that multiple representation of criminal defendants is ethically permissible only in the unusual case. See Rule 1.7, Comment [7] (“The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-defendant.”). We realize that the professional responsibility of lawyers to avoid even imputed conflicts of interest in criminal cases pursuant to Rule 1.10 (a) imposes real costs on Georgia’s indigent defense system, which continually struggles to obtain the resources needed to provide effective representation of poor defendants as the Constitution requires. See Gideon v. Wainwright , 373 U.S. 335 (83 SC 792, 9 LE2d 799) (1963). But the problem of adequately funding indigent defense cannot be solved by compromising the promise of Gideon . See Garland v. State , 283 Ga. 201, 204 (657 SE2d 842) (2008).Since FAO 10-1 accurately interprets Rule 1.10 (a) as it is to be applied to public defenders working in circuit public defender offices in the various judicial circuits of this State, it is approved.4Formal Advisory Opinion 10-1 approved. All the Justices concur.<hr width=\"33%\" size=\"1\" align=\"left\"> 1. In FAO 10-1, the Board purported to answer a broader question–whether “different lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit [may] represent codefendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so” – and we asked the parties to address a similar question in their briefs to this Court. That statement of the question, however, is too broad. The real issue addressed by the Board – and addressed in this opinion – is solely a question of conflict imputation, that is, whether Rule 1.10 (a) applies equally to circuit public defender offices and to private law firms. No doubt, the question of conflict imputation under Rule 1.10 (a) is part of the broader question that the Board purported to answer and that we posed to the parties. But whether multiple representations are absolutely prohibited upon imputation of a conflict – even with, for instance, the informed consent of the client or the employment of “screening” measures within an office or firm – is a question that goes beyond Rule 1.10 (a), and it is one that we do not attempt to answer in this opinion. To the extent that FAO 10-1 speaks to the broader question, we offer no opinion about its correctness.2.  There are 43 circuit public defender offices in Georgia.3.  Rule 1.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct provides:(a) A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as permitted in (b).(b) If client informed consent is permissible a lawyer may represent a client notwithstanding a significant risk of material and adverse effect if each affected client or former client gives informed consent confirmed in writing to the representation after: (1) consultation with the lawyer pursuant to Rule 1.0(c); (2) having received in writing reasonable and adequate information about the material risks of and reasonable available alternatives to the representation; and (3) having been given the opportunity to consult with independent counsel.(c) Client informed consent is not permissible if the representation: (1) is prohibited by law or these Rules; (2) includes the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same or a substantially related proceeding; or (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is disbarment.4.  Our opinion cites several precedents that concern the constitutional guarantee of the assistance of counsel, and it is only fitting that we think about the constitutional values that Rule 1.10 promotes as we consider the meaning of Rule 1.10. We do not hold that the imputation of conflicts required by Rule 1.10 is compelled by the Constitution, nor do we express any opinion about the constitutionality of any other standard for imputation. Rule 1.10 is a useful aid in the fulfillment of the constitutional guarantee of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, but we do not hold today that it is essential to fulfill the constitutional guarantee. We do not endorse any particular alternative to Rule 1.10 (a), but we also do not foreclose the possibility that Rule 1.10 (a) could be amended so as to adequately safeguard high professional standards and the constitutional rights of an accused – by ensuring, among other things, the independent judgment of his counsel and the preservation of his confidences – and, at the same time, permit circuit public defender offices more flexibility in the representations of co-defendants. As of now, Rule 1.10 is the rule that we have adopted in Georgia, FAO 10-1 correctly interprets it, and we decide nothing more.FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 10-1 QUESTION PRESENTED: May different lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so? SUMMARY ANSWER: Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so. OPINIONS: In Georgia, a substantial majority of criminal defendants are indigent.  Many of these defendants receive representation through the offices of the circuit public defenders.  More than 40 judicial circuit public defender offices operate across the State.Issues concerning conflicts of interest often arise in the area of criminal defense.  For example, a single lawyer may be asked to represent co-defendants who have antagonistic or otherwise conflicting interests.  The lawyer’s obligation to one such client would materially and adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent the other co-defendant, and therefore there would be a conflict of interest under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a).  See also Comment [7] to Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 (“…The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant”).  Each such client would also be entitled to the protection of Rule 1.6, which requires a lawyer to maintain the confidentiality of information gained in the professional relationship with the client.  One lawyer representing co-defendants with conflicting interests certainly could not effectively represent both while keeping one client’s information confidential from the other.  See Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4 (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation…”).Some conflicts of interest are imputed from one lawyer to another within an organization.  Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a), “[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so….”  Therefore, the answer to the question presented depends in part upon whether a circuit public defender office constitutes a “firm” within the meaning of Rule 1.10.Neither the text nor the comments of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly answers the question.  The terminology section of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct defines “firm” as a “lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services organization.  See Comment, Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification.”  Comment [1] to Rule 1.10 states that the term “firm” includes lawyers “in a legal services organization,” without defining a legal services organization.  Comment [3], however, provides that:Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid.  Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units.  As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation.That is the extent of the guidance in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and the comments thereto.  In the terms used in this Comment, the answer to the question presented is determined by whether lawyers in a circuit public defender’s office are in the same “unit” of a legal services organization.The Supreme Court of Georgia has not answered the question presented.  The closest it has come to doing so was in the case of Burns v. State , 281 Ga. 338 (2006).  In that case, two lawyers from the same circuit public defender’s office represented separate defendants who were tried together for burglary and other crimes.  The Court held that such representation was permissible because there was no conflict between the two defendants.  Presumably, therefore, the same assistant public defender could have represented both defendants.  The Court recognized that its conclusion left open “the issue whether public defenders should be automatically disqualified or be treated differently from private law firm lawyers when actual or possible conflicts arise in multiple defendant representation cases.”  Id. at 341.Other states, in case law and ethics opinions, have decided the question presented in disparate ways.  Some impute conflicts within particular local defender offices. See Commonwealth v. Westbrook , 400 A2d 160, 162 (Pa. 1979); Turner v. State , 340 So.2d 132, 133 (Fla. App. 2nd Dist. 1976); Tex. Ethics Op . 579 (November 2007);Va. Legal Ethics Op . No. 1776 (May 2003); Ct. Informal Op . 92-23 (July 1992);S.C. Bar Advisory Op . 92-21 (July 1992).  Some courts and committees have allowed for the possibility that there can be sufficient separation of lawyers even within the same office that imputation should not be automatic.  Graves v. State , 619 A.2d 123, 133-134 (Md. Ct. of Special Appeals 1993); Cal. Formal Op . No. 2002-158 (Sept. 2002); Montana Ethics Op . 960924.  Others have decided more generally against a per se rule of imputation of conflicts.  See Bolin v. State , 137 P.3d 136, 145 (Wyo.  2006); State v. Bell , 447 A.2d 525, 529 (N.J. 1982); People v. Robinson , 402 N.E.2d 157, 162 (Ill. 1979); State v. Cook , 171 P.3d 1282, 1292 (Idaho App. 2007).The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals looked at an imputed conflict situation in a Georgia public defender office.  The Court noted that “[t]he current disciplinary rules of the State Bar in Georgia preclude an attorney from representing a client if one of his or her law partners cannot represent that client due to a conflict of interest.”  Reynolds v. Chapman , 253 F.3d 1337, 1344 (2001).  The Court further stated that “[w]hile public defender’s offices have certain characteristics that distinguish them from typical law firms, our cases have not drawn a distinction between the two.”  Reynolds , supra, p. 1343.The general rule on imputing conflicts within a law firm reflects two concerns.  One is the common economic interest among lawyers in a firm.  All lawyers in a firm might benefit if one lawyer sacrifices the interests of one client to serve the interests of a different, more lucrative client.  The firm, as a unified economic entity, might be tempted to serve this common interest, just as a single lawyer representing both clients would be tempted.  Second, it is routine for lawyers in a firm to have access to confidential information of clients.  A lawyer could access the confidential information of one of the firm’s clients to benefit a different client.  For at least these two reasons, a conflict of one lawyer in a private firm is routinely imputed to all the lawyers in the firm.  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Third, Sec. 123, Comment b.The first of these concerns is not relevant to a circuit public defender office.  “The salaried government employee does not have the financial interest in the success of departmental representation that is inherent in private practice.”  Frazier v. State , 257 Ga. 690, 695 (1987) citing ABA Formal Opinion 342.The concerns about confidentiality, however, are another matter.  The chance that a lawyer for one defendant might learn the confidential information of another defendant, even inadvertently, is too great to overlook.Other concerns include the independence of the assistant public defender and the allocation of office resources.  If one supervisor oversees the representation by two assistants of two clients whose interests conflict, the potential exists for an assistant to feel pressured to represent his or her client in a particular way, one that might not be in the client’s best interest.  Furthermore, conflicts could arise within the office over the allocation of investigatory or other resources between clients with conflicting interests.The ethical rules of the State Bar of Georgia should not be relaxed because clients in criminal cases are indigent.  Lawyers must maintain the same level of ethical responsibilities whether their clients are poor or rich.Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office are members of the same “unit” of a legal services organization and therefore constitute a “firm” within the meaning of Rule 1.10.  Lawyers employed in the circuit public defender office in the same judicial circuit may not represent co-defendants when a single lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so.  Conversely, lawyers employed in circuit public defender offices in different judicial circuits are not considered members of the same “unit” or “firm” within the meaning of Rule 1.10.","UrlName":"rule557","Order":79,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"660638f2-b1d4-4ba1-adfc-8a9a2b9b48d0","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 11-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON APRIL 14, 2011 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 11-1 \n \n QUESTION PRESENTED: \n \nEthical Considerations Bearing on Decision of Lawyer to Enter into Flat Fixed Fee Contract to Provide Legal Services. \n \nOPINION: \n \n    Contracts to render legal services for a fixed fee are implicitly allowed by Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct (Ga. R.P.C.) 1.5 (a)(8) so long as the fee is reasonable. It is commonplace that criminal defense lawyers may provide legal services in return for a fixed fee. Lawyers engaged in civil practice also use fixed-fee contracts. A lawyer might, for example, properly charge a fixed fee to draft a will, handle a divorce, or bring a civil action. In these instances the client engaging the lawyer's services is known and the scope of the particular engagement overall can be foreseen and taken into account when the fee for services is mutually agreed. The principal ethical considerations guiding the agreement are that the lawyer must be competent to handle the matter (Ga. R.P.C. 1.1) and the fee charged must be reasonable and not excessive. See Ga. R.P.C. 1.5(a). \n \n    Analysis suggests that the ethical considerations that bear on the decision of a lawyer to enter into a fixed fee contract to provide legal services can grow more complex and nuanced as the specific context changes. What if, for example, the amount of legal services to be provided is indeterminate and cannot be forecast with certainty at the outset? Or that someone else is compensating the lawyer for the services to be provided to the lawyer's client? It is useful to consider such variations along a spectrum starting from the relatively simple case of a fixed fee paid by the client who will receive the legal representation for a contemplated, particular piece of legal work (e.g., drafting a will; defending a criminal prosecution) to appreciate the growing ethical complexity as the circumstances change. \n \n1. A sophisticated user of legal services offers to retain a lawyer or law firm to provide it with an indeterminate amount of legal services of a particular type for an agreed upon fixed fee. \n \n    In today's economic climate experienced users of legal services are increasingly looking for ways to curb the costs of their legal services and to reduce the uncertainty of these costs. Fixed fee contracts for legal services that promise both certainty and the reduction of costs can be an attractive alternative to an hourly-rate fee arrangement. A lawyer contemplating entering into a contract to furnish an unknown and indeterminate amount of legal services to such a client for a fixed fee should bear in mind that the fee set must be reasonable (Ga. R.P.C. 1.5(a)) and that the lawyer will be obligated to provide competent, diligent representation even if the amount of legal services required ultimately makes the arrangement less profitable than initially contemplated. The lawyer must accept and factor in that possibility when negotiating the fixed fee. \n \n    This situation differs from the standard case of a fixed-fee for an identified piece of legal work only because the amount of legal work that will be required is indeterminate and thus it is harder to predict the time and effort that may be required. Even though the difficulty or amount of work that may be required under such an arrangement will likely be harder to forecast at the outset, such arrangements can benefit both the client and the lawyer. The client, by agreeing to give, for example, all of its work of a particular type to a particular lawyer or law firm will presumably be able to get a discount and reduce its costs for legal services; the lawyer or law firm accepting the engagement can be assured of a steady and predictable stream of revenue during the term of the engagement. \n \n    There are, moreover, structural features in this arrangement that tend to harmonize the interests of the client and the lawyer. A lawyer or law firm contemplating such a fixed fee agreement will presumably be able to consult historical data of the client and its own experiences in handling similar matters in the past to arrive at an appropriate fee to charge. And the client who is paying for the legal services has a direct financial interest in their quality. The client will be the one harmed if the quality of legal services provided are inadequate. The client in these circumstances normally is in position to monitor the quality of the legal services it is receiving. It has every incentive not to reduce its expenditures for legal services below the level necessary to receive satisfactory representation in return. Accordingly, such fixed-fee contracts for an indeterminate amount of legal services to be rendered to the client compensating the lawyer for such services are allowable so long as the fee set complies with Ga. R.P.C. 1.5(a) and the lawyer fulfills his or her obligation to provide competent representation (Ga. R.P.C. 1.1) in a diligent manner (Ga. R.P.C. 1.3), even if the work becomes less profitable than anticipated. \n \n2. A third-party offers to retain a lawyer/law firm to handle an indeterminate amount of legal work of a particular type for a fixed fee for those whom the third-party is contractually obligated to defend and indemnify who will be the client of the lawyer/law firm. \n \n    This situation differs from the last because the third-party paying for the legal services is doing so for another who is the client of the lawyer. An example of this situation is where a liability insurer offers a lawyer or law firm a flat fee to defend all of its insureds in motor vehicle accident cases in a certain geographic area. Like the last situation, there is the problem of the indeterminacy of the amount of legal work that may be required for the fixed fee; and, in addition, there is the new factor that the lawyer will be accepting compensation for representing the client from one other than the client. \n \n    Several state bar association ethics committees have addressed the issue of whether a lawyer or law firm may enter into a contract with a liability insurer in which the lawyer or law firm agrees to handle all or some portion of the insurer's defense work for a fixed flat fee. With the exception of one state, Kentucky, <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> all the other state bar associations' ethics opinions have determined that such arrangements are not per se prohibited by their ethics rules and have allowed lawyers to enter into such arrangements, with certain caveats. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2]  </a> It should be noted that all of the arrangements approved involved a flat fee per case, rather than a set fee regardless of the number of cases. \n \n    Although the significance of this fact was not directly discussed in the opinions, it does tend to reduce the risks arising from uncertainty and indeterminacy. Even though some cases may be more complex and time-consuming than the norm, others will be less so. While the lawyer will be obligated under the contract to handle each matter for the same fixed fee, the risk of a far greater volume of cases than projected is significantly reduced by a fixed fee per case arrangement. The lawyer or law firm can afford to increase staff to handle the work load, and under the law of large numbers, a larger pool of cases will tend to even out the average cost per case. \n \n    In analyzing the ethical concerns implicated by lawyers entering into fixed-fee contracts with liability insurers to represent their insureds, several state bar association ethics opinions have warned of the danger presented if the fixed fee does not provide adequate compensation. An arrangement that seriously under-compensates the lawyer could threaten to compromise the lawyer's ability to meet his or her professional obligations as a competent and zealous advocate and adversely affect the lawyer's independent professional judgment on behalf of each client. \n \n    As Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners Opinion 97-7 (December 5, 1997) explains it:\n \n    If a liability insurer pays an attorney or law firm a fixed flat fee which is insufficient in regards to the time and effort spent on the defense work, there is a risk that the attorney's interest in the matter and his or her professional judgment on behalf of the insured may be compromised by the insufficient compensation paid by the insurer. An attorney or law firm cannot enter into such an agreement.\n \n    The same point was echoed in Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 98-2 (June 18, 1998) in which the Florida board determined that such flat fixed-fee contracts are not prohibited under the Florida Rules but cautioned that the lawyer \"may not enter into a set fee agreement in which the set fee is so low as to impair her independent professional judgment or cause her to limit the representation of the insured.\" \n \n    In addition to the Georgia Rules referenced above, a Georgia lawyer considering entering into such an agreement should bear in mind Ga. R.P.C. 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) as well as Ga. R.P.C. 1.7(a) and its Comment [6]. \n \n    Rule 1.8(f) cautious that \"A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless. . . (2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship. . . <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a>\n \n    Ga. R.P.C. 1.7(a) provides that: \n \n    A lawyer shall not represent or continue to represent a client if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interest or the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client, or a third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the client, except as provided in (b) [which allows client consent to cure conflicts in certain circumstances].\n \n    Ga. R.P.C. 1.7(c) makes it clear, however, that client consent to cure a conflict of interest is \"not permissible if the representation . . . (3) involves circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.\" \n \n    When a lawyer agrees to handle an unknown and indeterminable amount of work for a fixed fee, inadequate compensation and work overload may result. In turn, such effects could not only short-change competent and diligent representation of clients but generate a conflict between the lawyer's own personal and economic interests in earning a livelihood and maintaining the practice and effectively and competently representing the assigned clients. See Comment [6] to Rule 1.7: \"The lawyer's personal or economic interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.\" \n \n    As other state bar ethics opinions have concluded, this situation does not lend itself to hard and fast categorical answers. Nothing in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct would forbid such a fee agreement per se. But \"it is clear that a lawyer may not accept a fixed fee arrangement if that will induce the lawyer to curtail providing competent and diligent representation of proper scope and exercising independent professional judgment.\"Michigan Bar Ethics Opinion RI-343 (January 25, 2008). Whether the acceptance of a fixed fee for an indeterminate amount of legal work poses an unacceptable risk that it will cause a violation of the lawyer's obligation to his or her clients cannot be answered in the abstract. It requires a judgment of the lawyer in the particular situation. \n \n    A structural factor tends to militate against an outsized risk of compromising the ability of the lawyer to provide an acceptable quality of legal representation in these circumstances just as it did in the last. The indemnity obligation means the insurer must bear the judgment-related financial risk up to the policy limits. Hence, \"the duty to indemnify encourages insurers to defend prudently.\" <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> A liability insurer helps itself - not just its insured - by spending wisely on the defense of cases if it is liable for the judgment on a covered claim. Coupled with the lawyer's own professional obligation to provide competent representation in each case, this factor lessens the danger that the fixed fee will be set at so low a rate as to compromise appropriate representation of insureds by lawyers retained for this purpose by the insurer. \n \n3. A third-party offers to retain a lawyer or law firm to provide an indeterminate amount of legal work for an indeterminate number of clients where the third-party paying for the legal service has an obligation to furnish the assistance of counsel to those who will be clients of the lawyer but does not have a direct stake in the outcome of any representation. \n \n    A situation where a third party that will not be harmed directly itself by the result of the lawyer's representation is compensating the lawyer with a fixed fee to provide an indeterminate amount of legal services to the clients of the lawyer may present an unacceptable risk that the workload and compensation will compromise the competent and diligent representation of those clients. Examples might be a legal aid society that contracts with an outside lawyer to handle all civil cases of a particular type for a set fee for low-income or indigent clients or a governmental or private entity that contracts with independent contractor lawyers to provide legal representation to certain indigent criminal defendants. \n \n    In contrast to the earlier sets of circumstances, several structural factors that might ameliorate the danger of the arrangement resulting in an unmanageable work load and inadequate compensation that could compromise the legal representation are absent in this situation. First, and most obviously, there is a disconnection between the adequacy of the legal service rendered and an impact on the one paying for the legal representation. The one paying for the legal services is neither the client itself nor one obligated to indemnify the client and who therefore bears a judgment-related risk. While the third-party payor is in a position to monitor the adequacy of the legal representation it provides through the lawyers it engages and has an interest in assuring effective representation, it does not bear the same risk of inadequate representation as the client itself in situation No. 1 or the liability insurer in situation No. 2. \n \n    Second, and perhaps less obviously, this last situation is fraught with even greater risk from indeterminacy if there is no ceiling set on the number of cases that can be assigned and there is no provision for adjusting the agreed-upon compensation if the volume of cases or the demands of certain cases turns out to far exceed what was contemplated. Sheer workload can compromise the quality of legal services whatever the arrangement for compensation. But, where the payment is set at a fixed annual fee rather than on a fixed fee per case basis, the ability of the lawyer to staff up to handle a greater-than-expected volume with increased revenue is removed. \n \n    Accordingly, as compared to the other examples, the risk that inadequate compensation and case overload may eventually compromise the adequacy of the legal representation is heightened in these circumstances. A lawyer entering into such a contract must assess carefully the likelihood that such an arrangement in actual operation, if not on its face, will pose significant risks of non-compliance with Ga. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.8(f) or 1.7. \n \n    In this regard, a fee arrangement that is so seriously inadequate that it systematically threatens to undermine the ability of the lawyer to deliver competent legal services is not a reasonable fee. Ga. R.P.C. 1.5 Comment [3] warns that:\n \n    An agreement may not be made, the terms of which might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client's interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required. . . .\n \n   And Comment [1] to Ga. R.P.C. 1.3 reminds that \"A lawyer's work load should be controlled so that each matter can be handled adequately.\" \n \n   A failure to assess realistically at the outset the volume of cases and the adequacy of the compensation and to make an informed judgment about the lawyer's ability to render competent and diligent representation to the clients under the agreement could also result in prohibited conflicts of interest under Ga. R. P.C. 1.7(a). If an un-capped caseload or under-compensation forces a lawyer to underserve some clients by limiting preparation <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\"> [5] </a> and advocacy in order to handle adequately the representation of other clients or the fixed fee systematically confronts the lawyer with choosing between the lawyer's own economic interests and the adequate representation of clients a conflict of interest is present. Ga. R. P. C. 1.7 (c) makes it clear that a conflict that renders it \"reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the effected clients \"cannot be under-taken or continued, even with client consent. \n \n   It is not possible in the abstract to say categorically whether any particular agreement by a lawyer to provide legal services in this third situation violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. However, arrangements that obligate lawyers to handle an unknown and indeterminate number of cases without any ceiling on case volume or any off-setting increase in compensation due to the case volume carry very significant risks that competent and diligent representation of clients may be compromised and that the lawyer's own interests or duties to another client will adversely affect the representation. Lawyers contemplating entering into such arrangements need to give utmost attention to these concerns and exercise a most considered judgment about the likelihood that the contractual obligations that they will be accepting can be satisfied in a manner fully consistent with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer faced with a representation that will result in the violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct must decline or terminate it, Ga. R. P. C. 1.16(a)(1) <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\"> [6] </a> , unless ordered by a court to continue. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\"> [7] </a> \n \n <a name=\"ftn1\"> 1. </a> Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Opinion KBA E - 368 (July 1994). This opinion prohibiting per se lawyers from entering into set flat fee contracts to do all of a liability insurer's defense work was adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in American Insurance Association v. Kentucky Bar Association , 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996). The result and rationale are strongly criticized by Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle Over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 Conn. Ins. L. J. 205 (1997-98). \n \n <a name=\"ftn2\"> 2. </a> Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 98-2 (June 18, 1998) (An attorney may accept a set fee per case from an insurance company to defend all of the insurer's third party insurance defense work unless the attorney concludes that her independent professional judgment will be affected by the agreement); Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct Ethics Opinion 86-13 (February 11, 1987) (agreement to provide specific professional services for a fixed fee is not improper where service is inherently capable of being stated and circumscribed and any additional professional services that become necessary will be compensated at attorney's regular hourly rate.); Michigan Bar Ethics Opinion RI-343 (January 25, 2008) (Not a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to contract with an insurance company to represent its insureds on a fixed fee basis, so long as the arrangement does not adversely affect the lawyer's independent professional judgment and the lawyer represents the insured with competence and diligence.); New Hampshire Bar Association  Formal Ethics Opinion 1990-91|5 (Fixed fee for insurance defense work is not per se prohibited; but attorney, no matter what the fee arrangement, is duty bound to act with diligence.); Ohio Supreme Court Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Opinion 97-7 (December 5, 1997) (Fixed fee agreement to do all of liability insurer's defense work must provide reasonable and adequate compensation. The set fee must not be so inadequate that it compromises the attorney's professional obligations as a competent and zealous advocate); Oregon State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion No. 2005-98 (Lawyer may enter flat fee per case contract to represent insureds but this does not limit, in any way lawyer's obligations to each client to render competent and diligent representation. \"Lawyer owes same duty to 'flat fee' clients that lawyer would own to any other client.\"\"Lawyers may not accept a fee so low as to compel the conclusion that insurer was seeking to shirk its duties to insureds and to enlist lawyer's assistance in doing so.\"); Wisconsin State Bar Ethics Opinion E-83-15 (Fixed fee for each case of insurance defense is permissible; attorney reminded of duty to represent a client both competently and zealously.) \n \n <a name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> . Rule 5.4(c) similarly commands that:  \"A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.\" \n \n <a name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> . Silver, note 1 at 236. \n \n <a name=\"ftn5\"> 5 </a> . Ga. R. P. C. 1.1 requires that a lawyer \"provide competent representation to a client.\"Comment [5] spells out the thoroughness and preparation that a lawyer must put forth, noting that \"[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation . (emphasis added). \n \n <a name=\"ftn6\"> 6 </a> . See ABA Formal Opinion 06-441 (May 2006) titled \"Ethical Obligations of Lawyers Who Represent Indigent Criminal Defendants When Excessive Caseloads Interfere With Competent and Diligent Representation,\"suggesting that if a caseload becomes too burdensome for a lawyer to handle competently and ethically the lawyer \"must decline to accept new cases rather than withdraw from existing cases if the acceptance of a new case will result in her workload becoming excessive.\" \n \n <a name=\"ftn7\"> 7 </a> . \". . . When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.\"Ga. R. P. C. 1.16(c). \n \n    The second publication of this opinion appeared in the June 2011 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about June 6, 2011. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on June 23, 2011. No review was requested within the 20-day review period, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has not ordered review on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. \n ","UrlName":"rule536","Order":80,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d0f6cc2e-d9eb-4fa2-823c-4b4489dcb26e","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 13-1","Content":"FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 13-1 Approved And Issued On September 22, 2014 Pursuant To Bar Rule 4-403 By Order of The Supreme Court Of Georgia <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-131.pdf?sfvrsn=1ef116f6_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S14U0705</a>                                                     QUESTIONS PRESENTED : 1.    Does a Lawyer <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct when he/she conducts a “witness only” real estate closing? 2.    Can a Lawyer who is closing a real estate transaction meet his/her obligations under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by reviewing, revising as necessary, and adopting documents sent from a lender or from other sources? 3.    Must all funds received by a Lawyer in a real estate closing be deposited into and disbursed from the Lawyer’s trust account? SUMMARY ANSWER : 1.    A Lawyer may not ethically conduct a “witness only” closing. Unless parties to a transaction are handling it pursuant to Georgia’s pro se exemption, Georgia law requires that a Lawyer handle a real estate closing (see O.C.G.A § 15-19-50, UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and Formal Advisory Opinion No. 86-5) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> . When handling a real estate closing in Georgia a Lawyer does not absolve himself/herself from violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by claiming that he/she has acted only as a witness and not as an attorney. (See UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1). 2.    The closing Lawyer must review all documents to be used in the transaction, resolve any errors in the paperwork, detect and resolve ambiguities in title or title defects, and otherwise act with competence. A Lawyer conducting a real estate closing may use documents prepared by others after ensuring their accuracy, making necessary revisions, and adopting the work. 3.    A Lawyer who receives funds in connection with a real estate closing must deposit them into and disburse them from his/her trust account or the trust account of another Lawyer. (See Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(II) and Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1). OPINION:     A “witness only” closing occurs when an individual presides over the execution of deeds of conveyance and other closing documents but purports to do so merely as a witness and notary, not as someone who is practicing law. (UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2). In order to protect the public from those not properly trained or qualified to render these services, Lawyers are required to “be in control of the closing process from beginning to end.” (Formal Advisory Opinion No. 00-3). A Lawyer who purports to handle a closing in the limited role of a witness violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.     In recent years many out-of-state lenders, including some of the largest banking institutions in the country, have changed the way they manage the real estate transactions they fund. The following practices of these lenders have been reported. These national lenders hire attorneys who agree to serve the limited role of presiding over the execution of the documents (i.e., “witness only” closings). In advance of a “witness only” closing an attorney typically receives “signing instructions” and a packet of documents prepared by the lender or at the lender’s direction. The instructions specifically warn the attorney NOT to review the documents or give legal advice to any of the parties to the transaction. The “witness only” attorney obtains the appropriate signatures on the documents, notarizes them, and returns them by mail to the lender or to a third party entity.     The Lawyer’s failure to review closing documents can facilitate foreclosure fraud, problems with title, and other errors that may not be detected until years later when the owner of a property attempts to refinance, sell or convey it.     A Lawyer must provide competent representation and must exercise independent professional judgment in rendering advice. (Rules 1.1 and 2.1, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct). When a Lawyer agrees to serve as a mere figurehead, so that it appears there is a Lawyer “handling” a closing, the Lawyer violates his/her obligations under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 8.4). The Lawyer’s acceptance of the closing documents or signature on the closing statement is the imprimatur of a successful transaction. Because UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and the Supreme Court Order adopting it require (subject to the pro se exception) that only a Lawyer can close a real estate transaction, the Lawyer signing the closing statement or accepting the closing documents would be found to be doing so in his or her capacity as a Lawyer. Therefore, when a closing Lawyer purports to act merely as a witness, this is a misrepresentation of the Lawyer’s role in the transaction. Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(4) provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in “conduct involving . . . misrepresentation.”     The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct allow Lawyers to outsource both legal and nonlegal work. (See ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 08-451.) A Lawyer does not violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct by receiving documents from the client or elsewhere for use in a closing transaction, even though the Lawyer has not supervised the preparation of the documents. However, the Lawyer is responsible for utilizing these documents in compliance with the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, and must review and adopt work used in a closing. Georgia law allows a title insurance company or other persons to examine records of title to real property, prepare abstracts of title, and issue related insurance. (O.C.G.A. § 15-19-53). Other persons may provide attorneys with paralegal and clerical services, so long as “at all times the attorney receiving the information or services shall maintain full professional and direct responsibility to his clients for the information and services received.” (O.C.G.A. § 15-19-54; also see UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2 and Rules 5.3 and 5.5, Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct).     The obligation to review, revise, approve and adopt documents used in a real estate closing applies to the entire series of events that comprise a closing. (Formal Advisory Opinions No. 86-5 and 00-3, and UPL Advisory Opinion No. 2003-2). While the Supreme Court has not explicitly enumerated what all of those events are, they may include, but not be limited to: (i) rendering an opinion as to title and the resolution of any defects in marketable title; (ii) preparation of deeds of conveyance, including warranty deeds, quitclaim deeds, deeds to secure debt, and mortgage deeds; (iii) overseeing and participating in the execution of instruments conveying title; (iv) supervising the recordation of documents conveying title; and (v) in those situations where the Lawyer receives funds, depositing and disbursing those funds in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). Even if some of these steps are performed elsewhere, the Lawyer maintains full professional and direct responsibility for the entire transaction and for the services rendered to the client.     Finally, as in any transaction in which a Lawyer receives client funds, a Lawyer must comply with Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(II) when handling a real estate closing. If the Lawyer receives funds on behalf of a client or in any other fiduciary capacity he/she must deposit the funds into, and administer them from, a trust account in accordance with Rule 1.15(II). (Formal Advisory Opinion No. 04-1). It should be noted that Georgia law also allows the lender to disburse funds. (O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13(a)(10)). A Lawyer violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct when he/she delivers closing proceeds to a title company or to a third party settlement company for disbursement instead of depositing them into and disbursing them from an attorney escrow account. __________________________________________________ <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1. </a> Bar Rule 1.0(j) provides that “Lawyer” denotes a person authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its Rules to practice law in the State of Georgia, including persons admitted to practice in this state pro hac vice. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2. </a> The result is to exclude Nonlawyers as defined by Bar Rule 1.0(k), Domestic Lawyers as defined by Bar Rule 1.0(d), and Foreign Lawyers as defined by Bar Rule 1.0(f), from the real estate closing process.","UrlName":"rule572","Order":81,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0607ab69-dce9-40fe-943c-d25edbc1a458","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 13-2","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA \nISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD \nPURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON OCTOBER 23, 2013 \nFORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 13-2 \n<a href=https://www.gabar.org/"http://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=33056\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S14U0706</a> \n QUESTIONS PRESENTED: \n<ol> \n <li>May a lawyer representing a plaintiff personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?</li> \n <li>May a lawyer seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds?</li> \n</ol>\n SUMMARY ANSWER: \n<ol> \n <li>A lawyer may not ethically agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such agreements violate Rule 1.8(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from providing financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation.</li> \n <li>Further, a lawyer may not seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such conduct violates Rule 8.4(a)(1) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits a lawyer from knowingly inducing another lawyer to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.</li> \n</ol>\n OPINION: \nLawyers often represent clients in civil actions, such as personal injury or medical malpractice, who have incurred substantial medical bills as a result of their injuries. These lawyers are required to work diligently to obtain a fair settlement for these clients. Obtaining a settlement or judgment can sometimes take years.\nThe proper disbursement of settlement proceeds is a tremendous responsibility for a lawyer who receives such proceeds. Clients are often in need of funds from the settlement. Lawyers need payment for their services. And third persons such as medical providers, insurance carriers, or Medicare and Medicaid seek reimbursement of their expenses from the settlement.\n Increasingly, lawyers who represent plaintiffs are being asked to personally indemnify the opposing party and counsel from claims by third persons to the settlement proceeds. Lawyers are concerned not only about whether it is ethical to enter into such an agreement but also whether it is ethical to seek to require other lawyers to enter into such an agreement. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> \n 1. A lawyer may not ethically agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. \nThe first issue is governed by Rule 1.8(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as follows:\n“A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:\n1. a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; or\n2. a lawyer representing a client unable to pay court costs and expenses of litigation may pay those costs and expenses on behalf of the client.”\nComment 4 provides further guidance:\n“Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain ultimately liable for financial assistance provided by the lawyer. It further limits permitted assistance to court costs and expenses directly related to litigation. Accordingly, permitted expenses would include expenses of investigation, medical diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses would not include living expenses or medical expenses other than those listed above.”\n Financial assistance can take many forms. Such assistance includes gifts, loans and loan guarantees. Any type of guarantee to cover a client’s debts constitutes financial assistance. Rule 1.8(e) provides narrow exceptions to the prohibition on a lawyer providing financial assistance to a client in connection with litigation. Those exceptions do not apply when a lawyer enters into a personal indemnification agreement. Because a lawyer, under Rule 1.8(e), may not provide financial assistance to a client by, for example, paying or advancing the client’s medical expenses in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, it follows that a lawyer may not agree, either voluntarily or at the insistence of the client or parties being released, to guarantee or accept ultimate responsibility for such expenses. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> \n Moreover, any insistence by a client that the lawyer accept a settlement offer containing an indemnification agreement on the part of the lawyer might require the lawyer to withdraw from the representation. The lawyer may otherwise be in violation of Rule 1.16(a)(1), which provides that “a lawyer shall … withdraw from the representation of a client if … the representation will result in violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.” <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> \n 2. A lawyer may not seek to require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third persons to the settlement funds. \n The second issue is governed by Rule 8.4(a)(1), which provides that “It shall be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for a lawyer to … violate or knowingly attempt to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.” (emphasis added). Comment 1 to Rule 8.4 also provides direction:\n“The prohibitions of this Rule as well as the prohibitions of Bar Rule 4-102 prevent a lawyer from attempting to violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or from knowingly aiding or abetting, or providing direct or indirect assistance or inducement to another person who violates or attempts to violate a rule of professional conduct. A lawyer may not avoid a violation of the rules by instructing a nonlawyer, who is not subject to the rules, to act where the lawyer cannot.”\n<blockquote style=\"margin-left: 80px\"></blockquote>\n In light of the conclusion that plaintiff’s counsel may not agree to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third parties, it is also improper for a lawyer representing a defendant to seek to require that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third parties to the settlement funds. Nor can the lawyer representing the defendant avoid such a violation by instructing his client or the insurance company to propose or demand the indemnification. <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> \n_______________________________________________\n <a name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> .This opinion is intended to address the ethical concerns associated with a lawyer’s agreement to indemnify. This opinion does not address the legal or ethical issues involved in the disbursement of settlement funds.\n\n <a name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> . This opinion is consistent with advisory opinions from other states holding that an agreement by a client’s lawyer to guarantee a client’s obligations to third parties amounts to guaranteeing financial assistance to the client, in violation of Rule 1.8(e) or its equivalent. See, e.g. , Alabama State Bar Ethics Opinion RO 2011-01; Arizona State Bar Ethics Opinion 03-05; Delaware State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 2011-1; Florida Bar Staff Opinion 30310 (2011); Illinois State Bar Association Advisory Opinion 06-01 (violation of Illinois Rule 1.8(d), which is similar to Rule 1.8(e)); Indiana State Bar Association Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1 of 2005 (non-Medicare and Medicaid settlement agreement that requires counsel to indemnify opposing party from subrogation liens and third-party claims violates Indiana rules); Maine Ethics Opinion 204 (2011); Missouri Formal Advisory Opinion 125 (2008); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics Formal Opinion 2010-3; Supreme Court of Ohio Opinion 2011-1; Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee Opinion 2011-6 (2012); South Carolina Ethics Advisory Opinion 08-07; Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion 11-01; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1858 (2011); Washington State Bar Association Advisory Opinion 1736 (1997); Wisconsin Formal Opinion E-87-11 (1998).\n\nMany of these jurisdictions also hold that an agreement to guarantee a client’s obligations to third parties also violates Rule 1.7(a) or its equivalent regarding conflicts of interest. In reaching its decision, the Board does not consider it necessary to address that issue here.\n <a name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> .The mere suggestion by the client that the lawyer guarantee or indemnify against claims would not require withdrawal by the lawyer, only the client’s demand that the lawyer do so would require withdrawal. See Rule 1.16(a)(1) (“A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or violates the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.”).\n\n <a name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> .This opinion is consistent with advisory opinions from other states holding that a lawyer’s demand that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from claims by third parties to the settlement funds violates Rule 8.4(a)(1) or its equivalent. See, e.g. , Alabama State Bar Ethics Opinion RO 2011-01; Florida Bar Staff Opinion 30310 (2011); Missouri Formal Advisory Opinion 125 (2008); Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics Formal Opinion 2010-3; Supreme Court of Ohio Opinion 2011-1; Utah Ethics Advisory Opinion 11-01; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1858 (2011)). \n \n\n The second publication of this opinion appeared in the December 2013 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about December 19, 2013. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on January 21, 2014. No review was requested within the 20-day review period. On March 28, 2014, the Supreme Court of Georgiai issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.","UrlName":"rule569","Order":82,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"d9515c0b-e7cb-489c-937b-a0a3195f0368","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-1","Content":" STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD PURSUANT TO RULE 4-403 ON JULY 25, 2016 FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16-1 (Redrafted Version of FAO No. 03-2) <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-161.pdf?sfvrsn=e4dc72e3_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S16U1765</a>                                                     QUESTION PRESENTED: Does the obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, apply as between two jointly represented clients? SUMMARY ANSWER: The obligation of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, applies as between two jointly represented clients. An attorney must honor one client’s request that information be kept confidential from the other jointly represented client. Honoring the client’s request will, in almost all circumstances, require the attorney to withdraw from the joint representation. OPINION: Unlike the attorney-client privilege, jointly represented clients do not lose the protection of confidentiality described in Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, as to each other by entering into the joint representation. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, Opinion No. 296 (2000) and Committee on Professional Ethics, New York State Bar Association, Opinion No. 555 (1984). Nor do jointly represented clients impliedly consent to a sharing of confidences with each other.When one client in a joint representation requests that some information relevant to the representation be kept confidential from the other client, the attorney must honor the request and then determine if continuing with the representation while honoring the request will: a) be inconsistent with the lawyer’s obligations to keep the other client informed under Rule 1.4, Communication; b) materially and adversely affect the representation of the other client under Rule 1.7, Conflict of Interest: General Rule; or c) both.The lawyer has discretion to continue with the joint representation while not revealing the confidential information to the other client only to the extent that he or she can do so consistent with these rules. If maintaining the confidence will constitute a violation of Rule 1.4 or Rule 1.7, as it almost certainly will, the lawyer should maintain the confidence and discontinue the joint representation. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> Consent to conflicting representations, of course, is permitted under Rule 1.7. Consent to continued joint representation in these circumstances, however, ordinarily would not be available either because it would be impossible to obtain the required informed consent without disclosing the confidential information in question <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> or because consent is not permitted under Rule 1.7 in that the continued joint representation would “involve circumstances rendering it reasonably unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the affected clients.” Rule 1.7 (c) (3).The potential problems that confidentiality can create between jointly represented clients make it especially important that clients understand the requirements of a joint representation prior to entering into one. When an attorney is considering a joint representation, informed consent of the clients, confirmed in writing, is required prior to the representation “if there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s . . . duties to [either of the jointly represented clients] . . . will materially and adversely affect the representation of [the other] client.” Rule 1.7. Whether or not informed consent is required, however, a prudent attorney will always discuss with clients wishing to be jointly represented the need for sharing confidences between them, obtain their consent to such sharing, and inform them of the consequences of either client’s nevertheless insisting on confidentiality as to the other client and, in effect, revoking the consent. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> If it appears to the attorney that either client is uncomfortable with the required sharing of confidential information that joint representation requires, the attorney should reconsider whether joint representation is appropriate in the circumstances. If a putative jointly represented client indicates a need for confidentiality from another putative jointly represented client, then it is very likely that joint representation is inappropriate and the putative clients need individual representation by separate attorneys.The above guidelines, derived from the requirements of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and consistent with the primary advisory opinions from other jurisdictions, are general in nature. There is no doubt that their application in some specific contexts will create additional specific concerns seemingly unaddressed in the general ethical requirements. We are, however, without authority to depart from the Rules of Professional Conduct that are intended to be generally applicable to the profession. For example, there is no doubt that the application of these requirements to the joint representation of spouses in estate planning will sometimes place attorneys in the awkward position of having to withdraw from a joint representation of spouses because of a request by one spouse to keep relevant information confidential from the other and, by withdrawing, not only ending trusted lawyer-client relationships but also essentially notifying the other client that an issue of confidentiality has arisen. See, e.g., Florida State Bar Opinion 95-4 (1997) (“The attorney may not reveal confidential information to the wife when the husband tells the attorney that he wishes to provide for a beneficiary that is unknown to the wife. The attorney must withdraw from the representation of both husband and wife because of the conflict presented when the attorney must maintain the husband’s separate confidences regarding the joint representation.”) A large number of highly varied recommendations have been made about how to deal with these specific concerns in this specific practice setting. See, e.g., Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses , 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1253 (1994); and, Collett, And The Two Shall Become As One . . . Until The Lawyers Are Done , 7 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics &Public Policy 101 (1993) for discussion of these recommendations. Which recommendations are followed, we believe, is best left to the practical wisdom of the good lawyers practicing in this field so long as the general ethical requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct as described in this Opinion are met.___________________________________________<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7, cmt. 31 (“As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation.”)<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> See GEORGIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.0(h) (defining “informed consent” as “the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct”); see also id ., cmt. 6 (“The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct and a discussion of the client’s or other person’s options and alternatives.”)<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.7, cmt. 31 (advising that “[a] lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other). The second publication of this opinion appeared in the June 2016 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal , which was mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia on or about June 7. The opinion was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on July 1, 2016. No review was requested within the 20-day review period. On July 25, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. In accordance with Rule 4-403(d), this opinion is binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.  ","UrlName":"rule590","Order":83,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"9b253c5e-3f55-491e-8e49-20b048a5a176","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-2","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION 16-2 Approved And Issued On April 16, 2018 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order Of The Supreme Court Of Georgia <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-162.pdf?sfvrsn=4ea19b8c_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S17U0553</a> QUESTION PRESENTED: May an attorney who has been appointed to serve both as legal counsel and as guardian ad litem for a child in a termination of parental rights case advocate termination over the child's objection? SUMMARY ANSWER: When it becomes clear that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the child's wishes and the attorney's considered opinion of the child's best interests, the attorney must withdraw from his or her role as the child's guardian ad litem. OPINION: Relevant Rules This question squarely implicates several of Georgia's Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly, Rule 1.14.  Rule 1.14, dealing with an attorney's ethical duties towards a child or other client with diminished capacity, provides that \"the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.\"Comment 1 to Rule 1.14 goes on to note that \"children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> This question also involves Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation, and Rule 1.7, governing conflicts of interest. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> Comment 2 to Rule 1.7 indicates that \"[l]oyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other competing responsibilities or interests.  The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> This situation also implicates Rule 3.7, the lawyer as a witness, to the extent that the guardian ad litem must testify and may need to advise the court of the conflict between the child's expressed wishes and what he deems the best interests of the child.  Finally, Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, may also be violated if the attorney presents the disagreement to the Court.Statutory Background Georgia law requires the appointment of an attorney for a child as the child's counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> The statute also provides that the court shall additionally appoint a guardian ad litem for the child, and that the child's counsel is eligible to serve as the guardian ad litem unless there is a conflict of interest between the lawyer’s duty as an attorney for the child and the lawyer’s “considered opinion” of the child’s best interest as the guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\"> [5] </a> In addition to the child's statutory right to counsel, a child in a termination of parental rights proceedings also has a federal constitutional right to counsel. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\"> [6] </a> In Georgia, a guardian ad litem's role is \"to protect the interests of the child and to investigate and present evidence to the court on the child's behalf.\" <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\"> [7] </a> The best interests of the child standard is paramount in considering changes or termination of parental custody.  See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 276 Ga. 372, 377 (2003) (\"[t]he paramount concern in any change of custody must be the best interests and welfare of the minor child \").  The Georgia Court of Appeals held in In re A.P. based on the facts of that case that the attorney-guardian ad litem dual representation provided for under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-98(a) (the predecessor to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d)) does not result in an inherent conflict of interest, given that \"the fundamental duty of both a guardian ad litem and an attorney is to act in the best interests of the [child]. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn8\"> [8] </a> This advisory opinion is necessarily limited to the ethical obligations of an attorney once a conflict of interest in the representation has already arisen.  Therefore, we need not address whether or not the dual representation provided for under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d) results in an inherent conflict of interest. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn9\"> [9] </a> Discussion The child's attorney's first responsibility is to his or her client. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn10\"> [10] </a> Rule 1.2 makes clear that an attorney in a normal attorney-client relationship is bound to defer to a client's wishes regarding the ultimate objectives of the representation. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn11\"> [11] </a> Rule 1.14 requires the attorney to maintain, \"as far as reasonably possible . . . a normal client-lawyer relationship with the [child]. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn12\"> [12] </a> An attorney who \"reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest \"may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn13\"> [13] </a> Importantly, the Rule does not simply direct the attorney to act in the client's best interests, as determined solely by the attorney.  At the point that the attorney concludes that the child's wishes and best interests are in conflict, the attorney must petition the court for removal as the child's guardian ad litem.  The attorney must consider Rule 1.6 before disclosing any confidential client information other than that there is a conflict which requires such removal.  If the conflict between the attorney's view of the child's best interests and the child's view of his or her own interests is severe, the attorney may seek to withdraw entirely under Rule 1.16(b)(3). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn14\"> 14 </a> The attorney may not withdraw as the child's counsel and then seek appointment as the child's guardian ad litem, as the child would then be a former client to whom the former attorney/guardian ad litem would owe a continuing duty of confidentiality. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn15\"> 15 </a> This conclusion is in accord with many other states. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn16\"> 16 </a> For instance, Ohio permits an attorney to be appointed both as a child's counsel and as the child's guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn17\"> 17 </a> Ohio ethics rules prohibit continued service in the dual roles when there is a conflict between the attorney's determination of best interests and the child's express wishes. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn18\"> 18 </a> Court rules and applicable statutes require the court to appoint another person as guardian ad litem for the child. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn19\"> 19 </a> An attorney who perceives a conflict between his role as counsel and as guardian ad litem is expressly instructed to notify the court of the conflict and seek withdrawal as guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn20\"> 20 </a> This solution (withdrawal from the guardian ad litem role once it conflicts with the role as counsel) is in accord with an attorney's duty to the client. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn21\"> 21 </a> Connecticut's Bar Association provided similar advice to its attorneys, and Connecticut's legislature subsequently codified that position into law. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn22\"> 22 </a> Similarly, in Massachusetts, an attorney representing a child must represent the child's expressed preferences, assuming that the child is reasonably able to make \"an adequately considered decision . . . even if the attorney believes the child's position to be unwise or not in the child's best interest. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn23\"> 23 </a> Even if a child is unable to make an adequately considered decision, the attorney still has the duty to represent the child's expressed preferences unless doing so would \"place the child at risk of substantial harm. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn24\"> 24 </a> In New Jersey, a court-appointed attorney needs to be \"a zealous advocate for the wishes of the client . . . unless the decisions are patently absurd or pose an undue risk of harm. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn25\"> 25 </a> New Jersey's Supreme Court was skeptical that an attorney's duty of advocacy could be successfully reconciled with concern for the client's best interests. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn26\"> 26 </a> In contrast, other states have developed a \"hybrid \"model for attorneys in child custody cases serving simultaneously as counsel for the child and as their guardian ad litem. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn27\"> 27 </a> This \"hybrid \"approach \"necessitates a modified application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn28\"> 28 </a> That is, the states following the hybrid model, acknowledge the \"'hybrid' nature of the role of attorney/guardian ad litem which necessitates a modified application of the Rules of Professional Conduct,\"excusing strict adherence to those rules. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn29\"> 29 </a> The attorney under this approach is bound by the client's best interests, not the client's expressed interests. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn30\"> 30 </a> The attorney must present the child's wishes and the reasons the attorney disagrees to the court. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn31\"> 31 </a> Although acknowledging that this approach has practical benefits, we conclude that strict adherence to the Rules of Professional Conduct is the sounder approach.Conclusion At the point that the attorney concludes that the child's wishes and best interests are in conflict, the attorney must petition the court for removal as the child's guardian ad litem and must consider Rule 1.6 before disclosing any confidential client information other than that there is a conflict which requires such removal.  If the conflict between the attorney's view of the child's best interests and the child's view of his or her own interests is severe, the attorney may seek to withdraw entirely following Rule 1.16(b)(3).________________________________________<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14, Comment 1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.2, 1.7. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, Comment 4. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(b) (“The court shall appoint an attorney for a child in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The appointment shall be made as soon as practicable to ensure adequate representation of such child and, in any event, before the first court hearing that may substantially affect the interests of such child”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn5\"> 5 </a> O.C.G.A. § 15-11-262(d) (“The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child in a termination proceeding; provided, however, that such guardian ad litem may be the same person as the child's attorney unless or until there is a conflict of interest between the attorney's duty to such child as such child's attorney and the attorney's considered opinion of such child's best interests as guardian ad litem”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn6\"> 6 </a> Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359-61 (N.D. Ga. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 2010 WL 1558980 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2010). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn7\"> 7 </a> See Padilla v. Melendez, 228 Ga. App. 460, 462 (1997). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ft87\"> 8 </a> In re A.P., 291 Ga. App. 690, 691 (2008). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn9\"> 9 </a> See, e.g., Wis. Ethics Op. E-89-13 (finding no inherent conflict of interest with the dual representation of an attorney and guardian but concluding that if a conflict does arise based on specific facts, the attorney's ethical responsibility is to resign as the guardian). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn10\"> 10 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn11\"> 11 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2, Comment 1. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn12\"> 12 </a> Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn13\"> 13 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn14\"> 14 </a> Rule 1.16 (b)(3) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a lawyer may seek to withdraw if “the client insists upon pusuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn15\"> 15 </a> See Rule 1.6(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn16\"> 16 </a> See, e.g., Wis. Ethics Op. E-89-13, Conflicts of Interests; Guardians (1989) (providing that dual representation as counsel and guardian ad litem is permitted until conflict between the roles occurs, and then the attorney must petition the court for a new guardian ad litem); Ariz. Ethics Op. 86-13, Juvenile Proceedings; Guardians (1986) (providing that a \"lawyer may serve as counsel and guardian ad litem for a minor child in a dependency proceeding so long as there is no conflict between the child's wishes and the best interests of the child \"). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn17\"> 17 </a> Ohio Board of Comm'rs. on Griev. and Discipline, Op. 2006-5, 2006 WL 2000108, at*1 (2006). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn18\"> 18 </a> Id. at *2. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn19\"> 19 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn20\"> 20 </a> Id., quoting In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St. 3d 229, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985) (superseded by statute on other grounds). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn21\"> 21 </a> Id. See also Baxter, 17 Ohio St. 3d at 232 (\"[w]hen an attorney is appointed to represent a person and is also appointed guardian ad litem for that person, his first and highest duty is to zealously represent his client within the bounds of the law and to champion his client's cause \"). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn22\"> 22 </a> See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof. Ethics, CT Eth. Op. 94-29, 1994 WL 780846, at *3 (1994); In re Tayquon, 821 A.2d 796, 803-04 (Conn. App. 2003) (discussing revisions to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-129a). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn23\"> 23 </a> See Mass Comm. For Public Counsel Servs., Performance Standards, Standard 1.6(b), at 8-10, available at http://www.publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_manual/private_counsel_manual_pdf/chapters/chapter_4_sections/civil/trial_panel_standards.pdf; See also In re Georgette, 785 N.E.2d 356, 368 (Mass. 2003). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn24\"> 24 </a> Mass Comm. For Public Counsel Servs., Performance Standards, Standard 1.6(d) at 11. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn25\"> 25 </a> In re Mason, 701 A.2d 979, 982 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (internal citations omitted). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn26\"> 26 </a> See In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1285 (N.J. 1994). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn27\"> 27 </a> See Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 153-54 (Wyo. 1998); In re Marriage of Rolfe, 216 Mont. 39, 51-53, 699 P.2d 79, 86-87 (Mont. 1985); In re Christina W., 639 S.E.2d at 777 (requiring the guardian to give the child's opinions consideration \"where the child has demonstrated an adequate level of competency [but] there is no requirement that the child's wishes govern.\"); see also Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 390 (Alaska 1977) (\"[I]t is equally plain that the guardian is not required to advocate whatever placement might seem preferable to a client of tender years.\") (superseded by statute on other grounds); Alaska Bar Assn Ethics Committee Op. 85-4 (November 8, 1985)(concluding that duty of confidentiality is modified in order to effectuate the child's best interests); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee Op. No. 07-02 (June 7, 2007) (noting that Utah statute requires a guardian ad litem to notify the Court if the minor's wishes differ from the attorney's determination of best interests). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn28\"> 28 </a> Clark, 953 P.2d at 153. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn29\"> 29 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn30\"> 30 </a> Id. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn31\"> 31 </a> Id. at 153-54; Rolfe, 699 P.2d at 87. <div></div> </div>","UrlName":"rule600","Order":84,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"53dcc89b-edd1-496d-a18f-a08bc17059cc","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-3","Content":"STATE BAR OF GEORGIA ISSUED BY THE FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION BOARD PURSUANT TO BAR RULE 4-403 ON JUNE 14, 2016 FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 16-3 (Proposed FAO No. 15-R1) <a target=\"_blank\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"/docs/default-source/office-of-general-counsel/sc-orders_opinions/sc-order-fao-163.pdf?sfvrsn=f384af46_1\%22>Supreme Court Docket No. S17U0554</a>QUESTION PRESENTED: May a sole practitioner <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[1] </a>use a firm name that includes “group,” “firm,” “& Associates”?SUMMARY ANSWER: A sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “group” or “& Associates” because both terms would incorrectly imply that the sole practitioner practices with other lawyers. However, a sole practitioner may use a firm name that includes “firm.”OPINION: The question presented is governed by Rules 7.1 and 7.5 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 7.5(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.” Rule 7.1(a), in turn, provides that advertisements about a lawyer’s services may not be “false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading.” A firm name is a form of advertising about a lawyer’s services, and so a firm name may not be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading either. Rule 7.5 Comment [1]. In addition, Rule 7.5(d) provides that a firm name may state or imply that a lawyer “practice[s] in a partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.”In applying these rules to the question presented, the Board is mindful that lawyer advertising is commercial speech that is entitled to some protection by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. , 433 U.S. 350 (1977); In re Robbins , 266 Ga. 681 (1996) (per curiam). Commercial speech is not entitled to absolute protection, and false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech may be freely regulated or even prohibited entirely. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. , 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio , 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985); In re Robbins , 266 Ga. at 683. Thus, there is no constitutional impediment to prohibiting names of law firms that are false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading.The question, of course, is whether a particular firm name is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. The requestor has asked only about whether the use of “group” in a sole practitioner’s firm name, such as Doe Law Group, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[2] </a>is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. Because the use of “firm” and “& Associates” in a sole practitioner’s firm name, such as Doe Law Firm and Doe & Associates, is so similar to the use of “group,” this opinion considers all three. Indeed, the Office of the General Counsel regularly receives requests for ethical guidance regarding the use of all of these terms in firm names, not just the use of “group” as the requestor has asked, and so it is appropriate to expand the scope of the requestor’s request.In determining whether it is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading for a sole practitioner to use “group” in his firm name, this opinion first considers the common dictionary definitions of this term. According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, a “group” in the business context is “a number of people who work together or share certain beliefs.” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 768 (3d ed. 2010). Merriam-Webster similarly defines “group” as “a number of individuals assembled together or having some unifying relationship.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 552 (11th ed. 2011). These common dictionary definitions of “group,” as well as the absence of a specialized definition of “group” in the context of the legal profession, lead to the conclusion that a sole practitioner may not use “group” in his firm name because this term would incorrectly imply that the firm consists of multiple lawyers. This conclusion is consistent with ethics opinions in other jurisdictions, <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[3] </a>and it is also consistent with the position taken by the Office of the General Counsel when it has been presented with informal inquiries regarding the use of “group” in a sole practitioner’s firm name.A different result is required with respect to the use of “firm” in a sole practitioner’s firm name. Although there is some similarity between the meanings of “firm” and “group” in denoting the name of a business, a different result is required because the Rules define a “firm” as “a lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law.” Rule 1.0(e). “This specific definition is, at least implicitly, a recognition that firms may consist of many lawyers or only a single practitioner.” D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 332 (2005).Nevertheless, it should be noted that the common dictionary definitions of “firm” are not as clear as the common dictionary definitions of “group.” The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “firm” as “a business concern, esp. one involving a partnership of two or more people; a law firm .” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY at 651. Although this definition assumes that most firms will be comprised of more than one person, it allows for the possibility that a firm will have only one person. Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines “firm” as “a partnership of two or more persons that is not recognized as a legal person distinct from the members composing it,” but it also defines “firm” as “the name or title under which a company transacts business.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 472. Even Black’s Law Dictionary is ambiguous about whether “firm” signifies more than one person. It defines “firm” both as “[t]he title under which one or more persons conduct business jointly” and as “[t]he association by which persons are united for business purposes.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (10th ed. 2014). Thus, unlike “group,” “firm” is not necessarily pluralistic.The definition of “firm” in the Rules means that it is not false or untruthful for a sole practitioner to use a firm name that includes “firm.” But because an accurate firm name still may be deceptive or misleading, this opinion must consider whether a firm name such as Doe Law Firm is deceptive or misleading when Doe is a sole practitioner. This name is not inherently deceptive or misleading because it would not cause a reasonable member of the public to believe that Doe necessarily practices with other lawyers. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[4] </a>However, the use of “firm” in a sole practitioner’s firm name could be deceptive or misleading in certain contexts, and so a sole practitioner who uses “firm” in his firm name must be mindful of his obligations under Rules 7.1 and 7.5.The use of “& Associates” in a sole practitioner’s firm name, such as Doe & Associates, is a much more common issue. Whether this is proper depends on the meaning of “associate.” Generally, an associate is “a partner or colleague in business or at work” or “a person with limited or subordinate membership in an organization.” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY at 97; see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY at 75 (defining “associate” as “an entry-level member (as of a learned society, professional organization, or profession)”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 147 (defining “associate” as “[a] colleague or companion”). But “associate” has acquired a specific meaning in the context of the legal profession:An associate is a … lawyer-employee who is not a partner of the firm. All other non-lawyer employees are to be considered simply employees and not associates. This category of employees includes paralegals, secretaries, non-lawyer clerks, officer [sic] managers and the like. When the word associates is employed on firm letterhead or in commercial advertisement such term refers to lawyers working in the firm who are employees of the firm and not partners.Florida Bar v. Fetterman , 439 So. 2d 835, 838-39 (1983) (per curiam); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 147 (defining “associate” as “[a] junior member of an organization or profession; esp., a lawyer in a law firm, usu. with fewer than a certain number of years in practice, who may, upon achieving the requisite seniority, receive an offer to become a partner or shareholder”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[5]</a>This opinion adopts this definition. This means that a sole practitioner may not use a firm name that includes “& Associates” because, by definition, a sole practitioner does not have any associates. A sole practitioner also may not use “& Associates” in his firm name to refer to partners or non-lawyer employees, such as paralegals, investigators, nurse consultants, etc., because they are not associates. For the same reason, a sole practitioner also may not use “& Associates” in his firm name to refer to lawyers with whom he has an office-sharing arrangement. Thus, for a firm name that includes “& Associates” to be proper, there must be at least one lawyer who employs two or more associates. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[6] </a>For example, a firm name such as Doe & Associates is proper only if Doe is the only partner in the firm and the firm employs at least two associates. Otherwise, the name would be false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading because it would incorrectly identify the number of lawyers in the firm and misrepresent the status of the firm’s lawyers and employees.This conclusion raises additional questions, and although it is not possible to foresee all questions that may arise, a couple of the more obvious ones are addressed here. First, is it proper to use “& Associates” in a firm name to refer to part-time associates, lawyers designated as “of counsel,” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[7] </a>and lawyers hired on a contract basis? The answer depends on the degree to which the lawyer practices with the firm. For example, a part-time associate who works one day every month might not qualify, but a part-time associate who works twenty-five hours every week probably would qualify. The key is not the lawyer’s title but rather whether the lawyer actively and regularly practices with the firm. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn8\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">[8] </a>If the lawyer does so, he falls within the definition of “associate” quoted above, even though he may not work full-time hours and may actually be a contractor rather than an employee.Second, must a lawyer whose firm name includes “& Associates” change the name of the firm when the number of associates employed by the firm falls below two? At that time, the name of the firm has become inaccurate, but this opinion recognizes the practical difficulties associated with changing a firm’s name. When confronted with this issue, other jurisdictions have taken a flexible approach. In Minnesota, the continued use of “& Associates” in a firm name will not subject the lawyer to discipline if the requisite number of associates are hired within a reasonable amount of time or if the lawyer reasonably and objectively anticipates hiring the requisite number of associates within a reasonable amount of time. Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Resp. Bd., Op. 20 (2009). In Alabama, a disciplinary decision may depend on how long the firm has been without the requisite number of associates and what efforts have been made to hire more associates. Ala. State Bar, Off. of Gen. Couns., Formal Op. 1993-11 (1993). Similarly, in the District of Columbia, the factors considered include the frequency and duration of the firm’s time without the requisite number of associates and the extent of the efforts made to hire more associates. D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 189 (1988). Ultimately, though, a law firm will have to change its name if it no longer employs at least two associates. This opinion agrees with the flexibility used in Minnesota, Alabama, and the District of Columbia, but determining whether a firm name violates Rules 7.1 or 7.5 because of hiring and firing decisions will have to be made on a case-by-case basis.Although this opinion does not consider all of the possible terminology that could be used in the name of a sole practitioner’s firm, it does establish the principle that any name implying that a firm is larger than it truly is will be considered false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading and, therefore, a violation of Rules 7.1 and 7.5.__________________1 For purposes of this opinion, a sole practitioner is a lawyer who does not have any partners and does not employ any other lawyers.2 This opinion uses Doe Law Group, Doe Law Firm, and Doe & Associates as examples of firm names implicated by the question presented. These sample names are fictitious and are not intended to refer to actual law firms or lawyers.3 It appears that there are opinions on this issue from only four other jurisdictions, and all four concluded that a firm name may include “group” only if there are two or more lawyers practicing together. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 2163 (2007); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 2121 (2006); Sup. Ct. of Ohio, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances &Discipline, Op. 2006-2 (2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 732 (2000); Mo. Bar, Informal Advisory Op. 20000142 (2000).4 Again, it appears that there are very few opinions on this issue from other jurisdictions. All of them agree that a sole practitioner may use the term “firm” in his firm name. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 869 (2011); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 332 (2005); Ala. State Bar, Off. of Gen. Couns., Formal Op. 1993-11 (1993); Iowa Sup. Ct., Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &Conduct, Op. 79-68 (1979).5 In the analogous context of interpreting a statute, “the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter.” O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(b). This principle warrants reliance on the specific definition that “associate” has acquired in the context of the legal profession rather than on its general definition.6 Almost all other state bar associations that have considered this issue, as well as the American Bar Association, agree with this conclusion. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 931 (2012); Minn. Lawyers Prof’l Resp. Bd., Op. 20 (2009); State Bar of N.M., Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Ethics Advisory Op. 2006-1 (2006); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 05-19 (2005); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 332 (2005); Sup. Ct. of Ohio, Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances &Discipline, Op. 95-1 (1995); Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 138 (1994); Va. State Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 1532 (1993); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 189 (1988); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 1086 (1987); Fla. Bar, Ethics Op. 86-1 (1986); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 919 (1985); Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 93 (1984); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. 178 (1984); Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-246 (1981); Okla. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 288 (1975); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 286 (1973); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 50 (1972); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 318 (1967); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 310 (1963). Two states, Alabama and Arizona, appear to allow the use of “& Associates” when there is only one associate employed by the firm. Ala. State Bar, Off. of Gen. Couns., Formal Op. 1993-11 (1993); State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Op. 90-01 (1990). This opinion rejects this view because “& Associates,” as a plural term, obviously refers to more than one associate. Thus, the use of “& Associates” in a firm name to refer to only one associate is false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading. However, the use of “&Associate” would present a different question.7 See State Bar of Ga., Formal Advisory Op. 98-4 (1998) (defining what constitutes an “of counsel” relationship between a lawyer and a law firm).8 In Utah, a lawyer qualifies as an “associate” only if he “regularly spends a majority of [his] time working on legal matters for the firm.” Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 04-03 (2004). This standard is too stringent, especially in light of the fact that a lawyer in Georgia is permitted to practice in multiple law firms. State Bar of Ga., Formal Advisory Op. 97-2 (1997).The second publication of this opinion appeared in the August 2016 issue of the Georgia Bar Journal and was filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia on November 10, 2016. No petition for discretionary review was filed within the 20-day review period, and on December 8, 2016, the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an order declining to review the opinion on its own motion. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 4-403(d), Formal Advisory Opinion No. 16-3 is an opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board and is binding on the requestor and the State Bar of Georgia, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only.","UrlName":"rule591","Order":85,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"ef8d23f5-10fe-4c92-85da-bc1d7a5ec09a","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 20-1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 20-1 Approved On May 3, 2022 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia Thereby Replacing FAO No. 94-3 <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://efile.gasupreme.us/viewFiling?filingId=d3c8f438-8ff4-4397-b003-0a56b73fa577\%22 target=\"_blank\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">Supreme Court Docket No. S21U0879</a> QUESTION PRESENTED : Whether a lawyer may properly communicate with a former employee of a represented organization to acquire relevant information, without obtaining the consent of the organization’s counsel. SUMMARY ANSWER : Generally, a lawyer may communicate with a former employee of an organization that is represented by counsel without obtaining that counsel’s consent, provided that the lawyer fully discloses to the former employee, before initiating the communication, the following information: (1) the identity of the lawyer’s client and the nature of that client’s interest in relation to the organization (i.e., the former employer); and (2) the reason for the communication and the essence of the information sought. After making these disclosures, the lawyer must also obtain the former employee’s consent to the communication. Furthermore, in communicating with the former employee, the lawyer must not utilize methods of obtaining information that would violate the legal rights of the former employee or the represented organization, such as inquiring into information that may be protected by the attorney-client privilege or other evidentiary privilege.Finally, if the lawyer knows or at any point determines that the former employee is individually represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer may not communicate with the former employee, unless authorized by law or court order to do so, without obtaining the former employee’s counsel’s consent. OPINION : The question presented relates to the propriety of a lawyer seeking to obtain information from a former employee of an organization that is represented by counsel. Counsel for an organizational client undoubtedly would prefer that an adverse lawyer not be permitted to communicate with former employees of the organization for the purpose of obtaining information that could be used against the organization. However, prohibiting such communications by a lawyer, without the consent of the organization's counsel, would give that counsel a right of information control that is not supported by any rule of professional conduct. Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2, commonly known as the anti-contact rule, only addresses a lawyer’s ability to communicate about the subject matter of a representation with a person who is represented by counsel in the matter. Specifically, Rule 4.2(a) provides:A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.Rule 4.2 prohibits communication with some but not all of the constituents of the organization. Comment 4A to Rule 4.2 explains which constituents fall within the rule’s anti-contact protections—In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications with an agent or employee of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.The Comment does not anywhere suggest that a former employee comes within Rule 4.2’s protections. The only reasonable conclusion to draw from this omission is that Rule 4.2 does not apply to former employees.That, however, does not fully address a lawyer’s ethical obligations in this context. While a lawyer may communicate with a former employee <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> of an organization without first obtaining the consent of that organization’s counsel, the lawyer must comply with Rule 4.3 and make it clear that he or she is not disinterested and explain the nature of and reasons for the communication with the former employee. In particular, the lawyer must fully disclose to the former employee, before initiating the communication, the following information: (1) the identity of the lawyer’s client and the nature of that client’s interest in relation to the organization (i.e., the former employer); and (2) the reason for the communication and the essence of the information sought. After the required disclosures are made, the lawyer must secure the former employee’s consent to the communication. If the former employee refuses to consent, the lawyer must proceed through the formal discovery process in order to obtain the desired information. The lawyer must also exercise caution in communicating with the former employee and avoid utilizing methods of obtaining information that would violate the legal rights of the former employee or the represented organization. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> In particular, the lawyer must refrain from inquiring into information that may be protected by the attorney-client privilege or some other evidentiary privilege. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> Along the same lines, before initiating the communication, the lawyer should ensure that the former employee is not personally represented by counsel in the matter.  If the lawyer knows or determines that the former employee is individually represented by counsel, the lawyer must comply with Rule 4.2 and obtain the consent of the former employee’s counsel, unless the lawyer is otherwise authorized by law or court order to make the communication.  Finally, while this opinion focuses on a lawyer communicating with a former employee of an organization that is represented by counsel, the guidance it provides is also instructive for navigating the same situation when the organization is not represented by counsel. A former employee under such circumstances likewise has a right to know the identity of the lawyer’s client and the nature of and reasons for the lawyer’s communication. Therefore, even when the organization is not represented by counsel, a lawyer should make full disclosure to the former employee as set forth in this opinion and obtain the former employee’s consent before engaging in any other communication._________________________________________<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> Rule 4.3 addresses a lawyer’s duties in dealing with an unrepresented person: In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not: a. state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested; when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter,    the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding; and b. give advice other than the advice to secure counsel, if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of a client GEORGIA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 4.3 (2020) [hereinafter “GEORGIA RULES”].<a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> See GEORGIA RULES, R. 4.4(a). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> See GEORGIA RULES, R. 4.4(a), cmt. [1] (“Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, butthey include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships .”) (emphasis added).  </div>","UrlName":"rule610","Order":86,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"c7276add-2da8-45be-963a-23e26b88e132","Title":"Formal Advisory Opinion No. 22-1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> FORMAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 22-1 (Proposed FAO No. 21-R1) Approved on June 11, 2024 Pursuant to Bar Rule 4-403 By Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia <a href=https://www.gabar.org/"https://efile.gasupreme.us/viewFiling?filingId=a54f05c4-2ba1-46ff-a036-bb55ab7c3e55\%22 target=\"_blank\" data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\">Supreme Court Docket No. S24U0609</a> (Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion No. 21-R1) QUESTION PRESENTED: Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5, may a Domestic Lawyer or a Foreign Lawyer provide legal services by remote means from Georgia while residing in Georgia, when the services have no relationship with Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location? SUMMARY ANSWER: Yes, under certain conditions. A Domestic or Foreign Lawyer residing and working in Georgia may provide legal services by remote means that have no relationship to Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location if: (a) the lawyer does not hold out or otherwise represent that they are licensed in Georgia; (b) the lawyer takes reasonable steps to ensure that the lawyer’s Georgia location is not generally known; and (c) the lawyer takes reasonable steps to correct any misunderstanding about the lawyer’s licensure. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn1\"> [1] </a> OPINION: Under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer who is licensed elsewhere but not in Georgia is defined as either a “Domestic Lawyer” or a “Foreign Lawyer.” A “Domestic Lawyer” is “a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn2\"> [2] </a> A “Foreign Lawyer” is “a person authorized to practice law by the duly constituted and authorized governmental body of any foreign nation but not authorized by the Supreme Court of Georgia or its rules to practice law in the state of Georgia.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn3\"> [3] </a> The Formal Advisory Opinion Board (“FAOB”) has been asked to provide guidance about a hypothetical Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who has taken up residence in Georgia. Using telephone, email, cloud file storage, videoconferencing, and other technologies, the lawyer practices law from Georgia while residing in Georgia but provides no legal services that have any connection to Georgia other than the lawyer’s physical location. The narrow question for the FAOB is whether Rule 5.5 is violated under these specific circumstances. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn4\"> [4] </a> Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 sets forth the limited circumstances under which a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer may provide legal services “in Georgia.” It permits Domestic Lawyers to provide in Georgia certain services on an ongoing basis for the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates and services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal or Georgia law. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn5\"> [5] </a> Foreign Lawyers may provide in Georgia some ongoing services for the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn6\"> [6] </a> Rule 5.5 also permits both Domestic and Foreign Lawyers to provide some legal services in Georgia if the services are performed on a temporary basis. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn7\"> [7] </a> The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct do not define what it means to provide legal services “in Georgia.” This Opinion concerns only hypothetical activities that have no connection to Georgia other than the physical location of the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer rendering the service. The hypothetical services do not relate to any Georgia client, lawsuit, or alternative dispute resolution proceeding. They do not involve Georgia law or any property located in Georgia. They do not involve any organization or its affiliates with offices in Georgia. The FAOB concludes that providing such legal services from Georgia is not the provision of legal services “in Georgia” within the meaning of Rule 5.5. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn8\"> [8] </a> The limitations of Rule 5.5 on the circumstances under which Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may provide legal services in Georgia are thus inapplicable to the hypothetical activities addressed in this Opinion. Even if a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not providing legal services “in Georgia,” Rule 5.5 prohibits certain other activities. Domestic or Foreign Lawyers may not, except as authorized by other rules or other law, “establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law” or “hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the [Domestic Lawyer or Foreign Lawyer] is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn9\"> [9] </a> The purpose of these prohibitions is to prevent the public from being misled about the Domestic or Foreign Lawyer’s licensure. Obviously, an affirmative misrepresentation creates a risk that the public will be misled. So does the establishment of a physical office or other systematic and continuous presence for the practice of law in a state where the lawyer is not licensed. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn10\"> [10] </a> The question for the FAOB therefore is whether a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who resides in Georgia and renders legal services by remote means from Georgia can take steps to ensure that the public will not be misled about the lawyer’s licensure. The answer is yes. The Domestic or Foreign Lawyer must not affirmatively misrepresent themselves as licensed in Georgia. The lawyer must practice only remotely and take all other reasonable steps to ensure that the lawyer’s provision of legal services from Georgia is not generally known to the public. For example, the lawyer must not reveal their Georgia location in advertisements, letterhead, business cards, or on the internet. If the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a member of the public believes that the lawyer is licensed in Georgia, the lawyer must give an appropriate disclaimer. By providing legal services from Georgia under these conditions, even on a continuous basis, the lawyer negates the risk that the public will be confused about the lawyer’s licensure. The hypothetical Domestic or Foreign Lawyer has not therefore established an office or other continuous and systematic presence for the practice of law in Georgia in violation of Rule 5.5.Other authorities agree. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn11\"> [11] </a> For example, the Supreme Court of Florida approved an advisory opinion that it would be permissible for a lawyer not licensed in Florida to practice federal intellectual property law from his Florida home through his internet connection to his New Jersey law firm, where the lawyer “would have no public presence or profile as an attorney in Florida” and “neither he nor his firm will advertise or otherwise inform the public of his remote work presence in Florida.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn12\"> [12] </a> That opinion concluded that, under Florida’s version of Rule 5.5, the lawyer “will not be establishing a regular presence in Florida for the practice of law; he will merely be living here.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn13\"> [13] </a> Since then, the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct have been amended to add a comment to its version of Rule 5.5 that is consistent with the Florida advisory opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn14\"> [14] </a> Similarly, the Utah Ethics Advisory Committee posed and answered this question about Utah’s version of Rule 5.5: “what interest does the Utah State Bar have in regulating an out-of-state lawyer’s practice for out-of-state clients simply because he has a private home in Utah? And the answer is ... none.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn15\"> [15] </a> In New Jersey, a lawyer licensed elsewhere does not establish a continuous and systematic presence for the practice of law if the lawyer only practices out-of-state law and has no “outward manifestation of physical presence, as a lawyer, in New Jersey.” <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" href=https://www.gabar.org/"#ftn16\"> [16] </a> It is important to highlight the limits of this opinion. We conclude that a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer does not violate Rule 5.5 by providing legal services by remote means from Georgia (but not “in Georgia”) while residing in Georgia, under specific conditions. The lawyer must not misrepresent the lawyer’s lack of Georgia law license. The lawyer also must take reasonable steps to ensure that the Georgia location of the lawyer is not generally known and to correct any misunderstanding of the lawyer’s licensure. For Domestic and Foreign Lawyers who wish to practice from Georgia, this Opinion provides a safe harbor from the limits of Rule 5.5. This Opinion does not purport, however, to provide guidance beyond that. Domestic or Foreign Lawyers who provide services “in Georgia” or whose presence in Georgia becomes generally known must consult Rule 5.5 and other applicable law to determine the propriety of such activities.<div>_________________________________________</div><div><a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn1\"> 1 </a> Apart from the question addressed in this opinion, Domestic and Foreign Lawyers must consider whether practicing while physically residing in Georgia violates Georgia law. Part 14 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the State Bar of Georgia sets forth the rules governing the investigation and prosecution of the unlicensed practice of law. Rule 14-1.1 notes that the Supreme Court of Georgia has the inherent authority to regulate the practice of law, including the unlicensed practice of law. Rule 14-2.1 (a) defines the unlicensed practice of law to “mean the practice of law, as prohibited by statute, court rule, and case law of the State of Georgia.” Under OCGA § 15-19-51, it is a crime for “any person other than a duly licensed attorney” to practice law in Georgia. Whether the activities of a Domestic or Foreign Lawyer who is physically residing in Georgia violate Georgia law is a question of law on which the FAOB may not render an opinion, as its authority is limited to interpreting the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-403 (a) (2023). </div><a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn2\"> 2 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (f) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn3\"> 3 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (h) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn4\"> 4 </a> A corollary question concerns the circumstances under which lawyers admitted to practice in Georgia may practice law by remote means while physically residing outside of Georgia. Under Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5 (a), a lawyer licensed in Georgia is subject to the disciplinary authority of Georgia no matter where the lawyer’s activities occur. Georgia Rule 5.5 (a) provides: “A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.” Georgia lawyers who are practicing law remotely from other jurisdictions must ensure that their activities do not violate the law or the rules of those jurisdictions. This is potentially a complex question for which Georgia lawyers may need to consult authorities from other jurisdictions, such as those cited in this Opinion. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn5\"> 5 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (d) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn6\"> 6 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (f) (2023). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn7\"> 7 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (c) (2023) (Domestic Lawyers) and 5.5 (e) (Foreign Lawyers). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn8\"> 8 </a> See Hazard, Hodes, Jarvis &Thompson, LAW OF LAWYERING FOURTH ED. § 49.05 (2022-1 Supp. At 49-23) (“As a matter of public policy, the legitimate interest of the state of residence of the lawyer's home office in enforcing its own UPL rules in such instances will be either small or nonexistent. Practicing law ‘from’ a state in the absence of other connections between that practice and the state is not the same as practicing law ‘in’ a state.”) <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn9\"> 9 </a> GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (b) (Domestic Lawyers) and 5.5 (e) (Foreign Lawyers) (2022). This Opinion assumes that the hypothetical Domestic or Foreign Lawyer is not authorized by any rule or other law to establish an office or other continuous and systematic presence in Georgia for the practice of law. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn10\"> 10 </a> See Hazard, Hodes, Jarvis &Thompson, LAW OF LAWYERING FOURTH ED. § 49.05 (2022-1 Supp. at 49-24) (“a prohibition against maintaining a physical office for lawyers not licensed in the state is sensible, precisely because members of the public will not even think to ask about licensure when they are sitting across an office table from a flesh and blood lawyer….) and 49-26 (“In addition to the ban on out-of-state lawyers opening in-state offices, Rule 5.5 (b) (1) also prohibits the establishment of any ‘other systematic and continuous presence’ in the jurisdiction for the practice of law (emphasis added). Although this second dividing line is not as sharp as the first one, the idea animating the two prohibitions is the same.”). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn11\"> 11 </a> Other states differ somewhat in how they articulate the conclusion, but only the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has taken a more restrictive view. It concluded that a lawyer not licensed in the District of Columbia could provide services from D.C. only if the lawyer was practicing from home due to the COVID-19 pandemic and other conditions were met. See Opinion 24-20: Teleworking from Home and the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn12\"> 12 </a> The Florida Bar: Re Advisory Opinion – Out-of-State Attorney Working Remotely from Florida Home, 318 So. 3d 538, 540 (2021). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn13\"> 13 </a> Id. at 541. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn14\"> 14 </a> In Re Amendments to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-5.5, 334 So.3d 1272 (2022). <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn15\"> 15 </a> Utah Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 19-03 (2019) at 7. <a data-sf-ec-immutable=\"\" name=\"ftn16\"> 16 </a> Joint Opinion of the New Jersey Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (Opinion 59) and the New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (Opinion 742) at 2 – 3 (2021). See also Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1896 (2022); Wisconsin Formal Ethics Opinion EF-21-02 (2021); ABA Formal Op. 495 (2020). Arizona, New York, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and North Carolina have addressed the issue in their rules rather than by ethics opinions. AZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.5(d); N.Y. CT. APP. RULES FOR THE TEMPORARY PRACTICE OF LAW IN NEW YORK § 523.5; MN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.5(d); N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(d)(3); N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 5.5(d)(2). </div>","UrlName":"rule648","Order":87,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e206625a-5bec-4179-af98-e582f4eee646","555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["555b55b0-e5f8-4c79-9c2e-5456ea269173","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f6fa205f-16f1-432d-b171-9c3877eb4892","Title":"Internal Rules - State Disciplinary Review Board","Content":" RULES OF CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE OF THE STATE DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD\nPursuant to the powers and duties accorded it in Rule 4-215 (c) in Part IV of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of Georgia, the State Disciplinary Review Board of the State Bar of Georgia establishes the following Rules of Conduct and Procedure. (Approved January 11, 2019.)\n Rule 1. Oaths of Office.\nMembers of the State Disciplinary Review Board shall, upon their selection, sign the oath of office. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards will preserve the oaths in the records of the State Bar of Georgia at State Bar Headquarters.\n Rule 2. Powers and Duties.\nThe State Disciplinary Review Board shall have such powers and perform such duties as are set forth in Part IV of the Rules and Regulations of the State Bar of Georgia.\n Rule 3. Meetings.\nThe State Disciplinary Review Board shall meet at such times and places as may be set by the Board. The Review Board shall also meet at other times on the call of the chair of the Review Board.\n Rule 4. Election of Offices; Powers and Duties.\nAt the first meeting of the Review Board subsequent to the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia, the members of the Review Board shall elect a chair and a vice-chair. The chair shall preside at all meetings of the Review Board and shall serve until a successor is elected or the chair’s term on the Review Board expires.\nThe chair shall also exercise such powers and assume such duties as are hereinafter provided. In case of the absence, disqualification or incapacity of the chair, the vice-chair shall assume the duties and powers of the chair. In case of a disqualification of both the chair and vice-chair, the members of the Review Board shall elect another member of the Board to preside over consideration of the matter at issue.\n Rule 5. Original Pleadings.\nOriginal pleadings shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Bar Rule 4-221 (b). Bar Counsel and the respondent lawyer shall be responsible for serving copies of all pleadings on the special master and all parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The original pleadings shall be maintained at the headquarters of the State Bar of Georgia by the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards until the Clerk files the record in the case with the Supreme Court pursuant to Bar Rule 4-216 (e).\n Rule 6.  Review of the Report of the Special Master.\n(a) If a party requests review by the Review Board pursuant to Rule 4-214 (c), the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards or a designee of the Clerk shall cause copies of the report of the special master and the complete record in the case to be delivered to the members of the Review Board. The Clerk shall transmit the record after the exceptions and the opposing party’s response to the exceptions have been filed, or within 10 days after the time for the response has expired. Pursuant to Rule 4-216 (a), the Review Board shall consider the record, review the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the special master, consider the exceptions and responses filed by the parties, and determine whether a recommendation of disciplinary action will be made to the Supreme Court.\n(b) At the time the report of the special master and the record in the case are transmitted to the Board members, the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall notify the Respondent in writing of his or her right under Bar Rule 4-216(b) to challenge the competency, qualifications, or objectivity of any Board member. The procedure for filing such a challenge is set forth in Rule 9 of these Rules.\n(c) In disciplinary proceedings initiated prior to July 1, 2018, the Review Board may grant rehearings or new trials either before itself or before a special master on such issues and within such times as appear to it appropriate to serve the ends of justice. A majority vote of the members present shall be sufficient to order a rehearing or new trial except that there may be no de novo hearing before the Review Board without the unanimous vote of the members present.\n(d) The Review Board may in its discretion grant oral argument. Either party may request oral argument by filing such request with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards within 15 days of transmission of the record, including exceptions and responses to exceptions, to the Review Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards shall notify the chair of the Review Board upon the filing of a request for oral argument. A subcommittee consisting of the chair, vice-chair and the reviewing Board member shall review the request and shall decide the issue at least 10 days prior to the meeting of the Board at which the case will be considered, and shall notify the parties of the subcommittee’s decision. Any decision denying oral argument shall be subject to review by the entire Review Board.\n Rule 7.  Report to the Supreme Court and Recommendation of Discipline.\nAfter completion of its review of the final report of the special master, or review of a disciplinary proceeding, the Review Board shall prepare a report and recommendation to the Supreme Court. The Review Board may delegate responsibility for the preparation of its report to any member of the Board or to either party.\nThe chairperson of the Review Board shall file the report of the Board with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards and serve a copy of the report on the parties to the disciplinary proceeding. The Clerk shall file the report and the complete record with the Supreme Court pursuant to Bar Rule 4-216 (e).\n Rule 8. Preparation of Reprimands.\nUpon final judgment of a Review Board reprimand by the Supreme Court, the chair of the Review Board shall cause to be prepared a written reprimand. The chair may delegate responsibility for preparing written reprimands to the Office of the General Counsel or any Board member, but such written reprimand shall be reviewed and approved by the chair prior to administration to the respondent lawyer.\nThe chair or a designee shall administer the Review Board reprimand at a subsequent meeting of the Review Board. The chair shall be authorized to compel the attendance of the respondent lawyer by subpoena.\n Rule 9.  Challenges to the Competency, Qualifications or Objectivity of Review Board.\n(a) The respondent lawyer shall have the right to challenge the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member of the Review Board considering a disciplinary proceeding against him or her. Within 10 days after the special master’s report or a Notice of Reciprocal Discipline is transmitted to the Review Board, the respondent lawyer may file written objection to the competency, qualifications or objectivity of any member or members of the Review Board setting forth a specific factual basis for the challenge. The respondent lawyer shall file a copy of the challenge with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board, and serve a copy of the challenge upon each member of the Review Board and upon the Office of the General Counsel.\nThe challenged member may answer the respondent lawyer’s challenge in writing, at his or her option, but is not required to do so. Any such written answer shall be served on the remaining members of the Review Board, the respondent lawyer and the Office of the General Counsel.\nThe challenged member may also respond to the challenge orally at the next meeting of the Review Board.\nAt its next meeting, the Review Board shall consider the objection and any response. The affirmative vote of three members that the challenged member should be excluded shall be sufficient to sustain the challenge.\n(b) Any member of the Review Board shall have the right to withdraw voluntarily from consideration of any complaint in which his or her competency, qualifications or objectivity are challenged by the respondent lawyer.\n Rule 10. Removal of Board Members.\nAny Review Board member who is absent from either three (3) consecutive Review Board meetings or any four meetings in a bar year, shall be removed from the Review Board. The vacancy shall be filled by appointment pursuant to Rule 4-201.1 (b) (3).\n Rule 11.  Disqualification.\nNo member of the Review Board shall represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding. If a Review Board member’s partners or associates represent a respondent in any phase of an attorney disciplinary proceeding, then the Board member is automatically recused from determination, investigation, or review regarding the case during all phases of the disciplinary proceeding.\n Rule 12. Petitions for Reinstatement.\nIn the event the Supreme Court orders a respondent to file a petition for reinstatement with the Review Board for review and recommendation, the petition for reinstatement shall be filed with the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards in accordance with Bar Rule 4-221(b). The Office of the General Counsel shall have 20 days after service of the petition to respond. When all responses and reports have been filed, the record shall be delivered to the Review Board by the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Boards.\n Rule 13. Reimbursement of Expenses.\nMembers of the Disciplinary Review Board may be reimbursed for expenses as follows:\n(a) Transportation. Members may be reimbursed at the maximum tax free rate permitted by the IRS for automobile travel to and from meetings of the Board. The Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will calculate the appropriate amount for each meeting using the Board member’s home or work address (as designated by the Board member) and the address of the meeting location, and will submit a request for reimbursement at the member’s request. Although members are encouraged to carpool, only the member providing the vehicle will be approved for reimbursement.\nOther forms of transportation (including flights and rental car expenses) will not be reimbursed, but a member who elects to rent a car or fly to a meeting may receive the mileage reimbursement that would have been due had the member driven a personal vehicle.\nTolls and any cost for parking at a meeting site may be reimbursed at the actual rate. Valet parking expenses will only be reimbursed when self-parking is not available.\nTransportation rates may be adjusted or capped for meetings that take place outside of Georgia. At least 20 days before any out-of-state meeting the Clerk of the State Disciplinary Board will notify members of the mileage reimbursement for the meeting.\n(b) Meals. If meals are not provided during the meeting at the Bar’s expense, the State Bar of Georgia will provide a per diem at the same rate as the federal per diem rate for the location where the meeting is held. See https://www.gsa.gov/travel/plan-book/per-diem-rates/meals-and-incidental-expenses-mie-breakdown for a current list of reimbursement amounts for meals and incidentals. The Clerk will advise members of the applicable per diem before each meeting. Section (d) below contains special rules for the meal expenses of lay members of the Board who attend the Bar’s Annual Meeting.\n(c) Lodging. The Bar shall reimburse the actual cost of hotel sleeping rooms at the group rate obtained by the Bar. The maximum reimbursement to a Board member who elects to stay at a facility other than the designated hotel is the Bar rate. Reimbursement is limited to one night before the meeting, except for meetings that occur in conjunction with a State Bar of Georgia Board of Governors meeting, which shall qualify for two nights’ reimbursement. Members will not be reimbursed if they obtain lodging at no cost to themselves; i.e., for stays with friends or at the expense of others.\n(d) Annual Meeting. Special Rules for Lay Members. Lay members may receive a total of four nights of per diem and lodging reimbursement for the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. Lay members may receive two tickets for the group dinner events held as part of the meeting, including the Opening Reception, YLD Dinner, and the Presidential Gala. The usual per diem described in Section 2 will otherwise apply to lay member meals during the Annual Meeting.\n(e) Other expenses. Members may request reimbursement for copying, postage or other expenses related to their investigation with prior notice to the Clerk. Receipts are required for expenditures over $25.\n(f) Transportation. Procedure for reimbursement. After each meeting, the Clerk of the Boards will send an email to every Board member asking whether the member will request reimbursement for the meeting. In order to receive reimbursement, a member must respond to the Clerk’s email and make a request within 30 days of the date of the meeting. The Clerk will provide forms for requesting reimbursement via email.\n(g) Waivers. The General Counsel may waive the requirements of this Rule for good cause.\n","UrlName":"part7","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"35733557-f94e-4a97-b5d4-2c0e5fa949d4","Title":"Rule 4-404. Immunity","Content":"The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board, as well as staff persons and counsel assisting the Board and its members, including, but not limited to staff counsel, advisors and the State Bar of Georgia, its officers and employees, members of the Executive Committee, and members of the Board of Governors, shall have absolute immunity from civil liability for all acts performed in the course of their official duties. ","UrlName":"rule253","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Title":"CHAPTER 4 ADVISORY OPINIONS","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter28","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"6e17c812-cd79-45f4-a404-f95b8e7c29b9","Title":"Rule 4-401. Informal Advisory Opinions","Content":"The Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia shall be authorized to render Informal Advisory Opinions concerning the Office of the General Counsel's interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Informal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may be issued in oral or written form. An Informal Advisory Opinion is the personal opinion of the issuing attorney of the Office of the General Counsel and is neither a defense to any complaint nor binding on the State Disciplinary Board, the Supreme Court of Georgia, or the State Bar of Georgia. If the person requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion desires, the Office of the General Counsel will transmit the Informal Advisory Opinion to the Formal Advisory Opinion Board for discretionary consideration of the drafting of a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.","UrlName":"rule241","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Rule 4-402. The Formal Advisory Opinion Board","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the State Disciplinary Review Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the State Disciplinary Board and State Disciplinary Review Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"rule243","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"d2387df8-46e6-47b7-b689-b77c9f82b987","ParentId":"3bbf821d-b946-439c-a5b4-b42cbb2bd621","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall consist only of active members of the State Bar of Georgia who shall be appointed by the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with the approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia. \n \n(b) The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be selected as follows:\n (1) Five members of the State Bar of Georgia at-large; \n \n(2) One member of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association; \n \n(3) One member of the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; \n \n(4) One member of the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; \n \n(5) One member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia; \n \n(6) One member of the Georgia District Attorneys Association; \n \n(7) One member of the faculty of each American Bar Association Accredited Law School operating within the State of Georgia; \n \n(8) One member of the Investigative Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; \n \n(9) One member of the Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board; and\n(10) One member of the Executive Committee of the State Bar of Georgia.\n(c) All members shall be appointed for terms of two years subject to the following exceptions:\n (1) Any person appointed to fill a vacancy occasioned by resignation, death, disqualification, or disability shall serve only for the unexpired term of the member replaced unless reappointed; \n \n(2) The members appointed from the Investigative Panel and Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board and the Executive Committee shall serve for a term of one year; \n \n(3) The terms of the current members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board will terminate at the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Georgia following the amendment of this Rule regardless of the length of each member's current term; thereafter all appointments will be as follows to achieve staggered, two-year terms: \n \n (i) Three of the initial Association members (including the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia and the Georgia District Attorneys Association) shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial Association members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(ii) Two of the initial members appointed from the State Bar of Georgia at-large (the \"At-Large Members \") shall be appointed to one-year terms; three of the initial At-Large Members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years; \n \n(iii) Two of the initial members from the American Bar Association Accredited Law Schools shall be appointed to one-year terms; two of the initial law school members shall be appointed to two-year terms. As each initial term expires, the successor appointee shall be appointed for a term of two years;\n \n(4) All members shall be eligible for immediate reappointment to one additional two-year term, unless the President of the State Bar of Georgia, with approval of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia, deems it appropriate to reappoint a member for one or more additional terms.\n \n(d) The Formal Advisiory Opinion Board shall annually elect a chairperson and such other officers as it may deem proper at the first meeting of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board after July 1 of each year.\n(e) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall have the authority to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.","UrlName":"revision296"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Rule 4-403. Formal Advisory Opinions","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> <ol> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct.</li> \n <li>When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion.</li> \n <li>After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate.</li> \n <li>If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court.</li> \n <li>The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions.</li> \n <li>The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.</li> \n </ol></div>","UrlName":"rule248","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[{"Id":"174b3a3d-b53f-4ed3-ade3-857d1d6801c6","ParentId":"0f5cbfae-f89a-435c-95d5-748282b2b424","Title":"Version 2","Content":" (a) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall be authorized to draft Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions concerning a proper interpretation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct or any of the grounds for disciplinary action as applied to a given state of facts. The Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should address prospective conduct and may respond to a request for a review of an Informal Advisory Opinion or respond to a direct request for a Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(b) When a Formal Advisory Opinion is requested, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board should review the request and make a preliminary determination whether a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted. Factors to be considered by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board include whether the issue is of general interest to the members of the State Bar of Georgia, whether a genuine ethical issue is presented, the existence of opinions on the subject from other jurisdictions, and the nature of the prospective conduct. \n \n(c) When the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a preliminary determination that a Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted, it shall publish the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar Georgia, and solicit comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is published on the State Bar of Georgia website only,  the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notification by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be published on the State Bar of Georgia website. Following a reasonable period of time for receipt of comments from the members of the State Bar of Georgia, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board shall then make a final determination to either file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion as drafted or modified, or reconsider its decision and decline to draft and file the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion. \n \n(d) After the Formal Advisory Opinion Board makes a final determination that the Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion should be drafted and filed, the Formal Advisory Opinion shall then be filed with the Supreme Court of Georgia and republished either in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia or on the website of the State Bar of Georgia. If the proposed Formal Advisory Opinion is to be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website only, the State Bar of Georgia will send advance notificaiton by e-mail to the entire membership that have provided the State Bar of Georgia with an e-mail address, that the proposed opinion will be republished on the State Bar of Georgia website. Unless the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review as provided hereinafter, the opinion shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. Within 20 days of the filing of the Formal Advisory Opinion or the date the official publication is mailed to the members of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published in an official publication of the State Bar of Georgia), or first appears on the website of the State Bar of Georgia (if the opinion is published on the website), whichever is later, the State Bar of Georgia or the person who requested the opinion may file a petition for discretionary review thereof with the Supreme Court of Georgia. The petition shall designate the Formal Advisory Opinion sought to be reviewed and shall concisely state the manner in which the petitioner is aggrieved. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants the petition for discretionary review or decides to review the opinion on its own motion, the record shall consist of the comments received by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board from members of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Bar of Georgia and the person requesting the opinion shall follow the briefing schedule set forth in Supreme Court of Georgia Rule 10, counting from the date of the order granting review. The final determination may be either by written opinion or by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia and shall state whether the Formal Advisory Opinion is approved, modified or disapproved, or shall provide for such other final disposition as is appropriate. \n \n(e) If the Supreme Court of Georgia declines to review the Formal Advisory Opinion, it shall be binding only on the State Bar of Georgia and the person who requested the opinion, and not on the Supreme Court of Georgia, which shall treat the opinion as persuasive authority only. If the Supreme Court of Georgia grants review and disapproves the opinion, it shall have absolutely no effect and shall not constitute either persuasive or binding authority. If the Supreme Court of Georgia approves or modifies the opinion, it shall be binding on all members of the State Bar of Georgia and shall be published in the official Georgia Reports. The Supreme Court of Georgia shall accord such approved or modified opinion the same precedential authority given to the regularly published judicial opinions of the Court. \n \n(f) The Formal Advisory Opinion Board may call upon the Office of the General Counsel for staff support in researching and drafting Proposed Formal Advisory Opinions. \n \n(g) The name of a lawyer requesting an Informal Advisory Opinion or Formal Advisory Opinion will be held confidential unless the lawyer elects otherwise.","UrlName":"revision110"}],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"35733557-f94e-4a97-b5d4-2c0e5fa949d4","Title":"Rule 4-404. Immunity","Content":"The members of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board, as well as staff persons and counsel assisting the Board and its members, including, but not limited to staff counsel, advisors and the State Bar of Georgia, its officers and employees, members of the Executive Committee, and members of the Board of Governors, shall have absolute immunity from civil liability for all acts performed in the course of their official duties. ","UrlName":"rule253","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["683b5a52-f773-4015-9985-3f0dc4f364a7","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]}],"ParentId":"d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"e12e2da1-f716-48af-aa0b-7b06c5ad2041","Title":"Rule 4-304","Content":"This rule is reserved.","UrlName":"rule225","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["f720a89a-af9c-4b00-a58e-a5cef19a8f8e","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"0d18e960-68e3-48cb-bc1b-bb426f81e3a7","Title":"Rule 4-203. Powers and Duties","Content":"In accordance with these Rules, the State Disciplinary Board shall have the following powers and duties:\n(1) to receive and evaluate any and all written grievances against lawyers and to frame such charges and grievances as shall conform to the requirements of these Rules. A copy of the information serving as the basis for investigation or proceedings before the State Disciplinary Board shall be furnished to the respondent by the procedures set forth in Rule 4-203.1;\n(2) to initiate grievances on its own motion, to require additional information from a complainant, where appropriate, and to dismiss and reject matters that seem unjustified, frivolous, or patently unfounded;\n(3) to issue letters of instruction when dismissing a matter;\n(4) to delegate the duties of the State Disciplinary Board enumerated in paragraphs (1), (2), (8), (9), (10), and (11) hereof to the Chair of the State Disciplinary Board or such other members as the State Disciplinary Board or its Chair may designate subject to review and approval by the full State Disciplinary Board;\n(5) to conduct Probable Cause investigations, to collect evidence and information concerning matters under investigation, and to certify matters to the Supreme Court of Georgia for hearings by Special Masters as hereinafter provided;\n(6) to prescribe its own Rules of conduct and procedure;\n(7) to receive, investigate, and collect evidence and information, and review and accept or reject Petitions for Voluntary Discipline pursuant to Rule 4-227 (b) (1);\n(8) to sign and enforce, as hereinafter described, subpoenas for the appearance of persons and the production of documents, things and records at investigations both during the screening process and the State Disciplinary Board’s investigation;\n(9) to issue a subpoena as provided in this Rule whenever a subpoena is sought in this State pursuant to the law of another jurisdiction for use in lawyer discipline or disability proceedings, where the issuance of the subpoena has been duly approved under the law of the other jurisdiction. Upon petition for good cause the State Disciplinary Board may compel the attendance of witnesses and production of documents in the county where the witness resides or is employed or elsewhere as agreed by the witness. Service of the subpoena shall be as provided in the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Enforcement or challenges to the subpoena shall be as provided at Rule 4-221 (c);\n(10) to extend the time within which a formal complaint may be filed;\n(11) to issue Formal Letters of Admonition and Confidential Reprimands as hereinafter provided;\n(12) to issue a Notice of Discipline providing that unless the respondent affirmatively rejects the notice, the respondent shall be sanctioned as ordered by the Supreme Court of Georgia;\n(13) to refer a lawyer who appears to be impaired for an evaluation by an appropriate medical or mental health professional; and\n(14) to use the staff of the Office of the General Counsel in performing its duties.\n<div></div>\n<div></div>\n","UrlName":"rule108","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["7c864984-2377-4316-aac4-7f2864903101","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"3254fea5-c24d-461b-8a15-5530a31eed26","Title":"PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES","Content":" [1] A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. \n \n[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. \n \n[3] In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the these rules or other law. \n \n[4] A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the law, the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. \n \n[5] As a citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the public interest. \n \n[6] A lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as by substantive and procedural law. A lawyer also is guided by conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service. \n \n[7] Reserved. \n \n[8] In the nature of law practice conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict among a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these rules, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the rules. \n \n[9] The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. This connection is manifested in the fact that ultimate authority over the legal profession is vested in the Supreme Court of Georgia. \n \n[10] To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice. \n \n[11] The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves. \n \n[12] The fulfillment of a lawyer's professional responsibility role requires an understanding by them of their relationship to our legal system. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.","UrlName":"rule74","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["d0d17fe4-7247-4c3b-8c56-f3e269fd2adb","d037c3f3-6e47-4d87-816f-5781703b9955","e1de6520-9feb-4e23-8852-0736817db367","ff55569a-b5ac-482a-a62e-91712b8c5957"]},{"Id":"f3649151-d3e5-4454-beaa-74fa13151e85","Title":"Section 3. Collaborating with Other Programs.","Content":"The Center for Lawyer Wellbeing may collaborate with other programs of the State Bar of Georgia that serve similar interests as the Center. These other programs may combine under the umbrella of the Center, either on a temporary or permanent basis.","UrlName":"rule640","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["01744420-eaf1-4183-881e-a970f9dd0150","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1692aef7-0cd4-4a07-9cbe-749333cd9e70","Title":"Section 4. Annual Financial Report.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> A financial report of the funds of the Center shall be transmitted to the members at the annual meeting of the Center and shall be included in the Center’s annual report to the Board of Governors. The Center shall have the same fiscal year as the State Bar of Georgia.</div>","UrlName":"rule637","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b65dd6fc-a294-47e8-9948-eccc49d20b11","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"714e3f74-a911-4884-9fc4-e11bacceb4d4","Title":"Section 4. Actions of the Center.","Content":"All actions of the Center shall be by a majority vote of the members present and voting at any regular, special, or called meeting. Only members physically or virtually present may vote on Center business at any Annual or Special meeting of the Center. If a regular meeting is not scheduled or conducting a special or called meeting is not practical, the Center Executive Committee may make decisions in the absence of the membership. Decisions of the Center Executive Committee may be reversed by a super-majority vote of the members. A super-majority vote shall be defined as a vote of yea or nay by 3/4 of the membership present and voting where a quorum exists.","UrlName":"rule628","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["23005901-6921-45c5-89a8-8d745ff432e2","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","Title":" ARTICLE IV MEMBERSHIP AND FEES","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"></div>","UrlName":"chapter88","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"b68d0fff-f821-4d7f-9131-729db364d25c","Title":"Section 1. Requirement for Membership.","Content":"Any member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia may be a member of the Center for Lawyer Wellbeing. Any member of the State Bar, upon election on the annual fee statement or by request and payment of annual Center membership fees, will be enrolled as a member of the Center. Thereafter, membership fees are due each year on the same schedule as the payment of fees to the State Bar. Members so enrolled and whose membership fees are paid shall constitute the membership of the Center. Any member whose annual membership fees are not paid by the deadline for annual State Bar fee payments shall cease to be a member of the Center subject to reinstatement at any time upon the payment of fees for the current year.","UrlName":"rule623","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"53468669-efe8-4105-9e65-95ea65cbee25","Title":"Section 2. Membership Fees. How Established.","Content":"The annual Membership fees for the Center shall be established from time to time by the Center Executive Committee and submitted to the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia for approval.","UrlName":"rule624","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["b7e2a4a3-61ec-460d-bebe-e400257ced96","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"465889e7-fbf9-4adc-b25f-c637a8a1a723","Title":"Section 4. Duties of the Vice Chairperson.","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Vice Chairperson shall assist the Chairperson and, in the absence or disability of the Chairperson, shall perform the duties of the Chairperson.</div>","UrlName":"rule617","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["76950ef4-01c5-4e5e-9104-977504e3ccca","0ac575d3-666e-4f15-9543-e5a89fd94f66","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"bf21e98e-c153-480b-b6c5-d490a109d46c","Title":"Section 4. Committee Meetings","Content":"Each Committee, whether standing or special, shall meet, as often as necessary in order to perform its duties, upon the call of the Committee Chairperson for such Committee. ","UrlName":"rule574","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["2c2bbb07-05da-47a9-978e-876e0eeda349","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"c242dcf8-bd66-4d3a-a6f9-9c3f8bb43c0c","Title":"Section 4. Reports","Content":"Each Committee Chairperson shall submit to the President, Secretary and such other persons or committees as designated by the President, written reports of the activities of their respective committee. Reports may be submitted at intervals as required or desired by the President.","UrlName":"rule567","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["aa01c53a-df9b-4a77-a1c5-759519572ce3","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"a788d481-6196-435d-b5b5-fe8ce597d49b","Title":"Section 4. Nominations","Content":"Nominations for any office or position may be made by the Nominating Committee (described in Article IX, Section 1(d)) or by any YLD member as follows:\n (a) Nominations from Nominating Committee .\n (1) Nominations of Officers . In conjunction with and during the State Bar of Georgia Midyear Meeting, the Nominating Committee shall nominate one (1) or more candidates for the office of President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary, and shall report the names of all such nominees to the Election Committee. \n(2) Nominations for Representative Council . Not less than forty-five (45) days prior to the date of the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting, the Nominating Committee shall nominate: five (5) or more candidates from each Federal Judicial District for election as members representing such district to fill the terms that will terminate at the next Annual Meeting; twelve (12) or more candidates for election as members at large to the Representative Council; and two (2) or more candidates for election as nonresident members of the Representative Council in the years that the term of such office terminates at the next Annual Meeting. The Nominating Committee shall report the names of all Representative Council nominees to the Election Committee not less than forty-five (45) days prior to the date of the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting.\n (b) Nominations from Members . Nominations for candidates for the offices of President-Elect, Treasurer and Secretary and for positions on the Representative Council may be made by the membership of the Young Lawyers Division as follows:\n (1) Nominations of Officers . Any two (2) YLD members who are qualified to vote in accordance with these bylaws may submit a nominating petition in writing to the Election Committee for the nomination of Officers not less than thirty (30) days prior to the Election Commencement Date. .\n (2) Nominations for Representative Council . A nominating petition for the nomination of Representative Council members may be submitted to the Executive Director of the Young Lawyers Division or his or her designee, provided that the nominating petition is submitted prior to the commencement of Representative Council elections.\n (3) Nominating Petition . The nominating petition shall be substantially in the following form:\n Nominating Petition the Young Lawyers Division\n The undersigned member of the Young Lawyers Division of the State Bar of Georgia in good standing  hereby nominate ____________________ for the office of ___________________ for the term beginning at the close of the Annual Meeting in ______. \n_________________________ Nominator \n_________________________ Nominator [if applicable] \nDate ____________ \nI, _________________________, the person nominated in this petition, hereby accept said nomination and, if elected, will serve. \n_________________________ Nominee \n (c) No Nominations . Should a position on the Representative Council which is to be filled at an Annual Meeting lack a nomination properly filed in accordance with these bylaws, then nominations for such position may be made from the floor at the State Bar of Georgia Annual Meeting. \n ","UrlName":"rule426","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["650cc007-d3a5-4176-9360-17fce05d0da1","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"0856ad4e-7bbf-4116-8152-ee168c5df953","Title":"Section 4. Elections of Members of Representative Council","Content":"The members of the Representative Council described in Section 2(b), (c), and (d) of this Article shall be elected in the manner provided for in Article VII of these Bylaws and shall take office immediately upon the adjournment of the Annual Meeting at which said election is conducted.","UrlName":"rule563","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["de8e46f0-6005-40f8-b31c-04f24af2de55","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"8228657b-b418-4a6e-9693-9fffe7b33d5d","Title":"Section 4. Terms of Office","Content":"Each member of the Executive Committee shall hold office for the following terms:\n(a) The appointed Directors shall be appointed by the incoming President for terms to be served concurrent with that of the incoming President. \n(b) The Officers shall serve for a period concurrent with the incoming President, beginning upon their swearing-in at the Annual Meeting at which they are sworn-in as Officers and continuing until their successors are sworn-in at the next Annual Meeting.\n","UrlName":"rule424","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[{"Id":"7ade5683-b8bf-4444-ae8d-4552f0912c7c","ParentId":"8228657b-b418-4a6e-9693-9fffe7b33d5d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the Executive Committee shall hold office for the following terms: \n(a) The appointed Directors shall be appointed by the incoming President for terms to be served concurrent with that of the incoming President. \n(b) The Officers shall serve for a period concurrent with the incoming President, beginning upon their swearing-in at the Annual Meeting at which they are sworn-in as Officers and continuing until their successors are sworn-in at the next Annual Meeting. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision45"}],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Title":"ARTICLE IV EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE","Content":"","UrlName":"chapter61","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[{"Id":"4505f2a2-14d2-4abb-a8f8-631878579837","Title":"Section 1. Purpose and Powers","Content":" There shall be an Executive Committee of the Young Lawyers Division (the “Executive Committee ”). The Executive Committee shall conduct all business of the YLD between meetings of the YLD membership or the Representative Council, except those enumerated in Sections 1 and 3(c) of Article VIII, Section 1 of Article X, and Section 1 of Article XI. ","UrlName":"rule386","Order":0,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"b12de819-f879-4bcd-9f93-1818bfd5d464","Title":"Section 2. Composition of the Executive Committee","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Executive Committee shall be composed of: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> the Officers; and\n \n </li> \n <li> the appointed Directors.\n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"rule400","Order":1,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[{"Id":"1daac522-a7f6-4606-a668-59456f34136a","ParentId":"b12de819-f879-4bcd-9f93-1818bfd5d464","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> The Executive Committee shall be composed of: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> the Officers; and\n \n </li> \n <li> the appointed Directors.\n \n </li> \n </ol> \n</div>","UrlName":"revision44"}],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"48c7d7c2-a515-43a9-9bc4-53bbf914f970","Title":"Section 3. Directors","Content":"(a) Appointment. A minimum of four (4) Directors shall be appointed by the President to serve at the pleasure of the President and to be directly responsible to the President.\n (b) Duties. The Directors shall assist the President during his or her term in office and shall perform such duties and responsibilities as designated by the President. The Directors shall also oversee the activities of and advise one or more of the YLD Special Committees as designated by the President. \n ","UrlName":"rule416","Order":2,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"8228657b-b418-4a6e-9693-9fffe7b33d5d","Title":"Section 4. Terms of Office","Content":"Each member of the Executive Committee shall hold office for the following terms:\n(a) The appointed Directors shall be appointed by the incoming President for terms to be served concurrent with that of the incoming President. \n(b) The Officers shall serve for a period concurrent with the incoming President, beginning upon their swearing-in at the Annual Meeting at which they are sworn-in as Officers and continuing until their successors are sworn-in at the next Annual Meeting.\n","UrlName":"rule424","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[{"Id":"7ade5683-b8bf-4444-ae8d-4552f0912c7c","ParentId":"8228657b-b418-4a6e-9693-9fffe7b33d5d","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Each member of the Executive Committee shall hold office for the following terms: \n(a) The appointed Directors shall be appointed by the incoming President for terms to be served concurrent with that of the incoming President. \n(b) The Officers shall serve for a period concurrent with the incoming President, beginning upon their swearing-in at the Annual Meeting at which they are sworn-in as Officers and continuing until their successors are sworn-in at the next Annual Meeting. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision45"}],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"1f73c49c-8eb7-4831-8867-da89157f0827","Title":"Section 5. Eligibility","Content":"Persons who are YLD members (but not Honorary Members or Affiliate Members) at the time of their election or appointment shall be eligible to serve as a member of the Executive Committee. ","UrlName":"rule432","Order":4,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["ea3cd430-ac44-4d39-a891-cbd3049051e7","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]}],"ParentId":"7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","Revisions":null,"Ancestors":["7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"81316aa7-22f7-4e63-8e3f-8533699755b4","Title":"Section 4. President-Elect","Content":"The President-Elect shall perform such duties as may be assigned by the President, the YLD membership at any regular meeting, or by the Executive Committee or Representative Council. During any period in which the President is unable to act, the President-Elect shall perform the duties of President.\nThe President-Elect shall also plan for the year in which he or she shall act as President, and make needed arrangements for the prompt inauguration of the program for that year upon assuming office and to prevent interruption in the continuing program then being carried on by the Young Lawyers Division.","UrlName":"rule421","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","Revisions":[],"Ancestors":["e37c573e-2ab7-4e70-b592-00d72ccfb21a","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"03d405d2-a506-4a60-92f8-e57c29ab5e83","Title":"Section 4. Termination of Membership","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in The Young Lawyers Division shall terminate: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> at the end of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia (the \"Bar Year \") after (1) the member attains the age of thirty-six (36) or (2) the fifth anniversary of the member's being admitted to their first bar, whichever date is later (other than Honorary Members); or </li> \n <li>upon such member ceasing to be an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia; or</li> \n <li>in the case of Affiliate Members, by the vote of a majority of the YLD members in attendance at any meeting of the YLD membership.</li> \n </ol> \nNotwithstanding the foregoing, a person who met the requirements of Section 4(a) above at the time such person was elected President-Elect shall continue to be a YLD Member for the duration of the terms of President and Immediate Past President to which he or she succeeds. \n</div>","UrlName":"rule425","Order":3,"IsRule":false,"Children":[],"ParentId":"f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","Revisions":[{"Id":"cdf005df-9270-4c68-b701-b45cc8677d2c","ParentId":"03d405d2-a506-4a60-92f8-e57c29ab5e83","Title":"Version 1","Content":"<div class=\"handbookNewBodyStyle\"> Membership in The Young Lawyers Division shall terminate: \n <ol type=\"a\"> \n <li> at the end of the fiscal year of the State Bar of Georgia (the \"Bar Year \") after (1) the member attains the age of thirty-six (36) or (2) the fifth anniversary of the member's being admitted to their first bar, whichever date is later (other than Honorary Members); or </li> \n <li>upon such member ceasing to be an active member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia; or</li> \n <li>in the case of Affiliate Members, by the vote of a majority of the YLD members in attendance at any meeting of the YLD membership.</li> \n </ol> \nNotwithstanding the foregoing, a person who met the requirements of Section 4(a) above at the time such person was elected President-Elect shall continue to be a YLD Member for the duration of the terms of President and Immediate Past President to which he or she succeeds. \n</div>","UrlName":"revision42"}],"Ancestors":["f73b8f9f-19b9-4090-8984-29fed36d1b16","7f4a2e77-8b70-4e90-a08a-17fef3889bff","fed351fc-36a1-4351-9d5d-94a6b63424bc"]},{"Id":"2880c39c-3200-4139-bd98-f1c3def43c93","Title":"Section 4. Seal.","Content":"The seal of the State Bar shall be in the following form:\n <img hspace=\"0\" height=\"141\" border=\"0\" width=\"142\" vspace=\"0\" title=\"State Bar of Georgia Seal\" alt=\"State Bar of Georgia Seal\" id=\"||CPIMAGE:8984|\" src=https://www.gabar.org/"/barrules/images/bar_seal.jpg/">